Ex parte Union Steamboat Co., 178 U.S. 317 (1900)

Upon the opinion of this court in the case of The New York eing filed, a mandate issued that the decree of the Court of ppea s be reversed, and the case remanded to the District our , wit direction “ to enter a decree in conformity with ann of this court, with interest at the same rate per c Um ecrees boar m the State of Michigan.” Upon the thp It T111 be beard in the District Court, the petitioner, York S^a?lboat Company, owner of the propeller New in fault f a ^cree effect that both vessels were from bp o r 11° C?.^On’ and that the damages resulting there-Portation^ dlvided between the Erie and Western TransEZt r °Wner Of the Conemaugh, and the Union ages amonnt°TPan^’ owner the New York; that such dam-to i nter™ “ al to the SUm of ^4,319.49, of which cerand recovered1*!? Un e^^ters of the cargo were entitled to, from the Steamboat Company, $19,841.56; that [p. 318] the Transportation Company, as trustees for the underwriters and owners of the cargo of the Conemaugh, not intervening, suffered damages in the sum of $19,627.67; that, as owner of the propeller, it had suffered damages in the sum of $30,508.46, aggregating the sum of $50,136.13; that the Transportation Company recover of the petitioner one half of $50,136.13, less one half the sum of $19,841.56, decreed to be paid to the intervening petitioners, etc.

The duty of an inferior court upon receiving t e this court is nowhere better described than y J-Baldwin in an early case upon that subject, Ex p v. UM States, 12 Pet. 488, 492: “Whatever/ “ was before the court, and is disposed of, is consi er [p. 319] settled. The inferior court is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution, according to the mandate. They cannot vary it or examine it for any other purpose than execution ; or give any other or further relief; or review it upon any matter decided on appeal for error apparent ; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded. ... If the special mandate, directed by the twenty-fourth section, (of the judiciary act,) is not obeyed or executed, then the general power given to all courts of the United States to issue any writs which are necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law, by the fourteenth section of the judiciary act, fairly arises, and a mandamus or other appropriate writs will go,” although an appeal will also sometimes lie. Perkins v. Fourniquet, 14 How. 328, 330 ; Milwaukee de Minnesota Railroad Co. v. Soutter, 2 Wall. 440, 443. See also Boycds^ Executors v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275 ; Ex parte Dubuque & Pacific Railroad, 1 Wall. 69; Durant v. Essex Co., 101 U. S. 555; In re Washington & Georgetown R. R. Co., 140 U. S. 91; City Bank v. Hunter, 152 U. S. 512; In re City National Bank, 153 U. S. 246; In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. 8. 247; In re Potts, 166 U. S. 263.

S case was for a collision between the [p. 320] Conemaugh and the New York. The only question^ decided were as to the respective faults of the two vessels, and the claim of the underwriters upon the Conemaugh’s cargo, that they were entitled to a recovery to the full amount of their damages against the New York, notwithstanding the Conemaugh was also in fault for the collision. This claim was sustained, and directions given to enter a decree in conformity to the opinion of this court. Such decree was entered, dividing the damages between the two vessels, and awarding to the underwriters of the cargo a full recovery against the New York. It may be true that the decree holds the New York liable for seventy-six per cent of the entire damages and not fifty per cent, but this results from the fact that she was primarily held for the entire value of the cargo. The equal division applied only to the vessels, and upon the other hand if petitioner be entitled to the recoupment claimed, it would, apparently, result in an affirmative decree in its favor. But no question of recouping one half of such damages to the cargo from the moiety of damages awarded the Conemaugh was made by counsel or passed upon by this court. It is now insisted that, under the cases of The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540, and The Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240, this should have been done. This may be so; but it is an entirely new question, quite unaffected by the case of The ew York, and if the court erred in refusing to allow such recoupment, the remedy is by appeal and not by mandamus, er aps a mandamus might lie to review the allowance of interes, that may also be considered on appeal.