Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Leach, 249 U.S. 217 (1919)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Leach, 249 U.S. 217 (1919)
Full caption
BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL. v. LEACH.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 10, 1919
BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL. v. LEACH.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.
No. 132. Argued January 15, 16,1919.—Decided March 10, 1919.
A stipulation in an interstate bill of lading conditioning the shipper’s right to recover for loss or damage to live stock upon delivery of a verified claim in writing to a designated agent of the carrier within five days from the removal of the stock from the cars, held valid; and not waived; and not substituted by oral notice of the facts to the connecting carrier’s agent. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592. 173 Kentucky, 452, reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. William W. Crawford, with whom Mr. Alex. P. Humphrey, Mr. Edward P. Humphrey, Mr. Charles G. Middleton and Mr. Churchill Humphrey were on the briefs, for petitioners.
Mr. Frank W. Hackett, with whom Mr. B. M. Lee and Mr. John S. Blair were on the brief, for respondent.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court.
Respondent Leach sued the petitioners for damages sustained en route by cattle delivered at East St. Louis,
Clarke, J., dissenting. 249 U. S.
Illinois, October 1, 1914, for shipment to Georgetown, Kentucky. In defense the carriers set up non-compliance with the following provision contained in bill of lading issued as required by act of Congress: “That no claim for damages which may accrue to the said shipper under this contract shall be allowed or paid by the said carrier, or sued for in any court by the said shipper, unless a claim for loss or damages shall be made in writing verified by the affidavit of the shipper or his agent, and delivered to the General Freight Agent of said carrier at his office in Cincinnati, Ohio, within five days from the time said stock is removed from said car or cars, and that if any loss or damage occurs upon the line of connecting carrier, then such carrier shall not be liable unless a claim shall be made in like manner and delivered in like time, to some proper officer or agent of the carrier on whose line the loss or injury occurs.” This averment was not denied; but the shipper replied that he promptly advised the railroad’s agent at Georgetown of all essential facts and maintained that requirement in respect of written notice to general freight agent had been waived.
The point involved has been discussed in our recent opinions and we can find nothing which takes this case out of the rule requiring compliance with a provision in a bill of lading like the one above quoted. St. Louis, Iron Mt. & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592; Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart, 248 U. S. 446.
The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Pitney and Mr. Justice Brandeis concur in the result.
Mr . Justice Clarke dissenting.
In this case the shipper sued two connecting interstate [p. 219] 217. Clarke, J., dissenting.
carriers for damages to a carload of cattle, caused by delay in transit. Three died in the car and four more within three or four days of arrival at destination and the defense sustained by the court is failure to notify the carrier of claim for damages within five days of unloading.
The carrier pleaded that one of the terms of the bill of lading was the five-day limitation, quoted in the opinion of the court. This was immediately preceded, in the same paragraph, by the following:
“That in the event of any unusual delay or detention of said live stock caused by the negligence of said carrier, or its employees, or its connecting carriers, or their employees, or otherwise, the said shipper agrees to accept, as full compensation for all loss or damage sustained thereby the amount actually expended by said shipper, in the purchase of food and water for the said live stock while so detained.”
In Boston & Maine Railroad v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439, a provision in exactly these terms was held “illegal and consequently void,” as an attempt by the carrier to exonerate itself from loss negligently caused by it. This is the only provision in the bill of lading, as pleaded, which is applicable to a claim for delay, such as the shipper made in this case, and since it is void there is nothing in the contract for carriage on which the five-day limitation could operate, for it applied in terms only to claims “for damages which may accrue to the said shipper under this contract.”
The suit of the shipper was based on the common-law liability of the carrier,—not at all on the bill of lading; the five-day limitation is in terms applicable only to claims under the bill of lading; the only provision in the bill of lading applicable to claims for delay was void, and therefore it seems very clear that the five-day limitation was not available as a defense.
Permit me to add that the many cases coming into this
Counsel for Plaintiff in Error. 249 Ü. S.
and other courts show that this five-day limitation is unreasonably short and in my judgment, for this reason, it should be declared void upon its face. Certainly it should not be made a favorite of the law and extended beyond its strict terms, in presence of the Act of Congress, approved March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196, declaring that where in such suit the “ damage or injury complained of was due to delay ... or damage in transit by carelessness or negligence, then no notice of claim nor filing of claim shall be required as a condition precedent to recovery.” While the case before us arose prior to the passing of this act, it is an important declaration of public policy by Congress, which should not be overlooked.
For the reasons thus briefly stated, I cannot concur in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Justice McKenna also dissents.
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA v. COLLINS.
IN EQUITY.
No. 10, Original. Submitted March 4,1919.—Decided March 17, 1919.
Under the constitution and laws of South Dakota, interest received by the state treasurer on state funds deposited by him in bank belongs to the State, and the treasurer must account therefor. Judgment for plaintiff.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Clarence C. Caldwell and Mr. Edward W. Wagner for plaintiff.
No appearance for defendant.
SOUTH DAKOTA v. COLLINS. 221
Mb. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.
Suit by the State of South Dakota for an accounting and to recover from defendant interest received by him as treasurer of the State upon moneys of the State deposited by him in various banks.
There is no dispute about the facts, which are detailed at very great length in the bill of complaint.
Collins was treasurer for four years, beginning January, 1903. As such he was entitled to a salary of $1800 a year, and it is provided by the constitution of the State that neither the treasurer nor any other officer of the State shall receive any “fees or perquisites whatever for the performance of any duties connected with their offices.” And there are statutory provisions supplementing the constitution, one of which is that “ all moneys belonging to the state, deposited in banks by the state treasurer shall be deposited not to his credit as an individual, but in his name as state treasurer, and not otherwise.” § 333, Revised Political Code of 1903.
It is alleged that defendant received the sum of $10,000 and more, and it is prayed that he be required to make a full and correct accounting of the moneys received by him and wrongfully withheld from the State.
Defendant answered as follows: “I hereby deny the allegation as set forth in the complaint and plead not guilty to the charge of misappropriating, withholding or converting to my personal use any moneys belonging to the State of South Dakota during my term of office.”
On motion of plaintiff a referee was appointed to take the testimony on its part and that of defendant and make findings and recommendations.
On May 9, 1918, the referee made return of his proceedings, with the evidence adduced, from which he concluded as follows:
“That between January 1st, 1903, and January 10th, 1907, there was paid to the defendant as interest upon the moneys of the State of South Dakota, which was received by him as Treasurer of said State, and paid to him on deposits in the several banks above named, interest amounting to $32,094.27; that said sum was received by the defendant as interest upon the public moneys of the State of South Dakota deposited by him as such State Treasurer in said banks in excess of his salary and all other sums due him from said State as State Treasurer, and that the same was received and retained by him and he rendered no account thereof to the plaintiff nor any of its officers, and paid no part of the same to the plaintiff or any of its officers, and that the said defendant appropriated the said sum to his own use.” And the referee recommended that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of $32,094.27, with interest thereon at the rate of 7% per annum from January 1, 1907, and for plaintiff’s costs and disbursements of the suit.
The case was put down for argument and subsequently submitted on brief, the defendant filing none.
Counsel for the State submits quite a long argument to sustain the report, with citation of authorities to establish the liability of defendant. It is not necessary to review them. There is no doubt of defendant’s liability. He has not appeared to contend to the contrary, and at the taking of the testimony his defense or extenuation was that he acted upon his faith in a decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado, and, to evade or to withhold aid from any possible criminal prosecution, he declined to answer in regard to transactions concerning the receipt of interest on the public moneys he had deposited in various banks.
Further discussion is unnecessary. The Supreme Court of the State has decided (December 4, 1917), construing
§ 333, supra, and other statutory provisions, that in cases like that at bar it is state funds that are deposited and that earn the interest and not the money of the treasurer, and that, therefore, the interest becomes a mere increment of the principal fund and when it is paid to the treasurer it is in effect paid into the state treasury and the treasurer becomes Hable for it. State v. Schamber, 39 S. Dak. 492.
The report of the referee is approved and judgment directed to be entered against defendant in the sum of 832,094.27, with interest thereon at the rate of 7% per annum from January 1, 1907, and for costs and disbursements of the suit.
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