Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297 (1896)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Marks v. United States, 161 U.S. 297 (1896)
Full caption
MARKS v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 2, 1896
MARKS v. UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 852. Argued November 12,1895. — Decided March 2,1896.
When a petition filed in the Court of Claims alleges that a depredation was committed by an Indian or Indians belonging to a tribe in amity with the United States, it becomes the duty of that court to inquire as to the truth of that allegation, and its truth is not determined by the mere existence of a treaty between the United States and the tribe, or by the fact that such treaty has never been formally abrogated by a declaration of war on the part of either, but the inquiry is whether, as a matter of fact, the tribe was at the time, as a tribe, in a state of actual peace with the United States: and if it appears that the depredation was committed by a single individual, or a few individuals without the consent and against the knowledge of the tribe, the court may proceed to investigate the amount of the loss, and render judgment therefor; but if, on the other hand, the tribe, as a tribe, was engaged in actual hostilities with the United States, the judgment of the Court of Claims must be that the allegation of the
Counsel for Appellants.
petition is not sustained, and that the claim is not one within its prov ince to adjudicate.
Johnson v. United States, 160 U. S. 546, affirmed to the point that, by clause 2 of section 1 of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, 26 Stat. 851, the juris diction of the Court of Claims was limited to claims which, on March 3, 1885, had either been examined and allowed by the Department of the Interior, or were then pending therein for examination.
On July 8,1891, appellants, as claimants, filed their petition in the Court of Claims under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, 26 Stat. 851, to recover the sum of eleven thousand eight hun dred dollars, the value of certain personal property charged to have been taken and destroyed by the Bannock and Piute Indians during the month of June, 1878, in Happy Valley, in the State of Oregon. Subsequently they filed an amended petition. In that it was alleged that the Bannock and the Piute Indians were “in amity with the United States” at the time of the taking and destruction of the property; that they were “ chargeable for said depredation and under an obliga tion to pay for the same by reason of the provisions of the treaty of July 3, 1868, between the United States and the Shoshone (Eastern Band) and the Bannock tribe of Indians;” and further, that petitioners “ presented their said claim to the Hon. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, No. 4915, July 27,1888, for payment, but the same has not been returned or paid for.” A traverse having been filed by the government, the case was submitted to the court, which, on February 27, 1893, made a finding of facts, and thereon entered judgment dismissing the petition. 28 C. Cl. 147. The seventh finding of fact was as follows:
“ From these facts, the court finds the ultimate fact, so far as it is a question of fact, that the tribes or bands of Piute and Bannock Indians were not in amity with the United States at the time the depredations complained of were committed.”
From the judgment thus entered in favor of the defendants the claimants duly appealed to this court.
Mr. A. H. Garland and Hr. Charles A. Keigwin for appel lants. Mr. William ß. Matthews and Mr. JR. C. Garland were on their brief.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Howry for appellees.
Mr. Justice Brewer, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case, like that of Johnson v. United /States, 160 U. S. 546, recently decided, involves a construction of the Indian Depredation Act of March 3, 1891. The particular language to be considered is that found in the first clause of the act, which grants to the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims for property “destroyed by Indians belonging to any band, tribe, or nation, in amity with the United States.” The sev enth finding negatives the existence of amity, and if this stood alone there would be no room for discussion. But, as appears from its terms, it is based upon a series of facts stated in detail in prior findings, and is also to be taken in connec tion with the treaty entered into between the United States and the Bannock tribe of Indians of July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673, which contains, among other provisions, the following:
“ If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depredation upon the person or property of any one, white, black or Indian, subject to the authority of the United States, and at peace therewith, the Indians herein named solemnly agree that they will, on proof made to their agent and notice by him, deliver up the wrongdoer to the United States, to be tried and punished according to its laws; and in case they wilfully refuse so to do, the person injured shall be reimbursed for his loss from the annuities or other moneys due or to become due to them under this or other treaties made with the United States. And the President, on advising with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, shall prescribe such rules and regulations for ascertaining damages under the provisions of this article as in his judgment may be proper. But no such damages shall be adjusted and paid until thoroughly examined and passed upon by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and no one sustaining loss while violating or because of his violat ing the provisions of this treaty or the laws of the United States shall be reimbursed therefor.”
Turning to the prior findings, it is stated in the second that “ the Bannock and Piute Indians made a raid ” in which the property in controversy was destroyed, and also that “the Indians numbered between five hundred and six hundred, and were in a body or band moving in concert, having the form of an Indian military organization.” Other findings (which consist largely of telegrams and reports from various officers of the army and other officials, narrating at length a series of military operations during the years 1877 and 1878, which documents are by section 4 of the act of 1891 made competent evidence, and which are too voluminous to be copied into this opinion) show that what was done by the Indians was done by them as tribes, and not by a single individual, or a few in opposition to the will of the tribes. They show that these Indians were actually engaged in hostility, and that they were finally conquered and captured only by the military forces of the United States. Indeed, counsel for the claimants practi cally admit this, for in their brief it is stated “ that at various times in the spring of 1878 small bands left the reservation for the sake of obtaining food, until finally the majority of the tribe were absent; that in the month of June, 1878, the absentees began killing white people, after which date the several bodies of Indians carried on a raid over a large area in Idaho and Oregon, which was finally checked by the efforts of troops of the United States; that the troops were more or less actively engaged in suppressing the outbreak until the latter part of August, 1878; and that the Indians were captured and returned to their reservation shortly after the last-named date.”
Their contention is rather that actual hostilities may exist without war between two nations ; that war is a political status, and to be determined by the political department of the government, by matter of record, and never by oral testi mony; that it is not pretended that there was ever any formal declaration of war by either the Bannock tribe of Indians or the United States government; that, therefore, the political relations established by the treaty of 1868 continued during all these hostilities, and the tribe was “in amity with the p. 301United States;” and further, that subject and dependent people, like the Bannock Indians, are not capable of making war with the United States. In support of this contention is cited a number of declarations of publicists and decisions of courts, such as the following from Chancellor Kent: “But, though a solemn declaration, or previous notice to the enemy, be now laid aside, it is essential that some formal public act, proceeding directly from the competent source, should an nounce to the people at home their new relations and duties growing out of a state of war, and which should equally apprise neutral nations of the fact, to enable them to conform their conduct to the rights belonging to the new state of things. War, says Vattel, is at present published and declared by manifestoes. Such an official act operates from its date to legalize all hostile acts, in like manner as a treaty of peace operates from its date to annul them. As war cannot law fully be commenced on the part of the United States without an act of Congress, such an act is, of course, a formal official notice to all the world, and equivalent to the most solemn declaration.” 1 Bl. Com. 55. And this from People v. McLeod, 1 Hill, 377, 407: “ A state of peace and the continu ance of treaties must be presumed by all the courts of justice till the contrary be shown ; and this ispresumptio juris et de jure until the national power of the country in which such courts sit officially declares the contrary.”
Without questioning these declarations and decisions as applied to the relations between independent nations, we think they avail but little in the solution of the question here pre sented. That question is, what limitation did Congress intend by the words “ in amity with the United States.” The word annty” is not a technical term. It is a word of common use; and such words when found in a statute must be given
their ordinary meaning unless there be something in the con text which compels a narrower or a different scope. Webster defines it “friendship, in a general sense, between individual, societies, or nations; harmony; good understanding; as, a treaty of amity and commerce.” The last part of this defini tion shows that the phrase “ in amity ” is not the equivalent p. 302of “under treaty.” A “treaty” implies political relations; “ amity ” signifies friendship, actual peace.
The phrase “in amity with the United States” is one of frequent use in the legislation of Congress in reference to Indians. In the early act of May 19, 1796, c. 30, 1 Stat. 469, it appears twice, the sixth section reading as follows:
“ That if any such citizen, or other person, shall go into any town, settlement or territory belonging to any nation or tribe of Indians, and shall there commit murder, by killing an In dian or Indians, belonging to any nation or tribe of Indians in amity with the United States, such offender, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death.”
It is found again in the act of March 3, 1799, 1 Stat. 747; that of March 30, 1802, c. 13, 2 Stat. 139, 143; June 30, 1834, c. 160, 4 Stat. 728, 731, and elsewhere; appearing in the statutes, as stated by counsel, some fifty or sixty times.
The frequent use of this phrase in connection with the same subject-matter during all the legislative history of this country suggests, of course, a single and settled meaning. And, as said by Nott, J., in Love v. United States, 29 C. Cl. 332, 340: “ What did it mean, in 1796, when the law declared it to be murder to kill an Indian of a tribe ‘ in amity with the United States ? ”’ If that particular section had been in force dur ing these hostilities it would not seriously be contended that the killing of a hostile Bannock by one of the soldiers of our army, even if done within the limits of the Bannock reserva tion, would have been murder, on the ground that the Bannock tribe was still under treaty relations, and, therefore, in amity with the government.
Further, there are obvious reasons why Congress did not use this phrase in any different sense than as theretofore used. At the time of the passage of the act, nearly every tribe and band of Indians within the territorial limits of the United States was under some treaty relations with the government. It is said by counsel that there appear in the statutes, prior to the act of March 3, 1871, c. 120,16 Stat. 544, 566, declaring against further treaties, 666 treaties with Indian tribes. And it is a matter of history that all along our western frontier p. 303there has been a succession of Indian wars, with great de struction of life and property, and yet seldom has there been a formal declaration of war on the part of either the govern ment or the Indians. If the contention of the claimants were sustained, it would be practically tantamount to holding that by this language Congress had for the government assumed responsibility for all depredations committed by Indians domi ciled within the territorial limits of the United States, subse quently at least to the year 1865, and given to the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine and finally adjudicate the amount thereof.
If such had been its intent, it seems as though it would have expressed itself in different language, and not by a phrase so suggestive, from past use, of a more limited purpose.
Again, as often affirmed in the decisions of this court, the Indians are, in a certain sense, the wards of the United States, and the legislation of Congress is to be interpreted as intended for their benefit. The act of 1891 contemplates that in the same suit the tribe by whom, or members of whom, the dep redation is charged to have been committed, may be made a party defendant. In section 5 it is provided that the court, after determining the value of the property, “shall render judgment in favor of the claimant or claimants against the United States, and against the tribe of Indians committing the wrong, when such can be identified.” Section 6 reads as follows :
“ The amount of any judgment so rendered against any tribe of Indians shall be charged against the tribe by which, or by members of which, the court shall find that the depre dation was committed, and shall be deducted and paid in the following manner : First, from annuities due said tribe from the United States; second, if no annuities are due or availa ble, then from any other funds due said tribe from the United States, arising from the sale of their lands or otherwise ; third, if no such funds are due or available, then from any appropriation for the benefit of said tribe other than appro priations for their current and necessary support, subsistence and education ; and, fourth, if no such annuity, fund or p. 304appropriation is due or available, then the amount of the judgment shall be paid from the Treasury of the United States: Pro vided^ That any amount so paid from the Treasury of the United States shall remain a charge against such tribe, and shall be deducted from any annuity, fund or appropriation hereinbefore designated which may hereafter become due from the United States to such tribe.”
If this act requires the construction claimed, it is obvious to any one familiar with the history of the Indian, and even in dependently of what is said by counsel to be the record as to the multitude and amount of the claims presented, that the outcome would be, as to most if not of all of these tribes, that every dollar of annuity, if not every dollar of fund, would be swept away in satisfaction of these claims. We do not think this legislation is to^e thus construed, and are of the opinion that all that Congress intended was that when, as a matter of fact, a tribe was in the relation of actual peace with the United States, and by some individual, or individuals, without the consent or approval of the tribe, a depredation was com mitted upon the property of citizens of the United States, such depredation might be investigated, and the amount of the loss determined and adjudicated by the Court of Claims. This is in harmony with the language of many of the treaties between the United States and the Indians, and, among others, that of the treaty between the United States and the Bannock tribe, heretofore quoted, which reads: “ If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depredation,” etc.
In the light of this conclusion, it may be said that when the petition filed in the Court of Claims alleges that a depre dation was committed by an Indian or Indians belonging to a tribe in amity with the United States, it becomes the duty of that court to inquire as to the truth of that allegation, and its truth is not determined by the mere existence of a treaty be tween the United States and the tribe, or the fact that such treaty has never been formally abrogated by a declaration of war on the part of either, but that the inquiry is, whether as a matter of fact, the tribe was at the time, as a tribe, in a state of actual peace with the United States. If so, and the
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depredation was committed by a single individual, or a few individuals without the consent and against the knowledge of the tribe, the court may proceed to investigate the amount of the loss, and render judgment therefor. If, on the other hand, the tribe, as a tribe, was engaged in actual hostilities with the United States, the judgment of the Court of Claims must be that the allegation of the petition is not sustained, and that the claim is not one within its province to adjudi cate. It is doubtless true that the existence of a treaty im plies a state of peace, and, if no other evidence were produced, the court might properly infer therefrom that the tribe was in amity with the United States; but, after all, it is a question of fact, to be determined by the testimony which may be introduced. That question was investigated by the Court of Claims in this case, and its conclusion, justified by the facts as shown by the various reports and documents in evidence, was undoubtedly correct. The Bannock tribe was not, at the time of these depredations, in amity with the United States, and, therefore, the Court of Claims properly refused to adjudi cate upon the amount of the loss, or render judgment therefor against the United States.
Neither does this case come within the second jurisdictional clause of the act of 1891, for this was not a claim which had been examined and allowed by the Interior Department, or one which, on March 3, 1885, had been filed and was pending in said department for examination. Johnson v. United States, 160 U. 8. 546. The conclusion reached in that case in refer ence to the scope of this second clause has been challenged, and it has been said that such second clause should be con strued in connection with this language in section 2: “No claim shall be excluded from the jurisdiction of the court be cause not heretofore presented to the Secretary of the Interior, or other officer or department of the government; ” and that, so construed, neither the time nor the fact of filing in the In terior Department is material. No such construction can be sustained. It would in effect make the statute read as grant ig jurisdiction over all cases which, on March 3, 1885, had been examined and allowed by the Interior Department, and
VOL. CLXI—20
over all then filed in that department but not yet examined and allowed, with a proviso that it is immaterial whether the claim was ever filed in the department. The antagonism between the grant and the proviso is fatal to such a construc tion. The act of March 3, 1885, defines claims not by their nature but by their status as filed and allowed or simply filed. And to say that filing is immaterial when filing is the descrip tive matter is to destroy the significance of the clause. Full scope can be given for the operation of these words in sec tion 2 by connecting them with the first jurisdictional clause, which is a general grant of jurisdiction over all claims for property of citizens taken or destroyed by Indians in amity with the United States.
These are the only matters requiring consideration, and no error appearing in the conclusions reached by the Court of Claims, its judgment is
Affirmed.
DURLAND v. UNITED STATES.
SAME < SAME.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Nos. 628, 629. Argued October 29,1896. — Decided March 2,1896.
The provision in Rev. Stat. § 5480, as amended by the act of March 2,1889, c. 393, 25 Stat. 873, that “ if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . to be effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or communication with any person, whether resident within or outside the United States, by means of the Post Office Establishment of the United States, or by inciting such other person or any person to open communication with the person so devising or intending, shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, place or cause to be placed, any letter, packet, writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, in any post office, branch • post office, or street or hotel letter-box of the United States, to be sent or delivered by the said Post Office Establishment, or shall take or receive any such therefrom, such person so misusing the Post Office Establish ment shall, upon conviction, be punishable,” etc., includes everything
designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or sug gestions and promises as to the future; and it was enacted for protecting the public against all intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used to carry them into effect.
The refusal to quash an indictment on motion is not, generally, assignable for error.
The omission in an indictment for violating the above act to state the names of the parties intended to be defrauded, and the names and addresses on the letters, is satisfied by the allegation, if true, that such names and addresses are to the jury unknown.
The offence described in the statute is committed when the contriver of a scheme to defraud, with a view of executing it, deposits letters in the post office which he thinks may assist in carrying it into effect, whether they are so effective or not.
The objection that an indictment is multifarious is presented too late, if not taken until after the verdict.
These cases have so much in common that they may be considered together. Each is the record of the conviction of the plaintiff in error in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of a violation of sec tion 5480, Rev. Stat., as amended by the act of March 2,1889, c. 393, 25 Stat. 873. In neither record is preserved the testi mony given on the trial, or the charge to the jury. The only questions for consideration are those which arise on the indict ments. In the first, the indictment charged that defendant “ did knowingly, wilfully and falsely devise a scheme and ar tifice to defraud, that is to say, by divers false pretences and subtle means and devices to obtain and acquire for himself of and from divers persons to this grand inquest unknown, a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of fifty dollars each, and to cheat and defraud each of the said divers persons thereof by then and there representing, among other things,.that the Provident Bond and Investment Company would upon the payment of a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of ten dollars, and a further sum of five dollars monthly thereafter, by each of the said divers persons, issue to each of the said divers persons a bond in the words and manner following, to wit.”
diving a copy of the bond, the indictment proceeded: ‘ And that the said bonds would mature in accordance with p. 308paragraphs third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth of said bond hereinbefore set out, and that the redemption value of the said bond when called and the sum of money payable therefor to the said divers persons by the said Provident Bond and Investment Company would be the sum specified and at the time named, and upon the payments of the sums of money named in the circular issued by the said Provident Bond and Investment Company, which is in the words and matter fol lowing, to wit:
“ Λ Nut for Lottery Cranks to Crack.
« We give below our graduatory scale of redemption values, which is a complete refutation of the charge that a ‘lottery’ element enters into the methods of the Provident Bond and Investment Company. It will be observed that a steadily in creasing cash value applies to every bond in force from its issue to redemption. That every bond of equal age has the same cash value.
“ It is a further fact that every bond is non-forfeitable and interest-bearing, having both ‘ cash surrender ’ and loan values. Where does the lottery element come in ?
“ Redemption Scale.
“ Scale of current redemption values under the current sys tem of tontine investment, showing profit over total cost upon each $1000 bond from date of issue to face value; $500 bonds, one half of said amounts, both cost and profit.”
After this followed the scale referred to in the last clause, which, commencing —
Per cent
‘ No. of Cost to holder, Cash paid
Profits over
of
IIlonths in including by Co. for re
cost.
profit.
force. premium. demption.
1................... $15 00 2................... 20 00 3................... 25 00 $30 00 $5 00 20 4 ................. 30 00 40 00 10 00 33 5............. . 35 00 50 00 15 00 42.8 6......... . .. 40 00 60 00 20 00 50 ”
DURLAND v. ÚNITED STATES. 30»
ran up to and included ninety-one months. After the scale appears the balance of the circular, as follows:
“Such is the legitimate operation of ‘the current system of tontine investment,’ of which the Provident Bond and In vestment Company is the exponent and its president is the author.
“N.B. — The basic principle of the above table is copy righted. Infringements without due authority of the author will be prosecuted.”
And then the indictment, in its first count, closed with these words:
“Whereas in truth and in fact the said John EE. Durland, being then and there the president of the said Provident Bond and Investment Company, did not intend that the said bonds would mature in accordance with paragraphs third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth of the said bond, and that the redemption value of the said bond when called and the sum of money payable therefor to the said divers persons by the said Provident Bond and Investment Company, would be the sum specified and at the time named and upon the payments of the sums of money named in the circular issued by the said Provident Bond and Investment Company, as he, the said John H. Durland, then and there well knew, and the said John H. Durland intended then and there by said false represen tations to obtain for his own use the sum of money paid by each of the divers persons for said bond, to wit, the sum of fifty dollars each, which said scheme and artifice to defraud was to be effected by him, the said John H. Durland, opening a correspondence and communication with each of the said (livers persons by means of the Post Office Establishment of the United States and by inciting such divers persons to open communication with him, the said John H. Durland, so devis ing and intending; and he, the said John H. Durland, did heretofore, to wit, upon the day and year aforesaid, so devis ing and intending in and for executing such scheme and arti fice to defraud and attempting so to do, place and cause to be placed in a post office of the United States at Philadelphia to be sent and delivered by the said Post Office Establishment, p. 310divers letters and packets, to wit, twenty letters and circulars, directed respectively to the said divers persons, the names and addresses of whom are to this grand inquest unknown, con trary to the form of the act of Congress in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America.”
In the second case the indictment charged substantially the same scheme to defraud, but specified that the purpose of the defendant was “ to obtain and acquire for himself of and from another person, to wit, one W. S. Burk, at Chester, Pennsyl vania, a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of sixty dollars, and to cheat and defraud the said W. S. Burk thereof.” And then that “said scheme and artifice to defraud was to be effected by him, the said John H. Durland, opening a corre spondence and communication with another person, to wit, the said W. S. Burk, residing within the United States, to wit, at Chester, Pennsylvania, by means of the Post Office Establish ment of the United States and by inciting the said W. S. Burk to open communication with him, the said John H. Durland, so devising and intending; and he, the said John H. Durland, did heretofore, to wit, upon the day and year aforesaid, so devising and intending in and for executing such scheme and artifice to defraud and attempting so to do, place and cause to be placed a letter in the Post Office Establishment of the United States, to wit, the post office at Philadelphia, Pennsyl vania, within the above district, which said letter was then and there addressed and directed as follows, to wit: ‘ Mr. W. 8. Burk, Chester, Pa.,’ profert whereof is now made, contrary to the form of the act of Congress in such case made and pro vided and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America.”
The bond, a copy of which was in each indictment, is entitled a “Current-Tontine Investment Option Bond,” pur ported to be issued by the Provident Bond and Investment Company, whose capital was named as one hundred thousand dollars, and was a promise on the part of the company to pay one thousand dollars upon nine conditions; the first being a monthly payment of $5, failure to make any such monthly
DURLAND v. UNITED STATES. 311
payment working a forfeiture; second, that the company would retain fifty cents for expenses; of the net remainder, twenty-five per cent was to be carried to a reserve and seventy-five per cent was to constitute a redemption fund. The third and fourth conditions were as follows:
“ Third, (a.) This bond will mature when the net monthly instalments (exclusive of expense fund) together with its apportionment of reserve credits, equal its face value. (J.) It may be redeemed by the company at any time before its maturity, at any time after three regular monthly payments have been made herefor, the holder hereby agreeing to sur render the same whenever called, upon receipt of its then redemption value.”
“Fourth. The redemption value of this bond when called will be the sum specified under the 4 Table of Current Redemp tion Values’ printed on the back hereof, according with the number of months it has been in .force at time of call.”
The table mentioned in this fourth specification is the redemption scale which appeared in the circular heretofore referred to. The remaining stipulations were in reference to calls, special redemptions, conversion into certificates, return in case of death of all payments made to the redemption and reserve fund, and assignments. Section 5480, as amended by the act of March 2, 1889, so far as material to this case, reads as follows :
“ If any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . to be effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or communica tion with any person, whether resident within or outside the United States, by means of the Post Office Establishment of the United States, or by inciting such other person or any person to open communication with the person so devising or intending, shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, place or cause to be placed, any letter, packet, writing, circular, pamphlet or advertisement, in any post office, branch post office, or street or hotel letter-box of the United States, to be sent or delivered by the said Post Office Establishment, or shall take or receive any such p. 312therefrom, such person so misusing the Post Office Establishment shall, upon conviction, be punishable,” etc.
Mr. James Μ. Beck and Mr. Bampton L. Carson for plain tiff in error. Mr. William F. Harrity was on their brief.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Whitney and Mr. John L. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office De partment, for the defendants in error.
Mr. Justice Brewer, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Inasmuch as the testimony has not been preserved, we must assume that it was sufficient to substantiate the charges in the indictments; that this was a scheme and artifice to defraud, and that the defendant did not intend that the bonds should mature, or that although money was received any should be returned, but that it should be appropriated to his own use. In other words, he was trying to entrap the unwary, and to secure money from them on the faith of a scheme glittering and attractive in form, yet unreal and deceptive in fact, and known to him to be such. So far as the moral element is concerned it must be taken that the defendant’s guilt was established.
But the contention on his part is that the statute reaches only such cases as, at common law, would come within the definition of “false pretences,” in order to make out which there must be a misrepresentation as to some existing fact and not a mere promise as to the future. It is urged that there was no misrepresentation as to the existence or solvency of the corporation, the Provident Bond and Investment Com pany, or as to its modes of doing business, no suggestion that it failed to issue its bonds to any and every one advancing the required dues, or that its promise of payment according to the conditions named in the bond was not a valid and binding promise. And then, as counsel say in their brief, “it [the indictment] discloses on its face absolutely nothing but an p. 313intention to commit a violation of a contract. If there be one principle of criminal law that is absolutely settled by an over whelming avalanche of authority it is that fraud either in the civil courts or in the criminal courts must be the misrepre sentation of an existing or a past fact, and cannot consist of the mere intention not to carry out a contract in the future.”
The question thus presented is one of vital importance, and underlies both cases. We cannot agree with counsel. The statute is broader than is claimed. Its letter shows this: “ Any scheme or artifice to defraud.” Some schemes may be promoted through mere representations and promises as to the future, yet are none the less schemes and artifices to defraud. Punishment because of the fraudulent purpose is no new thing. As said by Mr. Justice Brown, in JEvans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584, 592, “ if a person buy goods on credit in good faith, knowing that he is unable to pay for them at the time, but believing that he will be able to pay for them at the maturity Of the bill, he is guilty of no offence even if he be disappointed in making such payment. But if he purchases them, knowing that he will not be able to pay for them, and with an intent to cheat the vendor, this is a plain fraud, and made punish able as such by statutes in many of the States.”
But beyond the letter of the statute is the evil sought to be remedied, which is always significant in determining the meaning. It is common knowledge that nothing is more alluring than the expectation of receiving large returns on small investments. Eagerness to take the chances of large gains lies at the foundation of all lottery schemes, and, even when the matter of chance is eliminated, any scheme or plan which holds out the prospect of receiving more than is parted with appeals to the cupidity of all.
In the light of this the statute must be read, and so read it includes everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future. The significant fact is the intent and purpose. The question presented by this indictment to the jury was not, as counsel insist, whether the business scheme suggested in this bond was practicable or not. If the testimony had shown p. 314that this Provident company, and the defendant, as its presi dent, had entered in good faith upon that business, believing that out of the moneys received they could by investment or otherwise make enough to justify the promised returns, no conviction could be sustained, no matter how visionary might seem the scheme. The charge is that in putting forth this scheme it was not the intent of the defendant to make an honest effort for its success, but that he resorted to this form and pretence of a bond without a thought that he or the com pany would ever make good its promises. It was with the purpose of protecting the public against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used to carry them into effect, that this statute was passed; and it would strip it of value to confine it to such cases as dis close an actual misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and exclude those in which is only the allurement of a specious and glittering promise. This, which is the principal conten tion of counsel, must be overruled.
The second, which applies more fully to the first than the second case, is that the indictment is defective in that it avers that in pursuance of this fraudulent scheme twenty letters and circulars were deposited in the post office, without in any way specifying the character of those letters or circulars. It is con tended that the indictment should either recite the letters, or at least by direct statements show their purpose and character, and that the names and addresses of the parties to whom the letters were sent should also be stated, so as to inform the de fendant as to what parts of his correspondence the charge of crime is made, and also to enable him to defend himself against a subsequent indictment for the same transaction. These ob jections were raised by a motion to quash the indictment, but such a motion is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and a refusal to quash is not, generally, assignable for error. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 282.
Further, the omission to state the names of the parties in tended to be defrauded and the names and addresses on the letters is satisfied by the allegation, if true, that such names and addresses are to the grand jury unknown. And parol evi-
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deuce is always admissible, and sometimes necessary, to estab lish the defence of prior conviction or acquittal. .Dunbar v. United States, 156 U. S. 185, 191.
It may be conceded that the indictment would be more sat isfactory if it gave more full information as to the contents or import of these letters, so that upon its face it would be ap parent that they were calculated or designed to aid in carry ing into execution the scheme to defraud. But still we think that as it stands it must be held to be sufficient. There was a partial identification of the letters by the time and place of mailing, and the charge was that defendant “ intending in and for executing such scheme and artifice to defraud and attempt ing so to do, placed and caused to be placed in the post office,” etc. This, it will be noticed, is substantially the language of the statute. If defendant had desired further specification and identification, he could have secured it by demanding a bill of particulars. Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29.
We do not wish to be understood as intimating that in order to constitute the offence it must be shown that the let ters so mailed were of a nature calculated to be effective in carrying out the fraudulent scheme. It is enough if, having devised a scheme to defraud, the defendant with a view of executing it deposits in the post office letters, which he thinks may assist in carrying it into effect, although in the judgment of the jury they may be absolutely ineffective therefor.
A final objection is that the indictment in the first case is multifarious because, as claimed, it includes many offences, and In re Henry, 123 U. S. 372, 374, is cited as authority therefor, in which, in reference to a case of this nature, Chief Justice Waite said: * Each letter so taken out or put in con stitutes a separate and distinct violation of the act.” This objection was not taken until after the verdict, and hence, if of any validity, was presented too late. Connors v. United States, 158 U. S. 408, 411.
These are the only objections which require consideration, and, finding no error in them, the judgment in each of these cases is
Affirmed.