Parker v. McLain, 237 U.S. 469 (1915)
Case details
Citation
237 U.S. 469
Full caption
PARKER v. McLAIN, EXECUTRIX OF McLAIN.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 10, 1915
Majority
Van Devanter (Justice)
PARKER v. McLAIN, EXECUTRIX OF McLAIN.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.
No. 220. Submitted April 14, 1915.—Decided May 10, 1915.
In order to give this court jurisdiction to review the judgment of a state court under § 237, Judicial Code, the assertion of a Federal right must not be frivolous or wholly without foundation; otherwise an utterly baseless Federal right might be made the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of this court merely for purposes of delay.
Whether a consent by a defendant to a revivor amounts to an estoppel against challenging the capacity of the substituted plaintiff to continue the action is purely a question of local law or practice and the decision of the state court is controlling.
Nothing in the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution or in the statute enacted thereunder requires the authenticated proof of a decree to include all the pleadings and proceedings. Where the original decree entered in one State and sued on in another does not purport to lay a reciprocal duty on the judgment creditor, but simply recites that on performance the judgment debtor becomes entitled to papers in the registry of the court, full faith and credit is not denied because the judgment entered on the decree in the latter State does not impose an actual reciprocal duty on the judgment creditor.
In this case the Federal questions raised being so plainly devoid of merit as to be frivolous the writ of error is dismissed.
Writ of error to review 88 Kansas, 717 and 873, dismissed.
The facts, which involve the application of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Edward P. Garnett and Mr. Isaac 0. Pickering for plaintiff in error.
Mr. W. R. Thurmond for defendant in error.
Mr . Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court.
In a suit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, wherein the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, Carey McLain secured a decree against M. V. B. Parker for a considerable sum of money. The suit was brought and the decree rendered upon the theory that Parker had fraudulently induced McLain to join him in the purchase of certain property; that by falsely overstating the value of the property, the price at which it was being purchased and the amount he was contributing to the price, Parker had secured from McLain several sums as the latter’s share of the purchase money when in truth these sums greatly exceeded his share, and that in consequence McLain was entitled to surrender his interest in the property to Parker and call upon him to refund what was paid to him. Before beginning the suit McLain executed and tendered to Parker appropriate deeds for the property, and when the suit was begun the deeds were brought into court and lodged with the clerk to be disposed of by the decree when rendered. Following a recital of these matters and a finding that McLain had been damaged to the extent of his payments to Parker, the decree ordered that the former have and recover from the latter the amounts paid—each being definitely stated—with interest at six per cent, per annum from the date of the decree, and directed that upon the satisfaction of the decree the deeds lodged with the clerk be delivered by him to Parker. The latter carried the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which affirmed the decree and in doing so pointed out the nature of the suit in these words, 229 Missouri, 68, 87, 93: 11 Plaintiff whilst charging fraud and deceit in the petition, and having the right to sue for damages without rescinding the contract, has taken the precaution in this, as in other counts, to p. 471make a tender of such instruments as would place the defendant in statu quo. . .. The gist of these several counts is fraud and deceit, and money paid out to defendant in consequence thereof, and the prayer of the petition is to recover the money so obtained, with interest thereon. The judgment responds to the petition, its prayer and the proof.”
After securing that decree McLain brought an action thereon in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, and during the pendency of the action died leaving a will. The will was duly probated in Kansas, the State of his residence, and letters testamentary were issued in that State whereby his widow became his executrix. An ancillary administrator was also appointed by the Probate Court of Jackson County, Missouri. Thereafter the action in Kansas was revived in the name of the executrix, with the defendant’s express consent, and in regular course a trial was had at which all questions of fact and law were resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, save that it was held that the real party in interest was not the executrix but the Missouri administrator and that the action ought not to have been revived in the name of the executrix. Judgment was rendered for the defendant and upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas was reversed with a direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff. 88 Kansas, 717, 873. The present writ of error was then sued out by the defendant.
Our jurisdiction to review the judgment of the highest court of a State turns upon whether a Federal right was specially set up or claimed in that court and denied by its decision. Judicial Code, § 237. And to be effective for this purpose the assertion of a Federal right must not be frivolous or wholly without foundation. It must at least have fair color of support, for otherwise an utterly baseless Federal right might be set up or claimed in almost any case, and the jurisdiction of this court invoked merely p. 472for purposes of delay. Hamblin v. Western Land Co., 147 U. S. 531; Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586, 595; New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 344; Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U. S. 154,156.
The contentions advanced by the defendant in the Supreme Court of Kansas upon which the jurisdiction of this court is sought to be rested are (a) that under the law of Missouri where the decree sued on was rendered the administrator appointed in that State was the real party in interest and therefore the executrix was without legal capacity to maintain the action; (b) that the decree was not proved conformably to the law of Congress (Rev. Stat., § 905), because, as was objected when the proof was offered, the authenticated record produced in evidence did not contain all the pleadings and proceedings in the suit but only the decree with its recitals and findings; and (c) that by the terms of the decree the payment of the money by the defendant ‘and the execution and delivery of the deeds by McLain were intended to be reciprocal, interdependent and concurrent acts and that to make the decree the basis of a judgment in Kansas against the defendant for the payment of the money without requiring performance of the reciprocal obligation imposed upon McLain would contravene the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. IV, § 1) and the law enacted thereunder by Congress (Rev. Stat., § 905), and would deprive the defendant of the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first contention was overruled because, as was said in the opinion, “the defendant explicitly consented to the revivor in the name of the executrix and in view of that fact cannot be heard to question her capacity to maintain the action.” Whether by consenting to the revivor and thus recognizing the executrix as the real party in interest (see Gen. Stat. Kan. 1909, § 6023) the defendant p. 473was estopped from subsequently challenging her capacity to maintain the action was purely a question of local law or practice, and its decision by the Supreme Court of the State is controlling.
The next contention was wholly without any support and was so held by the Supreme Court of the State. There is nothing in the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution or in the statute enacted thereunder which requires that the authenticated proof of a decree shall include all the pleadings and proceedings in the suit, or which attempts to specify what parts of the proceedings in a state court shall be included in making up the record in an adjudicated cause. While there may be instances in which a decree or judgment could not well be understood, or would not clearly show what was determined, unless read in connection with the pleadings or other proceedings, this was not such an instance. The recitals and findings were so full and explicit and the terms of the decree so direct that nothing more was required to disclose its full purpose or what was determined by it.
The remaining contention was equally without color, because it rested upon an obviously false assumption. The decree did not purport to lay any reciprocal duty or obligation upon McLain but, on the contrary, proceeded upon the theory that he had done all that could be required of him. This was recognized by the Supreme Court of Kansas, which said in its opinion (pp. 720, 721): “He was given an absolute and unconditional judgment for the recovery of a specific sum of money. ... Its enforcement was not made to depend upon any act to be subsequently performed. When it was paid or satisfied the defendant was entitled to receive the deeds from the clerk.” And again, p. 874, “If collection is made here it must be presumed that the defendant, upon showing that fact to the Missouri court, can obtain his deeds, just as he might do if the judgment had been satisfied in any
Counsel for Parties. 237 U. 8.
other maimer, and just as he might procure a discharge of any judgment against him, the amount of which had been collected by suit thereon in another State.”
What has been said sufficiently discloses that the Federal questions raised in the case were so plainly devoid of merit as to afford no basis for a review in this court.
Writ of error dismissed.
STATE OF GEORGIA v. TENNESSEE COPPER COMPANY AND DUCKTOWN SULPHUR, COPPER & IRON COMPANY, LIMITED.
MOTION TO ENTER A FINAL DECREE AGAINST THE DUCK-
TOWN SULPHUR, COPPER & IRON COMPANY, LIMITED.
No. 1, Original. Argued April 6, 7, 1915.—Decided May 10, 1915.
The defendant Ducktown Sulphur Copper & Iron Company and the State of Georgia not having agreed as to the method of operation of the furnaces of the former and additional testimony having been taken relating to alleged changed conditions since 1907 and it appearing that the furnaces are emitting fumes in excess of what is proper held that:
A final decree against the Ducktown Company be now entered
restraining it from operating its plant except upon the terms specified therein; the cause to be retained for further action and either side may present a decree in conformity with this decision. Final decree ordered in 206 U. S. 230, against defendant Ducktown
Company.
The facts, which involve questions of nuisance arising from fumes from smelting ore and the power of the court to enjoin the same at the instance of a State, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Warren Grice and Mr. J. A. Drake, with whom Mr. Lamar Hill was on the brief, for complainant.
Mr. J. A. Fowler and Mr. W. B. Miller for defendant Ducktown Company.
Mr . Just ice Mc Reynolds delivered the opinion of the court.
Both defendants are smelting copper ores in Polk County, East Tennessee, near the Georgia line. The works of the Tennessee Company, much the larger of the two, are situated within half a mile of the line; those of the Ducktown Company are some two and one-half miles away. The ores contain a very large amount of sulphur—around 20%—and in the process of smelting great quantities of sulphur dioxide are formed; if allowed to escape into the air this becomes sulphurous acid, a poisonous gas destructive of plant life.
In October, 1905, the State of Georgia began this Original proceeding alleging that defendants permitted discharge from their works of noxious gases which being carried by air currents ultimately settled upon its territory and destroyed the vegetation, and asking for appropriate relief. The case was heard on the merits and the issues determined in complainant’s favor, May, 1907. We then said: “If the State of Georgia adheres to its determination, there is no alternative to issuing an injunction, after allowing a reasonable time to the defendants to complete the structures that they now are building, and the efforts that they are making, to stop the fumes. The plaintiff may submit a form of decree on the coming in of this court in October next.” 206 U. S. 230, 239.
Hope was entertained that some practical method of subduing the noxious fumes could be devised and by consent the time for entering a final decree was enlarged. Both companies installed purifying devices. The Tennessee Company and the State finally entered into a p. 476stipulation whereby the former undertook annually to supply a fund to compensate those injured by fumes from its works, to conduct its plant subject to inspection in specified ways, and between April 10th and October 1st not to “operate more green ore furnaces than it finds necessary to permit of operating its sulphuric acid plant at its normal full capacity.” The State agreed to refrain from asking an injunction prior to October, 1916, if the stipulation was fully observed. The Ducktown Company and the State were unable to agree, and in February, 1914, the latter moved for a decree according a perpetual inj unction. Consideration of the matter was postponed upon representation that conditions had materially changed since 1907, and leave was granted to present additional testimony “to relate solely to the changed conditions, if any, which may have arisen since the case was here decided.” A mass of conflicting evidence has been submitted for our consideration.
The Ducktown Company has spent large sums—$600,000 and more—since the former opinion in constructing purifying works (acid plant); and a much smaller proportion of the sulphur contained in the ores now escapes into the air as sulphur dioxide—possibly only 41J^% as against 85^% under former conditions. Similar improvements have been installed by the Tennessee Company at great expense, but we are without adequate information concerning the effect produced by them. As it asked and was granted opportunity to show material changes the burden is upon the Ducktown Company. A full and complete disclosure of the improvements installed by it and the results continuously obtained has not been presented.
Counsel maintain that escaping sulphur fumes now produce no substantial damage in Georgia, and further that if any such damage is being done the Tennessee Company alone is responsible therefor. We think the p. 477proof fails to support either branch of the defense, and the State should have a decree adequate to diminish materially the present probability of damage to its citizens.
The evidence does not disclose with accuracy the volume or true character of the fumes which are being given off daily from the works of either company. Averages may not be relied on with confidence since improper operations for a single week or day might destroy vegetation over a large area, while the emission of great quantities of fumes during a short period would affect but slightly the average for a month or year.
It appears that in 1913 the total ores smelted by the Ducktown Company amounted to 152,249 tons, or 304,498,000 pounds—20% sulphur; total matte shipped was 12,537,000 pounds—about 4% of the ore; the total sulphur in the smelted ores not accounted for and which escaped into the air in the form of sulphur dioxide was 13,102 tons, or 26,204,000 pounds—over two pounds of sulphur for each pound of matte and an average of more than 35 tons per day.
During July, 1913, the total matte shipped (approximately the production) was 846,000 pounds—more was shipped in June and less in August. The July production was thus approximately 7% of the year’s total. The sulphur in the fumes generated in connection with the production for this month, not redeemed by the acid plant and emitted into the air, may be fairly estimated as not less than 7% of 13,102 or 917 tons—substantially 30 tons per day. This amount produced harmful results and must be diminished.
It is impossible from the record to ascertain with certainty the reduction in the sulphur content of emitted gases necessary to render the territory of Georgia immune from injury therefrom; but adequate relief, we are disposed to think, will follow a decree restraining the p. 478Ducktown Company from continuing to operate its plant otherwise than upon the terms and conditions following: (1) It shall keep daily records showing fully and in detail the course and result of the operations. (2) A competent inspector to be appointed by this court shall have access to all the books and records of the Company, shall make frequent careful observations of the conditions—at least once each fortnight—during the next six months, and at the end of that time shall make full report with appropriate recommendations. An adequate sum to cover the necessary costs and expenses must be deposited with the Clerk by the Company. (3) It shall not permit the escape into the air of fumes carrying more than 45% of the sulphur contained in the green ore subjected to smelting. (4) It shall not permit escape into the air of gases the total sulphur content of which shall exceed 20 tons during one day from April 10th to October 1st of each year or exceed 40 tons in one day during any other season.
The cause will be retained for further action and either party may apply hereafter for appropriate relief.
Within ten days either side may present a decree in conformity herewith, together with such suggestions as seem desirable.
Mr . Justi ce Hughes , dissenting: I do not think that the evidence justifies the decree limiting production as stated.
The Chief Justice and Mr . Just ice Holmes join in this dissent.
See page 678, post, for decree entered in conformity with this opinion.