Amado v. United States, 195 U.S. 172 (1904)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Amado v. United States, 195 U.S. 172 (1904)
Full caption
AMADO v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 7, 1904
AMADO v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF PORTO RICO.
No. 33. Submitted October 25,1904.—Decided November 7,1904.
The review of the final judgment of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico by this court is not restricted to cases in which the Constitution or a treaty of the United States or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed under it is denied. There may be cases, certainly civil cases, which if determined in a Supreme Court of one of the Territories of the United States could be reviewed although not involving any right of a distinctly Federal nature.
But a criminal case like this arising under § 3082 Rev. Stat., could not be reviewed by this court in virtue of the words, in § 35 of the Porto Rico act of April 12, 1900, “ in the same cases as from the Supreme Courts o the Territories of the United States.” .
Nor will the words in the same act, “ in all cases where the Constitution o the United States, or a treaty thereof, or an act of Congress is broug inquestion and the right claimed thereunder is denied, authorize is court to review a judgment of conviction in a criminal case in the cour e low under § 3082 Rev. Stat., when the only claim at the trial was that the
indictment did not charge “an offense under the statutes of the United States.” Such an objection was too indefinite.
Unless a judgment in the United States District Court for Porto Rico can be reviewed here, then it is final ; for no case determined in that court can be carried to a Circuit Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Submitted on the record for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Purdy for the United States. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
The Revised Statutes of the United States provide that if any person shall fraudulently or knowingly import or bring into the United States, or assist in so doing, any merchandise, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, such merchandise shall be forfeited and the offender shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both.” § 3082.
The act of April 12, 1900, temporarily providing revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, declares, among other things, that on and after its passage “ the same tariffs, customs, and duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon allarticles imported into Porto Rico from ports other than those of the United States which are required by law to be collected upon articles imported into the United States from foreign countries, also, that “the statutory laws of the United States not ocally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto ico as in the United States, except the internal revenue laws, w ic, in view of the provisions of section three, shall not have orce and effect in Porto Rico.” 31 Stat. 77, 80, c. 191, §§2, 14.
These statutes being in force, the plaintiff in error, Amado, was indicted in the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico, upon the charge of having, on May 28, 1901, unlawfully received, concealed and facilitated the transportation, concealment and sale of certain specified quantities of Holland gin, vermouth, brandy and Danish beer, theretofore, as the accused well knew, fraudulently imported into Porto Rico, contrary to law, without the payment to the United States of the duties imposed upon such articles.
The accused was duly arraigned, and found guilty by a jury. A motion in arrest of judgment having been overruled, he was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary of Porto Rico for one year and one day, and to pay a fine of five hundred dollars. A new trial was denied, and the accused sued out the present writ of error.
In allowing the writ the Judge of the District Court expressed some doubt whether error would lie, but he resolved the doubt in favor of the defendant.
The Government insists that the writ of error should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this court to review the judgment below; otherwise, that the judgment should be affirmed.
It is provided by the above act of April 12, 1900, that the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico “shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of District Courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all cases cognizant in the Circuit Courts of the United States, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a Circuit Court.” 31 Stat. 77, 84,
c. 191, § 34.
The act also provides that writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and the District Court of the United States shall be allowed and may be taken to this court “in the same manner and under the same regulations and in the same cases as from the Supreme Courts of the Territories of the United States; and such writs of error and appeal shall be allowed in all cases where [p. 175] the Constitution of the United States, or treaty thereof, or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied; . . . .” Ibid. §35.
A review of the final judgment of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico is not restricted to those cases in which the Constitution or a treaty of the United States or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed under it denied. This construction is too narrow and technical. There may be cases—certainly civil cases—in the United States District Court for Porto Rico that do not involve any question arising under the Constitution, or a treaty, or an act of Congress; and yet if the case be one which, if determined in a Supreme Court of one of the Territories of the United States, could be brought here for reexamination, the final judgment could be reviewed by this court, although no right of a distinctly Federal nature was involved. Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin, 192 U. S. 149,160; HijoN. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 320. See Crowley v. United States, 194 U. S. 461. But even this test, if applied here, will not avail the accused; for the statutes regulating the appellate jurisdiction of this court do not authorize a review of the final judgment in a Supreme Court of one of the Territories of the United States in a criminal case like this one.
Can our jurisdiction be sustained by reference to the words, in the Porto Rico act, “in all cases where the Constitution of the United States, or a treaty thereof, or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied?” We must answer this question in the negative. The nearest approach to a claim of specific right under the Constitution or a treaty of the United States or under an act of Congress, was when the accused, in his written motion to arrest the judgment or sentence, insisted that the indictment id not set forth “an offense under the statutes of the United tates. But that language amounted to nothing more, in egal effect, than a plea of not guilty, or a demurrer upon the general ground that the indictment did not state enough to
• 1 Syllabus. 195 U.S.
show an offense. It was not the assertion of any particular right under the Constitution, or under any treaty, or under an act of Congress, which would be denied to him, if the prosecution was sustained. His contention was only that he was not subject to criminal prosecution by reason of anything set forth in the indictment. The indictment was plainly sufficient under the statute prescribing the offense charged, and the objections to it were too indefinite to meet the requirements of the act of 1900, and make the case one which, by that act, could be brought to this court for review. Unless the case was one in which the judgment could be reviewed here, then such judgment would be final and not subject to review; for no case determined in the United States court for Porto Rico can be carried to a Circuit Court of Appeals. We said, in Royal Ins. Co. n. Martin, 192 U. S. 149, 160, that “Congress did not intend that any connection should exist between the United States court for Porto Rico and any Circuit Court of Appeals established under the act of 1891.”
The writ of error must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this court, and
It is so ordered.
CRAWFORD v. BURKE.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
No. 22 Argued April 25, 26,1904.—Decided November 7,1904.
A .plea puis darrien continuance waives all prior pleas and amounts to an admission of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
A commission merchant and factor who sells for others is not indebted in a fiduciary capacity within the bankruptcy acts by withholding the money received for property sold by him and this rule applies to a broker carry ing stocks on margin who sells the same and does not pay over the pro ceeds to his principal. . . A ehange in phraseology of a statute reenacted creates a presumption o [p. 177] 195 U. S. Statement of the Case.
change of intent of the legislative body from that expressed in the former statute.
While punctuation may shed some light on the construction of statutes, so little is it a part thereof that courts will read the statutes with such stops as will give effect to the whole.
The language of paragraph 4 of section 17 of the bankruptcy act of 1898 is different from that of section 33 of the act of 1867 and the words “fiduciary capacity” extend back to and qualify the words “fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation,” and an unliquidated claim of a principal against his broker for fraudulently selling stocks carried on margin is not within the exception of section 17 but is a provable debt and is barred by the discharge in bankruptcy.
A debt, originating or founded upon an open account or upon a contract express or implied, is provable against the bankrupt’s estate, though the creditor may have elected to bring his action in trover as for a fraudulent conversion instead of in assumpsit upon an open account.
This was an action in trover instituted September 10, 1897, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, by Burke against Crawford & Valentine, plaintiffs in error, to recover damages for the willful and fraudulent conversion of certain reversionary interests of the plaintiff in 550 shares of Metropolitan Traction stock.
There were ten counts in the declaration. In each of the first five counts it was alleged that the defendant firm of Crawford & Valentine were stock brokers and dealers in investment securities; that plaintiff employed the defendants as his brokers and agents to buy, hold and carry stocks for him subject to his order; that defendants had in their possession, or under their control, certain shares of the capital stock of the Metropolitan Traction Company, which they were holdlng as a pledge and security for the amount due them from the plaintiff on said stock; that defendants wrongfully, willully and fraudulently, and without his knowledge or consent, sold said shares of stock, and willfully and fraudulently, and
*
ntent to cheat and defraud the plaintiff, converted plains reversionary interest in said stock to their use, whereby it was wholly lost. In each of the last five counts it was alleged that after deen ants had wrongfully and fraudulently, and without plain-vol. oxov—12
Statement of the Case. 195 U. S.
tiff’s knowledge or consent, sold the plaintiff’s stock and converted the proceeds of such sales to their own use, they falsely and fraudulently represented to him that they still had the stock on hand and were carrying it for him; that their correspondents in Philadelphia, where the stock had been bought, were calling upon them for further demands or margins, and that it therefore became necessary to call upon the plaintiff to make further payments on the stock in order to comply with their correspondents’ demands and to be secured against loss. It was averred in each of said counts that such representations were false and fraudulent, and by means thereof defendants obtained from the plaintiff the aggregate sum of $10,800.
To this declaration defendants pleaded not guilty, upon which issue was joined January 4, 1900, and on May 12, 1900, a jury trial was waived in writing. The case rested without action until January 3, 1901, when defendants filed their separate pleas of puis darrein continuance, setting up that on April 5, 1900, the defendants had received their discharge in bankruptcy, in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and that plaintiff’s claims were provable and not excepted from the operation of such discharge. The plaintiff replied denying that his claim was provable, and averred that the same was excepted from such operation.
Notwithstanding the plea of puis darrein continuance, the plaintiff introduced evidence and proved the allegations in his declaration and the amount of damages he had sustained. Defendants were found guilty upon all the counts and judgment entered against them.
The case was taken to the appellate court, where it appearing that one of the justices had taken part in the trial of the case below, and that the two remaining justices were unable to agree upon the case, the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. The judgment of the appellate court was also affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois, 201 Illinois, 581, to review which judgment this writ of error was sued out. [p. 179] 195 ü. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error.
Mr. Charles E. Vroman and Mr. George Packard, with whom Mr. Harrison Musgrave was on the brief, fo*r plaintiff in error:
The claim of defendant in error is a provable debt in bankruptcy under the bankruptcy act of 1898. Bankruptcy Act, 1898, sec. 17; sec. 1 (11); sec. 63; In re Hirschman, 104 Fed. Rep. 69; T. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Clews, 67 Illinois, 383; Elliott v. Jackson, 3 Wisconsin, 649; Sloat v. Evans, 35 Illinois, 455; Western Assurance Co. v. Towle, 28 N. W. Rep. 106 (Wis.); Dashaney v. Rogers, 21 Pac. Rep. 342 (Cal.); In re Filer, 125 Fed Rep. 261; In re Silverman, 101 Fed. Rep. 219; Collier on Bankruptcy, 338, 344; Beers v. Hamlin, 99 Fed. Rep. 695; In re Hilton, 104 Fed. Rep. 981; In re Graff, 117 Fed. Rep. 343.
Being a provable debt, the claim is of such a character that it is barred by the discharge in bankruptcy of plaintiffs in error, it not being within any of the exceptions of section 17 of the bankruptcy act. (1.) As stock-brokers, or factors, plaintiffs in error were not“ acting in a fiduciary capacity.” Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202; Neal v. Scroggs, 95 U. S. 704; Keine v. Graff, 14 Fed. Cases, No. 7650; Hennequin v. Clews, Hl U. S. 565; Grover & Baker Co. v. Clinton, 11 Fed. Cases, No. 5845; Noble v. Hammond, 129 U. S. 68; Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 375; Anstill v. Crawford, 7 Alabama, 340; Woolsey v. Coch, 54 Alabama, 383; Sanders v. Sanders, 56 Arkansas, 588; Chipley v. Frierson, 17 Florida, M2; Georgia R. Co. v. Cubbedge, 75 Georgia, 323; Dupont v. Beck, 81 Indiana, 274; Phillips v. Russell, 42 Maine, 361; Hyman v. Powl, 7 Met. 330; Halpin v. May, 100 Massachusetts, 499; Cronan v. Cotting, 104 Massachusetts, 245; Woodward v. Towne, 127 Massachusetts, 42; Green v. Chilton, 57 Mississippi, 599; Gibson v. Gorman, 44 N. J. L. 327; Palmer v. Hussy, 87 N. Y. 308; Lawrence v. Harrington, 122 N. Y. 408; Mulock v. Byrns, 129 N. Y. 25; Bissell v. Couchine, 15 Ohio, 64; Curtis, v. Waring, 92 Pa. St. 109, Scott v. Porter, 93 Pa. St. 40; Pankey v. Nolan, 6 Humph. 155; Hammond v. Noble, 57 Vermont, 200; Slayton v. Wells, 6 Vermont, 63; Wilson v. Kirby, 88 Illinois, 570; Straw v. urgens, 144 Illinois, 507; Shepherd v. Furness, 153 Illinois,
Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. 195 U. S.
590; Pierce v. Shippee, 90 Illinois, 376; Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 16, p. 781 (2d ed.); In re Pasch, 97 Fed. Rep. 761; Bracken n. Milner, 104 Fed. Rep. 522.
The clause “fraud,” etc., used in subdivision four of section 17, is limited and restricted by the qualifying clause “ while acting in a fiduciary capacity.” There being no fiduciary relation between the parties, the debt is not within the exception, and hence is barred. In re Rhutassel, 96 Fed. Rep. 599; In re Hirschman, 104 Fed. Rep. 69; In re Lewinsohn, 99 Fed. Rep. 74; Hargadine-McKitrick Co. v. Hudson, 111 Fed. Rep. 361; Gee v. Gee, 87 N. W. Rep. 1116; In re Bullis, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1048; Allen v. Ferguson, 85 U. S. 1.
“Fraud,” as used in the act, means positive fraud, involving moral turpitude—not constructive fraud, or fraud in law. Conversion by one in lawful possession of property is not “fraud” within the meaning of the bankruptcy act. Hence the claim of defendant in error does not fall within the meaning of the term “fraud” as there used. And on this point the entire evidence is properly before the court on the plea puis and the replication thereto. Chitty on Pleadings, 246; Clough n. Shepherd, 31 N. H. 490; Teel v. Fonda, 4 Johns. 304, Neal v. Scroggs, 95 U. S. 704; Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 565; Noble v. Hammond, 129 U. S. 68; Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 138; Keime v. Graff, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 7650; Bracken v. Milner, 104 Fed. Rep. 522; Burnham v. Pidcock, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1009; In re Benedict, 75 N. Y. Supp. 165; In re Gaylord, 113 Fed. Rep. 131, 135; Scott v. Porter, 39 Am. Rep. 726; Watertown Carriage Co. v. Hall, 72 N. Y. Supp. 466; Crosby v. Miller, 25 R. I. 172 (55 Atl. Rep. 328); Western, etc., Co. v. Hunt, 116 Fed. Rep. 442.
The case made by defendant in error shows that there was no fraudulent intent or positive fraud on the part of plaintiffs in error, and that the relations between the parties were purely contractual and therefore not responsive to the counts either for conversion or deceit. Markham v. Jourdain, 41 N. Y. 239, Wood v. Hayes, 15 Gray, 375; In re Swift, 105 Fed. Rep. 493; [p. 181] 195 U. S. Argument for Defendant in Error.
Coville v. Loud, 135 Massachusetts, 41; Weston v. Jordan, 168 Massachusetts, 501; Corbett v. Underwood, 83 Illinois, 324.
The evidence shows that the transactions out of which the claim of defendant in error arises were of a gambling character and illegal and void at common law and under the statute. The court may, at any stage, when it appears that the matter involved is forbidden by public policy, or is against public morality, decline to consider a claim so founded, regardless of the pleadings. Lyon v. Culbertson, 83 Illinois, 38; Soby v. People, 31 Ill. App. 242; Cothran v. Ellis, 125 Illinois, 506; Schneider v. Turner, 130 Illinois, 39; Jameson n. Wallace, 167 Illinois, 396; Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261; Martin Emerich Outfitting Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 108 Ill. App. 364.
Mr. John E. Burke in person for defendant in error:
The claims of defendant in error were claims for unliquidated damages arising out of torts; they were claims for damages occasioned by positive fraud; they were not provable in bankruptcy, and therefore were not barred by the discharge of plaintiffs in error.
As to the proof of debts under the provisions of the act of 1898, paragraph a of § 63 classifies all claims or “ debts which may be proved,” while paragraph b provides for the precedent liquidation of such unliquidated claims only as come within the provisions of paragraph a, and, thereafter, for the proof and allowance of such claims.
Claims for unliquidated damages arising out of tort do not come within any of the provisions of paragraph a, and hence are not provable. Collier on Bankruptcy, 1900, 385; Lowell on Bankruptcy, 487; In re Yates, 114 Fed. Rep. 365; In re Big Meadows Co., I Am. Bank. Rep. 697; Old Colony Boot & Shoe o. v. Parker, 183 Massachusetts, 557, 561; Watertown Carriage Go. v. Hall, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1028.
The claims of the defendant in error were for unliquidated amages arising out of tort, and did not come within any of
Argument for Defendant in Error. 195 U. S.
the provisions of paragraph a. Under Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, such claims cannot be liquidated or proved under the provisions of paragraph b.
A claim which could not be liquidated and proved under the act of 1867 certainly cannot be liquidated and proved under the act of 1898. Defendant in error did not file any claim with the receiver or receive any dividend.
While the record does not show that the state Supreme Court passed upon the question as to whether the claims of plaintiff in error were provable, yet, the question appears of record, and was raised and argued in each of the courts below, and calls into exercise the jurisdiction of this court. The question is involved in the main question: Was the discharge in bankruptcy of plaintiffs in error a bar to the claims in controversy? If the claims were not provable, the discharge was not a bar, and the judgment should be affirmed. Collier v. Stanbrough, 6 How. 21; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 197, 198; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 636. The qualifying clause in subdivision 4 of § 17 of the act of 1898, “while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity,” refers, both grammatically and logically, to its next antecedent only, which is the term “defalcation,” and does not apply to or restrict the terms “fraud” or “embezzlement.
As to grammatical construction and effect of punctuation, see City Safe Dep. Co. v. Lee, 107 Ill. App. 263; >8. C., 204 Ill. Sup. Ct. 69; Endlich on Interpretation, §2; 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 613; Cushing n. Worrick, 9 Gray, 382, 385; State v. Jernigan, 3 Murphey, 12, 18; Dearborn v. Inhabitants of Brookline, $7 Massachusetts, 466, 469; Wetmore v. Wetmore, 17 Pa. County Rep. 11; Quinn v. Lowell Electric Light Co., 140 Massachusetts, 106; Price v. Price, 10 Ohio St. [p. 183] 195 U. S. Argument for Defendant in Error.
It cannot be held that the clause applies to some classes of debts created by positive fraud, but not to all. It has no other or different meaning or application in the act of 1898 than it had in the acts of 1841 and 1867. Under the act of 1867 it was never held that “ while acting in any fiduciary character” applied to or restricted the term “fraud.”
Neither does it restrict the term “embezzlement,” which is a specific term and imports the violation of a trust. Moore v. United States, 160 U. S. 268; Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 196; Central Nat. Bank v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54. As to definition of “ defalcation,” see 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 166; see Black’s Law Dictionary; Madison Twp. v. Dunkle, 114 Indiana, 262; Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202, 208; Frey v. Torrey, 75 N. Y. Supp., 40. Nothing in the statute can be regarded as superfluous but full effect must be given to every part of it. Endlich on Interpretation, §§ 23, 265; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 152; Bishop on Stat. Crime, 3d ed., § 82; Opinion of Justices, 22 Pick. 571, 575; Commonwealth v. McCaughey, 9 Gray, 296; Wilmot v. Mudge, 106 U. S. 217.
Section 33 of the act of 1867, was substantially a reënactment of the act of 1841, in that regard, with the additional provision that no debt created by fraud or embezzlement shall be discharged. See Noble v. Hammond, 129 U. S. 65, 69.
As to the construction to be given to § 33 of the act of 1867, with reference to the release of a bankrupt from debts or claims created by his positive fraud, see Strang v. Bradner, 114 U. S. 555; Ames v. Moir, 138 U. S. 306; Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 177 U. S. 177, holding that a discharge in bankruptcy id not release a bankrupt from debts or claims which were created by his positive fraud involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong, while not acting as an officer or in any duciary capacity at the time he committed the fraud.
Argument for Defendant in Error. 195 U. S.
Subd. 4 of § 17 of the act of 1898, is substantially a reenactment of a corresponding provision in the act of 1867, with the addition of the word “misappropriation.” Loveland on Bankruptcy, § 293, 295; Lowell on Bankruptcy, 395; In re Basch, 97 Fed. Rep. 761; Collier on Bankruptcy, 3d ed. 198; Frey v. Torrey, 73 N. Y. Supp. 201; aS. C., 75 N. Y. Supp. 40.
When an act, or part of an act, which has received a judicial construction, is reenacted in substantially the same terms, that construction must be considered to have the sanction of the legislature, unless the contrary appears. Mere change in the phraseology works no change in the established interpretation thereof, unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the legislature. Black on Interpretation, 161; Bradley v. State, 69 Alabama, 318; Huddleston v. Askey, 56 Alabama, 218; Posey v. Pressly, 60 Alabama, 243, 249; McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619, 628; Potter’s Dwarris, 181, note 2; Yates’s Case, 4 Johns. 318, 358; Dominick v. Michael, 4 Sandf. (13 N. Y.) 374, 409; The Devonshire, 13 Fed. Rep. 39; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162; Willis v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 169 U. S. 295, 307; Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 3 Gray, 450; State v. Cornell, 75 Fed. Rep. 25.
A discharge in bankruptcy, under the act of 1898, does not release a bankrupt from debts created by his positive fraud involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong. In re Wollock, 120 Fed. Rep. 912; In re Blumberg, 1 Am. Bk. Rep. 633; In re Black, 97 Fed. Rep. 493; In re Thomas, 92 Fed. Rep. 912; In re Basch, 97 Fed. Rep. 761; In re Lewensohn, 99 Fed. Rep. 73, In re Steed, 107 Fed. Rep. 682; Loveland on Bankruptcy, §§293, 295; Lowell on Bankruptcy, §433, p. 488; Collier on Bankruptcy, 3d ed. 200; Bracken v. Milner, 104 Fed. Rep. 522; In re Cole, 106 Fed. Rep. 837; Frey v. Torrey, supra; Stevens v. Meyers, 76 N. Y. Supp. 332; Predmore v. Torrey, 77 N. Y. Supp. 86.
The cases cited by plaintiffs in error can be distinguished.
The history of bankruptcy legislation shows that no such law was ever enacted, either in this country or in Englan
It has been repeatedly declared by the highest courts of both countries that bankrupt laws are enacted with the object and intention of relieving honest men, but not rascals, from the burden of their debts. In re Silverman, 22 Fed. Cas. 139; Cong. Rec. June 28, 1898; Re Dow’s Estate, 105 Fed. Rep. 889; In re Becker, 106 Fed. Rep. 54; Turner v. Turner, 108 Fed. Rep. 785; Lubke v. Thomas, 116 U. S. 606; In re Scott, 126 Fed. Rep. 981; McDonald v. Brown, 10 Am. Bank. Rep. 58; Dister v. McCauley, 71 N. Y. Supp. 949; Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473.
Mr. Justice Brown, after, making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
A year after this case was put at issue, and upon the opening of the trial, defendants filed their separate pleas puis darrein continuance, setting up their discharge in bankruptcy, and averring that plaintiff’s claim was a provable debt, and the discharge a complete defense.
It is a well-settled principle of law, and was so held by the Supreme Court of Illinois in this case, that a plea puis darrein continuance waives all prior pleas, and amounts to an admission of the cause of the action set up in the plaintiff’s declaration. Mount v. Scholes, 120 Illinois, 394; East St. Louis v. Renshaw, 153 Illinois, 491; Angus v. Trust & Savings Bank, 170 Illinois, 298; Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Wendell, 675.
But notwithstanding this, plaintiff was permitted to introduce evidence in proof of the fraud alleged in his declaration; and upon the conclusion of the trial the court found there had een a conversion of plaintiff’s reversionary interest in the ® oc^> l°r which he “had a right to recover in trover,” and at it was not such a debt as was barred by the bankruptcy ac. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court it was held that it was not necessary to the judgment to decide whether the allega ions of the declaration were admitted by the pleadings, ey were established by the proof which had been adduced [p. 186] by plaintiff, “and the propositions held as law on that branch of the case being correct, judgment for plaintiff necessarily follows.” That court also held that the case, being one of fraud, was not covered by the defendants’ discharge in bankruptcy.
The only Federal question involved in the case is whether the Supreme Court of Illinois gave the proper effect to the discharge pleaded by the defendants. If plaintiff’s claim was not a provable debt, or was expressly excepted from the operation of the discharge, the decision of that court was right, but if it was covered by the discharge such discharge was a complete defense.
Section 17 of the bankruptcy act of 1898 contains, among other things, the following provisions:
“Sec. 17. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release the bankrupt from all of his provable debts except such as . . . (2) are judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false pretences, or false representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to the property or person of another . . . or (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary capacity.”
Under this section, whether the discharge of the defendants in bankruptcy shall operate as a discharge of plaintiff’s debt, it not having been reduced to judgment, depends upon the fact whether that debt was “provable” under the bankruptcy act, that is, susceptible of being proved; second, whether it was or was not created by defendants’ fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.
1. Provable debts are defined by section 63, a copy of which appears in the margin.1 Paragraph a of this section includes
as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not, with any interest thereon which would have been recovera e a [p. 187] debts arising upon contracts, express or implied, and open accounts, as well as for judgments and costs. As to paragraph 6, two constructions are possible: It may relate to all unliquidated demands or only to such as may arise upon such contracts, express or implied, as are covered by paragraph a.
Certainly paragraph 6 does not embrace debts of an unliquidated character and which in their nature are not susceptible of being liquidated. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 350. Whether the effect of paragraph b is to cause an unliquidated claim which is susceptible of liquidation but is not literally embraced by paragraph a, to be provable in bankruptcy, we are not called upon to decide, as we are clear that the debt of the plaintiff was embraced within the provision of paragraph a, as one “founded upon an open account, or upon a contract, express or implied,” and might have been proved under section 63« had plaintiff chosen to waive the tort, and take his place with the other creditors of the estate. He did not elect to do this, however, but brought an action of trover, setting up a fraudulent conversion of his property by defendants. In the first five counts of his declaration he charges a fraudulent conversion of his interest in the stock, and in the last five counts that the defendants had induced him to make further payments on such stock in the way of margins, by false and fraudulent representations. a e, or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then payable and i not bear interest; (2) due as costs taxable against an involuntary bankrupt, who was at the time of the filing of the petition against him plaintiff m a cause of action which would pass to the trustee and which the trustee ee nes to prosecute after notice; (3) founded upon a claim for taxable s s incurred in good faith by a creditor before the filing of the petition U an action to recover a provable debt; (4) founded upon an open account, express or implied; and (5) founded upon provable debts sid<^- ° ¿Udginents after the filing of the petition and before the eon-and ¡nt 6 a^^Pt s application for a discharge, less costs incurred of the en7S S after the ^ng of the petition and up to the time °t the entry of such judgments. cation tn,n+i?U^a^i C^a'm® against the bankrupt may, pursuant to applithereaffor C°U 1 e fi^^ated in such manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and allowed against his estate.
The question whether the claim thus set forth is barred by the discharge depends upon the proper construction of section 17, which declares that the discharge in bankruptcy relieves the bankrupt from all of his “provable debts” except such as “. . . (2) are judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false pretences, or false representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to the property or person of another ... or (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary capacity.”
Do these words apply to all debts created by the fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation of the bankrupt, or only to such as were created while he was acting as an officer or in some fiduciary capacity? The fact that the second subdivision of section 17 excepted from the discharge “all judgments in actions for frauds, or of obtaining property by false pretences, or false representations,” indicates quite clearly that as to frauds in general it was the intention of Congress only to except from the discharge such as had been reduced to judgment, unless they fall within the fourth subdivision, of those created by the fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation of the bankrupt while acting as an officer or in a fiduciary capacity. Unless these words relate back to all the preceding words of the subdivision, namely, the frauds and embezzlements, as well as misappropriations or defalcations, it results that the exception in subdivision 2 of all judgments for fraud is meaningless, since such judgments would be based upon a fraud excepted from discharge by subdivision 4, whether judgment had been obtained or not.
This conclusion is fortified by reference to corresponding sections of the former bankrupt acts. Thus, by the first section of the act or 1841, 5 Stat. 440, the benefits of that act were extended to all persons owing debts “which shall not have been created in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer, or as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity.” It is entirely clear [p. 189] that under this section a discharge was not denied to the bankrupt by reason of debts fraudulently contracted, but only to such as were created by his defalcation as an officer, or while acting in a fiduciary capacity.
We may remark here in passing that ever since the case of Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202, this court has held that a commission merchant and factor who sells for others is not indebted in a fiduciary capacity within the bankruptcy acts by withholding the money received for property sold by him. This rule was made under the bankruptcy act of 1841, and has since been repeated many times under subsequent acts. Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, 708; Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 676, 679; Noble v. Hammond, 129 U. S. 65, 68; Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 365, 375, as well as in cases in the state courts too numerous for citation.
Under the bankruptcy act of 1867 the list of debts excluded from the operation of the discharge was considerably larger. In section 33, Revised Statutes, 5117, it was declared that:
“No debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary character, shall be discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy;.but the debt may be proved, and the dividend thereon shall be a payment on account of such debt.”
The language of this section is so clear as to require no construction. It is plain and explicit to the effect that the raud and embezzlement of the bankrupt need not have been committed by him while acting as an officer or in a fiduciary c aracter, and that this character relates only to his defalcaron But under the act of 1898 there is no such severance, in t e fourth paragraph as would authorize us to say that the u.rm Quinary capacity” did not extend back to the words yau, embezzlement and misappropriation.” It was the i P h°n Supreme Court of Illinois that11 a mere change p raseology, apparently for the sake of brevity, rendering ,e me^ng somewhat obscure, cannot be regarded as showing egis a ive intent to depart so radically from precedents [p. 190] established by previous bankruptcy legislation and judicial decisions, as to provide that debts created by fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt should be released by his discharge in bankruptcy, unless such fraud or embezzlement should be committed while the bankrupt was acting as a public officer, or in a fiduciary capacity.”
Our own view, however, is that a change in phraseology creates a presumption of a change in intent, and that Congress would not have used such different language in section 17 from that used in section 33 of the act of 1867, without thereby intending a change of meaning. The view generally taken by the bankruptcy courts has been that the terms “officer” and “fiduciary capacity” extend to all the claims mentioned in paragraph 4, and are not confined to cases of defalcation. In re Rhutassel, 96 Fed. Rep. 597; In re Lewensohn, 99 Fed. Rep. 73; In re Hirschman, 104 Fed. Rep. 69; In re Cole, 106 Fed. Rep. 837; In re Freche, 109 Fed. Rep. 620; Hargadine-Mc-Kittrick Dry Goods Co. v. Hudson, 111 Fed. Rep. 361. This is the natural and grammatical reading of the clause.
The cases in the state courts are almost uniformly to the same effect. Thus in Smith & Wallace Co. v. Lambert, 69 N. J. Law, 487, the defendant pleaded to an action on a book account his discharge in bankruptcy, to which the plaintiff replied that the cause of action was created by the fraud of the defendant. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held the replication to be insufficient. “We think,” said the court, “that under section 17 of the bankrupt law, to which reference has been made, there is no provision that would except from the discharge the debt upon which the present suit is brought.
In Morse v. Kauffman, 100 Virginia, 218, it was pleaded against the discharge that the goods were procured by false pretenses. After holding that the case had not fallen within subdivision 2 of section 17, as there was no judgment for fraud, the Supreme Court of Virginia observed:
“It would seem to be equally clear that the demand o plaintiffs in error is not within the exception of subdivision 4 [p. 191] of section 17. It is not pretended that the claim was created by the bankrupt’s fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary capacity.”
“The contention that ‘fraud’ should be segregated from the qualifying language ‘while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity ’ is without merit. Such interpretation would not only destroy the grammatical construction of the sentences and contravene its plain meaning, but it would likewise be inconsistent with paragraph 2 of the same section—that a creditor should have obtained judgment in an action for fraud in order to override a discharge in bankruptcy.”
A like construction was given to subdivision 4 by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Goodman v. Herman, 172 Missouri, 344, by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Gee v. Gee, 84 Minnesota 384, by that of Rhode Island in Crosby v. Miller, 25 R. I. 172, and by the Supreme Court of New York, fourth department, in In re Bullis, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1047. In this case the question was discussed at considerable length, the court saying:
“If any debt created by fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation is to be excepted from the application of the statute, then there is no necessity for subdivision 2, making a judgment essential to prevent the granting of the discharge under the statute.”
We have not overlooked the fact that the New York Supreme Court of the first department reached a different conclusion in Frey v. Torrey, 70 App. Div. 166, affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion, 175 N. Y. 501, but so far as we know this is the only case that supports the construction given to section 17 by the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Why an ordinary claim for fraud should be released by the discharge, while a judgment for fraud is not released, is not a together clear, although this distinction may have been created to avoid the necessity of going into conflicting evidence upon the subject of fraud; while in cases of judgments for [p. 192] frauds the judgment itself would be evidence of the fraudulent character of the claim. If a creditor has a claim against a debtor for goods sold which would ordinarily be covered by a discharge in bankruptcy, he is strongly tempted to allege, and if possible to prove, that the goods were purchased under a misrepresentation of the assets of the buyer, and thus to make out a claim for fraud which would not be discharged in bankruptcy. It was probably this contingency which induced Congress to enact that an alleged fraud of this kind should be reduced to judgment before it could be set up in bar of a discharge.
The intent of Congress in changing the language of the act of 1867 seems to have been to restore the act of 1841, which, as already observed, extended the benefits of the law to every debtor who had not been guilty of defalcation as a public officer or in a fiduciary capacity, the act of 1898 adding, however, to the excepted class those against whom a judgment for fraud had been obtained.
Some stress is laid by the Supreme Court of Illinois upon the punctuation of subdivision 4, section 17, presumably upon the insertion of a comma after the word 11 misappropriation,” thereby indicating a severance of that which precedes from that which follows. While we do not deny that punctuation may shed some light upon the construction of a statute, Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 32, we do not think it is entitled to weight in this case. In the enumeration of persons or things in acts of Congress it has been the custom for many years to insert a comma before the final “and” or “or” which precedes the last thing enumerated, apparently for greater precision, but without special significance. So little is punctuation a part of statutes that courts will read them with such stops as will give effect to the whole. Doe v. Martin, 4 J. R. 65, Hammock v. Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77, 84; United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 628; United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496.
2. But it is strenuously insisted by the plaintiff that a claim [p. 193] for the conversion of personal property is not within the scope of section 17; because it is not a “provable debt” within the definition of section 63a. Did the latter section stand alone, there would be some ground for saying that a claim, though “ founded upon an open account, or upon a contract, express or implied,” would not be a provable debt, if plaintiff elected to treat the conversion as fraudulent and sue in trover, though he might have chosen to waive the tort and bring an action for a balance due on account. An early English case, Parker v. Crole, 5 Bingham, 63, is cited to the effect that the operation of the discharge is determined by the election of the creditor to sue in assumpsit or case. A like ruling was made in certain cases under the bankruptcy acts of 1841 and 1867. Williamson v. Dickens, 27 N. Car. 259; Oliver v. Hughes, 8 Pa. St. 426; Bradner v. Strang, 89 N. Y. 299, 307.
But we think that section 63a, defining provable debts, must be read in connection with section 17, limiting the operation of discharges, in which the provable character of claims for fraud in general is recognized, by excepting from a discharge claims for frauds which have been reduced to judgment, or which were committed by the bankrupt while acting as an officer, or in a fiduciary capacity. If no fraud could be made the basis of a provable debt, why were certain frauds excepted from the operation of a discharge? We are, therefore, of opinion that if a debt originates or is “founded upon an open account or upon a contract, express or implied,” it is provable against the bankrupt’s estate, though the creditor may elect to bring his action in trover as for a fraudulent conversion, instead of in assumpsit for a balance due upon an open account. It certainly could not have been the intention of ongress to extend the operation of the discharge under section 17 to debts that were not provable under section 63a.
results from the construction we have given the latter section that all debts originating upon an open account or upon a contract, express or implied, are provable, though plaintiff e ect to bring his action for fraud.
vol, cxov—13
Syllabus. 195 U. S.
In the case under consideration defendants purchased, under the instructions of the plaintiff, certain stocks and opened an account with him, charging him with commission and interest, and crediting him with amounts received as margins. Subsequently, and without the knowledge of the plaintiff, they sold these stocks, and thereby converted them to their own use. Without going into the details of the facts, it is evident that the plaintiff might have sued them in an action on contract, charging them with the money advanced and with the value of the stock; or in an action of trover based upon their conversion. For reasons above given, we do not think that his election to sue in tort deprived his debt of its provable character, and that as there is no evidence that the frauds perpetrated by the defendants were committed by them in an official or fiduciary capacity, plaintiff’s claim against them was discharged by the proceedings in bankruptcy.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is therefore reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
AIKENS v. WISCONSIN.
HUEGIN v. WISCONSIN.
HOYT v. WISCONSIN.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN.
Nos. 3,4,5. Argued November 7, 1903.—Reargued October 17, 1904.—Decided November 7, 1904.
Malicious mischief is a familiar and proper subject for legislative repression as are also combinations for the purpose of inflicting it, and liberty to combine to inflict such mischief, even upon such intangibles as business or reputation, is not among the rights which the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect.
Section 4466a, Wisconsin Statutes of 1898, prohibiting combinations for the purpose of willfully or maliciously injuring another in his reputation, [p. 195] 195 U. S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.
trade, business or profession, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment so far as the section applies to such a combination made from solely malevolent motives.
The facts, which involved the constitutionality of § 4466a of the statutes of Wisconsin, 1898, are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. W. H. Timlin and Mr. Goerge D. VanDyke for plaintiffs in error in Nos. 3 and 4:
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution contains an express restriction against the State, through any of its governmental agencies, executive, legislative or judicial, depriving any person of liberty or property without due process of law. The words “ liberty or property ” not having been defined in the Constitution it is for the court to determine their scope and meaning according to the usual rules of construction, including of course the meaning which has been given to these words or either of them in judicial decisions, or juristic writings.
The constitutionality of § 4466a must be determined in this court upon the construction given to it by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676, that it prohibits intentional joint action of any kind intended to cause loss of trade to another. This includes cooperation in trade competition. Thus construed the statute is unconstitutional.
If the state court had limited “ injury” in this penal statute to mean, “an infraction of some legal right,” Penna. R. R. Co. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. St. 541, or had excepted the acts of cooperation in trade competition, different questions might arise, t did not do so. It treated loss of customers as an “injury.”
ecause this is the only injury claimed. A criminal statute cannot be used as a drag net to ensnare the guilty and the innocent, leaving the latter to extricate themselves as they can. Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82; Montana Co. v. St. ours Co., 152 U. S. 170, citing Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183: /n r* Ah Sow, 29 Fed. Rep. 181.
Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. 195 U. S.
The statute, as construed, subjects to criminal prosecution those who enter into an ordinary partnership to compete in trade and win away customers from another, at least provided a jury find their intentions in doing so to be malicious, and it makes criminal many agreements in trade competition approved and found to be a lawful exercise of the right of liberty to contract by many other eminent courts such as the agreements held valid in Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 Fed. Rep. 816; State v. Julow, 29 L. R. A. 257 (Missouri); People v. Gilson, 109 N. Y. 389; Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 21 Q. B. D. 544; >8. C., 23 Q. B. D. 598; >8. C., [1892] App. Cas. 25; Orr v. Ins. Co., 12 La. Ann. 255; Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Missouri, 583, 591; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604; Doctor v. Riedel, 96 Wisconsin, 158; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499; Transportation Co. v. Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611; S. C., 40 S. E. Rep. 591; Watch Case Co. v. Watch & Clock, Co., 66 Fed. Rep. 637; In re Grice, 79 Fed. Rep. 627; but see 169 U. S. 284; Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407-413; McCauley v. Tierney, 37 L. R. A. 455; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Lumbermen's Assn., 21 L. R. A. 337.
Even this court is able to say from the information alone (without here considering the plea) as the state court said in the habeas corpus case, that there could be no competitive purpose served by the acts charged against the accused. -The accused cannot by law be deprived of their liberty to contract, collectively or individually, with whom, at what rates and upon what terms they choose, including terms which prohibit their customer from dealing with their competitor. Coffeyville &c. Co. v. Perry, 76 Pac. Rep. (Kan.) 848; State ex rel. v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wisconsin, 530; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Massachusetts, 1; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1; Doremus v. Hennessey, 176 Illinois, 608; Wallace v. Georgia &c. R. R. Co., 94 Georgia, 732; State v. Julow, 129 Missouri, 163; People v. Warren, 34 N. Y. Supp. 942; Chicago v. Hurlbert, 68 N. E. Rep. 786, 792; Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Massachusetts, 117; Cooley on Torts, 278.
A strike or boycott becomes an unlawful conspiracy, not by
195 U. S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.
reason of the refusal of the interested parties to assume or continue contractual relations with the persons to be coerced, which is a legal right, but by reason of the strikers or boycotters going beyond this and preventing, even in some cases by persuasion, others with whom the strikers or boycotters neither have nor intend to have contract relations, from entering into contract relations with the person to be coerced. Erdmann v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79; N. C., 56 Atl. Rep. 327; Gray v. Building Trades Council, (Minn.) 97 N. W. Rep. 663; Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A. 209; N. C., 63 Fed. Rep. 310; Martell v. White, 69 N. E. Rep. (Mass.) 1085; Van Horn v. Van Horn, 52 N. J. Law, 284; Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Massachusetts, 92; Plant v. Woods, 176 Massachusetts, 492; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Maine, 196; Hopkins v. Oxley Stare Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 912; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minnesota, 223; Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. Rep. 636; Underhill v. Murphy, 78 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 482; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101; Park v. Druggists' Assn., 175 N. Y. 1; Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. Sup. 400; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Massachusetts, 555; Beck v. Railway &c. Union, 118 Michigan, 497; National Assn. v. Cummings, 170 N. Y. 315.
No one can be held answerable in law for the exercise of a legal right on the ground that it was exercised with malevolent intent. Doctor v. Riedel, 96 Wisconsin, 158; Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vermont, 219; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Massachusetts, 555; Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vermont, 49; Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wendell, 261; Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Florida, 206; South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vermont, 505; Harwood v. Benton, 32 Vermont, 724; Phelps v. Nowlen, 12 N. Y. 39; Am. Bar Assn., vol. 21, for 1898, 335, address of L. C. Krauthoff on Malice as an Ingredient of Civil Cause of Action; Auburn &c. Road Co. v. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444, 450; but see 8 Harv. Law Rev. 511; Glencoe &c. Co. v. Hudson &c. Co., 138 Missouri, 439; but see Boyson v. Thorne, 98 California, 578; Baker v. Sun Ins. Co., 64 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 967; Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Kentucky, 122; Boulier v.
Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. 195 U. S.
McCauley, 91 Kentucky, 135; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407; Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N.Y. 324; O'Callaghan n. Cronan, 121 Massachusetts, 114; Continental Ins. Co. v. Underwriters, 67 Fed. Rep. 310; Huttley v. Simmons, [1898] 1 Q. B. 181; Ajello v. Worsley, [1898] 1 Ch. Div. 274; article in 18 Cent. L. J. 424, citing a great number of cases; Kelly v. Railway Co., 93 Iowa, 436; Passaic Print Works v. Ely & W. Dry Goods Co., 44 C. C. A. 426; Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A. C. 495; Robinson v. Texas Pine Lands Assn., 40 S. W. Rep. 843.
The act of combining can never be considered a wrong or a crime when done in the exercise of a legal right or attempted exercise of a legal right which requires for its exercise combination or cooperation notwithstanding a malevolent purpose is admitted in some of the cases by demurrer. Many of the cases cited supra and Kearney n. Lloyd, 26 L. R. (Irish) 268; Boyer v. West. Union Telegraph Co. et al., 124 Fed. Rep. 246.
The statute is unconstitutional as depriving one of his liberty to make contracts and it is not a police regulation. State v. Julow, 129 Missouri, 163, and cases cited; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; Block v. Schwartz, 76 Pac. Rep. (Utah) 22; Street v. Varney Electric &c. Co., 160 Indiana, 338.
For examples of statutes held unconstitutional as interfering with the liberty of contract by imposing penalties for cooperation in matters of trade and contract, see Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 Fed. Rep. 816; Greenwich Dist. Co. v. Carroll, 125 Fed. Rep, 121; State v. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77; S. C., 46 Atl. Rep. 234; State v. Dodge, 56 Atl. Rep. 983.
The state law denies the equal protection of the laws. Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420; Matthews v. Illinois, 202 Illinois, 389; Louisville v. Louisville &c., 14 L. R. A. 579, and note.
Mr. S. S. Gregory, with whom Mr. Conrad H. Poppenhusen [p. 199] 195 U. S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.
and Mr. Joseph L. McNab were on the brief, for plaintiff in error, in No. 5:
There was nothing illegal at common law in the arrangement made by plaintiff in error. 1 Chitty Cr. Law, 1138; Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A. C. 495; Jones v. Randall, Lofft’s Rep. 383; Read v. Friendly Society &c., [1902] A. C. 593; Scottish Cooperative &c. v. Glasgow Fleshers’ &c. Assn., 35 Scottish Law Rep. 645; Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Maine, 225; Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255; Huttley v. Simmons, 1 Q. B. 1898,181; Guethler v. Altman, 26 Ind. App. 587; Railroad Co. v. Schaffer, 65 Ohio St. 414; Buchanan v. Kerr, 159 Pa. St. 433; Commonwealth n. Hunt, 4 Metcalf, 111; Vegelahn v. Güntner, 167 Massachusetts, 92, distinguished, and see dissenting opinion; Plant v. Woods, 176 Massachusetts, 492; People v. Witzig, 4 N. Y. Co. Rep. 403; Nat. Protective Assn. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315.
There is no common law offense of conspiracy against the United States, and by statute it is limited to certain indicated acts. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 109. See as to railroad strike cases, Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310, 329.
The statute is an unwarranted interference with constitutional rights and cannot be justified as being within the police power. State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; Goodcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. St. 306; Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Arkansas, 407; Thomas v. City of Hot Springs, 34 Arkansas, 553; State v. Scougal, 3 S. Dak. 55, and cases cited on p. 72; Wallace v. Georgia &c. Ry. Co., 94 Georgia, 72; In re Ah Jow, 29 Fed. Rep. 181; In re Grice, 79 Fed. Rep. 627; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Illinois, 66; Gillespie v. People, 188 Illinois, 176; Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 98; Bailey v. People, 190 Illinois, 28; Harding v. Glucose Co., 182 Illinois, 551, 621; Booth v. People, 186 Illinois, 43; see also the anti-trust law cases decided by this court.
Argument for Defendant in Error. 195 U. S.
Mr. James G. Flanders, with whom Mr. LaFayette M. Sturdevant, Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin, was on the brief, for defendant in error in Nos. 3, 4. Submitted by Mr. Sturdevant, for defendant in error in No. 5:
As construed by the state court the statute is merely declaratory of the common law. Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown, ch. 27, §2; Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach, 274; Chitty Cr. Law, 1139; Archibold Criminal Practice and Pleading, 1829; Queen v. Kendrick, 5 Q. B. D. 49. Authorities in this country to the same effect might be multiplied indefinitely. For example, see Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Virginia, 927; State v. Stewart, 59 Vermont, 273; State v. Donnelson, 32 N. J. L. 151, 156; State v. Glidden, 55 Connecticut, 46; People n. Petheram, 64 Michigan, 252; State v. Burnham, 15 N. H. 403; Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightly, 36; State v. Buchanan, 5 Harris & Johnson, 317; Farmers’ L. & T. Co. v. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 803, 817; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310.
It was not necessary, even at common law, to make a combination formed for the purpose of injuring the business of another illegal that such purpose should be the sole or ultimate object of the combination. It.was sufficient if there were a direct and immediate purpose to injure others, even though the ultimate object were to benefit the parties to the combination. Doremus v. Henney, 176 Illinois, 608; Barr v. Trades Councils, (N. J. Chan.) 30 Atl. Rep. 881; Hilton n. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47, 74; Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48; Casey v. Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 138; Callan n. Wilson, 127 U. S. 547; Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598; A. C. 25; Continental Ins. Co. v. Board of Underwriters, Cl Fed. Rep. 319; Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q. B. D. 715; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Massachusetts, 555; Graham v. St. Charles Str. Ry. Co., 27 R. L. A. 416; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 918; Quinn v. Leathern, L. R. App. Cas. (1901), 515, overruling Allen v. Flood, H. L. Appeal Cases (1898), 1.
Motive or intent with which an act is done is not an element [p. 201] of the cause of action, is not generally applicable to civil actions of conspiracy, and is not applicable at all to conspiracy in its criminal aspects any more than to any other criminal offense. 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed. 872; Bishop on Non-Contract Law, § 592; Clifford v. Brandon, 2 Campbell, 358; Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vermont, 6.
Of the many cases that might be cited illustrative of the limitations upon the scope of the Federal Constitution to abridge the powers of the State to regulate its internal affairs affecting the peace, order and general welfare of the community, see Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 589; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 124; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 62; Barbier v. Conway, 113 U. S. 31; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 709. See also Wisconsin General Statutes, § 1747c, and for other statutes, see § 168, Penal Code, New York; People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251; Matter of Davies, 168 N. Y. 89, 101; Rev. Stat. Illinois, § 130; Burns’s Statutes of Indiana, § 2302; Iowa General Statutes, § 5059; Minnesota Statutes of 1894, § 6423; New Hampshire Pub. Stat, of 1891, ch. 266, § 12; Rhode Island General Laws, 1896, ch. 279, § 45.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
These are three writs of error to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, brought to set aside convictions and sentences of the plaintiffs in error, the defendants below, upon informations filed by the District Attorney. 113 Wisconsin, 419. The ground of the writs is that the proceedings violated the rights of the plaintiffs in error under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The informations were brought under the Wisconsin statutes of 1898, § 4466a, which impose imprisonment or fine on “any two or more persons who shall combine ... for the purpose of wilfully or maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever,” etc. The plaintiffs in error were severally charged with unlawfully combining [p. 202] together with the intent of willfully and maliciously injuring The Journal Company, a corporation, and certain persons named, stockholders and officers of the company, in their trade and business. It was alleged that the company was publisher of a newspaper in Milwaukee and had notified an increase of about twenty-five per cent in its charges for advertising, and that thereupon the plaintiffs in error, who were managers of other newspapers in the same place, in pursuance of their combination and with the intent of willfully, maliciously and unlawfully injuring The Journal Company and the others named, agreed as follows: If any person should agree to pay the increased rate to The Journal Company, then he should not be permitted to advertise in any of the other three newspapers except at a corresponding increase of rate; but if he should refuse to pay The Journal Company the increased rate, then he should be allowed to advertise in any of the other three papers at the rate previously charged. It was alleged that this conspiracy was carried out and that much damage to the business of The Journal Company ensued.
The defendant Hoyt demurred to this information, setting up the Fourteenth Amendment. Aikens and Huegin filed pleas which admitted the combination and intent of injuring The Journal Company and the resulting damage but alleged that the combination was entered into in trade competition and that the parties had the right to make it under the Fourteenth Amendment. The State demurred to the pleas. The demurrer of Hoyt was overruled; those of the State were sustained. The defendants were sentenced and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State on the authority of an earlier decision between the same parties, reported in 110 Wisconsin, 189.
The statute, it will be observed, punishes combining for the purpose of willfully or maliciously injuring another in his business. If it should be construed literally, the word “willfully would embrace all injuries intended to follow from the parties acts, although they were intended only as the necessary means [p. 203] to ulterior gain for the parties themselves. Taken in that way the word would hit making a new partnership, if it was intended thereby to hurt some one else’s. business by competition. We shall not consider whether that branch of the statute, so construed, could be sustained and express no opinion about it. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has intimated that a narrower interpretation will be adopted, and in the present case we have to deal only with the other branch, depending on the word “maliciously,” as we shall explain in a moment. The last quoted word we must take as intended to add something to the word “willfully,” and we can do so only by taking it in its true sense. We interpret “maliciously injuring” to import doing a harm malevolently for the sake of the harm as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some further end legitimately desired. Otherwise the phrase would be tautologous, since a willful injury is malicious in the sense familiar to declarations and indictments, where indeed the word means no more than foreseen, or even less than that. A death is caused of malice aforethought if, under the circumstances known to the actor, the probability of its ensuing from the act done is great and manifest according to common experience. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Massachusetts, 165, 178; 1 East P. C. 262. See also Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598, 613.
The informations alleged a combination for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring others, and therefore brought the case within the latter branch of the statute, if there are two and if “or” in the act is not taken to mean “and.” It is true that the plan is set forth, and some argument was spent on whether that plan might or might not be an instrument of ultimate gain. But while that question may have been open when the state court was discussing the evidence warranting a commitment, in 110 Wisconsin, 189, none such is open here. The malevolent purpose is alleged, it is admitted by the demurrer, it is not sufficiently denied by the pleas, whatever we may conjecture would have been done if counsel had had this [p. 204] decision before them. A purely malevolent act may be done even in trade competition.
We come then to the question whether there is any constitutional objection to so much of the act as applies to this case. It has been thought by other courts as well as the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that such a combination followed by damage would be actionable even at common law. It has been considered that, prima fade, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape. Mogul Steamship Co. n. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598, 613; >8. C., [1892] A. C. 25. If this is the correct mode of approach it is obvious that justifications may vary in extent according to the principle of policy upon which they are founded, and that while some, for instance, at common law, those affecting the use of land, are absolute, Bradford v. Pickens, [1895] A. C. 587, others may depend upon the end for which the act is done. Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Massachusetts, 485, 487; Plant n. Woods, 176 Massachusetts, 492; Squires v. Wason Manuf. Co., 182 Massachusetts, 137, 140, 141. See cases cited in 62 L. R. A. 673. It is no sufficient answer to this line of thought that motives are not actionable and that the standards of the law are external. That is true in determining what a man is bound to foresee, but not necessarily in determining the extent to which he can justify harm which he has foreseen. Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A. C. 495, 524.
Whether, at common law, combinations would make conduct actionable which would be lawful in a single person it is unnecessary to consider. Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A. C. 495. We are aware too that a prevailing opinion in England makes motives immaterial, although it is probable that in Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1, 94, the jury were instructed, as in Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q. B. 715, 719, in such a way that their finding of malice meant no more than that the defendant had acted with foresight of the harm which he would inflict, [p. 205] as a means to an end. Quinn n. Leathern, [1901] A. C. 495, 514. However these things may be, we have said enough to show that there is no anomaly in a statute, at least, which punishes a combination such as is charged here. It has been held that even the free use of land by a single owner for purely malevolent purposes may be restricted constitutionally, although the only immediate injury is to a neighboring land owner. Rideout n. Knox, 148 Massachusetts, 368. Whether this decision was right or not, when it comes to the freedom of the individual, malicious mischief is a familiar and proper subject for legislative repression. Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. 558. Still more are combinations for the purpose of inflicting it. It would be impossible to hold that the liberty to combine to inflict such mischief, even upon such intangibles as business or reputation, was among the rights which the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to preserve. The statute was assumed to be constitutional in Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310, 325, 326.
But if all these general considerations be admitted, it is urged nevertheless that the means intended to be used by this particular combination were simply the abstinence from making contracts, that a man’s right so to abstain cannot be infringed on the ground of motives, and further, that it carries with it the right to communicate that intent to abstain to others and to abstain in common with them. It is said that if the statute extends to such a case it must be unconstitutional. The fallacy of this argument lies in the assumption that the statute stands no better than if directed against the pure nonfeasance of singly omitting to contract. The statute is directed against a series of acts, and acts of several, the acts of combining, with intent to do other acts. “The very plot is an act in itself.” Mulcahy n. The Queen, L. R. 3 H. L. 306, 317. But an. act, which in itself is merely a voluntary muscular contraction, derives all its character from the consequences which will follow it under the circumstances in which it was one. When the acts consist of making a combination calculated to cause temporal damage, the power to punish such [p. 206] acts, when done maliciously, cannot be denied because they are to be followed and worked out by conduct which might have been lawful if not preceded by the acts. No conduct has such an absolute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part. The most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law.
It was urged farther that to make a right depend upon motives is to make it depend upon the whim of a jury and to deny the right. But it must be assumed that the constitutional tribunal does its duty and finds facts only because they are proved. The power of the legislature to make the fact of malice material we think sufficiently appears from what we already have said.
Finally it is argued that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin would hold that the statute extends to acts of which the motives were mixed and which were done partly from disinterested malevolence and partly from a hope of gain. • If so, it is said, the statute would be open to all the objections at which we have hinted in dealing with the word “willfully.” The Supreme Court did use some language which looked that way, but we consider it to have decided that the statute would be confined to combinations with intent to do wrongful harm. 110 Wisconsin, 193, 260. Thus limited, on whatever ground, the statute would punish only combinations of a kind for which no justification could be offered and those which were taken out of the justification by the motive with which they were made. We see no sufficient reason to believe that the court will go farther or construe the act in such a way as to raise questions which we need not go into here. Therefore it is unnecessary to consider whether, on a more literal construction, the portion dealing with malicious intent could be separated from that which deals with the purpose of merely willful injury, and saved, even if the latter were held to go too
195 U. S. Syllabus.
far. Probably the two phrases will be read together and the statute made unquestionable as a whole.
. Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice White dissenting.
Not being able to concur in the conclusion of the court that the opinion of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has affixed to the statute of that State a much narrower meaning than the text of the statute imports, and thinking, on the contrary, that not only such text but the construction of the statute adopted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin operates to deprive the citizen of a lawful right to contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, I dissent.
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