United States v. Klumpp, 169 U.S. 209 (1898)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
United States v. Klumpp, 169 U.S. 209 (1898)
Full caption
UNITED STATES v. KLUMPP.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 21, 1898
Majority
Fuller (Chief Justice)
UNITED STATES v. KLUMPP.1
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 159. Argued January 20, 1898. —Decided February 21, 1898.
In paragraph 297 of the tariff act of August 27, 1894, c. 349, 28 Stat. 509, providing that“ the reduction of the rates of duty herein provided for manufactures of wool shall take effect January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five,” the words “ manufactures of wool ” had relation j;o the raw material out of which the articles were made, and, as the material of worsted dress goods was wool, such goods fell within the paragraph.
1
The docket title of this case is “ The United States, Appellant, v. Alexander Murphy & Co.” VOL. CLXIX—14
On the thirtieth day of August, a .d. 1894, John F. Klumpp and others, doing business as a partnership under the name of Alexander Murphy & Co., imported into New York certain merchandise consisting of women’s and children’s dress goods composed of worsted. The collector classified this merchandise and assessed it for duty under paragraph 395 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, c. 1244, 26 Stat. 567, at twelve cents per square yard and fifty per cent ad valorem. The importers protested, claiming the goods to be dutiable under paragraph 283 of the tariff act of August 27, 1894, c. 349, 28 Stat. 509, at forty per cent, or fifty per cent ad valorem, according to the value per pound.
The Board of General Appraisers overruled the protest (G. A. 2769), and the importers carried the matter to the Circuit Court, which reversed the decision of the Board of General Appraisers. Murphy v. United States, 68 Fed. Rep. 908. On an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the decision of the Circuit Court was affirmed. Murphy v. United States, 38 U. S. App. 467. The case was then brought here on certiorari.
It was admitted below “ that the classification of the merchandise by the collector was worsted dress goods, at twelve cents per square yard and fifty per cent ad valorem under schedule K, paragraph 395 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890.”
And “ that the merchandise in controversy is worsted dress goods, made from the fleece of the sheep, which has been combed and spun into worsted yarn, and is not composed of the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animal than sheep.”
Paragraph 395 of Schedule K of the act of October 1,1890, entitled “Wool and Manufactures of Wool,” read: “On women’s and children’s dress goods, coat linings, Italian cloth, bunting, and goods of similar description or character composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animals, and not specially provided for in this act, the duty shall be twelve cents per square yard, and in addition thereto fifty per centum ad valorem: Provided, That on all such goods weighing over four ounces per square yard the duty per pound shall be four times the duty imposed p. 211by this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the first class, and in addition thereto fifty per centum ad valorem.”
Paragraph 283 of Schedule K of the act of August 27,1894, c. 349, entitled “Wool and Manufactures of Wool,” provided : “ On women’s and children’s dress goods, coat linings, Italian cloth, bunting or goods of similar description or character, and on all manufactures, composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animals, including such as have india rubber as a component material, and not specially provided for in this act, valued at not over fifty cents per pound, forty per centum ad valorem; valued at more than fifty cents per pound, fifty per centum ad valorem.”
Paragraphs 280 to 286, inclusive, under this schedule, provided for duties on articles made, or composed, “ wholly or in part of wool, worsted or the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animals,” except that paragraph 282, which referred to blankets, etc., omitted the word “ worsted.”
Paragraphs 287 to 296, inclusive, related to carpets, mats, etc., and the concluding paragraph of the schedule read: “297. The reduction of the rates of duty herein provided for manufactures of wool shall take effect January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five.”
Paragraph 685, one of the paragraphs of the free list, was as follows: “ 685. All wool of the sheep, hair of the camel, goat, alpaca and other like. animals, and all wool and hair on the skin, noils, yarn waste, card waste, bur waste, slubbing waste, roving waste, ring waste and all waste, or rags composed wholly or in part of wool, all the foregoing not otherwise herein provided for.”
^.r. Solicitor General for appellant.
IK Wickham Smith for appellees. Mr. Charles Curie was on his brief.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Women’s and children’s dress goods, “composed wholly or p. 212in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animals,” were dutiable under paragraph 395 of the act of October 1,1890, at twelve cents per square yard and fifty per cent ad valorem; under paragraph 283 of the act of August 27, 1894, at forty or fifty per cent ad valorem, according to value’. But by paragraph 297, the reduction of the rates of duty on “ manufactures of wrool ” was not to take effect until January 1, 1895. And if that paragraph applied to worsted dress goods for women and children, then the collector was right, and the judgment must be reversed.
Was it intended that the words “ manufactures of wool,” as used in this paragraph, should include or exclude worsted goods ?
Worsted goods are made out of wool, and are necessarily a manufacture of wool. The Century Dictionary defines “ worsted ” as a noun : “ A variety, of woollen yarn or thread, spun from long-staple wool which has been combed, and in the spinning is twisted harder than is usual;” and as an adjective: “ Consisting of worsted; made of worsted yarn; as worsted stockings.”
“Worsted is but wool, spun and twisted in a particular manner,” said Mr. Justice Story, in Whiting v. Bancroft, 1 Story, 560. And in Cahn v. Seeberger, 30 Fed. Rep. 425, it was found by Judge Blodgett that: “Worsted is made by combing long fibred wools so that the fibres usually lie or are arranged alongside each other, while wool is treated by carding it so as to interlock the fibres with each other.”
As between worsted yarns and woollen yarns the Encyclopaedia Britannica says that the fundamental distinction “rests in the crossing and interlacing of the fibres in preparing woollen yarn, — an operation confined to this alone among all textiles, while for worsted yarn the fibres are treated, as in the case of all other textile materials, by processes designed to bring them into a smooth, parallel relationship with each other.” Vol. 24, p. 658.
Although through the introduction of improved processes of manufacture, it gradually became possible to comb shorter and finer varieties of wool, and thus to manufacture worsted p. 213goods of higher grade and better quality, approximating worsted to woollen goods, and removing the reason for any distinction between them in the matter of duties, the tariff laws prior to May 9, 1890, made a distinction in that respect between woollen and worsted goods, resting on the difference in the process of manufacture; but the raw material was, of course, always the same, namely, wool.
By the tariff acts of April 27, 1816, c. 107, 3 Stat. 310; of May 22,1824, c. 136, 4 Stat. 25; May 19, 1828, c. 55, 4 Stat. 270; July 14, 1832, c. 227, 4 Stat. 583; August 30, 1842, c. 270, 5 Stat. 548, worsted stuff goods were recognized as manufactures of wool.
By the acts of July 30,1846, c. 74, 9 Stat. 42; March 2,1861, 12 Stat. 252, Res. 15 ; July 14, 1862, c. 163,12 Stat. 543; June 30,1864, c. 171, 13 Stat. 202; March 2,1867, c. 197, 14 Stat. 559; March 3, 1883, c. 121, 22 Stat. 488, “manufactures of wool not otherwise provided for,” were separated from “ manufactures of worsteds not otherwise provided for,” and distinct duties levied on each, while from 1861 distinct duties were levied on articles specifically described, whether manufactured of wool or worsted.
In Seeberger n. Cahn, 137 U. S. 95, 97, it was held that cloths popularly known as diagonals, and in trade as worsteds, were subject to duty under the act of March 3, 1883, as manufactures of worsted and not as manufactures of wool, the ground of decision being thus stated by Mr. Justice Gray delivering the opinion of the court:
“ In the interpretation of the customs acts, nothing is better settled than that words are to receive their commercial meaning; and that when goods of a particular kind, which would otherwise be comprehended in a class, are subjected to a distinct rate of duty from that imposed upon the class generally, they are taken out of that class for the purpose of the assessment of duties.
“Of the two successive paragraphs in the customs act of 1883, upon which the parties respectively rely, the first imposes a certain scale of duties on ‘ all manufactures of wool of every description, made wholly or in part of wool, not p. 214specially enumerated or provided for in this act; ’ and the second imposes a lower scale of duties on ‘ all manufactures of every description, composed wholly or in part of worsted.’ . .
“ Though worsted is doubtless a product of wool, and might in some aspects be considered a manufacture of wool, yet manufactures of worsted being subjected by the second paragraph to different duties from those imposed by the first paragraph on manufactures of wool, it necessarily follows that a manufacture of worsted cannot be considered as a manufacture of wool, within the meaning of this statute.”
This decision was announced November 17, 1890, but the controversy had been pending for a long time in the courts, and on May 9, 1890, an act was passed, “providing for the classification of worsted cloths as woollens,” by enacting: “ That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he hereby is, authorized and directed to classify as woollen cloths all imports of worsted cloth, whether known under the name of worsted cloth or under the name of worsteds or diagonals or otherwise.” 26 Stat. 105, c. 200.
And since that date no distinction for customs purposes between woollens and worsteds has been recognized by Congress.
By the act of October 1, 1890, the same duties were levied upon worsted and woollen goods. Paragraphs 375 to 387 divided all wools, hair of the camel, goat, alpaca and other like animals into three classes, and levied certain duties on each class. Paragraphs 391 to 398 provided for certain duties on described articles, whether made wholly or in part of “ wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animals.”
By the act of August 27, 1894, wool was put on the free list (par. 685)j and the paragraphs of the act of October 1,1890, classifying wools and levying duties on the different classes, were omitted. Paragraphs 280 to 286, inclusive, of Schedule K of this act prescribed duties on certain enumerated articles, whether composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animal.
There was no distinction made by either of these acts p. 215between manufactures of wool and manufactures of worsted for the purposes of duty, and the word “worsted” seems to have been used out of abundant caution and as conducive to greater certainty.
The act of July 24, 1897, commonly known as the Dingley act, omits the repetition of the words “ wool, worsted, hair of the camel, goat, alpaca and other animals,” and uses the single word “ wool.” Paragraph 383 provides: “ Whenever, in any schedule of this act, the word ‘ wool ’ is used in connection with a manufactured article of which it is a component material, it shall be held to include wool or hair of the sheep, camel, goat, alpaca or other animal, whether manufactured by the woollen, worsted, felt or any other process.” 30 Stat. 151, c. 11.
Manifestly the distinction on which the decision in Seeberger v. Cahn turned was done away with by the acts of October 1,1890, and August 27, 1894, as well as by that of May 9, 1890, and there certainly is no imperative ground for its reinstatement by technical construction.
The reason for the postponing of the taking effect of the reduction of duties obviously had nothing to do with the process of manufacture, but related to the material of which the goods were composed, which material had been relieved from duty by paragraph 685 of the act.
Congress undoubtedly concluded that the manufacturers of goods from wool had laid in a large stock of material, which equitably they should be allowed a reasonable time to work off, and that there was probably on hand a large stock of goods, to dispose of which reasonable time should be allowed, rather than that the large dealers should be induced to bring in foreign goods at a cost which involved ruinous competition ; while at the same time the wool growers ought to have their original market until they could adjust themselves to the new condition of things.
The specific rate was compensatory, and, when stricken out, and the duty on raw material abolished, a postponement was provided for in order to avoid injustice.
But the reason for postponing the reduction on p. 216manufactures of wool, which, on the face of the act, we think properly imputable to Congress, is as applicable to worsted goods as to any other goods fabricated from wool.
It will be perceived that the acts of 1890 and 1894 did not levy a duty on “ worsted dress goods,” eo nomine, nor on worsted dress goods by commercial designation, nor on worsted dress goods as distinguished from woollen dress goods; but a duty on dress goods, whether made of “ wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca or other animals.” The description is addressed to the quality and material of the goods, namely, women’s and children’s dress goods, made of wool, worsted, etc.
The principle then that the special designation of pn article by its commercial meaning should prevail over general terms used in the same or a later act, has no application.
In Barber v. Schell, 107 U. S. 617, the words “cotton laces, cotton insertings,” etc., used in the act of 1846, were held to be designations of articles by special description of quality and material, and the general provision of 1857, transferring to Schedule C “ all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached, printed or dyed,” whereby a different duty was imposed on such goods, was held to apply. Mr. Justice Blatchford said : “The designations qualified by the word ‘ cotton ’ in the act of 1846 are designations of articles by special description, as contra-distinguished from descriptions by a commercial name or a name of trade. They are designations of quality and material.” Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U. S. 171, 178.
It is argued that the same reasoning which brings worsted goods within the words “ manufactures of wool,” would also compel the inclusion of goods composed of the hair of the camel and other animals, confessedly not covered by the phrase.
Doubtless wool considered as the sheep’s coat might be said to be the sheep’s hair, and fleeces of the hair of the Angora goat, the Llama, the Alpaca, and other like animals, might be called their wool. In the Encyclopaedia Britannica, (9th ed. vol. 24, p. 653,) under the title of “ Wool and Woollen p. 217Manufactures,” it is said : “Wool is a modified form of hair, distino-uished by its slender, soft and wavy or curly structure, and by the highly imbricated or serrated surface of its filaments. The numerous varieties of the sheep are the most characteristic, as they are also by far the most important, producers of wool; but the sheep is by no means the only animal which yields wool employed for industrial purposes. The alpaca and other allied fibres obtained from the alpaca and its congeners in South America, the mohair yielded by the Angora goat and the soft, woolly hair of the camel are all wools of much industrial importance, while the most costly wool in the world is that yielded by the Cashmere goat of the Himalayan Mountains. At what point indeed it can be said that an animal fibre ceases to be hair and becomes wool it is impossible to determine, because in every characteristic the one class by imperceptible gradations merges into the other, so that a continuous chain can be formed from the finest and softest merino to the rigid bristles of the wild boar.” G. A. 2834; Lyon v. United States, 8 U. S. App. 409, 413.
But the acts of 1890 and 1894, as well as prior tariff acts, distinguished the wool of the sheep from the hair of the camel, goat and other like animals, as raw materials. And there is nothing in this record from which to conclude that Congress felt obliged to make concessions by way of alleviating the effect of the act of 1894 on the production of the hair of the camel, the goat, the alpaca, and so on, in this country, or on manufactures thereof.
We think that the words “ manufactures of wool,” in paragraph 297, had relation to the raw material out of which the articles were made, and that as the material of worsted dress goods was wool, such goods fell within the paragraph.
Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed; judgment of the Circuit Court also reversed, and the cause remanded to that court with a direction to affirm, the decision of the Board of General Appraisers.
BARRETT v. UNITED STATES (No. 1).
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
Argued January 21,1898. — Decided February 21,1898.
When a bill of exceptions does not contain the evidence, it is impossible for this court to know the ground on which the trial court proceeded in overruling a motion on the evidence to compel the district attorney to elect, and an exception in that regard will not be considered. In December, 1894, when the proceedings took place which are questioned
in this case, there were not two judicial districts in the State of South Carolina, to the territorial limits of each of which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States was confined.
, The legislation on this subject from the commencement of the Government reviewed.
Barrett was indicted, with others, as stated in the caption of the transcript of the record, “ at a Circuit Court of the United States for the Fourth Circuit in and for the District of South Carolina, begun and holden at Columbia in the district aforesaid, on the fourth Monday in November, 1894, before the Honorable Wm. H. Brawley, United States Judge for the District of South Carolina, holding said Circuit Court according to the form of the act of Congress in such cases made and provided,” for conspiracy to commit an offence against the United States, under sections 5440 and 5480 of the Revised Statutes, and, having been duly tried, was found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment and fine.
To review this judgment, this writ of error was prosecuted. The indictment commenced as follows:
“ United States of America, I To wit; In the Circait Oourt.
District of South Carolina, )
“ At a stated term of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina, begun and holden at Columbia, within and for the district aforesaid, on the fourth Monday of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, the jurors of the United States of America within and for the district aforesaid upon their p. 219oaths respectively do present that Charles P. Barrett, [and others naming them,] together with divers other evil-disposed persons to the jurors aforesaid unknown, late of the district aforesaid, on the first day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-two, at Spartanburg, in the State of South Carolina aforesaid, in the district aforesaid and within the jurisdiction of this court, being persons of evil minds and dispositions, wickedly devising and intending to commit the offence against the United States hereinafter set forth, fraudulently, maliciously and unlawfully did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together between and among themselves to commit against the United States this offence — etc., etc.”
Certain exceptions were taken to the action of the court in refusing to sustain a challenge to the array of both grand and petit jurors on the ground that they were drawn from both the eastern and western districts of South Carolina, when the alleged offence was charged in the indictment to have been committed in the county of Spartanburg in the western district of said State; to the order of the court overruling defendant’s dexnurrer to the indictment on the ground that the offence was charged to have been committed in the county of Spartanburg, in the State of South Carolina, the same being in the western district of said State, although the indictment was found in the city of Columbia in the county of Richland in the eastern district thereof; to the refusal of the court to sustain defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction on the ground that, although the alleged offence was charged to have been committed in the county of Spartanburg, the same being in the western district of South Carolina, the trial was sought to be had in the city of Columbia in the county of Richland, in the eastern district of said State; to the denial by the court of defendant’s motion that the district attorney be required to elect on which one of several conspiracies disclosed by the evidence to have been committed, if any, he would ask for a conviction ; and to the refusal of the court to arrest judgment because the grand jurors who found the indictment and the petit jurors who found the verdict were drawn from the p. 220western and eastern districts of South Carolina, although the offence was alleged to have been committed in the county of Spartanburg in the western district; because the indictment was found in the county of Richland in the eastern district at a time not authorized by law for the sitting of the United States court for the western district, and because the trial was had in the county of Richland in the eastern district for an offence committed in the western district.
Mr. Charles C. Lancaster for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Boyd for defendant in error.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
As to the action of the court overruling defendant’s motion on the evidence to compel the district attorney to elect, the bill of exceptions does not contain the evidence, and it is impossible for this court to know the ground on which the Circuit Court proceeded. The exception in that regard need not therefore be considered.
In respect of the other exceptions, they all present the same objection in different forms, namely, that the State of South Carolina was divided into two judicial districts, and that an indictment could not be lawfully found in the Circuit Court of the United States held in the eastern district or a trial be therein had, for a criminal offence committed in the western district.
The Constitution provides that the trial of crimes shall be had in the State “ where the crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed,” Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3; and by Amendment VI, that “ in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, p. 221which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.”
This indictment was found December 3; the trial had December 6 to 11; and the defendant sentenced December 12, 1894, in the Circuit Court in session at Columbia. Were there at that time two judicial districts in South Carolina within the intent and meaning of the Constitution and the acts of Congress in that behalf ?
The circuit court of each judicial district sits within and for that district; and its jurisdiction as a general rule is bounded by its local limits. Toland n. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 328; Devoe Manufacturing Company, Petitioner, 108 U. S. 401. At the same time courts may be required to be held at different places in a judicial district, and prosecutions for offences committed in certain counties may be required to be tried, and writs and recognizances to be returned at each place, but this does not affect the power of the grand jury sitting at either place to present indictments for offences committed anywhere within the district. Logan n. United States, 144 U. S. 263. As to where trials shall be had in a judicial district depends entirely on the legislation upon the subject. Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U. S. 257; Post n. United States, 161 U. S. 583.
By the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, the then United States were divided into thirteen districts, of which New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia and South Carolina each constituted one district, called by the name of the State, as for instance, “ South Carolina district; ” while a part of the State of Massachusetts was erected into a district “ called Maine district,” and a part of the State of Virginia into a district “ called Kentucky district,” the remaining part of the State of Massachusetts being made a district “ called Massachusetts district,” and the State of Virginia, except so much thereof as was thereby made the district of Kentucky, a district “called Virginia district.” 1 Stat. 73.
The plan was to make each of the States a judicial district, and to direct the appointment of a judge, a clerk to be p. 222appointed by him, a district attorney and a marshal, for each district. But that part of Massachusetts now constituting the State of Maine and that part of the State of Virginia now forming the State of Kentucky were erected into independent districts under the names of “ Maine District ” and “ Kentucky District,” and the district court established in each was invested with the powers of a Circuit Court.
By the fourth section these districts, “ except those of Maine and Kentucky,” were divided into three circuits, called the eastern, the middle and the southern circuits; and it was provided that circuit courts should be held “ in each district of said circuits,” by two of the justices of -the Supreme Court and “ the district judge of such districts.”
North Carolina having ratified the Constitution, November 21, 1789, Congress by the act of June 4, 1790, c. 17,1 Stat. 126, gave effect to the judiciary act of 1789 in that State, erecting it into a district to be called “North Carolina district,” establishing a district court with one judge, and annexing the district to the Southern circuit. Rhode Island having ratified the Constitution, May 29, 1790, a similar act to give effect to the judiciary act was passed June 23,1790, c. 21,1 Stat. 128, by which Rhode Island was annexed to the Eastern circuit.
From the first, then, district courts have been, in exceptional instances, vested with Circuit Court jurisdiction.
On February 21, 1823, an act was passed, c. 11, entitled “ An act to divide the State of South Carolina into two judicial districts,” as follows: “ That the State of South Carolina be, and the same is hereby divided into two districts, in manner following, that is to say: the districts of Lancaster, Chester, York, Union, Spartanburg, Greenville, Pendleton, Abbeville, Edgefield, Newberry, Laurens and Fairfield; shall compose one district, to be called the western district, and the residue of the State shall form one other district to be called the eastern district. And the terms of the said district court, for the eastern district, shall be held at Charleston, at such times as they are now directed by law to be holden. An for the trial of all such criminal and civil causes, as are by law p. 223cognizable in the district courts of the United States which may hereafter arise or be prosecuted, or sued, within the said western district, there shall be one annual session of the said district court holden at Laurens court-house, to begin on the second Monday in May in each year; to be holden by the district judge of the United States of the State of South Carolina; and he is hereby authorized and directed to hold such other special sessions as may be necessary for the despatch of the causes in the said court, at such time or times as he may deem expedient, and may adjourn such special sessions to any other time previous to a stated session.” 3 Stat. 726.
By an act approved May 25, 1824, c. 145, entitled “ An act to alter the times of holding the Circuit and District Courts of the United States for the district of South Carolina,” 4 Stat. 34, it was provided that the Circuit Court “ for the district of South Carolina” should annually be held “at Charleston on the second Tuesday of April; and at Columbia on the third Tuesday of November,” etc.; and that “ the times of holding the district court of the United States at Laurens court-house, South Carolina, shall be so altered that the said court shall hereafter convene on the Tuesday next ensuing after the adjournment of the Circuit Court of the United States at Columbia.”
On March 3, 1825, this act was amended by providing that “the Circuit Court for the district of South Carolina at Columbia, South Carolina, shall commence on the fourth Tuesday of November, annually.” 4 Stat. 124, c. 78.
By an act of May 4, 1826, c. 37, the sessions of the Circuit Court “for the District of South Carolina” were again changed, 4 Stat. 160; and again February 24, 1829, c. 19, 4 Stat. 335.
By the act of March 1, 1845, 5 Stat. 730, c. 39, it was provided, referring to the Circuit Court, “ that the spring term of said court shall be held in and for the district of South Carolina at Charleston, on the Wednesday preceding the fourth Monday of March.”
By an act approved August 16, 1856, c. 119, entitled “An p. 224act to alter the time for holding the district court in South Carolina, and for other purposes,” 11 Stat. 43, it was provided that so much of the act of May 25, 1824, as provided “for holding the District Court of the United States at Laurens court-house, South Carolina, on the Tuesday next ensuing after the adjournment of the Circuit Court of the United States at Columbia, be and the same is hereby repealed; and that in place thereof the said court shall be held at Greenville court-house, South Carolina, on the first Monday in August in each year.” And it was further provided that the jurors for said court, grand as well as petit, should be drawn “ from the inhabitants of Greenville district, South Carolina,” except that the jurors for the first term of the court should be drawn at “ the term of the district court to be holden in the city of Charleston; ” and further that “ the said district court for Greenville, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction and powers of a District Court of the United States, shall have jurisdiction of all causes (except appeals and writs of error) which now are or may be hereafter made cognizable in a Circuit Court of the United States, and shall proceed in the same manner as a Circuit Court.”
The act of July 15, 1862, c. 178, 12 Stat. 576, provided that “ the districts of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Florida, shall constitute the fifth circuit; ” and repealed the act or acts which vested circuit court powers in the district courts for the districts of Texas, Florida, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and Kansas; while by the act of March 3, 1863, c. 100, 12 Stat. 794, the districts of California and Oregon were constituted the tenth circuit; and so much of any act or acts as vested in the district courts for California and Oregon the power and jurisdiction of circuit courts was repealed.
By the act of July 23, 1866, c. 210, 14 Stat. 209, it was provided that “ the districts of Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina shall constitute the fourth circuit.”
The act of April 10, 1869, c. 22, 16 Stat. 44, authorized the appointment of a circuit judge “for each of the nine existing judicial circuits;” but that act, by the act of July 1,184O, c.
186 was not to be construed “ to require a circuit court to be held in any judicial district in which a circuit court was not required to be held by previously existing law.” 16 Stat. 179.
In the Ku Klux Cases, tried in the Circuit Court at Columbia in the fall of 1871, before Circuit Judge Bond and District Judoe Bryan, Mr. Reverdy Johnson objected to the issue of a venire to summon additional grand and petit jurors “ from the body of the district ” embracing the whole State, though he admitted that “ it is true that the circuit court has jurisdiction, as a court, over the entire district of South Carolina.” The court ruled that so far as the circuit court was concerned there was but one district in South Carolina. South Carolina Ku Klux Trials, pp. 8, 9, 10.
The Revised Statutes were adopted June 22, 1874, (the second edition being published in 1878,).and contain the following sections:
“Sec. 530. The United States shall be divided into judicial districts as follows:
“Sec. 531. The States of California, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and West Virginia, each, constitute one judicial district.”
“ Sec. 546. The State of South Carolina is divided into two districts, which shall be called the eastern and western districts of the district of South Carolina. The western district includes the counties of Lancaster, Chester, York, Union, Spartanburg, Greenville, Pendleton, Abbeville, Edgefield, Newberry, Laurens and Fairfield, as they existed February 21, 1823. The eastern district includes the residue of said State.”
“Sec. 551. A district judge shall be appointed for each district, except in the cases hereinafter provided. Every such judge shall reside in the district for which he is appointed, . . .
“ Sec. 552. There shall be appointed in each of the States of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina and Tennessee, one district judge, who shall be district judge for each of the districts included in the State for which he is appointed, and shall reside within some one of the said districts. . . .”
VOL. CLXIX—15
“ Sec. 571. The district courts for the western district of Arkansas, the eastern district of Arkansas at Helena, the northern district of Mississippi, the western district of South Carolina and the district of West Virginia, shall have in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of district courts, jurisdiction of all causes, except appeals and writs of error, which are cognizable in a circuit court, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court.
“ Sec. 572. The regular terms of the district courts shall be held at the times and places following: ... In the eastern district of South Carolina, at Charleston, on the first Monday in January, May, July and October. In the western district, at Greenville, on the first Monday in August.”
“ Sec. 604. The judicial districts of the United States are divided into nine circuits as follows: . . . Fourth. The Fourth Circuit includes the districts of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina. . . .”
“ Sec. 608. Circuit courts are established as follows: One for the three districts of Alabama, one for the eastern district of Arkansas, one for the southern district of Mississippi and one for each district in the States not herein named; and shall be called the circuit courts for the districts for which they are established.”
“ Sec. 658. The regular terms of the circuit courts shall be held in each year, at the times and places following. . . : In the district of South Carolina, at Charleston, on the first Monday in April; and at Columbia, on the fourth Monday in November.”
“ Sec. 767. There shall be appointed in each district, except in the middle district of Alabama, and the northern district of Georgia, and the western district of South Carolina, a person learned in the law, to act as attorney for the United States in such district. . . . The district attorney of the eastern district of South Carolina shall perform the duties of district attorney for the western district of said State.”
Section 776 makes similar provision as to United States marshals for said districts.
“ Sec. 563. The district courts shall have jurisdiction as follows:
“First. Of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, . . . the punishment of which is not capital. . . •
“ Sec. 629. The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: . . . Exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where it is or may be otherwise provided by law, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of crimes and offences cognizable therein.”
The Revised Statutes were compiled under an act of June 27,1866, c. 140, providing “ for the revision and consolidation of the statute laws of the United States,” 14 Stat. 74, the appointment of three commissioners being thereby authorized to accomplish the work. These commissioners were directed to arrange the statutes and parts of statutes “under titles, chapters and sections, or other suitable divisions and subdivisions, with headnotes briefly expressive of the matter contained in such divisions; also with side notes so drawn as to point to the contents of the text and with references to the original text from which each section is compiled.”
By the act of March 2, 1877, c. 82, 19 Stat. 268, the preparation and publication of a new edition of the Revised Statutes was provided for, the work to be done by a single commissioner, who was required to add to the marginal references made in the previous revision.
In United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 626, we said : “ If there be any ambiguity in section 5467, inasmuch as it is a section of the Revised Statutes, which are merely a compilation of the statutes of the United States, revised, simplified, arranged and consolidated, resort may be had to the original statute from which this section was taken to ascertain what, if any, change of phraseology there is and whether such change should be construed as changing the law. United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 513; United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33; Myer n. Car Company, 102 U- 8. 1, 11. Ami is saij that this is especially so where the act authorizing the revision directs marginal references p. 228as is the case here. 19 Stat. c. 82, § 2, p. 268; Endlich on Int. Statutes, § 51.”
Section 546 appears under “Title XIII. The Judiciary. Chapter one. Judicial Districts; ” and the cross-reference in the margin is to the act of “ 21 Feb. 1823, c. 11, § 1, v. 3 p. 726.”
When, then, Congress enacted this section it seems to have construed the act of 1823, not as dividing the State into two judicial districts, as indicated in the title of the act, but into two districts in the sense of geographical divisions, which is in harmony with the language used in the body of the act. At all events, the phraseology of section 546 is only consistent with the conclusion that the State constituted but one judicial district, containing two divisions, which were “ called the eastern and western districts of the district of South Carolina.”
And it should be remembered that there was, during all this time, (and this has prevailed from thence hitherto,) but one judge, one attorney and one marshal for the district of South Carolina.
It is said that in the first draft of the commission to revise the statutes, the commissioners recommended the adoption of a section corresponding to section 546, in this language: “The district of South Carolina is divided into two divisions, which will be called the eastern and western divisions of the district of South Carolina. The western division includes the counties of Lancaster, etc., as they existed February 21, 1823. The eastern division includes the residue of said State.” And it is argued that because section 546 was couched in its present language, notwithstanding the recommendation, that it therefore follows that Congress intended to divide the State into two judicial districts. We cannot concur in that view. While the use of the word “ division ” might have been more felicitous, yet we think the meaning of the statute was sufficiently plain, and that it would be inadmissible to recur to the draft of the commissioners to create a doubt where none existed. Moreover, it would be a much greater stretch of construction to say that because Congress did not see fit to use the word “ division,” therefore it should be held that the p. 229words actually employed, “of the district of South Carolina,” were inadvertently inserted, and should be rejected altogether.
It should be noted that by section 608 Circuit Courts were established for each district in the States not therein named, the States specified being Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi and yet that by section 571 certain district courts, including that for the western district of South Carolina, retained circuit court powers.
Nevertheless, it was held by Chief Justice Waite, sitting with Judge Bond in the Circuit Court in 1877: “ As to the question of the jurisdiction of this court throughout the entire State of South Carolina, we decide, for the purposes of this trial, in favor of the jurisdiction. This is in accordance with the uniform practice of the court, without objection from any quarter, for nearly half a century.” United States n. Butler, 1 Hughes, 457, 463.
And in 1886, it was said by Simonton, J., holding the Circuit Court: “All parts of the State of South Carolina are within the jurisdiction of this court. Its process runs all through the State. It does not know, in the sense which affects its jurisdiction, either the eastern or western district.” Young v. Merchant^ Ins. Co., 29 Fed. R.ep. 273, 275.
However we are relieved from considering the effect upon the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court having jurisdiction throughout a State, constituting a single judicial district, of a part of the district being subjected to the jurisdiction of the district court clothed with circuit court powers, as the act of February 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 Stat. 655, in terms “established a circuit court of the United States in and for the western district of Arkansas, the northern district of Mississippi and the western district of South Carolina, respectively, as the said districts are now constituted by law ; ” and withdrew circuit court powers from said district courts.
By the act of April 26, 1890, c. 165, 26 Stat. 71, it was provided that there should be “ four regular terms of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina in each year, as follows: In the city of Greenville on the p. 230first Monday of February and on the first Monday in August; in the city of Charleston on the first Monday of April; and in the city of Columbia on the fourth Monday of November;” and that “ the office of the clerk of said court shall be kept in the cities of Charleston and of Greenville, and the clerk shall reside in one of the said cities and shall have a deputy in the other.” And although the act then went on to prescribe terms “ of the District Courts for the Eastern District of South Carolina,” and “of the District Court in the Western District of South Carolina,” we think the operation of the prior sections was not thereby affected.
It may be added that in the legislative, executive and judicial appropriation act of May 28, 1896, c. 252, §§ 7, 9, appropriations were made for the salaries (among others) of the United States district attorney “ for the eastern and western districts of the district of South Carolina,” and of the United States marshal “ for the eastern and western districts of the district of South Carolina.” 29 Stat. 140.
From this review of the statutes we are unable to arrive at any other conclusion than that in 1894, when these proceedings were had, there were not two judicial districts in the State of South Carolina, to the territorial limits of each of which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was confined; and that the exceptions in this.regard must be held not to have been well taken.
It is also suggested in the brief for plaintiff in error that error supervened in that the record does not affirmatively show the issue of the venire for the grand and petit juries; nor that the defendant was arraigned; nor that he was personally present when the verdict was rendered and sentence pronounced.
But the record does show that the indictment was duly returned ; that motions to quash the indictment and the venire of grand and petit juries were made and overruled; that the defendant pleaded “ not guilty ” to said indictment; that the trial came on on that issue, and a petit jury was duly empanelled and sworn; that trial was had and a verdict of guilty returned, and sentence thereon entered; and that no exceptions p. 231were saved to any of these proceedings other than the exceptions before mentioned.
The result is that the judgment must be
Affirmed.