Walton v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 651 (1824)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Walton v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 651 (1824)
Full caption
Walton, Plaintiff' in Error, v. The United States, Defendants in Error.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1824
Walton, Plaintiff' in Error, v. The United States, Defendants in Error.
Under the 2d and 4th sections of the act of the 3d of Match, 1767, ch. 368. a certified transcript from the books of the Treasury is evidence against the defendant; and no claim for any credit call be admitted al the trial, which has not been presented to, and disal lowed by, the accounting officer of the Treasury, (unless in the cases excepted by the act,) although no proceedings have been had against the debtor, under the act of the 3d of March, 1795, ch. 189., by notification from the Treasury Department, requiring him to render to the Auditor of the Treasury Ills accounts and vouchers for settlement.
Qmrrf, Whether the act of the 3d of March, 1795, ch, 289. is not virtually repealed by the act of the 3d of March, 1797, ch. 338.?
The official bond given by a Receiver of Public Moneys, does not extinguish the simple contract debt arising from a balance of ac count due from him to the United States. An action of assumpsit for the balance of account, and an action of debt upon the bund against the principal and sureties, may be maintained at the same time-In an action against the Receiver, not describing him in his official capacity, evidence may be given of moneys received in his official capacity; and, under a count for money had and received, evi dence may be given of public stock received by him, where such stock is, by law, made receivable, at par, in payment for lands sold by the Utided States.
It is not necessary that a bill of exceptions should be formally drawn and signed before the trial is at an end. The exception may be taken at the trial, and noted by the Court, and may, afterwards, during the term, be reduced to form, and signed by the Judge. But, in such cases, it is signed nunc pro tunc, and purports, on its face, to be the same as if actually reduced to form, and signed during lire trial. It would be a fatal error if it were to appear otherwise.
1824- THIS cause was argued by Mr. Clay, for die plaintiff in error, and by the Attorney-General, March 1st-
for the defendants in error.
Mank nth. Mr. Justice Duvall delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error in this case, who was de fendant in the Court below, was a receiver of pub lic money, in one of the land offices in the District of Mississippi, and being indebted to the United States in a large amount, an action of assumpsit was instituted against him, to recover the balance due, which was stated to be $102,478 85s, made up of cash and stock; viz. in cash, $93,639 931, and in Mississippi stock, $8,838 92. The de claration contains only one count, which is for money lent and advanced, laid out and expended, and for money had and received. To this the general issue of nan assumpsit was pleaded, and issue was joined. The attorney for the United States, to support the claim, offered in evidence a transcript from the booksand proceedings of the Treasury, authenticated under the seal of the Department, pursuant to an act to provide more effectually for the settlement of accounts between the United States and receivers of public money, passed on the 3d of March, 1797; to the admis sion of which evidence the attorney for the de fendant objected :
1. Because there had not been any proceedings against him under the act of the 3d of March, 1795, entitled, “ An act for the more effectual re covery of debts due from individuals to the United
States,” by notification from the Treasury Depart 1824-ment, requiring him to render to the Auditor of
Walton
v.
the Treasury his accounts and vouchers, in order
U. States.
to a settlement, os directed by that act.
2. Because the account offered in evidence was against the defendant, as receiver of public money, west of Pearl river, and that the defendant, as such receiver, had executed a bond with security, according to law, for the faithful discharge of his duties as such; and that the remedy against him being upon his official bond alone, an action for money had and received would not lie.
3. Because the declaration was against him in his individual capacity, and the evidence offered showed that he was liable, if at all, in his public character as receiver of public money west of Pearl river, and not in his individual capacity. But the Court overruled the objection, and were of opinion that the transcript was evidence to support the declaration, and permitted the same to go to the jury: to which opinion of the Court, the defen dant, by his counsel, excepted, and the proceed ings were brought up to this Court by writ of error, for their revision.
In the argument of this cause, the counsel for the plaintiff in error has made no question which docs not appear in the record. He contends that the act of 1795 is not repealed by that of 1797, and that the suit of the United States against Walton cannot be maintained, because, before a suit can be sustained by the United States against a debtor, he is entitled, according to the provi sions of the act of 1795, to a notification from
1824. the Comptroller of the Treasury, to appear before the Auditor, with his accounts and vouchers, af-
y- fording him an opportunity of a just and fair setw‘ tlement upon a full investigation of his accounts.
That, without such investigation, many items, for which the debtor may claim a credit, may be re jected for want of the necessary explanations.
To this reasoning the Attorney-General, on be half of the United States, replies, by insisting that the act of 1795 is virtually repealed by that of 1797, which contains similar and additional provisions, incompatible with those of the former act; and that the debtor has ample opportunity of a full and just examination of his accounts under the last mentioned act. The Court deem it unne cessary to decide the question, whether the act oi 1795 is repealed by that of 1797, because the last mentioned act contains ample provision for this case. It is provided by the 2d section oi that act, " that tn every case of delinquency, where suit has been or shall bo instituted, a transcript from the books and proceedings of the Treasury, cer tified by the Register, and authenticated under the seal of the Department, shall be admitted as evi dence, &c.” And by the 4th section it is enacted, tc that in suits between the United States and indi viduals, no claim for a credit shall be admitted, upon trial, but such as shall appear to have been presented to the accounting officers of the 'I reasury for their examination, and by them disallowed, in whole or in part, unless it should be proved to the satisfaction of the Court, that the defendant is, at the time of trial, in possession of voucher? [p. 655] not before in his power to procure, and that he was 1824. prevented from exhibiting a claim for such credit
Walton
V.
at the Treasury, by absence from the United
U. States
Slates, or some unavoidable accident.”
These positive provisions of the law must be disregarded, if we say that the authenticated trans cript from the Treasury Department is not evidence. They are too plain to require argument; and the debtor has a fair opportunity of establishing his account, if just, without a notification from the Comptroller, according to the act of 1795. In the first place, he states his account, and when stated, it is rendered to the Auditor, who examines it, and makes a report to the Comptroller, by whom it is revised. Afterwards, in case of a suit, he has an impartial trial in Court, where an opportunity is again afforded him of supporting his claim ; and if the Court and jury, before whom the cause is tried, should be of opinion that any item of his ac count has been improperly rejected, it is restored to his credit. On the trial of this cause in the Court below, it appears that the balance claimed was reduced by the verdict of the jury to 44,994 dollars and 57 cents; it is presumed, by the ex hibition of vouchers under the 4th section of the act of 1797, which had not been rendered to the accounting officers of the Treasury.
It was also urged, on the part of the plaintifi' in error, that the amount offered in evidence is against him, as receiver of public money; and that he had executed a bond with security, according to law, for the faithful discharge of his duties as such ; and that, therefore, the account was merged
1824. in the sealed instrument, on which alone the ac '^Q^/ tion can be sustained. It may be admitted, that
v. a security under seal extinguishes a simple condre" tract debt; but in the case under consideration, the account and the bond are distinct from each other. The official bond is not given for the ba lance due ; it is a collateral security for the faith ful performance of the official duties of the officer, and was executed long before the existence of the balance claimed* It may be asked, how could a bond, in a penalty of 10,000 dollars, extinguish a simple contract debt of more than 100,000 dollars? The balance claimed could not be recovered by a suit on the bond. In all similar cases, between the United States and their debtors, it is usual to institute a suit for the recovery of the balance struck on settlement of the account, and an action ofdebtonthe official bond, to recover the penalty of the sureties. It is indispensably necessary, in every instance where the debtor is unable to pay.
The third and last objection made on behalf of the plaintiff in error, is on the ground that he is charged in the declaration in his individual capa city, and the evidence offered is against him in his public character; and further, that the account charges stock and money, and the claim is in mo ney only ; that on a count for money had and re ceived, evidence cannot be given that the defend ant received any thing but money. It is a full an swer to this objection, to observe, 1. That the receiver is individually responsible for all the mo ney he received in his public capacity; and, 2. That evidences of the public debt arc made, by
1821.
law, payable at their nominal value, for lands sold by the United States ; and, therefore, stock is re
Walton
v.
ceivable as money at par. And it appearing, by
U. State?.
the account offered in evidence, that the far great er part of the balance claimed is in money, it was proper and legal evidence to support the declara tion ; and as the balance claimed was reduced by the verdict of the jury, which is for money only, and for less than the amount of cash claimed, the just inference is, that the stock balance was extin guished by the vouchers produced by the defend ant, on the trial in the Court below.
An objection was made on the part of the Uni ted States, that I he bill of exceptions in this case was not taken al the trial, but purports on the face of the record to have been taken and signed after judgment rendered in the case. It is true, that the bill of exceptions states, that the evidence was objected to at the trial; but it is not said that any exception was then taken to the decision of the Court. So that, in fact, it might be true, that the objection was made, and yet not insisted upon by way of exception. But the more material consi deration is, that the bill of exceptions itself ap pears on the record not to have been taken at all, until after judgment. Il is a settled principle, that no bill of exceptions is valid, which is not for mat ter excepted to at the trial. We do not mean to say, that it is necessary, (and in point of practice we know it to be otherwise,) that the bill of excep tions should be formally drawn and signed, before the trial is at an end. It will be sufficient, if the exception be taken at the trial, and noted by the
Vet. IX. a.
1824. Court, with the requisite certainty; and it may, ^f^ afterwards, during the term, according to the rules of the Court, be reduced to form, and signed by the Judge ; and so, in fact, is the general practice. But in all such cases, the bill of exceptions is sign ed nunc pro tunc; and it purports on its face to be the same, as if actually reduced to form, and signed, pending the trial. And it would be a fa tal error, if it were to appear otherwise; for the original authority, under which bills of excep tions are allowed, has always been considered to be restricted to matters of exception taken pend ing the trial, and ascertained before the verdict.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
[Prize.]
The Fanny. The Consul-General of Portugal, Libellant.
Case of capture by an armed vessel, fitted out in the ports of the United States, in breach of the neutrality acts. Claim by an al leged bonw Jidei purchaser in a foreign port rejected, and lestitulion decreed to the original owners.
A bona> fidti purchaser, without notice, in such case, is entitled to be reimbursed the freight which he may have paid upon die captured goods; and the innocent neutral carrier of such goods, the same having been transhipped in a foreign port, is entitled to freight old of the goods.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Maryland. 1324.
v^-v^^ The Fanny.
This was the case of a libel filed by the Consul-General of Portugal, on behalf of certain Portu guese subjects, owners of a number of hides which had been brought from St. Thomas to Baltimore in the brig Fanny. The facts proved in the cause, which the Court considered to be material, are the following:
Sometime in the year 1317, Robert AI. Good win, Clement Cathill, James Halsey, and John R. Mifflin, all of them citizens of the United States, and denominated “The American concern,” fitted out, at Buenos Ayres, a brig, called Lu Republi can a, as a privateer to cruise against the subjects of Spain and Portugal, under a commission ob tained for her from Jose Artigas. Thus prepared, she sailed under the command of Obadiah Chase, also a citizen of the Uni ted States, and, in February, 1818, she captured the Portuguese brig Aurora, which, with her cargo, were sent to St. Harts, and there sold as American property for about 20,000 dollars. With this money, thus raised, Goodwin proceeded to Baltimore, and there invested it in the purchase of a new brig, called the Athenea, which had been lately built at that port. Having changed her name to that of the New Republican;!, both pri vateers shipped their crews al Baltimore, together with their munitions of war, except the cannon and carriages for the latter vessel, which, with a view ot deceiving the custom-house officers, were put on board of a small schooner, and were trans ferred to this privateer, a few miles below the [p. 660] fiso CASES LN THE SUPREME COURT
1824. fort. The commission, together with other papers ThTtC^r belonging to the Republicans, were delivered to the New Rcpublicnna, and both the privateers proceeded to sea; the latter under the command of the above mentioned Clement Cathill, one of the owners. She soon after fell in with the Por tuguese ship Don Pedro de Alcantara, laden with a valuable cargo of hides, sugar, &c. which she captured on the 22d of September, 1818, and or dered in to the Five Islands, there to await rhe orders of Goodwin. At this place, Goodtvin tran shipped the principal part of the cargo into seve ral small vessels, which proceeded to the island of St. Thomas, consigned to Souffron & Co., mer chants of that place. The residue of the cargo, except a small part, which was afterwards taken, together with the Don Pedro, by Commodore Jolly, commanding a squadron belonging to the republic of Colombia, was also carried by Goodwin to St. Thomas, in the old privateer, at which place it is probable the whole or a great part of the captu red property was sold. Nathaniel Levy, the Ameri can Consul at that island, purchased 1004 of the hides, which, together with 555 logs of lignum ritec, he shipped in the brig Fanny to Baltimore, where she arrived in January, 1819, consigned to Lyde Goodwin. On the 21st of this month, the hides and lignum vita were libelled as Portuguese property, illegally taken on the high seas, and on the 27th of the same month, the lignum vita was released from the operation of the libel.
To this libel a claim was filed by Lyde Good win, as agent of Levy, in which it is asserted that
the hides had been purchased by Levy, in the re 182-1. gular course of trade, from Souffron &. Co., and
The Fanny.
all knowledge of the matters alleged in the libel isdenied. On the 15th of March the hides were delivered upon stipulation, having been appraised at the sum of 12000 dollars.
In the progress of the cause in the District Court, the owners of the brig Fanny presented to the Judge a petition, setting forth, that on the 6th of October, 1818, Nathan Levy entered into a charter-party of affreightment with the petitioners for the brig Fanny, on certain terms stated in the petition, for a voyage from Baltimore to St. Lucie, and if required, to three other ports in the West Indies, and thence back to Baltimore, That, un der this charter-party, the said brig took in a cargo at Baltimore, and sailed to St. Lucie, and to three other ports, and finally delivered the cargo to the said Levy, who afterwards shipped on board the said brig, at St. Thomas, 4000 hides and 555 sticks of lignum vine, to he carried to Baltimore, where she arrived on the 17th of January, 1819. That upon her arrival, and when the master was about to deliver the cargo to the consignee of Levy, this libel and claim were filed, and the cargo was taken from the possession of the master by the Marshal, under the process of the said Court. I hat there was then due to the petitioners, on the said charter-party, the sum of 2094 dollars 50 cents, as admitted by the said Levy, which they pray may be paid out of the proceeds of the hides and lignum vita:. This petition was accompanied by an account, dated the 28th of December, 1818,
1824. signed by Nathan Levy, acknowledging a balance ^f*' ’>f 2094 dollars 50 cents to be due the said brie
Fanny on the charter-party. Below this account is the following entry, not signed by any person : “The freight on the homeward cargo, consisting of 4004 hides and 555 sticks of lignum vita, 81047 25.” The Court made an order that the agent of the,claimant should pay the freight on the above goods to the amount of 1047 dollars 25 cents.
The District Court decreed the claimants to pay to the libellant the appraised value of the hides, as mentioned in their stipulation, together with in terest and costs, after deducting the amount ol freight theretofore ordered to be paid. This de cree being wholly affirmed by the Circuit Court, upon an appeal, both parties appealed from that decree to this Court.
Mr. D. Hoffman, for the libellant, argued,
1. That this was a piratical taking, there being
no sufficient evidence of a valid commission/ But
if the power granting the commission were valid,
still the seizure is piratical, as the commission was
not only amortised, but transferred to a new ves
sel and a new commander, by whom it was abused
in the grossest acts of violence, evincive of an ani
mus depredandi, and which constituted the cap
tors trespassers ab initio? Had the authority
which granted the commission been competent.
a 7 Wheat. Rep. 476. 8 Wheat. Rep. 1 li ft 3 Wood. Lee. 14 Johns. Rep. 273.
and the proceedings under it regular, as the laws 1824. of this country have been violated by the captors, who are American citizens, this Court will restore the res capta.' The appellant claims the protec tion of this Court, on the ground of his being a bona fidet purchaser, under a valid condemnation. If this could avail him in law, he has failed in his proof of bona fides. Every circumstance of evi dence and probability is against him. Admitting, however, that there was a purchase in good faith, and under entire ignorance of the circumstances, the title of this claimant cannot be valid against that of the original owners, since there was no condemnation in point of fact; and if there had been, still, as the taking was either without a valid commission, or in virtue of an amortised or abu sed one, the condemnation would be inoperative.4
2. Levy, if free from all blame, cannot sustain his claim, under the doctrine of market overt. There can be no such protection for property ta ken jure belli, at least until after condemnation ; and the doctrine of market overt is itself unknown to the jus gentium.'
3. A condemnation is produced, but it is wholly unnecessary to dwell on its operation, since a con demnation, in all respects valid as between belli gerents, cannot deprive this Court of its power to
a 6 Wheat. Rep. 152. 7 Wheat. Rep. 496. 8 Wheat. Rep. 108. 4 2 Bro. Civ. Late, 55. 252, 253. 268. 461. 464. 1 Johns. Rep. 4’1. R^ nep 308. 5 Wheat. Rep. 345, 346.
c 2 Wood. Lee. 429. 1 Johns. Cas. 471. Martens on Priv. 44. Moll, de Jllre Mar 57, (i0 68 g5. Godi 193. h^ 79. 7 Wheat. Rep. 490.
1821 restore, when the original taking was in violation of our Jaws. And, wcotw//i/, the condemnation The Fanny.
now exhibited, cannot possibly apply to the pro perty in question, as it will be found, on reference to the dates, that this decree of condemnation was some time after levy’s alleged purchase, and, in deed, only a few days prior to the filing of the libel in this cause. But,
4. The main point of inquiry regards the claim ta freight. We contend, that the appellant is re sponsible to us fortbe entire value of the hides,as the same is ascertained by the stipulation, together with interest; and that the freight bill, though properly paid by the appellant to the innocent ship-owner, cannot now be deducted by this ille gal captor, from the amount stipulated to be paid by hint. Waiving all question which might be made, as to the power of this Court to decree freight in the case, on the ground of incidental ju risdiction, we insist that the present is not a claim by the ship-owner for his freight, but by the appel lant, to have the same allowed to him out of this fund, as having been properly paid by him. It this Court reject the claim of the appellant to the property, on the ground of its having been illegally captured, and that this infirmity adheres to the property even in the hands of abonerjidei purcha ser, we are at a loss to conceive how this purcha ser can rightfully impose any charge or incum brance whatever upon it. But when wre advert to the real character of the appellant, and find hint
Ol THE UNITED STATED 065
an unworthy claimant, in truth as much so as the 1824. captor himself had been, we cannot suppose that ^7J^^ he can be entitled to any favour al the hands of this Court. He brought this prize property into an American port, without the knowledge or privi ly of its owner, and surely ought not to claim either compensation or indemnity, for doing that which, as to the other party, is in invitum, and has proved, in fact, extremely prejudicial to him. If this be a claim on the fund, it is only so as re gards the innocent owner. No lien can be created, by one who has no property, general or special, in the thing. If a mala fidei possessor cannot so mortgage or pledge the property, as that such mortgage or pledge shall be valid against the true proprietor, he is not competent to create any lien, nor to impose any charge or incumbrance what ever. But without pressing this point, we do not think that the appellant is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the innocent ship-owner, if such right of lien even vested in him. If this claim to freight were one in rem, as well as in personam, and the illegal captors, or those claiming under them, have satisfied the personal obligation, it does not follow that they can now enforce that lien against the fund, which it might, arguments gratia, be admitted that the ship-owner possessed. This is very unlike the case of a ncutrars claim for freight on belligerent property captured from him by another belligerent. The neutral had a right so to employ his vessel, subject only to the bellige rent’s right to make the seizure ; he, therefore, in such case, takes it cum onere, and must pay the
Vol. IX.
1824.
neutral bis freight. The object here, however, is to transfer the obligation of paying the freight The Fanny.
from the illegal captor to the despoiled individual. If the controversy were now wholly between the Portuguese owners of the property and the inno cent American ship-owner, the claim might de serve some consideration. In this case, the ship owner is the agent of the captors, or those claiming under them, not of the Portuguese owner, and as such, must look to his employers, and not to the goods ; and if, in fact, the illegal captor has paid the freight, be cannot thereby entitle himself to be refunded out of the fruits of his piratical taking. The claim to freight is always conventional; a claim even to pro rata freight, arises from some convention, and not from the simple fact of trans portation. In this case, no consent of the owners to the shipment to Baltimore can be implied. Our claim to the property is disputed on all points; and if none of these is found tenable, but the taking is ascertained to be a gross act of piracy, it would be a strange anomaly, that an honest and lawful belligerent must pay freight to a neutral ship owner, and yet that a piratical captor shall be ex empt from charges voluntarily imposed by him on the property, and that these shall be cast on those whom be has endeavoured to despoil.
5. The Court below has, also, manifestly erred in allowing the entire freight bill, as this includes a charge on some lignum vita, which formed no part of that which is owned or demanded by the libellant. We, therefore, ask at the hands of this Court, the whole value of the property, as it is [p. 667] ateertained by the stipulation, together with interest 1 824. from its date, so that the claim to freight may be
The Fanny.
wholly rejected. The ship-owner is, indeed, the petitioner for freight in thhease; but he has been since paid, and the claim, in truth, is now at the instance of the captor, who desires to be subroga ted to the rights of the ship-owner, and to enforce his lien, if he had one. We have endeavoured to show, that no such right existed, and that if it ever did, the captor is not entitled to receive the bene fit of such lien.
Mr. Winder, contra, argued principally upon the facts, to show that the alleged purchase was bona fide.
Mr. Justice Washington, delivered the opinion March nth. of the Court; and after stating the case, proceed ed as follows;
The above case presents two questions for the consideration of this Court. 1. Whether the Court below was correct, in restoring to the Por tuguese owner that part of the cargo of the Fanny which was restored? And, 2. Whether the freight which was ordered by the Court to be paid to the owners of that vessel, ought, in whole or in part, to have been deducted from the appraised value of the hides?
Upon the first question, it is to be observed, that the facts above slated are mcontestibly proved by the evidence in the cause. That the capturing vessel, the New Republicans, was built at Balti-
1824. more, purchased at that place by citizens of the 1^*7^ United States, and there manned and fitted for sea, armed and equipped as a vessel of war, with in the waters and jurisdiction of the United States; and with such equipments, left the United States, to cruise against the vessels and property of Spa nish and Portuguese subjects on the high seas; and upon such cruise, captured the Don Pedro de Alcantara, with a valuable cargo, belonging to Portuguese subjects, were facts too clearly proved to be questioned ; nor were they questioned by the counsel for the claimants. It is established, by evidence equally clear and uncontradicted, that the 4001 hides which were brought in the Fanny from St. Thomas to Baltimore, upon which the sentence of the Court below operated, formed a part of the cargo of the Don Pedro de Alcantara at the time of her capture, and that they were the property of Portuguese subjects.
This, then, is the case of property belonging to the subjects of a friendly power, captured on the high seas by a privateer, owned and com manded by citizens of the United States, filled and equipped as a vessel of war, within the wa ters and jurisdiction of the I nited States; and, according to the uniform decisions of this Court in similar cases, as well as in others, w here similar equipments have been made within the waters of the United Slates by foreigners, the property so illegally captured and brought within our jurisdic tion, roust be restored to the original owners, unless it could be maintained that the sale of it to the claimant devested those owners of their right
OF THE UNITED STATES. bOU
to the same. But it is to be remarked, in the first 1824. place, that the asserted purchase of these hides '^F^ny by Levy is unsupported by any evidence what ever. lie alleges in his claim, that he purchased the hides for a valuable consideration from Souffron & Co. in the regular course of trade; but this allegation is not upheld by any written docu ment, or by the testimony of a single witness. The cause was depending more than two years in the Courts below, during all which time it was fully in the power of the claimant, a resident ot the island of St. Thomas, to have proved the reality of this purchase, by the testimony of the vendors, or otherwise, if the fact had been as it was alleged.
But, admitting the truth of the asserted sale to Levy, he was, nevertheless, a purchaser from the agent of a tortious possessor of property to which he had no title whatever, and who, consequently, could transfer none to his vendee. The proceed ings in the Vice-Admiralty Court of Margarita, by Commodore Jolly, against the Don Pedro do Alcantara and the small part of her cargo which had not been transhipped at the Five Islands, so far from amounting to a sentence of condemnation, even of the property libelled as prize of war, proceeded upon the ground of a recapture from a non-commissioned privateer, for which the recaptor was rewarded by a liberal salvage, and the residue of the sales of the property was decreed to the Portuguese owners, in case they should claim the same within the period of a year and a day. This Court is, therefore, of opinion that
1824* the decree of the Circuit Court, so far as it re-The F^X stores to the libellant the 4004 hides, or their pro ceeds, is right, and ought to be affirmed.
The second question respects the freight, which the decree of the Court below ordered to be de ducted from the appraised value of the hides; and it is attended by no difficulty but such as arises from the confined and imperfect statement of the facts appearing in this record. That the freight of the lignum vita, which did not belong to the libellants, and against which the proceedings were abandoned, ought not to have been paid out of the proceeds of the hides, is a matter which we think is quite too clear to be disputed; and we think it probable that the mistake was occasioned by an oversight in the Judge of the District Court, from his not knowing, or recollecting, when the petition for freight was before him, that the lig num rita had been released from the operation of the libel. The decree, then, must, of course, be reversed, for this reason, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in order to ascertain and separate the freight upon that article, from that due upon the hides.
But there is, apparently, error in the decree in respect to the whole of the freight, which, it is possible, may be explained and removed by a fur ther examination of this subject in the Court be low. The petition for freight claims the precise sum of 2094 dollars and 50 cents, as the balance acknowledged to be due by the claimant, and the account, signed by him on the 28th of December, 1818, which accompanied the petition, amounted [p. 671] to an acknowledgment that that sum was then due. 1824. The items of that account are, freight on 1095 ^Xw” barrels of flour, out and home, per charter-party, 5 cases of furniture, 36 bags of corn, and 7 days de murrage. Below that account is stated the freight due upon the hides and lignum vit®, amounting to 1047 dollars and 25 cents. It would seem, therefore, as if the freight upon the hides and lignum vita:, which arrived in Baltimore some time in January, 1819, was not included in the account signed by the claimant, and if so, it was not claimed to be due, nor required by the peti tion to be paid. Yet the order of the Court was, that it should be paid, and it was accordingly de ducted from the appraised value of the hides. If the case should turn out to be such as is above supposed, it would seem to warrant the conclu sion, that the freight upon the hides had been paid by bevy, in which case it ought not to be deducted from their appraised value, unless the reality of the asserted purchase of the hides by Levy should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Court below, without which, we are of opinion that he is to be considered as a mala jidei possessor, and, consequently, as not entitled to be reimbursed the freight so paid, out of the property of the Por tuguese owners. If, on the other hand, it should appear that the claimant was a bona jidei purcha ser of the hides, without notice, or that the freight upon them had not been paid by him to the owners of the Fanny, then it was properly de ducted.
1824. Decree. This cause came on to be heard, &cOn consideration whereof, it is decreed and or dered, that so much of the decree of the said Cir cuit Court as orders that the claimant pay to the libellant the appraised value of the hides, in the proceedings mentioned, together with interest and costs of suit, be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs, subject, however, to such deduction for freight as the said Circuit Court may hereafter direct, to be paid out uf said appraised value, as may be hereafter decreed under the further pro ceedings in this cause: And as to so much of said decree of said Circuit Court, as directs the amount of freight to be deducted, agreeably to the pre vious order of said Circuit Court, the same is hereby reversed and annulled. And it is further ordered, that said cause be remanded to the said Circuit Court, for further proceedings to be had therein, according to law, for the purpose of as certaining, upon further proof, whether the claim ant bad paid the freight of the hides to the owner of the Fanny; and, if so, whether the claimant was a bond, fidei purchaser of said hides, without notice. And if the said Court should be satisfied from such further proof, that the said claimant, Nathan Levy, has paid the owner of the Fanny for said freight, or that he was not such bond fid ci purchaser, without notice, then with instructions not to allow a deduction of freight from the said appraised value. But if the said claimant was such bona fidei purchaser, without notice, or it said freight had not been paid by said claimant to
OF THE UNITED STATES. 67$
the owners of the Fanny, then the freight for the 1824. hides, excluding the freight on the lignum vita, '^^£/ to be deducted from the appraised value of said r
Wear..
hides.
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He cited Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. Rep. 115. Danforth v. Thomas, fa, 155, v^. IX, „
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