SMITH v. Whitman Saddle Co. A ppp, at, 148 U.S. 674 (1893)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
SMITH v. Whitman Saddle Co. A ppp, at, 148 U.S. 674 (1893)
Full caption
SMITH v. WHITMAN SADDLE COMPANY. A ppp, at, from the circuit court of the united states fob THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 17, 1893
SMITH v. WHITMAN SADDLE COMPANY.
A ppp, at, from the circuit court of the united states fob
THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.
No. 188. Argued and submitted March 28, 1893. — Decided April 17,1893.
Where a new and original shape or configuration of an article of manufact ure is claimed in a patent issued under Rev. Stat. § 4929, its utility is an element for consideration in determining the validity of the patent. or ham Manufacturing Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, distinguished.
The test of identity of design in the invention covered by such a paten the sameness of appearance to the eye of an ordinary observer. The saddle, the design for which is protected by letters patent No. > ’
issued September 24, 1878, to Royal E. Whitman for an improve for saddles, was made by taking the front half of a saddle previo
known as the Granger tree, and the rear half of a saddle known as the Jenifer or Jenifer-McClellan saddle, changing the Granger tree part so as to have a perpendicular drop of some inches at the rear of the pommel.
In view of this previous condition of the art,, the new and material thing protected by those letters patent was the sharp drop of the pommel at the rear, and they were not infringed by the saddles constructed by the plaintiffs in error.
The Whitman Saddle Company, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York, brought this bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Connecticut, against Charles D. Smith and Benjamin A. Bourn, citizens of the State of Connecticut, and doing business in the city of Hartford, under the firm name and style of Smith, Bourn & Co., for the alleged infringement of a patent for a “ design for saddles,” No. 10,844, dated September 24, 1878.
The Circuit Court sustained the patent, adjudged that complainant was entitled to recover of the defendants as infringers, and rendered a decree perpetually enjoining them, and for an amount found due for profits, costs, charges and disbursements, from which decree an appeal was taken to this court. The opinion of Judge Shipman is reported in 38 Fed. Rep. 414.
The specification and claim are as.follows:
“ Be it known that I, Royal E. Whitman, of Springfield, Hampden County, State of Massachusetts, have invented an improved design for saddles, of which the foHowing is a specification:
“ The nature of my design is fully illustrated in the accompanying photographic picture, to which reference is made.
“ Figure 1 is a side profile view, and Fig. 2 a partial front view.
“ The pommel B rises at the fork to a point on, or nearly on, a horizontal level with the raised and prolonged cantie. The pommel on its rear side falls nearly perpendicularly for some inches, when it is joined by the line forming the profile of the seat. The straight inner side of the pommel (marked ty is joined at c by the line C of the seat. The line C [p. 676] describes a gradual curve to the centre of the seat, from thence gradually rising to the highest point of the cantie D. The cantie is defined in side profile by the lines ef, starting from its outer end in continuous curves, which separate to define the thickness of the cantie before uniting at a point g, near the centre of the saddle, the line f forming the outside and rear edge of the saddle until joined by the line A, which, leaving the line f at an angle, bends to form the rear bearing of the saddle. The line from the front of the pommel B inclines outward for some distance in a nearly straight line, before being rounded toward the rear to join the line /¿, at the point where the stirrup-strap is attached, to thus define the bottom line of the saddle, the outline given by line m from the pommel being the general form of the English saddle-tree known as the ‘ cut-back.’
“ A plan view of the saddle shows a centre longitudinal slot extending from pommel to cantie.
“ I am aware that portions of the curves employed by me have been used in the designing of saddles ; but, when combined with a longitudinally-slotted tree, the lines I employ to give the profile form a new design for saddles, and giving the general idea in the front, lower and rear lines of a sea-fowl or vessel modelled upon the same curves, and by these curves and lines giving the impression of lightness, grace and comfort that could not as well be conveyed by any others, as the impression of comfort is given by the large amount of bearing-surface obtained without undue elevation above the back of the animal, combined with the large seat for the rider, and lightness and grace by the small surface of tree shown m vertical plan, coupled with the form in which it is presented.
“ Now, having described my invention, what I claim is
“ The design for a riding saddle, substantially as shown and described.”
The following is the picture referred to:
Mr. W. E. Simonds for appellant.
Mr. Samuel A. Duncan for appellee submitted on his brief.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court :
Section 4929 of the Revised Statutes provides that : “ Any person who, by his own industry, genius, efforts and expense, has invehted and produced any new and original design for a manufacture, bust, statue, alto-relievo or bas-relief; any new and original design for the printing of woollen, silk, cotton or other fabrics; any new and original impression, ornament, pattern, print or picture to be printed, painted, cast or otherwise placed on or worked into any article of manufacture ; or any new, useful and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture, the same not having been known or used by others before his invention or production thereof, or patented or described in any printed publication, may, upon [p. 678] payment of the fee prescribed and other due proceedings had, the same as in cases of inventions or discoveries, obtain a patent therefor.”
The first three of these classes plainly refer to ornament, or to ornament and utility, and the last to new shapes or forms of manufactured articles; and it is under the latter clause that this patent was granted.
In Gorham Manufacturing Co. V. White, 14 Wall. 511, 524, it was said by this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Strong, that the acts of Congress authorizing the granting of patents for designs contemplated “ not so much utility as appearance, and that, not an abstract impression, or picture, but an aspect given to those objects mentioned in the acts. . . . And the thing invented or produced, for which a patent is given, is that which gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives form. The law manifestly contemplates that giving certain new and original appearances to a manufactured article may enhance its salable value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the public. It, therefore, proposes to secure for a limited time to the ingenious producer of those appearances the advantages flowing from them. Manifestly the mode in which those appearances are produced has very little, if anything, to do with giving increased salableness to the article. It is the appearance itself which attracts attention and calls out favor or dislike. It is the appearance itself, therefore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not entirely, the contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense.” This language was used in reference to ornamentation merely, and moreover the word “ useful,” which is in section 4929, was not contained in the act of 1842, under which the patent in Gorham Co. v. White, was granted. So that now where a new and original shape or configuration of an article of manufacture is claime, its utility may be also an element for consideration. Lehnheuter v. Ilolthaus, 105 IT. S. 94.
But as remarked by Mr. Justice Brown, then District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, in Northrup n. Adams, 12 0. G. 430, and 2 Bann. & Ard. 567, 568, which was a bill for the infringement of a design patent for a cheese safe, the law applicable to design patents “ does not materially differ from that in cases of mechanical patents, and ‘ all the regulations and provisions which apply to the obtaining or protection of patents for inventions or discoveries . . . shall apply to patents for designs.’ (Sec. 4933.) ” And he added: “ To entitle a party to the benefit of the act, in either case, there must be originality, and the exercise of the inventive faculty. In the one, there must be novelty and utility; in the other, originality and beauty. Mere mechanical skill is insufficient. . There must be something akin to genius — an effort of the brain as well as the hand. The adaptation of old devices or forms to new purposes, however convenient, useful or beautiful they may be in their new role, is not invention.” Many illustrations are referred to, as, for instance, the use of a model of the Centennial Building for paper weights and ink stands; the thrusting of a gas-pipe through the leg and arm of the statue of a shepherd boy, for the purpose of a drop light; the painting upon a familiar vase of a copy of Stuart’s portrait of Washington — none of which were patentable, because the elements of the combination were old. The shape produced must be the result of industry, effort, genius or expense, and new and original as applied to articles of manufacture. Foster v. Crossin, 44 Fed. Bep. 62. The exercise of the inventive or originative faculty is required, and a person cannot be permitted to select an existing form and simply put it to a new use any more than he can be permitted to take a patent for the mere double use of a machine. If, however, the selection and adaptation of an existing form is more than the exercise of the imitative faculty and the result is in effect a new creation, the design may be patentable.
In Jennings n. Kibbe, 10 Fed. Rep. 669, and 20 Blatchford, 353, Mr. Justice Blatchford, when Circuit Judge, applied the rule laid down in Gorham Manufacturing Co. n. White, supra, stating it thus, that “ the true test of identity of design is [p. 680] sameness of appearance, — in other words, sameness of effect upon the eye; that it is not necessary that the appearance should be the same to the eye of an expert, and that the test is the eye of an ordinary observer, the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordinary acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article upon which the design has been placed that degree of observation which men of ordinary intelligence give.” Ripley v. Elson Glass Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 927.
In this case it appeared from the evidence that among other trees and saddles that were old in the prior art was one called the Granger tree, which had a cut-back pommel and a low, broad cantie, and was well known; and another called the Jenifer tree or Jenifer-McClellan saddle, which was also well known, and had a high, prominent pommel and a high-backed cantie, or hind protuberance, in the shape of a duck’s tail.
The exhibits embrace, among others, a slotted Granger saddle, the Jenifer-McClellan, the Sullivan-Black-Granger tree, and the saddle sold by the defendants, the latter being substantially the Granger saddle with the Jenifer cantie.
The saddle design described in the specification differs from the Granger saddle in the substitution of the Jenifer cantie for the low, broad cantie of the Granger tree. In other words, the front half of the Granger and the rear half of the Jenifer, or Jenifer-McClellan, make up the saddle in question, though it differs also from the Granger saddle in that it has a nearly perpendicular drop of some inches at the rear of the pommel, that is, distinctly more of a drop than the Granger saddle had.
The experienced judge by whom this case was decided conceded that the design of the patent in question did show prominent features of the Granger and Jenifer saddles, and united two halves of old trees, but he said: “ A mechanic may take tne legs of one stove, and the cap of another, and the door of another, and make a new design which has no element of invention ; but it does not follow that the result of the thought of a mechanic who has fused together two diverse shapes, which were made upon different principles, so that new lines and curves and a harmonious and novel whole are [p. 681] produced, which possesses a new grace and which has a utility resultant from the new shape, exhibits no invention.” And he held that this was effected by the patentee and that the shape that he produced was, therefore, patentable. But we cannot concur in this view.
The evidence established that there were several hundred styles of saddles or saddle-trees belonging to the prior art, and that it was customary for saddlers to vary the shape and appearance of saddle-trees in numerous ways according to the taste and fancy of the purchaser. And there was evidence tending to show that the Granger tree was sometimes made up with an open slot and sometimes without, and sometimes with the slot covered and padded at the top and sometimes covered with plain leather ; while it clearly appeared that the Jenifer cantie was used upon a variety of saddles, as was the open slot. Nothing more was done in this instance (except as hereafter noted) than to put the two halves of these saddles together in the exercise of the ordinary skill of workmen of the trade, and in the way and manner ordinarily done. The presence or the absence of the central open slot was not material, and we do not think that the addition of a known cantie to a known saddle, in view of the fact that such use of the cantie was common, in itself involved genius or invention, or produced a patentable design. There was, however, a difference between the pommel of this saddle and the pommel of the Granger saddle, namely, the drop at the rear of the pommel, which is thus described in the specification: “The pommel, on its rear side, falls nearly perpendicularly for some inches, when it is joined by the line forming the profile of the seat. The straight inner side of the pommel (marked 5) is joined at c by the line C of the seat.” The specification further states : “ The line from the front of the pommel B inclines outward for some distance in a nearly straight line, m, before being rounded toward the rear to join the line A, at the point where the stirrup-strap is attached, to thus define the bottom line of the saddle, the outline given by line m from the pommel being the general form of the English saddle-tree known as the ‘cut-back.’ ”
Syllabus.
The shape of the front end being old, the sharp drop of the pommel at the rear seems to constitute what was new and to be material. Now, the saddles of the defendants, while they have the slight curved drop at the rear of the pommel, similar to the Granger saddle, do not have the accentuated drop of the patent, which “ falls nearly perpendicularly several inches,” and has a “ straight inner side.” If, therefore, this drop were material to the design, and rendered it patentable as a complete and integral whole, there was no infringement. As before said, the design of the patent had two features of difference as compared with the Granger saddle, one the cantie, the other the drop. And unless there was infringement as to the latter there was none at all, since the saddle design of the patent does not otherwise differ from the old saddle with the old cantie added, an addition frequently made. Moreover, that difference was so marked that in our judgment the defendants’ saddle could not be mistaken for the saddle of the complainant.
There being no infringement the decree must be reversed and the cause remanded, with a direction to dismiss the bill, and it is
So ordered.
BUSHNELL v. CROOKE MINING & SMELTING COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO.
No. 195 Argued and submitted April 4, 5,1893. —Decided April 17, 1893.
A federal question, suggested for the first time in a petition for a rehearing, after judgment in the highest court of a State, is not properly raised so as to authorize this court to review the decision of that court.
The decision in the state court in this case clearly presented no fe era question; as no right, immunity or authority under the Constitution or laws of the United States was set up by the plaintiffs in error, or *^e”ie by the Supreme Court of the State, nor did the judgment of the a^er court necessarily involve any such question, or the denial of any right.
Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.
Jfr. A. R. Bushnell in person for himself and others plaintiffs in error, and in opposition to the motion.
Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, for defendant in error and in support of the motion.
Mr. C. S. Thomas and Mr. IF. H. Bryant filed a brief in support of the motion.
Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action of ejectment brought by the defendant in error in the district court of Hinsdale County, State of Colorado, against the plaintiffs in error to recover possession of a certain portion of the surface location of a mining claim on Ute Mountain in said county and State. The suit grew out of conflicting and interfering locations of mining claims by the parties. The defendant in error was the owner or claimant of a mining location, called the Annie lode, while the plaintiffs in error were the owners of a claim called the Monitor lode. The claim of the latter was first located, but when the plaintiffs in error applied for a patent the defendant in error filed an adverse claim to a portion of the same location, and thereafter, under section 2326 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and within the time prescribed therein, the defendant in error commenced this action in the state court to recover possession of the portion of the surface location which was in interference and in controversy between the parties.
In its complaint or declaration it is alleged that it is the owner of the Annie lode mining claim, and that defendants below had, at a certain date, entered upon and ever since wrongfully held possession of a part of said claim specifically described, and that the action was in support of plaintiff’s adverse claim to such portion of the surface location. The answer of the defendants (plaintiffs in error) interposed a [p. 684] general denial of all the allegations contained in the complaint or declaration.
The question presented on the trial of the controversy, under the pleadings, was purely one of fact, and had reference to the true direction which the Monitor lode or vein took after encountering a fault, obstruction or interruption at a point south of the discovery shaft sunk thereon. It was claimed by the plaintiff below that the true vein or lode of the Monitor claim did not bear westwardly so as to cross the Annie lode, but that its true direction was southeastwardly across the line of its location, and was not within the distance of one hundred and fifty feet from the centre of the Annie lode.
The court charged the jury fully and clearly upon this question of fact, as follows:
“ 1st. The court charges you that the defendants have applied for a patent from the United States on what is claimed by them as the Monitor lode mining claim, in Galena mining district in this county. The plaintiff company has brought this action in ejectment in support of an adverse claim made and filed by it to a part thereof described in the complaint as lying within the boundaries of what is claimed by the plaintiff as the Annie lode.
“ 2d. The court charges you that if the original locators of the Monitor lode within the time required by law sunk a sufficient discovery shaft thereon, posted at the point of discovery a sufficient location notice, and properly put out their boundary posts marking their surface boundaries, and, on June 20, 1875, recorded their claim in the office of the county recorder by a sufficient location certificate, in compliance with the law, and the owners thereof have ever since then performed labor or made improvements thereon each year to the amount of one hundred dollars or more, then the plaintiff company’s original grantor, John Dougherty, in attempting to locate the Annie lode to include a part of sue surface ground and in sinking the discovery shaft thereon in October, 1878, wasprimafacie a trespasser in so doing, an the plaintiff cannot recover in this action unless it shows tha he was not a trespasser in so doing.
“ 3d. The court charges you that the plaintiff claims that the Monitor lode claim was never properly located, and that the vein on which its discovery shaft is sunk does not run down through its surface ground as located to the southwest, but that it runs off from its surface ground through its southeast side line at a point about — feet from its discovery shaft, and that by reason thereof Dougherty [plaintiff’s grantor] was not a trespasser in locating the Annie lode discovery shaft and a part of its surface ground within the boundary stakes of the Monitor lode.”
“ 9th. The court charges you that the question here is: Is the course of the Monitor vein from the discovery shaft down the mountain towards the southwest, along the line claimed by defendants, or off through the southeast side line of the Monitor lode surface grounds or otherwise, as claimed by plaintiff? And the court further charges you that upon this question the presumption is that the course of the vein is as located, and the plaintiff company must prove that the course of the vein is not as located; otherwise, on this point, plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict shall be for the defendants.
“ 10th. The court charges you that it is not sufficient that the plaintiff merely raises a doubt in your minds as to whether the Monitor vein runs as the lode is staked or not. The plaintiff must satisfy you by a preponderance of the testimony that the lode does not run as staked; otherwise, upon this question, you will find for the defendants.
“11th. The court charges you that the discoverer and prior locator of a lode or vein has a right to stake his lode according to his best judgment as to where it runs.
“ 12th. Such prior locator has a right to move and change his boundary stakes upon his lode and take his ground thereon within the legal limits to suit himself at any time within sixty days after the date of his location or discovery notice.”
“ 14th. The court charges you that when a vein branches m its course a prior locator has a legal right to follow with his location whichever branch of it he chooses at the time of making such location.”
“ 16th. The court instructs the jury in the law of this case [p. 686] that if the locators of the Monitor mine made the location on the Monitor lode or vein and staked it as running down the mountain in the direction of the Annie vein in controversy, and uniting therewith or running parallel thereto substantially through the centre of the surface ground of the Monitor lode claim, the said Monitor locators or their assignees are entitled to the whole of said vein as staked, even if the alleged Enterprise vein crosses said Monitor vein and runs in the course of the Monitor vein as staked, provided that at such crossing the said veins course so together that it is simply conjectural that said 4Monitor’ lode is crossed by said so-called‘Enterprise' vein and does not continue in its course as staked.”
“ 18th. The court instructs you that it is of no consequence where the so-called Annie vein runs in any part of its course if Dougherty [the plaintiff’s grantor] was a trespasser in locating it. A trespasser’s location is entirely void.”
The court then refused to give the following instructions for the plaintiffs in error:
“ 13. The court charges you that a prospector in locating his vein is not required to follow it through a fault or other obstruction which interposes solid country rock in its course, but in such case he may follow with his location any vein that continues on from the point of such obstruction in the general course of his original vein.”
“ 15. The court charges you that if a prospector in locating his lode discovered by a first location secures continuous vein matter substantially along through the centre of his surface ground in a continuous general direction, and so that the extension of his end lines will include between them all of his surface ground, he will hold the same and every part thereof against all subsequent claimants.”
It thus appears that the question at issue, under the pleadings and at the trial, was as to the true course of the Monitor lode or vein down the mountain south of its discovery shaft. The jury found the following verdict in favor of the defendant in error: “We, the jury, find the issues joined for the plaintiff, and that it is the owner of and entitled to the possession of the ground described in the complaint.”
The plaintiffs in error moved for a new trial on the ground of error in the charge to the jury, and because of the refusal of the court to instruct the jury as requested, and for various reasons, such as the admission of improper testimony offered by the plaintiff below, and the refusal to admit proper testimony offered by the defendants below, and other alleged errors and irregularities committed in the progress of the trial, which are not brought under review in the present case.
A new trial being refused an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Colorado, which held that there was no error in the instructions given to the jury, nor in the refusal to give those requested by the plaintiff in error, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The Supreme Court of Colorado rested its judgment and affirmance upon the general proposition that the trial court had correctly stated to the jury the principal point in controversy, and had left it properly to them to determine as a matter of fact what was the course of the Monitor lode. The Supreme Court said: “ The controlling issue in the case, we think, was fully understood by the jury, and was clearly stated by the court in the 9th instruction, viz.: ‘ The principal point in the controversy is, upon what vein was the Monitor claim located or what is the course of said vein. The defendants allege and seek to prove that the location was made upon a vein which runs from the discovery shaft of the Monitor across and towards the vein upon which the Annie claim was located, while the plaintiff asserts and seeks to prove that the location was made upon a vein which runs from the Monitor shaft down and nearly parallel with the Annie lode, and which empties into or connects with the Ule lode. This is the principal point in controversy, and to determine which claim is best supported by testimony and reason is the province and duty of the jury.’ ”
After the decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the State a petition for rehearing was presented by the plaintiffs in error, which, for the first time, sought to present the question whether section 2322 of the Revised Statutes of the United States gave to the appellants “ ‘ the exclusive right [p. 688] of possession’ and enjoyment of all other veins and lodes having their apexes within the Monitor surface ground, which would give to these appellants beyond all question the so-called ‘ Enterprise ’ that is alleged to ‘ cross ’ the ‘ Monitor ’ on the surface; and certainly a vein that is thus our own cannot be used by one who has no interest either in the ‘ Monitor ’ or i Enterprise ’ title to create any question of lode crossing between them or any other question of conflict. Under such circumstance there is but one grant, and it is all the ‘ Monitor ’ grant and its rights and title, and such grant is in nowise severable into a part ‘ Monitor’ and a part ‘Enterprise,’ no separate life or vitality being given to the said so-called ‘ Enterprise.’ ”
The application for rehearing being denied, the present writ of error was brought to have the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed and reversed. The defendants in error have moved to dismiss the writ or affirm the judgment. The motion to dismiss is based upon several grounds. The principal and only ground which need be noticed, however, is that the record presents no question of a federal character such as will give this court jurisdiction to review the judgment complained of.
It is plainly manifest that neither the pleadings nor the instructions given and refused present any federal question, and an examination of the opinion of the Supreme Court affirming the action of the trial court as to instructions given, as well as its refusal to give instructions asked by the defendants below, fails to disclose the presence of any federal question. It does not appear from the record that any right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution or laws of the United States was specially set up or claimed by the defendant below, or that any such right was denied them, or was even passed upon by the Supreme Court of the State, nor does it appear, from anything disclosed in the record, that the necessary effect in law of the judgment was the denial o any right claimed under the laws of the United States.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado in no way brought into question the validity or even construction of any [p. 689] federal statute, and it certainly did not deny to the plaintiffs in error any right arising out of the construction of the federal statutes. It was said by the Chief Justice, in Cook County v. Calumet a/nd Chicago Canal Co., 138 IL S. 635, 653 : “ The validity of a statute is not drawn in question every time rights claimed under such statute are controverted, nor is the validity of an authority every time an act done by such authority is disputed.”
The attempt to raise for the first time a federal question in a petition for rehearing, after judgment, even assuming that the petition presented any such question, is clearly too late. It has been repeatedly decided by this court that a federal question, when suggested for the first time in a petition for rehearing after judgment, is not properly raised so as to authorize this court to review the decision of the highest court of the State. Texas <& Pacific Railvoa/y v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 137 U. S. 48, 54; Butler v. Gage, 138 U. S. 52; Winona & St. Peter Railroad n. Plainview, 143 U. S. 371; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462.
In the case of Doe v. City of Mobile, 9 How. 451, it was held that under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act this court “ cannot reexamine the decision of a state court upon a question of boundary between coterminous proprietors of lands depending upon local laws.”
The question involved in the present case turned largely upon the provisions of § 3149, 2 Mills’ Annotated Stats, of Colorado, 1788, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State construing the same, as shown by the case of Patterson v. Hitchcock, 3 Colorado, 533, which limited the width of mining claims to 150 feet in width on each side of the centre of the lode or vein at the surface. The controverted question m the case at bar turned upon which direction the Monitor lode properly ran south of the discovery shaft, and it being found by the jury that the lode or vein did not bear westwardly toward the Annie lode, but southeastwardly and across the western side line of the Monitor claim at a distance exceeding 150 feet from the centre of the Annie locle, it followed that the claim of the plaintiff below was sustained,
VOL. CXLVni—44
and the jury accordingly returned its verdict that the plaintiff below was entitled to the possession thereof.
The question thus presented and decided involved no construction of any federal statute, nor did it become necessary to determine the rights of the parties under the federal mining statutes.
In Roby v. Colehour, 146 U. S. 153, 159, Mr Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, said : “ Our jurisdiction being invoked upon the ground that a right or immunity, specially set up and claimed under the Constitution or authority of the United States, has been denied by the judgment sought to be reviewed, it must appear from the record of the case either that the right, so set up and claimed, was expressly denied, or that such was the necessary effect in law of the judgment.”
Applying this rule to the case at bar, there is clearly presented no federal question, for no right, immunity or authority under the Constitution or laws of the United States was set up by the plaintiffs in error, or denied by the Supreme Court of Colorado, nor did the judgment of that court necessarily involve any such question, or the denial of any such right. We are, therefore, of opinion that the motion to dismiss is well made, and should be allowed, and it is accordingly so ordered. . ,
Dismissed.
Mr. Justice Field did not sit in this case, or take part in its decision.
PHINEAS PAM-TO-PEE v. UNITED STATES.
POTTAWATOMIE INDIANS OF MICHIGAN AND
INDIANA v. UNITED STATES.
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
Nos. 1125, 1133. Argued January 9, 10, 1893. — Decided April 17, 1893.
The decision of the Court of Claims respecting the amount of money to be awarded to the Indians in these cases is affirmed; and it is further suggested, as to the distribution of that amount among the several claimants that it is a question of law, to be settled by the court; but as the facts are not presented in an authoritative form, this court acquiesces in the suggestion of the court below that it be dealt with by the authorities of the government.
The questions involved in this case grow out of the stipulations of certain treaties entered into between the United States and the Pottawatomie Indians within the period covered by the years 1795 to 1846, inclusive. In some of the treaties various tribes united with the Pottawatomies, but the tribes were recognized by the government as being distinct from one another, and their respective rights and duties under the treaties were therein defined and set forth. In others the Pottawatomie Indians were included in the tribe designated as the united nation of Chippewa, Ottawa and Pottawatomie Indians, but the government seems to have dealt with the united nation as though it were identical with the Pottawatomie tribe, and we shall so consider it in the present case. By the various treaties the Indians ceded lands to the government, and received for the same other lands, money, etc., and also pledges of specified annuities. By a treaty made on September 26, 1833, the said united nation ceded to the United States a tract of land on the western shore of Lake Michigan, containing 5,000,000 acres, and received as the consideration for the cession a reservation 5,000,000 acres in extent, west of the Mississippi River, various sums of money, [p. 692] and the promise from the government of $280,000, to be paid in annuities of $14,000 a year for twenty years. It was provided by the treaty that a just proportion of the annuity money named therein, as well as a just proportion of the annuities stipulated for in the former treaties, should be paid west of the Mississippi to such portion of the nation as should have removed thither within three years, and that after the expiration of that time the whole amount of the annuities should be paid at the reservation west. On the day following the execution of that treaty an article supplementary thereto was made on behalf of the chiefs and head men of the nation, by which they ceded to the United States certain lands in the Territory of Michigan, south of the Grand River, containing about 164 sections. It was agreed that the Indians making this cession should be considered as parties to the treaty of the preceding day, and be entitled to participate in the benefits of the provisions therein contained, as part of the united nation. To the supplemental article another provision was added, as follows:
“ On behalf of the chiefs and head men of the United Nation of Indians who signed the treaty to which these articles are supplementary, we hereby, in evidence of our concurrence therein, become parties thereto.
“ And, as since the signing of the treaty a part of the band residing on the reservations in the Territory of Michigan have requested, on account of their religious creed, permission to remove to the northern part of the peninsula of Michigan, it is agreed that in case of such removal the just proportion of all annuities payable to them under former treaties and that arising from the sale of the reservation on which they now reside shall be paid to them at l’Arbre Croche.”
Upon the basis of provisions contained in the various treaties, claims for unpaid annuities have been presented to Congress from time to time on behalf of Indians alleged to represent the part of the band mentioned in the last provision of the said supplemental article, and for the purpose, pre sumably, of having all questions connected with those claims finally settled, Congress passed an act, which was approve
March 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 24, c. 39, entitled “An act to ascertain the amount due the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana.” The act is as follows:
“ Whereas representatives of the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, in behalf of all the Pottawatomie Indians of said States, make claim against the United States on account of various treaty provisions which, it is alleged, have not been complied with: Therefore,
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the Court of Claims is hereby authorized to take jurisdiction of and try all questions of difference arising out of treaty stipulations with the said Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, and to render judgment thereon; power is hereby granted the said court to review the entire question of difference de novo, and it shall not be estopped by the joint resolution of Congress approved twenty-eighth July, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled ‘ Joint resolution for the relief of certain Chippewa, Ottawa and Pottawatomie Indians,’ nor by the receipt in full given by said Pottawatomies under the provisions of said resolution, nor shall said receipt be evidence of any fact except of payment of the amount of money mentioned in it; and the Attorney General is hereby directed to appear in behalf of the Government, and if the said court shall decide against the United States the Attorney General may, within thirty days from the rendition of the judgment, appeal the cause to the Supreme Court of the United States; and from any judgment that may be rendered the said Pottawatomie Indians may also appeal to said Supreme Court: Provided, That the appeal of said Pottawatomie Indians shall be taken within sixty days after the rendition of said judgment, and the said courts shall give such cause precedence.
‘ Seo. 2. That said action shall be commenced by a petition stating the facts on which said Pottawatomie Indians claim to recover, and the amount of their claims, and said petition Wy be verified by a member of any ‘ Business Committee ’ or authorized attorney of said Indians as to the existence of [p. 694] such facts, and no other statements need be contained in said petition or verification.”
On behalf of the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, John Critcher filed a petition in the Court of Claims, April 14, 1890, averring that he was the authorized attorney of the said Indians, as, he stated, would appear by an agreement between himself and the business committee of the Indians, dated September 29, 1881, and claiming certain unpaid annuities under the said treaties. The claimants exhibited a table showing by periods of five years, from 1836 to 1872, inclusive, an enumeration of the Indians in Michigan and of those west of the Mississippi, from which it appeared that the average number of the former during that time was 291, and of the latter 2812. The petition contains a statement in detail of the various annuities claimed to be due, and asks for a judgment against the United States in the sum of $223,035.46, as being in the ratio of 291 to 2812 to the entire amount alleged to have been pledged to all the Pottawatomie Indians under the various treaties, plus the amount of $38,000, the sum of the annuities for nineteen years under the treaty of 1833. The latter sum was claimed on the assumption that the claimants should receive, of the annuities arising from the cession of their lands in southern Michigan, not a just proportion, but the whole amount. The claimants averred that the main tribe of Indians moved to their reservation west of the •Mississippi, and that the part of the band which was to remove to the north did so remove in obedience to the terms of the provision supplementary to the treaty of 1833; that they are the representatives of that part of the band, and, as such, are entitled to all the benefits secured by the said supplemental provision.
On November 5, 1890, another petition was filed in the name of Phineas Pam-to-pee and 1371 other Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, by John B. Shipman, their attorney, alleging that they were entitled to share in the annuities secured to the Pottawatomie Indians by the sai treaties; that they were not represented in the petition first filed, and that the attorney named in that petition had no [p. 695] authority to act for them in the premises. This petition was filed on behalf of certain Indians, citizens of the United States, who were individually described by name and residence, alleged to be all the Pottawatomie Indians, so far as could be ascertained, resident in the said States, except not exceeding 250, from 91 of whom they alleged that the attorney named in the first petition derived his authority to act. The claimants stated, however, that their petition was intended for the benefit of all Indians included in the provisions of the act of Congress who might choose to take part in the proceedings in the said court. They averred that the Indians designated in the act, or their ancestors, were parties to all the said treaties, and entitled to share per capita in the annuities secured thereby to the Pottawatomies, and that the conditions imposed upon them by the treaties had been complied with. The claimants alleged that they were entitled to a just proportion of all the annuities provided for by the treaties in question. They interpreted the last provision of the treaty of 1833, as did the claimants in the first petition, to be that the Indians exempted from the requirement of removal west should receive the entirety of the annuity stipulated for in that provision. Under the treaty of 1833 they, therefore, claimed the sum of $38,000, being $2000 per year for the nineteen years the same remained unpaid. They also contended that the perpetual annuities provided for should be capitalized and the amounts thereof, in the sum of $446,000, added to the sum of the past unpaid determinate and perpetual annuities, namely, $2,021,200. Under a treaty made subsequently to 1833, to wit, on June 17, 1846, with the said Indians who emigrated west, the petitioners claimed that the Indians who remained in Michigan were entitled to the sum of 8446,974.80. It is averred that by that treaty the said reservation west of the Mississippi was ceded to the United States by the said Indians, who were promised therefor, in addition to a perpetual annuity of $300, the sum of $850,000, less certain deductions provided for in the treaty; that after making such deductions, the balance remaining was $643,000, which was to be held by the government as a trust fund for [p. 696] the Indians, and was to bear interest at 5 per cent, payable annually for thirty years, and until the nation should be reduced below one thousand souls; that the first instalment of interest became payable in 1849; that the total amount of interest up to and including the year 1890 was $1,350,300, and the value of the same as a capitalized annuity was $643,000, making an aggregate of $1,993,300. The petitioners averred that when the final provisions of the treaty of 1833 were executed, the number, as nearly as they could ascertain, of the Indians removing west of the Mississippi was 3840, and the number of those remaining in Michigan was 1110. They, • therefore, alleged that the gross amounts stated, (with the exception of the said amount of $38,000,) should be apportioned between the Indians who removed west and those who remained in Michigan in the ratio of 3840 to 1110. They deduct from the total of the amounts ascertained as above the sum of $75,162.50, which they admit that the Indians remaining in Michigan received from the government under the treaties of July 29, 1829, and September 26, 1833, and under the act of Congress of July 28, 1866, leaving the sum of $963,058.50. This is the amount alleged to be due the Indians exempted from the requirement of removal west, upon the assumption that their number has remained the same as it was in 1833. The petitioners claimed to represent the Indians only who went north, whose number they alleged to have been the difference between 1110 and the number of those who remained in southern Michigan, and, therefore, the petitioners asked for a judgment for themselves in the sum of $804,383.80.
On January 8, 1891, the United States moved the Court o Claims to consolidate the cases, and on January 19,1891, made a motion to dismiss the case presented by the last-named petition. The motions were reserved to be decided on the tria, and the court ordered that the cases be tried together. Upon the trial the motion to consolidate the cases was a^°we > and the motion to dismiss the second case overruled. e court was of opinion that the purpose of the act of March, 1890, was to have all questions of difference arising from t e [p. 697] claims of the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana settled in an authoritative and judicial form, and that any proceeding which would accomplish that purpose, irrespective of technical rules of pleading, was proper under the act of Congress. It was further observed by the court that in each case it appeared that by special appointment the attorneys named in the petitions represented some of the Pottawatomie Indians who remained in the States of Michigan and Indiana, and that the essential requirements of the statute were thus fulfilled.
After due proceedings were had in the consolidated case, the Court of Claims, on March 28, 1892, 27 C. Cl. 403, found, in substance, the following facts: In obedience to the last provision of the article supplementary to the treaty of September 26, 1833, a few of the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana removed to the northern part of the pen in - sula of Michigan, but the great body of them remained in southern Michigan. To this failure to remove the government did not object, and did not force them to remove. Within the period from 1843 to 1866, inclusive, the Indians remaining in southern Michigan were there paid, by government agents, an aggregate amount of $75,162.50, $39,000 of which was the amount provided for by the joint resolution of Congress referred to in the act giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction in this case. The remaining amount, $36,162.50, was paid to the Indians as their proportion of annuities secured to them by the treaties of July 29, 1829, and the supplemental provision of the treaty of 1833. During the said period, as shown by a table in the office of the Second Auditor of the Treasury, the average number of Indians in southern Michigan was 253, and of those west of the Mississippi, 2834, and payments were made to the Indians in Michigan in this ratio. None of the Indians so paid permanently removed to the northern part of Michigan. During the period from 1836 to 1812, the average number of Indians in Michigan who remained under the treaty of 1833 was 291, and the average number west of the Mississippi was 2812. A number of other Indians residing on the reservation in Michigan in 1833 remained in the State of Michigan. Those Indians, and the 291 [p. 698] who stayed on account of their religious creed, numbered in all 1100. Many of the Indians who were in Michigan at the time the treaty of 1833 was made were dissatisfied with the requirement that they should emigrate west with the main tribe, and refused to go. It was necessary for the government to use force to compel them to leave, and in the struggle caused by this attempt to enforce the treaty many of the Indians, in evading the officers and agents of the government, scattered into different portions of the State, and many went to the northern portion. Those Indians did not come within the supplemental provisions of the said treaty, as construed by the agents of the United States. What their number was cannot be ascertained, but they outnumbered the Indians who remained by consent of the government as coming within the final provision of the treaty of 1833. The United States never made any tender to any Indians at l’Arbre Croche, nor in the northern part of Michigan. The agents of the government did not insist upon the removal of the Indians as a condition of their right of payment at any time.
.Since 1835 the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana have received no payments of annuities provided for by the treaties of the following dates: August 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49, Art. 4; September 30, 1809, 7 Stat. 113, Art. 3; October 2, 1818, 7 Stat. 185, Art. 3; August 29, 1821, 7 Stat. 218, Art. 4; September 20, 1828, 7 Stat. 317, Art. 2; October 20, 1832, 7 Stat. 378, Art. 3; October 26, 1832, 7 Stat. 394, Art.
3. Of the annuities promised by the treaties of October 16, 1826, 7 Stat. 295, Art. 3, and June 17, 1846, 9 Stat. 853, they have received no payments. The court also finds, specifically, that the said Indians have not been paid any money of an annuity of $2000 under the treaty of October 16, 1826, for the year 1848 ; nor of an annuity of $1000 under the treaty of September 20, 1828, for the year 1848 ; nor of an annuity of $15,000 under the treaty of October 20, 1832, for the years from 1843 to 1852, inclusive; nor of an annuity of $20,000 under the treaty of October 26, 1.832, for the year 1852; nor of an annuity of $15,000 under the treaty of October 27,1832, for the year 1844.
The claimants in both cases included in the list of treaties under which they requested the court to find annuities to be due them for the time subsequent to 1836, the last-named treaty, to wit, that of October 27, 1832, but the court made no finding with regard to payments made thereunder except as to the year 1844.
Upon the foregoing facts the court determined, as a conclusion of law, that the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana were entitled to recover the sum of $104,626, and gave judgment for the said Pottawatomie Indians in that amount. Prom that judgment the claimants in both petitions appealed to this court.
Br. John B. Shipman for Phineas Pam-to-pee and others, appellants in No. 1125.
Ur. John Critcher and A/r. George S. Boutwell for the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, appellants in No. 1133.
Ur. Assista/nt Attorney General Pa/rker for appellees.
Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court.
The act of March 19, 1890, entitled “ An act to ascertain the amount due the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana,” conferred jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to “ try all questions of difference arising out of treaty stipulations with the said Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, and to render judgment thereon.” The act granted power to said court to “ review the entire question of difference de novo” and provided for an appeal to this court by either party.
In pursuance of the provisions of this statute, on the 14th of April, 1890, a petition was filed in the Court of Claims by the Pottawatomie-Indians, by their agent and attorney, John Critcher, and on the 5th of November, 1890, another petition by the Pottawatomie Indians, by their agent and attorney, John B. Shipman.
The United States objected to the filing of two petitions, [p. 700] and the court below, overruling a motion to dismiss the later petition, consolidated the causes, and dealt with them as one. The two classes of claimants unite in the appeal to this court.
They agree in complaining of the insufficiency of the sum allowed the Indians by the decree of the court below, but they disagree, as between themselves, in respect to the division of the moneys awarded by the decree. The Indians represented by John Critcher claim the entire fund; those represented by John B. Shipman claim a right to participate in the fund, and claim, likewise, as we understand them, that only 91 Indians are really represented in the first petition. We shall first consider the merits of the appeal as against the United States, and afterwards deal with the question of distribution.
The first controverted question is as to whom is due the annuity of $2000 for twenty years, granted by the last clause of the supplemental treaty of September 27, 1833. The petitioners claim the entire amount, $38,000. The United States contend that this amount is distributable between the Indians who went west under the provisions of the treaty of September 26, 1833, and those who remained in Michigan under the supplemental treaty of September 27, in proportion to their respective numbers.
To answer this question, we must resort to the language of the treaties. The 4th article of the treaty of September 26, 1833, is as follows:
“ A just proportion of the annuity money, secured as well by former treaties as the present, shall be paid west of the Mississippi to such portion of the nation as shall have removed thither during the ensuing three years. After which time the whole amount of the annuities shall be paid at their location west of the Mississippi.” 7 Stat. 431.
The articles supplementary, of September 27, provided as follows, 7 Stat. 442:
“Article 1st. The said chiefs and head-men cede to the United States all their land situate in the Territory of Michigan south of Grand River, being the reservation at [p. 701] Notawasepe, of 4 miles square, contained in the 3d clause of the 2d article of the treaty made at Chicago on the 29th day of August, 1821; and the ninety-nine sections of land contained in the treaty made at St. Joseph on the 19th day of Sept., 1827; and also the tract of land on St. Joseph River opposite the town of Niles, and extending to the line of the State of Indiana, on which the villages of To-pe-ne-bee and Pokagon are situated, supposed to contain about 49 sections.
“Article 2d. In consideration of the above cession it is hereby agreed that the said chiefs and head-men and their immediate tribes shall be considered as parties to the said treaty to which this is supplementary, and be entitled to participate in all the provisions therein contained as a part of the United Nation; and further, that there shall be paid by the United States the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, to be applied as follows : ” (Here follows a specific disposition of $60,000 of it.)
And then this is added :
“ And forty thousand dollars to be paid in annuities of two thousand dollars a year for twenty years, in addition to the two hundred and eighty thousand dollars inserted in the treaty, and divided into payments of fourteen thousand dollars a year.
“ Article 3d. All the Indians residing on the said reservations in Michigan shall remove therefrom within three years from this date, during which time they shall not be disturbed in their possession, nor in hunting upon the lands as heretofore. In the meantime no interruption shall be offered to the survey and sale of the same by the United States. In case, however, the said Indians shall sooner remove the government may take immediate possession thereof.”
On page 445 appears the following, signed by eight Indians but not signed by the commissioners :
“ On behalf of the Chiefs and Head-men or the United Nation of Indians who signed the treaty to which these articles are supplementary, we hereby, in evidence of our concurrence therein, become parties thereto.
“And as since signing of the treaty a part of the band [p. 702] residing on the reservations in the Territory of Michigan have requested, on account of their religious creed, permission to remove to the northern part of the peninsula of Michigan, it is agreed that in case of such removal the just proportion of all annuities payable to them under former treaties, and that arising from the sale of the reservation on which they now reside shall be paid to them at l’Arbre Croche.”
The court below held, with the United States, that under these provisions these claimants were entitled, not to the whole, but to “ a just proportion ” of this annuity provided for in the supplemental articles of September 27, 1833; and in this view we concur.
It was admitted that the one year’s annuity, $2000, had been paid, leaving to be paid $38,000, of which amount the court awarded in favor of the claimants, as “ a just proportion thereof,” the sum of $3653.60. The court arrived at this particular sum by taking the number of the Indians who went west at 2812 and the number of those who were permitted to remain east as 291.
It is claimed that the court below erred in this method of computation, because it gives an interest to Indians who were not entitled, under the supplemental treaty of September 27, 1833, to participate in this fund. An examination of that treaty shows that the annuity of $2000 for twenty years was in part consideration of the cession by the Indians who took part in it of 49 sections of reservations on which they were then settled; and it is claimed with considerable force that the proceeds of the sale of such reservations, so far as this annuity was concerned, should be distributed among the Indians on whose behalf the supplemental treaty was made, to the exclusion of those who had made the treaty of the day before.
However, we think the court below was right in refusing o adopt this view of the case, and in regarding the two treaties as substantially one, and that, therefore, this annuity was distributable among both classes, giving to those who were permitted to remain east “ a just proportion thereof.
The conclusion arrived at by the court below, in its 8 [p. 703] finding, was that, under the several treaties and upon the entire account, there had accrued to the entire tribe, those who had gone west and those who had remained in Michigan and Indiana, the sum of $1,432,800 ; that the portion of this that belonged to the petitioners was $134,368.26. To this is to be added the proportion awarded the petitioner of the $2000 annuity under the supplemental treaty of September 27, 1833, being, as we have already seen, $3653.60. The court below further awarded the petitioners, as their proportionate share of the money due and unpaid of the perpetual annuities under the treaties of September 26 and 27, 1833, the sum of $41,626. As against these sums the court below charged the petitioners with the sum of $75,162.50, which amount it is admitted has been received. The court below was urged to decree that the perpetual annuities under said treaties should be reduced to a cash basis, as of the present time, and be now paid. Such a disposition of these annuities would be a very convenient one, and all the claims of the petitioners would thereby be finally closed. But the court properly held that no power had been given it to convert the perpetual annuities into a sum for present payment; and that matter must be left to be hereafter dealt with by Congress.
As the United States took no appeal, the several contentions on their behalf are not before us for consideration.
Accepting, as we must do, the facts of the case as found by the court below, we perceive no error in its decree establishing the sum due to the petitioners.
How the moneys so awarded shall be distributed among the several claimants it is not easy for us to say. The findings of the court below, and the contradictory statements of the several briefs filed by the appellants, have left this part of this subject in a very confused condition. The court says:
“ The second section provides that said action shall be commenced by petition, stating the facts, and that the same may be verified by a ‘Business Committee,’ or authorized attorney of said Indians. Each of the petitions in this proceeding is verified by the affidavit of the attorney appearing m each case, and in that particular are identical. In each [p. 704] case it appears that by special appointment the attorneys represent some of the Pottawatomies who remained in the States of Indiana and Michigan, under the supplementary article to the treaty of September 27, 1833. In this view of the statute the court allows the motion of the defendants to consolidate the cases, made on the 8th day of January, 1891, and overrules the motion to dismiss cause No. 16,842, made on the 19th of January, 1891.
“ This brings the issue by both petitioners to the consideration of the court, to be disposed of upon one broad ground of the right of all the Pottawatomies of Michigan and Indiana. Congress have recognized by the very title of the act a claimant designated as the ‘ Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana,’ and under that generic head is to be determined the aggregate right of such claimant, leaving the question of distribution to that department of the government, which by law has incumbent on it the administration of the trust which in legal contemplation exists between the United States and the different tribes of Indians.”
On the other hand, it is contended, with great show of reason, by the petitioners who are represented in case No. 1125, (16,842 in the court below,) that the question of what Indians are entitled to participate in the fund is one of law, to be settled by the court, and should not be left to clerical functionaries. Our difficulty, in disposing of this part of the subject, is that we have neither findings nor concessions that enable us to deal with it intelligently.
It is to be observed that the court below found, as a fact, (see finding 10,) that the average proportion between the Indians who removed west and those who remained was as 2812 of the former to 291 of the latter, and the court used that relative proportion of numbers as a factor in computing the amount due the petitioners.
The petitioners, however, -number 1371 in case No. 1125, but the number represented in No. 1133 (16,473 in the court below) is not precisely stated. It is alleged in the brief filed in behalf of petitioners in case No. 1125 that only 91 Indians are actually represented in case No. 1133, ana tna [p. 705] the other 200 Indians are among those represented in case No. 1125.
But these facts are not found for us in any authoritative form. Nor, indeed, would it seem that the court below was furnished with information sufficient to enable it to define what Indians or what number of Indians, entitled to distribution, are represented by the respective attorneys or agents.
Unable as we are to safely adjudicate this question as between these classes of claimants, we can do no better than acquiesce in the suggestion of the court below, that it is one to be dealt with by the authorities of the government when they come to distribute the fund.
As these petitioners no longer have any tribal organization, and as the statutes direct a division, of the annuities and other sums payable, by the head, and as such has been the practice of the government, perhaps the necessities of the situation demand that the identification of each claimant entitled to share in the distribution shall be left to the officers who are the agents of the government in paying out the fund. United States n. Old Settlers, ante, 427.
The decree of the court below is Affirmed.
vol. cxLvni—45
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APPENDIX,
Jtx
LUCIUS QUINTUS CINCINNATUS LAMAR, LL.D.
Mb. Justice Lamar died at Macon, Georgia, the evening of the 23d of January, 1893. On the coming in of the court on the following morning the Chief Justice said:
“It again becomes my melancholy duty to announce the death of a member of this court. Mr. Justice Lamar died at Macon, Georgia, last evening, at 8.50 o’clock. No business will be transacted, but the court will now adjourn until Monday next.”
On Friday, the 29th of January, Mr. Justice Lamar was buried at Macon, the Chief Justice and Justices Blatchford, Brewer and Brown attending the funeral.
At noon, on Saturday, the 11th day of March, 1893, the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States and the officers of the court met in the court room in the Capitol. Mr. William F. Vilas, of Wisconsin, was called to the chair, and Mr. James H. McKenney, Clerk of the court, acted as Secretary. Mr. E. C. Walthall, Mr. J. Z. George, Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson, Mr. A. H. Garland, Mr. John B. Gordon, Mr. William M. Stewart, Mr. James L. Pugh, Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, Mr. T. C. Catchings, Mr. J. Randolph Tucker, Mr. William E. Earle and Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson were appointed a committee to prepare and report resolutions for consideration. Thereupon the meeting was adjourned to Saturday, the 18th of March, 1893, at the same place.
On Saturday, the 18th of March, 1893, the meeting was again convened, pursuant to adjournment. Mr. J. Z. George, on behalf of the committee, reported a series of resolutions, which, after [p. 708] remarks by Mr. J. Z. George, Mr. E. C. Walthall, Mr. T. 0. Catchings, Mr. John H. Mitchell, Mr. William M. Stewart, Mr. Leroy F. Youmans, Mr. J. Randolph Tucker, Mr. Charles E. Hooker and Mr. A. H. Garland were unanimously adopted. The meeting was then adjourned.
On Monday, the 24th of April, 1893, Mr. Attorney General Olney, in compliance with the request of the bar, presented these resolutions to the court with the following remarks :
I have been requested, if your honors please, to present to the court the resolutions of the bar upon the occasion of the death of Mr. Justice Lamar. In undertaking that duty I have no hesitation in saying that the resolutions, which I shall presently read, do but simple justice to the character of your late associate, and in no way exaggerate either the great loss of the whole community or the profound affliction of a very large circle of friends and acquaintances. Under any circumstances, the death of a justice of this court is of preeminent importance. Though the court remains, an element disappears which had vitally affected its deliberations and its results, to be succeeded by a new one different to some extent in the nature of things, and possibly of a wholly diverse character. Thus, as one departs and another assumes his place, a new order of things arises, all the more surely because it comes insensibly and almost by stealth. It is a new order of the greatest moment because, in the scope and extent of its jurisdiction and power, as touching on the one hand the private rights of every one of sixty millions of people, and dealing on the other with the collective rights of numerous populous communities and sovereign States, no court like it or even strongly resembling it has ever existed among men. To have sat upon such a court without reproach and without discredit, may well fill to the full the measure of the loftiest ambition.
With Mr. Justice Lamar has passed away not merely a lawyer and a judge, but a notable historical figure. It may have been his misfortune as a lawyer, though certainly his good fortune as a man, that his lot was cast in tempestuous times — in times which, however adverse to the acquisition of technical knowledge and technica skill, always and inevitably develop whatever there is in a man o intellectual and moral greatness. He was born when the echoes of the sectional contest over the admission of Missouri into t e Union — that issue which startled Jefferson “like a fire bell in t e night ” — were still resounding throughout the land. He was a [p. 709] mere youth when the Missouri Compromise was succeeded by another, and the spectre of disunion was laid for a time by the mingled firmness and moderation of General Jackson. He had hardly entered upon the practice of the law when North and South again came into violent collision over the fugitive-slave law and the extension of slavery into the Territories. He went with his section and his State in the civil war that followed only ten years later, and supported their cause with equal devotion on the battlefield and in the forum. Always and under all circumstances he was a leader, not merely followed and obeyed, but implicitly trusted and sincerely loved.
He continued to lead even more decisively and on a larger field when arms were laid down, and to him more than to any other one man, North or South, is due the adoption by both victors and vanquished of those counsels of moderation, magnanimity and wisdom which have made the edifice of our constitutional Union more impregnable to all assault than ever before. But this eventful and stormy career, these engrossing and exciting occupations and achievements of the soldier and statesman and patriot, necessarily interrupted and prevented that exclusive devotion to the science of jurisprudence, and that constant familiarity with its practical application in the administration of justice, which that jealous mistress, the law, inexorably exacts of all her followers.
I do not believe that Mr. Justice Lamar ever practised law, as his sole or chief occupation, for any one term of five consecutive years. I am unable to discover that he could have made the practice of the law his sole or principal pursuit for more than ten or twelve years in all. And it is the highest possible tribute to his natural genius, to his legal instincts, and extraordinary intellectual gifts, that, in spite of all the disadvantages under which he labored, Mr. Justice Lamar performed his part as a member of this high court of judicature, not only to the acceptance of the bench and the bar, but with such intelligent and well-directed zeal and devotion that only failing health and strength could have prevented his ultimately attaining decided judicial eminence.
The resolutions I have the honor to present are as follows:
Resolved, That by the death of Mr. Justice Lamar the country loses a judge whose career on the bench, though brief, showed that he had a rare judicial mind and temperament, with a great power °f legal analysis, and a faculty of expressing himself in nervous English, which left no room for misunderstanding. His long service [p. 710] in public life fitted him to deal with the great questions of const! tutional law which make a seat upon the bench of the Supreme Court so important and so responsible. He entered early into the public service and soon became prominent. When the war closed no one was more conspicuous than he in-efforts to allay distrust, to do away with division and coldness, and to produce, throughout the Union, a feeling of confidence and good will. For this he labored and spoke in the Senate; and, with this ever before his eyes, he administered the Department of the Interior. We offer this tribute to his memory with no wish to perform a mere perfunctory duty. Over and above his intellect, his trained faculties, his knowledge, his wit and his power, he was an affectionate, loving and lovable man, dear to all who knew him. He is mourned not only by his friends, but by many who had no personal acquaintance with him.
Resolved, That the Attorney General be requested to lay these resolutions before the court, and to ask that they be spread upon the record.
Resolved, That the chairman be requested to transmit a copy of them to the family of Mr. Justice Lamar.
The Chief Justice responded:
The court receives with appreciation the tribute of the bar through the Attorney General to the memory of the eminent man who so recently passed from its membership.
Although he was not spared to give many years to its labors, Mr. Justice Lamar was long enough upon this bench to exhibit on a comparatively new field his undoubted intellectual power, and to demonstrate the possession of marked judicial qualities. The remarkable career which preceded his appointment, crowded with varied incident and filled with distinguished service in public station, while it withdrew him from that active participation in professional practice which assures the habit of prompt decision in ordinary litigation, nevertheless well prepared him for the consideration of those grave public questions that so often press for solution before this tribunal. Experience in affairs had made him sage, and the wisdom thus acquired was aided by that “ desire to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert, readiness to reconsider,” which the great philosopher declared fitte him for nothing so well as for the study of truth. Such was indee his nature, and leadership came to him not merely by reason of is courage, his eloquence, his statesmanlike views and general ability, [p. 711] but largely, perhaps chiefly, because of his simplicity and single-mindedness, his integrity of thought as well as honesty in action, and that unobtrusive and unselfish devotion to duty which gives entrance to the kingdom that " cometh without observation.”
There can be no better qualification for a great magistrate than, in addition to sufficient learning, to possess keen love of justice, earnest desire for truth, absolute sincerity and the highest conception of the responsibilities of public office, coupled with an intimate knowledge of the workings of government obtained through practical experience.
Mr. Justice Lamar always underrated himself. This tendency plainly sprang from a vivid imagination. With him the splendid visions attendant upon youth never faded into the light of common day, but they kept before him an ideal, the impossibility of whose realization, as borne in upon him from time to time, oppressed him with a sense of failure. Yet the conscientiousness of his work was not lessened, nor was the acuteness of his intellect obscured, by these natural causes of his discontent; nor did a certain Oriental dreaminess of temperament ever lure him to abandon the effort to accomplish something that would last after his lips were dumb.
We fully recognize the fitness of the reference to the loving disposition of our departed colleague. This especially endeared him to us, and it was this which enabled him to bear with cheerfulness the trials of a long illness and to find in the consolations of religion the peace that passeth all understanding.
Sincere in his support of a cause to which his early education and the training of opening manhood, his surroundings and personal attachments, committed him, his acceptance of the result of the arbitrament of arms was genuine and unqualified; and the singular felicity was his, here having returned to die at home at last, to appreciably contribute to the restoration of the ties of common interest and affection of a united people; of pride in common institutions and love for a common country; and to pass his closing days in assisting in the authoritative exposition of the wonderful instrument which binds together “the great contexture of this mysterious whole.”
The resolutions and accompanying remarks will be spread upon our records, and the commemorative expressions of the bars of the State of Georgia, of the State of Mississippi and of the State of Illinois, and such other similar testimonials as may be transmitted to us, will be placed on file.
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