Nw. Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620 (1898)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Nw. Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620 (1898)
Full caption
NORTHWESTERN BANK v. FREEMAN.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Oct. 24, 1898
NORTHWESTERN BANK v. FREEMAN.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.
No. 18. Argued April 15,18, 1898. —Decided October 24, 1898.
A description in a chattel mortgage of a given number of articles or animals out of a larger number is not sufficient as to third persons with acquired interests; but such a mortgage is valid against those who know the facts.
A purchaser of personal property, which is mortgaged, is charged with knowledge of every fact shown by the records, and is presumed to know every other fact which an examination, suggested by the records, would have disclosed.
Under the rule that the incident covers the principal, a mortgage of domestic animals covers the increase of such animals, though it be silent as to such increase.
The appellees recovered judgment in the district court, which was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory, from which an appeal has been taken to this court.
The facts found by the territorial Supreme Court are as follows:
“ On July 10, 1890, Harry Fulton, one of the defendants in the court below, executed an alleged chattel mortgage for $7500, payable in one year, in favor of the Arizona Central Bank, one of the appellees herein and plaintiffs in the court below; that the description in said mortgage of the property purporting to be covered by it is as follows: ‘1200 lambs, marked — ewes with hole in left ear and split in right; wethers, hole in right ear and split in left ear; 1600 ewes marked hole in left ear and split in right ear; 2200 wethers marked hole in right ear and split in left ear, making 5000 sheep in all with the Fulton brand.’
“That on said day said Fulton executed another alleged mortgage for $4000, payable in ninety days, in favor of John Vories, one of the appellees herein and one of the defendants in the court below; that the description in said alleged mortgage is as follows: ‘ Wethers and dry ewes to the number of 1000, the wethers marked with a split in the left ear and a hole in the right; ewes marked with a hole in the left ear and a split in the right.’
“ That on said day said Fulton owned and possessed 6200 sheep that were herded and run together, and this was all he owned, said sheep being marked as follows: ‘ Ewes and ewe lambs split in the right ear, hole in the left; wethers and wether lambs reverse;’ and both of the said appellees had knowledge of this fact at the time they accepted their alleged mortgages, the one on 5000 head and the other on 1000 head.
€22 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.
200 head not being included in either of said mortgages, all of said sheep having the same mark and running in the same herd, and none of them being capable of identification save only by the ear mark put on them as aforesaid, and that therefore there was no way by which any of said sheep could be distinguished from any of the others.
“ That said Fulton continued in the ownership and possession of all of said sheep, save only such as died, were sold by him, consumed or lost, until the 18th of December, 1893. At no time did appellees, or either of them, ever take or ever have possession of said sheep, or any of them, or of the increase thereof, nor were any of said sheep or the increase thereof ever by any one identified, designated or in any way segregated, apportioned or substituted to the or on account of the said pretended mortgages, or of either thereof. From date of said mortgages (July 10, 1890) to January 4, 1893, said Fulton from time to time sold of said sheep as follows: 1700 head, at $3 per head, that were by said Fulton accounted for, and the proceeds of which he deposited with the appellee Arizona Central Bank; that both of said appellees knew of these sales and consented to them.
“ On January 4, 1893, said Fulton executed a mortgage for $8885 in favor of Arizona Lumber and Timber Company, one of appellants herein, and one of the defendants in the court below, covering, among other property, the following described sheep: ‘ About 3000 ewes, 1000 wethers, and 2000 lambs, same being all the sheep now owned by mortgagor, and including all wool and increase which may be produced by said sheep marked — ewes, split in right ear, hole in left; wethers reverse.’ At the instance of appellees said appellant, Arizona Lumber and Timber Company, permitted the following recital to be inserted in said last-mentioned mortgage, namely : 1 This being subject to a mortgage on 5000 of above sheep to Arizona Central Bank, and one on 1000 head, and the residence property to John Vories, said number, as described in mortgages, to be kept good out of increase.’ There was consideration for the foregoing recital in the mortgage of January 4, 1893, namely, that the appellees should forbear p. 623to foreclose their mortgages, and should release their claim on the wool clip of 1893, the wool at that time not having been shorn.
“That to August 30, 1893, $3000 of the amount claimed to he due on the mortgage of January 4, 1893, was paid out of wool proceeds, and that on said day said Fulton, for the purpose of securing a $500 advance, and applying the remainder as a payment on said mortgage of January 4, 1893, executed his promissory negotiable note, payable in 90 days, securing the same by a chattel mortgage for the sum of $6000 to the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company.
“ That said mortgage was a conveyance, as a security for the payment of said note, of sheep, the same being in said mortgage described as follows, namely: ‘ About 3200 ewes, more or less; about‘1300 wethers, more or less; about 1400 lambs, more or less, being all the sheep now owned by mortgagor, including all the wool and increase which may be produced by said sheep — marked, ewes and ewe lambs, split in right ear, hole in left; wethers and wether lambs, reverse?
“That in said last-mentioned mortgage no recital or reference was made in any way, nor in any manner, to the existence of any other mortgage or mortgages whatsoever.
“That on the 29th day of September, 1893, and prior to the maturity of said last-mentioned note of $6000, said appellant Arizona Lumber and Timber Company, representing that said mortgage was a first and prior lien on said described sheep, and by means thereof, sold, assigned, endorsed and delivered said note and mortgage to the Northwestern National Bank, one of the appellants herein and one of the defendants in the court below, said Northwestern National Bank becoming an innocent purchaser for value.
“That on December 18, 1893, said Fulton, being then indebted to Riordan Mercantile Company, one of the appellants herein and a defendant in the court below, in the sum of $810.91, it brought its action in said district court against said Fulton whereby to collect the same, and at the same time caused to be issued out of the clerk’s office of said court a writ of attachment, which was then levied on the property following, p. 624namely: ‘ All the right, title and interest of the defendant Harry Fulton in and to the following-described sheep: 2926 ewes, marked hole in left ear, split in right; 900 wether sheep, marked hole in right ear, split in left ear; 1287 lambs — ewe lambs marked hole in left ear, split in right; wether lambs marked hole in right ear, split in left; 118 rams,’ same being all of the sheep then owned by said Fulton.
“ That on 16th March, 1894, judgment was rendered in said suit in favor of said plaintiff company and against said Fulton,, for said amount, and said attachment lien was foreclosed; that on the 31st day of March, 1894, the sheriff of said county of Coconino, by virtue of and pursuant to said judgment, sold said property and delivered the same to the appellant Riordan Mercantile Company, who then entered into the possession thereof, was so in the possession thereof when this cause was tried in the lower court, and are still in possession thereof.
“ That by virtue of said writ of attachment the sheriff attached all the sheep then owned by said Fulton, and that on said day, to wit, on the 18th day of December, 1893, there were of said sheep only 1000 head of ewes remaining out of all the sheep that existed on July 10, 1890, the date of said alleged mortgages to appellees; that the remainder of said ewes, all the male sheep and the lambs, had by that time died, been consumed, sold or lost.
“ That subsequent to the making of said alleged mortgages to said appellees, an oral agreement between them and the said Fulton was made that the securities of appellees were to be kept good out of the increase by substitution, the consideration therefor being that said Fulton might sell and dispose of the said sheep without interference from appellees.
“ That Sisson, a witness for appellants in this case, is and was during all of said transactions the treasurer of both the Riordan Mercantile Company and the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company, appellants herein, and that these two corporations have practically the same officers. , “ That in said district court said Arizona Central Bank brought its suit as plaintiff against said Fulton, Vories, Donahue as sheriff, the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company, the
Riordan Mercantile Company and the Northwestern National Bank, as defendants, asking for a foreclosure of its said alleged mortgage, the same being the above-entitled cause.
“That said action was tried and judgment was rendered foreclosing said alleged mortgages of both of appellees herein and also the said mortgage dated January 4, 1893, of said Arizona Lumber and Timber Company and the mortgage owned by said Northwestern National Bank as aforesaid, in which said judgment said court adjudged that appellees have a prior and first lien on said property, viz., the Arizona Central Bank upon 5000 sheep of the Fulton mark by reason of its said mortgage, and the said Vories on 1000 sheep of the Fulton mark by reason of his said mortgage; and said court decreed and ordered that an order of sale issue for the sale of all of said property to the sheriff of said county, and that the proceeds arising therefrom be divided by the sheriff and applied as follows, namely, at the ratio of five dollars to said Arizona Central Bank and one dollar to said Vories ; that in case anything should be left after the payment of said two mortgages to said bank and Vories, the same should be applied to the payment of the judgments of said Northwestern National Bank and said Arizona Lumber and Timber Company and Riordan Mercantile Company in the order named.”
There are seventeen assignments of errors, which are somewhat confused. They are grouped and presented by counsel under seven heads as follows :
“ First. In the first assignment of error it is set forth that the trial court erred in adjudging, and the territorial Supreme Court erred in affirming said judgment, that the mortgages of the appellees were prior liens on all of the sheep owned by defendant Fulton at the time of the execution of said mortgages, even though said mortgages had been good and prior liens on the sheep specified therein.
“Second. In the second, third, fifth and eighth assignments of error it is set forth that the trial court, and the territorial Supreme Court in sustaining its holding, erred in admitting in evidence the mortgages from defendant Fulton
VOL. CLXXI—io
to the appellees, marked Exhibit ‘ A ’ and ‘ B,’ against the objections of the appellants; and in overruling motion of appellants to strike out of the evidence the said mortgages; and in holding that said mortgages were valid and subsisting liens on all of said property; and in holding and deciding that the description of said property in appellees’ said mortgages was a sufficient description.
“ Third. In the fourth and seventh assignments it is set forth that the court erred in admitting, over the objection of the appellants, testimony concerning a conversation between J. H. Hoskins, John Vories, F. W. Sisson and Harry Fulton, and evidence relative to an alleged agreement, and evidence tending to prove a breach of contract between the appellees and appellant Arizona Lumber and Timber Company.
“ Fourth. The trial court erred, as set forth in the fifteenth and sixteenth assignments, in adjudging that on the date of its decree herein the mortgage of said appellee bank covered five thousand head of sheep of the Fulton herd and mark, such adjudication attempting to substitute five thousand head of sheep after the making of said two mortgages to appellees; the trial court erred in attempting said substitution and then holding it good as to appellants Riordan Mercantile Company and Northwestern National Bank.
“ Fifth. The trial court erred, as set forth in the eleventh assignment, in adjudging that said mortgages of appellees were mere securities for debts, the legal title to said sheep remaining in said Fulton notwithstanding said mortgages and in adjudging that said sheep should be sold and the proceeds paid to said Arizona Central Bank and said Vories, in the proportion of five dollars to the former and one to the latter.
“ Sixth. The trial court erred, as set forth in the seventeenth assignment, in adjudging that appellant Northwestern National Bank was bound by said pretended agreement of substitution or was bound by said pretended mortgages of appellees, or that said mortgages were prior liens on said property, or on any of it to the mortgage owned by said appellant.
“ Seventh. In the sixth, ninth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth p. 627and fourteenth assignments it is set forth that the court erred in denying and overruling defendants’ motion for a new trial of said cause; and in deciding that the mortgage to said appellee the Arizona Central Bank conveyed five thousand head of sheep, marked: ewes with hole in left ear and split in right, wethers with hole in right ear and split in left ear, and that a thousand more of said sheep were conveyed by mortgage to said appellee Vories, with the same marks; and in adjudging that the property included in the said attachment lien of the said Riordan Mercantile Company and sold and delivered to said company thereunder was the same property that is conveyed, or attempted to be conveyed, by the mortgages of said appellees; and in adjudging that the rights, title and interests obtained by said Riordan Mercantile Company, by virtue of said attachment lien and sale, was subject to the alleged rights of said appellees by virtue of their said pretended mortgages; and in adjudging that appellants Riordan Mercantile Company and Arizona Lumber and Timber Company had actual notice of the property conveyed by the said alleged mortgages of said appellees; and in adjudging that F. W. Sisson, as the treasurer of said Riordan Mercantile Company, agreed with said appellees that the number of sheep in said mortgages of appellees should be kept good out of the increase of said sheep, and that the wool was released by said agreement to said company, and that the consideration thereof was an alleged forbearance to foreclose said mortgages of said appellees.”
Mr. A. B. Browne for appellants. Mr. A. T. Britton and Mr. E. E. Ellenwood were with him on the brief.
Mr. Fred. Herringtoniavappellees. Mr. Cass E. Herrington was with him on the brief.
Mb. Justice McKenna, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The contest is for priority. The territorial Supreme Court awarded it to the mortgages of the appellees. The appellants p. 628contend that this was error because of the fact that the mort gages respectively covered 5000 and 1000 head of sheep, and that Fulton owned 6200 head, and that hence the mortgages were invalid on account of insufficient descriptions. The mortgages do not state that Fulton owned a greater number than those he mortgaged, but the fact is found by the court.
The rule is laid down that, as to third persons who have acquired interests, a description in a mortgage of a given number of articles out of a larger number is not sufficient. Jones on Chattel Mortgages, sec. 56 et seq., and cases cited.
But such a mortgage is valid against those who know the facts. Cole v. Green. 77 Iowa, 307: Clapp n. Trowbridqe, 74 Iowa, 550.
The mortgage of January 4, 1893, executed by Fulton to the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company was undoubtedly taken by the latter not only with actual notice, but it was expressly made subject to the prior ones to appellees. The finding of the court is: “ At the instance of appellees said appellant, Arizona Lumber and Timber Company, permitted the following recital to be inserted in said last-mentioned mortgage, namely: ‘ This being subject to a mortgage on 5000 of above sheep to Arizona Central Bank, and one on 1000 head, and the residence property to John Vories, said number, as described in mortgages, to be kept good out of increase.’ There was consideration for the foregoing: recital in the mortgage of January 4, 1893, namely, that the appellees should forbear to foreclose their mortgages, and should release their claim on the wool clip of 1893, the wool at that time not having been shorn.”
The court further finds that on August 30, 1893, Fulton paid to the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company $3000 out of the proceeds of the wool from the mortgaged sheep, secured from the company an advance of $500, and for that and the amount due on his note “executed his negotiable promissory note payable in ninety days, securing the same by a chattel mortgage for the sum of $6000.” In this mortgage there was no recital or reference to the existence of any other mortgage. On the 29th of September, 1893, and prior to this p. 629maturity, the “appellant, the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company, representing that said mortgage was a first lien, sold, endorsed and delivered the note and mortgage to the appellant, the Northwestern National Bank.” It is this note and mortgage that are in controversy and which are claimed as prior liens to the mortgages of appellees. The bank is found to be an innocent purchaser for value. By this is meant that it had no actual notice of the prior mortgages. Did the law impute notice to it ? Certainly not by the record of the mortgages to appellees. Did it by the record of the mortgage of January 4, 1893, to the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company ? If the bank was charged with notice of that mortgage it was charged with notice of its contents. “Notice of a deed is notice of its whole contents, so far as they affect the transaction in which notice of the deed is acquired.” 2 Sch. & Lef. 315, cited and approved in Boggs v. Varner, 6 Watts & Sergeant, 469, 473.
A purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the records, and is presumed to know every other fact which an examination suggested by the records would have disclosed. Secs. 710 and 710<z, Devlin on Deeds, and cases cited. The mortgage of January 4, 1893, to the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company was by the same mortgagor as that of August 30, the one sold to the Northwestern National Bank, and covered the same sheep, and hence, under the rule announced, the bank was charged with notice of it and of its recitals. It was not given up or satisfied. It was preserved as an independent lien.
It was not satisfied, appellants-say, because it covered other property beside the sheep. This is an insufficient reason. If the debt it secured was paid, there was no reason for retaining the lien on any property. But whatever the reason, it was retained and affected the title. That is the material circumstance, and not in whose name it stood. It was in the chain of the title and affected it. It would have been found if looked for, and would have notified the bank of the transactions which conducted to it and caused it to be made subject to the mortgages of the appellees. We therefore think the p. 630territorial courts committed no error when they assigned priority to those mortgages. Nor was it error to subordinate the attachment and judgment of the Riordan Mercantile Company to them. That company had, according to the finding of the court, actual notice.
The territorial court found that on the 18th of December, 1893, there were one thousand head of ewes remaining out of all the sheep which existed on July 10, 1890, the date of the mortgages to appellees; that the remainder of the ewes, all of the male sheep, and the lambs had died, been consumed, sold or lost. The findings are absolutely silent as to whether there were or were not other sheep in existence at that time, or at the time the decree was entered. We infer from the briefs of counsel that there were others — the increase of those mortgaged — and there is a contention as to whether these are covered by the lien of the mortgages.
Under the rule that the incident follows the principal, a mortgage of domestic animals covers the increase of such animals, though it is silent as to such increase. This court said in Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, by Mr. Justice Harlan “according to the maxim partus sequitur ventrem, the brood of all tame and domestic animals belong to the owner of the dam or mother.” 2 Bl. Com. 390. See also Pyeatt v. Powell, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 10 U. S. App. 200, and cases cited.
But whatever was doubtful or disputable in the mortgages of appellees as to the increase was resolved and settled by agreement between all who had interests, and was expressed in the mortgage of January 4, 1893. There is nothing in the record to show a substitution except by the increase, and therefore we are not called upon to pass upon some of the interesting questions argued by appellants. Nor are we embarrassed by considerations of the increase being in or having passed out of the “ period of nurture.” Such considerations are only important when a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee has taken without notice, actual or constructive, which we have seen the Northwestern National Bank did not.
The objections to testimony assigned as error in the fourth and seventh assignments of error were not well taken. The testimony showed the transactions and the relations of the parties to them.
Decree affirmed.
BROWN v. UNITED STATES.
CURLEY v. UNITED STATES.
EEBOE TO THE UNITED STATES COUET IN THE INDIAN TEEEITOEY.
Nos. 249, 250. Submitted April 25, 1898.—Decided October 24, 1898.
This court has no appellate jurisdiction of capital cases from the United States court from the Northern District of the Indian Territory, such appellate jnrisdiction being vested exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory.
Cyeus A. Brown, plaintiff in error in case No. 249, was indicted in the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, charged with the crime of murder, which indictment was filed in the United States court for the Indian Territory, Northern District, sitting at Muscogee on the 10th day of December, a .d. 1896.
On the 17th day of December, a .d. 1897, he was convicted of the crime of murder in said court, and the judgment of the court sentencing him to death was made on the 24th day of December, a .d. 1897. On the 1st day of February, a .d. 1898, the plaintiff in error filed a petition in said court for a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States, and filed an assignment of errors. On February 8, a .d. 1898, a writ of error was allowed in said cause, and on the same day a citation was issued in said cause, service of which was acknowledged on the 16th day of February, a .d. 1898. Pursuant to the writ of error in said cause a transcript of the record in said cause was filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States on the 23d day of February, a .d. 1898. The government has filed its motion to p. 632dismiss the writ of error in said cause, for the reason that the Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction under the law to entertain said writ of error, nor to pass upon any of the alleged errors in said record, because said court has no appellate jurisdiction of said cause.
George Curley, alias George Cully, plaintiff in error in case No. 250, was indicted in the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, sitting at Vinita, charged with the crime of murder, which indictment was filed in open court on the 21st day of October, a .d . 1897. On the same day the defendant took a change of venue to the United States court at Muscogee, and a transcript of the record and the original indictment were forwarded to the clerk of the United States court at Muscogee, Indian Territory. On the 13th day of December, a .d. 1897, at the December term of the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, at Muscogee, the indictment heretofore found was referred to the grand jury, and upon the same day the grand jury returned into open court at Muscogee, Indian Territory, a new indictment against the defendant for murder. On the 22d day of December, a .d. 1897, the defendant was found guilty of the crime of murder, and on the 24th day of December, a .d. 1897, judgment of the court was pronounced upon said defendant, sentencing him to death.
On February 11,1898, plaintiff in error, through his attorney, W. H. Twine, filed a petition for a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States, and also filed his specification of error. A writ of error was allowTed, on the 19th day of February, 1898, and on the 23d day of February, 1898, service of the citation issued out of this court was acknowledged. A transcript of the entire record was filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States on March 1, 1898. The government has filed its motion to dismiss the writ of error in said case for the reason that the Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction under the law to entertain said writ of error, nor to pass upon any of the alleged errors in said record, because said court has no appellate jurisdiction of said cause.
Mr. Solicitor General and Mr. P. L. Soper for the motion.
Mr. John II. Koogler and Mr. John Watkins on behalf of Brown, and Mr. W. II. Twine on behalf of Curley, opposing.
Mr. Justice Shiras, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
By the act of Congress approved March 1, 1889, c. 333, 25 Stat. 783, there was established a United States court for the Indian Territory. The act conferred no jurisdiction over felonies, but by the fifth section exclusive original jurisdiction was conferred over all offences against the laws of the United States committed within the Indian Territory, not punishable by death or by imprisonment at hard labor. Jurisdiction was conferred in all civil cases between citizens of the United States who are residents of the Indian Territory where the value of the thing in controversy shall amount to one hundred dollars or more. The final judgment or decree of the court, where the value of the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds one thousand dollars, may be reviewed and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of error or appeal, in the same manner and under the same regulations as the final judgments and decrees of a Circuit Court.
On March 1, 1895, Congress passed an act, c. 145, 28 Stat. 693, dividing the Indian Territory into three judicial districts, and providing for the appointment of two additional judges. This act extended the jurisdiction of the United States court in said Territory to capital cases and other infamous crimes, the jurisdiction over which had theretofore been vested in the United States courts at Fort Scott, Kansas, Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Paris, Texas, and provided that all such offences should be prosecuted in the United States court in the Indian Territory after the first day of September, 1896.
The eleventh section is as follows:
“That the judges of said court shall constitute a court of appeals, to be presided over by the judge oldest in commission p. 634as chief justice of said court. And said court shall have such jurisdiction and powers in said Indian Territory and such general superintending control over the courts thereof as is conferred upon the Supreme Court of Arkansas over the courts thereof by the laws of said State, as provided by chapter forty of Mansfield’s Digest of the Laws of Arkansas, and the provisions of said chapter, so far as they relate to the jurisdiction and powers of said Supreme Court of Arkansas as to appeals and writs of error, and as to the trial and decision of cases, so far as they are applicable, shall be, and they are hereby, extended over and put in force in the Indian Territory;
“ And appeals and writs of error from said court in said districts to said appellate court, in criminal cases, shall be prosecuted under the provisions of chapter forty-six of Mansfield’s Digest, by this act put in force in the Indian Territory.”
These enactments clearly provide that writs of error in criminal cases shall be taken to the appellate court of the United States for the Indian Territory, and dispose of the question before us, unless there are other provisions of the acts of Congress which prevent such a conclusion.
The counsel for defendants in error contend that the act of February 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 Stat. 655, gave to the Supreme Court the right to review. The sixth section of that act is in the following words:
“ That hereafter, in all cases of conviction of crime the punishment of which provided by law is death, tried before any court of the United States, the final judgment of such court against the respondent shall, upon the application of the respondent, be reexamined, reversed or affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, under such rules and regulations as said court may prescribe.”
It will be observed that when this law was passed the United States court for the Indian Territory did not possess jurisdiction in capital cases. That jurisdiction was subsequently conferred. But, even if it be conceded that the provisions of the act of February 6, 1889, might have attached or become applicable to the judgments of the United States court for the Indian Territory when jurisdiction in capital cases was p. 635extended to that court, the intention of Congress is manifested to have been otherwise by the provision above cited from the act of March 1, 1895, whereby it is provided that writs of error in capital cases shall be taken to the Court of Appeals of the United States for the Indian Territory.
This court had occasion to consider the effect of the act of February 6, 1889, in respect to the judgments of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in capital cases, in the case of Cross v. United States, 145 U. S. 571, and it was there said :
“ It is contended on behalf of the Government that the writ of error will not lie because the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is not a court of the United States, within the intent and meaning of the section. MeAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, is cited with the decision referred to therein, as sustaining that view, but it is to be remembered that that case referred to territorial courts only; and moreover, if the disposal of the motion turned on this point, the words, ‘ any court of the United States,’ are so comprehensive that, used as they are in connection with convictions subject to the penalty of death, the conclusion might be too technical that Congress intended to distinguish between courts of one class and of the other. But the difficulty with the section is that it manifestly does not contemplate the allowance of a writ of error to any appellate tribunal, but only to review the final judgment of the court before which the respondent was tried, where such judgment could not otherwise be reviewed by writ of error or appeal. It is the final judgment of a trial court that may be reexamined upon the application of the respondent, and it is to that court that the cause is to be remanded, and by that court that the judgment of this court is to be carried into execution. The obvious object was to secure a review by some other court than that which passed upon the case at nisi prius. Such review by two other courts was not within the intention, as the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, shows. This is made still clearer by the further provision that no such writ of error ‘ shall be sued out or granted unless a petition therefor shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the trial shall have been had during the same term or within such
€36 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.
time, not exceeding sixty days next after the expiration of the term of the court at which the trial shall have been had, as the court may for cause allow by order entered of record.’ This language is entirely inapplicable to the prosecution of a writ of error to the judgment of an appellate tribunal affirming the judgment of the trial court. And the case before us shows this.”
It is true that in the present cases the writs of error were sued out directly to the trial court, whereas in the case of Cross the writ of error was taken to the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District affirming the judgment of the trial court, and therefore some of the language quoted from the opinion in the latter case is not strictly applicable. But the reasoning of the court, showing that it was unlikely that Congress intended a review by two other courts than the trial court, is applicable. It is not to be supposed that Congress, when it provided by the act of March 1, 1895, for a review or writ of error in the Court of Appeals for Indian Territory, regarded the sixth section of the act of February 6, 1889, as also applicable.
The counsel for the defendants in error cite in their briefs the fifth and thirteenth sections of the act of March 3,1891, establishing the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, providing that appeals or writs of error may be taken from the District or Circuit Courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in cases of capital crimes, and providing that appeals and writs of error may be taken from the decisions of the United States court in the Indian Territory to the Supreme Court of the United States, or to the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Eighth Circuit, in the same manner and under the same regulations as from the Circuit or District Courts of the United States.
Of course as, when this act was passed, the United States court in the Indian Territory had no jurisdiction over capital crimes, Congress did not contemplate any appeal or writ of error in such cases. And when, by the act of March 1, 189o, jurisdiction of the United States court in the Indian Territory was extended to capital cases, and a court of appeals was p. 637established, with power to entertain appeals and writs of error, the act of March 3, 1891, cannot be regarded as applicable in such cases. Where a statute provides for a writ of error to a specified court of appeals it must be regarded as a repeal of any previous statute which provides for a writ of error to another and different court.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals of the United States in the Indian Territory are final except so far as they are made subject to review by some express provision of law. In the eleventh section of the act of March 1,1895, it is provided that “appeals and writs of error from the final decision of said appellate court shall be allowed, and may be taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial Circuit in the same manner and under the same regulations as appeals are taken from the Circuit Courts of the United States;” but it is not claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff in error that this provision applies to capital cases; and see the case of Folsom v. United States, 160 U. S. 121.
It has been held by this court that the court established in the Indian Territory, though a court of the United States, is not a District or Circuit Court of the United States. In re Mills, 135 U. S. 263, 268.
We accept the contention of the Solicitor General on behalf of the Government, that the Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory, being a court of the United States, is analogous to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and bears the same relation to the trial court in the Indian Territory as the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia bore to the trial court in the District.
And it was held in Aa? parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 329, that no appeal could be taken or writ of error sued out to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in a capital case, the court saying: “ No appeal or writ of error in such case as that lies to this court. The act of Congress has made the judgment of that court conclusive, as it had a right to do, and the defendant, having one review of his trial and judgment, has no special reason to complain.” In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, 84.
Our conclusion is that we have no appellate jurisdiction of capital cases from the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, and that such appellate jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory.
The motion is allowed and the writs of error in these cases are
Dismissed.