Interstate Com. Comm'n v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Interstate Com. Comm'n v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912)
Full caption
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. HUMBOLDT STEAMSHIP COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 29, 1912
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. HUMBOLDT STEAMSHIP COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No. 859. Argued April 16, 1912.—Decided April 29, 1912.
Alaska is a Territory of the United States within the meaning of § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591.
An organized Territory of the United States does not necessarily mean one having a local legislature as distinguished from one having a less autonomous form of government, such as that of Alaska.
Even if “Territory of the United States” as used in § 1 of the InterState Commerce Act as amended includes only organized Territories, Alaska falls within its meaning. The Steamer Coquitlam, 163 U. S. 346; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486; Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516.
The Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591, extended the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act to interterritorial commerce and for the first time gave to the Commission the power to fix rates. In so doing it made the act completely comprehensive, and the power given to the Commission superseded the power of the Secretary of the Interior to revise and modify rates of railroads in Alaska given by § 2 of the act of May 14, 1898, 30 Stat. 409, c. 299.
Mandamus can be issued to direct performance of a ministerial act but not to control discretion. It may be directed to a tribunal, one acting in a judicial capacity, to proceed in a manner according to his or its discretion.
The jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 363, does not exist in an administrative body which is subject to having its jurisdicton defined by the courts.
The United States Commerce Court has no jurisdiction to review the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in refusing to entertain a complaint because the subject is beyond its jurisdiction. In such a case the remedy is by mandamus to compel the Commission
to proceed and decide the case according to its judgment and discretion.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Act to Regulate Commerce in Alaska, and to compel carriers in that Territory to conform to the law; and if the Commission refuses to act on the ground that it has no jurisdiction, mandamus will issue directing it to take jurisdiction.
39 Washington Law Reporter, 386, affirmed, and 19 I. C. C. 81, disapproved.
The facts, which involve the status of common carriers in Alaska under the Interstate Commerce Act, and the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission over common carriers in Alaska, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. P. J. Farrell for plaintiff in error:
Alaska is not a Territory of the United States within the meaning of § 1 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Matter of Water Carriers in Alaska, 19 I. C. C. 81.
In the jurisdictional clause of the Hepburn Act, the District of Alaska is not included by name and the word “District” as used in that section is confined to the District of Columbia.
Alaska has never been officially designated as a Territory: see act of May 17, 1884; Rev. Stat. 1 Sup., c. 53, p. 430; act of June 4, 1887, providing for the appointment of commissioners of deeds and a marshal; act of July 24, 1897, providing for the appointment of a surveyor general; act of June 6,1900, 31 Stat. 321, making further provision for a civil government for Alaska.
In the Appropriation Acts of 1907 and 1908, 34 Stat. 963, and 35 Stat. 212, Alaska is called a District, while Arizona, New Mexico, and Hawaii are described as Territories. See also acts of January 27, 1905, 33 Stat. 616; of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1262 and 1265; § 1, act of February 4, 1887; act of June 18, 1910.
At the time the amendment of June 29, 1906, was passed Congress was acquainted with the rulings of the p. 476Commission that the District of Alaska is not a Territory of the United States within the meaning of § 1 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. See the Townsend Bill (H. R. 17536), reported to the Whole House by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in the second session of the Sixty-first Congress on April 1, 1910; and the Fletcher Bill (S. 9975), introduced January 9, 1911.
Both attempts to place common carriers operating lines of transportation in Alaska under the control of the Commission failed.
Under these circumstances, this court will consider itself bound by the interpretation of the Commission, which is the tribunal primarily charged with the enforcement of the provisions of said act. See New Haven R. R. Co. v. Int. Com. Comm., 200 U. S. 361, holding that an interpretation placed on the act by the Commission in the cases of Haddock v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 4 I. C. C. Rep. 296, and Coxe Bros. & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 4 I. C. C. Rep. 535, was binding upon the court.
The authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior by the act of May 14, 1898, has not been taken away by § 10 of the Hepburn Law. The law does not favor repeals by impheation, Alaska is not referred to by name either in the Hepburn Law or in the act to regulate commerce, and Congress has never specifically conferred upon the Commission jurisdiction over any common carrier in any district of the United States except the District of Columbia.
Mandamus is not a proper proceeding in which to correct an error of law like that alleged in the petition. Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 4 Wall. 522; West v. Hitchcock, 19 App. D. C. 333, 342; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 514; United States v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 48; United States v. Guthrie, 17 How. 284; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347; United States v. Windom, 137 U. S. 636, 644; United States v. Blaine,
139 U. S. 306, 319; United States v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 303, 308; Kimberlin v. Commission to Five Civilized Tribes et al., 104 Fed. Rep. 653.
The preliminary question of jurisdiction the Commission decided was as much within the scope of its authority as any other which could arise. Having resolved it in the negative, there was no occasion for the Commission to look further into the case. Only a reversal by the tribunal of appeal can revive it, and cast upon the Commission the duty of further action in the premises.
This proceeding in mandamus is not the only remedy open to defendant in error. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 188 Fed. Rep. 221.
Mr. Charles D. Drayton, with whom Mr. John B. Daish and Mr. James Wickersham were on the brief, for defendant in error.
Mr . Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.
The ultimate question in the case is whether Alaska is a Territory of the United States within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended.
The Interstate Commerce Commission resolved the question in the negative and dismissed the petition of the Humboldt Steamship Company, the relator, which alleged violations of the act by the White Pass & Yukon Railway Company, operating in Alaska, applying its decision in Matter of Jurisdiction Over Rail and Water Carriers Operating in Alaska, 19 I. C. C. Rep. 81.
The steamship company instituted an action in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia praying for a mandamus against the Commission to require it to take jurisdiction and proceed as required by the act and grant the relief for which the steamship company had petitioned, p. 478hereinafter specifically mentioned. The proceeding was dismissed. The court expressed the view that the Commission had “ ample authority to assume jurisdiction over common carriers in Alaska, the same as in any other Territory, and over those carriers operating between the State of Washington and Alaska, and between Alaska and Canada, and if they took jurisdiction no one could successfully question their right to do so.” The court, however, held that it had no power “to require the Interstate Commerce Commission to act contrary to its own judgment in a matter wherein, after investigation, it had reached a conclusion, honestly and fairly, which might be contrary to the conclusion which the court would reach.”
The Court of Appeals, to which court the case was taken by the steamship company, entertained the same view of the Interstate Commerce Act as that expressed by the Supreme Court, but took a different view of the power of the courts to compel action upon the part of the Commission, and reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court and remanded the cause, “with directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus directed to the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring it to take jurisdiction of said cause and proceed therein as by law required.” To this ruling the Interstate Commerce Commission prosecutes this writ of error.
The proceedings before the Commission were instituted by the steamship company filing a petition (No. 2578) against the White Pass & Yukon Route, consisting of the Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Company, British Columbia-Yukon Railway Company, British-Yukon Railway Company, and British-Yukon Navigation Company, to require said companies to file with the Commission, in the form prescribed by the Act to Regulate Commerce, and to print and keep open for public inspection, schedules showing their rates and charges for transportation of passengers and property between points in Alaska and p. 479points in the Dominion of Canada and other places; to establish through routes and joint rates in conjunction with the petitioner between certain named places in Alaska and Seattle, in the State of Washington; to afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines; and to cease and desist from preventing by sundry devices the carriage of freights from being continuous from place of shipment to place of destination when such freight is originated or in any wise handled by the Humboldt Steamship Company.
The companies proceeded against filed answers. There were intervening companies on both sides of the controversy.
A hearing was assigned and had in October, 1909, and subsequently, July 6, 1910, the Commission decided that it was “without jurisdiction to make the order sought by complainant,” resting its ruling upon the authority of its decision in Matter of Jurisdiction Over Rail and Water Carriers Operating in Alaska, supra.
Section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act provides that the provisions of the act “shall apply to any . . . common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad (or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment), from one State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, to any other State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from one place in a Territory to another place in the same Territory, ... or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States. . . .” 34 Stat. 584.
The pivotal words are: “From one State or Territory of the United States ... to any other State or p. 480Territory, ... or from one place in a Territory to another place in the same Territory,” “Territory” being the especially significant word.
If we may venture to reduce to a single proposition an elaborate discussion of elements and considerations, we may say that the Commission gave to the word “territory” the signification of “organized territory,” the chief and determining feature of which is a local legislature as distinguished from a territory having a more rudimentary and less autonomous form of government which it considered Alaska possessed.
To this signification and distinction the arguments of counsel are addressed, and much of the reasoning of the lower courts. That field, however, has been traversed by cases in this court, and it need not again be passed over. We may accept and apply the conclusions which have been reached and expressed.
In the case of Steamer Coquitlam v. United States, 163 U. S. 346, the relation of the courts of Alaska to the Federal judicial system and the applicability of certain statutes concerning the same were decided, after a review of those statutes and those defining the status of Alaska.
By the fifteenth section of the act of March 3, 1891, creating the Circuit Court of Appeals, it is provided that the Circuit Court of Appeals^ in cases in which the judgments of the Circuit Courts of Appeal are made final by this act, shall have “the same appellate jurisdiction, by writ of error or appeal, to review the judgments, orders, and decrees of the supreme courts of the several Territories as by this act they may have to review the judgments, orders, and decrees of the district courts and circuit courts; and for that purpose the several Territories shall, by orders of the supreme court, to be made from time to time, be assigned to particular circuits.” 26 Stat. 826, 830, c. 517.
In execution of the duty imposed by that section, this p. 481court, by an order promulgated May 11, 1891, assigned Alaska to the Ninth Judicial Circuit.
Subsequent to this order the United States brought a suit in admiralty in the District Court of Alaska for the forfeiture of the steamer Coquitlam because of an alleged violation of the revenue laws. A decree was rendered for the United States and an appeal was prosecuted to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The United States disputed the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds: (1) that the District Court of Alaska was not a district court within the meaning of the sixth section of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act; and (2) that the District Court of Alaska was not a Supreme Court of a Territory within the meaning of that act and the order of this court assigning Alaska to the Ninth Circuit.
The court certified the questions to this court. We answered the first in the negative and the second in the affirmative. We said, through Mr. Justice Harlan, that the Circuit Court of Appeals Act was necessarily interpreted by this court as conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the Circuit Court of Appeals when by the “ order of May 11, 1891, 139 U. S. 707, Alaska was assigned to the Ninth Circuit.” And it was further said (p. 352):“ Alaska is one of the Territories of the United States. It was so designated in that order and has always been so regarded. And the court established by the act of 1884 (providing for a civil government for Alaska) is the court of last resort within the limits of that Territory. ... No reason can be suggested why a Territory of the United States, in which the court of last resort is called a Supreme Court, should be assigned to some circuit established by Congress that does not apply with full force to the Territory of Alaska, in which the court of last resort is designated as the District Court of Alaska. The title of the territorial court is not so material as its character.”
The case needs no comment. It clearly defines the vol. ccxxiv—31 p. 482relation of Alaska to the rest of the United States. It was not a description of a definite area of land or “landed possession,” but of a political unit, governing and being governed as such.
This view is reinforced by other cases. In Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 490, 491, we said, through Mr. Justice Brewer, that we had held in Steamer Coquitlam v. United States that “Alaska is one of the Territories of the United States.” And also: “Nor can it be doubted that it is an organized Territory, for the act of May 17, 1884, 23 Stat. 24, entitled ‘An act providing a civil government for Alaska,’ provided: That the territory ceded to the United States by Russia by the treaty of March thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and known as Alaska, shall constitute a civil and judicial district, the government of which shall be organized and administered as hereinafter provided.”
In Binns v. United States the fact of a local legislature, or indeed any special form of government, was not considered as necessarily a feature of an organized Territory. “It must be remembered,” it was said, “that Congress in the government of the Territories as well as of the District of Columbia, has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution, that the form of government it shall establish is not prescribed, and may not necessarily be the same in all the Territories.” There is much more in that case which might be quoted as establishing that the status of Alaska is that of an organized Territory. See also Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516.
It is contended further by the Commission that railways were first authorized to be constructed in Alaska by the act passed May 14, 1898, 30 Stat. 409, c. 299, and that § 2 of the act provided as follows:
“That all charges for the transportation of freight and passengers on railroads in the District of Alaska shall be p. 483printed and posted as required by section six of an Act to regulate commerce as amended on March second, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, and such rates shall be subject to revision and modification by the Secretary of the Interior.”
The argument is that this provision brings into force § 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and that, it is said, “ under familiar rules of construction, excludes the application of every other section in the act,” and that, besides, the provision that the rates on the Alaskan railroads should be subject to revision and modification by the Secretary of the Interior “negatived the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, even if Alaska was apprehended to be within section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act.”
These contentions do not seem to have been made in either the Supreme Court of the District or in the Court of Appeals. It was referred to very briefly as a circumstance to be considered in a majority report of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the ruling case, and more at length in the minority report. In the latter report important circumstances were pointed out. The Interstate Commerce law preceded that which gave authority to the Secretary of the Interior to revise and modify railroad rates, and the authority was confined to that special exercise, and, so far, it may be said to have amended the Interstate Commerce Act. At that time it had been held in the Maximum Rate Cases (162 U. S. 184; 167 U. S. 479, and 168 U. S. 144), that Congress had not conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the legislative power to prescribe rates, either maximum, minimum or absolute. The power to prescribe a rate was conferred by the amendment of June 29, 1906, and that amendment extended the provisions of the act for the first time to intraterritorial commerce. The amendment made the act completely comprehensive of the whole subject and. p. 484entirely superseded the minor authority which had been conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior. As said by the minority of the Commission: “There is no suggestion of doubt that the ends of justice require as much the application of the same principle and regulation in Alaska as in New Mexico or Arizona.” The two latter at the time this was said were Territories.
It is next contended by the Commission that “mandamus is not a proper proceeding to correct an error of law like that alleged in the petition.”
The general principle which controls the issue of a writ of mandamus is familiar. It can be issued to direct the performance of a ministerial act, but not to control discretion. It may be directed against a tribunal or one who acts in a judicial capacity to require it or him to proceed, the manner of doing so being left to its or his discretion. It is true there may be a jurisdiction to determine the possession of jurisdiction. Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 363. But the full doctrine of that case cannot be extended to administrative officers. The Interstate Commerce Commission is purely an administrative body. It is true it may exercise and must exercise quasi judicial duties, but its functions are defined and, in the main, explicitly directed by the act creating it. It may act of its own motion in certain instances—it may be petitioned to move by those having rights under the act. It may exercise judgment and discretion, and, it may be, cannot be controlled in either. But if it absolutely refuse to act, deny its power, from a misunderstanding of the law, it cannot be said to exercise discretion. Give it that latitude and yet give it the power to nullify its most essential duties, and how would its non-action be reviewed? The answer of the Commission is, by “a reversal by the tribunal of appeal.” And such a tribunal, it is intimated, is the United States Commerce Court.
But the proposition is plainly without merit, even p. 485although it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that the Commerce Court is by law vested with the exclusive power to review any and every act of the Commission taken in the exertion of the authority conferred upon it by statute; that is, to exclusively review, not only affirmative orders of the Commission granting relief, but also the action of that body in refusing to award relief on the ground that an applicant was not entitled to relief. This is so because the action of the Commission refusing to entertain a petition on the ground that its subject-matter was not within the scope of the powers conferred upon it, would not be embraced within the hypothetical concessions thus made. A like view disposes of the cases relied upon in which it was decided that certain departmental orders were not susceptible of being reviewed by mandamus. We do not propose to review the cases, as we consider them to be plainly inapposite to the subject in hand.
In the case at bar the Commission refused to proceed at all, though the law required it to do so; and to so do as required—that is, to take jurisdiction, not in what manner to exercise it—is the effect of the decree of the Court of Appeals, the order of the court being that a peremptory writ of mandamus be issued directing the Commission “to take jurisdiction of said cause and proceed therein as by law required.” In other words, to proceed to the merits of the controversy, at which point the Commission stopped because it was “constrained to hold,” as it said, “upon authority of the decision recently announced in In the Matter of Jurisdiction Over Rail and Water Carriers Operating in Alaska, 19 I. C. C. Rep. 81, that the Commission is without jurisdiction to make the order sought by complainant,” the steamship company.
Judgment affirmed.
WASHINGTON HOME FOR INCURABLES v. AMERICAN SECURITY AND TRUST COMPANY.
VERMILLION v. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY.
APPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF AN APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND FOR A WRIT OF ERROR TO THE SAME.
Submitted April 15, 1912.—Decided April 29, 1912.
Section 299 of the Judicial Code of March 3,1911, 36 Stat. 1087, c. 231, saving suits pending on appeal, does not give the right of appeal from judgments of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in cases covered by the statutes repealed by the Judicial Code and in which the cause of action accrued prior to January 1, 1912, but which were not decided by the Court of Appeals until after that date. Appeal from 40 Washington Law Reporter, 146, denied. Writ of error to review 40 Washington Law Reporter, 228, denied.
The facts, which, involve the construction of the provisions of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, in regard to appeals to this court from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Henry B. F. Macfarland, Mr. Charles Cowles Tucker and Mr. J. Miller Kenyon for petitioner The Washington Home for Incurables:
The saving clause of the Judicial Code, § 299, clearly preserves the right of appeal in this case. Its language would have to be wrested from its evident meaning to bar the appeal.
Giving to the language of § 299 the consideration warranted by the familiar canons of construction of statutes will show that the intention, and the action of Congress, p. 487contemplated the continuance of the right of appeal in this cause.
For the canons of construction of statutes, or decisions respecting them, see summary, 1 Fed. Stat., Ann., pp. VIII to CXXX, on statutes and statutory construction.
In the light of reason an examination of the Judicial Code as affected by § 299 shows that it cannot bar appeals covered by the saving clause as in this case.
If, as may be claimed, the intention of Congress was simply to preserve the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over writs of error and appeals in cases actually pending on the first day of January, 1912, in the Supreme Court of the United States itself, and not in any appellate or other court below, Congress could and would have said so in a very few words.
If Congress meant to preserve only appeals pending in the Supreme Court it should and would have said so, as in former acts, in explicit terms. For other instances, see Act of March 3,1873,17 Stat. 485, c. 223; Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1115; Act of January 20, 1897, 29 Stat. 492.
Section 299 is unnecessary for any other purpose than that suggested in this case.
In cutting off a privilege of appeal enjoyed by the National Capital for more than a century, Congress gave days of grace at least as to pending cases.
Mr. Joseph W. Cox and Mr. John A. Kratz, Jr., for petitioner Vermillion:
The plain words of § 299 expressly saves the jurisdiction which this court had under the act of February 9, 1893, 27 Stat. 436.
The section is very comprehensive, and provides that the appeal of existing laws shall not affect: (a) any act done, or any right accruing or accrued; (b) any suit or proceeding pending at the time of the taking effect of this act; (c) any suit or proceeding pending on writ of p. 488error, appeal certificate, or writ of certiorari in any appellate court referred to or included within the provisions of the act at the time of its taking effect.
The act further provides that, “all such suits and proceedings and suits and proceedings for causes arising or acts done prior to such date, may be commenced and prosecuted within the same time, and with the same effect, as if said repeal or amendments had not been made.”
The meaning plainly to be deduced from a reading of this section is that Congress was leaving unaffected proceedings under the repealed laws in pending cases, and also proceedings in causes arising, or acts done prior to such date. The words of this section are not ambiguous, but leave the intent of Congress plain, and this court has decided that under such circumstances it will not give construction to an act of Congress. Dewey v. United States, 178 U. S. 510; United States v. Union P. R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72.
While one of the effects of § 299 is to accomplish just what the Court of Appeals declares it does, the section is far more comprehensive in its effective operation than that ascribed to it by that court.
Congress used the words of this section in their plain and natural meaning, as is clearly shown by the legislative history of the section and its comparison with §§ 5597 and 5599, Rev. Stat, of 1873, from which its language was taken. See the bill as originally reported to the Senate, S. 7031 and to the House, H. R. 23,377; Sen. Report, 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. of Special Joint Committee on Revision and Codification of the Laws of the United States.
Where Congress in a subsequent act adopts the provisions of a former act and in the main its language, it must be presumed that Congress intended the provisions of the subsequent law to accomplish the same thing and to have the same force and effect as the earlier law. p. 489Especially is this so where the courts have construed the earlier Jaw, before the enactment of the subsequent law, to be in harmony with the plain meaning of the words employed. Bechtel v. United States, 101 U. S. 597; May v. County of Logan, 30 Fed. Rep. 250.
The plain words of the section, its legislative history, and this court’s construction of prior laws in pari materia all show that the intention of Congress was to save this court’s jurisdiction in a case like that at bar.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
These are applications for the allowance of an appeal and writ of error, respectively. The cases come before the court under the same circumstances as the application for a writ of error just decided. American Security & Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, post, p. 491.
The first named is a bill in equity that was pending in the Court of Appeals on January 1, 1912, and decided on March 4, 1912. The matter in dispute in both, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of five thousand dollars. The law before the enactment of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, allowed a writ of error or appeal in such cases, act of February 9, 1893, c. 74, § 8, 27 Stat. 434, 436, and the applicants contend that the appeal and writ of error are rights saved by § 299 of the Code. That section is as follows: “The repeal of existing laws, or the amendments thereof, embraced in this Act, shall not affect any act done, or any right accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceeding, including those pending on writ of error, appeal, certificate, or writ of certiorari, in any appellate court referred to or included within, the provisions of this Act, pending at the time of the taking effect of this Act, but all such suits and proceedings, and suits and proceedings for causes arising or acts done prior to such date, may be commenced and prosecuted within p. 490the same time, and with the same effect, as if said repeal or amendments had not been made.” This act took effect when this suit was pending in the Court of Appeals, on January 1, 1912.
The purpose of the act in the matter of appeals from the Court of Appeals of the District was to make a substantial change and to do away with them except in classes of cases of which this is not one. There seems to be little if any more reason for preserving a further appeal in cases then before the Court of Appeals than there is in those in which no writ had been sued out, but the cause of action had accrued before January 1, 1912, which is nothing at all. It must appear clearly, therefore, that this case is saved or it will fall under the general rule. We find no clear expression of such intent. The general provision that the repeal shall not affect any right or suit, is ambiguous and is qualified and explained by the words ‘including those pending on appeal,’ etc., which suggest that but for them appeals already taken would have fallen. Baltimore & Potomac R. R. Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398. If express words were thought necessary to save pending appeals, a fortiori such words were needed to save appeals not yet taken, and no such words were used. The first part of the section, declaring what shall not happen, is elucidated by the antithetical statement, in the last part, of what shall take place. We gather from that that all suits upon causes of action that arose before January 1 stand alike. We cannot suppose that a suit not yet begun can be taken to this court on the ground that a sum of more than $5,000 is involved, and we are of opinion that the applicant makes no better case. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the act saves jurisdiction when an appeal has been taken, but does not save an appeal for all suits in causes of action accrued before this year.
Leave to appeal and writ of error denied. p. 491AMERICAN SECURITY AND TRUST COMPANY v. COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Submitted April 15, 1912.—Decided April 29,1912.
The jurisdiction of this court to reexamine final judgments or decrees of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia under § 250 of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, c. 231, in cases in which the construction of a law of the United States is drawn in question, does not extend to cases where the act of Congress construed by that court is a purely local law relating to the District of Columbia, but only extends to those having a general application throughout the United States.
In construing a statute the same phrase may have different meanings when used in different connections.
Section 250 of the Judicial Code should be strictly construed, as the intent of Congress was to relieve this court from indiscriminate appeals where the amount involved exceeded $5,000.
All cases in the District of Columbia arise under acts of Congress; and to so construe § 250 of the Judicial Code as to include the case at bar, because the construction of a local street extension act was involved, would largely and irrationally increase the appellate jurisdiction and the statute will not be construed so as to include such cases even if within its literal meaning. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 437.
Writ of error to review 40 Washington Law Reporter, 34, denied.
The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, in regard to appeals to this court from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Win. G. Johnson for petitioner:
The jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based upon § 250, Judicial Code, providing that any final judgment or decree of the Court p. 492of Appeals of the District of Columbia may be reexamined and affirmed, reversed, or modified by this court upon writ of error or appeal, when the construction of any law of the United States is drawn in question by the defendant.
Upon this provision of the statute but two questions can arise affecting the jurisdiction of this court; namely, (1) was the construction of the above-recited statutes drawn in question by the defendant, and (2) are those statutes within the descriptive words “any law of the United States,” as those words are used in § 250 of the Judicial Code.
In this case the construction of the statutes was drawn in question by the defendants.
The statute is, itself, an instruction to the jury, and the instruction objected to by defendants and the one asked by defendants, of necessity, drew in question the construction of the statute.
The words “any law of the United States” embrace the statutes, the construction of which was drawn in question in this case.
The two acts of Congress, the construction of which was drawn in question in this case, are laws of the United States. Every legislative act of the Congress, whether local or general, is a law of the United States, and is so defined in the Constitution.
While it is freely conceded that the word “any” like other words, may have a greater or less extensiveness, according to the intent with which it is used, still, in general, it embraces each and every object in the class to which it is applied. United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1.
Uniformity of statutory construction is not the object or effect of the statute.
The appellate jurisdiction conferred upon this court by clause 6 of § 250, novel in the legislation of Congress on the subject of appellate jurisdiction, and extending to but p. 493one court in the entire judicial system of the Nation, cannot, by any possibility, even tend to produce uniformity of decisions as to the construction of laws of the United States of national application. Being wholly unadapted and incompetent to produce uniformity of decision, the clause in question cannot properly be said to have been framed with that object, in the absence of any such declared purpose in the statute, and the inference, that the clause should be confined to general statutes of the United States as distinguished from those of purely local application, based, as it is, upon that supposed purpose of the legislature, is without foundation. See Parsons v. Dist. of Col., 170 U. S. 45: Balt. & Pot. R. R. v. Hopkins, 130 U. S. 210.
Nor is the relief of this court involved; whether this was the intention of the act admits of serious question. No such purpose is declared in the statute and it is not to be inferred from provisions expressly conferring additional appellate jurisdiction upon this court.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an application for a writ of error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia under the new Judicial Code. Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231. 36 Stat. 1087. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. Thereupon application was made to the Chief Justice. He referred it to the court. Briefs were called for and one was submitted by the applicants. It now is to be decided whether the writ should be allowed.
By § 250 of the Code any final judgment or decree of the Court of Appeals may be reexamined ‘in the following cases: . . . Sixth. In cases in which the construction of any law of the United States is drawn in question by the defendant.’ This is the clause relied upon. The case was a suit for the condemnation of land brought by the Commissioners under a special act of p. 494February 6, 1909, c. 75, 35 Stat. 597, for the extension of New York Avenue. By that act the procedure was to follow subchapter one of chapter fifteen of the District Code, which provides among other things for the separate assessment of benefits. Act of March 3, 1901, c. 854. 31 Stat. 1189, 1266. The jury were instructed that by the extension of the avenue they were to understand its establishment, laying out and completion for all the ordinary uses of a public thoroughfare. The applicants contended that, as there was no present provision for grading, paving, laying water mains or sewers, or otherwise opening the avenue to traffic, any advantage that would accrue from such improvements if made must be disregarded; and so they say that they drew the construction of the special act and perhaps of the Code in question, and that these were laws of the United States.
We do not stop to consider whether any question of construction properly can be said to have been raised, rather than a question of general law in the application of words that were colorless so far as the point in controversy was concerned. It might not be just to assume that the general averment of the application was not justified by exceptions more clearly turning on the construction of the local laws than the example given in the brief. The ground on which the writ was refused by the Court of Appeals was that the words quoted from § 250 should not be construed to apply to the purely local laws of the District, and with that view we agree.
Of course there is no doubt that the special act of Congress was in one sense a law of the United States. It well may be that it would fall within the meaning of the same words in the third clause of the same section: ‘Cases involving the constitutionality of any law of the United States.’ Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45. But it needs no authority to show that the same phrase may have different meanings in different connections.
Some reasons for strict construction apply here. We are entirely convinced that Congress intended to effect a substantial relief to this court from indiscriminate appeals where a sum above $5,000 was involved, and to that end repealed the former act. See Carey v. Houston & Texas Central Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 170, 179. Cochran v. Montgomery County, 199 U. S. 260, 272, 273. But all cases in the District arise under acts of Congress and probably it would require little ingenuity to raise a question of construction in almost any one of them. If, then, the words have the meaning given them by the applicants the appellate jurisdiction of this court has been largely and irrationally increased. We believe Congress meant no such result.
A well-known example of construing a statute not to include a case that indisputably was within its literal meaning, but was believed not to be within the aim of Congress, is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; we may refer further to Cochran v. Montgomery County, ubi supra. In the case at bar if the words ‘construction of any law of the United States’ are confined to the construction of laws having general application throughout the United States the jurisdiction given to this court by § 250 is confined to what naturally and properly belongs to it. If they are construed the other way it would have been less arbitrary to provide that every question of law could be taken up. That they were not to be understood as the applicant contends is to be inferred not only from the sense of the thing but from clause first: ‘In cases where the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue,’ with provision for certifying that question alone. It is difficult to imagine a case in which the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue where the construction of a special law of the United States would not be drawn in question.
Writ of error denied.