The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S. 568 (1900)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S. 568 (1900)
Full caption
THE BENITO ESTENGER.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 5, 1900
THE BENITO ESTENGER.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOK
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.
No. 192. Argued January 11,12, 1900. —Decided March 5,1900.
The general rule is that in time of war the citizens or subjects of the be ligerents are enemies to each other without regard to individual sen ments or dispositions, and that political status determines the ques io of enemy ownership. , tbe By the law of prize, property engaged in any illegal intercourse wi enemy is deemed enemy property, whether belonging to an a y ° citizen, as the illegal traffic stamps it with the hostile charac ei attaches to it all the penal consequences. become Provisions are not, in general, deemed contraband; but they may
so if destined for the army or navy of the enemy, or his ports o or military equipment. f trade In dealing with a vessel asserted to be an enemy vessel, tne
with the enemy in supplies necessary for the enemy s forces is sive importance.
Individual acts of friendship cannot change political status where there is no open adherence to the opposite cause and former allegiance remains apparently unchanged.
A consul has no authority by reason of his official station to grant exemption from capture to an enemy vessel; and this vessel was not entitled to protection by reason of any engagement with the United States.
In cases of peculiar hardship, or calling for liberal treatment, it is not for the courts, but for another department of the Government, to extend such amelioration as the particular instance may demand.
Transfers of vessels flagrante bello cannot be sustained if subjected to any condition by which the vendor retains an interest in the vessel or its profits, a control over it, or a right to its restoration at the close of the war.
The burden of proof in respect of the validity of such transfers is on the claimant, and the court holds as to the transfer in this case that the requirements of the law of prize were not satisfied by the proofs.
The Benito Estenger was captured by the U. S. S. Hornet on June 27,1898, off Cape Cruz on the south side of the island of Cuba, and was brought into the port of Key West and duly libelled on July 2. The depositions in preparatorio of Badamero Perez, Edwin Cole and Enrique de Messa were taken, and thereafter and on July 27 a claim was interposed by Perez as master of the steamer on behalf of Arthur Elliott Beattie, a British subject, as owner, supported by test affidavits of himself and de Messa. The cause was preliminarily heard on the libel, the depositions in preparatorio and the test affidavits, and sixty days given for further proofs. Accordingly the epositions of the claimant and sundry others were taken on ehalf of the claimant, and the testimony of the consul of the nited States at Kingston on behalf of the captor. The cause coming on for final hearing, the court entered a decree Decemer 7,1898, condemning the vessel as lawful prize as enemy property, and ordering her to be sold in accordance with law.
aimant thereupon appealed, and assigned errors to the ® eot in substance that the court erred in failing to hold that e enito Estenger was a British merchant ship, duly docu-1 G1f n to the protection of the British flag, and u y owned and registered by a subject domiciled in Great fu? ^S° ^°^ng that the Benito Estenger was law-prize of war, inasmuch as she was engaged on a voyage in
Counsel for Parties.
behalf of the local Cuban junta in Kingston, allies of the United States, and when captured was in the service of the United States, and employed in friendly offices to the forces of the United States. The vessel prior to June 9, 1898, was the property of Enrique de Messa, of the firm of Gallego, de Messa and Company, subjects of Spain and residents of Cuba. On that day a bill of sale was made by de Messa to the claimant, Beattie, a British subject, and, on compliance with the requirements of the British law governing registration, was registered as a British vessel in the port of Kingston, Jamaica. The vessel had been engaged in trading with the island of Cuba, and more particularly between Kingston and Montego, Jamaica, and Manzanillo, Cuba. She left Kingston on the 23d of June, and proceeded with a cargo of flour, rice, cornmeal and coffee to Manzanillo, where the cargo was discharged. She cleared from Manzanillo at 2 o’clock a .m., June 27, for Montego, and then for Kingston, and was captured at half-past five of that day off Cape Cruz. The principal question was as to the ownership of the vessel and the legality of the alleged transfer, but other collateral questions were raised in respect of the alleged Cuban sympathies of de Messa; service on behalf of the Cuban insurgents in the United States; and the relation of the United States consul to the transactions which preceded the seizure. It was argued that the vessels of Cuban insurgents and other adherents could not be deemed property of the enemies of the United States; that this capture could not be sustained on the ground that the vessel was such property; that the conduct of de Messa in his sale to Beattie was lawfu, justifiable, and the only means of protecting the vessel as neu tral property from Spanish seizure; and finally, that this cour could and should do justice by ordering restitution, under a the circumstances of the case.
Mr. Harrington Putnam for claimant.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Hoyt for the United States Mr. Joseph K. McCammon and Mr. James H. Hayden, cou ■ sei for captors, were on his brief.
Jfr. George A. King and Mr. William B. King filed a brief on behalf of captors.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
If the alleged transfer was colorable merely, and Messa was the owner of the vessel at the time of capture, did the District Court err in condemning the Benito Estenger as lawful prize as enemy property ?
“Enemy property” is a technical phrase peculiar to prize courts, and depends upon principles of public policy as distinguished from the common law. The general rule is that in war the citizens or subjects of the belligerents are enemies to each other without regard to individual sentiments or dispositions, and that political status determines the question of enemy ownership. And by the law of prize, property engaged in any illegal intercourse with the enemy is deemed enemy property, whether belonging to an ally or a citizen, as the illegal traffic stamps it with the hostile character and attaches to it all the penal consequences. Prize cases, 2 Black, 635,674; The Sally, 8 Cranch, 382, 384; Jecker v. Montgomery, 18 How. 110; The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28; The Flying Scud, 6 Wall. 263.
Messa was a Spanish subject, residing at Santiago, and for years engaged in business there. His vessel had a Spanish crew and Spanish officers, and he testified that he was on oard of her as supercargo. She had the Spanish flag in her ockers, though she was flying the British flag at the moment, un er a transfer, which, as presently to be seen, was colorable aQ lnvalid. There was evidence tending to show that Messa sympathized with the Cuban insurgents, but no proof that he was imself a Cuban rebel or that he had renounced his allegiance to Spain. The vessel carried to Manzanillo on this oyage a cargo of provisions, consisting principally of eleven hundred barrels of flour. th^fi112^^0 WaS a severa^ thousand inhabitants and e rst important place on the south Cuban coast between p. 572Santiago and Cienfuegos, lying inside the bay formed by the promontory which Cape Cruz terminates, and about sixty miles northeast of the cape. Cape Cruz is about due north from Montego Bay on the northwestern shore of Jamaica, and about seventy-five miles distant, while Kingston is on the southeastern coast of Jamaica. The record lacks evidence of the condition of affairs there at that time, but official reports leave no doubt that it was defended by several vessels of war and by shore batteries, and was occupied by some thousands of Spanish soldiers. On the 6th of April, 1898, the Secretary of the Navy had instructed Admiral Sampson, among other things, that the Department desired, “ That in case of war, you will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly the ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo and Cienfuegos.” Manzanillo was the terminus of a cable which connected with Santa Cruz, Trinidad, Cienfuegos and Havana, and was subsequently cut by the forces of the United States, in order to check the inland traffic with Manzanillo and to prevent the calling of reenforcements to resist the capture of that place. And it appeared that Admiral Sampson had been for some weeks endeavoring to stop blockade running on the south coast of Cuba, and that a large vessel with a heavy battery was stationed at Cape Cruz. Manzanillo was not declared blockaded, however, until the proclamation of June 27, 1898; but the consul of the United States at Kingston had warned Messa and Beattie that a blockade in fact existed. The claimant testified that the vessel was chartered by Flouriache, a Cuban merchant, and that the cargo was consigned to Bauriedel an Company, at Manzanillo. The deposition of neither of t icse was taken. According to the explicit testimony of the con sul, he was informed by both the claimant and his brot er that the flour was transferred by Bauriedel and Company, through a communicating way from their warehouse to 6 Spanish government warehouse, immediately upon its e iv ery; and no evidence to contradict this was introduce.
The instructions of the Navy Department to “Bloc a ® Vessels and Cruisers,” in the late war, included among ar ic p. 573conditionally contraband, “Provisions, when destined for an enemy’s ship or ships, or for a place that is besieged.”
In The Commercen, 1 Wheat. 382, 388, Mr. Justice Story said: “ By the modern law of nations provisions are not, in general, deemed contraband; but they may become so, although the property of a neutral, on account of the particular situation of the war, or on account of their destination. ... If destined for the ordinary use of life in the enemy’s country, they are not, in general, contraband; but it is otherwise if destined for military use. Hence, if destined for the army or navy of the enemy, or for his ports of naval or military equipment, they are deemed contraband.”
In The Jonge Margaretha, 1 C. Rob. 189, 193, Sir William Scott discussed this question, and, after referring to many instances, concluded: “And I take the modern established rule to be this, that generally they are not contraband, but may become so under circumstances arising out of the particular situation of the war, or the condition of the parties engaged in it.”
But while alluding to this subject by way of illustration we do not feel called on to consider under what particular circumstances, generally speaking, provisions may be held contraband of war. It is enough that in dealing with a vessel adjudicated to have been an enemy vessel, the fact of trade with the enemy, especially in supplies necessary for the enemy’s forces, is of well nigh decisive importance.
n reply it is suggested that this cargo was intended for e Cuban insurgents, and a quotation is made from a letter o t e consul to the effect that he had been “ told privately by president of the local junta, who has performed valuable services for me, that the proceeds of this cargo are to be forwarded at Sovernnient and troops through the Cuban agent anzanillo.” The suggestion derives no support from the ecoi, and the facts remain that the provisions were delivered st S°V6rnment, and that the trade to this Spanish fong constituted, under the laws of war, illicit intercourse with the enemy.
This brings us to consider the contention that Messa had p. 574rendered important services to the United States; that he was the friend and not the enemy of this Government, and that there was an agreement between him and the United States consul which operated to protect the vessel from capture. But Messa’s status was that of an enemy, as already stated, and this must be held to be so notwithstanding individual acts of friendship, certainly since there was no open adherence to the Cuban cause, and allegiance could have been shifted with the accidents of war. The legal conclusion was not affected by the fact that Messa had, in cultivating friendly relations with the consul, given the latter an old Government plan of the province of Santiago and an especially prepared chart of the harbor. Thus displaying his amicable inclinations, he endeavored to obtain from the consul a letter of protection for the voyage he was about to undertake, but this the consul declined to furnish, and informed him at the same time that Manzanillo was blockaded, and that the contemplated venture would be at his own risk.
Nevertheless, the consul agreed to write the Admiral, and did write him June 23, that Messa offered to give certain information that might be valuable, and that he proposed to be off Cape Cruz on June 30, when he could be picked up there and taken to the Admiral if desired; but the consul said: “ You quite understand that in dealing with those people, one is always more or less liable to imposition. I therefore make no recommendation of Messa to you.” There was nothing to show that the voyage was undertaken on the strength of this letter or that it in any way contributed to the capture, nor that the Admiral intended to avail himself o the suggestion in regard to Messa.
The claimant asserted and the consul denied that protection to the voyage was extended by the latter. But we do not go at length into this matter because we think that no engage ment with the United States nor any particular service to t ie United States was made out in that connection, and so ar as appears the vessel was captured in the ordinary course o, cruising duty at a time and under circumstances when e liability was not to be denied. Moreover, a United a e p. 575consul has no authority by virtue of his official station to grant any license or permit the exemption of a vessel of an enemy from capture and confiscation. This was so held by Judge Me Caleb in Rogers v. The Amado, Newberry, 400, in which he quotes the language of Sir William Scott in The Hope, 1 Dodson, 226, 229 : “ To exempt the property of enemies from the effect of hostilities, is a very high act of sovereign authority; if at any time delegated to persons in a subordinate situation, it must be exercised either by those who have a special commission granted to them for the particular business, and who, in legal language, are termed mandatories, or by persons in whom such a power is vested in virtue of any official situation to which it may be considered incidental. It is quite clear that no consul in any country, particularly in an enemy’s country, is vested with any such power in virtue of his station. lEi rei nonprœponitur and therefore his acts relating to it are not binding.”
In The Joseph, 8 Cranch, 451, the vessel was condemned for trading with the enemy, and it was held that she was not excused by the necessity of obtaining funds to pay the expenses of the ship, nor by the opinion of an American minister expressed to the master, that by undertaking the voyage he would violate no law of the United States. The court said at these considerations, “if founded in truth, present a case o peculiar hardship, yet they afford no legal excuse which it is competent to this court to admit as the basis of its decision.”
is is equally true of the case before us, for even if the circumstances may have justified liberal treatment, that cane Permitted to influence our decision. It belongs to ano er department of the Government to extend such amelio^s appears to be demanded in particular instances.
Cod61]61* Case ^es Frères, 4 Lebau’s Nouveau cited R68 ^^SeS’ nor that of The ATaria, 6 C. Rob. 201, of P hr C0Unset’ k *n P°int. In the former, the Committee the R 1(] Safety the year three of the French calendar of as an U^°n ^e01,66^ the condemnation of Les Cinq Frères FrencU6™^ $ Vesse^’ and °t her cargo although belonging to men’ but further decreed restitution of the cargo or its p. 576value, as matter of grace, in consideration of services rendered by the claimants in furnishing provisions to the Republic, adding that this should not be drawn into a precedent. The latter simply involved the interpretation of an indulgence specifically granted by the British government.
Thus far we have proceeded on the assumption that the transfer of the Benito Estenger was merely colorable, and this, if so, furnished in itself ground for condemnation. A brief examination of the evidence, in the light of well-settled principles, will show that the assumption is correct.
Messa’s story of the transfer was that the steamer had been owned by Gallego, Messa and Company, and then by himself; that he was compelled to sell in order to get money to live on ; that he made the sale for $40,000, for which, or a large amount of which, credit was given on an indebtedness of Messa to Beattie and Company, and that he was employed by Beattie to go on the vessel as his representative and business manager.
It appeared that Beattie applied to the customs and shipping office in Jamaica for a British register, lodged with him the bill of sale, and made a declaration of ownership before him as registrar of shipping, which documents were filed on June 9 and 14 respectively, and were in conformity with the requirements of British law. The depositions of the ship broker and his employes put the price at nine thousand pounds, and showed their belief that the sale was hona fide, foundec on what passed between Messa and Beattie. They did not know what arrangements were made for the payment of t e price or how or in what shape the purchase money was pai The accountant stated that after the sale Beattie went on board and took possession of the vessel, and informed the o cers in charge that he had become the owner, gave or ers regarding her, and informed witness that he had given IV essa the position as supercargo. .
There was considerable confusion on the point as to w was master of the vessel after the transfer. Perez tes i that he was, and as master he interposed the claim on e of Beattie. He also swore that Mr. Beattie “informed i p. 577that he could remain as master, but it would be necessary for him to put an English subject on board as first officer or second captain, in conformity with the British law.” Cole, a British subject, asserted that he was master, and Beattie stated that he appointed him such with Perez as mate and pilot, while Messa said that Perez was master and that he, Messa, was supercargo. Perez had been the captain of the ship and remained on her, and conceding that Cole was placed on board in the capacity of captain, the inference is not unreasonable that this was for appearances only.
Beattie testified that he was a member of the firm of Beattie and Company, composed of himself and his brothers, all British subjects, and interested in lands, sugar estates, mines and forests in the district of Manzanillo; that he had resided there for some years, returning to his parents’ home in England for several months at a time; that he concluded the purchase of the Benito Estenger from Messa on June 9, 1898; that she left Jamaica on her last voyage on June 23, bound for Manzanillo, and chartered by Flouriache, a Cuban merchant, carrying a cargo of food stuffs sent for the purpose of trade; that he bought the vessel for nine thousand pounds; hut he declined to state of what the payment or payments of the purchase money consisted, although saying that the sale ^lonafide., , e consul testified that claimant, in conversation, while insisting that the transfer was absolute, admitted that it was e ected for the purpose of protecting the vessel.
In short, the statements as to price were conflicting; the reason assigned for the sale was to get money to live on, and yet apparently no money passed, and Messa said that he receive credit for a large part of the consideration on indebtedness to claimant’s firm; claimant himself refused to describe e payment or payments; the Spanish master and crew reame in charge; Messa went on the voyage as supercargo; - e vessel continued in trade, which, in this instance at least, is’Tt trade with the enemy; and, finally, it sai y claimant’s counsel in his printed brief: “ It will not con ended upon this appeal that all the interest of Mr.
vol. CLXXVI—37
Opinion of the Court.
Messa in the Benito Estenger ceased on June 9, 1898. The transfer was obviously made to protect the steamer as neutral property from Spanish seizure. That Mr. Messa, however, still retained a beneficial interest after this sale and transfer of flags, and continued to act for the vessel as supercargo, has not been disputed.”
The attempt to break the force of this admission by the contention that the change of flag was justifiable as made to avoid capture by the Spanish is no more than a reiteration of the argument that Messa was a Cuban rebel, and his vessel a Cuban vessel, wThich, as has been seen, we have been unable to concur in. If the transfer were invalid, she belonged to a Spanish subject, she was engaged in an illegal venture, and her owner cannot plead his fear of Spanish aggression.
Transfers of vessels flagrante hello were originally held invalid, but the rule has been modified, and is thus given by Mr. Hall, who, after stating that in France “ their sale is forbidden, and they are declared to be prize in all cases in which they have been transferred to neutrals after the buyers could have knowledge of the outbreak of the war;” says: “In England and the United States, on the contrary, the right to purchase vessels is in principle admitted, they being in themselves legitimate objects of trade as fully as any other kind of merchandise, but the opportunities of fraud being great, the circumstances attending a sale are severely scrutinized, an the transfer is not held to be good if it is subjected to any condition or even tacit understanding by which the ven or keeps an interest in the vessel or its profits, a control over i, a power of revocation, or a right to its restoration at the con elusion of the war.” International Law, (4th ed.) 525. 11 to the same effect is Mr. Justice Story in his Notes on ® Principles and Practice of Prize Courts, (Pratts ed.) j, Wheat. App. 30: “ In respect to the transfers of ships during the war, it is certain that purchases of t em neutrals are not, in general, illegal; but such purchases are ble to great suspicion; and if good proof be not given o validity by a bill of sale and payment of a reasona e sideration, it will materially impair the validity o a ne p. 579claim; . . . and if after such transfer the ship be employed habitually in the enemy’s trade, or under the management of a hostile proprietor, the sale will be deemed merely colorable and collusive. . . . Anything tending to continue the interest of the enemy in the ship vitiates a contract of this description altogether.”
The Seeks Geschwistern, 4 C. Rob. 100, is cited, in which Sir William Scott said: “This is the case of a ship, asserted to have been purchased of the enemy; a liberty which this country has not denied to neutral merchants, though by the regulation of France, it is entirely forbidden. The rule which this country has been content to apply is, that property so transferred, must be bona fide and absolutely transferred ; that there must be a sale divesting the enemy of all further interest in it; and that anything tending to continue his interest, vitiates a contract of this description altogether.”
In The Jemmy, 4 C. Rob. 31, the same eminent jurist observed: “This case has been admitted to farther proof, owing entirely to the suppression of a circumstance, which if the court had known, it would not have permitted farther proof to have been introduced; namely, that the ship has been e t in the trade, and under the management of her former owner. Wherever that fact appears, the court will hold it to e conclusive, because, from the evidential rei, the strongest presumption necessarily arises, that it is merely a covered and pretended transfer. The presumption is so strong, that scarcely any proof can avail against it. It is a rule which the court o s itself under the absolute necessity of maintaining. If e enemy could be permitted'to make a transfer of the ship, J1 ^e management of it, as a neutral vessel, it frauds ” 6 tor ^e court to protect itself against
^mn^us, 6 0. Rob. 71, he said: “The court to h° occaston to observe, that where a ship, asserted and transferred, is continued under the former agency world n orm.er habits of trade, not all the swearing in the
TheW1] Convtoce toat it is a genuine transaction.”
ru e was stated by Judge Cadwalader of the Eastern p. 580District of Pennsylvania thus: “ The rule of decision in some countries has been that, as to a vessel, no change of ownership during hostilities can be regarded in a prize court. In the United States, as in England, the strictness of this rule is not observed. But no such change of property is recognized where the disposition and control of a vessel continue in the former agent of her former hostile proprietors; more especially when, as in this case, he is a person whose relations of residence are hostile.” The Island Belle, 13 Fed. Cases, 168.
So in The Baltica, Spinks Prize Cases, 264, several vessels had been sold by a father, an enemy, to his son, a neutral, immediately before the war, and only paid for in part, the remainder to be paid out of the future earnings thereof, and the Baltica, which was one of them, was condemned on the ground of a continuance of the enemy’s interest.
In The Soglasle, Spinks Prize Cases, 104, Dr. Lushington held the onus probandi to be upon the claimant, and made these observations: “With regard to documents of a formal nature, though when well authenticated they are to be duly appreciated, it does not follow that they are always of the greatest weight, because we know, without attributing blame to the authorities under which they issue, they are instruments often procured with extraordinary facility. What the court especially desires is, that testimony which bears less the appearance of formality, — evidence natural to the transaction, but which often carries with it a proof of its own genuineness, the court looks for that correspondence and other evidence which naturally attends the transaction, accompanies it, or o lows it, and which, when it bears upon the face of it the aspec of sincerity, will always receive its due weight.”
In The Ernst Kerch, Spinks Prize Cases, 98, the sale was to neutrals of Mecklenburg shortly before the breaking ou of war, and it was ruled that the onus of giving satisfactory proof of the sale was on the claimant, and without it the cour could not restore even though it was not called on to pronounce affirmatively that the transfer was fictitious an raU ulent. In that case the vessel was condemned partly $ of absence of proof of payment, Dr. Lushington saying.
Syllabus.
all know that one of the most important matters to be established by a claimant is undoubted proof of payment.”
To the point that the burden of proof was on the claimant see also The Jenny, 5 Wall. 183; The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1; The Lilia, 2 Cliff. 169; Story’s Prize Courts, 26.
We think that the requirements of the law of prize were not satisfied by the proofs in regard to this transfer, and on all the evidence are of opinion that the court below was right in the conclusion at which it arrived. n
Decree ajjirmed.
Mr. Justice Shiras, Mb. Justice White and Mb. Justice Peckham dissented.
MAXWELL v. DOW.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Ho. 384. Argued December 4, 1899. — Decided February 26, 1900.
The decision in Hurtado n. California, 110 U. S. 516, that the words “ due process of law ” in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States do not necessarily require an indictment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a State for murder, has been often affirmed, and is now reaffirmed and applied to this case. he privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States do not necessarily include all the rights protected by the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution against the powers of the Federal Government. e trial of a person accused as a criminal by a jury of only eight persons instead of twelve, and his subsequent imprisonment after conviction o not abridge his privileges and immunities under the Constitution as a citizen of the United States and do not deprive him of his liberty without due process of law. ®t er a trial in criminal cases not capital shall be by a jury composed of eig t instead of twelve jurors, and whether, in case of an infamous crime, person shall be only liable to be tried after presentment or indictment foAh^11^ are ProPer to be determined by the citizens of each State the 0 ems.e^ves’ an<^ do not come within the Fourteenth Amendment to are so long as all persons within the jurisdiction of the State andT^ Proceeded against by the same kind of ptocedure, iQ c ° ave same kind of trial, and the equal protection of the laws is secured to them.
The statement of the case is in the opinion of the court.
Afr. J. IF. N, Whitecotton for plaintiff in error.
Air. Alexander C. Bishop for defendant in error. Mr. William A. Lee was on his brief.
Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opinion of the court.
On the 27th of June, 1898, an information was filed against the plaintiff in error by the prosecuting attorney of the county, in a state court of the State of Utah, charging him with the crime of robbery committed within the county in May, 1898. In September, 1898, he was tried before a jury composed of but eight jurors, and convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for eighteen years, and since that time has been confined in prison, undergoing the sentence of the state court.
In May, 1899, he applied to the Supreme Court of the State for a writ of habeas corpus, and alleged in his sworn petition that he was a natural-born citizen of the United States, and that his imprisonment was unlawful, because he was prosecuted under an information instead of by indictment by a grand jury, and was tried by a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors. He specially set up and claimed (1) that to prosecute him by information abridged his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States, under article 5 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and also violated section 1 of article 14 of those amendments, (2) that a trial by jury of only eight persons abridged his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States, under article 6, and also violated section 1 of article 14 o such amendments; (3) that a trial by such a jury and is subsequent imprisonment by reason of the verdict oi jury deprived him of his liberty without due process o aw, in violation of section 1 of article 14, which provides t a no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or proper y, without due process of law.
The Supreme Court of the State, after a hearing of the case, denied the petition for a writ, and remanded the prisoner to the custody of the keeper of the state prison, to undergo the remainder of his sentence, and he then sued out a writ of error and brought the case here.
The questions to be determined in this court are, (1) as to the validity, with reference to the Federal Constitution, of the proceeding against the plaintiff in error on an information instead of by an indictment by a grand jury ; and (2) the validity of the trial of the plaintiff in error by a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors.
We think the various questions raised by the plaintiff in. error have in substance, though not all in terms, been decided by this court in the cases to which attention will be called. The principles which have been announced in those cases clearly prove the validity of the clauses in the constitution of Utah which are herein attacked as in violation of the Constitution of the United States. It will, therefore, be necessary in this case to do but little else than call attention to the former decisions of this court, and thereby furnish a conclusive answer to the contentions of plaintiff in error.
The proceeding by information and also the trial by a jury, composed of eight jurors, were both provided for by the state constitution.
Section 13, article 1, of the constitution of Utah provides :
“Offences heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by mdictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The grand jury shall consist of seven persons, five of whom must concuT to find an indictment; but no grand jury s all be drawn or summoned unless in the opinion of the judge of the district public interest demands it.”
ection 10, article 1, of that constitution is as follows :
‘In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of p. 584inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.”
The objection that the proceeding by information does not amount to due process of law has been heretofore overruled, and must be regarded as settled by the case of Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516. The case has since been frequently approved. Hallinger v. Davis, 146 IT. S. 314, 322; McNulty v. California, 149 IT. S. 645; Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 IT. 8, 262, 272; Holden v. Hardy, 169 IT. S. 366, 384 ; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 IT. S. 172, 176; Bolin n. Nebraska, 176 IT. 8. 83.
But the plaintiff in error contends that the Hurtado case did not decide the question whether the state law violated that clause in the Fourteenth Amendment which provides that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Although the opinion is mainly devoted to an inquiry whether the California law was a violation of the “ due process clause ” of the above-mentioned amendment, yet the matter in issue in the case was as to the validity of the state law, an the court held it valid. It was alleged by the counsel for t e plaintiff in error, before the court which passed sentence, t a the proceeding was in conflict with the Fifth and the our teenth Amendments, and those grounds were before this com. The Fifth Amendment was referred to in the opinion in this court, and it was held not to have been violated X ® state law, although that amendment provides for an in ment by a grand jury. This decision could not have e arrived at if a citizen of the United States were entit e, virtue of that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re to the privileges and immunities of citizens of t e n States, to claim in a state court that he could not e pro cuted for an infamous crime unless upon an indictmen grand jury. In a Federal court no person can e e answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime un indictment by a grand jury, with the exceptions sta e
Fifth Amendment. Yet this amendment was held in the Hurtado case not to apply to a prosecution for murder in a state court pursuant to a state law. The claim was made in the case (and referred to in the opinion) that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment provided an additional security to the individual against oppression by the States themselves, and limited their powers to the same extent as the amendments theretofore adopted had limited the powers of the Federal Government. By holding that the conviction upon an information was valid, the court necessarily held that an indictment was not necessary; that exemption from trial for an infamous crime, excepting under an indictment, was not one of those privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States which a State was prohibited from abridging. The whole case was probably regarded as involved in the question as to due process of law. The particular objection founded upon the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States is now taken and insisted upon in this case. ।
Under these circumstances it may not be improper to inquire as to the validity of a conviction in a state court, for an infamous crime, upon an information filed by the proper officer under the authority of the constitution and laws of the State wherein the crime was committed and the conviction took place; confining the inquiry to the question of the effect o the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting e States from making or enforcing any law which abridges t e privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. othe other objection, that a conviction upon an information a Person liberty without due process of law, e wtado case is, as we have said, a complete and concluS1ve answer.
he inquiry may be pursued in connection with that in to the validity of the provision in the state constitu!on or a trial before a jupy composed of but eight urors m criminal cases which are not capital. One of the obth° 1OD.S this provision is that its enforcement has abridged ci® privileges and immunities of the plaintiff in error as a Z*n o the United States; the other objection being that a p. 586conviction thus obtained has resulted in depriving the plaintiff in error of his liberty without due process of law. Postponing an inquiry in regard to this last objection until we have examined the other, we proceed to inquire what are the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States which no State can abridge? Do they include the right to be exempt from trial, for an infamous crime, in a state court and under state authority except upon presentment by a grand jury ? And do they also include the right in all criminal prosecutions in a state court to be tried by a jury composed of twelve jurors ?
That a jury composed, as at common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, there can be no doubt. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 349. And as the right of trial by jury in certain suits at common law is preserved by the Seventh Amendment, such a trial implies that there shall be an unanimous verdict of twelve jurors in all Federal courts where a jury trial is hel. American Publishing Company n. Fisher, 166 U. S. 46, Springville n. Thomas, 166 U. S. 707.
It would seem to be quite plain that the provision in t e Utah constitution for a jury of eight jurors in all state crim inal trials, for other than capital offences, violates the Sixt Amendment, provided that amendment is now to be construe as applicable to criminal prosecutions of citizens of the Unitec States in state courts.
It is conceded that there are certain privileges or immum ties possessed by a citizen of the United States, because o is citizenship, and that they cannot be abridged by any ac io of the States. In order to limit the powers which i wa feared might be claimed or exercised by the Federal ment, under the provisions of the Constitution as it w as w adopted, the first ten amendments to that instrument w ere p & posed to the legislatures of the several States by the rs gress on the 25th of September, 1789. They eQen. as restraints and limitations upon the powers o e eral Government, and were not intended to and i no any effect upon the powers of the respective States.
been many times decided. The cases herewith cited are to that effect, and they cite many others which decide the same matter. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131,166; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. 8. 366, 382; Brown n. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172,174.
It is claimed, however, that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the effect of the former amendments has been thereby changed and greatly enlarged. It is now urged in substance that all the provisions contained in the first ten amendments, so far as they secure and recognize the fundamental rights of the individual as against the exercise of Federal power, are by virtue of this amendment to be regarded as privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States, and, therefore, the States cannot provide for any procedure in state courts which could not be followed in a Federal court because of the limitations contained in those amendments. This was also the contention made upon the argument in the Spies case, 123 U. S. 1315 151 • but in the opinion of the court therein, which was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, the question was not decided because it was held that the case did not require its decision.
In the Slaughter-house cases, 16 Wall. 36, the subject of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of a particular State, was treated by r. Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the court, e stated that the argument in favor of the plaintiffs, claimlng that the ordinance of the city of New Orleans was in-
1 5 rested wholly on the assumption that the citizenship is e same and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the ourteenth Amendment are the same as to citizens of the ni e States and citizens of the several States. This he t^^TT’I*0 be n°tWe^ f°unded 5 that there was a citizenship of d® nited States and a citizenship of the States, which were ist’jrOni ea°^ °^er’ depending upon different characterpriTl c^rcamstances in the individual; that it was only tha/ an<^ *mniunities of the citizen of the United States the?^ace^ by the amendment under the protection of ties of C^^ation, and that the privileges and immunia citizen of a State, whatever they might be, were not p. 588intended to have any additional protection by the paragraph in question, but they must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested.
He then proceeded to inquire as to the meaning of the words “ privileges and immunities ” as used in the amendment, and said that the first occurrence of the phrase in our constitutional history is found to be in the fourth article of the old confederation, in which it was declared “ that the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively.” A provision corresponding to this, he found in the Constitution of the United States in section 2 of the fourth article, wherein it is provided that “ the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the seveia States.” What those privileges were is not defined in the Constitution, but the justice said there could be but little ques tion that the purpose of both those provisions was the same, and that the privileges and immunities intended were the same in each. He then referred to the case of Corfield v. Corye, decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the Circuit Court foi t 6 District of Pennsylvania, in 1823, 4 Washington C. C. 3/ , where the question of the meaning of this clause in the tution was raised. Answering the question, what were privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, Justice Washington said in that case: . .
“We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions^^ those privileges and immunities which are in their na fundamental', which belong of right to the citizens o a governments, and which have at all times been enJ°^e^m citizens of the several States which compose this Union the time of their becoming free, independent and so\eie0
What these fundamental principles are it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; . . . The enjoyment of life and liberty with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole.”
Having shown that prior to the Fourteenth Amendment the legislation under reviewr would have been regarded as relating to the privileges or immunities of citizens of the State, with which the United States had no concern, Justice Miller continued:
“It would be the vainest show of learning to attempt to prove by citations of authority, that up to the adoption of the recent amendments no claim or pretence was set up that those rights depended on the Federal government for their existence or protection, beyond the very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution imposed upon the States — such, for instance, as the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. But with the exception of these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined, lay within the constitutional and egislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal overnment. Was it the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendnient, by the simple declaration that no State should make or en orce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immu^es C^^Zens United States, to transfer the security protection of all the civil rights, which we have mentioned, «rom the States to the Federal Government ? And where it is ec ared that Congress shall have the power to enforce that ar ic e, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress e entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclu«y to the States? Dlai t’ft^ an^ more mus^ follow, if the proposition of the jecHo h^ eFr°r soun(I. . For not only are these rights sub-
0 e control of Congress whenever in its discretion any p. 590of them are supposed to be abridged by state legislation, but that body may also pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects. And still further, such a construction followed by the reversal of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases, would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment. The argument vre admit is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an instrument. But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State Governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress in the exercise of power heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when, in fact, it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these Governments to the people, the argument has a force that is irresistible in the absence o language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to adim o doubt. We are convinced that no such results were inten e by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by t e legislatures of the States which ratified them.” *
If the rights granted by the Louisiana legislature di infringe upon the privileges or immunities of citizens o United States, the question arose as to what such privi ege^ were, and in enumerating some of them, without assummo state them all, it was said that a citizen of the United a as such, had the right to come to the seat of governmen assert claims or transact business, to seek the protection o government or to share its offices; he had the rig access to its seaports, its various offices throughout t e c try, and to the courts of justice in the several States,
mand the care and protection of the General Government over his life, liberty and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government; the right, with others, to peaceably assemble and petition for a redress of grievances; the right to the writ of habeas corpus, and to use the navigable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several States; also all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations; the right to become citizens of any State in the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State; and the rights secured to him by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution. A right, such as is claimed here, was not mentioned, and we may suppose it was regarded as pertaining to the State and not covered by the amendment.
Other objections to the judgment were fully examined, and the result was reached that the legislation of the State of Louisiana complained of violated no provision of the Constitution of the United States.
We have made this extended reference to the case because of its great importance, the thoroughness of the treatment of the subject, and the great ability displayed by the author of
the opinion. Although his suggestion that only discrimination y a State against the negroes as a class or on account of their race was covered by the amendment as to the equal protec-
tion of the laws, has not been affirmed by the later cases, yet !t was but the expression of his belief as to what would be e decision of the court when a case came before it involving * poiuk The opinion upon the matters actually involved an maintained by the judgment in the case has never been °u ted or overruled by any judgment of this court. It remains one of the leading cases upon the subject of that °^on Fourteenth Amendment of which it treats.
e definition of the words “privileges and immunities,” as in^p1 -^-r^ Justice Washington, was adopted in substance lan^a 8 Wall. 168, 180, and in Ward v. Maryter-h a^' ^18’ These rights, it is said in the Slaughouse cases, have always been held to be the class of p. 592rights which the State Governments were created to establish and secure.
In the same volume as the Slaughter-house cases is that of Bradwell n. The State, 16 Wall. 130, where it is held that the right to practice law in the courts of a State is not a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. And in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, it was held that the right of suffrage was not necessarily one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and although a woman was in one sense a citizen of the United States, yet she did not obtain the right of suffrage by the adoption of that amendment. The right to vote is a most important one in our form of government, yet it is not given by the amendment.
In speaking of the meaning of the phrase “ privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States,” under section second, article fourth, of the Constitution, it was said by the present Chief Justice’, in Cole n. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, that the intention was “to confer on the citizens of the severa States a general citizenship, and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same State wou be entitled to under the like circumstances, and this includes the right to institute actions.”
And in Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 248, various cases are cited regarding the meaning of the words “privileges an immunities,” under the fourth article of the Constitution, in not one of which is there any mention made of the ng claimed in this case, as one of the privileges or immunities of citizens in the several States.
These cases show the meaning which the courts a attached to the expression, as used in the fourth the Constitution, and the argument is not laboie w gives the same meaning to it when used in the Four ee Amendment. re
That the primary reason for that amendment was o,se the full enjoyment of liberty to the colored race isi no ® ’ yet it is not restricted to that purpose, and it apphes 0 e
one, white or black, that comes within its provisions. But, as said in the Slaughter-house cases, the protection of the citizen in his rights as a citizen of the State still remains with the State. This principle is again announced in the decision in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, wherein it is said that sovereignty, for the protection of the rights of life and personal liberty within the respective States, rests alone with the States. But if all these rights are included in the phrase “privileges and immunities” of citizens of the United States, which the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot in any manner abridge, then the sovereignty of the State in regard to them has been entirely destroyed, and the Slaughter-house cases, and United States v. Cruikshank are all wrong, and should be overruled.
It was said in Minor v. Happersett, supra, that the amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen ; it simply furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he already had. And in In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, it was stated by the present Chief Justice that — “The Fourteenth Amendment did not radically change the whole theory of the relations of the state and Federal governments to each other, and of both governments to the people. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State. Protection to life, iberty and property rests primarily, with the States, and the amendment furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon those fundamental rights w ich belong to citizenship, and which the state governments Mere created to secure. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from the privileges an immunities of citizens of the States, are indeed protected 7 it; but those are privileges and immunities arising out of 6 na^ure and essential character of the National govern-granted or secured by the Constitution of the mted States. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. ,S. 542.; WWow cases, 16 Wall. 36.”
s Constitutional Limitations, (4th ed. p. 497, margsal page 397,) the author says:
VOL. CLXXVI—38
“ Although the precise meaning of ‘ privileges and immunities ’ is not very conclusively settled as yet, it appears to be conceded that the Constitution secures in each State to the citizens of all other States the right to remove to and carry on business therein; the right by the usual modes to acquire and hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the law; the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the enforcement of other personal rights, and the right to be exempt, in property and person, from taxes or burdens which the property or persons of citizens of the same State are not subject to.”
There is no intimation here that among the privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States are the right of trial by jury in a state court for a state offence and the right to be exempt from any trial for an infamous crime, unless upon presentment by a grand jury. And yet if these were such privileges and immunities, they would be among the first that would occur to any one when enumerating or defining them. Nor would these rights come under the description given by the Chief Justice in the Kemmler case, supra. Such privileges or immunities do not arise out of the nature or essential charac ter of the National Government.
In Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, it was held that a trial by jury in suits at common law in the state courts was not a privilege or immunity belonging to a person as a citizen of t e United States, and protected, therefore, by the Fourteent Amendment. The action was tried without a jury by of an act of the legislature of the State of Louisiana. © plaintiff in error objected to such a trial, alleging that e a a constitutional right to a trial by jury, and that the sta u e was void to the extent that it deprived him of that ng • The objection was overruled. Mr. Chief Justice ai e, delivering the opinion of the court, said : .
“ By article 7 of the amendments it is provided that in s at common law, where the value in controversy s ia e, twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be Prese |n This, as has been many times decided, relates on y 0 r^ap the courts of the United States. Edwards v. Elhott, t
532, 557. The States, so far as this amendment is concerned, are left to regulate trials in their own courts in their own way. A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in the state courts is not, therefore, a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to abridge. A State cannot deprive a person of his property without due process of law; but this does not necessarily imply that all trials in the state courts affecting the property of persons must be by jury. This requirement of the Constitution is met if the trial is had according to the settled course of judicial proceedings. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land (& Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 280. Due process of law is process due according to the law of the land. This process in the States is regulated by the law of the State. Our power over that law is only to determine whether it is in conflict with the supreme law of the land — that is to say, with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof — or with any treaty made under the authority of the United States.”
This case shows that the Fourteenth Amendment in forbidding a State to abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, does not include among them the right of trial by jury in a civil case, in a state court, although the right to such a trial in the Federal courts is specially secured to all persons in the cases mentioned in the Seventh Amendment.
Is any one of the rights secured to the individual by the 11 or by the Sixth Amendment any more a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States than are those secured y t e Seventh ? In none are they privileges or immunities granted and belonging to the individual as a citizen of the ti^p but they are secured to all persons as against e ederal Government, entirely irrespective of such citizens ip. As the individual does not enjoy them as a privilege of izens ip of the United States, therefore, when the Fourteenth men ment prohibits the abridgment by the States of those m eges or immunities which he enjoys as such citizen, it is correct or reasonable to say that it covers and extends to p. 596certain rights which he does not enjoy by reason of his citizenship, but simply because those rights exist in favor of all individuals as against Federal govermental powers. The nature or character of the right of trial by jury is the same in a criminal prosecution as in a civil action, and in neither case does it spring from nor is it founded upon the citizenship of the individual as a citizen of the United States, and if not, then it cannot be said that in either case it is a privilege or immunity which alone belongs to him as such citizen.
So it was held in the oyster planting case, McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, that the right which the people of that State acquired to appropriate its tide waters and the beds therein for taking and cultivating fish, was but a regulation of the use, by the people, of their common property, and the right thus acquired did not come from their citizenship alone, but from their citizenship and property combined. It was, therefore, a property right and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship, and, for that reason, the citizen of one State was not invested by the Constitution of the United States with any interest in the common property of the citizens of another State.
This was a decision under another section of the Constitution (section second of article fourth) from the one under discussion, and it gives to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, but it is cited for the purpose of showing that where the privilege or immu nity does not rest alone upon citizenship, a citizen of another State does not participate therein.
In this case the privilege or immunity claimed does not res upon the individual by virtue of his national citizenship, an hence is not protected by a clause which simply prohibits t e abridgment of the privileges or immunities of citizens o United States. Those are not distinctly privileges or ties of such citizenship, where every one has the same as agai the Federal Government, whether citizen or not.
The Fourteenth Amendment, it must be remembere, not add to those privileges or immunities. The Sauvme ca is an authority in favor of the contention that the amen
does not preclude the States by their constitutions and laws from altering the rule as to indictment by a grand jury, or as to the number of jurors necessary to compose a petit jury in a criminal case not capital.
The same reasoning is applicable to the case of Kennard n. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480, although that case was decided with special reference to the “ due process of law ” clause.
In Kemmler’s case, 136 U. S. 436, it was stated that it was not contended and could not be that the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was intended to apply to the States. This was said long after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also subsequent to the making of the claim that by its adoption the limitations of the preceding amendments had been altered and enlarged so as in effect to make them applicable to proceedings in the state courts.
In Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, it was held that the Second Amendment to the Constitution, in regard to the right of the people to bear arms, is a limitation only on the power of Congress and the National Government, and not of the States. It was therein said, however, that as all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force of the National Government, the States could not prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive t ie United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the General Government.
In O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 332, it was stated that as a general question it has always been ruled that the Eighth mendment to the Constitution of the United States does not aPply to the States.
th^ ^Or^l^on v- Montgomery, 147 U. S. 490, it was said at the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution operates exclusive y in restraint of Federal power, and has no application 10 the States.'
have cited these cases for the purpose of showing that j e privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States eiffht necessar^y include all the rights protected by the first amendments to the Federal Constitution against the p. 598powers of the Federal Government. They were decided subsequently to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and if the particular clause of that amendment, now under consideration, had the effect claimed for it in this case, it is not too much to say that it would have been asserted and the principles applied in some of them.
It has been held that the last clause of the Seventh Amendment, which provides that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law, is not confined to trials by jury in Federal courts, but applies equally to a cause tried before a jury in a state court and brought thence before a Federal court. The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; Chicago, Burlington &c. Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Capital Traction Company v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1. But these decisions only carry out the idea that the amendment is a restraint upon Federal power, and not upon the power of the State, inasmuch as they declare that the clause restricts the right of the Federal courts to reexamine the facts found by a jury in a state court, as well as in a Federal one.
In Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, it was held that the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a State from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws, did not thereby prohibit the State from prescribing the jurisdiction of its several courts either as to their territorial limits or the subject-matter, or amount or finality of their respective judgments or decrees; that a State might establish one system of law in one portion of its territory and another system m another, provided it did not encroach upon the proper juris diction of the United States, nor abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the aws in the same district, nor deprive him of his rights wi due process of law. In the course of the opinion, whic wa delivered by Mr. Justice Bradley, he said: , “We might go still further and say, with undoubtec tru^
that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees p. 599all or any part of its territory. If the State of New York, for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its method of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counties, and the common law and its method of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so. This would not of itself, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, be a denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. If every person residing or being in either portion of the State should be accorded the equal protection of the laws prevailing there he could not justly complain of a violation of the clause referred to. For, as before said, it has respect to persons and classes of persons. It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances. The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two States separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right. Each State prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding. If diversities of laws and judicial proceedings may exist in the several States without violating the equality clause in the ourteenth Amendment, there is no solid reason why there may not be such diversities in different parts of the same fate. A uniformity which is not essential as regards different States cannot be essential as regards different parts of a tate, provided that in each and all there is no infraction of e constitutional provision. Diversities which are allowable in ifferent States are allowable in different parts of the same te. Where part of a State is thickly settled, and another Par as but few inhabitants, it may be desirable to have diferent systems of judicature for the two portions — trial by J ny m one, for example, and not in the other. Large cities require a multiplication of courts and a peculiar arrangeo/th ° ^risdictions. It would be an unfortunate restriction e powers of the state government if it could not, in its p. 600discretion, provide for these various exigencies. If a Mexican State should be acquired by treaty and added to an adjoining State or part of a State in the United States, and the two should be erected into a new State, it cannot be doubted that such new State might allow the Mexican laws and judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion, and the common law and its corresponding judicature in the other portion. Such an arrangement would not be prohibited by any fair construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. It would not be based on any respect of persons or classes, but on municipal considerations alone, and a regard for the welfare of all classes within the particular territory or jurisdiction.”
Although this case was principally discussed under that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, yet the application of the amendment with regard to the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States was also referred to, and if it had been supposed that it secured to a citizen of the United States, when proceeded against under state authority, all the privileges an immunities set forth in the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution, Mr. Justice Bradley could not, in t e course of his opinion in the case, have said that a trial by jury might exist as a right in one State and not exist in another. Trial by jury would in such case have been protected under t e Fourteenth Amendment, because it was granted to all persons by article six in all criminal prosecutions in the Federal cou^ ’ and by article seven in civil actions at common law, where value in controversy should exceed twenty dollars. On t e con trary, it was stated that great diversity in these respects nug1 exist in two States separated only by an imaginary ne’ one side of which there might be a right of trial by jury, a on the other side no such right. Each State, it was sai, P scribes its own modes of judicial procedure. The this case was by a unanimous court, and the remar s o justice are wholly irreconcilable with the existence o a r d of trial by jury in a state court which was guarantee an tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstan in p. 601denial of such right by and under the constitution and laws of the State.
The principle to be deduced from these various cases is that the rights claimed by the plaintiff in error rest with the state governments, and are not protected by the particular clause of the amendment under discussion. What protection may be afforded the individual against state legislation or the procedure in state courts or tribunals under other clauses of the amendment, we do not now inquire, as what has been heretofore said is restricted to the particular clause of that amendment which is now spoken of, the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
Counsel for plaintiff in error has cited from the speech of one of the Senators of the United States, made in the Senate when the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was under consideration by that body, wherein he stated that among the privileges and immunities which the committee having the amendment in charge sought to protect against invasion or abridgment by the States, wrere included those set forth in the first eight amendments to the Constitution, and counsel has argued that this court should, therefore, give that construction to the amendment which was contended for by the Senator in his speech.
What speeches were made by other Senators, and by Representatives in the House, upon this subject is not stated by counsel, nor does he state what construction was given to it, if anL by other members of Congress. It is clear that what is 8311 in Congress upon such an occasion may or may not express the views of the majority of those who favor the adophon of the measure which may be before that body, and the question whether the proposed amendment itself expresses the ybich those who spoke in its favor may have assumed a it did, is one to be determined by the language actually rem used and not by the speeches made regarding it. i d ln^v^ua^ Senators or Representatives may have urged co p 'n re^ar^ to the meaning to be given to a proposed a fir ^U^0Ila^ amendment, or bill or resolution, does not furnish ground for its proper construction, nor is it important p. 602as explanatory of the grounds upon which the members voted in adopting it. United States v. Trans-AHssouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 318; Danlap n. United States, 173 U. 8. 65, 75.
In the case of a constitutional amendment it is of less materiality than in that of an ordinary bill or resolution. A constitutional amendment must be agreed to, not only by Senators and Representatives, but it must be ratified by the legislatures, or by conventions, in three fourths of the States before such amendment can take effect. The safe way is to read its language in connection with the known condition of affairs out of which the occasion for its adoption may have arisen, and then to construe it, if there be therein any doubtful expressions, in a way so far as is reasonably possible, to forward the known purpose or object for which the amendment was adopted. This rule could not, of course, be so used as to limit the force and effect of an amendment in a manner which the plain and unambiguous language used therein would not justify or permit.
For the reasons stated, we come to the conclusion that the clause under consideration does not affect the validity of the Utah constitution and legislation.
The remaining question is, whether in denying the right o an individual, in all criminal cases not capital, to have a jury composed of twelve jurors, the State deprives him of life, 1 erty or property, without due process of law.
This question is, as we believe, substantially answere y the reasoning of the opinion in the Hurtado case, sup^ The distinct question was there presented whether it was c ue process of law to prosecute a person charged with mur er^y an information under the state constitution and law. w held that it was, and that the Fourteenth Amendment i prohibit such a procedure. In our opinion the rig t 0 exempt from prosecution for an infamous crime, excep UP^ a presentment by a grand jury, is of the same nature as right to a petit jury of the number fixed by the common If the State have the power to abolish the grand jury an^ consequent proceeding by indictment, the same course o p. 603soning which establishes that right will and does establish the right to alter the number of the petit jury from that provided by the common law. Many cases upon the subject since the Hurtado case was decided are to be found gathered in Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 IT. S. 262; Holden n. Hardy, 169 IT. S. 366, 384: Brown n. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172; Bolin v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83.
Trial by jury has never been affirmed to be a necessary requisite of due process of law. In not one of the cases cited and commented upon in the Hurtado case is a trial by jury mentioned as a necessary part of such process.
In In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, it was stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere with the power of a State to protect the lives, liberty and property of its citizens, nor with the exercise of that power in the adjudications of the courts of a State in administering process provided by the law of the State.
In Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, it was held that no State can deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law, without violating the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and that due process of law, within the meaning of the Constitution, is secured when the laws operate on all alike, and no one is subjected to partial or arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.
In Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 467, it was said “ that y the Fourteenth Amendment the powers of States in deal!ng with crime within their borders are not limited, except at no State can deprive particular persons, or class of persons, of equal and impartial justice under the law ; that law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice ls ue process, and when secured by the law of the State the constitutional requirement is satisfied; and that due process is so secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjectlng the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government unrestrained by the established principles of 110 R6 and distributive justice. Hurtado v. California,
’ S. 516, 535, and cases cited.” See also for statement p. 604as to due process of law the cases of Davidson n. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 IT. S. 701, 707.
The clause has been held to extend to a proceeding conducted to judgment in a state court under a valid statute of the State, if such judgment resulted in the taking of private property for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, under the conditions mentioned in the cases herewith cited. Chicago, Burlington &c. Raitroad v. Chicago, 166 IT. S. 226; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Company, 169 IT. S. 557.
It has also been held not to impair the police power of a State. Barrier v. Connolly, 113 IT. S. 27.
It appears to us that the questions whether a trial in criminal cases not capital shall be by a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors, and whether in case of an infamous crime a person shall only be liable to be tried after presentment or indictment of a grand jury, are eminently proper to be determined by the citizens of each State for themselves, and do not come within the clause of the amendment under consideration, so long as all persons within the jurisdiction of the State are made liable to be proceeded against by the same kind of procedure and to have the same kind of trial, and the equal protection of the laws is secured to them. Caldwell v. Texas, 137 IT. S. 692; Leeper v. Texas, 139 IT. 8. 462. It is emphatically the case of the people by t eir organic law, providing for their own affairs, and we are o opinion they are much better judges of what they ought o have in these respects than any one else can be. The reasons given in the learned and most able opinion of Mr. ustice Matthews, in the Hurtado case, for the judgment erel$ rendered, apply with equal force in regard to a tria y J jury of less than twelve jurors. The right to be procee e against only by indictment, and the right to a tria twelve jurors, are of the same nature, and are su jec the same judgment, and the people in the severa have the same right to provide by their organic law or change of both or either. Under this construction
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
amendment there can be no just fear that the liberties of the citizen will not be carefully protected by the States respectively. It is a case of self-protection, and the people can be trusted to look out and care for themselves. There is no reason to doubt their willingness or their ability to do so, and when providing in their constitution and legislation for the manner in which civil or criminal actions shall be tried, it is in entire conformity with the character of the Federal Government that they should have the right to decide for themselves what shall be the form and character of the procedure in such trials, whether there shall be an indictment or an information only, whether there shall be a jury of twelve or a lesser number, and whether the verdict must be unanimous or not. These are matters which have no relation to the character of the Federal Government. As was stated by Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court in Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, the State has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution. The legislation in question is not, in our opinion, open to either of these objections.
Judged by the various cases in this court we think there is no error in this record, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah must, therefore, be am j
’ ’ Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting.
nder an information filed against him in one of the courts of th$ Utah, Maxwell, the plaintiff in error, a citizen a d h United States, was convicted of the crime of robbery, aving been tried by a jury consisting of eight persons as ound guilty and sentenced to confinement in the penitenor the term of eighteen years. stit his imprisonment is in violation of the Conhy inf°n United States in that he was proceeded against n ormation not by indictment or presentment of a grand
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
jury — and was tried for an infamous crime by a jury composed of less than twelve persons.
By its opinion and judgment just rendered this court holds that neither the prosecution by information nor the trial by eight jurors was in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
Upon the first point I do not care to say anything. For, in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, this court held that a state enactment authorizing the prosecution by information for the crime of murder in the first degree — the penalty for such crime being death — was not in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The principles there announced have been reaffirmed in later cases. In the Hurtado case I dissented from the opinion and judgment of the court and stated fully the reasons why, in my judgment, no civil tribunal or court, Federal or state, could legally try a citizen of the United States for an infamous crime otherwise than on the indictment or presentment of a grand jury. I adhere to the views then expressed, but further discussion of the question decided seems unnecessary.
The remaining question in the present case is whether t e trial of the accused by eight jurors is forbidden by the Consti tution of the United States.
The Fourteenth Amendment, after declaring that all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to tie jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States an o the State wherein they reside, provides that “ no State s ia make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges o immunities of citizens of the United States,” nor sha a” State deprive any person of life, liberty or property wi due process of law.” . „
What are the privileges and immunities of a citizens o United States”« Without attempting to enumerate them,^ ought to be deemed safe to say that such privileges an munities embrace at least those expressly recognize er Constitution of the United States and placed beyon t ie p of Congress to take away or impair. . of
When the Constitution was adopted by the Conven
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
1787 and placed before the people for their acceptance or rejection, many wise statesmen whose patriotism no one then questioned or now questions earnestly objected to its acceptance upon the ground that it did not contain a Bill of Rights guarding the fundamental guarantees of life, liberty and property against the unwarranted exercise of power by the National Government. But the friends of the Constitution, believing that the failure to accept it would destroy all hope for permanent union among the people of the original States, and following the advice of Washington who was the leader of the constitutional forces, met this objection by showing that when the Constitution had been accepted by the requisite number of States and thereby become the supreme law of the land, such amendments could be adopted as wTould relieve the apprehensions of those who deemed it necessary, by express provisions, to guard against the infringement by the agencies of the General Government of any of the essential rights of American freemen. This view prevailed, and the implied pledge thus given was carried out by the first Congress, which promptly adopted and submitted to the people of the several States the first ten amendments. These amendments have ever since been regarded as the National Bill of Rights.
Let us look at some of those amendments. It is declared y the First, “ Congress shall make no law respecting an estabishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or a ridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of e people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Governwent for a redress of grievances;” by the Third, “no soldier s a in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time'of war, but in a manner to e prescribed by lawby the Fourth, “the right of the peope to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects andlnS^ Unreasona^e searches and seizures shall not be violated, by1 "arran^ss^a^ issue but upon probable cause, supported be °a a®rma^oni and particularly describing the place to Fift^0 e^5 persons or things to be seized ; ” by the twi 5 n° ?er^on shall “ be subject for the same offence to be e put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall he be compelled
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation; ” by the Sixth, “ in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence;” and by the Eighth, “excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
It seems to me that the privileges and immunities enumerated in these amendments belong to every citizen of the United States. They were universally so regarded prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity, the political community known as the People of the United States ordained and established the Constitution of the United States; and every member of that politica community was a citizen of the United States. It was that community that adopted, in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, the first ten amendments; and what they had in view by so doing was to make it certain that the privileges and immu nities therein specified — the enjoyment of which, the fathers believed, were necessary in order to secure the blessings liberty — could never be impaired or destroyed by the Nationa Government. -if
Now, the original Constitution declared that “ the tna o. all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by Jur/'^ This was supplemented by the Sixth Amendment, dec anno that in all criminal prosecutions the accused should enjoy right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury o State and district wherein the crime was committe
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
we have held that the jury here referred to was a common law jury consisting of neither more or less than twelve persons, whose unanimous verdict was necessary to acquit or convict the accused; that a jury of less number was not admissible in any criminal trial in the District of Columbia or in a Territory of the United States, or in any prosecution of a criminal character in a court of the United States or in any court organized under the authority of the United States. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343. We have often adjudged that the declaration in Magna Charta that the King would not pass upon any freeman, nor condemn him, “but by the lawful judgment of his peers,” referred to a jury of twelve persons.
It is not difficult to understand why the fathers intrenched the right of trial by jury in the supreme law of the land. They regarded the recognition and exercise of that right as vital to the protection of liberty against arbitrary power. Mr. Hallam in his Constitutional History of England, after observing that liberty had been the slow fruit of ages, said that as early as the reign of Henry VII one of the essential checks upon royal power was that “ the fact of guilt or innocence on a criminal charge was determined in a public court, and in the county where the offence was alleged to have occurred, by a jury of twelve men, from whose unanimous verdict no appeal could be made.” And it is an interesting fact that the first ordinance adopted by the Plymouth Colony in 1623 was one eclaring among other things that “ all criminal facts ” should e tried “ by the verdict of twelve honest men to be impanneled ^ authority, in form of a jurye upon their oaths.” The value c that institution was recognized by the patriotic men of the evolutionary period when in the Declaration of Independence ey complained that the King of Great Britain had deprived t e people of the Colonies in many cases of the benefits of sft ^Ur^' • to the provisions of the Federal Conu ion relating to the personal security of citizens of the e States, Kent says they “must be regarded as funda-
naf a ]ln every State, for the colonies were parties to the °na declaration of rights in 1774, in which the trial by
VOL. CLXXVI—39
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
jury, and the other rights and liberties of English subjects were peremptorily claimed as their undoubted inheritance and birthright.” Upon this general subject Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution has said: “ It was under the consciousness of the full possession of the rights, liberties and immunities of British subjects, that the colonists in almost all the early legislation of their respective assemblies insisted upon a declaratory act, acknowledging and confirming them. And for the most part they thus succeeded in obtaining a real and effective Magna Charta of their liberties. The trial by jury in all cases, civil and criminal, was as firmly and universally established in the colonies as in the mother country.” 1 Storys Const. § 165. Again, the same eminent jurist says: “ It seems hardly necessary in this place to expatiate upon the antiquity or importance of the trial by jury in criminal cases. It was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties, and watched with an unceasing jealousy and solicitude. The right constitutes one of the fundamental articles o Magna Charta, in which it is declared, nullus homo capiat^ nec imprisonetur, aut exuletur^ aut aliquo modo destruatur, ) nisi per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terrify no man shall be arrested, nor imprisoned, nor banished, nor deprived of life, etc., but by the judgment of his peers, or y the law of the land. The judgment of his peers here allu e to, and commonly called, in the quaint language of former times, a trial per pais, or trial by the country, is the trial ya jury, who are called the peers of the party accused, being o the like condition and equality in the State. When our more immediate ancestors removed to America, they broug privilege with them, as their birthright and inheritance, as^ part of that admirable common law which had fence and interposed barriers on every side against the approac arbitrary power. It is now incorporated into all our s a stitutions as a fundamental right, and the Constitution 0 United States would have been justly obnoxious to e conclusive objection if it had not recognized and con rm in the most solemn terms. The great object of a tna y
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
in criminal cases is to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers, and against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people. Indeed, it is often more important to guard against the latter than the former.” 2 Story’s Const. § 1779. Blackstone has said: “ A celebrated French writer, who concludes that because Rome, Sparta and Carthage have lost their liberties, therefore those of England in time must perish, should have recollected that Rome, Sparta and Carthage, at the time when their liberties were lost, were strangers to the trial by jury.” 2 Bl. Com. 379. In a recent American work on trial by jury the author well says: “The English colonists settled here with a deep-rooted regard for this right. It had been, no doubt, to them in the mother country a valuable protection. They brought it with them and established it as one of their dearest privileges, and in every enumeration of their rights and immunities it takes a conspicuous place.” Again, the same author: “ Ever since Magna Charta, the right to a trial by jury has been esteemed a peculiarly dear and inestimable privilege by the English race; and whether in a strictly historical view the right was defined or secured by that instrument or not, it was nevertheless invariably appealed to and implicitly relied on as unalterably and inviolably securing the right among other valuable privileges guaranteed therein. During long centuries, when popular rights were overborne by prerogative or despot-Jsm, those who claimed and were denied the right to such a kial, founded their demand on the guarantee of the Great arter, and solemnly protested against its violation when the privilege was denied them; and whenever an invasion or vioation of individual rights was threatened, the security afforded y this guarantee was relied on as an effectual safeguard either o repei the attack or nullify its effect.” Profifat on Jury s, 81, 82. And this court has declared that “ the trial y jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always sen an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every en°ac ment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.”
v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 446.
otwithstanding this history of the incorporation into the
Dissenting Opinion : Harlan, J.
Constitution of the United States of the provision relating to trial by jury, it is now adjudged that immunity from trial for crime except by a jury of twelve jurors is not an immunity belonging to citizens of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It does not solve the question before us to say that the first ten amendments had reference only to the powers of the National Government and not to the powers of the States. For if prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment it was one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States that they should not be tried for crime in any court organized or existing under National authority except by a jury composed of twelve persons, how can it be that a citizen of the United States may be now tried in a state court for crime, particularly for an infamous crime, by eight jurors, when that amendment expressly declares that “ no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” ? It does not meet the case to say that a trial by eight jurors is as much a trial by jury as if there were twelve jurors; for if a citizen charged with crime can be subjected to trial by a less number of jurors than that prescribed by the Constitution, the number may be reduced to three. Indeed, under the interpretation now given to the amendment, it will, I think, be impossi e to escape the conclusion that a State may abolish tria y jury altogether in a criminal case, however grave the o ence charged, and authorize the trial of a case of felony be ore a single judge. I cannot assent to this interpretation, ecau^ it is opposed to the plain words of the Constitution, and e ea the manifest object of the Fourteenth Amendment. .
I am of opinion that under the original Constitution a the Sixth Amendment, it is one of the privileges an ties of citizens of the United States that when charge ' _ crime they shall be tried only by a jury compose o persons; consequently, a state statute authorizing by a jury of eight persons of a citizen ;of ndment charged with crime, is void under the Fourteent declaring that no State shall make or enforce any
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
“shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
I am also of opinion that the trial of the accused for the crime charged against him by a jury of eight persons was not consistent with the “ due process of law ” prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to the words in the Fifth Amendment, that “ no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,” this court said in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken^ 18 How. 272, 276-7: “The Constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It was manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the Government, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make any process ‘due process of law’ by its mere will. To what principles are we to resort to ascertain whether this process enacted by Congress is due process? To this the answer must be twofold. We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes ofproceeding existing in the common and statute law of England fore the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition y aving been acted on by them after the settlement of this country.”
o one, I think, can produce any authority to show that accor ing to the “settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors,” the trial of one accused of felony o erwise than by a jury of twelve, or wholly without a jury, ^as consistent with “ due process of law.” If the original f^ons itution had not contained a specific prohibition of trials cess01*1^6 °^.erw'se by a jury, the requirement of due pro-Wav °f aW 'U Amendment would have stood in the
0 any act of Congress authorizing criminal trials in the
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
Federal courts in any mode except by a common law jury. When therefore the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the deprivation by any State of life, liberty or property without due process of law, the intention was to prevent any State from infringing the guarantees for the protection of life and liberty that had already been guarded against infringement by the National Government.
This interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment finds support in some of the decisions of this court. In addition to the clause forbidding the deprivation of property “without due process of law,” there is in the Fifth Amendment a clause specifically declaring “ nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” The Fourteenth Amendment does not in terms refer to the taking of private property for public use, yet we have held that the requirement of “ due process of law ” in that amendment forbids the taking of private property for public use without making or securing just compensation. Chicago, Burlington &c. Bailroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 233, 241 ; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 277.
If then the “ due process of law ” required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow a State to take private property without just compensation, but does allow the life or liberty of the citizen to be taken in a mode that is repugnant to t e settled usages and the modes of proceeding authorized at t e time the Constitution was adopted and which was express y forbidden in the National Bill of Rights, it would seem t » the protection of private property is of more consequence t an the protection of the life and liberty of the citizen.
If the court had not ruled otherwise, I should have thoug it indisputable that when by the Fourteenth Amendmen was declared that no State should make or enforce abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the nl States, nor deprive any person of life, liberty or property wi out due process of law, the people of the United Sta upon the States the same restrictions that had been imp^ ^ upon the National Government in respect as well o t e leges and immunities of citizens of the United Sta es
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
the protection of the fundamental rights of life, liberty and property.
The decision to-day rendered is very far reaching in its consequences. I take it no one doubts that the great men who laid the foundations of our Government regarded the preservation of the privileges and immunities specified in the first ten amendments as vital to the personal security of American citizens. To say of any people that they do not enjoy those privileges and immunities is to say that they do not enjoy real freedom. But suppose a State should prohibit the free exercise of religion; or abridge the freedom of speech or of the press; or forbid its people from peaceably assembling to petition the government for a redress of grievances; or authorize soldiers in time of peace to be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; or permit the persons, houses, papers and effects of the citizen to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures under warrants not issued upon probable cause nor supported by oath or affirmation, nor describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; or allow a person to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; or compel the accused to be a witness against himself; or deny to the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, or to have the assistance of counsel; or require excessive bail; or inflict cruel and unusual punishment. These or any of these things being one by a State, this court, according to the reasoning and egal effect of the opinion just delivered, would be bound to say that the privileges and immunities specified were not privieges and immunities of citizens of the United States within e meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that citizens 0 t e United States affected by the action of the State could no invoke the protection of that amendment or of any other provision of the National Constitution. Suppose the State of
Y. s ou^ amend its constitution and make the Mormon ’S1011 the established religion of the State, to be supported axation on all the people of Utah. Could its right to do
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
so, as far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, be gainsayed under the principles of the opinion just delivered? If such an amendment were alleged to be invalid under the National Constitution, could not the opinion herein be cited as showing that the right to the free exercise of religion was not a privilege of a “citizen of the United States” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ? Suppose, again, a State should prescribe as a punishment for crime burning at the stake or putting out the eyes of the accused. Would this court have any alternative under the decision just rendered but to say that the immunity from cruel and unusual punishments recognized in the Eighth Amendment as belonging to every citizen of the United States was not an immunity of a citizen within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and was not protected by that amendment against impairment by the State ? The privileges and immunities specified in the first ten amendments as belonging to the people of the United States are equally protected by the Constitution. No judicial tribunal has authority to say that some of them may be abridged by the States while others may not be abridged. If a State can take from the citizen charged with crime the right to be tried by a jury of twelve persons, it can, so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, take away the remaining privileges and immunities specified in the National Bill of Rights. There is no middle position, unless it be assumed to be one of the functions of the judiciary by an interpretation of the Constitution to mitigate or defeat o its members may deem the erroneous or unwise action o t ie people in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment. The cour cannot properly say that the Constitution of the United Sta es does not protect the citizen when charged with crime in state court against trial otherwise than by a jury of twe v persons, but does protect him against cruel and unusua p^ ishment, or against being put twice in jeopardy of life or 1 for the same offence, or against being compelled to es^ against himself in a criminal prosecution, or in fie« 0 speech or in the free exercise of religion. The rig tried when charged with crime by a jury of twelve pe
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.
is placed by the Constitution upon the same basis as the other rights specified in the first ten amendments. And while those amendments originally limited only the powers of the National Government in respect of the privileges and immunities specified therein, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment those privileges and immunities are, in my opinion, also guarded against infringement by the States.
If it be said that there need be no apprehension that any State will strike down the guarantees of life and liberty which are found in the National Bill of Rights, the answer is that the plaintiff in error is now in the penitentiary of Utah as the result of a mode of trial that would not have been tolerated in England at the time American independence was achieved, nor even now, and would have caused the rejection of the Constitution by every one of the original States if it had been sanctioned by any provision in that instrument when it was laid before the people for acceptance or rejection. Liberty, it has been well said, depends not so much upon the absence of actual oppression as on the existence of constitutional checks upon the power to oppress. These checks should not be destroyed or impaired by judicial decisions. On the contrary, speaking by Mr. Justice Bradley, we have declared m Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 636, that «it is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen.” If some of the guarantees of life, liberty and property which at the time of the adoption of the National Constitution were regarded as fundamental and as absolutely essential to the enjoyment of freedom, have in the judgment o some ceased to be of practical value, it is for the people of e United States so to declare by an amendment of that instrument. But, if I do not wholly misapprehend the scope an legal effect of the present decision, the Constitution of
6 United States does not stand in the way of any State s ri’ing down guarantees of life and liberty that Englishspea ing people have for centuries regarded as vital to persona security, and which the men of the Revolutionary period niversally claimed as the birthright of freemen.
issent from the opinion and judgment of the court.