Basso v. United States, 239 U.S. 602 (1916)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Basso v. United States, 239 U.S. 602 (1916)
Full caption
BASSO v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 17, 1916
BASSO v. UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 143. Argued January 6, 1916.—Decided January 17, 1916.
The rule that the Court of Claims has not jurisdiction of actions founded on tort is based on a policy imposed by necessity that governments are not liable for unauthorized wrongs inflicted on the citizens by their officers, even though occurring while engaged in discharge of official duties. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163. Congress has wisely reserved to itself the right to give or withhold relief where the claim is founded on the wrongful proceedings of an officer of the Government. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163. Neither Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, nor United States, v.
Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, sustaining jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in cases respectively to recover sums wrongfully exacted for taxes and for compensation for property taken for public purposes, over- p. 603239 U. S. Argument for Appellant.
rules, or is antagonistic to, Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, which is subsisting authority of this court that the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction of an action for a claim for private injury to an individual through the tortious act of an officer of the United States. 49 Ct. Cl. 702, affirmed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in cases founded on a tort of an officer of the United States, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Henry M. Ward for appellant:
The Court of Claims has jurisdiction over a claim ex delicto, founded upon the Constitution of the United States. Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445.
In United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333; United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180; United States v. Emery, 237 U. S. 28, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims has been sustained in actions “sounding in tort” but founded upon a law of Congress or upon an implied contract.
See also Christie Street Company v. United States, 136 Fed. Rep. 326; United States v. Hyams, 146 Fed. Rep. 15; Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593.
The Schillinger Case has been limited, if not overruled, by the more recent decisions of this court, cited above, and consequently the proper construction of the Tucker Act is that claims founded upon the Constitution or any law of the United States are now within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims whether based upon contract or tort.
Irrespective of the authority of the recent decisions of this court this contention is supported by the well-settled rules of statutory construction.
It was manifestly the intention of Congress in enacting the Tucker Act to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction of cases sounding in tort but founded upon the Constitution. Jurisdiction of claims upon contract the court already p. 604had, and the words founded upon the Constitution are meaningless unless they apply to torts. See Act of February 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612; Act of July 4, 1864, 13 Stat. 381; Act of March 3, 1887, known as the Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505; and see § 1059, Rev. Stat.
This construction of the Tucker Act, for which appellant contends, gives effect to its language but does not extend the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to embrace all torts committed by agents of the Government. Peabody v. United States, 291 U. S. 530, distinguished.
Ordinary torts are clearly omitted from the grant of jurisdiction, but where officers of the Government by a misconstruction of the law deprive a man of his liberty in violation of his constitutional rights, his claim is founded on the Constitution and he has the same right of redress as those whose money was taken in payment of customs duties under the same misconstruction of the law.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Huston Thompson for the United States.
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant is a Spanish subject who resided, at the time his alleged cause of action accrued and at the time his petition was filed in the Court of Claims, in the Island of Porto Rico.
Porto Rico was ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris, ratifications of which were exchanged April 11, 1899. The Island was occupied by the military forces of the United States prior to January 1, 1899, and February 1, 1899, the President of the United States by order promulgated the “Amended Customs Tariff and Regulations for Ports in Porto Rico,” which fixed and provided for the collection of duties upon all articles imported into
Porto Rico. And duties were collected thereafter in accordance with such tariff and the amendments thereto made from time to time until May 1, 1900.
Certain officers of the army were designated to act and did act as collectors of customs under such tariff at the several ports of entry in Porto Rico and enforced such tariff upon merchandise brought into Porto Rico from the United States and from foreign countries.
Under authority of general order No. 88 the general commanding in the Island established a provisional court of the United States for the Department of Porto Rico.
On or about July 13, 1899, by information filed by the prosecuting officer of the provisional court, appellant was charged before that court with the crime of having imported from the United States into Porto Rico certain merchandise without having made entry of the same in the custom house and without having paid duty thereon. He was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and the case was set for trial.
At the trial he entered a plea that §§ 2865 and 3082 of the Revised Statutes of the United States were without force or effect in Porto Rico, that the latter was. part of the United States and that there was no warrant in law for imposing duties on goods brought from the United States into the Island.
The defenses were not allowed, he was found guilty, sentenced to imprisonment and was imprisoned for twenty-seven days.
He alleged the foregoing facts in his petition and that he suffered damages thereby in the sum of $10,000, $7,500 general and $2,500 special damages. That he is advised by counsel that the act for which he was accused and condemned did not then constitute a crime; that the said sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States under which the provisional court claimed authority to act were not in force in Porto Rico and the court was p. 606wholly without jurisdiction in the premises and its sentence was null and void, and that by reason of such accusation, trial, conviction, sentence and imprisonment he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
Judgment was prayed for the sum of $10,000.
The United States filed a general traverse of the petition but subsequently moved to dismiss upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to consider it, it presenting “an action for damages in a case sounding in tort.”
The motion was sustained and judgment entered dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction. This appeal was then taken.
Appellant concedes that “the cause of action not merely ‘sounds in tort’ but is based wholly upon the tortious actions of the agents of the United States.” He, however, contends that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act over claims ex delicto founded upon the Constitution of the United States. And, this, he further contends, is supported by the recent decisions of this court, and relies especially upon Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222.
But that case did not overrule Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, which, counsel says, holds directly contrary to his contention and that he has not the ingenuity to suggest how the court can now decide the case at bar in appellant’s favor without at least by implication overruling the Schillinger Case. We are not disposed to overrule the case, either directly or by implication. The court found nothing in it antagonistic to the reasoning and conclusion reached in the Dooley Case.
In United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, the Schillinger Case was treated as subsisting authority, and Mr. Justice Brown, who wrote the opinion in the Dooley Case, in his concurring opinion in the Lynah Case, considered it as correctly declaring the law.
The Dooley Case and cases subsequent to it which are relied upon by appellant concerned the exaction of duties or taxes by the United States or its officers or property taken by the Government for public purposes.1 In such cases jurisdiction in the Court of Claims for the recovery of the duties and taxes or for the value of the property taken was declared.
In the case at bar (assuming as true all that is charged) there was a wrong inflicted, if a wrong can be said to have been inflicted by the sentence of a court legally constituted after judgment upon issues openly framed by the opposing parties both of fact and the applicable law, whether that law was §§ 2865 and 3082 of the Revised Statutes or the Constitution of the United States. But conceding that a wrong was inflicted through these judicial forms, the case nevertheless is of different character from the Dooley Case, as was also the Schillinger Case. The latter case passed upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in actions founded on tort and declared the general principle to be, based on a policy imposed by necessity, that governments are not liable (155 U. S., p. 167), “‘for unauthorized wrongs inflicted on the citizen by their officers, though occurring while engaged in the discharge of official duties.’” And it was further said (p. 168):
Congress has wisely reserved to itself the right to give or withhold relief where the claim is founded on wrongful proceedings of an officer of the government.’” Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269,275; Morgan v. United States, 14 Wall. 531,534.
The Schillinger Case was cited in the New Orleans-Belize Royal Mail v. United States, ante, p. 202, in rejection of a contention that the United States was liable for services imposed by their officers outside of a contract p. 608with the Royal Mail Company, in the performance of which the vessel owned by the company was damaged.
We repeat, therefore, that the Schillinger Case being subsisting authority, and appellant conceding that if such be its value it is controlling, further discussion is unnecessary.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice McReynolds took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.
WHITE v. UNITED STATES.
FORD v. UNITED STATES.
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
Nos. 153, 154. Argued January 7, 1915.—Decided January 17, 1916.
The act of March 4, 1913, c. 148, 37 Stat. 891, granting officers of the Navy, who had been advanced in rank, the pay and allowances of the higher rank, applies only to officers on the active list and does not apply to officers on the retired list who were assigned for active service after their retirement.
In construing a statute the court will regard it as more rational to assume that Congress was dealing with present affairs than that it was reopening finished transactions.
The general rule of statutes relating to duty and pay of naval officers is found in Rev. Stat., § 1462, providing that no officer on the retired list shall be employed in active duty except in time of war.
49 Ct. Cl. 702, affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of various statutes of the United States relating to pay of retired naval officers while on active service, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Frederick A. Penning, with whom Mr. Lloyd p. 609Odend’hal and Mr. Spencer Gordon were on the brief, for appellant in No. 154:
The act of March 4,1913, 37 Stat. 891, should be interpreted according to the usual meaning of its words.
By the usual meaning of its words the appellant comes within its provisions and has a valid claim against the United States.
The court should not go beyond the words of the act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 891, to look for a more limited construction.
Appellant’s claim does not involve a repeal of the act of June 7,1900, 31 Stat. 703, and the act of August 22,1912, 37 Stat. 328, 329, is not in point. The act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 891, allows appellant active pay.
In support of these contentions see Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 255, 261; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 620; United States v. Temple, 105 U. S. 97, 99; Tyler v. United States, 105 U. S. 224; Knox County v. Morton, 68 Fed. Rep. 787, 789; Union Life Ins. Co. v. Champlin, 116 Fed. Rep. 858, 860; Tyler v. United States, 16 Ct. Cis. 223; Schuetze v. United States, 24 Ct. Cis. 229; Franklin v. United States, 29 Ct. Cis. 6; Fowler v. United States, 31 Ct. Cis. 35; Seers v. United States, 46 Ct. Cis. 105.
Mr. Simon Lyon, with whom Mr. Edward S. McCalmont and Mr. R. B. H. Lyon were on the brief, for appellant in No. 153:
So long as the language used is unambiguous, a departure from the natural meaning is not justified by any consideration of its consequence, or public policy, and it is the plain duty of the court to give it force and effect. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662; United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 95; Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 15.
It is fairly and justly presumable that the legislature which was unrestrained in its authority over the subject, has so shaped the law as without ambiguity or doubt, to vol. ccxxxix—39 p. 610bring within it everything that was meant should be embraced. Cooley on Taxation (3d ed.), p. 464.
The statute must be held to mean what its language imports; when it is clear and imperative, reasoning ab inconvenienti is of no avail, and there is no room for construction. Boudinet v. United States, 11 Wall. 616; Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 621; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662. _
Construction and interpretation have no function where the terms of the statute are plain and certain, and its meaning clear. Colorado & N. W. R. R. v. United States, 209 U. S. 544.
The statute is a remedial one and should be liberally interpreted. Silver v. Ladd, 7 Wall. 219; Johnson v. So. Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 15; Merchants Bank v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 6; 1 Kent’s Comm. 465.
In expounding remedial laws, the courts will extend the remedy as far as the words will admit. Hayden’s Case, 3 Coke, 7; Pierce v. Hopper, 1 Strange, 253.
A remedial statute ought not to be construed so as to defeat in part the very purpose of its enactment. Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U. S. 353; Jones v. Guaranty Co., 101 U. S. 626; Twenty Per Cent Cases, 13 Wall. 575; Ross v. Doe, 1 Pet. 667.
Although the pendency of one class of claims may have induced the passage of an Act of Congress providing for their adjustment, the act may embrace other claims if its terms are sufficiently wide so to do. United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1; Thames-Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 19.
Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether expressed in general or limited terms, there is no room left for construction, and a resort to extrinsic facts is not permitted to ascertain its meaning. Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Porter, 266; United States v. Musgrove, 160 Fed. Rep. 700; Lake County v. Rollins, 131 U. S. 671.
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 463; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, do not infringe this rule. See Blackstone’s Introduction, § 2, p. 60.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Huston Thompson, with whom Mr. Richard P. Whiteley was on the brief, for the United States.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
These claims raise the same question. The claimant White was a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy. On June 30, 1905, he was transferred to the retired list, on his own request, with the rank of Commander, (Navy Personnel Act of March 3, 1899, c. 413, §§ 8, 9; 30 Stat. 1004, 1006,) and on April 13, 1911, was commissioned a Commander on the retired list from June 30, 1905. (Act of March 4, 1911, c. 266; 36 Stat. 1354.) He was continued in active service from June 30,1905, until October 31,1911. (Naval Appropriation Act of June 7,1900, c. 859; 31 Stat. 684, 703.) The claimant Ford was a Captain, was retired on May 19, 1902, under Rev. Stats., § 1444, with the rank of Rear Admiral, (Act of March 3, 1899, c. 413, § 11; 30 Stat. 1007,) and was commissioned Rear Admiral on the retired list from May 19, 1902. (Act of March 4, 1911, c. 266; 36 Stat. 1354.) He was continued on active duty from May 19, 1902, until December 25, 1907. (Act of June 7, 1900, c. 859; 31 Stat. 703.) As provided by the last-mentioned statute, both of these officers received the pay and allowances of the rank they held before they were retired. By the Naval Appropriation Act of March 4, 1913, c. 148, 37 Stat. 891, 892, it was enacted that “all officers of the Navy who, since the third day of March, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, have been advanced or may hereafter be advanced in grade or rank pursuant to law shall be allowed the pay and allowances of the higher p. 612grade or rank from the dates stated in their commissions.” The claims are made under this act for the difference between the pay and allowances received during active service after retirement and that of the higher grade to which the claimants respectively had been advanced. Demurrers to the petitions were sustained by the Court of Claims.
The claimants, although pressing the universal application of the statute according to the literal meaning of its words, still tacitly concede that we must go behind the letter of the law. For while the statute says that all officers who have been advanced since the date mentioned shall have the pay of the higher grade and says nothing about active service, the claims are confined to the periods of active service named, which implies a concession that the advance in grade by itself was not enough. And this concession was required by the fact that the statute grants allowances as well as pay and that allowances are an incident of active duty alone.
As it stands admitted that the statute is of more limited scope than is apparent on its face, to an untrained reader, at least, the question is whether it is to be read as applying to all advanced officers who have been on active service or only to all such officers upon the active list. We are of opinion that the latter is the true meaning and that the decision of the Court of Claims was right. The general rule of the statutes is found in Rev. Stats., § 1462. “No officer on the retired list of the Navy shall be employed on active duty except in time of war.” An exception, limited to twelve years from its passage, was made by the act of June 7, 1900, allowing officers oh the retired list, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy, to be ordered to such duty as they might be able to perform, and giving them while so employed, the pay and allowances of the grade on the active list from which they were retired. When the act of 1913, under which these claims are made, p. 613was passed, this exception had expired—all services under it had been rendered and paid for, and with other exceptions not affecting this case the general rule was in force. It is more rational to suppose that Congress was dealing with present affairs than that it was reopening transactions that might be ten years old and that must have been finished, at the latest, nearly a year before. And this construction is confirmed when we notice that the increased pay and allowances are given from the date of the commission, that is, if the claimants are right, from the date of their retirement without regard to the time when their active duty began. In these cases it was continuous with their service before retirement. But it might have begun years afterwards and yet by the statute the date of the increase in pay and the allowances would have been the same.
The conclusion to which the statutes directly concerned would lead us, is confirmed still further by consideration of the Naval Appropriation Act of August 22,1912, c. 335; 37 Stat. 328, 329. This act provided that thereafter, any Naval Officer on the retired list might, with his consent, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy, be ordered to such duties as he might be able to perform, and while so employed in time of peace should receive the pay and allowances of an officer on the active list of the same rank, provided that he was not to receive more than the pay and allowances of a lieutenant, senior grade, on the active list of like length of service, and, if his retired pay exceeded that, then he was to receive his retired pay only. The clash that there would be between the policy of this act and that of 1913 if construed as the claimants would have it construed is plain.
Finally it may be worth noticing that the reports that introduced the enactment pointed out as the evil to be remedied that under the Act of June 22, 1874, c. 392; 18 Stat. 191, the only officers who did not receive the pay of p. 614their grade from the time they took rank as stated in their commissions, were the youngest officers, who were appointed to the lowest grade and therefore not promoted to fill a vacancy as contemplated in the act of 1874. House Rep. No. 1089. 62d Cong., 2d Sess. Senate Rep. No. 1217. 62d Cong., 3d Sess.
Judgments affirmed.
Mr. Justice McReynolds took no part in the consideration and decision of these cases.