United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229 (1907)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229 (1907)
Full caption
UNITED STATES v. R. P. ANDREWS & COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Dec. 2, 1907
UNITED STATES v. R. P. ANDREWS & COMPANY.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 44. Argued November 8, 11, 1907.—Decided December 2, 1907.
Whether the Philippine Islands are a distinct governmental entity for whose contracts the United States is bound, not decided; but held in this case that the purchase having been made by the Secretary of War through the Division of Insular Affairs, the contract was on behalf of the United States, notwithstanding the statement that the price was to be paid from Philippine funds.
Delivery of goods by a consignor to a common carrier for account of a consignee amounts to a delivery and where a purchaser directs delivery of the goods for his account to a designated carrier the latter becomes his agent. Delivery by the consignor, and acceptance by the consignee or his agent, of bills of lading issued by a common carrier for goods, constitutes a delivery.
While the presumption of delivery of goods to the consignee by delivery to a common carrier designated by him may be overcome by express contract that the goods are to remain at consignor’s risk until arrival at ultimate destination, the mere statement in a government proposal that goods are to be “ F. O. B. port of destination,” ■without designating the carrier, is not sufficient to rebut that presumption where it appears that subsequently the government directed the goods to be delivered “ F. O. B. port of shipment ” to a designated common carrier.
The invalidity of a contract with the United States because not reduced to writing and signed by the parties with their names at the end thereof as required by § 3744, Rev. Stat., is immaterial after the contract has been performed. St. Louis Hay Co. y. United States, 191 U. S. 159.
41C. Cl. 48, affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Van Orsdel, with whom Mr. Charles F. Kincheloe was on the brief, for appellant:
The Philippine Islands were, at the time of the making of this contract, a distinct political territorial entity, having practically as complete a civil territorial government as had any of the organized continental Territories of the United States. The United States was therefore no more liable on this contract of the Philippine Government than it would be upon a similar contract made by the government of the Territory of New Mexico or of Arizona.
The National Government is not liable on a contract or other obligation of one of its territorial governments, or of a political subdivision of such territorial government, even though the obligation be authorized by Congress. National Bank v. Yankton County, 101 U. S. 129; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; Mills v. Commissioners of Hendricks Co., 50 Ind. 436.
While according to commercial usage, delivery by a vendor to the carrier is, in the absence of special agreement to the contrary, delivery to the vendee, yet no one will question the right and power of the parties to vary this rule by contract provisions requiring delivery to be made by the vendor at the point of final destination. Dunlop v. Lambert, 6 C. & F. 620-622; Pacific Iron Works v. L. I. R. R. Co., 62 N. Y. 272. No matter how the contract in the case at bar may be construed, it called for delivery f. o. b. Manila.
As the contract called for delivery at Manila, the contractor has no right of recovery, as it is well settled that in contracts for the sale and delivery of property the risk of damage or loss of the property follows the title. Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331; Oil Company v. Van Etten, 107 U. S. 325, 333, McConihe v. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 497. The title does not pass until delivery is made according to contract. Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331; Pacific Iron Works v. L. I. R- R-Co., 62 N. Y. 272; Magruder v. Gage, 33 Maryland, 348; Blackwood v-Cutting, 76 California, 212. The risk is therefore in him who [p. 231] undertakes to deliver. Am. & Eng. Ency. (2d ed.), Vol. 24, p. 1050; Benjamin on Sales, §§ 330, 693; Grant v. United States, 1 Wall. 331; Buckingham v. Dake, 112 Fed. Rep. 258; Pacific Iron Works v. L I. R. R. Co., 62 N. Y. 272; Taylor v. Cole, 111 Massachusetts, 363; McConihe v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 496; Dunlop v. Lambert, 6 C. & F. 620-622; Castle v. Playford, 5 Ex, L. R. 165.
If the United States Government be held a principal party to the transaction, the contract was in violation of law, and void, on account of its not having been reduced to writing and signed by the parties in accordance with § 3744 Revised Statutes, and there can therefore be no recovery on the contract. Clark n. United States, 95 U. S. 539; South Boston Iron Co. v. United States, 118 U. S. 37.
And while there would have been a right of recovery upon a quantum valebant if the paper had been delivered to and accepted and used by the government, yet there was never any legal delivery, or any acceptance or use whatever of the paper by the government, at Manila or elsewhere, and there is therefore no ground for recovery even upon a quantum valebant. Clark n. United States and South Boston Iron Co. v. United States, supra; Monroe v. United States, 184 U. S. 524; St. Louis Bay and Grain Co. v. United States, 191 U. S. 159.
Mr. A. A. Boehling, Junior, for appellee, submitted.
Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
The United States appeals from a judgment against it (41 C. Cl. 48), for the contract price of paper purchased for use in the public printing office in the Philippine Islands. We summarize from the findings the status of the Philippine Islands at the time of the contract, stating besides the facts concerning the organization in the War Department of what is now known as the Bureau of Insular Affairs.
After the occupation of Manila, up to September 1, 1900, a [p. 232] military government prevailed. From September 1, 1900, to July, 1901, authority of a legislative nature was vested in the Philippine Commission, under and subject to rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War. From July 4, 1901, the executive authority as to civil affairs was transferred to the president of the Philippine Commission under the title of Civil Governor, his authority being exercised under instructions from the President, subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War organized the Division of Insular Affairs, which was given general charge of departmental business concerning the Philippine Islands. The organization of the division was confirmed and ratified by Congress on July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 712), and after that act the division became known as the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department. The facts concerning the contract in controversy are these:
In May, 1901, the president of the Philippine Commission telegraphed the Secretary of War, stating the necessity for a government printing office at Manila, asking concerning the qualifications of a particular individual suggested for superintendent, and recommending the immediate purchase and shipment of an outfit for the proposed printing office. The findings expressly state or by clear implication establish the following:
In response to said cablegram, the Secretary of War directed the Insular Bureau of the War Department to purchase and forward to Manila the necessary machinery, equipment, and supplies for the establishment and operation of such printing office, and also to secure the services of a competent force of operators therefor; which duty was performed by said division.
On and prior to August 17,1901, claimant was furnishing and supplying defendants divers papers and stationery, under contract, for use in various of its departments; and, thereupon, the chief of the Division of Insular Affairs solicited claimant to furnish and supply, for use in said Philippine Public Printing Office, being established at Manila, Philippine Islands, certain papers of described kinds, as follows:
“ (Circular D.)
“War Department, Office of the Secretary,
“ Division of Insular Affairs,
“Washington, D. C., August 17, 1901.
“R. P. Andrews & Co.,
“ 627 Louisiana avenue, Washington, D. C. “Gentlemen: Under instructions from the Chief of Division of Insular Affairs I write you as follows:
“Will you furnish for the use of the Philippine Public Printing Office, Manila, P. I., articles called for in the inclosures 1 and 2 F. 0. B., Manila, at the price at which the same is now furnished to the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., plus freight from New York; payment to be made from Philippine funds on invoice verification at Manila, P. I.
“Inspection at Insular Division, where samples are to be sent.
“When can supplies be shipped from port of departure?
“ Bills for supplies to be submitted, in duplicate, to the Chief of Division of Insular Affairs, for verification of prices at Government Printing Office rates.
“Copies of bills of lading from New York to be submitted, in duplicate, to Chief of Division of Insular Affairs for verification.
“Very respectfully,”
III.
In reply claimant, on August 28, 1901, submitted a proposal as follows:
“Washington, D. C., August 28, 1901,
“ Chief of Division of Insular Affairs,
“War Department, City.
Dear Sir: Replying to ,your favor of the 17th instant, Circular D, we beg to advise you that we will furnish the different lots of paper called for in inclosures 1 and 2, which accompanied said circular, at the prices for which the same is now being furnished to the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., plus freight rate from New York to Manila, P. I., [p. 234] except lots. ... All other lots mentioned we will, as stated above, furnish at the same prices that the same class of goods are being furnished to the Government Printing Office, plus, as stated above, the freight from New York to Manila, P. I. Payment to be made from Philippine funds on invoice verification at Manila, P. I. Inspection at Insular Division, where samples are to be sent. Bills for supplies to be submitted in duplicate to the Chief of Division of Insular Affairs for verification of prices at Government Printing Office rates. Copies of bills of lading from New York to be submitted in duplicate to Chief of Division of Insular Affairs for verification.
11 We can have the goods ready for shipment October 1st to November 15th.”
IV.
On the same date (August 28, 1901), said Chief of the Division of Insular Affairs wrote claimant as follows:
“ (Circular E.)
“War Department, Office of the Secretary,
11 Division of Insular Affairs,
“ Washington, D. C., August 28, 1901.
“R. P. Andrews & Co.,
“ 627 Louisiana avenue, Washington, D. C. “Gentlemen: Please deliver F. 0. B. Manila, P. I. (via Suez Canal), the following:
“Articles called for in inclosures 1 and 2.
“To be shipped between October 20 and November 1, 1901. “Quality of goods furnished will be considered in making future orders.
“Please acknowledge the receipt of this circular by return mail.
“To be properly packed for export shipment.
“Ship care Barber & Co., steamship agents, Pier B, Pennsylvania docks, Jersey City, N. J. (See note inclosed.)
“Marked as follows:
“No. , Governor W. H. Taft, Manila, P. I.
“ Contents, ; weight, lbs.
“For Philippine public printing plant.
“As per your agreement in your letter dated August 28, 1901, now on file in this office.
“Very respectfully.”
The inclosures marked 1 and 2, referred to in this letter, were statements tabulating the quantity and quality of paper to be furnished. The note referred to and inclosed in the letter was the following: “ Note.—(Care Barber & Company, steamship agents, Pier
B, Pennsylvania docks, Jersey City, N. J.)
“A special arrangement has been made so that after F. 0. B. delivery, as above, at Jersey City, the freight rate for the transportation of these supplies and the equipment, of the Manila Printing Office will not be higher than $11.05 per ton (dead weight) and possibly less. Rate for measurement freight to be made on a correspondingly low basis, in accordance with the space occupied. Therefore the Philippine government will, upon invoice verification at Manila, reimburse you for the cost of this ocean shipment.”
Before the paper was shipped the Division of Insular Affairs gave further instructions as follows: “Note.—(Care Barber & Company, East Central Pier, Brooklyn, N. Y.)
“A special arrangement has been made so that after F. 0. B. delivery, as above, at Brooklyn, the freight rate for the transportation of these supplies and equipment of the Manila Printing Office will not be higher than $11.05 per ton (dead weight) and possibly less. Rate for measurement freight to be made on a correspondingly low basis, in accordance with the space occupied. Therefore the Philippine government will, upon invoice verification at Manila, reimburse you for the cost of this ocean shipment.”
The findings relating to the value of the paper, its forwarding to and arrival of a part at Manila, and the subsequent controversy between Andrews & Co. and the Government concerning t e same, show the following to be the case.
In compliance with the directions Andrews & Co. packed the paper for export shipment, directing it to Governor W. H. Taft, Manila, Philippine Islands, in care of Barber & Co., East Central Pier, Brooklyn, N. Y., and prepaid the freight. The quoted value of the paper was 83,087.75. The freight charges from New York to Manila were $196.35, which, together with one dollar for clearance papers, prepaid by Andrews & Co., brought the total purchase or invoice price to $3,285.10. When the paper was delivered to Barber & Co., Andrews & Co. took triplicate bills of lading, consigning the paper to Governor W. H. Taft or his assigns, Manila, Philippine Islands, and delivered the duplicate bills of lading to the Chief of Division of Insular Affairs, in accordance with the instructions given. Barber & Co. forwarded the paper by the steamship Indrasamaha. When the vessel arrived at Singapore it was found that a portion of her cargo, including the consignment of paper, was badly damaged by water. Some of the paper was condemned by a board of survey convened by the agents of the ship, and was sold in Singapore. The remainder was repacked and forwarded to Manila. When it arrived it was so damaged as to render it unfit for use. The consignee (Governor Taft) refused to accept it, and a committee, which was appointed by him as Civil Governor, recommended that the paper be stored in a ware-house of the Philippine government until instructions were received from Andrews & Co., who had no agent in the islands. Thereupon the Public Printer of the Philippine Islands wrote Andrews & Co., informing them of the facts just stated, and asking instructions as to what they wished done, and on May 31, 1902, the Division of Insular Affairs also wrote Andrews & Co. on the same subject as follows:
11 War Department, Office of the Secretary,
“ Division of Insular Affairs,
“Washington, D. C., May 31, 1902.
“Gentlemen: I have the honor to inform you that a letter dated April 14th, 1902, has been received from Mr. John 8. Leech, public printer, Manila, P. I., advising this division of the [p. 237] accident which occurred to the S.S. “Indrasamaha,” which resulted in damaging 500 reams linen paper, valued at $3,285.10, as per your bill of October 24th, 1901.
“Mr. Leech requested that.you be informed that the paper is damaged so badly that it will be impossible to use any of it; that an insurance inspector and a Government inspection committee were then surveying and inspecting the damaged goods, and that this action was taken for the protection of the contractors, who had taken the precaution to insure their goods against losses.
“Very respectfully.”
Andrews & Co. thus replied to this letter:
“Washington, D. C., June 7, 1902.
“Lieut. Col. Edwards,
“ Chief Division of Insular Affairs,
“War Department, Washington, D. C.,
“Dear Sir: We are in receipt of your favor May 31st, No. 5423-1, quoting letter received from Mr. John S. Leech, public printer, Manila, P. I., with regard to map paper, therein stated to have been damaged in transportation on steamship ‘ Indrasamaha.’
“This paper was shipped as per your order, bills of lading being obtained as directed, and your instructions carried out implicitly. Your goods were turned over upon direction of your office to Messrs. Barber & Company, your agents in that behalf at Jersey City, N. J., in good order and condition, whereupon our responsibility ceased.
‘We have the honor, therefore, to request that our bill as rendered be approved for payment.
Kindly advise us also whether you desire us to make a duplicate of said shipment.
Requesting the favor of an early reply, we are' very respectfully yours.”
The shipment of paper was not insured either by the Government or by Andrews & Co. The proceeds of the sale at Singapore never reached either the Government or Andrews & Co., [p. 238] and the paper stored at Manila remained there until May, 1903, when it was sold, producing a sum insufficient to pay the storage charges, and the proceeds were turned into the treasury of the government of the Philippine Islands in partial payment of the charges.
All the propositions which the Government has elaborately pressed at bar are reducible to two.
First. That the paper was purchased by the Government of the Philippine Islands, and therefore in any event there was error in holding the United States liable.
Second. That even if the United States was the purchaser, it was erroneously held liable, because the paper was never delivered, and therefore was at the risk of the owner, Andrews & Co., and the loss and damage fell upon them.
We proceed to consider these propositions:
1. We need not consider the contention that the Philippine Islands were a distinct governmental entity for whose contracts the United States was not bound, because that subject is irrelevant, since it begs the real question—that is, whether the purchase was made by the United States. Testing whether the paper was bought by the United States by the contract and course of dealing as disclosed by the findings, we think there is no escape from the conclusion that the United States was the party contracting for the purchase. It cannot be doubted that the findings make clear the fact that the Secretary of War, through his agent, the Division of Insular Affairs, was the actor on one side and Andrews & Co. on the other. Nothing in the dealings as disclosed by the findings would warrant the conclusion that the Division of Insular Affairs acted or purported to act as the agent of the government of the Philippine Islands. The telegram to the Secretary of War, which opened the subject, did not even suggest a contract to be made in the name of the government of the Philippine Islands, but simply submitted recommendations to the Secretary of War for his action, accompanied with the request that if the recommendation was favorably considered he, the Secretary of War, [p. 239] should make the purchase desired. In the second place, the Division of Insular Affairs undertook the negotiation under an order of the Secretary of War, directing that the paper required be purchased, without an intimation that it was contemplated that the Division of Insular Affairs in executing the authority conferred should act as the agent of the government of the Philippine Islands, instead of as the representative of the Secretary of War, as a result of the authority vested in him. The first letter written on the part of the Division of Insular Affairs to Andrews & Co., soliciting a proposal to furnish the paper, we think manifests that the purpose of the division was to make the purchase for the United States in accord with the direction under which the division was acting—that is, the authority of the Secretary of War acting for the United States. True it is the letter made it clear that the paper which the United States proposed to purchase was intended for use in the Philippine Islands, and contained a statement that the price would be “paid from Philippine funds.” But the mere statement of the purpose for which the paper was intended would not justify the conclusion that the Division of Insular Affairs was acting as the mere agent of the government in the Philippine Islands, instead of as the agent of the Secretary of War representing the United States. The statement of the fund from which the payment was to be made, instead of justifying the inference that the contract was intended to be made in the name of the government of the Philippine Islands, through its agent, gives countenance to a contrary inference. This follows because if the government of the Philippine Islands was the contracting party its funds would, as a matter of course, be the source from which the payment was to be made. The reference, therefore, to the fund from which the payment was to be made but served to indicate that the United States, in making the contract, contemplated that the purchase price would be discharged by it from the Philippine funds under its control. That Andrews & Co., when they replied to the inquiry made to them as to price, etc., understood that the contract proposed was on behalf of [p. 240] the United States we think is deducible from their reply. Besides, the subsequent correspondence and dealings which we shall hereafter consider in determining whether the paper was delivered under the contract prior to the happening of the damage, we think will serve to make clear the fact that both parties deemed the contract was one made in the name of and for account of the United States. Especially is this so when it is borne in mind that the findings either directly or by necessary implication establish that in October, 1901, soon after the goods were shipped, a bill for the amount of the total purchase price, including the freight to Manila, was rendered by Andrews & Co. to the Division of Insular Affairs, and there is nothing in the findings warranting even an implication that that division made any objection upon the ground that the bill should have been made out against the Philippine government as the purchaser and have been transmitted to that government for payment. Yet further, it is apparent from the letter written by the division to Andrews & Co., after it was learned that the paper had been damaged or lost, that the Division of Insular Affairs was solicitous, not because a bill had been mistakenly rendered, but as to whether the loss should fall upon the United States or upon Andrews & Co.
2. That as a general rule the delivery of goods by a consignor to a common carrier for account of a consignee has effect as delivery to such consignee is elementary. That where a purchaser of goods directs their delivery for his account to a designated carrier, the latter becomes the agent of the purchaser, and delivery to such carrier is a legal delivery to the purchaser is also beyond question. Certain also is it that when on the delivery of goods to a carrier bills of lading are issued x for the delivery of the goods to the consignee or his order, the acceptance by the consignee of such bills of lading constitutes a delivery. Of course the presumption of delivery arising from the application of any or all of these elementary rules would not control in a case where by contract it clearly appeared that, despite the shipment, the goods should remain at the risk [p. 241] of the consignor until arrival at the point of ultimate destination. And such in effect is the contention here made on behalf of the Government. We come briefly then to consider the findings concerning the contract for the purpose of showing that this contention is without merit.
In considering the matter it is to be conceded that the contract is not to be deduced alone from the letter of the Division of Insular Affairs of May 31, 1901, and the reply of Andrews & Co. of June 7, but is to be ascertained by a consideration of those letters and the subsequent correspondence under which the purchase was concluded and the shipment made.
The statement in the proposal of the Division of Insular Affairs of August 17, 1901, by which the negotiation was commenced, “F. 0. B. Manila,” might give rise, if standing alone, to the implication that it was intended that the goods should be delivered at the cost of the seller at Manila. But the further statement in the letter, that the freight from New York to Manila was to be a part of the purchase price and to be paid as such by the purchaser, rebuts the implication that the words “F. 0. B. Manila” were understood as implying that the amount of the freight charges for the shipment of the goods to Manila should be at the cost of the seller. These words not therefore having been used in their ordinary commercial sense, their meaning must be sought in the context of the proposal in which they are found. Considering that context, it would seem most reasonable to conclude that the words implied that, as the Government desired the freight to Manila to be included m the purchase price, the freight therefore to Manila was to be primarily defrayed by the seller. That this was the understanding of Andrews & Co. we think results from their reply, in which no reference whatever was made to the F. 0. B. Manila clause, but a willingness was expressed to furnish the paper at a price to be fixed by the price paid by the Government in Washington for like paper, with the addition of the freight rate to the Philippine Islands, thereby saving the seller from bearing the burden of the freight to Manila, and at the same time securing vol. oovu—16 [p. 242] to the Government the delivery of the paper at Manila without the payment there to the carrier of the cost of the freight as such, since that item would become a part of and be included in the price. It is certain, when the subsequent correspondence is considered, that this construction, which the reply of Andrews & Co. put upon the words “F. 0. B. Manila,” as used in the proposal, was deemed by the Division of Insular Affairs to be the correct one, since that reply was in the subsequent correspondence treated by the division as being directly responsive to and an acceptance of the proposal submitted. Moreover, we think the subsequent correspondence, when considered in other aspects, makes certain the conclusion that the words “ F. 0. B. Manila,” as used in the proposal, meant precisely what we have stated the context of the proposal indicated that those words were intended to imply. This we think results from the provisions of the letter of August 28, selecting a particular firm to whom the goods were to be delivered for transport to Manila, and of all the other directions contained in the letter, since they are inconsistent with the theory that the words “F. 0. B. Manila” were used as meaning that the goods should not be delivered as directed, but should remain the property of Andrews & Cd., and be under their control and subject to their risk until delivered at Manila. Especially is it impossible to attribute to the words “ F. 0. B. Manila,” used in the original proposal and reiterated in the letter of August 28, any other meaning than that which we have affixed to them, when the note which was expressly referred to in the letter of August 28, and which was inclosed therein, is considered. By the terms of that note not only were the previous specific directions as to the mode of shipment confirmed, but it was expressly provided that the delivery to the agent selected by the Division of Insular Affairs should be “F. 0. B. Jersey City,” thus making cleai the distinction between the sense in which the words “F. 0. B. Manila” were used in the proposal and their meaning applie to the final delivery at Jersey City in consummation of the contract, by which the sum of the freight to Manila had been in- [p. 243] eluded in the purchase price. So also the same implications arise from the final instruction, shifting the place of delivery from Jersey City and directing that the merchandise should be delivered to the agent selected, “F. 0. B. Brooklyn.” We think the contention made in argument, that the letter of August 28 and the acceptance by Andrews & Co. of the terms of that letter, should be alone held to constitute the contract, disregarding the note inclosed in the letter as a part thereof, is refuted by its mere statement. In any event, taking the most favorable view possible for the Government of the contract, we think it cannot be said that the presumption which arises from the delivery of the goods to the carrier designated by the Government and the acceptance by the Government of the bills of lading made to the consignee or his order, is rebutted by the contract.
Lastly, it is urged that in any event the court below erred, since the contract in question was not “reduced to writing and signed by the contracting parties with their names at the end thereof,” as required by Rev. Stats., § 3744. But it is settled that the invalidity of a contract -because of a. non-compliance with the section referred to is immaterial after the contract has been performed. St. Louis Hay &c. Co. v. United States, 191 U. S. 159, 163. The contention that the contract in question had not been executed because there had been no delivery, is disposed of by what we have already said.
As the views which we have expressed concerning the delivery dispose also of many subsidiary contentions based upon isolated provisions of the contract, such as the right to verify the contents of the package at Manila, etc., it follows that the judgment below was right, and it is therefore
Affirmed,
Statement of the Case. 207 U. S.
EARLE v. MYERS.
SAME v. SAME.
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Nos. 12, 388. Argued October 15, 1907.—Decided December 2, 1907.
In an accounting for attorneys’ fees for collection of claims against the Government this court followed the general rule of affirming a finding of fact made and confirmed by both the courts below unless the same is clearly erroneous and held that certain services were of the character generally designated as lobbying services and could not be allowed. Where an administrator of an attorney performs services and incurs expenses in completing the business in which his intestate and another attorney were interested he should be allowed therefor and those services and expenses as well as those rendered and incurred by the intestate can be settled in one suit where the account has been treated by both parties as one account.
Where one interested in attorney fees for collection of government claims can expect nothing until the amount adjudged has been appropriated, laches will not be charged against him if he bring the suit for an accounting within a reasonable period after the passage of the appropriation act. In this case two years was not unreasonable.
A decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversing the Supreme Court of the District as to some of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and directing a new decree to be entered in accordance with the opinion is not a final decree and an appeal will not lie therefrom to this court.
The appeals in the above numbers involve the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (25 App. D. C. 582, sub nom. Waggaman v. Earle), which modified the decree of the Supreme Court confirming the report of an auditor. The action was brought by the appellees against the administrator of Earle’s estate for an accounting, and after issue joined it was referred to an auditor to state the account upon the pleadings and proof placed before him. The auditor reported in favor of allowing the complainant as due the Causten estate the sum of $7,462.20. After the report had been confirmed by
207 U. S. Statement of the Case.
the Supreme Court, each side took an appeal and the Court of Appeals reversed some of the findings and conclusions of law of the court below, and directed a new decree to be entered, in accordance with the opinion of the court. The defendants appealed from that order to this court, and that appeal is the above number 12.
Fearing that there might be some doubt as to the finality of this decree for the purpose of an appeal to this court, the parties, pursuant to the decree of the Court of Appeals, took the case down to the trial court, which referred it to the auditor, who restated the account in accordance with the direction of the Court of Appeals, to which exceptions were filed by the defendant, which were overruled, the auditor’s report confirmed and another decree entered, from which an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals and there affirmed, and from the decree of affirmance an appeal has been taken to this court and allowed, which is number 388.
The material facts which appear in the record are the following: For many years a series of attempts had been made to secure legislation from Congress looking to the payment of claims made by American citizens for damages arising from illegal seizure of their vessels by the government of France, which the United States had, by treaty, undertaken to pay. Such attempts had been unsuccessful, until at length an act was passed by Congress, chapter 25 of the Laws of 1885 (23 Stat. 283), which provided for the ascertaining of claims of American citizens for spoliation prior to the thirty-first of July, 1801.
During quite a number of years preceding the act of 1885 one James H. Causten, a resident of the District of Columbia, had accumulated papers, which were regarded as of considerable value in facilitating proofs of these claims. Mr Causten died before the passage of the act of Congress, leaving these papers in the hands of Mr. William E. Earle, who was also interested in the prosecution of said claims, and therefore desired the benefit of the use of these papers, and after the act of Congress Mr. Earle and Mr. Waggaman, the administrator of the estate
Statement of the Case. 207 U. S.
of Mr. Causten, entered into a contract as of the date of June 12, 1885, by which Mr. Earle was to be allowed to continue in the possession and exclusive use of these papers in the prosecution of the spoliation claims, for which possession and exclusive use he was to pay to the administrator (Waggaman) twenty-five per centum of all fees which he should receive on account of these claims, “after deducting from all such fees received, or which shall hereafter be received by him, the proper expenses incurred by him, since the passage of the act of Congress referring said cases to the Court of Claims in the prosecution of said French spoliation claims, such as clerk hire, printing, advertising, office rent, and the compensation of other attorneys necessarily associated with him, and in whose compensation said Earle does not share. And settlements between said Earle and said Waggaman, administrator as aforesaid, or his successor in office, shall be made every six months, and the proportionate part of said fees due said administrator shall be paid over to said administrator or his successor in office, at such settlement.”
Earle agreed to keep true books of account of all fees and retainers received by him, and also of all expenses attending the prosecution of the claims in which he should be engaged as counsel or otherwise, the books of account to be open at all times for the inspection of the administrator, or his successor in office.
Thereafter proceedings were taken by Earle in the Court of Claims towards proving the claims of his clients, and the action of that court recognizing such claims among others, to a certain extent, was certified to Congress, as provided in the act of 1885.
On March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 897), Congress made an appropriation in payment of a portion of all claims so certified, and out of this appropriation Mr. Earle received as fees up to July, 1893, the sum of about $38,000, while his books showed an expenditure of over $57,000, leaving Mr. Earle some $18,000 behind. Future legislation was expected, which would turn
EARLE v. MYERS. 247
this deficit into a profit. It was hoped that a further appropriation would be made in 1893, but that hope was not realized. Mr. Earle died in August, 1893, and an. administrator was thereafter appointed. No further appropriation was made until August 3, 1899 (30 Stat. 1161, 1191). Under this appropriation the estate of Earle received some $50,000 in fees.
Negotiations for the settlement of the accounts between the administrator of Earle’s estate and the administrator of Causten’s estate were proceeded with, but proved unsuccessful, when this suit was instituted by the Causten administrator for an accounting. Pleadings were had in due form, and the case was referred to an auditor of the court for a statement of the account, who, after considerable testimony had been adduced, filed his report and found the sum of $7,462.20 to be due from the defendant to the complainant. Exceptions were filed by both parties, which were overruled by the Supreme Court, and the auditor’s report was confirmed.
The Court of Appeals modified the decree entered by the Supreme Court, as already stated.
Mr. Henry E. Davis and Mr. John C. Gittings for appellant.
Mr. T. Percy Myers and Mr. Michael J. Colbert, with whom Mr. S. T. Thomas was on the brief, for appellees.
Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
In making up the account the representative of the Earle estate claimed a credit for the sum of $19,558.05 as part of the proper expenses incurred by or in behalf of defendant in obtaining the appropriations above mentioned. The auditor struck out $13,058.05 of such claimed credit, leaving $6,500 as a proper credit in favor of the administrator of Earle. The thirteen thousand and some odd dollars were stricken out by the auditor because of the fact, as he found, that these moneys [p. 248] were paid for lobbying services, in efforts to secure the appropriation by Congress, which services he held were contrary to public policy and discountenanced by the courts, and therefore not to be allowed as a proper credit. The balance, $6,500, the auditor held that the proof showed had been paid by the defendant for legal services by the individuals named, and that such services were valuable, and the amount paid was not excessive or unreasonable. This amount consisted of.three separate items, two items for $2,000 and one item for $2,500.
Upon the argument in the Court of Appeals the defendants’ counsel insisted that the whole nineteen thousand dollars should have been allowed as a proper credit, while the plaintiff’s counsel asserted that the disallowance of the thirteen thousand dollar credit was right, but that the court erred in admitting the $6,500 as a proper credit. The Court of Appeals, as we have said, affirmed that portion of the decree in which the auditor disallowed the thirteen thousand dollars claimed for credit, but reversed that portion of the decree by which the auditor allowed the credit of $6,500, and directed the decree to be amended by striking out the above credit for that sum. This was upon the ground that the $6,500 claimed was also illegal. The court said that it was impossible to read the record without coming to the conclusion that these alleged services were of the kind known as lobbying services; that, although proof on the subject was meager, yet so far as it went it tended unmistakably to show the illicit character of the services, being personal influence and personal solicitation with members of Congress, and that courts had branded services of a like nature as improper, and for which no recovery would be allowed.
The auditor before whom the case was tried and who heard the witnesses, while holding that certain of the credit claims were illegal as claims for lobbying services, yet held that these particular claims for services performed by members of the bar, and. representing the $6,500 allowed, were for proper pro fessional services, and as such should be allowed. The Supreme
Court of the District confirmed the report of the auditor, and thereby held that the credit claimed for the payment of these services was proper.
After a careful examination of the testimony in the case we are unable to concur with the Court of Appeals on this question. We cannot find any evidence to justify a reversal of the report of the auditor, confirmed as it is by the Supreme Court. The payments were proved to have been made, and there is no evidence of any illegality connected with the services performed sufficient to justify an appellate tribunal in reversing the finding of the auditor and the Supreme Court upon this question of fact. It is unnecessary to embody in this opinion a reference to the testimony in the case or to make extracts therefrom, but it is enough to say that we are satisfied, from a careful perusal thereof, that we are right in the conclusions which we have come to.
As to the thirteen thousand dollar credit which the auditor and the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have all disallowed, we are of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to justify its disallowance. The evidence would seem to justify the finding of the auditor that these particular services thus paid for were of the character generally designated as lobbying services, and in such case it is proper to follow the general rule of affirming a finding of fact made and confirmed by the courts below, unless the same be clearly erroneous.
Again, the auditor disallowed in part a claim of some fifteen thousand dollars, which the defendants assert was paid to two other attorneys for their services, under a special agreement which was made between the administrator of the Earle estate and such attorneys. The auditor made a finding of the facts in regard to such employment, and carefully considered the conditions as they appeared in the proof, and stated that he was of the opinion that the services in question did not require the time and attention of these three gentlemen, and that it would not be just to impose the burden of the payment to them upon this case in such a manner as to diminish the small [p. 250] amount which would be found due and payable to the complainant. He therefore in the account allowed a credit for but one-half of the amount, which he said was in his “judgment a liberal allowance for the present account.” Counsel for the defendants have failed to show from the evidence in the record that this item was improperly disposed of by the auditor.
As to the alleged laches on the part of the complainant in bringing this suit, we think the courts below have committed no error in their judgments. The evidence showed that during the time of the life of Mr. Earle, although the books of account were quite meager, yet such as there were had been examined by the administrator of Causten, in the office of Mr. Earle, and that objection had been made to the payment of the moneys to these persons in regard to whom the charge of lobbying services was made. There was no account stated, and the failure to bring suit for an accounting until January, 1901, two years after the appropriation act of 1899, from which payment might be made, cannot be regarded as laches to prevent a recovery in this suit.
The objection that there was in reality no liability on the original contract arising out of services performed by the administrator after the death of William E. Earle cannot be sustained. The accounting has been treated by both parties as one proper to be made for the whole period, including that which elapsed subsequently to the death of Mr. Earle. The defendant recognized this right by making the accounting not only for fees received prior to the death of Mr. Earle, but for such fees as were received under the appropriation act of 1899. The account presented by the Earle estate to the Causten estate admits an indebtedness due from the administrator of the former of something over $2,000, and the account purports to be one between the estate of Earle and the estate of Causten, and- it embraces not only fees received by William E. Earle in his lifetime under the appropriation act of 1891, but fees received by the estate of Earle under the appropriation act of 1899. Thus both parties seem to have treated the account as
207 U. S. Syllabus.
one account, with reference to the act of 1891 and also to that of 1899, and we think that under the circumstances the defendants should be held Hable to account therefor as indicated.
The account should be restated by allowing credit to the defendant of $6,500, the amount paid the attorneys as already stated. As to all other matters, the decree is right. The proper disposition of the case is to dismiss the appeal in No. 12, because the decree appealed from is not a final one, and to reverse the decree in No. 388, for the purpose of making the proper credit to defendants in the account.
Reversed.
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