Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Taber ex rel. Small, 244 U.S. 200 (1917)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Taber ex rel. Small, 244 U.S. 200 (1917)
Full caption
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. TABER, GUARDIAN OF SMALL ET AL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 21, 1917
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v.
TABER, GUARDIAN OF SMALL ET AL.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.
No. 760. Submitted April 10, 1917.—Decided May 21, 1917.
The claim that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act should have governed the action will not afford jurisdiction under Judicial Code,. § 237, where the action was originally based upon a state statute and the federal act was not set up or relied upon in the answer or
otherwise called to the trial court’s attention and where the state supreme court, following the state statutes and established practice, declined to pass upon the claim because not presented to the trial court. Writ of error to review 186 S. W. Rep. 688, dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Edward J. White, Mr. Thomas Hackney and Mr. Martin Lyons for plaintiff in error.
Mr. John T. Wayland, Mr. R. J. Ingraham, Mr. L. E. Durham and Mr. Hale Houts for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court.
Charles H. Small was killed at Kansas City while employed by plaintiff in error as a switchman. Relying upon a state statute, the guardian of his minor children sued for damages in the Jackson County Circuit Court and recovered a judgment which the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, May 15, 1916. We are asked to reverse that action because the Federal Employers’ Liability Act was not applied, but rights and liabilities were determined according to state laws.
Unless some right, privilege, or immunity under the federal act was duly and especially claimed we have no jurisdiction. Judicial Code, § 237. Speaking for the court in Erie R. R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 148, 154, Mr. Justice Harlan announced the applicable rille. “Now, where a party—drawing in question in this cpurt a state enactment as invalid under the Constitution of the United States, or asserting that the final judgment of the highest court of a State denied to him a right or immunity under the Constitution of the United States—did not raise such question or especially set up or claim such right or p. 202immunity in the trial court, this court cannot review such final judgment and hold that the state enactment was unconstitutional or that the right or immunity so claimed had been denied by the highest court of the State, if that court did nothing more than decline to pass upon the Federal question because not raised in the trial court as required by the state practice. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131,181; MWer v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 538; Morrison v. Watson, 154 U. S. Ill, 115.”
The original action was based upon a state statute; the answer did not set up or rely upon the federal act; the trial court’s attention was not called thereto; and although urged to hold liability depended upon it, the Supreme Court declined to pass upon that point because not pre-' sented to the trial court. This ruling seems in entire accord with both state statutes and established practice. Rev. Stats. Mo. 1909, § 2081; St. Louis v. Flanagan, 129 Missouri, 178; Freeland v. Williamson, 220 Missouri, 217.
The writ must be dismissed.
Dismissed.
VALLEY STEAMSHIP COMPANY v. WATTAWA.
VALLEY STEAMSHIP COMPANY v. MRAZ.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH DISTRICT, OF THE STATE OF OHIO.
Nos. 469, 470. Argued January 10, 11, 1917.—Decided May 21, 1917.
It being settled that in the absence of congressional legislation the commerce clause does not forbid a State to legislate concerning the relative rights and duties of employers and employees within her borders although engaged in interstate commerce, a contention to the p. 203contrary will not afford jurisdiction to this court to review a state judgment.
So held where an Ohio elective Workmen’s Compensation Law, in withdrawing the defenses of contributory negligence, negligence of fellow servant and assumption of risk from employers not accepting provisions of the act, was claimed to contravene the commerce clause, as applied to a company engaged in interstate transportation by steamship.
The objection that the Ohio Compensation Act, as applied to a steamship company engaged in interstate commerce, would be an unconstitutional invasion of the federal maritime jurisdiction cannot be considered in this case, since the jurisdiction of the court below is confined to review of the trial court’s judgment for errors appearing on the record, and this objection was neither made in the trial court, nor, clearly, in the petition in error before the court below, nor definitely mentioned in the latter court’s opinion. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291.
Dismissed.
The cases are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Tracy H. Duncan, with whom Mr. Frank S. Masten was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. George H. Eichelberger for defendants in error. Memorandum opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds.
Number 469.
Seeking damages under the laws of Ohio, defendant in error Wattawa brought this action in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. He alleged that by reason of the Steamship Company’s negligence he suffered personal injuries in September, 1913 while employed by it as a deck hand on the Edwin N. Ohl then lying at Sandusky, Ohio; and that although an employer of more than five men the company was not a subscriber or contributor to the State Insurance Fund provided for by the Act of May 31,1911 the first Ohio Workmen’s Compensation Act.1 In defence p. 204the company claimed that although employing more than five men it was engaged in interstate commerce and therefore was not required to subscribe to the State Insurance Fund; denied negligence; and alleged that the accident resulted wholly from the employee’s want of care and moreover that he had assumed the risk. Upon motion the allegation as to assumption of risk was stricken out.
1
General Code, §§ 1465-37 to 1465-70.
The court charged that as the company had not accepted the Compensation Act it could not rely upon common-law defences based on the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk or contributory negligence. Judgment upon a verdict for $5,200.00 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and petitions in error and for certiorari were denied by the Supreme Court.
We are asked to reverse the action of the Court of Appeals upon two grounds. First, because the company was engaged in interstate commerce and therefore could not be subjected to the Compensation Act without burdening such commerce contrary to the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Second, because Article III, § 2 of the Constitution extended judicial power to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and thereby rendered the general maritime law part of the federal laws not subject to alteration by state statutes.
The first point relied upon is entirely without merit and inadequate to support our jurisdiction. In the absence of congressional legislation the settled general rule is that without violating the Commerce Clause the States may legislate concerning relative rights and duties of employers and employees while within their borders although engaged in interstate commerce. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285,297; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 408.
The second reason for reversal now set up was not presented to the trial court in any form. It was not pointed out clearly, if at all, by the petition in error before p. 205the Court of Appeals and was not definitely mentioned in the opinion of that court whose powers only extend to a review of the trial court’s judgment for errors appearing on the record. Section 12,247, Ohio General Code, as amended by Ohio Laws 103, pp. 405, 431. The question therefore is not properly before us. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291, 308, 309.
The writ of error must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Number 470.
Counsel for the Steamship Company have admitted of record here that this cause involves the same state of facts and questions of law as those presented in Number 469. They were heard together and the same judgment will be entered in each of them.
Dismissed.