N. Am. Transp. & Trading Co. v. Morrison, 178 U.S. 262 (1900)
Case details
Citation
178 U.S. 262
Full caption
NORTH AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION & TRADING COMPANY v. MORRISON.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 21, 1900
NORTH AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION & TRADING
COMPANY v. MORRISON.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON.
No. 203. Submitted March 20,1900.—Decided May 21,1900.
Where a plaintiff asserts, as his cause of action, a claim which he cannot be legally permitted to sustain by evidence, a mere ad damnum clause will not confer jurisdiction on the Circuit Court, but the court on motion or demurrer, or of its own motion, may dismiss the suit. In the circumstances disclosed by the plaintiff’s declaration, and in the
certificates of the trial judge, the defendant company, though liable in a court of competent j urisdiction for the other claims asserted, cannot be held for the amount of wages or profits which the plaintiff suggests be might have earned had he reached Dawson City.
This was an action originally brought in December, 1897, in the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County, by Donald Morrison against the North American Transporta tion and Trading Company, and subsequently, on petition o the defendant company, removed to the Circuit Court o e United States for the District of Washington. Tothe d601*™' tion, containing several counts, the defendant ^eiaur^ * , demurrer was overruled, and the cause was trie ore District Judge and a jury. After verdict and ju favor of the plaintiff, the District Judge certified the foil g statement of facts and questions of jurisdiction to t is con
“I, C. H. Hanford, District Judge, presiding in the Court aforesaid, and the judge before whom the a ovee cause was tried, do now, on the 29th day o 606111 . verdict being the December term, at which the judgmen a were entered herein, certify as follows: „citizen and
“Morrison, the plaintiff, alleging himse resident of the State of Minnesota, began J® against Superior Court of King County, State o and ex-the defendant, alleging it to be a corporation org p. 263isting under the laws of the State of Illinois, and engaged in business in the State of Washington. The suit was upon eight causes of action, the first on plaintiff’s own account, the other on account of seven alleged assignors of plaintiff. The citizenship of these assignors was nowhere alleged.
“ Defendant removed the case to this court on the ground of diversity of citizenship between it and plaintiff Morrison, and the involving of a sum exceeding two thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. After removal defendant demurred to each cause of action in the complaint as not sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and as to the last seven causes of action on the additional ground that the court had no jurisdiction to hear it, and this was overruled, with exception to defendant. Issue was then joined, and, after two trials, judgment was entered as now complained of in error in the sum of $2119.50. After the verdict and before judgment defendant moved to dismiss or remand the whole cause and each cause of action on the ground that as to the first cause of action it did not involve two thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, and as to the second and each subsequent cause of action -that is to say, as to the assigned causes of action—that each oi tnese did not involve two thousand dollars, exclusive of indivpr T i°S^S- and because, also, it did not appear that proper XXt °ltlZenshiP at the time of the commenceXI“?0”’or “1the time Of its removal> between ‘he upon the F ? ' and defendant so as to confer jurisdiction
Which said motion to dis™iss and re-
“- ” deni^> exception to defendant.
for by Morrison aggregate sum sued eight causp« nf +• *3*50’ dlvlded? as already stated, into carriage betweeT d°f 7^ WaS Upon contracts of seven assignors f defendant as a carrier and plaintiff and his »Ws and the y Xo R- ® ‘° ?-T“ City’by way of St Mihave been broken K »u 1TCr’ wblcb contracts were alleged to the p^nXV hy failnre and rrfusal "
“ The first thaU F°rt Yukon the river. , himself to be a riff 10f that of plaintiff himself — alleged zen and a resident of Minnesota and p. 264defendant a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois. The contract was alleged to have been made at Seattle on the 30th day of July, 1897, and the agreed date of the delivery of the plaintiff at Dawson by the carrier was alleged to be September 15,1897, and this suit was brought on the 17th day of November, 1897. On the breach of the contract at Fort Yukon, plaintiff alleged himself compelled to return to Seattle. The damages claimed by him were as follows: (a) The price of his ticket from Seattle to Dawson City, $200.00; (5) $72.50, returning to Seattle after the breach of contract at Fort Yukon ; (c) expense of one dollar a day and loss of time at three dollars a day at Seattle since his return there, the 18th day of October, 1897; (d) three dollars a day from the 30th day of July, 1897, which he could have earned if he had not started on the journey at all; (<?) fifteen dollars a day which he could have earned for a year at Dawson after the 15th day o September, 1897; (/) lost baggage, $29.50; the total prayer of this cause of action being $2301.75.
“The second and subsequent causes of action, being the assigned causes, arose on exactly similar contracts of carnaoe. The citizenship of the respective assignors was not aventea. The damages claimed were exactly the same as t ose c aim by plaintiff himself, excepting that none of the assignors c i the item of lost baggage, and that the item of cost ® from Fort Yukon to Seattle was as low as $61.50 in stances, and as high as $103.25 in others. claimed by any of the assignors as his total damage $ and the highest claimed was $2303.25. option was
“ Neither in the original nor the assigne cau it alleged that any of these passengers had ever son before, had any previous engagement any promise of employment, the allege ion i that ‘ he tion as to the passenger’s damage m this resp could have obtained employment and engag him competent to perform and transact ato b son City, and thereby secured wage’ ^^0^ fifteen dollars per day continuously fro P ,he for the period of the year thence next ensui g, p. 265lias wholly lost all of said employment and time, and all of said wages and profits, to his damage in the sum of $2000.’ It was not alleged what, if any, occupation either plaintiff or any of his assignors had before departure on the journey, nor was it alleged what occupation was expected at the point of destination, or that any expected occupation was communicated to the defendant.
“ Now, therefore, I do certify to the Supreme Court the following question of jurisdiction, as follows:
“ Whether the motions to dismiss and to remand should have been granted because at the time of removal to this court the cause was one of which this court could not take jurisdiction—that is to say, whether —
“ (a) In each of the causes of action the sum or value of the matter actually in dispute, as shown in the pleadings was less than two thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, and a controversy was involved substantially within the jurisdiction of this court; and whether—
(J) If the foregoing be answered in the affirmative, the amounts claimed in the assigned causes of action could be united to that in the first to make up the jurisdictional amount, the citizenship of the assignors not being alleged; and whether—uPPosmg the jurisdictional amount was sufficient in
° ac^onj case was even then removable to this onlv in . necessary diversity of citizenship was alleged assigned fil>St °f a°tlOn’ and Was not alle£ed in those
Frederick Bausman for plaintiff in error.
error. Arthur and Mr. L. H. Wheeler for defendant in
ion of the courfHIBAS’after statinS the case, delivered the opin-
citizen of thecate of° Momson’ alleging himself to be a of Minnesota, against the North American p. 266Transportation and Trading Company, a corporation of the State of Illinois, for damages arising out of a breach of a contract whereby the transportation company had agreed to carry the plaintiff and his baggage from Seattle in the State of Washington to Dawson City in the Northwest Territory, in the Dominion of Canada.
It is conceded that the defendant company failed, without sufficient excuse, to fulfill its engagement, and the question upon which the jurisdiction of the court below depended is as to the nature and amount of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. The allegations in the complaint in that respect were, first, the sum paid by the plaintiff as a fare being $200; second, the expenses caused by having to return to Seattle, amounting to $72.50; third, the wages which he could and would have earned at Seattle if he had not proceeded upon the attempted journey, being wages at the rate of three dollars per day during all the time intervening between August 3,1897, and November 17, 1897, amounting to about $320; fourth, the loss of a certain portion, of plaintiff’s baggage, amounting to $29.25; and, fifth, the loss occasioned plaintiff by the defendant s a ure to transport him to Dawson City, “ where the P^1^1 could have obtained employment and engaged in business which he was competent to perform and transact, at or about awson City, and thereby have secured wages and profits at the। rateo fifteen dollars per day continuously from September 15, iw, for the period of the year next ensuing; by reason w there is due and owing the plaintiff from the de en an y son of the premises, for said expenditures, out ay an a , the sum of two thousand three hundred and one dollars
seventy-five cents.” e . . . fh tjf
It was obvious, on the face of the plaintiff s comp j he was not entitled to recover the money w ic e . could have earned and secured by engaging in business at or about Dawson Ci y, involved. essary to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction ^aSmOunt claimed
While it has sometimes been said that it is th by the plaintiff in his declaration that brings the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, that was in suits p. 267liquidated damages, in which the amount which the plaintiff was entitled to recover was a question for the jury ; an inspection of the declaration did not disclose and could not disclose but that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount claimed, and hence, even if the jury found a verdict in a sum less than the jurisdictional amount, the jurisdiction of the court would not be defeated. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 89.
But where the plaintiff asserts, as his cause of action, a claim which he cannot be legally permitted to sustain by evidence, a mere ad damnum clause will not confer jurisdiction on the Circuit Court, but the court on motion or demurrer, or of its own motion, may dismiss the suit. And such, we think, was the present case.
We do not consider it necessary to enter upon a discussion of t e rule that a person is not to be held responsible in damages or the remote consequences of every negligent act, but only forthose which are proximate or natural, and shall content ourS? u siting ouy conclusion that, in the circumstances disc ose y the plaintiff’s declaration and in the certificate of the nai judge, the defendant company, though liable in a court of
\Jurisdiction for tlle other claims asserted, cannot be hl -e K?KUnfc °f WageS °r profits which the Plaintiff sugn®? ha™ earned had he reached Dawson Citv.
tiff did S it is stated that the plainer bad anv nr he had eVer lived in Da'vson City before, ise of emnlovnT10? $ ®”£a£ement or business there or any promXS X 7as what’a X oo°u-
nor what occnnaf efore his departure on the journey, or that anv exL WaS expected at the Poinfc of destination, cated to the defend ^ccupatlon or employment was communi-
The 1 • . endant company. there procure sow n travednS to a land of promise, hoping to In some business he ^CUpa 1On’ knew not what, or to engage venture cannot be fer notwkat- The result of such an ad-no safe ground on the plaintiff’s anticipations afford
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espect to his own claim, did not p. 268disclose a case of which the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, did he overcome that difficulty by the additional counts in which he alleged himself to be the assignee of several other voyagers who had suffered loss and damages similar to those claimed by him on his own behalf ? The citizenship of the assignors was not alleged, and the greater portion of the respective claims consisted of matter which we have held in reference to plaintiff’s own claim to be too remote and uncertain to be allowed.
It is somewhat uncertain, upon the facts alleged in the declaration and those stated to us in the certificate of the District Judge, whether if all the claims, as well those assigned and those held by the plaintiff in his own right, omitting those which we have held to be too remote and uncertain, were aggregated, they would reach the necessary jurisdictional amount. But however that may be, as it is not alleged that the assignors could have themselves prosecuted suit in the Circuit Court, it is the settled construction of the statutes of the United States that the suit cannot be maintained in favor of the assignee.
Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch, 332, was an action commenced to foreclose a mortgage given by a citizen of Louisiana to ano er citizen of the same State. The language of the judicial y ac o 1789 was as follows: “ Nor shall any District or Circui ou have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents o any p issory note or other chose in action in favor of an less a suit might have been prosecuted in sue cour the said contents if no assignment had been made. — The plaintiff was the general assignee in Mar gagor, and was an alien; and it was said y shall, delivering the opinion of the court. .
“Without doubt assignable paper, bemge most usually transferred, was m the mind o g the law was framed, and the words of the pro n0 fore, best adapted to that class of assignmen . . ¿jgp0Sed reason to believe that the legislature were no to except from the jurisdiction of the Federal' could sue in virtue of equitable sue in virtue of legal assignments. accounts of a merchant might, under certain circums
of an the open c;rcunistances, be p. 269permitted to sue in equity in his own name, and there would be as much reason to exclude him from the Federal courts as to exclude the same person when the assignee of a particular note. The term ‘ other chose in action ’ is broad enough to comprehend either case, and the word ‘ contents ’ is too ambiguous in its import to restrain that general term. The contents of a note are the sums it shows to be due, and the same, without much violence to the language, can be said of an account.”
And the same construction was put upon the language of the act of August 13,1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433. Mexican National Railroad, n . Davidsori, 157 U. S. 201.
We do not think that it was competent for the plaintiff to add to his own cause of action, in order to obtain jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, claims assigned by those whose citizenship and residence did not appear either in the complaint or in the petition for removal. As, however, the plaintiff brought his action in the state court, where he was entitled to join the assigned c aims with his own, and as the case was removed into the Fede court at the instance of the defendant company, whose mo°n remand the case we are now obliged to sustain, we im-
R® the costs in the Circuit Court and in this court on the plaiW i“ TranSportation and Trading Company, the tions certihed8 needless to answer severally the ques-
^9mmt °f the Cirmit * versed, « landed to that court, with directions to emand the c^e to the state court.