McDaid v. Okla. Territory ex rel. Smith, 150 U.S. 209 (1893)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
McDaid v. Okla. Territory ex rel. Smith, 150 U.S. 209 (1893)
Full caption
McDAID v. OKLAHOMA TERRITORY, ex rel. SMITH.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 20, 1893
McDAID v. OKLAHOMA TERRITORY, ex rel. SMITH.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY
OF OKLAHOMA.
No. 785. Submitted October 20,1893. — Decided November 20,1893.
Under the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by the act of May 14, 1890, 26 Stat. 109, c. 207, entitled “ an act to provide for town site entries of lands in what is known as ‘ Oklahoma,’and for other purposes,” it was entirely competent for the Secretary to provide for an appeal to the Commissioner of the General Land Office in case of contest.
when an appeal from a decision of the trustees appointed by the Secretary under the provisions of that act was duly taken, it became the duty of the trustees to decline to issue a deed to the appellee until the appeal was disposed of.
This was a proceeding in mandamus brought in the District court of the First Judicial District of Logan County, in the Territory of Oklahoma, April 27, 1891, to compel Daniel J.
VOL. CL—14 [p. 210] McDaid, William H. Merriweather, and John H. Shanklin, as trustees of the town site of Guthrie, Oklahoma Territory, appointed by the Secretary of the Interior under the act of May 14, 1890, 26 Stat. 109, c. 207, entitled “ An act to provide for town site entries of lands in what is known as ‘ Oklahoma,’ and for other purposes,” to execute deeds for certain lots in said town site. The relators, Smith and Bradley, claimed to have entered two lots on the site, and one John Galloway claimed a prior right thereto.
On September 23, 1890, the relators applied to the town site trustees for a deed to the lots, and on the same day Galloway also made his application therefor. The trustees heard the controversy of the two claimants, and on April 6, 1891, rendered their decision in favor of the relators, finding that they were entitled to the lots in dispute and to a conveyance from the trustees, and they ordered that a deed be executed accordingly. Galloway having died, his heirs were substituted for him, and they filed their appeal from the decision to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. In consequence of the appeal the trustees refused to issue the deed* and thereupon the relators instituted this suit.
The complaint alleged that the sole ground of refusal was the appeal; that there was no authority for such appeal, and that it furnished no excuse to the trustees for their refusal. The defendants answered, setting up that Galloway’s heirs “ duly filed their appeal from the decision of this board to the Commissioner of the General Land Office pursuant to the instructions under the act of Congress under which this board was appointed, such instructions having been made by the Secretary of the Interior authorizing appeals by claimants to lots in cases where such claimants feel themselves aggrieved by the decisions of this board.
“ And these defendants, further answering, say that there is a right of appeal given by the instructions of the Secretary of the Interior and recognized by this board, and that appeals in similar cases have been taken by other persons from other decisions of this board both before and after the appeal taken in this case.
McDAlD v. OKLAHOMA, ex- rel. SMITH. .211
■ u And these defendants say that they were appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, and that at the time of their appointment were directed to allow appeals from their decisions where such appeals were properly prayed, and that the appeal in this case was properly prayed, and under such instructions was granted.
“And these defendants further say that the question of legal ownership as to said lot has not been definitely settled by the higher tribunals of the Interior Department, and that no deeds have passed for such lots and should not pass until such appeal is disposed of, and that under such circumstances it is not for this court by mandate or otherwise to direct in what manner or to whom conveyances of lands or lots, the title to which is in the United States, should be made to individuals.”
Relators demurred to the answer and their demurrer was sustained. Defendants then moved to dismiss the cause upon the ground that the territorial court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter. This motion was overruled, and thereupon judgment was entered ordering the trustees to execute and deliver a deed to the relators of the lots in question. An appeal was thereupon prosecuted to the Supreme Court of the Territory, by which the judgment was affirmed, July 6, 1892. The opinion of the court and of Clark, J., dissenting, will be found in 1 Oklahoma, 92. The cause was then brought to this court by writ of error.
The act of Congress of May 14, 1890, omitting the eighth section, is as follows :
“ Be it enacted, etc., That so much of the public lands situate in the Territory of Oklahoma, now open to settlement, as May be necessary to embrace all the legal subdivisions covered by actual occupancy for purposes of trade and business, not exceeding twelve hundred and eighty acres in each case, may be entered as town sites, for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, by three trustees to be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior for that purpose, such entry to be Made under the provisions of section twenty-three hundred and eighty-seven of the Revised Statutes as near as may be * [p. 212] and when such entry shall have been made, the Secretary of the Interior shall provide regulations for the proper execution of the trust, by such trustees, including the survey of the land into streets, alleys, squares, blocks, and lots when necessary, or the approval of such survey as may already have been made by the inhabitants thereof, the assessment upon the lots of such sum as may be necessary to pay for the lands embraced in such town site, costs of survey, conveyance of lots, and other necessary expenses, including compensation of trustees: Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior may when practicable cause more than one town site to be entered and the trust thereby created executed in the manner herein provided by a single board of trustees, but not more than seven boards of trustees in all shall be appointed for said Territory, and no more than two members of any of said boards shall be appointed from one political party.
“ Sec. 2. That in the execution of such trust, and for the purpose of the conveyance of title by said trustees, any certificate or other paper evidence of claim duly issued by the authority recognized for such purpose by the people residing upon any town site, the subject of entry hereunder, shall be taken as evidence of the occupancy by the holder thereof of the lot or lots therein described, except that where there is an adverse claim to said property such certificate shall only be prima facie evidence of the claim of occupancy of the holder: Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to make valid any claim now invalid of those who entered upon and occupied said lands in violation of the laws of the United States or the proclamation of the President thereunder: Provided further, That the certificates hereinbefore mentioned shall not be taken as evidence in favor of any person claiming lots who entered upon said lots in violation of law or the proclamation of the President thereunder.
“ Sec. 3. That lots of land occupied by any religious organization, incorporated or otherwise, conforming to the approved survey within the limits of such town site, shall be conveyed to or in trust for the same.
“ Sec. 4. That all lots not disposed of as hereinbefore pr0' [p. 213] vided for shall be sold, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, for the benefit of the municipal government of any such town, or the same or any part thereof may be reserved for public use as sites for public buildings, or for the purpose of parks, if in the judgment of the Secretary such reservation would be for the public interest, and the Secretary shall execute proper conveyances to carry out the provisions of this section.
“ Sec. 5. That the provisions of sections four, five, six, and seven of an act of the legislature of the State [of] Kansas, entitled ‘ An act relating to town sites,’ approved March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, shall, so far as applicable, govern the trustees in the performance of their duties hereunder.
“Sec. 6. That all entries of town sites now pending on application hereafter made under this act, shall have preference at the local land office of the ordinary business of the office and shall be determined as speedily as possible, and if an appeal shall be taken from the decision of the local office in any such case to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the same shall be made special, and disposed of by7 him as expeditiously as the duties of his office will permit, and so if an appeal should be taken to the Secretary of the Interior. And all applications heretofore filed in the proper land office shall have the same force and effect as if made under the provisions of this act, and upon the application of the trustees herein provided for, such entries shall be prosecuted to final issue in the names of such trustees, without other formality, and when final entry is made, the title of the United States to the land covered by such entry shall be conveyed to said trustees for the uses and purposes herein provided.
“Seo. 7. That the trustees appointed under this act shall have the power to administer oaths, to hear and determine all controversies arising in the execution of this act, shall keep a record of their proceedings, which shall, with all papers filed, with them and all evidence of their official acts, except conveyances, be filed in the General Land Office and become part 0 the records of the same, and all conveyances executed by [p. 214] them shall be acknowledged before an officer duly authorized for that purpose. They shall be allowed such compensation as the Secretary of tjie Interior may prescribe, not exceeding ten dollars per day while actually employed; and such travelling and other necessary expenses as the Secretary may authorize, and the Secretary of the Interior shall also provide them with necessary clerical force by detail or otherwise.”
Section 238T of the Revised Statutes reads thus:
“Whenever any portion of the public lands have been or may be settled upon and occupied as a town site, not subject to entry under the agricultural preemption laws, it is lawful, in case such town be incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof, and, if not incorporated, for the judge of the county court for the county in which such town is situated, to enter at the proper land office, and at the minimum price, the land so settled and occupied in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective interests; the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such town, and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State or Territory in which the same may be situated.”
Sections four, five, six, and seven of the act of the legislature of the State of Kansas, entitled “ An act relating to town sites,” approved March 2, 1868, are as follows:
“ Sec. 4. At any time after the entry of any such town site, the probate judge of the county in which such town may be situated may appoint three commissioners, who shall not be residents of such town, or the owners of any interest therein; and it shall be the duty of such commissioners to cause an actual survey of such site to be made, conforming, as near as may be, to the original survey of such town, designating, on such plat, the lots or squares on which improvements are standing, with the name of the owner or owners thereof, together -with the value of the same.
“ Sec. 5. Said commissioners shall, as soon as the survey an plat shall be completed, cause to be published, in some news? paper published in the county in which such town is situate, [p. 215] a notice that such survey has been completed, and giving notice to all persons concerned or interested in such town site that, on a designated day, the said commissioners will proceed to set off to the persons entitled to the same, according to their respective interests, the lots, squares, or grounds to which each of the occupants thereof shall be entitled. Such publication shall be made at least thirty days prior to the day set apart by such commissioners to make such division.
“ Sec. 6. After such publication shall have been duly made, the commissioners shall proceed, on the day designated in such publication, to set apart to the persons entitled to receive the same, the lots, squares, or grounds to which each shall be entitled, according to their respective interests, including, in the portion or portions set apart to each person or company of persons, the improvements belonging to such persons or company.
“ Sec. 7. After the setting apart of such lots or grounds and the valuation of the same, as hereinbefore provided for, the said commissioners shall proceed to levy a tax on the lots and improvements thereon, according to their value, sufficient to raise a 'fund to reimburse to the parties who may have entered such site, the sum or sums paid by them in securing the title to such site, together with all the expenses accruing in perfecting the same, the fees due the commissioners and the surveyor for their respective services, and other necessary expenses connected with the proceedings.” Kansas Gen. Stats. 1868, pp. 1074, 1075.
Mr. Solicitor General for plaintiffs in error.
No appearance for defendants in error.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court.
In Knight v. United States Land Association, 142 U. S. 161, the supervisory power of the Secretary of the Interior over all matters relating to the sale and disposition of the public lands, the surveying of private land claims and the issuing of [p. 216] patents thereon, and the administration of the trusts devolving upon the government by reason of the laws of Congress or under treaty stipulations, respecting the public domain, was fully considered, and numerous authorities cited. It was declared by Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking for the court, that the Secretary was clothed with plenary authority as the supervising agent of the government to do justice to all claimants, and to preserve the rights of the people of the United States, and that he could exercise such supervision by direct orders or by review on appeal, and, in the absence of statutory direction, prescribe the mode in which it could be exercised by such rules and regulations as he might adopt.
In the execution of the trusts created by the act of May 14, 1890, the Secretary of the Interior on June 18, 1890, issued a circular setting forth such regulations. (10 Land Dec. 666.) Of these, paragraph 12 provided for the hearing and determination by the town site trustees of controversies between two or more claimants to the same lot, block, or parcel of land, and paragraph 13 for an appeal from their judgment to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and an appeal from the Commissioner to the Secretary. On Muy 8, 1891, this paragraph was amended by adding thereto the words: “ A failure to appeal as herein provided shall not be construed as a waiver of, or to prejudice the rights of either party, nor held to preclude suits in the courts in case the party entitled to appeal desires to proceed in that manner for the purpose of settling the title to the lot or lots in controversy.” (12 Land Dec. 612.) These regulations were referred to by the Secretary under date of July 3, 1891, in certain instructions to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, in which it was ruled that the Secretary was authorized to allow appeals from the decisions of the town site trustees under the act of May 14, 1890, to the Commissioner, even though the act did not expressly provide for an appeal in such cases. (13 Land Dec. 9.) The question of the right of appeal is there discussed at length, and again on March 15, 1892, (14 Land Dec. 295,) by the Assistant Secretary, who decided that the issue of the patent to town site trustees under the act was not a disposition [p. 217] of the government title, but a conveyance in trust to be held under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior.
This proposition is denied, and it is insisted that the authority of the Secretary relates solely to public lands, the title to which is still in the United States, and that by the issue of the patent to town site trustees the title passes and all control over the lands embraced therein is lost. Hence that in this case the title of the United States passed by the patent to the trustees, and that they held it thereafter in trust for the occupants, free from the control of the Land Department. Reference is made to Moore v. liobbins, 96 U. S. 530, and like cases, to the point that when a patent has been awarded, issued, delivered, and accepted, all right to control the title or to decide on the right to the title has passed from the executive department of the government. But those cases refer to the legal title directly and finally conferred, and the principle invoked can only be applicable on the assumption that by the town site conveyance title was granted to the Oklahoma trustees for the purpose of divesting the government of all authority and control oyer the final disposition of the property, and not for the purpose of putting title in the trustees as agents of the government for the execution of the trust devolving upon them as such. Whether this assumption is justified or not must depend upon the terms and true construction of the act of May 14, 1890.
By section one of that act the land that might be embraced in each town site entry was limited, and it was prescribed that the entry should be made for the several use of the occupants thereof by three trustees to be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior for that purpose, and that when the entry should have been made the Secretary should provide regulations for the proper execution of the trust by such trustees, including surveys when necessary, or the approval of such survey as might already have been made by the inhabitants, and for the assessment upon the lots of such sum as might be necessary to pay for the lands embraced in such town site, costs of survey, conveyance of lots, and other necessary expenses, including compensation of trustees.
Section two provided that in the execution of such trust and for the purpose of the conveyance of title by the trustees, any certificate or other paper evidence of writing duly issued by the authority recognized for such purpose by the people residing upon any town site, the subject of entry thereunder, should be taken as evidence of the occupancy by the holder thereof of the lot or lots therein described, except that where there might be an adverse claim to such property such certificate should only be prirnafacie evidence of the claim of occupancy.
Section four directed that all lots not disposed of as thereinbefore provided for should be sold under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the municipal government of any such town, or the same or any part thereof might be reserved for public use as sites of public buildings or for the purpose of parks, if in the judgment of the Secretary such reservation should be in the public interest, and the Secretary was required to execute proper conveyances to carry out the provisions of this section.
Section six prescribed the manner of the adjudication of the entries, and directed “ that when final entry is made the title of the United States to the land covered by such entry shall be conveyed to said trustees for the uses and purposes herein provided.”
By section seven power was given to the trustees to administer oaths and to hear and determine all controversies arising in the execution of the act, and they were directed to keep a record of their proceedings, which should, with all papers filed with them and all evidence of their official acts, except conveyances, be filed in the General Land Office and become part of the records of the same; and the trustees were to be allowed such compensation within a specified limit as the Secretary of the Interior might prescribe, and such travelling and other necessary expenses as he might authorize, and he was also to provide them with the necessary clerical force by detail or otherwise.
In the light of these provisions we perceive no reason for doubting that the trustees appointed by the Secretary under the act, and whose compensation and expenses were fixed by [p. 219] him, were agents of the government for the purpose of carrying out the trust thereby created to the extent and as specified, and this included the ascertainment of the’beneficiaries in the first instance and the transfer of the title to them. While on the final entry the title of the United States was to be conveyed to the trustees, such conveyance was explicitly declared as made “ for the uses and purposes in the act provided,” and among these uses and purposes was the determination of controversies between contesting claimants by the trustees, who were to administer oaths, pass on evidence, and keep a record of their proceedings, to be deposited in the Land Department. They unquestionably acted in that regard as the representatives of the government, and their decisions were properly subject to that appeal to the Commissioner and the Secretary for which the Secretary’s regulations provided. As matter of convenience, the trustees were the instrumentality for the transmission of title in respect of lands disposed of to actual holders, while the Secretary, notwithstanding the patent, was the medium as to surplus lands, which he could not be if the legal title had definitively passed to the trustees by the patent for the whole site. The result is the same if the fourth section be construed as directing the Secretary to cause the trustees to execute the conveyances therein referred to. The trust upon which the title was held was to be discharged in accordance with the regulations, and was necessarily subject to the supervisory power of the Department of the Interior.
Section 2387 of the Revised Statutes confirms this view, for the town sites there referred to were to be entered by the corporate authorities of the town, if incorporated, or, if not, by the judge of the county court for the county in which the town was located, and the trust as to the disposal of the lots and the proceeds of the sales thereof was to be executed in accordance with such regulations as might be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State or Territory in which the town might be situated, while under this special act, in reference to Oklahoma, the entry was to be made by trustees appointed by the Secretary and the trust conducted under such regulations as might be established by him. In the one case [p. 220] the government parted with its connection with the land when the patent issued to the local authority; in the other, the government retains its* connection by having the entry made by its own agents, and the trust executed in the manner it directs.
By the scheme of this act, the title is held in trust for the occupying claimants, it is true, but also in trust sub modo for the government until the rightful claimants and the undisposed of or surplus lands are ascertained. The act did not contemplate that the allowance of the entry and the issue of the patent should operate to devolve the final determination of conflicting claims to lots upon these government appointees, and, until the trustees conveyed, the title did not pass beyond the control of the executive department in that regard.
The regulation of the execution of the trust by the Secretary covered the regulation of the matter of controversies between claimants, and also included, in addition and not by way of limitation, the regulation of the survey of the land into blocks, streets, alleys, and lots, and the assessment for purchase money, costs, compensation, and expenses. The supervisory power could no more be denied in respect of the decisions of the trustees upon adverse claims than in respect of the survey and assessment.
In our judgment, it was entirely within the competency of the Secretary to provide for an appeal in cases of contest, and, as he had done so by the regulations in question, and an appeal had been duly taken thereunder in the case before us, the trustees properly declined to issue the deed, and the mandamus was improvidently awarded, even assuming that the District Court has jurisdiction in the premises and that mandamus was the appropriate remedy.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma, with a direction to reverse thejudgment of the District Court and rema/nd the case to that court with directions to dismiss the petition.
KNAPP v. MORSS.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.
UFFORD v. MORSS.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Nob. 55,310. Argued October 26, 1893. — Decided November 20,1893.
The second claim in letters patent No. 233,240, for improvements in dress forms, issued October 12, 1880, to John Hall, and by him assigned to Charles A. Morss, viz.: “ 2. In combination with the standard a and ribs c, the double braces e2, the sliding blocks f1 and f2, and rests A1 and h2, substantially as and for the purposes set forth,” when read and interpreted with reference to other and broader claims which were made by the patentee and were rejected by the Patent Office, must either be held to be invalid for want of invention, or must be so limited in view of that action by the Patent Office, and in view of the prior state of the art, as not to be infringed by a combination leaving out one of the elements of the patentee’s device.
A claim in letters patent cannot be so construed as to cover what was rejected by the Patent Office on the application for the patent.
The combination of old elements which perform no new function, and accomplish no new results, does not involve patentable novelty.
The end or purpose sought to be accomplished by a device is not the subject of a patent, but only the new and useful means for obtaining that end.
In equity to restrain the infringement of letters patent. The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. John Kimberly Beach for appellants.
Mr. Payson E. Tucker and Mr. Charles F. Perki/ns for appellee.
Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the court.
These two causes, which were heard at the same time, are substantially alike in every particular affecting their proper [p. 222] determination, and will, therefore, be considered together, although they come from different jurisdictions. They are suits for the infringement of letters patent No. 233,240, for improvements in dress forms, issued October 12, 1880, to John Hall, and by him assigned to Charles A. Morss, the appellee. In one cause the appellants, William H. Knapp and Charles L. Knapp, are the manufacturers of the articles alleged to infringe, while the appellants in the other cause, Samuel N. Ufford & Son, are merely the selling agents of the manufactured articles. In both cases it was decreed below that the second claim (the only one in controversy) of the patent was infringed. From these decrees the present appeals are prosecuted.
The invention relates to improvements in dress forms, by means of which every part of the device is rendered adjustable, so that it may be applied to a dress of any size or style and fill it out perfectly in order that trimming may be placed upon it. The device described in the patent by which this result is to be accomplished consists of upright ribs of thin, springy material assembled around a central standard, which supports the whole structure. The ribs are connected near their top and bottom extremities to braces or stretchers, which extend obliquely from the ribs to the standard, and are there concentrated and hinged on small movable collars which encircle the standard. There is a single set of braces at the bottom, while at the top there is a double set. This double brace consists of a series of arms or stretchers, part of which radiate from the upper movable collar obliquely downward to the ribs, to which they are fastened at a point near where the other part of the arms or stretchers are fastened. The lower series of stretchers extend obliquely downward from the point on the ribs where they are fastened to a collar separate from and independent of the upper collar. Following each collar, which is loose, is a rest which may be secured to the standard at any point desired by a set screw, thus enabling the whole structure to be adjusted and revolve upon the standard.
The second claim of the patent reads as follows: “ 2. In combination with the standard a and ribs c, the double braces [p. 223] the sliding blocks/' and/2, and rests h' and h2 substantially as and for the purposes set forth.”
The defences set up by the answer were invalidity in the patent and non-infringement, and in support of the former defence the following patents were relied on : To C. W. Wilson, May 3, 1870, No. 102,638 ; to F. A. Balch, September 17, 1867, No. 68,831; to S. B. Ferris, August 27,1878, No. 207,351; to C. Franke, September 7, 1875, No. 167,394.
The theory of the invention is that as the collar at the bottom of the standard is raised the braces will force the ribs to expand to the circumference limited by the tape or elastic affixed to the lower extremities of the ribs. Should the collar be pushed above the mean centre of expansion, which is attained when the braces are at right angles with the standard, the tendency to expand would cease and contraction would begin. But the proper degree of expansion produced by the lower braces is never exceeded in expanding the dress form. At that point the skirt hangs loosely on the form, and the resistance is so slight that this brace is of but little use. However, the lower brace is not one of the elements of the combination of the second claim. But at the upper part of the form, where expansion and opposition to contraction are alike desired, the mechanical difficulty resulting from pushing the single brace beyond the mean centre of expansion is avoided by using double braces. If the ribs were unrestrained, either by a tape or a skirt of any fabric, the double braces would not be necessary, but as the chief purpose of the invention is to give a proper contour to what is called the hip portion of the dress form, the double braces are most essential. Inasmuch as the ribs at their tops are confined by a tape to a circumference corresponding with the size of the waist, it is reasonably clear that if they were expanded to their utmost tension at the hip portion a single set of braces would afford but slight resistance to contraction. But by the use of the double set of braces, with the arms fastened to the ribs at or near the same point, and diverging obliquely in opposite directions to collars, some distance apart, a triangle is formed which is well known to offer the most powerful resistance to contraction of any device used in the [p. 224] whole range of mechanics. The opposing force brought to bear by pushing the lower collar up and the upper collar down operates on the ribs to give shape to the hip portion of the skirt form closely resembling the human figure, and to oppose all tendency to contraction caused either by the ribs being too closely confined by the tape, or by the tight adjustment of the skirt to the contour of the dress form.
In determining the proper construction to be placed upon the second claim of the patent it is necessary to consider the action of the Patent Office upon the original application of the patentee, and also examine the prior art. In his original application the patentee sought to secure the following claims:
“ 1. A dress form consisting essentially of a central standard, one or more series of adjustable ribs, and corresponding series of braces or stretchers hinged to one or more runners or sliding blocks upon said standard and having their outer ends connected with said ribs, whereby the» dress form may be expanded and contracted substantially as and for the purpose set forth.
“ 2. In combination with the standard a, rest A, sliding blocky, and braces ey the ribs c, and elastic band dy substantially as and for the purpose described J’
These broad and general claims were rejected by the Patent Office for the following reasons:
“The first claim is rejected on patents 202,713, Everett, April 23, 1878, and 207,351, Ferris, August 27, 1878, (both in dummies and hangers.)
“ There is no novelty in the elements of the second claim, in view of the above patents in connection with the elastic band shown in 75,864, Keffer, March 17, 1868, (blocking and stretching hats,) which band is there used in the same way and for the same purpose as in applicant’s device.”
The patentee acquiesced in the rejection, and thereupon accepted his patent with its specific claims, the second of which is alleged to be infringed.
It is well settled that the second claim must be read and interpreted with reference to the rejected claims and to the prior state of the art, and cannot be so construed as to cover [p. 225] either what was rejected by the Patent Office, Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U. S. 593; Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U. S. 530, or disclosed by prior devices.
A brief reference to the prior state of the art will serve to show what limitations should be placed upon the claim in question.
In 1878 a patent was issued to George W. Everett for a skirt exhibitor, in which there was a standard and a waist-band, divided into two segments. These segments were expanded and adjusted by a slide and socket mechanical device. The standard and adjustable waist-band perform the same function as the standard and tape in the Hall patent. Vertical ribs were afterwards added to the waist-band, but the owner of the patent did not claim such ribs as a part of his invention.
In 1870, a patent was granted to C. W. Wilson for an adjustable form for the manufacture of hoop-skirts. There is in this device also a standard and an adjustable waist-band, but in addition to these elements it was said there might be “as many ribs as are necessary hinged to the waist-band.” These ribs are hinged near their lower ends, to jointed braces, whose inner ends are hinged to a block sliding on the standard, and the position of the sliding block is determined by a set screw. In the specification of this patent it is stated that “in operation the adjustable band block may be drawn out to make any size waist-band for skirts without its being necessary to increase the circumference of the bottom of the form, and, by simply moving the sleeve upon the shaft (standard) up or down, the size of the skirt is uniformly increased or diminished.” This invention contains all of the elements substantially of the Hall patent, except the double braces. It has the standard, ribs, sliding blocks, and rests. It also has the brace-expanding mechanism for the lower part, which performs the same function as that in the Hall patent.
It appears, so far, that all the elements of the claim have been shown to have been anticipated except that of the double braces. But it is manifest that this element is not new. It was the principal novelty employed in the patent granted to
VOL. CL—15
S. B. Ferris, August 27, 1878, for a corset exhibitor. The invention consists of a central standard with a block at the top and also at the bottom. Between these blocks is an umbrella-like framework, the braces of which extend beyond the point of junction with the outside ends from the standard, and, pressing against the interior of the corset, impart shapeliness to it. The ribs or braces are triangulated on the standard the same in principle as the double braces in the Hall patent.
In the patent issued to F. A. Balch, in 1867, for a winding reel are shown the double braces, the standard, the sliding collars, and the rest with a set screw, comprising all of the expanding mechanism of the Hall patent. The outer ends of the braces are hinged on a blade which may be made as long as desired, and it would require only mechanical skill to adapt this reel to the device patented by Hall. Such an adaptation, produced by simply lengthening the ribs, would have secured the accomplishment of the same result in exactly the same way.
But, aside from these prior patents, the state of the art is perhaps more clearly illustrated in the device used for opening and shutting a common umbrella. In this device are found all the elements of the combination of the second claim. There are the standard, the collar with the rest, the double braces, and the ribs. Because the upper ribs are elongated so as to hold the fabric which covers them, it cannot be said that the double braces are different in principle and operation from those used in the patent in controversy. It would require but ordinary mechanical skill to convert a skirt form into an umbrella, or an umbrella into a skirt form like that described in the Hall patent.
It is conceded by the appellee that all of the elements of the second claim are old, except ribs c, which, it is claimed, constitute the new and patentable feature of the Hall invention; but, from the foregoing brief review of the prior art, we think it clearly shown that the ribs c do not constitute any new feature. They are shown in the Everett invention; in the Wilson patent, where it is said there may be as many as [p. 227] neoessary; and in the common umbrella; also in the Ferris device for a corset exhibitor, where the function performed by the ribs constitutes the chief feature of the invention ; and in the Balch reel short ribs are used, which might be lengthened to adapt the device to the dress form patented by Hall.
But it is urged on behalf of the appellee that the Hall patent differs from all previous devices in presenting a structure which, as an entirety, is radially expansible in all directions from a common centre, so as to preserve the symmetry of the form, whatever its diameter may be, and by the combination of the patent a new and useful result is thus attained which involves patentable novelty. In support of the validity of the patent, the principle stated in Loom, Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580, 591, is invoked. In that case it was laid down by the court, as a general rule, though not an invariable one, “ that if a new combination and arrangement of known elements produce a new and beneficial result, never attained before, it is evidence of invention.” • But we do not consider the Hall patent as coming within the principle there laid down, for the reason that the standard, the double braces, sliding blocks on the standard, and the rests to hold the blocks, as well as the ribs, which constitute the combination of the second claim, were not only found in the prior devices, but they separately and in combination with such devices performed the same function, and operated in substantially the same way as in the Hall patent. The combination of old elements which perform no new function and accomplish no new results does not involve patentable novelty. Mosier Safe Co. v. Mosier, 127 U. S. 354, 361; Hailes v. Van Wormer, 20 Wall. 353, 368; Reckendorfer n. Faber, 92 IT. S. 347; Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310, 318; Peters n. Hanson, 129 IL S. 541.
The use and purpose sought to be accomplished by the Hall patent was the radial expansion of the dress form, but it is "ell settled by the authorities that the end or purpose sought to be accomplished by the device is not the subject of a patent. The invention covered thereby must consist of new and useful means of obtaining that end. In other words, the subject of a patent is the device or mechanical means by which the desired [p. 228] result is to be secured. Carver v. Hyde, 16 Pet. 513, 519; LeRoy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156 ; Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252; Barr v. Duryee, 1 Wall. 531; Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 IT. S. 288.
Tested by these authorities the validity of the patent in question must be ascertained, not from a consideration of the purposes sought to be accomplished, but of the means pointed out for the attainment thereof, and if such means, adapted to effect the desired results, do not involve invention, they can derive no aid or support from the end which was sought to be secured. All that Hall did was to adapt the application of old devices to a new use, and this involved hardly more than mechanical skill, as was ruled in Aron v. Hanhattan Railway Co., 132 U. S. 85, where it was said: “ The same device employed by him (the patentee) existed in earlier patents; all that he did was to adapt them to the special purpose to which he contemplated their application, by making modifications which did not require invention, but only the-exercise of ordinary mechanical skill; and his right to a patent must rest upon the novelty of the means he contrived to carry his idea into practical application.”
There is another test as to the validity of the second claim. If the Balch, Everett, Wilson, or Ferris patents, or even the umbrella, were subsequent in date to that of the Hall patent, they would constitute an infringement thereof, for the rule is well established that “that which infringes, if later, would anticipate if earlier.” Peters v. Active Nfg. Co., 129 IT. S. 530, 537 ; Thatcher Heati/ng Co. v. Burtis, 121 U. S. 286, 295; Grant v. Walter, 148 U. S. 547, 554; Gordon v. Warder, ante, 47.
If, however, the patent could be sustained at all, it would have to be restricted and confined to the specific combination described in the second claim as indicated by the letters of reference in the drawings, and each element specifically pointed out is an essential part thereof. Duff v. Sterlwg Pump Co., 107 IT. S. 636, 639 ; Newton v. Furst & Bradley Co., 119 IT. S. 373 ; Bragg v. Fitch, 121 IT. S. 478; Crawford n. Heysinger, 123 IT. S. 589 ; Dryfoos n. Wiese, 124 IT. S. 32.
For if not so restricted by the letters of reference the effect would be to make the claim coextensive with what was rejected in the Patent Office.
If any validity could be conceded to the patent, the limitation and restriction which would have to be placed upon it by the action of the Patent Office, and in view of the prior art, would narrow the claim, or confine it to the specific structure therein described, and as thus narrowed there could be no infringement on the part of appellants if a single element of the patentee’s combination is left out of the appellants’ device. Sargent v. Hall Safe de Lock Co., 114 U. S. 63; Eddy v. Den/nis, 95 U. S. 560 ; McCormick v. Talcott, 20 How. 402.
The appellants’ dress form, which is alleged to infringe the combination of elements particularly described in the second claim of the Hall patent, does not contain several of the specific elements of said claim; it has a tubular standard, within which is a loose vertical rotable shaft extending above the end of the standard. Surrounding this shaft are several ribs. The shaft is screwr-threaded at one portion with a left-hand thread, and at a portion above the left-hand thread there is a right-hand screw-thread. On each of these portions is a corresponding nut, so that the shaft being rotated in one direction will cause the nuts to approach each other, or, rotated in the opposite direction, the nuts will separate. Above the screw-threaded nuts is a fixed and immovable collar. To this collar and the movable nuts are hinged the braces which are similar to those described in the Hall patent. By turning the top of the standard either to the right or to the left the whole form is adjusted by one movement.
Comparing this device with the combination described in the Hall patent, it is found that there are a standard, double braces, and ribs, but there are no sliding blocks or rests, and the function of the standard is doubled. There is no sliding block whatever at the top of the upper braces, and the lower collar is a screw-threaded nut resting upon corresponding screw-threads in the standard. It is clear that the sliding blocks and the rests, two of the five elements specifically described in the a 1 Patent, are not employed in the dress form of the appel-
Dissenting Opinion: Brown, Shiras, JJ.
lants. If the Hall patent was a valid pioneer invention, the doctrine of equivalents might be invoked with regard to the sliding blocks and rests, and thus a different question would be raised, but, being confined to the specific elements enumerated by letters of reference, it is neither entitled to a broad construction, nor can any doctrine of equivalents be invoked so as to make the appellants’ device an infringement of the second claim in controversy.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Hall patent is invalid, and further, if it could be sustained at all, it would have to be in the most restricted form, and thus restricted, it is not infringed by the appellants. It follows, therefore, that in each case the judgment of the courts below must be
Reversed, and the cause remanded, with direction to dismiss the bill.
Mr. Justice Brown (with whom was Mr. Justice Shiras ) dissenting.
In the construction of his device Hall took the principle of the common umbrella and of an adjustable reel for unwinding yarn, and by adding to it ribs and elastic bands, adapted it to an entirely different purpose, namely, to the construction of an adjustable dress form, which has largely supplanted those previously in use. While the changes made were not radical in their character, I think they were such as to involve invention within the rule stated in Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 IT. S. 580, 591; The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U. S. 275; Gandy v. Main Belting Co., 143 U. S. 587; and Topliff v. Topliff, 145 IT. S. 156; and that the change made by the defendant in using a collar fixed to the standard for the upper sliding block, and a nut and threaded standard for the lower sliding block and rest of the Hall patent, was in fact the substitution of well-known equivalents, and does not exonerate them from the charge of infringement.
The Chief Justice did not sit in this case and took no part in its decision.
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