Graves v. United States, 165 U.S. 323 (1897)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Graves v. United States, 165 U.S. 323 (1897)
Full caption
GRAVES v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 15, 1897
GRAVES v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.
No. 31. Argued January 4, 5, 1897. —Decided February 15, 1897.
When the managers of a national bank make arrangements with depositors in the bank to give them credit at the bank for larger sums than appear upon the credit side of their accounts up to specified amounts and for a fixed time, and the proper officers of the bank make entries thereof in the books of the bank in good faith and in the belief that they have a right so to do, such an entry is not a false entry within the meaning of that term as used in Rev. Stat. § 5209, and the person so making it is not guilty of a violation of that statute in so doing.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. C. C. Cole for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Whitney for defendants in terror.
Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff in error was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, under section 5209 of the Revised Statutes, of making false entries in certain reports in regard to the condition of the Commercial National Bank of Dubuque, of which he was president.
The indictment contained sixteen counts, all but six of which were taken from the jury, .the remaining counts being the fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth.
The fourth and seventh counts relate to the making of alleged false entries in the returns made respectively on the 5th days of August and October, 1887. Those counts (each relating to one of the two returns) charged that the plaintiff m error falsely understated the amount of overdrafts paid by the bank and remaining unpaid to it on the date mentioned in the count.
The ninth and tenth counts relate to the same reports, and each count charges that the plaintiff in error falsely overstated the amount of loans and discounts which the bank had made and which stood on its books at the date mentioned, the claim in fact being that, as to the sum of about $20,000 contained in the item of “ loans and discounts,” the return was a false statement.
The point in dispute is in regard to which heading of the returns the items amounting to about $20,000 should have been placed under; whether they should have been treated as overdrafts or as loans and discounts.
The proof regarding these four counts shows that there are in substance two charges of making false entries under the two heads of “ overdrafts ” and “ loans and discounts ” in the returns dated respectively August and October, 1887.
The fifth and eighth counts relate to the making of entries alleged to have been false in the returns for the same two quarters, and relating to the liabilities of the directors, it being therein charged that those liabilities were stated in each report at a sum much less than the actual fact required it.
The plaintiff in error having been duly arraigned upon the indictment, pleaded not guilty, and was placed on trial at a term of the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, Eastern Division, held in December, 1892, and was convicted upon the counts above mentioned.
In the course of the trial and for the purpose of proving the guilt of the accused under the fourth count, the Government gave evidence that from the books of the bank there appeared under the head of loans and discounts, on August 1, 1887, the sum of $490,133.78; that the plaintiff in error was the president of the bank and as such signed the quarterly report to the Comptroller of the Currency as to the condition of the bank at the time last named; that under the head of loans and discounts he placed in the report to the Comptroller the sum of $551,048.60, which, as is seen, is an increase of about sixty thousand dollars over the amount as shown by the bank’s books on that date. One of the items going to make up this increase was the sum of $20,465.00, and this sum was [p. 325] part of a sum of $23,413.38 appearing in the bank’s books to have been drawn out by certain depositors in excess of the amounts appearing in such accounts to their credit. In this way it appeared on the books of the bank that there were overdrafts, on the above date, to the extent of $23,413.38. In the return to the Comptroller the amount of overdrafts was stated to have been, at the close of business on the 1st of August, 1887, $2948.38, when in truth, as is alleged, it was the sum above named, $23,413.38. The amount taken from the above item of overdrafts was placed by the plaintiff in error in the same report under the head of loans and discounts, thus increasing that sum by that amount. Other items were placed under that heading so as to make up the difference between the $490,000.00 and the $551,000.00 as above stated. The Government claims the plaintiff in error had no right to take those items amounting to over $20,000 from the heading “overdrafts” and place them under that of “loans and discounts,” and that an intentional act of that kind was a violation of the statute, if meant to deceive. The plaintiff in error urged that he had the legal right to do as he did, and upon being called to the witness stand he testified substantially as follows:
“Certain overdrafts were classified and were put in the reports as loans and discounts, because the different persons making such overdrafts had spoken to the managers of the bank and obtained permission to make the same. Those overdrafts which had not been arranged for were reported as overdrafts. Those that were included in loans and discounts were accounts that had been arranged for and permission asked to overdraw. In other accounts treated as overdrafts were those where the person drew his check in advance without asking permission, and when this was done it was treated as an overdraft. Where they asked permission to overdraw and such permission was granted it was classified as a loan. The overdraft made upon permission of the bank was treated as a loan. The reports severally contained the overdrafts treated as a part of the loans and discounts, while the others were classed in the reports as overdrafts. (The witness names the persons [p. 326] whose accounts were included in the loans and discounts, and each of whom had permission and had arranged for the overdraft; also the names and amounts of those whose accounts were overdrawn.)
“ All these matters were brought before the board in detail. Explanations of the permission to overdraw were made to the board at their meetings. Each and all those accounts included in the loans and discounts had permission to overdraw and had arranged therefor. A classified list of overdrafts, showing the book loans and overdrafts proper, was laid before the directors at each of their meetings. A loan in the form of an overdraft account was classified as book loan and the others as overdrafts. They were presented to the directors in two lists; one headed as book loans and the other as overdrafts; and in this way they were presented to the board of directors at each of their meetings. Those persons having book loans were o»ranted them for different reasons. The book loans were made to parties who had been to the bank and made arrangements to overdraw. The overdrafts were where checks were presented and paid without any arrangement or authority for the drawers to overdraw their accounts. Where an account had been overdrawn at first without permission, and parties thereafter made arrangement for its continuance for a few days, it was classed under the heading book loans.”
Explanations of his action were given in regard to the other items in the report to the Comptroller, making up the sixty thousand dollar increase of loans and discounts, the sufficiency of which it is not necessary here to discuss. It appears from the reasons stated by the plaintiff in error for changing the amounts of “ loans and discounts ” and “ overdrafts,” that the items making up the $20,000 were regarded by him as a loan by the bank and not an overdraft; and although it appeared from an examination of the individual accounts of depositors in the bank that more money had been drawn by certain of them than stood to their credit on the books of the bank, yet he thought this did not necessarily show that the excess of the draft over the amount of the credit was an overdraft, but that where the overdrafts had been arranged for by the [p. 327] depositors with the managers of the bank and consent been given by them that such overdrafts should be made and would be honored to the amount agreed upon, such a transaction amounted to a loan and not an overdraft. Under these circumstances the court charged the jury, among other things, as follows:
“ The farther question remains as to this ‘ loans and discount ’ entry in the report to the Comptroller, did the defendant make a false entry in such report, when he entered as ‘ loans and discounts ’ the farther sum of $20,465, which he has testified before you is composed of part of the overdrafts that day shown by the books of the bank to exist in the accounts of various depositors whose names he has given you ? It will be convenient to consider this question in connection with the farther charge in the indictment, with reference to said report of August 1, 1887, that defendant made a false entry in said report as to overdrafts.
“The proof shows that the amount of overdrafts entered in said report was the aggregate of $2948.38, and defendant has testified before you that the aggregate overdrafts upon that day, as shown by the books of the bank was the sum of $23,413.38, so that the books of the bank at the close of business on August 1, 1887, show an aggregate of overdrafts in excess of that entered in said report of $20,463. In other words, while the books of the bank, in the progress of their regular keeping from day to day, showed the accounts of its depositors to be then overdrawn in the aggregate of $23,413.38, the entry in the report to the Comptroller as to the condition of overdrafts that day was $20,465, less than shown by the books, and the entry in such report was the sum of $2948.38.
“ You will have noticed that this difference ($20,465) is the exact amount which defendant testifies he entered from or took from the overdraft account of the books of the bank, and put into the entry in the report as to ‘ loans and discounts.’ And the matter may be thus stated: If defendant rightly did this; that is, if in so doing he made a report to the Comptroller of the true condition of the bank, he did not then make a false entry in these particulars. But if the entry in [p. 328] reporting the overdraft that day as $2948.38 instead of $23,413.38, was not a truthful entry, then it would naturally follow that the entry in the ‘ loans and discounts ’ of said $20,465 of overdrafts was also not a truthful entry. For this sum of $20,465 of overdrafts could not have been truthfully entered in both overdrafts and loans and discounts. In which did a truthful entry of the condition of the bank require it to be entered ?
“ Now there is no difficulty in understanding what an overdraft is. There is no conflict in the testimony on this point. The books of the bank as testified to by defendant and by all the witnesses, and as themselves in evidence before you, show that an overdraft occurs whenever a depositor overdraws the amount of his deposit. I deposit in a bank a thousand dollars subject to be checked out. I commence to check it out. And whenever the amount of my checks paid by the bank exceeds the amount of the funds I have deposited, an overdraft occurs in my account, and such overdraft is the amount the bank has thus paid, over and beyond the amount I have deposited.
“ Where then in the report to the Comptroller should these overdrafts appear? You will find upon looking at the report made to the Comptroller that it contains a heading called ‘ Overdrafts.’ This heading is ‘ Overdrafts,’ plainly and simply, and without more, ‘ overdrafts.’ This is the form the Comptroller has prescribed and which it was the duty of the defendant to follow and to enter correctly and truthfully whenever he made an entry in said report with regard to the condition of the bank as to overdrafts.
“ Counsel for defendant have argued to you that an overdraft is, in fact, a loan, and that, therefore, the defendant was justified in including ‘overdrafts’ in ‘loans and discounts.’ But the Comptroller demanded that the bank should report ‘overdrafts’ in one place in the report, as well as ‘loans’ in another place. Defendant assumed to report ‘overdrafts.’ Did he make a true entry thereof? No explanation on the report advises the Comptroller that the entry as to ‘overdrafts ’ is an impartial or incomplete entry as to ‘ overdrafts actually existing at the time the report assumed to give them.
“There is no separate heading of ‘overdrafts arranged for’ in the report.”
The effect of this charge was to tell the jury in substance that the plaintiff in error was required by the law to place under the heading “ overdrafts ” the full sum which the bank books showed had been drawn out by the depositors of the bank over and above the amounts which they had severally deposited therein; that a failure to do this was a failure to comply with the law, and that a transfer of any portion of such excess from the heading “overdrafts” to the heading “ loans and discounts ” was the making of a false entry, and under the general directions of the charge, if intentionally and wilfully made, it was a violation of the statute and a crime on the part of the plaintiff in error. It took away from the jury the right to even consider, upon the question of intent, the explanation given by the plaintiff in error for his changing the twenty thousand dollar item from under the heading “overdrafts” to that of “loans and discounts.”
If the jury believed the testimony given by the plaintiff in error in regard to the arrangements which had been made by certain depositors in the bank with its proper managers to give them credit at the bank for a larger sum than appeared on the credit side of their accounts, up to a certain amount and for a certain time, and if under such circumstances the plaintiff in error made the entries in good faith and in the belief of his right so to do, they were not false entries within the meaning of the statute, and he was not guilty of a violation thereof in making them. The charge of the learned judge substantially took away this defence and held the plaintiff in error guilty if he knowingly and wilfully placed the alleged overdrafts under the heading of loans and discounts, a fact about which there was no dispute, ignoring thereby the right of the plaintiff in error to have the jury pass upon the question whether they had been arranged for in good faith as demand loans. This charge had necessarily a prejudicial effect upon the defendant with regard to the other counts (fifth and eighth) of the indictment.
We think the court erred in the above charge, and the judgment must, therefore, be
Reversed^ and the cause remanded with instructions to grant a new trial.
Mb. Justice Harlan dissented.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. JOHNSON.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. SHECKELS.
APPEALS FROM THE COUBT OF CLAIMS.
Nos. 617, 618. Submitted January 4,1897. —Decided February 15, 1897.
The act of February 13, 1895, c. 87, 28 Stat. 664, providing that in the adjudication of the claims against the District of Columbia therein referred to, the Court of Claims should allow the rates established and paid by the board of public works, simply conferred a gratuity upon the persons covered by its provisions, which became “due and payable” only from the time when the act which gave it was passed.
The claim of the District of Columbia to offset against any recovery here, the amount of the interest from June 1, 1874, on its counterclaim found due in its favor against the claimants, cannot be admitted.
The case is stated in the opinion.
J/r. Assistant Attorney General Dodge and Mr. Special Assistant Attorney Howard for appellants.
Mr. J. J. Johnson for Johnson, appellee,
Mr. W. L. Cole for Sheckels, appellee.
Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opinion of the court.
•
These are appeals from the Court of Claims which gave judgments in favor of the appellees in actions commenced by them in December, 1880, pursuant to the provisions of the act [p. 331] of June 16, 1880, c. 243,21 Stat. 284, entitled “ An act to provide for the settlement of all outstanding claims against the District of Columbia, and conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear the same, and for other purposes.” 31 C. Cl. 395.
The actions relate to work done under various contracts with the authorities of the District of Columbia between 1871 and 1876. These contracts were a few among a very large number of others, entered into with the authorities of the District of Columbia by many different persons, and relating to improvements then in contemplation and partly in course of completion in the city of Washington. Those in question here were originally made with one Peter McNamara, in or about the year 1872, for work in the nature of grading, sewering and filling various streets in that city. The contracts were in writing and stated the specific prices which were agreed upon for the various items of work to be performed under the contract.
At the time when these contracts were entered into, an act of Congress, approved February 21, 1871, c. 62, 16 Stat. 419, forbade the municipal authorities to contract except in writing, and forbade the allowance of extra compensation for work done under a written contract. Notwithstanding this legislative prohibition the board of public works then existing, without authority and in plain violation of the terms of the act,, raised the prices agreed to be paid under the contracts with McNamara to what are called “ board rates ”, (that is, rates, allowed by the board of public works), the effect of which was to enormously increase the cost of the work done under them. In this way the work upon the improvements went on until in 1874, when Congress, by an act approved June 20, of that year, c. 337, 18 Stat. 116, abolished the District government and substituted another in its stead. The sixth section of the act constituted the First and Second Comptrollers of the Treasury of the United States a board of audit for the settlement of all unfunded or floating debts of the District of Columbia and of the board of public works as specified in such section, and the section further provided that .the board of [p. 332] audit should issue to each claimant a certificate signed by the board and countersigned by the comptroller of the District, stating the amount found to be due to each and on what account.
The seventh section of the act provided that the sinking fund commissioners of the District should cause bonds of the District of Columbia to be prepared, bearing date August 1,1874, and payable 50 years thereafter, with interest at the rate of Per cenk Per annum, payable semi-annually, which bonds the sinking fund commissioners were authorized to exchange at par for like sums for any class of indebtedness named in the preceding sixth section, including certificates of the auditing board provided in the act. The section contained the following statement: “ And the faith of the United States is hereby pledged that the United States will by proper proportional appropriations, as contemplated in this act, and by causing to be levied upon the property within said District such taxes as will do so, provide the revenues necessary to pay the interest on said bonds as the same may become due and payable, and create a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof at maturity.”
By general resolution, approved March 14, 1876, 19 Stat. 211, Congress abolished the board of audit, and forbade the further issue of bonds.
By another act, approved June 11, 1878, c. 180, 20 Stat. 102, 104, 105, a permanent government was established for the District of Columbia, and in it the commissioners were required to annually make assessments for all expenses of the District, which, upon being submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by him, were to be laid before Congress; and it was then provided that “to the extent to which Congress shall approve of said assessments, Congress shall appropriate the amount of 50 per centum thereof, and the remaining 50 per centum of such approved assessments shall be levied and assessed upon the taxable property and privileges in said District other than the property of the United States and of the District of Columbia.” In this manner Congress assumed the payment of a portion of the bonds and expenses of the District.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. JOHNSON. 333:
Under the authority of these statutes, the bonds of the District of Columbia, carrying interest at the rate of 3^57 percent were issued and used to a certain extent in the payment of the indebtedness of the District incurred as above mentioned. In 1880 there still remained outstanding many certificates, which had been delivered by the board of audit under the sixth section of the act of 1874, and many accounts against the District were also outstanding and unprovided for.
On the 16th of June, 1880, Congress passed “An act to provide for the settlement of all outstanding claims against the District of Columbia, and conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear the same, and for other purposes.” c. 243, 21 Stat. 284. That act conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims in regard to all such claims against the District of Columbia as then existed, arising out of contracts made by the late board of public works and extensions thereof, and to-other claims mentioned in the section; and the act conferred upon the court the same power and provided that it should proceed in the same manner and should be governed by the same rules in respect to the mode of hearing, determination and adjudication of claims as in those against the United States.
The second section provided that the claims should be prosecuted by the contractor, his personal representative or his assignee, in the same manner and subject to the same rules, so far as applicable, as claims against the United States are prosecuted therein. Judgments were to be entered, and for the payment thereof the sixth section provided as follows:
“The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to demand of the sinking fund commissioner of the District of Columbia so many of the three sixty-five bonds authorized by act of Congress approved June twentieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, and acts amendatory thereof, as may be necessary for the payment of the judgments; and said sinking fund commissioner is hereby directed to issue and deliver to the Secretary of the Treasury the amount of three sixty-five bonds required to satisfy the judgments; which bonds shall be received by said claimant at par in payment of such judgments, and shall bear date August first, eighteen hundred and seventy- [p. 334] four, and mature at the same time as other bonds of this issue: Provided, That before the delivery of such bonds as are issued in payment of judgments rendered as aforesaid on the claims aforesaid the coupons shall be detached therefrom from the date of said bonds to the day upon which such claims were due and payable; and the gross amount of such bonds heretofore and hereafter issued shall not exceed in the aggregate fifteen millions of dollars: Provided, The bonds issued by authority of this act shall be of no more binding force as to their payment on the Government of the United States than the three sixty-five bonds issued under authority of the act of June twentieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-four.”
The mode of payment thus provided for was changed subsequently by a provision in the act approved March 3,1881, c. 134, 21 Stat. 458, 466, as follows:
“The Treasurer of the United States, as ex officio sinking fund commissioner, is hereby authorized, whenever in his opinion it will be more advantageous for the District of Columbia to do so, to sell the bonds authorized to be issued under the provisions of the sixth section of the act of the Congress of the United States, entitled 1 An act to provide for the settlement of all outstanding claims against the District of Columbia, and conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear the same, and for other purposes,’ approved June sixteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty, for the satisfaction of the judgments which may be rendered by said Court of Claims under the provisions of said act, and pay the said judgments from the proceeds of said sales, instead of delivering to said judgment claimants the said bonds as provided for in said act.”
A large number of actions were brought against the District under these statutes, and among them the two actions in question. They were brought by the executrix of McNamara and by the assignee of a portion of his claim against the District for the purpose of recovering payment of the balance alleged to be due under the various contracts which McNamara had secured from the municipal authorities. They were consolidated into one action on motion of the Attorney General, and proceeded to trial before a referee. The referee found upon [p. 335] the trial a certain amount due the claimants by reason of the work done under the contracts mentioned in the actions. He also found that there was due from the McNamara estate to the defendant, the District of Columbia, over and above the sum due from the District of Columbia to such estate, the amount of $6694.41, being the excess which had been paid to McNamara at “ board rates” for work done under his contracts, and which sum was over and above the amount which was due him at the rates provided for in his contracts, and the referee further found that such amount was due to the defendant as a counterclaim June 1, 1874, with interest from that date. The report of the referee having been filed was excepted to by claimants, but the defendant took no exception to the report, and there the matter rested until after the passage of the act of February 13, 1895, c. 87, 28 Stat. 664.
Prior to the passage of that act many of those contractors in whose favor “ board rates ” had been allowed instead of the prices which were contained in the contracts executed by them had brought suits against the District of Columbia of a nature similar to the two suits now here, and had based their claims as to the balance due them with reference to the board rates allowed for work under the contracts instead of the prices named in such contracts. These claims had been held to be illegal, and the District of Columbia had successfully defended the actions and had succeeded in obtaining judgments allowing counterclaims in its favor for the difference between the prices as named in the contracts and those which had been paid by the board. The Court of Claims had decided many cases to that effect, among which are those of Roche, 18 C. Cl. 217, Barnard, 20 C. Cl. 257, Barnes, 22 C. Cl. 366, and Eslin, 22 C. Cl. 160, and 29 C. Cl. 370. This court had held the same proposition in Barnard v. District of Columbia, 127 U. 8. 409. The ground upon which the recovery on the counterclaim had been allowed was the illegality of altering the prices named in the contracts and of paying any greater sums for the work contracted to be done than was provided for in the written contracts, and payments beyond those sums were held to have been illegal.
Prior to the passage of the act of 1895, therefore, it is undisputed there was no claim, legal or equitable, which the parties could successfully maintain against the District of Columbia for the recovery at board rates for work done under written contracts with the municipal authorities, but such work could only be legally paid for at the prices named in the various contracts for such work.
Under the statute of 1880, it had been customary for the Court of Claims in deciding questions arising in this class of cases to state the day upon which the claims awarded by it had become due and payable, so that under the sixth section of the act of 1880, if payment were to be made in the 3^ bonds, the coupons thereon might be detached from the date of the bonds to the date upon which the claims were by the judgment of the court found to have been due and payable. If instead of paying judgments by the delivery of the bonds as provided for in the act of 1880, the Treasurer of the United States proceeded under the act of March 3, 1881, to sell the bonds, he might do so, and with the proceeds pay the judgments rendered by the Court of Claims.
Matters were in this condition when the act of February 13, 1895, was passed, which provided as follows, 28 Stat. 664:
“ That in the adjudication of claims brought under the provisions of the act entitled ‘An act to provide for the settlement of all outstanding claims against the District of Columbia, and conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear the same, and for other purposes,’ approved the sixteenth of June, eighteen hundred and eighty (Twenty-first Statutes at Large, page two hundred and eighty-four), the Court of Claims shall allow the rates established and paid by the board of public works; and whenever said rates have not been allowed, the claimant or his personal representative shall be entitled, on motion made within sixty days after the passage of this act, to a new trial of such cause.”
Under this act these claimants again presented their cases to the Court of Claims (no judgment having been entered upon the previous finding of the referee that the estate was indebted to the District), and thereupon the court granted [p. 337] judgment to the administrator of McNamara and to the executrix of his assignee, respectively, by allowing the claimants compensation for work done under the contracts at the rates established and paid by the board of public works (instead of the contract prices), and the court held as a conclusion of law that those sums which were thus allowed by virtue of the act of 1895 were, according to its true intent and meaning, due and payable, one portion to the administrator of McNamara, February 1, 1872, and another portion February 1,1876, and still another portion to the executrices of Theodore Sheckels, assignee, April 1, 1878. The effect of the finding is to allow interest on these sums secured under the provisions of the act of 1895, for about twenty years.
The claim of the appellant is that the amount allowed by the Court of Claims did not, as a matter of law, become due or payable until after the passage of the act of February 13, 1895, and the granting of a judgment by virtue of that act. The appellant further insists that, although the effect of the act was to extinguish its counterclaim so far as the principal sum was concerned, yet, as the referee found that principal sum was due the defendant, with interest from June 1, 1874, the claim for interest itself was not so extinguished, and that such interest should have been allowed as a counterclaim against the claim made by the estate of the contractor against the appellant.
In the opinion of the Court *of Claims delivered in these cases it is conceded, and, indeed, there is no dispute in regard to it, that the finding of the referee was correct at the time he made it, as to the amount of the counterclaim legally existing in favor of the defendant and against the claimants, and the only ground upon which that finding can be attacked is based upon the act of February 13,1895. The question, therefore, is as to the effect of that act. Did this enactment so far change existing facts and law as not only to permit a recovery of the board rates instead of the contract rates, but did it also make that sum “ due and payable ” 20 years before its passage ? Under the holdings of the Court of Claims and of this court, it is perfectly apparent that the result of the passage of the act
VOL. CLXV—22
of 1895 was simply to bestow a pure gratuity to the amount of the difference between the contract price and the board rates upon those persons included within its provisions. There is no element of a legal or an equitable claim within the proper meaning and signification of those words on the part of any of those who will profit by the act of 1895, against the municipal authorities of the District. That act bestowed a pure and simple gift.
Those who are to profit by it are those who had entered into a fair and legal written contract with the District authorities to do certain work at prices named in the contract and at a time when a law of Congress prohibited the granting of any extra compensation for contract work, and when it provided that all contracts should be in writing, signed by the parties making the same, and a copy thereof filed in the office of the secretary of the District. Viewed in the light of a gratuity, a gift, wholly without consideration, the statute itself must receive a strict construction; not such a construction as will prevent the fair meaning thereof from taking effect, but such as shall not be enlarged by inferences or implications not plainly to be drawn from the language of the act.
The United States has pledged its faith for the payment of claims arising out of these transactions when properly proved. Unless, therefore, the claim for interest against the government is clear and beyond question, it must be denied. Interest is not to be collected from thé government in the absence of language specially providing for its payment. United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 565 ; United States v. Verdier, 164 U. S. 213. We are unable to see how it can be correctly stated that the claims in question became “ due and payable ” at the time of the completion of the work under these contracts more than twenty years ago, when it is conceded that but for the passage of the act of 1895 there was no legal or valid claim whatever, and that the right to any recovery depends upon the language used in that act. The statute of 1895 simply, as we have said, conferred a gratuity upon the persons covered by its provisions, and the reasonable construction of such an act is to say that the gratuity thus given becomes “ due and payable ” only [p. 339] from the time when the act which gave it was passed. To make the amount of the gratuity thus given “ due and payable” twenty years before the passage of the act giving it, so as thereby to allow interest from that time upon the amount of such gratuity, requires the clearest and most certain expression of legislative will to that effect. We do not find any such expression in the act here under consideration. Although it permits the Court of Claims to allow the rates used and paid by the board of public works, yet as that allowance is a mere gift, the further burden of twenty years’ interest on it should not be added to the gift without the use of the very plainest language.
For these reasons we think the Court of Claims erred in holding that any portion of the moneys which might be due the claimants, and which arose by virtue of the act of 1895, became due and payable at any time before the passage of that act.
The claim of the appellant to offset against any recovery here, the amount of the interest from June 1, 1874, on its counterclaim found due in its favor against the claimants, in the report of the referee, we think cannot be admitted. The effect of the passage of the act of 1895 is in substance the same as if the counterclaim, which is the principal sum, had been paid, and when that is the case the interest becomes thereby extinguished. Pacific Railroad v. United States, 158 U. S. 118.
These views lead us to the conclusion that the judgments of the Court of Claims must be
Reversed, and the cases remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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