Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sears, 178 U.S. 345 (1900)

Case details
Citation
178 U.S. 345
Full caption
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. SEARS.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 28, 1900
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. SEARS.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT.
No. 452. Argued March 14,15,1900.—Decided May 28,1900.
In view of what has been already decided in Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Phinney, ante, 327, the court holds that it is needless to do more than note the fact that, as shown by the answer, after the insured had once defaulted in May, 1892, and a second default had occurred in May, 1893, application was made to him by the company, through its agents, to restore the policy, and that he declined to make any further payments or to continue the policy, and elected to have it terminated, which election was accepted by the company, and the parties to the contract treated it theieafter as abandoned, and that there is nothing in the New York statute (if controlling at all) to prevent the parties from dealing with t lat as any other contract; and if they choose to abandon it, their action is conclusive.
This , like the case of Mutual Life Insurance Company v. unney, ante, 327, just decided, is an action on an insurance po icy issued by the company, the premiums on which were npai for years before the death of the insured. The facts, > P^^dings, (and the case went off on the P mgs, without any testimony,) are that on May 18, 1891, beinc^th^1106 COmPan^ i^ued a policy to Stephen P. Sears, he He nai 1 th er^e^c^ary named in the policy as well as the insured, newlectn i + rSt annual Prenaium and received the policy, but subsenna 4 Pay.the Premium due on May 18, 1892, aid all tb2fta\Pre^UmS' He lived until March 30, 1898, and ecutrix ThS W1 °W’ below, was appointed his ex-from 18Q9 6 ansv'er alleged non-payment of the premiums the said Ste^V a^S° “^^a^ subsequent to the failure of premium fan,en j ®ears to. make payment of the said annual quent to the Ue <°n -Sa^ P0^0^’ May 18, 1893, and subsement and aft said policy for failure to make said pay-and knew th»^ Sa^ ^^Pben P. Sears was fully informed sai policy had been by it declared lapsed and p. 346void for non-payment of premium, this defendant, through its agents, applied to said Stephen P. Sears to make restoration of said policy by making payment of said defaulted premium and having the said policy restored to force, but that said Stephen P. Sears refused to make such payment and refused longer to continue said policy or make any further payments thereon, and then and there elected to have the same terminated, and this defendant, relying upon the said election and determination of said Stephen P. Sears, at all times subsequent thereto treated said policy as lapsed, abandoned and terminated, and relying upon the said conduct of said Sears, abstained from taking any further action or step in relation to said policy, by way of notice or otherwise, in order to effect the cancellation and termination thereof.”
A demurrer to this answer was sustained and judgment entered for the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 97 Fed. Rep. 986, and the case was thereupon brought to this court on certiorari.
JZr. Julien T. Davies and Mr. John B. Allen for petitioner. Mr. Edward Lyman Short and Mr. Frederic D. McKenney were on their brief.
Mr. Stanton Warburton and Mr. Harold Preston for respondent. Mr. Ehen Smith was on their brief.
Mr . Jus tic e Brew er , after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the court.
In view of what has been already decided in the case o tual Life Lnsurance Company N. Phinney, Executrix, an , it is needless to do more than note the fact that, as s . the answer,-after the insured had once defaultecm a , and a second default had occurred in May, 1893’ IP was made to him by the company, throug its agen , the policy, and that he declined to make any ur or to continue the policy, and elected to ave parties which election was accepted by the company, an p. 347to the contract treated it thereafter as abandoned. As we held in the prior case, there is nothing in the New York statute (if controlling at all) to prevent the parties from dealing with that as any other contract, and if they chose to abandon it, that action is conclusive.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit and of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington are reversed and the case remanded to the latter court, with instructions to overrule the demurrer to defendants answer.
Mr . Justi ce Peck ha m did not sit in the hearing and took no part in the decision of this case.
*
Just ice Brew er delivered the opinion of the court. e resembles the last two decided, in that it was an or mailing anv n +■ °,’ ^a^ an^ abstain from giving
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