Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Mills, 184 U.S. 290 (1902)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Mills, 184 U.S. 290 (1902)
Full caption
HUGULEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. GALETON COTTON MILLS.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 24, 1902
HUGULEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. GALETON COTTON MILLS.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOB
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
No. 94. Argued January 15, 1902.—Decided February 24,1902.
By the act of March 3, 1891, the judgments and decrees of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are made final in all cases in which the jurisdiction o the Circuit Court as originally invoked, is dependent entirely on diversity of citizenship.
If after the jurisdiction has attached on that ground, issues are raised an decided, bringing the case within either of the classes defined in section five of the act, the case may be brought directly to this court, althoug it may be carried to the Circuit Court of Appeals, in which event t » final judgment of that court cannot be reviewed in this court as of rig • If the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court rests solely on the ground that suit arose under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United ta es, then the jurisdiction of this court is exclusive, but if it is placed on^ verse citizenship, and also on grounds independent of that, then if car*1 to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision of that court woul no made final by the statute. ,. The use of the words “ or otherwise ” in the statute, when it provi es cases in which the decrees or judgments of the Circuit Court of PP [p. 291] are made final, may be brought here by “ certiorari or otherwise,” adds nothing to the power of this court, to so direct, as any order or writ in that behalf must be ejusdem generis with certiorari. Pending this appeal, appellants applied for certiorari to perfect the record, on diminution suggested, which was granted, and the omissions supplied. This auxiliary writ did not operate to bring the case before the court or in itself to add any support to the appeal.
Appellants took no appeal from the Circuit Court directly to this court, even assuming that this could have been done. The sole ground on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was invoked was diversity of citizenship and the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals was made final by the statute. This appeal therefore could not be sustained.
This was a bill filed in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Georgia, January 21, 1891, by J. J. Robinson as trustee, who averred that he was “ a citizen of and resided in the State of Alabama,” “ against the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company, a corporation created under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Georgia and a resident and citizen of said Northern District of Georgia; and against the Huguley Manufacturing Company, a corporation created under the laws of said State of Georgia, and a resident and citizen of said State of Georgia and of the Northern District of said State; and against W. T. Huguley, who your orator avers to be a citizen of said State of Georgia and residing within the said Northern District of Georgia.”
The bill averred that on January 2,1884, “ the said Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company executed and delivered said W. T. Huguley, W. C. Yancey, and your orator, as trusts, a certain deed of trust, conveying to said persons named, and to orator, all the property of the said Alabama and Georgia anufacturing Company upon the terms and upon the trusts erein stated for the purpose of securing certain negotiable n s of said company in the principal sum of sixty-five thou-san dollars, and interest thereon, which deed of trust was accep e by said trustees and duly recorded.” A copy of the trust ee was attached and conveyed certain real estate in the State o eorgia and certaih real estate in the State of Alabama as therein described.
It was further averred that the bonds were duly issued by [p. 292] the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company and sold or otherwise disposed of; that the company was insolvent and had ceased to do business; that under and by virtue of a decree in chancery of the Superior Court of Troup County, Georgia, all the property of the manufacturing company covered by the deed of trust had been sold and purchased by certain persons who afterwards conveyed the same to the Huguley Manufacturing Company, and that the last-named corporation was now in the possession of the same; that the sale was made subject in all respects to the rights and lien of the trust deed for the holders of the first mortgage bonds; that W. T. Huguley, defendant herein, and named as one of the trustees for said bondholders, was interested in the purchase of said property, and in the property and assets of the Huguley Manufacturing Company, and adversely to complainant as trustee for said bondholders, and that the other trustee, W. C. Yancey, had departed this life since the execution and delivery of the deed of trust.
The bill then set up default on the part of the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company in the payment of interest; the election of a majority of the bondholders to treat the whole of the principal sum named in the bonds as due; request of complainant to begin proceedings to secure the property pledged for the payment of the indebtedness, and which he deemed to “ the best interest of the bondholders; ” and prayed for an accounting, foreclosure, and sale of the property.
Defendants acknowledged service, and the two defendant companies filed a demurrer to the bill, which was subsequently overruled on hearing, Mr. Justice Lamar presiding. 48 fed-Hep. 12. Answer was filed by these defendants and the bi taken as confessed as to W. P. Huguley. The cause subsequently went to final decree adjudging recovery on all t e bonds and of foreclosure and sale, which decree was afterwards reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circui, 56 Fed. Rep. 690, because all the bonds were not due, acceptance of interest on some of them having waived default, and t e cause remanded. Pending the appeal the property was pur chased for the bondholders under the decree and $10,000 pai [p. 293] into court by the purchasers as required by the decree, who organized a company under the name of the Galeton Cotton Mills, which corporation was placed in possession of the property and remained in such possession for a period of three years and six months. The decree of foreclosure having been vacated, the Circuit Court granted a petition on behalf of the Huguley Manufacturing Company to restore it to the possession of the property, on condition however that it pay into court the $10,000 which had been paid in by the purchasers. The Huguley Manufacturing Company did not comply with this condition, and a second decree of foreclosure was entered adjudging that, out of a total of one hundred and thirty bonds, ninety were due when the bill was filed, and forty were not then due because of waiver of default, though now due; that the property was indivisible and could not be sold to satisfy part of the bonds only; and that the proceeds of sale should be proportionately distributed on all the bonds. Thereupon an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed. 72 Fed. Rep. 708.
A second foreclosure sale took place and the property was again purchased for the bondholders, and this sale was confined June 25, 1896. Defendants filed a petition for an accounting of the rents and profits from the time of the first sale, an an amendment thereto, and a reference was made to a specia master, who on November 2,1897, filed his report in which e ound the Galeton Cotton Mills liable for rents and profits in e sum of $39,715.31. Exceptions were filed to the master’s eport y both parties. February 23,1898, the exceptions of appellants were overruled and the exceptions of appellees sustained ne extent of reducing the master’s finding to $35,857.54, and ter th^r^0 effect Was entered February 28,1898. Thereafshn la k lrcuft ^ourt entered a decree that the rents and profits deer fleused reduction of the mortgage debt, and later a direct nF amount of the mortgage debt and costs and and th^ ° manner aPPtying thereto the rents and profits tions e<!ailloun^ cas^ already received and reserving all ques■Rep 218 an<^ exPenses n°t therein disposed of. 89 Fed.
t the last foreclosure sale a balance was left due on [p. 294] the trust deed of $33,414.21. September 22,1898, the purchaser at the second sale petitioned for a final conveyance, and on October 15, 1898, a decree was entered directing the completion of the sale by a cash payment, and conveyance. A motion was made to set aside this decree, which was overruled, whereupon an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal was heard, and the decree of the Circuit Court was on May 16, 1899, affirmed. 94 Fed. Rep. 269. Application was made to this court for a certiorari, which was denied October 30, 1899. 175 U. S. 726. May 12, 1900, an appeal to this court was allowed by Pardee, J., in order to preserve any possible rights of the applicants, although he expressly stated that he seriously doubted the right of appeal. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal, the consideration of which motion was postponed to the hearing on the merits.
J/?. John T. Morgan for appellants.
Mr. Louis D. Brandeis for appellees. Mr. William H. Dunbar was on his brief.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court.
The act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, provides in section 6 that the Circuit Courts of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction to review judgments and decrees of the Circui Courts in all cases in which a direct appeal is not allowed y section 5 to this court, and that the judgments and decrees o the Circuit Courts of Appeals shall be final in all cases in which the jurisdiction is dependent entirely on diversity of ci izenship. . .
If after the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court attaches on the ground of diversity of citizenship, issues are raised, the decision of which brings the case within either of the classes set forth in section five, then the case may be brought directly to this court; although it may be carried to the Circuit Court of Appeals, in which event the final judgment of that court could not be brought here as of right. Loeb n. Columbia Trustees, 179 U. S. 472. If the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court rests solely on the ground that the suit arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, then the jurisdiction of this court is exclusive, but if it is placed on diverse citizenship, and also on grounds independent of that, then if carried to the Court of Appeals, the decision of that court would not be made final, and appeal or writ of error would lie. American Sugar Company v. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 277.
The general intention of the act was to distribute the appellate jurisdiction and to permit an appeal to only one court. Robinson v. Caldwell, 165 U. S. 359.
In this case appellants did not attempt to take an appeal directly to this court from the Circuit Court, nor could they have done so since no question was so raised as to bring the case within either of the classes named in section 5. Cornell v. Green, 163 U. S. 75. The ground on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was invoked was solely diversity of citizenship, and e record does not show anything to the contrary, so that the ecree of the Circuit Court of Appeals cannot be regarded otherwise than as made final by the statute.
The question before us is whether this appeal was properly granted and can be maintained. In all cases where the decree ^5 Ju gment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is made final by e s atute, an appeal does not lie, but any such case may be adT^ . e “by certiorari or otherwise.” The latter words
Dot ing to our power, for if some other order or writ might resorte to, it would be ejusdem generis with certiorari, clar Th"18 e<lu^va^en^ an appeal or writ of error as dee, y statute, and it is issued in the discretion of the wurt.
TPlia
record filed in this case June 25,1900, was entirely [p. 296] insufficient, and appellants applied for certiorari to perfect it by bringing up the alleged lacking portions. We granted that application, and the omissions were supplied. This auxiliary writ did not operate to bring the case before us or in itself to add any support to the appeal, which must stand or fall according as the statute did or did not allow it to be taken. Many matters are urged, such as alleged lack of indispensable parties below and so on, as reasons why an appeal ought to lie, but our jurisdiction depends on the statute and cannot be enlarged by the supposed hardship of particular cases. Finally, it is argued that a large part of the property dealt with by the decree is situated in the State of Alabama and it is said that therefore the decrees of both courts are void for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
As the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the mortgagor company, the company claiming under it, and the surviving cotrustee of complainant, and the trust deed was made and executed in Georgia, where part of the property was situated, the courts below may have assumed that the case came within Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444; International Bridge Tramway Company v. Holland Trust Company, 52 U. S. App. 240; and kindred cases.
But we need not discuss the validity of the decrees in this regard. If the point had been raised in the Circuit Court and its decision would have justified an appeal directly to this court, no such appeal was taken. If its existence in the record justified a review of the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, the proper course was to apply for a certiorari. That course was taken in this case, and the application was denied. In view o repeated and well considered decisions of this court, some o which we have cited, we are unable to find any ground on whic this appeal can be sustained.
Appeal dismissed. [p. 297] In re THE HUGULEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND THE ALABAMA AND GEORGIA MANUFACTURING COMPANY, PETITIONERS.
ORIGINAL.
Nonumber. Submitted November20,1901.—Decided February 24,1902.
Where there is a plain and adequate remedy by appeal, a writ of prohibition or mandamus will not be granted.
Prohibition or mandamus was applied for in this case in respect of an interlocutory order of the Circuit Court granting an injunction, on the ground of want of jurisdiction. Held, That a plain and adequate remedy by appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals was provided for by the act of Congress of June 6, 1900, and the issue of either of the writs applied for was denied.
The Riverdale Cotton Mills, by leave of court, filed June 10, 1901, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia, a bill against the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company and the Huguley Manufacturing ompany, and also certain solicitors of said companies, as ancilary to the bill of foreclosure in that court, brought by Robinson, trustee, against said companies, the appeal in which has just been disposed of.
The bill averred that the defendant companies were corpora-10ns of Georgia, and if they had also been authorized under e aws of Alabama, they had no place of business in that State, u only in Georgia; and that the only officers, directors and S 00 °tders they ever had were the officers, directors and I oc olders of the corporations organized in Georgia; that as o’ia'3 as?key had any property, it was situated partly in Georgia an partly in Alabama, and was operated as one business
°®ces of the corporations in Georgia; and full d 6 Pr°Per^y °f the Alabama and Georgia Company was beiif ,e^Cr^e(t the trust deed, a copy of which was attached, pron’ t 6 dee(^ foreclosed at the suit of Robinson, and the per y o the Huguley Manufacturing Company was an equity [p. 298] of redemption therein acquired after the execution and delivery of that trust deed. The bill then set forth the acquisition by the Huguley Company of the property, subject to the trust deed, by proceedings in the Superior Court of Troup County, Georgia; the filing by Robinson of the bill to foreclose the trust deed; the decree of foreclosure'; the sale to representatives of the bondholders, and the transfer to the Galeton Cotton Mills; the reversal of that decree by the Circuit Court of Appeals; the second decree and second sale ; the confirmation of sale and deed to complainant, who paid all the purchase money; and the appeal thereupon to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the affirmance of the decree and proceedings. 94 Fed. Rep. 269. It was further averred that from this decree of affirmance an appeal was prosecuted May 16, 1899, to the Supreme Court of the United States where it was still pending.
The bill further showed that thereafter the Huguley Manufacturing Company and the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company filed in the chancery court of Chambers County, Alabama, their bill of complaint against the Riverdale Cotton Mills, the Galeton Cotton Mills, Robinson, trustee, Huguley, trustee, and the West Point Manufacturing Company, alleging that the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company was an Alabama corporation ; that all the property described in the trust deed was situated in Alabama, and that no sale of the property was ever made in Alabama, and that all judicial proceedings in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Georgia were null and void, so far as affected the title of the two companies to the part of the lands lying in Alabama; an it was sought to hold the Riverdale Cotton Mills, the Galeton Cotton Mills and the West Point Manufacturing Company, for the rents and profits of the property since May, 1892.
Complainant further averred that each and all of the claims to relief set up by these two companies in the Chambers chan eery court were set up, or could have been set up, and were judicated in the proceedings had in the Circuit Court in suit of Robinson, trustee, as aforesaid, as appeared from ® record and proceedings in that case; and that all the substan i issues raised in the suit in Chambers County had been adju g [p. 299] and determined by the Circuit Court. Complainant alleged that a large part of the property described in the trust deed was situated in the State of Georgia, and another part in the State of Alabama, and that the Circuit Court acquired and had full jurisdiction to order the sale of all the property described in the trust deed, and that neither the Huguley Manufacturing Company, the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company, nor W. T. Huguley, who were defendants to the bill filed by Robinson, ever during the progress of the cause in the Circuit Court raised any issue as to the jurisdiction of that court to render a decree for the sale of all the lands; and complainant alleged that the property was in fact indivisible. Complaint reiterated that the same companies were seeking by the bill of complaint filed in Chambers County to again raise and have investigated by a court of equity the same identical matters and issues which had theretofore been passed upon and adjudicated by the Circuit Court in the suit of Robinson. Complainant invoked the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as ancillary to the main suit instituted by Robinson to protect it against the violation of its rights by the prosecution of the bill of complaint in the chancery court of Chambers County, and prayed for an injunction and general relief.
The Circuit Court, on consideration of the bill, ordered defendants to show cause why an injunction should not issue as prayed for, and in the meantime granted a restraining order.
e two defendant companies appeared and showed cause, setting up that they were corporations chartered under the aws of Alabama; that the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing ompany was a distinct and separate legal entity from the a ama and Georgia Manufacturing Company incorporated nn er the laws of Georgia, and that it was the Georgia corpora ion and not the Alabama corporation that was made party e en ant to the suit of Robinson; and they alleged, on infora ion and belief, that the Huguley Manufacturing Company sist^ S in.COrPorat(*l under the laws of Georgia. They in-Circu’t C^ proceedings in Alabama the decree of the them1 ^orec^osure suit was n°h conclusive upon as e Circuit Court was without jurisdiction, and that [p. 300] the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of this bill because it was an original and not an ancillary bill, and complainants and defendants were citizens of Georgia; and further, that the foreclosure suit was pending in the Supreme Court of the United States. It was also averred that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to issue the injunction prayed in view of section 720 of the Revised Statutes; and further, because after filing the bill in Alabama, all the defendants thereto, without pleading in abatement, bad filed demurrers, pleas and answers.
The response further set up that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction of the original foreclosure suit because the complainant therein and the Huguley Manufacturing Company were citizens of Alabama, and that the charter of the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company in Georgia had expired by legal limitation before any sale of the property under the foreclosure proceedings. And it was further alleged that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to sell the mortgaged property because it was all situated in the State of Alabama, or, if not, to sell that portion lying in the State of Alabama, and it was denied that the property in Alabama and Georgia were parts of an indivisible whole. Respondents asked that the rule might be discharged, and the bill dismissed.
Upon a hearing the Circuit Court granted an injunction as prayed until the further order of the court. Ill Fed. Rep. 401.
On November 20, 1901, the Huguley Manufacturing Company and the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company submitted a motion for leave to file their petition for a writ o prohibition to restrain the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia from taking any further steps in the suit of the Riverdale Cotton Mills or in respect o the suit in Alabama, and for a mandamus requiring the Circuí Court to dismiss the bill of the Riverdale Cotton Mills. e petition, which they asked leave to file, averred that they were complainants in the chancery suit in Alabama filed for thep“1 pose of redeeming the property in question, and state a they were not parties to any litigation in the Circuit the Northern District of Georgia, but that they ha ® served with what purported to be process from that cour [p. 301] appear in the alleged ancillary proceedings. Petitioners charged that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction over the original suit in Georgia because the property was located in the State of Alabama; that the Alabama and Georgia Manufacturing Company of Alabama was not made a party to the suit in Georgia; that one of the trustees was not joined as complainant; that bondholders protesting against the foreclosure were not made parties; that the other bondholders were not made parties; that the Huguley Manufacturing Company was not given its day in court for redemption ; and, in brief, reiterated the grounds presented in their response to the rule to show cause.
Mr. J. C. Welles, Mr. John M. Chilton and Mr. Alexander C. King for petitioners.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court.
It is firmly established that where it appears that a court, whose action is sought to be prohibited, has clearly no jurisdiction of the cause originally, a party who has objected to the jurisdiction at the outset and has no other remedy, is entitled to a writ of prohibition as a matter of right. But where there is another legal remedy by appeal or otherwise, or where the question of the jurisdiction of the court is doubtful, or depends on facts which are not made matter of record, the granting or refusal of the writ is discretionary. In re Rice, 155 U. S. 396.
nd that the writ of mandamus cannot be used to perform the o ce of an appeal or writ of error, and is only granted as a general rule where there is no other adequate remedy. In re Attantic City Railroad Company, 164 U. S. 633.
And it may be added that it is also the general rule as to the wnt of certiorari when sought as between private parties and on e ground that the proceedings below are void, that it will w^red °r ^en^e(^ in sound discretion of the court, and e refused where there is a plain and adequate remedy by 168^ °s °-g erw^se* re Tampa Suburban Railway Company,
In this case there was under the act of Congress of June 6,
Syllabus.
1900, 31 Stat. 660, c. 803, a plain and adequate remedy by appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the interlocutory order granting an injunction. After a final decree an appeal to this court would lie in respect of the jurisdiction if the question were properly raised and certified, or if issues were raised and decided bringing the case within section five of the act of March 3, 1891; or to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The case as presented is far from being one in which we should regard it as a proper exercise of our jurisdiction to interfere with the orderly progress of the suit below by the issue of either of the writs applied for. In re Nev) York and Porto Nico Steamship Company, Petitioner, 155 U. S'. 523, 531.
The contention of counsel seems to go to the extent of insisting that the proceedings in the foreclosure suit were wholly void, and without force and effect as to all persons and for all purposes, and incapable of being made otherwise; and in declining to go into the subject at large we are not to be understood as concurring in that proposition.
Leave denied.
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