United States v. Finnell, 185 U.S. 236 (1902)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
United States v. Finnell, 185 U.S. 236 (1902)
Full caption
UNITED STATES v. FINNELL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 21, 1902
UNITED STATES v. FINNELL.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 523. Submitted February 28,1902.—Decided April 21,1902.
The District and Circuit Courts of the United States are always open for the transaction of some business which may be transacted under the orders of the judge in his absence, and on such transaction rest the plaintiff’s claims in this case, which the court sustain as business which could be transacted by the clerk in the absence of the judge, following the departmental construction of the statutes.
Of course if that construction were obviously or clearly wrong it would be the duty of the court to so adjudge; but if there simply be doubt as to the soundness of that construction, the action of the Government in conformity with it for many years should not be overruled except for cogent reasons.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
J/r. Assistant Attorney General Pradt and Mr. Philip M. Ashford for appellants.
Mr. Charles C. Lancaster for appellee.
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellee was clerk of the District and Circuit Courts for the Kentucky District from July 1, 1894, to June 30, 1898, his office, during that period and previously, being in the city
UNITED STATES v. FINNELL. 237
of Covington, one of the places at which those courts were held. The District Judge resided in the city of Louisville, while the Circuit Judges resided in other States.
The clerk presented to the proper officers of the Treasury for payment his account for certain services rendered during the above period, amounting to $995.
The account was sworn to and approved as required by the act of February 22, 1875, which provides, among other things, that before “ any account payable out of the money of the United States shall be allowed by any officer of the Treasury, in favor of clerks, marshals or district attorneys, the party claiming such account shall render the same, with the vouchers and items thereof, to a United States Circuit or District Court, and, in presence of the district attorney or his sworn assistant, whose presence shall be noted on the record, prove in open court, to the satisfaction of the court, by his own oath or that of other persons having knowledge of the facts, to be attached to such account, that the services therein charged have been actually and necessarily performed as therein stated; and that the disbursements charged have been fully paid in lawful money; and the court shall thereupon cause to be entered of record an order approving or disapproving the account, as may be according to law, and just.” 18 Stat. 333, c. 95, § 1.
Payment bf the account having been refused, this suit was brought against the United States, the petitioner averring that his whole compensation, if said fees were added, would not exceed the maximum compensation of $7000 for any one year.”
Judgment having been entered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount sued for, the Government has prosecuted this appeal.
The findings of fact upon which the judgment below was based were as follows:
I. The claimant, Joseph C. Finnell, was clerk of the District and Circuit Courts of the United States for the District of Kentucky from July 1, 1894, to June 30, 1898, duly qualified and acting. n
II. During said period he entered orders, decrees and other procee ings of the court on 199 days, extending through said tme. one of the judges of said courts were personally [p. 238] present at the time of the entry of such orders, decrees and proceedings, but said orders, decrees and proceedings were transmitted to the claimant by mail by the different judges composing the courts of said district. Said orders, decrees and proceedings were endorsed: ‘ Enter this order ’ (signed by the judge); or, ‘ Enter this ’ (signed by the judge); or, ‘ Enter ’ (signed by the judge). For the purpose of entering said orders, decrees and other proceedings the claimant made the following entries on the journal for opening and adjourning court on the dates for which attendance is claimed: ‘ Court met: Present, Hon. John W. Barr, sitting as Circuit Judge’ (or Judge Taft, or Judge Lurton, or whoever may have been the judge sending the order. Then follows the entry of the order or other proceedings of the court for that day) and, ‘ It is now ordered that the court stand adjourned until .’ The date to which adjournment was had was left blank and when another such order, decree or other proceeding was received to be entered said blank was filled by entering therein the date on which the same was received, and another entry, similar to the above, opening and adjourning the court to a blank date was made. The record containing the entries of the opening and adjourning of court, the certified presence of the judge, and the orders, decrees and other proceedings of the court was afterwards signed by the judge sending such orders, decrees and other proceedings to be entered as the record of the court for the days on which the same were respectively entered. The Exhibits A, B and C, attached to and made a part of these findings, are illustrative copies of the record of the court upon such days.
“ The nature and character of business transacted on the days on which court was opened and adjourned, as aforesaid, is best shown by the following statement of the subject-matter of said orders, decrees, and other proceedings entered as aforesaid on the days actually claimed for:
“Entry of order granting additional time to plead, 4 days.
“ Entry of order directing drawing of jury by jury commissioners, 18 days.
“ Entry of order granting restraining order, 5 days.
“ Entering orders disposing of sundry demurrers and motions, 21 days.
“ Entry of orders granting rule, 10 days.
“ Entry of orders granting application for writ of certiorari, 4 days.
“ Entry of orders granting petition for witnesses on behalf of the defendant at the cost of the United States, 7 days.
“ Entry of orders approving report of receivers, authorizing compromise by receiver, instructions issued to receiver, and various other orders pertaining to the appointment and conduct of receivers, 33 days.
“ Entry of orders and decrees finally disposing of cases, 17 days.
“ Sundry entries of orders granting writs of possession, approving bond of clerk of court, granting leave to withdraw exhibits, granting leave to file intervening petition, ordering sale of property, confirming sale of property, determining the priorities of liens, continuing cases, and granting appeals, 80 days.
“ III. Claimant made his account for said services as attendance on court when the same was opened and adjourned by order of the judge and while the same was actually in session and business actually transacted, which was verified and presented to the United States court for approval in the presence of the district attorney, and orders approving the same as being just and according to law were entered of record. Said accounts were then presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury epartment for payment, and payment of fees as per diems in Finding IV was refused.
IV. Item 1. Per diems for attendance on court on the days on which said orders, decrees and other proceedings were entered, 199 days, at $5 per day, $995.
V. Charges for similar services have been made by the claimant in every account rendered since 1882, and were always allowed and paid by the accounting officers of the Treasury up to June 30, 1893.”
By section 828 of the Revised Statutes, a clerk of a Circuit istrict Court of the United States was allowed “five dol-ars a ay for his attendance on the court while actually in session.” J
This section was similar to one in the act of February 26, 1853, c. 80, 10 Stat. 161, 163. Under that act clerks were allowed five dollars a day for attendance only, whether business was transacted or not by the court. After many years had expired, Comptroller of the Treasury Durham held that interpretation of the statute to be erroneous, and ruled that the transaction of business was a condition precedent to the right to a per diem compensation for attendance, although the court may have been, in fact, regularly opened for business and awaiting the coming of suitors. But the Court of Claims held, in 1885, that the Comptroller was in error, and adjudged that within the meaning of section 828 the clerk was entitled to five dollars a day for his attendance on court even when no business was transacted. Jones v. United States, 21 C. Cl. 1.
The judgment of that court did not, however, put the matter at rest; for, by the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of August 4, 1886, c. 902, it was provided that no part of the money appropriated by that act should “ be used in payment of a per diem compensation to any clerk or marshal for attendance in court except for days when business is actually transacted in court, and when they attend under sections 583, 584, 671, 672 and 2013 of the Revised Statutes, which fact shall be certified in the approval of their accounts.” 24 Stat. 222, 253. That act, by its terms, was temporary.
At the subsequent session of Congress the subject was again considered, and resulted in a permanent provision to be found in the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of March 3,1887, c. 362. By that act it was provided “ that hereafter no part of the appropriations made for the payment of fees of United States marshals or clerks shall be used, etc., . . . nor shall anypart of any money appropriated be used in payment of a per diem compensation to any attorney, clerk or marshal for attendance in court, except for days when the court is opened by the judge for business, or business is actually transacted in court, and when they attend under sections 583, 584, 671, 672 and 2013 of the Revised Statutes, which facts shall be certified in the approval of their accounts.” 24 Stat. 509, 541.
The sections of the Revised Statutes referred to in the act of 1887 are as follows:
UNITED STATES v. FINNELL. 241
“ § 583. If the judge of any District Court is unable to attend, at the commencement of any regular, adjourned, or special term, the court may be adjourned by the marshal, by virtue of a written order directed to him by the judge, to the next regular term, or to any earlier day, as the order may direct.
“ § 584. If the judge of any District Court, in Alabama, California, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee or West Virginia is not present at the time for opening the court, the clerk may open and adjourn the court from day to day for four days; and if the judge does not appear by two o’clock afternoon of the fourth day, the clerk shall adjourn the court to the next regular term. But this section is subject to the provisions of the preceding and next sections.”
“ § 671. If neither of the judges of a Circuit Court is present to open any session, the marshal may adjourn the court from day to day until a judge is present: Provided, That if neither of them attends before the close of the fourth day after the time appointed for the commencement of the session, the marshal may adjourn the court to the next regular term.
“ § 672. If neither of the judges of a Circuit Court be present to open and adjourn any regular or adjourned or special session, either of them may, by a written order, directed alternatively to the marshal, and, in his absence, to the clerk, adjourn the court from time to time, as the case may require, to any time before the next regular term.”
§ 2013. The Circuit Court, when opened by the judge as required in the two preceding sections, shall therefrom and thereafter, and up to and including the day following the day of e ection, be always open for the transaction of business under is Title, and the powers and jurisdiction hereby granted and con erred shall be exercised as well in vacation as in term time; an 1U(^8G sitting at chambers shall have the same powers an. Jurisdiction, including the power of keeping order and of cou1S con^enipt of his authority, as when sitting in
Section 2013 had reference to the functions of the Circuit °Th ln e^ec^on matters, and has been repealed.
e account here in suit is not for the attendance of the vol. clxxxv —16 [p. 242] clerk under sections 583, 584, 671 and 672, but for attendance under sections 574 and 638, which are hereafter given in this opinion.
It will be observed that the act of 1887 recognizes the right of the clerk to a per diem compensation in two states of case, namely, “ when the court is opened for business, or business is actually transacted in court.”
What do those words mean ? We are informed by the representatives of the Government that for nearly forty years prior to 1886 it had been the practice of its accounting officers to allow a per diem compensation to clerks for attendance, when court was opened by the judge and adjourned without transacting any business ; and that such practice had been sanctioned by an unbroken line of decisions in the Federal courts. And it is suggested that the purpose of the act of 1886 was to break up that practice. All this only serves to prove that Congress used the words found in the act of 1887 with full knowledge of the former practice, and of the change made, or supposed to be made, by the act of 1886. It is clear that the words used, reasonably interpreted, indicate a purpose to allow the per diem compensation for attendance as well when the court was opened for business, whether any business was actually transacted or not, as when business was actually transacted in colirt. It is said that no business could be lawfully transacted “ in court ” unless the judge was personally present. We do not assent to that view. It rests upon a construction which is too literal. The services for which Finnell’s account was rendered constituted business actually transacted in court, unless it be that a clerk could never enter any order unless the judge was, at the time, in the place, room or building where his court was ordinarily held. But we cannot so adjudge. There are many things that may be legally done by a clerk pursuant to the written order of a judge sent to him, and which, being done, may be fairly held to constitute business “ actually transacted in court.” This much is to be implied from sections 574 an 638 of the Revised Statutes, which are as follows:
574. The District Courts, as courts of admiralty, and as courts of equity, so far as equity jurisdiction has been conferred [p. 243] upon them, shall be deemed always open, for the purposes of filing any pleading, of issuing and returning mesne and final process, and of making and directing all interlocutory motions, orders, rules and other proceedings, preparatory to the hearing upon their merits of all causes pending therein. And any District Judge may, upon reasonable notice to the parties, make, and direct and award, at chambers, or in the clerk’s office, and in vacation as well as in term, all such process, commissions, orders, rules and other proceedings, whenever the same are not grantable of course, according to the rules and practice of the court.”
“ § 638. The Circuit Courts, as courts of equity, shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading, of issuing and returning mesne and final process, and of making and directing all interlocutory motions, orders, rules, and other proceedings, preparatory to the hearing upon their merits of all causes pending therein. And any judge of a Circuit Court raay, upon reasonable notice to the parties, make, and direct and award, at chambers or in the clerk’s office, and in vacation as well as in term, all such process, commissions, orders, rules and other proceedings, whenever the same are not grantable of course, according to the rules and practice of the court.”
As will be seen from those sections, the District and Circuit Courts of the United States are always open for the transaction of certain kinds of business which, we think, may be transacted under the orders of the judge, who may at the time be absent rom the place, room or building in which the court is held, he business transacted by the appellee was such as could be transacted by the clerk under the orders of the judge. It is too narrow an interpretation of the statute to hold that such business was not actually transacted in court. This whole subject was carefully considered and the statutes relating to it fully analyzed by Judge Baker in Butler v. United States, 87 Fed. Rep. 655.
These views are justified by long practice in the Department, an upon that we may properly rest our affirmance of the judgmen o the Court of Claims. It is found as a fact that the present appellee, in every account rendered by him since 1882,
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting.
has charged for services similar to those set out in the account here in suit, and such accounts were uniformly allowed and paid up to June 30, 1893. And on his account for the period from January 1, 1892 to June 30, 1894, he obtained judgment in the Court of Claims, which judgment was paid—no appeal having been prosecuted by the United States. Finnell v. United States, 32 C. Cl. 634. It thus appears that the Government has for many years construed the statute of 1887 as meaning what we have said it may fairly be interpreted to mean, and has settled and closed the accounts of clerks upon the basis of such construction. If the construction thus acted upon by accounting officers for so many years should be overthrown, we apprehend that much confusion might arise. Of course, if the departmental construction of the statute in question were obviously or clearly wrong, it would be the duty of the court to so adjudge. United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 219; Wisconsin C. R'd Co. v. United States, 164 U. S. 190. But if there simply be doubt as to the soundness of that construction—and that is the utmost that can be asserted by the Government the action during many years of the department charged with the execution of the statute should be respected, and not overruled except for cogent reasons. Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206,210; United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52, 59; United States n. Johnston, 124 U. S. 236, 253 ; United States n. Alabama G. S. Rd Co., 142 U. S. 615, 621. Congress can enact such legislation as may be necessary to change the existing practice, if it deems that course conducive to the public interests.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Gray took no part in this decision.
Mr. Justice Brown, with whom concurred Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Peckham, dissenting.
From the passage of the act of 1791, fixing the compensation of officers of the courts of the United States, the subject o
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting.
fees for attendance upon the Circuit and District Courts appears to have been one of constant dispute between the officers on one hand, who naturally seek a construction of the fee bill favorable to them, and the Treasury officials upon the other, whose duty it is to supervise and pass upon the accounts of these officers. A statement of some, although by no means all, the acts of Congress upon this subject may aid in the solution of these difficulties. The earliest is that of March 3,1791, 1 Stat. 216, wherein there was allowed “ to the clerk of the District Court, for attending in the District or Circuit Court, five dollars per day.” The act, however, was made temporary, and at the next session, May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 277, certain changes were made, though none in the matter of attendance.
The law upon the subject of attendance was apparently not changed until April 18, 1814, 3 Stat. 133, when it was provided, under “ an act to lessen the compensation ” of such officers, that there should not be allowed or paid to the clerk of the Circuit or District Courts of the United States in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, the Southern District of New York, or Pennsylvania, “any daily compensation for attending on the said courts.” Why this discrimination was made we have no means of knowing, but the act was repealed March 8, 1824. 4 Stat. 8. No important change was made in the law until 1842, when in the Civil and Diplomatic bill of May 18, 5 Stat. 475, 484, it was provided that no per diem compensation should be paid to clerks for attendance upon the Circuit or District Courts “ while sitting for the transaction of business under the bankrupt law merely, or for any portion of the time during which either of said courts may be held open, or in session, by the authority conferred in that law. . . . And no per diem or other allowance shall be made to any such officer for attendance at rule days of the Circuit or District ourts,” or for more than one per diem while both courts are m session.
But even before this act of 1842 was passed, it had been held y Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Cogswell, 3 Sumn.
w^ich involved the validity of marshal’s charges for at-en ance upon rule days, that as the marshal did not either
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting.
travel to or attend these rule days at the clerk’s office, his claim was for a constructive travel and attendance ; “ but we are of opinion that this charge, whatever might be its validity, if the marshal had actually traveled and attended at these rules, is, under the circumstances, wholly inadmissible. To justify the charge an actual travel and attendance are, in our judgment, indispensable.”
By act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161, R. S. sec. 828, the whole subject of fees was revised, and an attendance fee allowed to the clerk of $5 per day for his attendance on the court “ while actually in session.” By that act the words “ while actually in session” were first introduced into the law. It is evident that some change was contemplated by the use of these words. For some purposes, notably in admiralty and equity cases, (R. S. §§ 574, 638,) the court may be deemed to be sitting when a judge is present upon a rule day, or makes an order which can only be made by the court; but, as we shall show hereafter, no attendance was contemplated on these days, at least in the absence of the judge.
The words “ actually in session,” found in the act of 1853, are emphasized by the sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 509, 541, wherein it is enacted as follows: That hereafter no part “ of any money appropriated (shall) be used in payment of a per diem compensation to any attorney, clerk or marshal for attendance in court, except for days when the court is open (opened) by the judge for business, or business is actually transacted in court, and when they attend under sections 583, 584, 671, 672 and 2013 of the Revised Statutes, which fact shall be certified in the approval of their accounts.” The special sections here mentioned and reproduced in full in the opinion of the court may be dismissed from consideration, as, with the exception of section 2013, since repealed, they relate to cases where there is no judge present at the opening of the term, when special authority is given to the clerk or marshal to adjourn the court from day to day until a judge is present. As no claim is made in the case under consideration for attendance under these sections, they are only important here as indicating the will of Congress that neither the clerk nor the
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting,
marshal, should have an unlimited discretion in opening the court in the absence of the judge, and requiring a special authority for that purpose. These sections undoubtedly contemplate a special exigency, to prevent a lapse of the term, which might follow from the absence of the judge, and to allow the court to be adjourned for a limited number of days. In two of these sections (584 and 671) there is a provision that, if the judge does not attend before the close of the fourth day, the court shall be adjourned until the next regular term. We have already held in the case of United States v. Pitman, 147 U. S. 669, that the officers are entitled to per diem fees for attendance under these sections, the same as if the judge were present and business were transacted.
By Rev. Stat. sec. 828, under which this claim is made by the petitioner, the court must have been “ actually in session,” and by the act of 1887 the court must have been opened by the judge for business, or business must have been actually transacted in court. There is no conflict between these acts, since, in order that the court be opened by the judge for business, it must be “ actually in session,” and if business be actually transacted in court, the court must be opened for the transaction of such business. In either case the court must have been actually opened the judge or actually in session, which amounts to the same thing. As the petitioner bases his claim upon section 828, we shall inquire, first, when the court is actually in session. It is certainly not in session upon rule days, since, by Rev. Stat, section 831, “ no per diem or other allowance shall be made . . . for attendance at rule days of a District or Circuit Court.” We are then remitted to the real question in this case: When is a court actually in session, for we agree entirely in the opinion of the court that if the court be opened by the judge in person, and no business is transacted, the per diem compensation is still payable.
We had supposed the law to be that no court could be in session without the presence of a judge, and that the sections above cited from the opinion of the court in this case (583, 584, 671, 2,) allow an attendance to be charged, not because the court is actually in session, but to prevent a lapse of the term, when
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting.
the officers are supposed to be present and in readiness, should the judge appear. Bouvier says (Law Diet.) in giving a definition of the word “ court ” and the different styles of court, “ that the one common and essential feature in all courts is a judge or judges—so essential, indeed, that they are even called the court as distinguished from the accessory and subordinate officers.” So, too, in Bacon’s Abridgment, a court is defined as an incorporeal political being, which requires for its existence the presence of the judges.
Thus in State v. Judges, 32 La. Ann. 1261, it is said: “The court is an incorporeal political being, which requires for its existence the presence of the judges, or of a competent number of them, and a clerk or a prothonotary, at the time during which and at the place where it is by law authorized to be held, and the performance of some public act indicative of a design to perform the functions of a court.” A similar definition is given in the Lawyers’ Tax Cases, 8 Heisk. 650. So in Schoultz v. McPheeters, 79 Ind. 376, discussing the powers of a master commissioner, the court is said to be “ a tribunal organized for the purpose of administering justice, and presided over by a judge or judges.” So a court is defined in Mason v. Woerner, 18 Mo. 570, to be a tribunal established for the public administration of justice, and composed of one or more judges, who sit for that purpose at fixed times and places, attended by the proper officers. And in White County v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, a court is defined as consisting of persons, officially assembled at a time and place fixed by law for the administration of justice, although a judge alone does not constitute a court. Gold N. Vermont Central Railroad Co., 19 Vt. 478. But the presence of a judge is indispensable. Hobart v. Hobart, 45 Iowa, 503; Levey v. Bigelow, 6 Ind. App. 677; Michigan Central R- R-v. Northern Indiana R. R., 3 Ind. 245.
In Davis v. Township of Delaware, 41 N. J. Law, 55, where the question arose as to the validity of a verdict taken by a crier in the absence of the judge and clerk, it was held that the verdict so taken was entirely invalid. “ It seems a profitless labor to discuss so obvious a proposition.” “No verdict therefore is valid unless given openly in court.” It was held, how-
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting.
ever, in that case that the record of the court, showing the verdict of the jury to have been returned into the court, imported absolute verity.
So, too, in In re Terrill, Petitioner, 52 Kan. 29. This was a writ of habeas corpus in which the prisoner, convicted of murder, claimed his release, because his trial was had at a time not authorized by law. It appears that the judge was not present at the time and place when the term should have begun, nor for several days afterwards, and after several adjournments the clerk attempted to adjourn the court, until a later day, when the judge appeared and the prisoner was tried. It was held that the failure of the judge to appear and open court upon the day appointed resulted in the loss of the term, and that the proceedings were absolutely void. Said the court: “ There is ample power in a court which has been regularly convened to adjourn to a future time, provided it be not beyond the term; but in the absence of a statute authorizing it, the clerk or other ministerial officer cannot act for the judge in either opening or adjourning court. The clerk is a ministerial officer, and, without statutory authority, can exercise no judicial functions. The opening, holding and adjournment of court are the exercise of judicial power to be performed by the court. To perform the functions of a court, the presence of the officers constituting the court is necessary, and they must be present at the time and place appointed by law. . . . ‘To give existence to a court, then, its officers and the time and place of holding it, must be such as are prescribed by law.’ Hobart v. Hobart, 45 owa, 503. There being no authority in law for the clerk to open and adjourn the court, the consequence of the failure of t e judge to appear upon the day appointed for holding court was the loss of the term.”
The citation of these authorities, however, appears to be quite unnecessary in view of the express provision of the act of 1887, at no fees for attendance in court shall be payable except for ay$ "hen the court is opened by the judge for business.
e exhibits to which reference was made in the findings of act are in the following form:
Justices Bbown, White and Peckham, dissenting.
“ Exhibit A.
“ United States Circuit Court, District of Kentucky.
“ May term, Monday, October 15th, A. D. 1894.
“ Court met. Present: Hon.------------------- , Circuit (or District) Judge. “ Julius C. Lang, Admr., i
vs. >
The Ches. & Ohio R. R. Co. et al.)
“ This cause coming on to be heard upon the motion of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company for writ of certiorari and for a rehearing upon the motion to remand, the court having considered said motion and the affidavit filed herein, and the original petition for removal herein having been exhibited to the court, and being now duly advised, it is ordered that the clerk of the Kenton Circuit Court at Independence, Ky., be, and he hereby is, directed and ordered to make and transmit to the clerk of the United States Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky, at Covington, Kentucky, a true and correct transcript of the papers and proceedings in this case. The order remanding the case is now set aside and a rehearing of the motion to remand is hereby granted and is set for Saturday, October 20th, A. D. 1894, at 10 o’clock A. M. in chambers, at Cincinnati, Ohio.
“ It is now ordered that court stand adjourned until Friday, November 2nd, A. D. 1894.”
(The others are in form like unto this.)
It will thus be seen that, while the form of the journal entry showed an exact compliance with the law, the findings of fact show that it was a mere form, and that the facts found by the court were wholly inconsistent with the proceedings as they appear upon the journal, and were presented to the accounting officers. The form shows that the court met. It did not meet. That the circuit or district judge was present. He was not present. That a certain cause in each case came on to be hear and that an order was made in such cause, none of which too place at the time or place indicated; but the order was ma e
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting.
and transmitted by mail to the clerk. The final entry is that the court stands adjourned until a definite day, when the actual fact was that the day to which adjournment was made was left blank, and when another such order, decree or proceeding was received to be entered, such blank was filled with the date on which it was received, and another entry similar to the above, opening and adjourning the court to a blank day, was made. From the nature and character of business transacted on the days on which the court was opened and adjourned as aforesaid, it appears that with scarcely an exception they were orders which might have been made and which in fact were made in chambers. While the judge in each case directed the order to be entered, he did not direct the court to be opened for that purpose.
Now, while as before stated, if the court be properly opened, no business need be done to entitle the officers to their attendance fees, and when authority to do so is given by statute, the clerk or marshal may open the court and adjourn it, we know of no authority under which a clerk may open court at his own will, when he may have some order to enter ; nor do we know of any authority under which even a judge may open court without his personal presence, unless specially authorized to do so by statute. Under the practice pursued in this case the court might be opened every day in the year, provided some excuse be found in the shape of an order signed by a judge, though the work actually done in court might not have occupied ten days during the entire year.
The opening of a court is a solemn judicial act, and must be performed by the judge in person, unless special authority is given by statute for its performance by a subordinate officer.
o such authority is found in this case. It is true that in United States v. Pitman, 147 U. S. 669, it was held that the o cers were entitled to their attendance while waiting for the Ju ge to appear. We said in that case that “ the court should e eemed actually in session within the meaning of the law, no only when the judge is present in person, but when, in obelence to an order of the judge directing its adjournment to a certain day, the officers are present upon that day, and the
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting.
journal is opened by the clerk, and the court is adjourned to another day by further direction of the judge.” This, however, was said with particular reference to the case under consideration, and is no authority for the practice pursued in this case, since the court was not opened in obedience to any order from the judge.
Great stress is laid in the opinion of the court upon the practice of the departments in this connection, and upon the finding that the present appellee in every account rendered by him since 1882 has charged for services similar to those set out in the account here in suit, and that such accounts were uniformly allowed and paid up to June 30, 1893. An inspection of the entries in this case will show the weight to be attached to this practice of the departments. When it appears upon the journal that the court met, that the judge was present, that an order was made in court, and that the court adjourned to a specific date, how are the accounting officers of the Treasury to know that such was not the fact ? The practice of the departments to pay these bills might have continued for a century without anything to show that they wrere apprised of the actual facts appearing in the findings, and no inference can be drawn from such practice. Had it appeared that in such cases the facts set forth in these findings had been called to the attention of the accounting officers the rule would be different; but we fail to see how the practice could afford any justification for these charges. A practice like this is liable to throw one’s notions of differences of form and substance into sad confusion. Fictions in pleading were long, and still are, tolerated in many cases, but we know of no definition of the word “ fiction ” which authorizes journal entries like this, based upon the findings shown in this case. Had the facts been actually stated in connection with these entries, we imagine the practice of the department would have been so quickly changed that no argument based upon it could have been made.
Petitioner in his brief claims his attendance under sections 574 and 638, fully set forth in the opinion of the court, which, construed together, declare that courts of admiralty and equi y “ shall be deemed always open” for the purpose of filing any
UNITED STATES v. FINNELL. 253
Justices Brown, White and Peckham, dissenting,
pleading, issuing and returning process, and making and directing interlocutory motions, orders, etc., preparatory to the hearing upon their merits of all cases pending therein. No claim under these sections, however, is made in the petition, wherein the petitioner relies alone upon section 828 for attendance when the court is “ actually in session.”
There are, however, so many other answers to his claim under sections 574 and 638 that no elaborate discussion of them is necessary. (1) These three sections, 574, 638 and 828, are all taken from the Revised Statutes, and must be construed together as if they constituted parts of one act, as they really do. Nothing is said about attendance in the first two of these sections, and all the orders are such as are usually made at chambers. Both sections provide upon their face that the proceedings therein authorized may be made at chambers, or in the clerk’s office, and in vacation as well as in term ; but in a separate and distinct section, 828, providing for clerk’s fees, his fees for attendance are limited to such as are earned while the court “ is actually in session.” Of course, if there be any conflict between these sections the later rules, but in addition to that it is inconceivable that Congress, while providing specially for attendance " hile the court is in actual session, should throw the door wide open in sections 574 and 638 to a charge for attendance upon every day when the judge may happen to make an order, whether the court be actually in session or not. All that is nieant by sections 574 and 638 is a recognition of the old cusom that courts of admiralty and equity are presumed to be always open for incidental purposes, a custom as old as the very existence of these courts. (2) The list of the orders actually ma e y the judge, for the entry of which the clerk claims at-en ance in this case, shows that none of them were in admira y cases, and comparatively few in equity cases. The great
< vere in common law cases. The claim under these sec-on s was evidently an afterthought. (3) If these sections be ons ruec as opening the door for an attendance fee each time of WaS ma^e’_ ^len they were clearly repealed by the act
। ’ un(^er which the clerk has a right to compensation y w en the court is opened by the judge for business, or [p. 254] business is actually transacted in court, and when they attend under certain sections, in which sections 574 and 638 are not included.
For these reasons I am compelled to dissent from the opinion of the court in this case.
I am instructed to say that Mr. Justice White and Me. Justice Peckham concur in this dissent.
Mr. J ustice Gray took no part in the decision of this case.
WASHINGTON STATE v. NORTHERN SECURITIES
COMPANY.
ORIGINAL.
Argued April 14,1902.—Decided April 21,1902.
In the exercise of original jurisdiction by this court the usual practice in equity cases is to hear applications for leave to file bills, ex parte, and, ordinarily, leave is granted as of course.
But this is not an invariable rule, and where it is apparent on the face of the proposed bill that there is a defect of parties, which cannot be supplied without ousting the jurisdiction, leave will be denied.
Where the objection is one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and the case is of grave importance, leave to file will be granted that the fullest argument may be had.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
Jfr. W. B. Stratton for the motion. J/r. Wallace B. Douglas was on his brief.
JMLr. C. W. Bunn and J/?. John W. Griggs opposing. MB George B. Young and J/r. Jf. D. Grover were on Mr. Bunn s brief.
The Chief Justice :
This is an application by the State of Washington for leave
WASHINGTON v. NORTHERN SECURITIES CO. 255
to file an original bill in this court against the Northern Securities Company, a corporation of New Jersey; the Great Northern Railway Company, a corporation of Minnesota; and the Northern Pacific Railway Company, a corporation of Wisconsin. Notice was given to the proposed defendants and argument had in support of and against the motion.
The usual practice in equity cases has been to hear such applications ex parte, Georgia v. Grant, 6 Wall. 241; although under special circumstances a different course has been pursued. Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475. Ordinarily, as stated by the Chief Justice in the latter case, the motion for leave to file is granted as matter of course. 4 Wall. 478.
In Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50, a bill in equity was filed by the State of Georgia to enjoin the Secretary of War and other officers representing the Executive authority from carrying into execution certain acts of Congress, on the ground that such execution would overthrow the existing state government of the State and establish another and different one in its place; and a motion was made to dismiss for want of jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject-matter, on which full argument was had. It was held that the bill called for the judgment of the court on political grounds and on rights of a political character, and that, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
Louisiana n. Texas, 176 IT. S. 1, the case stated shows that argument was had on objections to granting leave, but it appearing to the court the better course in this instance, leave was granted, and the bill filed, whereupon defendants demurred, an t e cause was submitted on the oral argument already had and printed briefs.”
In Minnesota v. Northern Securities Company, decided at is erm, 184 IT. S. 199, application to file a similar bill to that etore us and seeking similar relief, was made, and after eximng t e bill we directed notice to be given and heard arguk°n S^es‘ result was that leave to file was deem id ec^u^e want of certain indispensable parties, who inrisd & ^rou^t without defeating our constitutional ic ion. That insuperable difficulty does not meet us on
Syllabus.
the threshold here, but, among other objections to granting leave, it is urged that the court would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter because, as contended, the bill does not present the case of a controversy of a civil nature, which is justiciable under the Constitution and laws of the United States, in that the suit is purely a suit for the enforcement of “ the local law and policy of a sovereign and independent State, whose right to make laws and to enforce them exists only within itself and by means of its own agencies, and is limited to its own territory.”
In the exercise of original jurisdiction the court has always necessarily proceeded with the utmost care and deliberation, and, in respect of all contested questions, on the fullest argument ; and in the matter of practice we are obliged to bear in mind, in an especial degree, the effect of every step taken in the instant case on those which may succeed it. In view of this it seems to us advisable to take the same course on the pending application as was pursued in Louisiana v. Texas, that is, without intimating any opinion whatever on the questions suggested, to grant leave to file in accordance with the usual practice. Our rules require service sixty days before the return day of process, but as the final adjournment of the term will have taken place within that time, process will be made returnable on the first day of next term.
Leave is granted and process will issue accordingly-
UNITED STATES v. GREEN. CHRISTIE v. UNITED STATES.
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.
Nos. 109,129. Argued January 27, 28,1902. — Decided April 28,1902.
The terms of the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 854, (establishing the of*Private Land Claims), with reference to a proceeding like this, eav no room for doubt that it was the intent of Congress to require t a,
UNITED STATES v. GREEN. 257
fore a decision of the court in the premises, all those asserting claims in the land, adverse to the United States, should be made parties, and should be heard in support of their validity.
By the law in force at the time of the sale under consideration, a grant initiated in the manner in which the one in question is claimed to have been, could not exceed in the aggregate four sitios.
In its essential features this case is like Ely's Administrator v. United States, 171 U. S. 220.
It may be presumed that the Mexican officials duly performed the duty imposed upon them of registering the fact of the making of a grant of public lands.
In Cameron v. United States, 148 U. S. 301, the matter passed upon was not the same as that which is present in the case at bar.
These appeals concern the title to a tract of land situated in the county of Pima, Territory of Arizona. The litigation was begun by the filing in the Court of Private Land Claims, on February 27,1893, on behalf of Alfred A. Green, of a petition by which the court was asked to declare the validity of the title of Green to the tract. It was alleged that Green had become invested with the title by mesne conveyances from one Ramon Romero and others, to whom the land had been granted on May 15,1825, by the State of the West in the Republic of Mexico.
While the original documents constituting the grant were averred to be in the official custody of the surveyor general of the United States for the Territory of Arizona, it was alleged that the claim had not theretofore been considered or acted upon by Congress, or any other authority of the United States. A map was annexed to the petition, which it was asserted showed the boundaries of the land, and established that the quantity t ereof was sixteen square leagues. Not only the United States, ut also Colin Cameron, and others whom it was averred claimed some interest in the land, were made parties defendant to the cause.
he United States filed a general denial. Thereafter, on arch 20,1895, upon the application of the United States, Harvey. Christie was made a party defendant, on the ground that ie asserted title to the land under the grant to Romero. h d^ ' ar°h Colin Cameron filed an answer, in which e enie^ that petitioner had any interest in whole or in part
VOL. OLXXXV—17
in the land, and it was also averred that he (Cameron) was the owner in fee simple, and that he was in possession of the tract, under the grant of May 15, 1825, referred to in the petition. The land claimed by Cameron was delineated on a map annexed to the answer, and the land was averred to be embraced within the original survey of the grant. The proceedings which it was claimed culminated in the grant were detailed at length. It was also alleged that as the result of proceedings instituted on February 28, 1880, by the successors in interest to the original grantees the surveyor general of the United States for the Territory of Arizona, on April 28,1880, recommended the confirmation by Congress of said grant to the legal representatives of the original grantees to the extent of four square leagues, but that no action had been taken thereon by Congress.
Defendant also pleaded that on September 6, 1886, the United States, under the act of Congress approved February 25, 1885, entitled “ An act to prevent unlawful occupancy of the public lands,” brought suit against him for an alleged unlawful enclosure of public lands, a part of the tract in question, and that the trial court had adjudicated that the map attached to Cameron’s answer in this case correctly represented the land included within the boundaries described in the original title papers of said grant, and that such map correctly represented the location of each monument called for and described in said title papers. Such findings of fact as to the monuments and location of the said grant were thereupon averred to be res adjudicata herein. The answer concluded as follows:
“ Defendant further avers, in order to save every right belonging to him, that he in nowise invokes the jurisdiction of this court or submits himself to it voluntarily, and that he answers herein only because he has been made a party defendant. Defendant avers that he claims the lands of the said San Rafael de la Zanja grant under a title derived from the Mexican government that was complete and perfect when the Unite States acquired sovereignty over such lands; that all the steps and proceedings in. the matter of the petition, survey, appraisement offers, auctions and sale of said grant and payment therefor were regular, complete and lawful, and vested a perfect an [p. 259] valid title in fee thereto in the said grantees of said grant, and that said grantees at the time went into the actual possession, use and occupation of said grant and erected the proper monuments, and that said grantees and their descendants and legal representatives have continued ever since and until the present time in the actual possession, use and occupation of the same, and are now seized and possessed in fee thereof; that said grant document is a complete, definite grant in fee by way of sale, coupled with the condition subsequent not to abandon the same for a longer period than three years, without good reason, which abandonment would subject the tract to adjudication to third parties who might apply for or denounce the same; but that no forfeiture of said grant was ever claimed.
“Defendant avers that by reason of the premises he is in nowise bound by the act of Congress, establishing this court to apply to this court for a confirmation of said title, and that he is unwilling to submit himself to the conditions, or any of them, imposed by the act establishing this court, upon petitioners applying to said court for confirmation of their title, and that he does not by this answer, or in any other way, so apply.”
< On February 4, 1899, Cameron filed what was termed a separate answer,” in which were repeated the averments in the prior answer as to the petitioner not possessing any interest in the tract, the ownership thereof in the defendant, the proceedings which culminated in the grant to Romero, and the proceedings had before the surveyor general of Arizona. An axerment was made that the map filed with the answer, as a part thereof, was a correct map of the grant in question, and showed the area of the grant to be 152,889.62 acres. It was next alleged that the grant to Romero was not a grant by quantity, but w as a sale by metes and bounds and natural landmarks established by the Spanish survey, and that the grant vested in the grantees a true and valid title in fee to the whole e surveyed land; and it was further alleged that each and every person in the occupancy of any portion of the tract was un aw ully occupying and that any patents issued by the [p. 260] United States for land within the grant were null and void. The answer next contained the following averments :
“ Defendant further avers that prior to said treaty, known as the Gadsden treaty, no resurvey of said grant had ever been applied for or ordered by any one, and that none of the grantees or their successors in interest had prior to said treaty any knowledge or notice that within the said monuments there was any excess of land over the area stated in said title papers, and defendant avers that the grantees under said grant were, under the laws of Mexico and the State of Sonora existing at the date of said treaty, and for a long time prior thereto had been, holders in good faith of any such excess or surplus, if any such there is, and entitled to occupy and retain the same as owners even after such overplus is shown, without other obligations than to pay for the excess according to the quality of the land and the price that governed when it was surveyed and appraised; and defendant further avers that if this honorable court should decide that said sale as recited in said title papers did not, as defendant avers it did, convey to the grantees therein all of the said tract of land to the monuments described in said title papers without further payment therefor, he is ready and willing and now offers to pay to the United States of America any amount that may be found to be due from him for such overplus, and also the costs for ascertaining the same, as soon as the amount of the same and the sum due therefor is ascertained.”
The answer concluded with a tender of $1359 as payment for any overplus, and the further sum of $200 for the costs of ascertaining and determining the existence or non-existence of such overplus, and concluded with the prayer “ that upon said payment this honorable court decree that defendant is entitled to and is the owner of all of said tract of land as originally surveyed, including said overplus or surplus, and that by said decree he be secured in the ownership and possession of the whole of said tract, and defendant, answering herein by reason of the fact that he has been made a party defendant, prays that the validity of his said title may be inquired into and decided, an that his title to all of said lands be declared valid, and that the said grant be adjudged to be and always to have been a [p. 261] complete and perfect and unconditional title in fee, and the defendant be adjudged to be the owner in fee thereof, and for such other and further relief as to the court may seem meet and proper in the premises.”
On February 4, 1899, an answer of defendant Christie was filed, in which it was averred that Christie was the owner of the land granted to Romero. In other respects the answer reiterated the allegations contained in the separate answer of Cameron just stated.
In a supplemental answer filed by leave on May 19, 1899, Cameron reiterated the plea of res adjudicata contained in his original answer.
From time to time various other defendants filed answers, setting up title by adverse possession, and otherwise to sundry portions of the land in controversy. The cause was heard on the theory that the pleadings of Cameron and Christie just referred to were cross complaints, demanding affirmative relief against the United States. On behalf of the two defendants named, there was introduced in evidence a certified copy of the expediente of the grant, as also the original titulo. This titulo shows the following as the original proceedings upon which the title was based:
On July 19, 1821, Don Manuel Bustillo, a resident of the presidio of Santa Cruz, applied to the intendant of the province of Sonora and Sinaloa, Antonio Codero, at Arispe, for four sitios of land at a place to which was afterwards given the name of San Rafael de la Zanja. Three of these sitios were to be north of and adjoining the lands of said presidio, and the other at the place called Cajoncito to the east. The application was granted on the same day without prejudice to third parties, and the commandant of Santa Cruz was ordered to make the survey, appraisement and publication of the land for thirty consecutive ays in solicitation of bidders. Gonzales, the commandant of anta Cruz, accepted the commission October 4, 1821, and or-ere the survey to be commenced on the next day, after summoning the party in interest and the owners of coterminous an s. An assistant was appointed, and the survey made on c o er 5 and 6, 1821. After a waxed and twisted hempen [p. 262] cord of fifty varas had been measured, the applicant (Bustillo) requested that, inasmuch as the place called Cajoncito was inside of the presidio lands, the one sitio he had asked for there be given to him in one tract with the other three, which request was granted. In substance it appeared that the survey was made by running or estimating the lines from the central point two hundred cords east, west, north and south, the ends of the lines being extended to form a square. The recitals of the survey concluded as follows:
“ With which measurements was formed the square of the four sitios registered by Don Manuel Bustillo for raising cattle, and as such he accepted them; being informed that in due time he was to establish his boundaries with monuments of lime and rough stone as required by law.”
Appraisers were appointed, and four sitios were appraised as follows: Three sitios at $60 each, because they had permanent water, and one sitio at $30, because it was dry. Publication was then made for thirty consecutive days, soliciting bidders. None appeared. Affidavits were taken to show that Bustillo was able to stock four sitios. The expediente was then forwarded to the intendant, who, in December, 1821, referred it to the attorney general for his opinion. The latter official submitted a written opinion December 20,1821, approving the proceedings, and recommending that the three usual public offers be made and the land sold to the highest bidder upon payment of the price and the usual fees. The intendant approved the recommendation, and ordered the three public offers made. The first offer was made January, 1822. The proclamation made by the crier, as recited in the account of the proceedings of the first auction, was as follows:
“ There are going to be sold for this commission of auctions four sitios of public lands for cattle raising, comprised in the place named San Rafael de la Zanja, situated within the juris diction of the presidio of San Cruz, surveyed in favor of the one who denounced them, Don Manuel Bustillo, and appraise in the sum of two hundred and ten dollars, being at the rate o sixty dollars each for three of said sitios, and the remaining one at thirty dollars.”
The bidders at the sale were Bustillo and one Romero. The latter, on behalf of himself and the residents of the presidio of Santa Cruz, became the purchasers for the sum of $1200. Romero was notified of the result, with which he expressed satisfaction, and asked the grant to be made. On January 11,1822, the intendant ad interim, Ignacio de Bustamente, approved all the proceedings, and ordered Romero to be notified and to pay into the treasury the price of the land and the usual fees, and, as soon as that was done and a voucher for the payment was attached to the expediente, it be sent to the superior board of the treasury in Mexico for such action as it might see fit to take. Romero made the payment, and a certificate was given him for the amount thereof. At this point the proceedings were suspended, and so remained until May 15, 1825, when the recently created commissary general of the State of Sonora, Juan Miguel Riesgo, issued a title to “ Don Ramon Romero and the other residents in interest,” for “ the four sitios of land for breeding cattle, comprising the place called San Rafael de la Zanja,” under article 81, ordinance of intendants, and the royal instructions of October 15, 1754, at Fuerte, the then capital of the United States of Sonora and Sinaloa.
The following appears at the end of the titulo, viz: “Entry of this title is made at folio 3 of book No. 2 that exists in this commissariat general.”
The expediente, which was on file in the archives of the State of Sonora, Mexico, at the city of Hermosillo, the capital, contained, following the certificate of the payments made by Romero, the following recital:
“ The title on this expediente was issued on May 15, 1825, in avor of the interested parties, Don Ramon Romero and other residents of Santa Cruz. Rubricas E. R. Pa. 7 a. Notification. Vale. ”
The court found (two members dissenting) that a valid grant t een made, that the evidence established the central point o e original survey, and confirmation was made and decreed o t e said title of the said Ramon Romero, and of his coowners and of their heirs, successors in interest, and assigns ” our sitios of the tract, measured in a square from the center [p. 264] established by the Mexican surveyor, as shown on the map of a certain survey made in 1895, and in evidence in the cause. The claim of plaintiff and of defendants Cameron and Christie to all other land not so confirmed was rejected.
Appeals were prosecuted by the United States and by Cameron and Christie.
J/r. John W. Griggs and J/r. Francis J. Henry for appellants in No. 129, and appellees in No. 109.
Mr. William H. Pope and Mr. Matthew G. Reynolds for the United States. Mr. Solicitor General was on their brief.
Mr. Rochester Ford filed a brief for the United States and for Christie.
Mk. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
We will first dispose of the questions presented by the appeal of the United States. In substance, it is asserted that the grant should have been rejected in toto, instead of being confirmed to the extent of four sitios, upon the following grounds: 1. That the claim was barred by section 12 of the act establishing the Court of Private Land Claims, because not asserted until after the expiration of two years from the passage of the act. True, it is said, the claim of Green was presented in time, but as he was not represented at the trial and Cameron and Christie were treated as the sole claimants and they had not by their cross complaints asked for affirmative relief within the statutory limitation, the bar of the statute was operative as to them. 2. The intendant ad interim Bustamente, through whom the sale to Romero and others purported to have been effected, and the commissary'general of Sonora who ultimately extended the title, did not possess the power in the premises which they assumed to exercise; 3. The grant in question was not du y located prior to September 25, 1853, as required by article of the Gadsden treaty; 4. The grant was not duly recorded m the archives of Mexico prior to September 25,1853, which was
UNITED STATES v. GREEN. 265
made a condition precedent to the recognition of an alleged grant, by the article of the treaty just referred to.
As respects the bar of the statute, we think the contention is clearly without merit, even upon the hypothesis that the grant to Romero constituted, at the date of the treaty, but an imperfect title to the extent to which the court below confirmed the same. The provision of the act establishing the Court of Private Land Claims, relied upon, is as follows :
“ Sec. 12. That all claims mentioned in section six of this act which are by the provisions of this act authorized to be prosecuted shall, at the end of two years from the taking effect of this act, if no petition in respect to the same shall have then been filed as hereinbefore provided, be deemed and taken, in all courts and elsewhere, to be abandoned, and shall be forever barred.”
By the filing of the petition on behalf of Green the court below was vested with jurisdiction to determine the validity of the grant upon which the proceeding was based and to pass upon the question as to whether or not the lands embraced therein were at the date of the treaty public land of the United States. The terms of the act establishing the Court of Private Land Claims, with reference to a proceeding thus instituted, in our opinion leave no room for doubt that it was the intention of Congress to require that before a decision by the court in the premises, all those asserting claims in the land adverse to the United States, under the grant relied upon, should be made parties and be heard in support of its validity. The provisions of section six of the act, which relate to claims for confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles, manifestly import that every adverse possessor or claimant should be made a party defendant, and the section prohibits the entry of a decree “ otherwise than upon full legal proof and hearing.” By section seven, all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the petition ” are required to “ be conducted as near as may be according to the practice of the courts of equity of the United States;” and, in addition, it is provided as follows:
The said court shall have full power and authority to hear an etermine all questions arising in cases before it relative to [p. 266] the title to the land the subject of such case, the extent, location and boundaries thereof, and other matters connected therewith fit and proper to be heard and determined, and by a final decree to settle and determine the question of the validity of the title, and the boundaries of the grant or claim presented for adjudication, according to the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty concluded between the United States and the Republic of Mexico, at the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, on the second day of February, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and forty-eight, or the treaty concluded between the same powers at the city of Mexico on the thirtieth day of December, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and fifty-three, and the laws and ordinances of the government from which it is alleged to have been derived, and all other questions properly arising between the claimants or other parties in the case and the United States, which decree shall in all cases refer to the treaty, law or ordinance under which such claim is confirmed or rejected.”
The fact also that, by section 8, the United States may, without limitation as to time, voluntarily institute a proceeding for the determination of the validity or invalidity of any claim or title deemed by it “ open to question,” affords further support for the construction that Congress intended that in a proceeding brought in due time to settle the validity of an alleged Spanish or Mexican grant, the United States might, at any stage of such pending litigation, apply to the Court of Private Land Claims—as was done by the United States with respect to the defendant Christie—to have brought into the case adverse claimants who had not been made parties defendant by the petitioner, in order that such parties might be afforded an opportunity to be heard, and the Court of Private Land Claims be aided in reaching a just decision. As further establishing the fact that it was not the purpose of Congress to deprive the Court of Private Land Claims of power to adjudicate upon claims asserted by defendants during the pendency of a lawful proceeding to obtain an adjudication respecting the validity o an alleged Mexican grant, even though such defendants were made parties or filed claims for affirmative relief after the pe-
UNITED STATES v. GREEN. 267
riod limited for the institution of an original proceeding to obtain confirmation of a claim of title, we excerpt the following proviso to the portion of section 12 heretofore quoted:
“ Provided, That in any case where it shall come to the knowledge of the court that minors, married women or persons non compos mentis are interested in any land claim or matter brought before the court, it shall be its duty to appoint a guardian ad litem for such persons under disability, and require a petition to be filed in their behalf, as in other cases, and if necessary to appoint counsel for the protection of their rights.”
The second and third grounds relied upon by the Government, as above stated, to defeat the claim in its entirety do not require extended consideration, as they are foreclosed by recent decisions of this court. By the law in force at the time of the sale under consideration a grant initiated in the manner in which the one in question is claimed to have been, could not exceed, in the aggregate, four sitios. The evidence clearly showed that the quantity of land denounced, appraised, paid for and purported to have been granted was only four sitios. Under these circumstances, the court below properly sustained the grant to the extent of four sitios only. As said by the Court of Private Land Claims: “ The cause is founded on a proceeding initiated in 1821 and concluded in 1825. In its essential features it is like Ely’s Administrator v. United States, 171 U. S. 220. The proceedings under which the grant was made are precisely like those upon which the grant in that case was made, and were had under the same laws, and the two grants were made by the same officer.” The case in the particular stated is, therefore, ruled by Ely v. United States, supraj United States v. AUaisk, 171 U. S. 277; Perrin v. United States, 171 U. S. 292; and United States v. Camou, and Reloj Cattle Company v. United States, 184 U. S. 624.
As from the evidence the Court of Private Land Claims was a e to determine the true boundaries of the tract as limited, t e cases just cited are also authority for deciding that the grant was duly located to that extent, and hence that the court rig‘tfully confirmed the grant for the lawful extent thereof.
e remaining ground upon which the United States [p. 268] contends that the claim should have been rejected, is that it was not established that a record of the grant was made. As respects the evidence of a due recording of the grant, the case at bar is similar to the Ely case, supra, where, however, no question was raised by the Government as to the want of a proper record. In the Sonoita grant, passed on in the Ely case, the final title was issued on the same day on which the final title in the case at bar purports to have been issued, and contained a like notation that “ note of this title is taken on page 3 of book No. 2 in this general commissariat.” A memorandum of this character appears to have been customarily endorsed on the titulo.
The evidence in the case at bar showed that there are only two books of Toma de Razon in the records at the capital of the State of Sonora, Mexico. One book has the figure 1 written on the first page of the first leaf, and contains entries of grants up to and including May 13, 1825. The first entry on the other book bears date of 1831. In the case at bar the final title or titulo, of date prior to the regulations of 1828, was admitted in evidence without objection or question as to its genuineness, nor was any objection interposed by the Government to the introduction in evidence of a letter, dated some time in 1831, written by the provincial secretary of Sonora, on behalf of the commissariat general of that State, alluding to the existence of the title to this San Rafael grant. The expediente is also on file in the Mexican archives, and contains thereon a memorandum of the issue of a grant. In view of all these circumstances it may properly be presumed that the ministerial duty which it is claimed was imposed on the Mexican officials of registering the fact of the making of a grant of public lands was duly performed, and that such record was in fact made. Whether, as held by the court below, the mere retention in the Mexican archives of the expediente constituted the record o the grant, within the meaning of the treaty of 1853, need no be determined.
We come then to consider the contentions relied upon by the claimants to sustain their appeals. Those contentions are in substance that the grant to Romero and his associates consti
UNITED STATES v. GREEN. 269
tuted a complete and perfect title to the full quantity of land embraced within the original survey, which it was asserted by witnesses for the claimants aggregated not merely four sitios, but nearly one hundred and sixty thousand acres of land. It is manifest however, from the authorities wThich we have previously cited, that as the grant was lawful to the extent of only four sitios, the claimants cannot be heard successfully to assert that it embraced and could be confirmed for the larger quantity.
The previous decisions of this court also preclude the claim for a confirmation of the grant as to the overplus upon payment of the asserted value of such excess. In Ainsa v. United States, 184 U. S. 639, decided at this term, discussing the contention of the- claimant that he was entitled to an award of the demasias or overplus beyond the cabida legal or real quantity granted, upon payments of such amount as might be found due, the court concluded as follows:
“ It is obvious that this contention cannot be sustained for the reasons indicated, and we repeat what we said in Ely's case, 171 U. S. 239: ‘This government promised to inviolably respect the property of Mexicans. That means the property as it then was, and does not imply any addition to it. The cession did not increase rights. That which was beyond challenge before remained so after. That which was subject to challenge before did not become a vested right after. No duty rests on this government to recognize the validity of a grant to any area of greater extent than was recognized by the government of Mexico. If that government had a right, as we have seen in Ainsa v. United States it had, to compel payment for an overplus or resell such overplus to a third party, then this government is under no moral or legal obligations to consider such overplus as granted, but may justly and equitably treat the grant as limited to the area purchased and paid for.’ ” Counsel for claimants in their brief call attention to the plea 0 res adjudicata interposed by the claimant Cameron, though t ey do not discuss the same. The action in which the judgment thus pleaded was rendered related to land within the asserted exterior bounds of the grant, near the alleged north and nort east monuments, as said boundaries were recited and [p. 270] measured in the expediente. The courts of the Territory had held that the lands enclosed were public lands of the United States, that Cameron had unlawfully enclosed the same, and the removal of the fence enclosing the land was ordered. On appeal, however, this court, while expressly disclaiming any intention to pass upon the validity of the asserted title of Cameron, held that there was color of title sufficient to take the case outside of the operation of the statute, reversed the judgment against Cameron, and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the petition. 148 U. S. 301. It is clear that, irrespective of the question of parties, the matter passed upon in the fence case was not the same as that which is present in the case at bar. The fence case did not involve, as does the case at bar, the question whether or not the claimant had a valid title to land within the boundaries of the alleged grant, and hence nothing decided in that case was conclusive in this.
Decree affirmed.
1
“ Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States has lately decided
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