Werckmeister v. Am. Tobacco Co., 207 U.S. 375 (1907)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Werckmeister v. Am. Tobacco Co., 207 U.S. 375 (1907)
Full caption
WERCKMEISTER v. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Dec. 16, 1907
WERCKMEISTER v. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT.
No. 29. Argued October 30, 1907.—Decided December 16, 1907.
Section 4965, Rev. Stat., as amended by the act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 965, is penal in nature and cannot be extended by construction; it contemplates a single action for the recovery of plates and copies infringing a copyright, and for the money penalty for the copies found. Such an action is wholly statutory and all the remedies given by the statutes must be exhausted therein, and after the owner of the copyright has recovered judgment for possession of the plates and copies he cannot maintain a separate action to recover the money penalty.
There is no requirement in § 4965, Rev. Stat., that the United States shall be a party to the action provided for the recovery of plates and copies found
Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 207 U. S.
and for penalties; the evident purpose of that section is that the proprietor of the copyright shall account to the United States for one-half the money penalty recovered. 148 Fed. Rep. 1022, affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of § 4965, Rev. Stats., as amended by the act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 965, and the nature of the action to recover penalties thereunder for violation of copyright, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Antonio Knauth for plaintiff in error:
The words used in the statute admit of no other construction than that the two remedies, the recovery of the unlawful sheets and the recovery of the money penalty, are cumulative remedies to which the plaintiff is entitled, and it has been uniformly so held.
Previous to the decision in this case by the Circuit Court there was no decision by any court that the two remedies must be sought in one action. Whenever the money penalty is sought to be recovered for sheets which have been found in the defendant’s possession, there must be a previous action for the recovery of the sheets and the finding of the sheets therein by means of proper process. Thornton v. Schreiber, 124 U. S. 612; Falk v. Curtis Pub. Co., 107 Fed. Rep. 126, 128.
There are intrinsic differences in the actions for the forfeiture of the property and for the payment of the money penalty. The action for the recovery of the forfeited articles is an action in rem. The property in the articles remains in the owner until it is seized, and then by the seizure the title relates back to the time of the forfeiture. Clark v. Protection Ins. Co., 1 Story, 134; United States v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee, 8 Cranch, 398; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 311; United States v. Baker, 5 Ben. 28; Fontaine v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 292; Amory v. McGregor, 15 Johns. 23; Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44, 56; Thacher's Distilled Spirits, 103 U. S. 679; The Mary Celeste, 2 Lowell, 356.
WERCKME1STER v. AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. 377
207 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error.
The action for the recovery of forfeited articles is always regarded as an action in rem. United States v. Spring Valley Distillery, 11 Blatch. 267. As the action for the recovery of the forfeited articles is an action in rem, the court has jurisdiction over the forfeited articles, whenever they are within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and personal service of process upon the defendant in the action is not an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of the action. The court would have power to call in the defendant by publication or service of the summons outside of the State. Act of March 3, 1875, § 8 (18 Stat, at L. 470, 472), amending Rev. Stat., § 738; also 25 Stat. 434; Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co., 177 U. S. 1; Mellen v. Moline, 131 U. S. 352.
The defendant American Tobacco Company being a New Jersey corporation, this court had undoubtedly jurisdiction to proceed in the replevin action without personal service, but no jurisdiction to proceed to a decree in the personal action unless the defendant appeared or could be found in this jurisdiction. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 46.
On the other hand, the action to be brought for the recovery of the money penalty is a personal action, and can be maintained only when the defendant is personally found within the jurisdiction of the court. The term “forfeit” as applied to a money penalty, means only that the offender shall be made to pay the amount. It means a fine, a mulct. In re Levy, 30 Ch. Div. 119; Merchants' Bank v. Bliss, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 370; Ex parte Alexander, 30 Mo. App. 108; People v. Nedrow, 122 Illinois, 367; Commonwealth v. Avery, 14 Bush (Ky.), 638; Taylor v. Steamer Marcella, 1 Woods, 304.
The fiction that the title to forfeited property dates back to the time of the commission of the wrong is applied because convenience and justice require its application. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 208.
It is quite different with the money penalty, which cannot be dated back any further than to the day of finding the sheets in defendant’s possession, because that very finding
Argument for Defendant in Error. 207 U. S.
is a condition precedent to the accruing of the money penalty.
As to the sheets, the plaintiff has an inchoate title, which exists as soon as they are wrongfully made, and this inchoate title ripens into a complete title upon condemnation. As to the recovery of the money penalty he can have no such inchoate right; it is a mere claim for payment which arises only after the finding.
It follows from the different nature of the two remedies which are required to enforce the two distinct forfeitures under the statute, that there will be frequently cases where they cannot be combined.
If the property is found in one State, in the hands of an agent or employé, while the offender resides in another State, he could not be sued in the State of his residence, because the property could not be found therein. Neither could he be sued in the State where the property was found, because for the purposes of a personal action the court will have no jurisdiction over him. If the rule should be established that one suit only can be brought, the plaintiff would lose the money penalty in such a case, if the two remedies must be combined.
Mr. William A. Jenner for defendant in error:
A second and separate action will not lie for penalties after a judgment in a former distinct action for forfeiture of sheets.
There cannot be two actions, one for the forfeiture of sheets, the other for the money penalty.
There is only one offense committed by doing one or other or all the things mentioned in § 4965. Bolles v. Outing Co., 77 Fed. Rep. 966; 5. C., 175 U. S. 266.
The solution of the matter seems to be to permit in one action a forfeiture of sheets found in possession when it is commenced and in the same action to adjudge the penalties for the sheets so found.
207 U. S. Opinion of the Court.
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court.
This case was argued and submitted with American Tobacco Company v. Werckmeister, decided December 2, 1907, ante, p. 284.
The present action was brought to recover, under § 4965, Revised Statutes, relating to copyright (3 U. S. Compiled Stat. 3414), the penalties of $10 each, for 1,196 sheets of the alleged infringing publications claimed to have been found in the defendant’s possession and seized by the United States marshals, under the two writs of replevin described in that suit.
Plaintiff in error, Werckmeister, offered in evidence the judgment roll in the former suit, with the pleadings and judgment, and also offered in evidence the writs and returns of the marshals for the Southern and Western Districts of New York, respectively, showing seizures of 203 copies and 993 copies; the court excluded these writs as immaterial. No other evidence being offered, the court instructed the jury to render a verdict for the defendant, and judgment was afterwards rendered accordingly upon the verdict. 138 Fed. Rep. 162. On writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals the judgment below was affirmed, 148 Fed. Rep. 1022, and this writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
This action requires the construction of § 4965, Rev. Stat., as amended March 2,1895,28 Stat.965 (U.S. Compiled Stat., vol. 3, p. 3414), which is as follows:
“Sec. 4965. If any person, after the recording of the title of any map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, print, cut, engraving, or photograph, or chromo, or of the description of any painting, drawing, statue, statuary, or model or design intended to be perfected and executed as a work of the fine arts, as provided by this act, shall, within the term hmited, contrary to the provisions of this act, and without the consent of the proprietor of the copyright first obtained in writing, signed in presence of two or more witnesses, engrave, etch, p. 380work, copy, print, publish, dramatize, translate, or import, either in whole or in part, or by varying the main design, with intent to evade the law, or, knowing the same to be so printed, published, dramatized, translated, or imported, shall sell or expose to sale any copy of such map or other article, as aforesaid, he shall forfeit to the proprietor all the plates on which the same shall be copied, and every sheet thereof, either copied or printed, and shall further forfeit one dollar for every sheet of the same found in his possession, either printing, printed, copied, published, imported, or exposed for sale; and in case of a painting, statue or statuary, he shall forfeit ten dollars for every copy of the same in his possession, or by him sold or exposed for sale: Provided, however, That in case of any such infringement of the copyright of a photograph made from any object not a work of fine arts, the sum to be recovered in any action brought under the provisions of this section shall be not less than one hundred dollars, nor more than five thousand dollars, And: Provided further, That in case of any such infringement of the copyright of a painting, drawing, statue, engraving, etching, print or model or design for a work of the fine arts or of a photograph of a work of the fine arts, the sum to be recovered in any action brought through the provisions of this section shall be not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, and not more than ten thousand dollars. One-half of all the foregoing penalties shall go to the proprietors of the copyright and the other half to the use of the United States.”
As with the sections of the copyright act under consideration in Tobacco Company v. Werckmeister, ante, this section has been the subject of consideration in the Federal courts, with different conclusions as to its purport and meaning. While the statute provides for the forfeiture of the plates and sheets and for the sum of $10 in case of a painting, for every copy found in the offending person’s possession or sold by him, it is silent as to the kind of action to be brought, and we are left to discover the meaning of the act in this respect from a consideration of the p. 381language used, read in the light of the objects and purposes to be effected.
Obviously the statute does not provide a proceeding in rem, as is sometimes done in the revenue laws, for the act is levelled against any person who shall, contrary to its provisions, without consent, etc., engrave, work, copy, print, etc., forfeit to the proprietor the plates and sheets and a sum of money for each sheet, etc., found in his possession. This section of the statute is penal, and there should be especial care to work no extension of its provisions by construction. Statutory provisions similar to those above cited have been the subject of consideration in a number of cases in this court. In Backus n. Gould, 7 How. 798, it was held that there could be no recovery for publishing sheets, copyright matter, etc., unless the same were found in the possession of the defendant. In Stevens v. Cady, 2 Curtis, 200; >8. C., Fed. Cases No. 13,395, Mr. Justice Curtis, sitting at the circuit, held there could be no accounting for the penalties in an action in equity, and that the proprietor of the copyright was left by the act to his remedy at law by trover or replevin. In Thornton v. Schreiber, 124 U. S. 612, it was held that action would not he against Thornton, who was the business manager of Sharpless & Son, of Philadelphia, in whose store the prints in question in that case were found, and in speaking for the court Mr. Justice Miller, who delivered the opinion in that case, said (p. 620):
“Counsel for defendants in error, Schreiber & Sons, insist that the words 1 found in his possession ’ are to be construed as referring to the finding of the jury; that the expression means simply that where the sheets are ascertained by the finding of the jury to have been at any time in the possession of the person who committed the wrongful act, such person shall forfeit one dollar for each sheet so ascertained to have been in his possession. We, however, think that the word Hound’ means that there must be a time before the cause of action accrues at which they are found in the possession of the defendant.”
This language was held in Falk v. Curtis Pub. Co., 102 Fed. p. 382Rep. 967, 971, affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Falk v. Curtis Pub. Co., 107 Fed. Rep. 126, to mean that before the action for the penalty would he there must be a finding of the articles in the possession of the defendant by means of a proceeding instituted for the express purpose of condemnation and forfeiture, and that an action of assumpsit brought at the same time with the action of replevin was premature.
In the case of Bolles v. The Outing Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 966, Judge Wallace, who spoke for the Court of Appeals in that case, said (p. 968):
“The statute is apparently framed to give the party whose copyright has been invaded complete relief by an action in which he can procure a condemnation of the infringing sheets, and at the same time recover, by way of compensation, a penalty for every sheet which he is entitled to condemn. The words ‘ found in his possession ’ aptly refer to a finding for the purposes of forfeiture and condemnation. The remedy by condemnation and forfeiture is only appropriate in a case where the property can be seized upon process; and where, as here, the forfeiture declared is against property of the ‘offender,’ it is only appropriate when it can be seized in his hands. The section contemplates two remedies, enforceable in a single suit, each of which depends upon the same state of facts. The aggrieved party may, at his election, pursue either one or both remedies. But it does not contemplate a recovery of penalties, except in respect to the sheets which can be condemned.”
And in Bolles v. The Outing Co., 175 U. S. 262,266, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Brown, observed:
“No remedy is provided by the act, although by section 4970 a bill in equity will lie for an injunction, but the provision for a forfeiture of the plates and of the copies seems to contemplate an action in the nature of replevin for their seizure, and in addition to the confiscation of the copies, for a recovery of one dollar for every copy so seized or found in the possession of the defendant.”
And in that case the view expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was approved (175 U. S. 268), and while the point was not necessarily involved, we think the indication in Bolles v. The Outing Company, that a single action inzthe nature of replevin for the recovery of plates and copies and a penalty for copies found, is correct.
We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that the language in Thornton v. Schreiber, above quoted, was not intended to indicate that an action declaring the forfeiture was required by the statute before the adjudication of the articles to the plaintiff, as is generally necessary in actions of forfeiture (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 518), but that the true construction of the statute, and the one intended to be indicated by Mr. Justice Miller, is that before the penalty can be recovered it is necessary that the sheets be actually found in the possession of the defendant. As we have said, this section of the statute is highly penal {Bolles v. The Outing Co., supra), and there is nothing in its terms to indicate that the offender is to be subjected to more than one action; on the contrary, the provisions of the section seem to point clearly to the conclusion that when the offender is brought into court, under this section, he shall forfeit to the proprietor the plates on which the articles shall be copied and every sheet thereof, whether copied or printed, “and shall further forfeit one dollar for every sheet of the same found in his possession,” etc., and in case of a painting, etc., “ he shall forfeit ten dollars for every copy of the same in his possession, or by him sold or exposed for sale.”
There is nothing in this section which seems to contemplate the method of procedure pursued in this case, namely, a separate action for the money penalty, upon the theory that it arose only in case of actual finding and judgment of condemnation, hut the statute contemplates the bringing of the offender into court in one suit, in which the plates and sheets shall be seized and forfeited and the penalty recovered.
If it had been the intention of Congress to provide two p. 384actions, one for the forfeiture of the plates, sheets, etc., and another for the recovery of the money penalty, it would have been easy to have said so. Likewise, had it been the intention of Congress to permit a recovery for the money penalty only after judgment of forfeiture had gone in favor of the plaintiff, it would have been equally as easy to have made such provision.
Until Congress shall provide otherwise, and this section might well be made more specific as to the nature and character of the remedy given, we think this section intended to provide, in a single action, all the remedy which is within its scope, and that to construe it as requiring two actions would be extending a penal act beyond the provisions incorporated in its terms.
In reaching this conclusion we have not overlooked the fact that one-half of the penalties go to the proprietors of the copyright and one-half to the United States. There is no requirement that the United States shall be a party to the action, and we think the purpose of the statute was to make the proprietor of the copyright accountable to the United States for one-half of the money penalty recovered.
Upon this construction of the statute the plaintiff in error had exhausted his remedy in the judgment rendered in the first suit, and as the action is wholly statutory and no second action is given as we construe the act, the court was without power to award the second judgment in the separate action for the money penalty, and the Circuit Court properly directed the verdict for the defendant below.
The judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
WATER, LIGHT AND GAS COMPANY OF HUTCHINSON v. THE CITY OF HUTCHINSON, KANSAS.
SAME v. SAME.
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.
Nos. 53, 54. Argued October 24, 1907.—Decided December 23, 1907.
A grant conferring a privilege is not necessarily a grant making that privilege exclusive.
Grants by the State to municipal corporations, like grants to private corporations, are to be strictly construed, and the power to grant an exclusive privilege must be expressly given, or, if inferred from other powers, must be indispensable, and not merely convenient, to them. Citizens’ Street Railway v. Detroit, 171 U. S. 48.
The Kansas statutes for the government of cities, as construed by the highest court of that State, do not confer on cities of the second class the power to grant exclusive franchises and, in the absence of such power expressly conferred, the exclusive features of an ordinance of such a city granting an exclusive franchise are invalid. Vicksburg n. Waterworks Co., 206 U. S. 496, distinguished. 144 Fed. Rep. 256, affirmed.
The ultimate question in these cases is the validity of Ordinance No. 402 of the city of Hutchinson, which took effect March 17, 1897, and by which the Water, Light and Gas Company claims to have, for the period of twenty years from such date, the exclusive right and privilege of supplying the city and its inhabitants with water, and with light, heat and power by means of electricity and gas.
On the nineteenth of December, 1905, the city enacted and published Ordinance No. 651, granting permits to Emerson Carey and others, their successors and assigns, to construct and operate a street railway in and along the streets of the city, and to construct and. operate electric and gas plants for the purposes for which electricity may be used.
These suits were brought to command the city and those claiming under Ordinance No. 651, to “desist from doing any vol. covii—25
Statement of the Case. 207 U. S.
acts or exercising any pretenses of right to act” under the ordinance which will in anywise affect the exclusive right of the Water, Light and Gas Company “to furnish the city and its inhabitants with electric or gas light for lighting and heating purposes or power, except for street cars and electric railways, and also from making or proceeding to make any contract for furnishing light or gas to said city and its inhabitants” until the expiration of the “franchises and contracts” of that company.
The cases went off on demurrers to the bills. The Circuit Court, assuming that Ordinance No. 402 was exclusive in its terms and was intended to be so by the city, held that the city did not possess the power, either inherent or under the law of its creation, to make a contract binding and exclusive of all others, and entered decrees dismissing the bills. 144 Fed. Rep. 256.
The facts are: In 1885 the city granted to the Holly Manufacturing Company, its successors and assigns, an exclusive right to build and operate waterworks for twenty years. The company erected and operated the works until the subsequent assignment of its rights.
In the same year the city granted to the Interstate Gas Company the right to erect and maintain gas works for the period of twenty-one years; and in 1886 granted to Drake and Orton the right for the period of twenty years to construct and operate an electric light plant. The latter right, and those granted to the two companies, passed by successive assignments, with the knowledge and consent of the city, to the Water, Light and Power Company, and existed in that company at the time of the passage of Ordinance No. 402.
The various companies expended in the aggregate on the construction of their plants and equipment $400,000, to secure which the Hutchinson Water, Light and Power Company executed a mortgage upon all the water, light and gas rights and franchises and properties.
Subsequently, the city became financially embarrassed, so
WATER, LIGHT & GAS CO. v. HUTCHINSON. 387
207 U. S. Statement of the Case.
that before the year 1897 it had become indebted for hydrant rentals in the sum of $12,800 in excess of its ability to pay.
On account of this default of the city the company became embarrassed and hindered in the payment of interest on its' mortgage, and its mortgage bondholders took possession of its property, and operated the plant during the year 1896 and until the readjustment of its affairs in the spring of 1897, resulting in the passage of Ordinance No. 402.
By reason of its embarrassment the company found it expedient to scale down its bonded indebtedness and secure a new franchise from the city, and in consideration of securing the same, and the readjustment of the contract obligations between the company and the city, the bondholders agreed to reduce and scale down their mortgage indebtedness from $400,000 to $212,500.
On March 5, 1897, at the earnest and repeated solicitation of the city, and in consideration of its inability to discharge its past indebtedness to the company and to pay the current indebtedness thereafter, the company agreed with the city to remit one-half of the indebtedness then due; that is, to scale it down to $6,400, and to reduce the sum thereafter, annually payable for hydrant rental from $12,800 to $6,000 for the years of the contract, and to reduce the rental for hydrants thereafter located from $60 to $36, and reduce the number of hydrants from twelve to ten per mile. These concessions and abatements were made on the condition of a renewal and extension of the franchise and contract rights of the company. And the city was to have, what it did not have before,, the right to purchase or otherwise acquire the light and gas properties at any time after ten years from the date of the renewal and adjustment. In view of these considerations and in pursuance of them the city passed Ordinance No. 402, to take effect March 17, 1897, and by that ordinance “granted to the company, its successors and assigns, for the period of twenty years from said date the exclusive privilege of supplying the city and its inhabitants with the public utilities of
Statement of the Case. 207 U. S.
water, light, heat and power by means of electric current and gas.” But it was agreed that the right for furnishing electric current or power should not be exclusive as to or for the operation of street railways, nor exclusive as to any person residing in the city, or any company doing business therein manufacturing gas or electricity for his or its own use for light or fuel. A copy of the ordinance was attached to and made part of the bill. The concessions and abatements would not have been made by the company except for the consideration of the exclusive rights and privileges granted; and the total of the reductions of monetary demands made for what was due and to become due for the period the water franchise had to run amounted to $65,240, which the company remitted from its contract rights and demands against the city. The mortgage bondholders of the Water, Light and Power Company, for the purpose of effectuating the promises and agreements between the company and the city contained in Ordinance No. 402, scaled down their indebtedness from $400,000 to $212,500 and cancelled their mortgage and accepted a substitute mortgage on the property, franchise and contracts and on its income of $212,500.
The Water, Light and Power Company, on the fourth of October, 1902, sold and transferred to the Water, Light and Gas Company, the complainant, all of its property rights and franchise, and complainant has since that date been in possession of the same, and in the fulfillment of the duties and obligations imposed on it by its purchase and said ordinance liabilities with the consent of the city, and the city has ratified and approved the same and contracted and dealt with the complainant as the successor of the Water, Light and Power Company. The Water, Light and Gas Company has since its purchase expended large sums of money in the improvement and enlargement of its properties and the service rendered by it, and has, under the direction and order of the city, extended its water mains and placed hydrants upon such extensions, and, as agreed by it, has reduced the number of hydrants on p. 389207 U. S. Statement of the Case.
its extended mains from twelve to ten per mile, and generally has complied with the orders and requests of the city, whether or not under the Ordinance No. 402 it was required to comply with such orders, all of which was done in reliance on the obligations of the city and its good faith in carrying out all the terms and conditions and provisions of Ordinance No. 402, but the city, notwithstanding, through its mayor and councilmen, on or about the nineteenth of December, 1905, enacted and published Ordinance No. 651, by which it assumed to grant to Emerson Carey and others the right and privilege for the term of twenty years thereafter of establishing and operating in the city a plant and appliances for the manufacture and sale to the city and its inhabitants of electric light and power and manufactured and natural gas, with the right and privilege to lay and construct gas mains and pipes and erect poles, and wires and all other things necessary to the maintenance of said public service in the streets, alleys and public places of the city in opposition to the business of complainant.
It is alleged that Ordinance No. 402 constitutes a contract between the city and the complainant in respect to all the rights secured, and in particular in respect to the exclusive rights and privileges thereby conferred, and that the city, by and through Ordinance No. 651, illegally and inequitably impairs the same, in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which forbids the impairment of the obligation of contracts by the several States of the Union.
Neither the city nor any of the grantees in Ordinance No. 651 have paid or tendered complainant the monetary abatement, or the reductions and concessions paid or secured to the city in consideration of the enactment of Ordinance No. 402, or to secure complainant from loss from the competition of the nval public service association or company. At the time the public service enterprises were undertaken by the grantors of complainant the city of Hutchinson had about 5,000 inhabitants, and at the time complainant succeeded to their rights about 10,000, and at both of said times it would have been
Argument for Appellant. 207 U. S.
impossible, and is now impossible, to maintain rival or competing companies in the city so as to enable either to earn a fair and reasonable income on the cost of their respective properties, and at none of the times when the complainant or its grantors undertook the work of furnishing said public necessities would it or they have done so without being secured in the enforcement thereof for a reasonable time against the competition of rival companies, nor could the large sums of money have been obtained therefor except under like security. The company has not up to this time, and will not for many years to come, have secured the repayment of the purchase price of said public service and the cost of the betterments, extensions and improvements.
The company alleges that it does not seek to prevent the granting by the city of a franchise or contract for the erection and maintenance of an electric railway in the city or elsewhere.
An injunction was prayed against the doing or exercising gny pretenses of right under Ordinance No. 651 which would in any way affect the exclusive rights of the company to furnish electricity and gas for lighting and heating purposes.
Mr. John F. Dillon and Mr. Frank Doster, with whom Mr. Harry Hubbard, Mr. Houston Whiteside and Mr. Howard S. Lewis were on the brief, for appellant:
Statutes delegating to municipalities the police power to furnish light or to procure it to be furnished are to be liberally construed to effectuate their object, and are liberally construed in Kansas. Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Michigan, 565; State v. City of Topeka, 68 Kansas, 177,182; Andrews n. National Foundry & Pipe Works, 61 Fed. Rep. 782.
Under the statutes of Kansas authorizing cities of the second class “to provide for and regulate theslighting of the streets, and to make contracts with any person, company or association for such purpose, and to give such person, company or association the privilege of furnishing light for the streets of said city for any length of time not exceeding twenty-
207 U. S. Argument for Appellant.
one years,” power was given to make an exclusive contract, such as Ordinance No. 402, for a limited and reasonable period to light the streets. General Statutes of Kansas, 1889, §§ 759, 787, 816, 817, 824, 1401 and 1402; Manley v. Emlen, 46 Kansas, 655; Wood v. Waterworks Co., 33 Kansas, 590, 597; Waterworks Co. v. City of Burlington, 43 Kansas, 725, 728; The Columbus Waterworks Co. v. The City of Columbus, 46 Kansas, 666; The Columbus Waterworks Co. v. The City of Columbus, 48 Kansas, 99; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453; City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1; State v. City of Topeka, 68 Kansas, 177; City of Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 517; Omaha Waterworks Co. v. City of Omaha, 147 Fed. Rep. 1; California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306.
Under the general power 11 to make all contracts and to do all other acts in relation to the property and affairs of the city necessary to the exercise of its corporate or administrative powers,” and under the general welfare clauses and cognate provisions of the statutes of Kansas governing cities of the second class, such cities have power to make an exclusive contract for twenty years, such as Ordinance No. 402, subject to police control, to furnish the city and its inhabitants with light. Eureka Light & Ice Co. v. City of Eureka, 5 Kans. App. 669, 676; N. C., 48 Pac. Rep. 935; Cherryvale Water Co. v. City of Cherryvale, 65 Kansas, 219, 228; Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 Indiana, 149; Manley v. Emlen, 46 Kansas, 655; Wood v. Waterworks Co., 33 Kansas, 590, 597; Waterworks Co. v. City of Burlington, 43 Kansas, 725, 728; The Columbus Waterworks Co. v. The City of Columbus, 46 Kansas, 666; S. C., 48 Kansas, 99; Ellinwood v. Reedsbury, 91 Wisconsin, 131; Greenville v. Greenville Waterworks Co., 125 Alabama, 625; Grace v. Hawkinsville, 101 Georgia, 553; Webb City Waterworks Co. v. Webb City, 78 Mo. App. 422; Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Missouri, 540; Rome v. Cabot, 28 Georgia, 50; Heilbron v. Cuthbert, 96 Georgia, 312. See also City of Newport v. Newport Light Co., 84 Kentucky, 166.
Opinion of the Court. 207 U. 8.
Mr. Max Pam, Mr. C. M. Williams and Mr. A. C. Malloy, with whom Mr. F. F. Prigg was on the brief, for appellees:
The city of Hutchinson in the State of Kansas, being a city of the second class in said State, had no power to grant an exclusive privilege or franchise to the complainant. Citizens’ Street Ry. v. Detroit Railway, 171 U. S. 48, and cases cited; Jackson County Horse R. Co. v. Interstate Rapid Transit Ry. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 307; Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. City of Arkansas City, 22 C. C. A. 179; Saginaw Gas Light Co. v. City of Saginaw, 28 Fed. Rep. 529; Vicksburg n. Vicksburg Water Co., 202 U. S. 453, discussed and distinguished.
Even admitting that under the constitution of Kansas the legislature of the State had power to grant exclusive franchises, yet it did not have the right to delegate such power. See Constitution of Kansas, § 2 of the Bill of Rights; In re Lowe, 54 Kansas, 57.
Mr. Justice McKenna, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The Circuit Court assumed that Ordinance No. 402. was in terms exclusive and was intended to be made so by the city. We shall assume the same thing. Indeed, it would be impossible to decide otherwise. It recites that the Hutchinson Water, Light and Power Company “is the owner of certain exclusive franchises and contracts with the city of Hutchinson,” under which it has expended large sums of money, and that the city “is desirous of modifying and changing said franchise and contracts to the advantage of said city of Hutchinson, without cancelling or abridging any of the rights or privileges vested in said company,” and that, therefore, in consideration of the surrender of all existing contracts and franchises, except as therein specified, “there is hereby given and granted” to the company, “its successors or assigns, the exclusive rights and privileges for the term of twenty years from the date of the passage and approval of this ordinance, of p. 393supplying the city of Hutchinson, Reno County, Kansas, and the inhabitants thereof, by a system of waterworks with water . . . with electric current for electric light and power, and for all other purposes for which electric current may be used, except power for the operation of street railways. . . . ” The city, it is clear, in express terms and for consideration received granted exclusive rights. The power of the city to do this is denied, and this makes the question in the case. The Circuit Court ruled against the existence of the power applying to the statutes conferring power upon the municipalities of the State the rule of strict construction. The ruling is challenged by appellants, and it is contended, that the general welfare clause and “the municipal power to furnish light carries with it the obligation to enter into all contracts and to exercise all subsidiary powers which the circumstances of the case require.” And it is further contended that in Kansas statutes delegating to cities the power to furnish light and water have been liberally construed by the Supreme Court of the State.
That grants to municipal corporations, like grants to private corporations, are subject to the rule of strict construction was announced by this court in Citizens’ Street Railway v. Detroit Railway, 171 U. S. 48, following and applying the doctrine of previous cases. It was said that the power to grant an exclusive privilege must be expressly given, or, if inferred from other powers, must be indispensable to them, and that this principle was firmly fixed by authority. See also Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 80, fourth edition. The case was concerned with a grant to a street railway, and in the argument of the cases at bar a distinction is asserted between an exclusive privilege to occupy the surface of streets and interfere with “a matter of common right,” and a privilege to use the streets below the surface “as incidental only and subsidiary to the performance of a contract pertaining to another matter, and on this distinction, it is argued, the “ first must show an express grant of authority” to make the right exclusive, p. 394but that the second is not limited by such requirement. The distinction is only one of degree and has not been considered as varying the application of the rule of construction announced. In Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport City, 180 U. S. 587, a statute of Illinois was considered which gave power to cities and villages to provide for the supply of water at such rates as might be fixed by ordinance and for a period not exceeding thirty years. And passing upon these provisions as constituting a contract precluding a change of rates from time to time, we said (page 598): “The rule which governs interpretation in such cases has often been declared. We expressed it, following many prior decisions, in Citizens’ Street Railway v. Detroit Railway, 171 U. S. 48, to be that the power of a municipal corporation to grant exclusive privileges must be conferred by explicit terms. If inferred from other powers, it is not enough that the power is convenient to other powers; it must be indispensable to them.” See also Rogers Park Water Company v. Fergus, 180 U. S. 624; Joplin v. Light Co., 191 U. S. 150, and cases cited; Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co., 191 U. S. 358. The doctrine was recognized as existing in’ Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, and in Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453. In the two latter cases the power of the respective cities to make a contract, precluding them from building waterworks and operating their own water systems, was declared. In the Vicksburg case it was pointed out that the power of the city to exclude itself from building waterworks of its own was recognized to exist by the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
In Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 206 U. S. 496, a contract of the city, fixing a maximum rate, was sustained upon the authority of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State, holding that under a broad grant of power conferring without restriction or limitation upon the city, the right to make a contract for a supply of the water, it was within the right of the city council, in the exercise of that power, to make a binding contract fixing the maximum rate at which the water
207 U. 8» Opinion of the Court.
should be supplied to the inhabitants of the city for a limited term of years.
This case is especially relied on by appellant as establishing a right in the city of Hutchinson to grant an exclusive franchise under the statutes of the State, both from their letter and as construed by the Supreme Court of the State. A consideration of the statutes and decisions, therefore, becomes necessary. Those quoted by the Circuit Court in its opinion are inserted in the margin.1 They confer power to provide for the general welfare and enable a city to construct water and lighting plants of its own or “to make contracts with any person or company for such purposes,” and give such person or company “ the privilege of furnishing light for the streets, lanes or alleys of said city for any length of time not exceeding twenty-one years.”
In addition to these sections, appellant cites others, which-give to the city the power to make all contracts in relation to» its property and affairs necessary to the exercise of its corporate;
1 Sec. 35. The mayor and council of each city governed by this act shall have the care, management and control of the city and its- finances, and shall have power to enact, ordain, alter or repeal any and all ordinances not repugnant to the constitution and laws of this State, and such as it shall deem expedient for the good government of the city, the preservation of the peace and good order, the suppression of vice and immorality, the benefit of trade and commerce, and the health of the inhabitants thereof, and such other ordinances, rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry such power into effect. General Laws of 1901, § 971, p. 225.
Sec. 65. The council may provide for and regulate the lighting of the streets and the erection of lamp posts, and the numbering of the buildings in the city, and the construction of sewers; and the council shall have power to make contracts with any person, company or association for such purposes, and give such person, company or association the privilege of furnishing light for the streets, lanes or alleys of said city for any length of time not exceeding twenty-one years. General Laws of 1901, § 1000, p. 232.
Sec. 83. That cities of the second class of the State ;/ Kansas are hereby granted full power and authority, on behalf of said cities, to purchase, procure, provide and contract for the construction of and construct waterworks, electric light and gas plants for the purpose of supplying such cities and the inhabitants thereof with water, light and gas for domestic use and any and all other purposes. General Laws of 1901, § 1017, p. 237.
or administrative powers, the power to open and improve streets, purchase or condemn land for hospital and waterworks, to make regulations to secure the general health of the city, to enact ordinances for any of the above-mentioned purposes, and “for maintaining the peace, good government and welfare of the city and its trade and commerce.” Also a section which gives to gas and water companies the power to manufacture and furnish gas and water and to lay down pipes and mains in the streets “with the consent of the municipal authorities thereof and under such regulations as may be prescribed,” and a section giving power to such authorities “to contract with any such corporation for the lighting or supplying with water the streets, lots, lanes, squares and public places in any such city, town or village.”
It is from these provisions that the water company deduces the power of the city to make the privileges granted exclusive, and special stress is put upon the provision of § 65, which we have quoted. Counsel say: “Language more explicitly expressing an absolute measure of power could hardly be framed. The power is given to light the streets, to make contracts for the lighting of the streets and to confer the privilege of lighting the streets for a specific term of years.” And, further, counsel say: “It will be observed that the grant of power is to confer ‘the privilege of furnishing light.’ The definite article ‘the is used. Power to confer the privilege implies ex vi termini, the exclusive privilege, not a fractional or communal privilege. The privilege conferred exists as a concrete and integral whole, and therefore when conferred must pass in its entirety. The city possessed the privilege of lighting its own streets as a function of its municipal authority. It was that privilege in its integral and exclusive form which the legislature authorized the city to confer.” We cannot concur. The kind of privilege is defined, not the extent of it. It is exclusive of some persons, but not of all. It is exclusive of those who have not a grant from proper authority. There are privileges which may exist in their full entirety in more than one person, and the privilege
207 U. S. Opinion of the Court.
or franchise or right to supply the inhabitants of a city with light or water is of this kind. A grant of power to confer such privilege is not necessarily a grant of power to make it exclusive. To hold otherwise would impugn the cited cases and their reasoning. It would destroy the rule of strict construction. The foundation of that rule requires the grant of such power to be explicit—explicit in the letter of the grant—or, if inferred from other powers or purposes, to be not only convenient to them, but indispensable to them. And these conditions are imperative—too firm of authority to be disregarded upon the petition of equities, however strong.
It is, however, contended that the statutes of Kansas fulfill the rule by the construction put upon them by the Supreme Court of the State, and the case is therefore brought, it is further contended, within the rule of Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Company, 206 U. S. 496. The Kansas cases relied on are Eureka Light & Gas Company v. City of Eureka, 5 Kan. App. 669; State v. The City of Topeka, 68 Kansas, 177; Cherryvale Water Company v. The City of Cherryvale, 65 Kansas, 219. In those cases the court did say, in determining what duties were imposed or powers conferred upon the city, that the statute should be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of the legislature, but the powers under consideration were different from the powers herein involved, otherwise those cases would not be reconcilable with Payne v. Spratley, 5 Kansas, 525, 545, and Mining Gas Company v. Gas Mining Company, 55 Kansas, 175, 178. In Payne v. Spratley the general principles respecting the power of municipal corporations were said to be those which we have expressed. In Mining Gas Company v. Gas Mining Company, one of the companies, claiming an exclusive right, sought to test the validity of two city ordinances, granting the other the use of the streets and to restrict it from using the privileges granted. For this purpose the court said the plaintiff company clearly had no standing in court, because the city authorities alone were charged with the duty of preventing encroachment on the
Syllabus. 207 U. S.
streets, and they, alone, could test the validity of the ordinance. The court said further: “The city did not, in terms, attempt to give the plaintiff company a right to the exclusive use of the streets and lanes for the purpose of laying down its pipes. If it had attempted to do so it could not, for want of power.”
The conclusion from these cases is reinforced by a change in the statutes conferring power upon the cities of the State. Section 65, supra, was § 30 of the statutes of 1868 (subds. 10 and 18, p. 162), and as such gave to a city the power to make the contracts therein expressed, and give “ the exclusive privilege of furnishing gas to light the streets, lanes and alleys of said city for any length of time not exceeding twenty-one years.” This provision was repeated in § 59 of the statutes of 1872, Kansas Laws, 1892, p. 211. But in 1885 that section was amended, so as to omit the words “ the exclusive privilege.” Section 7, chapter 99, Statutes of 1885, p. 147. And as thus amended it was reenacted in 1901. Section 1000, General Statutes of 1901.
Decrees affirmed.
1
Docket title, Old Dominion Steamship Company, owner of the Steamship Hamilton, v. Gilmore.