Powers v. Slaght, 180 U.S. 173 (1901)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Powers v. Slaght, 180 U.S. 173 (1901)
Full caption
POWERS v. SLAGHT.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 7, 1901
Majority
Harlan (Justice)
Dissent
Brewer (Justice), joined by Shiras
Concurrence
White (Justice) in the result
POWERS v. SLAGHT.
ERROE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.
No. 47. Argued and submitted October 15,16,1900.—Decided January 7,1901.
For reasons stated in Hewitt v. Schultz, ante 139, the court holds, in conformity with the long established practice in the Land Department, that the order of withdrawal of lands within the indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company is inconsistent with the true construction of the act of July 2, 1864, c. 217.
This action was commenced in one of the courts of the State of Washington by the present plaintiffs in error. They alleged in their second amended complaint that on or about December 15, 1883, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, under and by virtue of the act of Congress approved July 2,1864,13 Stat. 365, c. 217, granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound on the Pacific coast, and the various acts and joint resolutions of Congress supplemental thereto and amendatory thereof, applied at the United States district land office in the district in which the lands were situated to select and selected lots 10,11, 14 and 15 in section 1, township 16 north of range 45 east, Willamette meridian, Washington, with other lands, as indemnity in lieu of lands within the place limits of the grant to the company and which had been reserved, sold, granted or otherwise appropriated, or to which preemption or other claims or rights ad attached at the date when the line of the company coterminous therewith was definitely fixed by filing a plat thereof in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office—a 1st of the lands selected, prepared in the manner and form prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Interior Department, being filed by the company in the district land office, and en er and payment made to the receiver thereof of the fees required by law to be paid upon the selection of lands. The s was allowed and approved by the register and receiver on ecem er 17, 1883, the fees accepted, and thereafter the list p. 174was transmitted to the Commissioner of the General Land Office for approval. These lands were selected as public land to which the United States had full title, not reserved, sold, granted or otherwise appropriated, and free from preemption or other claims or rights, except such reservation, appropriation, claim and rights as had attached thereto in favor of the railroad company.
On October 26, 1887, the railroad company, in compliance with other and additional instructions of the officers of the Interior Department issued and given after the above selection had, as stated, been accepted, allowed and approved, filed a list designating the losses in lieu of which the lands described in the selection list were selected; and thereafter, in the years 1892 and 1893, the company, in compliance with instructions issued by the officers of the Interior Department subsequently to the acceptance, allowance and approval of the selection, re-arranged the list of losses and the selection list so that the losses for which each tract of land selected by the company had been taken should be specifically designated. It appeared from the re-arranged list that the lands in question were selected in lieu of certain lands included in section 7, township 9 north of range 15 east, Willamette meridian, Washington, which last-described land was located coterminous with and within forty miles of the line of the company as definitely fixed, and was at the date of the grant to the company, and at the date when its line coterminous therewith was definitely fixed, included in a reservation of the land set apart for the Yakima Indians.
On or about December 24, 1885, after the selection of the above-described land, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company entered into a contract in writing with the plaintiff William L. Powers to convey to him lots 3, 6,11 and 14 in section 1, township 16 north of range 45 east, upon the payment by him to the company of the sum of $822; and on August 4, 1887, payment having been made, the company conveyed the lots to him.
On July 30, 1887, the company conveyed to Powers lots 2, 7, 10 and 15 in that section.
In the year 1877 A. M. Duffield settled upon lots 2, 3, 6,7, 10,11,14 and 15 in the section in question. Shortly thereafter p. 175he sold and assigned his possessory rights and improvements to L. M. Rhodes, and thereafter, Rhodes having failed to make payment therefor, the property was assigned to the plaintiff Powers, who settled thereon in 1881 with the expectation and intention of purchasing the lands or a portion thereof from the railroad company. Soon after such settlement Powers offered to purchase lots 2, 7, 10 and 15 from the company, and at the same time John G-. Powers, a brother of the plaintiff, offered to purchase lots 3, 6,11 and 14 from the company. Thereafter, as above stated, the plaintiff William L. Powers purchased the lands from the railroad company, having prior thereto taken a relinquishment from his brother of all interest in and to lots 2, 7,10 and 15.
On or about March 1,1883, the defendant Slaght rented and leased lot 10 of the plaintiff Powers, and received and took possession of the same. He paid rental therefor, as agreed, from the date upon which he took possession of the premises until the 31st day of October, 1887.
On the last-named day Slaght presented an application at the United States district land office for the district in which the land was situated, to enter lots 10,11,14 and 15 as public lands of the United States, under the act of Congress approved May 20, 1862,12 Stat. 392, c. 75, entitled “ An act to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain,” alleging in his application that he had settled and established his actual residence upon those lands March 4, 1883, that such residence had been thereafter continuous, and that he had built a house on the land and improved the same. In the complaint in this case the plaintiffs averred that the settlement, occupation and improvement by Slaght were under and in pursuance of the renting and leasing of and from Powers, as above set forth, and not otherwise.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company having been notified o the application of Slaght to enter the land, filed its objec-10ns against the allowance thereof on or about December 2, . hearing was ordered by the United States district n officers for the district in which the land was situate to e rnune the rights thereto of the railroad company and p. 176Slaght, and such proceedings were had in the contest that the district land officers, in July, 1889, held the land to be excepted from the operation of the selection of the railroad company by reason of the settlement of the plaintiff Powers, and that the defendant Slaght had settled upon the land as the tenant of Powers.
The railroad company appealed from the decision of the district land officers to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. On April 13, 1895, the Commissioner rendered the following decision, directed to the register and receiver of the district land office at Walia Walia: “ I have considered the contest of Jacob Slaght v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company and Wil-Ham L. Powers, Intervenor, involving lots 10, 11,14,15, sec. 1, T. 16 N., R. 45 east, the record in which was transmitted with your letter of July 10, 1889, on appeal by Jacob Slaght and said railroad company from your decision in favor of William L. Powers, intervenor. The land is within the limits of the withdrawal upon the line of the amended general route of said road, the map showing which was filed February 21,1872, and upon the definite location of the road it fell within the indemnity limits, the order for the withdrawal of which was received at the local office November 30,1880. These withdrawalshave been held by the department to be without authority of law and of no effect. 17 L. D. 8, and 18 L. D. 87. On December 17, 1883, the company selected the land in question under the act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 365, per list No. 1, and on the same day said company selected the land under acts of July 2,1864, 13 Stat. 365, and May 31, 1870,16 Stat. 376 for indemnity purposes per amendatory list No. 2. On October 31, 1887, Jaco Slaght presented an application to make homestead entry for this land and alleged that he settled and established his actua residence thereon March 4, 1883, and the same has been con tinuous; that he built a house 12X14 feet, a kitchen 10X12 feet, a stable, dug a cellar and broke a garden spot, and built a ha mile of fence, and that his improvements are worth about$27 • The company was duly notified of said application and file i s objections against the acceptance of the same December 2, Upon the issuance of notice to the parties in interest a hearing p. 177in the case was had and concluded April 4, 1889, at which all parties were represented. The testimony adduced at the hearing on behalf of Slaght shows that he established his actual residence on the land in March, 1883; that he broke and planted a garden; that within a few days after moving in the log house on the land he built an addition thereto; that in September, 1883, he built a house 12x14 feet, a kitchen, a stable, a chicken house, dug a cellar, and fenced about eighty acres ; that his residence on the above-described tracts of land has been continuous since March 1,1883, and that his improvements are worth $400, and that he is a qualified settler.”
After stating the substance of the evidence adduced, the Commissioner proceeded: “ Therefore, in view of this showing, your decision in favor of William L. Powers is hereby reversed, likewise your decision adverse to Jacob Slaght. Your opinion that said company’s selection as to this land was improperly allowed, and that the company had no right to the land prior to its selection, and as the same was occupied and improved as the home of a settler, Slaght’s, at the date of selection, that such selection as to the land in question should be cancelled, was in accordance with the uniform practice of the department, and I concur therein. Accordingly, said amendatory list No. 2 of selections of Dec. 17th, 1883, by said company is hereby held for cancellation as to said lots 10, 11, 14 and 15, sec. 1, twp. 16 N., R. 45 E. The usual time, sixty days after notice, will be allowed the railroad company and William L. Powers within which to appeal to the honorable Secretary of the Interior. Should this decision become final, Slaght will be permitted to make homestead entry for this land. You will advise him of this action.”
From the decision of the Commissioner the Northern Pacific Railroad Company appealed to the Secretary of the Interior, who, in 1896, affirmed the action of the Commissioner.
In 1897 Slaght received from the Interior Department letters patent of the United States conveying to him lots 10, 11, 14 and 15.
Pontiffs averred that the letters patent were issued to ag t under a misconstruction and misinterpretation of the vol. clxxx —12 p. 178law; that long prior to the settlement upon the land by Slaght the lands and each and all of them had been reserved for the use and benefit of the railroad company; that the plaintiff Powers had settled upon the lands with the intention of purchasing them from the company; that the lands were subject to selection by the company, and by its selection thereof it acquired the title in and to the same; that at the time Slaght applied to enter the land, and at the date of the hearings in the contest above referred to, and at the date of the issuing of the letters patent to him, the land was not, nor was it at any of those times, public land subject to settlement or entry under the land laws of the United States other than the act of Congress approved July 2, 1864, above referred to, granting lands to the railroad company; and that the officers of the Interior Department were without authority to issue letters patent purporting to convey the land to Slaght, because the United States had long prior to the issuing of those letters parted with the title to the railroad company.
The complaint stated that the other of the above named plaintiffs in this cause asserted and claimed title to certain portions of the lands in dispute under and by virtue of conveyances from Powers and his grantees.
It was also averred that. the plaintiff Powers had conveyed to various parties, with warranty to defend the title thereof, certain other portions of the land; that the questions involved and to be determined in this action were of common and general interest to many persons, who were so numerous that it was impracticable to bring them into court; that the plaintiffs and such other persons wTere the owners in fee-simple and had an indefeasible title and were in possession of the lots named, and the defendant claimed an interest or estate therein adverse to the plaintiffs, but that defendant had no estate, right, title or interest whatever in the same or to any part thereof; tha the defendant was threatening to commence divers suits in ejectment, and without suit forcibly to dispossess and eject plaintiffs and the other numerous parties of and from the prem ises or a portion thereof, and unless restrained by an order o court wpujd bring such suits, and would also without suit forci p. 179bly enter the premises and without any right whatever eject and dispossess them; and that thereby a multiplicity of suits would be caused and great costs and injuries inflicted upon them, the courts of the State greatly and unnecessarily burdened, and great and irreparable injury wrought to the other parties having common and general interest in the question involved in the cause.
The plaintiff therefore prayed (among other things) that the letters patent issued to Slaght be declared to have been issued under a misconstruction of the law and to be void and to constitute clouds upon the titles of the plaintiffs and of the various persons to whom the plaintiff Powers had conveyed any portion of the land in dispute; that Slaght be decreed to be a trustee holding such right, title and interest in and to those lands as he acquired under and by virtue of such letters patent, if any, for the benefit of the plaintiff Powers and his grantees, both direct and through mesne conveyances, and that Slaght be required to convey such right, title and interest, if any, to the plaintiff Powers and his grantees. The plaintiffs also prayed for such other and further relief as was equitable and just.
A demurrer to the amended complaint was sustained and the plaintiffs electing not to plead further, the action was dismissed.
The judgment of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington upon the authority of the decision of that court in Moore v. Gormode^ 20 Wash. 305, 712, just decided upon appeal to this court.
Mr. C. W. Bunn and Mr. James B. Kerr for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. JJ. L. Ettenger, Mr. Charles L. Wyman and Mr. Thomas eill^ for defendant in error, submitted on their brief.
Mr. Justice Harlan, after stating the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
The issue as to the validity of the order of withdrawal made y irection of the Secretary of the Interior of lands within the p. 180indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, as indicated by the company’s accepted map of definite location, presents the controlling question in this case. Unless such order be sustained as a valid exercise of power by that officer, there is no ground upon which a decree could be rendered against Slaght.
For the reasons stated in Hewitt v. Schultz, just decided, we hold, in conformity with the long-established practice in the Land Department, that that order of withdrawal must be regarded as inconsistent with the true construction of the act of Congress of July 2,1864. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is, accordingly,
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice White concurred in the result.
Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Shiras dissented.
MOORE v. STONE.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.
No 48. Argued October 15, 16,1900.—Decided January 7,1901.
Hewitt v. Schultz, ante, 139, again followed.
On the 12th day of December, 1883, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company selected the northeast quarter of section 3, in township 13 north of range 42 east, Willamette meridian, in Garfield County, Washington, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, as indemnity in lieu of other 11 making the selection it filed in the district land office at Walla a list showing the tract selected, at the same time n dering to the officers of the district land office the fees by law. The tract was selected as public land, to whic e United States had full title, not reserved, sold, granted or p. 181otherwise appropriated, and free from preemption or other claim or rights. The list was accepted, allowed and approved by the officers named on January 5,1884, and transmitted to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. On October 26, 1887, in compliance with and in pursuance of certain orders and directions subsequently made by the Secretary of the Interior, the railroad company designated the losses for which the above-described lands were selected as indemnity.
On the 30th day of June, 1884, the defendant Dimon B. Stone presented an application to make a preemption declaratory statement for the lands selected as above stated by the railroad company, to the district land office at Walla Walla, alleging settlement upon the land April 25, 1882. His application was rejected, and on appeal to the Commissioner of the General Land Office a hearing in the matter was ordered to determine the condition of the land at the date of its selection and the respective rights of the defendant and the railroad company. At the hearing the officers of the district land office, in January, 1891, held that the settlement of the defendant and the application to file the preemption declaratory statement excepted the lands from the grant to the railroad company, and that therefore they were not subject to selection by it; and the selection made was recommended to be cancelled.
The railroad company appealed to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. In a decision rendered April 30, 1895, and directed to the register and receiver at Walla Walla, that officer said: “ The land is within the limits of withdrawal upon the line of amended general route of said road, the map showwg which was filed Feb. 21st, 1872, and upon the definite location of the road it fell within the indemnity limits, the order for withdrawal of which was received at the local office Nov. 30th,
80. These withdrawals have been held by the department to be without authority of law and of no effect. 17 L. D. 8 ?D 19 L. D. 87. . . . The testimony adduced at the hearlng s ows that Stone is a qualified settler, and established his ac ua residence with his family on the land about the middle pnl, 1882, in a cabin he built upon the tract; that in the ummer of 1882 he built a house 16X24 feet, one and a half p. 182stories high, dug a well, and cultivated a garden; that in 1883 he cropped 15 acres to grain, in 1884 and 1885, 15 acres, and in 1886 and 1887, 40 acres, in 1888,45 acres, in 1889,140 acres, and in 1890, 155 acres; that he has fenced the whole place, and that his improvements are worth from $700 to $800. You are of the opinion that Co.’s selection as to this land was improperly allowed, and that the Co. had no right to the tract prior to its selection, and that as the land was occupied and improved as the home of a qualified settler at the date of such selection, that such selection as to the land in question should be cancelled and Stone’s application to make preemption should be overruled; your ruling is in accordance with the uniform practice of the department, and I concur in same. Therefore, your decision is sustained and the amendatory list No. 1 of selection of Jan. 5th, 1884, by said Co. is hereby held for cancellation as to the above-described tract of land.”
On July 2, 1895, the railroad company, by general warranty deed and for a valuable consideration, sold and conveyed the north half of section 3 in the above-named township to the plaintiff Moore.
On May 20, 1896, the Secretary of the Interior sustained the above decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
The amended complaint of the plaintiff Moore, after setting out the foregoing facts, alleged that the above decisions by the officers of the Land Department and the Secretary of the Interior were made and rendered under a misapprehension and mistake of law and were contrary to law; that under the rulesand practice of the Department of the Interior, the decision of the Secretary finally closed and determined in that department the controversy as to the tract of land, of which fact the parties received notice, the contest being closed July 10,1896; t a thereafter the defendant made final proof and received a fina receipt for the land, in which it was recited that he was entit to a patent for the land from the United States; and that in 1897 a patent was issued to him. „
The plaintiff averred that the United States district lan o cers, the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the ec p. 183retary of the Interior were wholly without jurisdiction to consider the application of the defendant Stone to make preemption entry of the land, for the reason that it was not public land of the United States subject to homestead entry, but at the time of the defendant’s application had been withdrawn by order of the Secretary of the Interior from entry or sale under the settlement laws of the United States; that the railroad company was the owner in fee simple of the premises and entitled to the legal title thereto and to a patent from the United States; that the patent issued to the defendant, or which, if not issued, would be issued to him, constituted the defendant a trustee, holding the legal title for the benefit of the plaintiff, and cast a cloud upon his title.
It was set out in the complaint that in 1898 the wife of the defendant Stone died intestate, “ leaving as her heirs the defendants herein, who, excepting defendant D. B. Stone, are her children and the only children surviving her and the only children which she has or ever had; that the premises and property herein described, if any right or interest was ever acquired by defendant D. B. Stone, was acquired after his marriage with the said deceased; that some of said children of said deceased are of age and some are minors; that the names of those who are minors are Sylvia S. Jenks, Orson Emer Stone, Harland Clifford Stone, and Orlie Otis Stone; that the said Ammvillis Allen and Sylvia S. Jenks are married; that said children and defendants other than D. B. Stone have no other rights except as heirs of the said deceased.”
The plaintiff therefore prayed that the defendants be dec ared trustees for the use and benefit of plaintiff; that by decree it be adjudged that defendants or either of them have no ng t, title, interest or estate whatever in and to these lands an premises or any part thereof; that the title of plaintiff be ecreed good, valid and a fee simple title; and that defendants e required to execute and deliver to plaintiff deed or deeds so as o vest in plaintiff a complete record title in and to the premises; that any and all pretended claims of defendants or T er of them be held for naught and cancelled; that the deen ants and each of them be enjoined aud debarred from p. 184asserting any claim whatever in or to the lands or any part thereof adverse to the plaintiff; that plaintiff have judgment quieting his title against defendants and each of them, and removing the cloud thereon created by the pretended claim or claims of defendants or either of them; that plaintiff be adjudged entitled to immediate and exclusive possession of the premises and the whole and every part thereof and be put into possession thereof by order of the court; and that plaintiff have such other or further relief as should seem meet, proper and agreeable to equity.
The amended complaint was demurred to, and the demurrer was sustained; and the plaintiff declining to plead further, the action was dismissed. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed in the Supreme Court of the State, on the authority of Moore v. Cormode, 20 Wash. 305, 713.
J/r. James B. Kerr and Mr. C. IF. Bunn for plaintiff in error.
Mr. George Turner filed a brief for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice Harlan, after stating the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
As in the other cases just decided, the plaintiff’s right to recover depended upon the validity of the order made by the Secretary of the Interior directing the withdrawal from sale or entry under the preemption and homestead laws of the United States of the odd-numbered sections of land within the indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company as defined by its map of definite location. The order was based wholly upon the filing and acceptance of that map, and in advance of anJ selection based on ascertained losses of distinct tracts in the place limits.
For the reasons stated in Hewitt v. Schultz, such order must be regarded as not authorized by the act of July 2,1864, un er which the railroad company and its grantee claimed title; an p. 185upon that ground the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington must be and is
Affirmed.
Ms. Justice White concurred in the result.
Mb. Justice Beewee and Me. Justice Shieas dissented.