Indiana v. United States, 148 U.S. 148 (1893)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Indiana v. United States, 148 U.S. 148 (1893)
Full caption
INDIANA v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 13, 1893
INDIANA v. UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 1162. Argued January 13,1893. — Decided March 13,1893.
The State of Indiana is not entitled, under the act of April 19, 1816, c. 57, and the act of March 3, 1857, c. 104, to be paid by the United States the two per cent of the net proceeds of sales by Congress of lands within the State, which the United States agreed by the former act to apply “to the making of a road or roads leading to the said State,” and have actually applied to the making of the Cumberland road.
This was a petition, filed in the Court of Claims on October 23, 1889, by the State of Indiana against the United States, to recover the sum of $412,184.97, alleged to be due to the State of Indiana out of moneys received by the United States from sales of public lands in that State. The Court of Claims dismissed the petition. 28 C. Cl.------. The petitioner appealed to this court. The facts found by the Court of Claims, and the material provisions of the statutes bearing upon the claim of the petitioner, were as follows:
In the act of April 30, 1802, c. 40, for the admission of the State of Ohio into the Union, one of the propositions offered by Congress, and accepted by the State, was that one twentieth part of the net proceeds of lands within the State, afterwards sold by Congress, should “ be applied to the laying out and making public roads, leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic, to the Ohio, to the said State, and through the same, such roads to be laid out under the authority of Congress, with the consent of the several States through which the road shall pass; ” and it was provided that the propositions so offered were on condition that the State p. 149should provide, by ordinance irrevocable without the consent of Congress, that all lands sold by Congress should be exempt from taxation under authority of the State for five years after sale. 2 Stat. 175. By the act of March 3, 1803, c. 21, § 2, it was enacted that three per cent of these proceeds should be paid, from time to time, to the State, to be applied to the laying out, opening and making roads within it. 2 Stat. 226.
By the act of March 29, 1806, c. 19, for building a road from Cumberland in Maryland to the State of Ohio, (since known as the Cumberland or National road,) and by subsequent acts passed before the admission of the State of Indiana into the Union, Congress appropriated for the building of that road various sums amounting to $710,000, to be reimbursed out of the two per cent fund. 2 Stat. 357, 555, 661, 730, 829 ; 3 Stat. 206, 282. The expenses upon the road during that period largely exceeded the moneys credited to that fund.
The act of April 19, 1816, c. 57, for the admission of the State of Indiana into the Union, likewise provided that five per cent of the net proceeds of the sale by Congress of lands in the State should be reserved for the making of public roads and canals, of which three fifths should be applied to those objects by the State, and two fifths “ to the making of a road or roads leading to the said State, under the direction of Congress.” 3 Stat. 290. And by the act of April 11,1818, c. 49, the Secretary of the Treasury was directed to pay the three per cent, from time to time, to the State of Indiana. 3 Stat. 424.
Similar provisions were contained in the acts for the admission into the Union of Mississippi in 1817, of Illinois in 1818, of Alabama in 1819, and of Missouri in 1820. 3 Stat. 348 428, 489, 545.
By the act of May 15, 1820, c. 123, Congress directed the road to be continued from Cumberland to Wheeling in the tate of Virginia: provided, however, “that nothing in this
aot contained, or that shall be done in pursuance thereof, shall be deemed or construed to imply any obligation on the part of the United States to make, or to defray the expense of p. 150making, the road hereby authorized to be laid out, or of any part thereof.” 3 Stat. 604.
In 1822 the road had been finished from Cumberland to Wheeling. In the same year, an act ordering the erecting of toll gates and the imposition of tolls on the road was passed by both houses of Congress, but was vetoed by President Monroe.
A continuance of the road was laid out, graded, bridged and made a highway from the Ohio River opposite Wheeling to the seat of government of the State of Missouri, and upon it was transported the government mail, and it was opened and used by the public. But this was not accomplished until after toll gates had been erected and tolls imposed upon it by the States of Ohio and Virginia, as authorized by the acts of Congress of March 2, 1831, c. 97, and March 2, 1833, c. 79. 4 Stat. 483, 655. By successive acts, passed from 1829 to 1856 inclusive, and collected in the opinion of the Court of Claims, Congress surrendered the road, as fast as completed, to the States through which it ran.
By the act of September 4, 1841, c. 16, § 16, the two per cent of the net proceeds of the lands sold by the United States in the State of Mississippi, and reserved by former acts for the making of a road or roads leading to that State, was relinquished to the State of Mississippi, to be applied to the making of a railroad from Brandon in that State to the boundary line of Alabama; and by § 17, the like fund was relinquished to the State of Alabama, to be applied to the construction of certain lines of internal improvements in that State. 5 Stat. 457, 458.
By the act of March 2, 1855, c. 139, entitled “An act to settle certain accounts between the United States and the State of Alabama,” it was enacted “ that the Commissioner of the General Land Office be, and he is hereby, required to state an account between the United States and the State of Alabama, for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money are due to said State, heretofore unsettled, under the sixth section of the act of March 2, 1819, for the admission of Alaham a, into the Union ; and that he be required to include in said account the several reservations under the various p. 151treaties with the Chickasaw, Choctaw and Creek Indians within the limits of Alabama, and allow and pay to the said State five per centum thereon, as in case of other sales.” 10 Stat. 630.
The act of March 3, 1857, c. 104, entitled “ An act to settle certain accounts between the United States and the State of Mississippi and other States,” required the Commissioner of the General Land Office, by § 1, “ to state an account between the United States and the State of Mississippi, for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money are due to said State, heretofore unsettled, on account of the public lands in said State, and upon the same principles of allowance and settlement as prescribed in the” act of March 2, 1855, c. 139, and to include in like manner the reservations under Indian treaties; and further provided, in § 2, that “ the said commissioner shall also state an account between the United States and each of the other States upon the same principles, and shall allow and pay to each State such amount as shall thus be found due, estimating all lands and permanent reservations at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.” 11 Stat. 200.
On December 4, 1872, the Commissioner of the General Land Office stated an account between the United States and the State of Indiana, in which he found that, by accounts referred to, there appeared to be due to the State the following sums:
Balance due December 31, 1856, on account of
three per cent fund............................................
$47 12
Amount of two per cent on net proceeds of sales of public lands from December 1, 1816, to December 31, 1856, (the expenses incident to sales since that date being in excess of the gross receipts)....................................................
413,568 61
Amount of five per cent on the cash value, at
$1.25 per acre, of lands within permanent Indian reservations................................. <.... 6,333 73
$419,949 46 p. 15215% OCTOBER TERM, 1892.
The Commissioner also referred to a table of the acts of Congress making appropriations for the construction of the Cumberland road, which showed that the sums appropriated from 1818 to 1837, under acts requiring them to be reimbursed out of the two per cent reserved for the laying out and making1 roads in the States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, amounted to $2,502,900.45; and that the additional sums appropriated from 1825 to 1836, under acts requiring them to be reimbursed out of the two per cent reserved for laying out and making roads in those three States and Missouri, amounted to $1,555,000. The Commissioner then stated that it would thereby be seen that the proportion of the sums from time to time appropriated for the construction of the Cumberland road, which, by law, were to be replaced in the Treasury out of the five per cent accruing in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri, would more than absorb the entire amount of the two per cent which had accrued upon the sales of lands in Indiana; and that, therefore, in the absence of special legislation upon the subject, nothing would appear to be at present payable to the State of Indiana, except the sums of $47.12 on the three per cent account and $6333.73 for Indian reservations.
On January 25, 1873, the Comptroller of the Treasury certified the balance, consisting of those two sums, and amounting to $6380.85, to be due to the State of Indiana. On February 10, 1873, the Secretary of the Treasury, under the authority given him by the act of March 30, 1868, c. 36, (15 Stat. 54,) referred the account to the Comptroller for reexamination, and he thereupon vacated the former certificate. On February 5, 1874, the Comptroller reaffirmed the former decision and certificate, as to the sum of $6380.85; but reserved for future consideration the question as to the further claim made by the State. This amount of $6380.85 was paid to the State, but was not accepted by it as a final settlement of its demands.
It did not appear, either from that account or from the evidence in the case, what part of the expenditures upon the National road was properly chargeable to “ making a road p. 153to the said State,” or what proportion of such expenditures for making a road to the State of Indiana was properly chargeable to the States of Ohio, Illinois and Missouri.
On October 17, 1889, the State of Indiana made a formal demand upon the Commissioner of the General Land Office to state an account between the United States and the State of Indiana, in accordance with the act of March 3, 1857. But no further account than that above mentioned has been stated by the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
Jfr. William E. Earle for appellant.
JTr. Assistant Attorney General Parker for appellees.
Me. Justice Geay, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
By each of the acts of Congress, successively admitting the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri into the Union, Congress agreed that five per cent of the net proceeds of public lands within the State, sold by Congress, should be applied to the making of a road or roads leading to the State; and by those and other acts it was provided that, of this five per cent fund, three per cent should be disbursed by the States, and two per cent by the United States. The general purpose was to promote the construction of a national highway connecting the new States in the interior with the old States on the Atlantic seaboard.
In the act for the admission of Indiana, the original obligation assumed by Congress in this respect did not define the termini of the road or roads to be built, or bind Congress to complete any road, or require the two per cent of the proceeds of the sales of lands in Indiana to be expended within the State; but the only obligation was to apply this two per cent fund “ to the making of a road or roads leading to the said State, under the direction of Congress.” It was for Congress to decide on what part of the road leading to Indiana this fund should be expended; and Congress had the right to p. 154treat the road as a whole, constructed for the benefit of all the States through which it passed.
It is unnecessary to determine whether this obligation was in the nature of a contract only, or whether it can be considered as in any sense constituting a trust; because, in either aspect, the contract has been performed, or the trust executed, by applying the fund in question to the making of a road “ leading: to the said State ” of Indiana.
It appears by the statement of the account between the United States and the State of Indiana by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (which there is nothing in the case to control,) that the sums appropriated to the construction of the Cumberland road leading to the State of Indiana greatly exceeded the wrhole amount of the two per cent fund from sales of lands in the State; and that, therefore, in the absence of special legislation upon the subject, nothing was payable to the State of Indiana on account of this fund.
Congress haying a general authority to apply this fund to any part of the road leading to the State of Indiana, the presumption is that this authority was honestly and fairly exercised, and there is nothing whatever in the record which has any tendency to rebut this presumption. Such being the case, the statement in the findings of fact, that it did not appear, from that account or otherwise, what part of the expenditures upon the road was properly chargeable to “ making a road to the said State,” or what proportion of such expenditures for making a road to the State of Indiana was properly chargeable to the States of Ohio, Illinois and Missouri, is wholly immaterial; and it was so treated by both parties at the argument.
As appears by the definition of the petitioner’s position at the beginning of the brief of its counsel, the failure of the United States to build the National road was not made the foundation of the claim, but “ was only suggested in argument as a motive, by wTay of incidental explanation” of the act of March 3, 1857, c. 104, § 2, upon which he relied, and under which he contended that “it was immaterial what moneys had been expended by the government toward the p. 155construction of the National turnpike.” The decision of the case, therefore, turns upon the interpretation and effect of this act.
The argument for the appellant is based upon the following enactments: By the act of September 4, 1841, c. 16, §§ 16, 17, the United States relinquished to the States of Alabama and Mississippi the two per cent fund accruing from sales of lands in those States. By the act of March 2, 1855, c. 139, the Commissioner of the General Land Office was required to state an account between the United States and the State of Alabama, “ for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money are due to said State, heretofore unsettled,” under the act of 1819 admitting that State into the Union, and to include in that account the reservations under treaties with Indians within the limits of Alabama, “ and allow and pay to the said State five per centum thereon, as in case of other sales.” By the act of March 3, 1857, c. 104, § 1, the commissioner was required to state an account between the United States and the State of Mississippi “ upon the same principles of allowance and settlement as prescribed in ” the act of 1855; and by section 2 of the act of 1857, “said commissioner shall also state an account between the United States and each of the other States upon the same principles, and shall allow and pay to each State such amount as shall thus be found due, estimating all lands and permanent reservations at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.”
It is argued for the appellant that, as by the act of 1857 the account between the United States and the other States is to be settled “ upon the same principles ” as prescribed in that act with relation to Mississippi, and in the act of 1855 with relation to Alabama, and as by the act of 1841 the two per cent fund had been relinquished to Alabama and to Mississippi, therefore the payment to the State of the whole two per cent is one of the principles on which the account with each of the other States is to be settled.
But the premises relied on do not support the conclusion. Neither the act of 1857, nor the act of 1855, refers to the act °f 184L The act of 1857 requires the account with each p. 156State to be settled on “ the same principles of allowance and settlement as prescribed ” in the act of 1855. The principles of allowance and settlement prescribed in the act of 1855 are that the account with Alabama be stated “ for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money are due to said State, heretofore unsettled,” under the act for its admission into the Union, and including five per cent on the Indian reservations within the State, “ as in case of other sales.” The principles of settlement are that the United States shall be charged with the sums due, treating Indian reservations as sales. They may not be limited to Indian reservations, and may well include any unpaid balance of the three per cent fund which Congress had agreed should be disbursed by the States, as well as any part of the two per cent fund which had not been applied by the United States to the making of a road or roads according to their original obligation. But there is nothing, in any of the acts upon the subject, which warrants the inference that Congress intended that, because the United States held themselves to be liable to Alabama and to Mississippi for the two per cent fund which they had never applied as they had agreed, they should therefore be liable to the other States for the like two per cent fund which had been fully appropriated and expended in accordance with their obligations to those States.
These views being conclusive against the right of the State of Indiana to recover anything in this case, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions discussed in the opinion of the Court of Claims and argued in this court.
Judgment affirmed.
In re SCHNEIDER, Petitioner. (No. 1.)
ORIGINAL.
No number. Submitted March 13,1893. — Decided March 14,1893.
A writ of error from this court does not lie to a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing the petition of a convict for a writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner, a prisoner confined in the jail of the District of Columbia, under a sentence of death, by his attorneys, moved for a writ of error from this court to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus, which had been prayed for in a petition to that court. The substance of the averments in the petition is printed in the margin.*12
1 The petition of Howard J. Schneider and of J. M. Wilson, William F. Mattingly and A. A. Hoehling, Jr., his attorneys, and in his behalf, respectfully represents :
1. That the petitioner, Howard J. Schneider, is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the District of Columbia, and that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the above-named respondent, Jerome B. Burke, in the District of Columbia.
2. Your petitioners further say that the facts concerning the detention of petitioner Schneider by the said respondent, and the claim or authority under and by virtue of which said petitioner is so detained, are as follows:
That on the 11th day of February, a .d. 1892, said petitioner was indicted by the grand jury of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a criminal term, on the charge of having murdered Amanda M. Schneider; that, thereafter, such proceedings were had in said court as that said petitioner was arraigned and tried on said indictment, and a verdict of guilty as charged in said indictment was returned against him on the 9th day of April, a .d. 1892, upon which verdict the judgment of the court was thereafter had, and sentence of death pronounced on, to wit the 7th day of May, a .d. 1892.
That, thereafter, an appeal was taken from the said judgment to the said Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a general term, and, afterwards, to wit, on the 9th day of January, a .d. 1893, the said judgment was, by said Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a general term, affirmed; and the said petitioner, under and in pursuance of the pro-
J/?. William F. ALattingly, Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson and Mr. A. A. Uoehling, Jr., for the petitioner.
This is an application for writ of error to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in
ceedings hereinbefore set forth, was committed to the custody of the said Jerome B. Burke, warden of the jail of the District of Columbia, and wh® now holds the said petitioner in custody under and pursuant to said commitment; and to execute said sentence of death on March 17th, a .d. 1893.
3. Your petitioners further aver that said judgment and the said order of commitment, and the said detention of petitioner Schneider by the said warden, pursuant thereto, was, and each of them is, unlawful and void, and that your petitioner is now restrained of his liberty under or by color of the authority of the United States, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, in this, that the right of petitioner, secured and guaranteed him by the Constitution of the United States, to a trial by an impartial jury was denied him, as will more fully appear by reference to the record of said case, and all the proceedings in said trial, and of the hearing before the said general term, as announced by Mr. Justice Cox, all of which are filed herewith and prayed to be taken and read as a part of this petition.
4. Your petitioners further say that, among other reasons why said petitioner Schneider is unlawfully detained, in violation of his rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States, are the following, to wit:
(a) That the said petitioner Schneider, by the proceedings of said court (as will more fully and at large appear by reference to said record), was deprived of his constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury.
(h) That by the laws of the District of Columbia, under and pursuant to which the said proceedings were had, your petitioner Schneider was entitled to have twenty peremptory challenges, to be exercised at his will and according to his own discretion in respect to persons who were legally competent to sit as jurors in said case, of which right he was deprived, as in said record more fully appears, and to which reference is hereby made.
(c) That during the course of the selection of the jury in said case the following named jurors, who had been summoned as such and examined on their voir dire were severally challenged for cause by your petitioner [here follow the names] each one of which said several challenges for cause was by the court overruled, and exception noted by the petitioner to the action of the court in holding said several so challenged for cause to be competent.
(d) That said petitioner exercised each one of the said twenty peremptory challenges allowed him by law, and, when he had so exhausted his twenty peremptory challenges, there still remained on the jury two jurors, as to each of whom your said petitioner had been by the court overruled, p. 159dismissing the petition of Howard J. Schneider in that court for a writ of habeas corpus, based upon the averment that, in his trial, he was denied the right and privilege, secured him
and said jurors, over the objection of the petitioner, were held to be competent, and sat in the trial of the said case.
(e) That among other of the jurors so challenged for cause by petitioner, and by the court held to be competent against the objection of petitioner, was one Charles W. Morris, who, being examined on his voir dire touching his competency to sit as a juror, testified as follows: [Here follows the testimony and a statement that a full and complete record of the case is attached.]
5. Your petitioners aver that in and by the action of the court in the matter of the selection of the jury, and over the objection of the petitioner Schneider, holding to be competent as jurors to sit in the trial of said case said several jurors so challenged for cause, he was deprived of his right to a trial by an impartial jury, secured him by the Constitution of the United States.
And your petitioners further say that in consequence of said jury, by which said petitioner Schneider was tried, not being such an impartial jury as he was entitled to have under the Constitution of the United States, for the reasons hereinbefore given, said court holding a criminal term was without jurisdiction and power to proceed with said trial, and to award judgment on said verdict, and that all said proceedings based thereon were null and void.
Wherefore your petitioners pray that the writ of habeas corpus may issue, directed to said Jerome B. Burke, commanding him to produce your petitioner Schneider before your honorable court, and that such proceedings may be had as may be in accordance with law.
Your petitioners, the above-named attorneys, state and aver that the reasons for uniting in this petition are the following:
That the said Howard J. Schneider has refused to read or to permit to be read to him, or to execute a petition similar to the foregoing, in his individual name. That, in their opinion, he was unable to comprehend either the purport or the necessity for the petition, and that his mental condition is such that, in the opinion of these petitioners, he is unable to intelligently comprehend and make affidavit to the same.
Howard J. Schneider,
. By J. M. Wilson, t w Sis Attorney. J- M. Wilson, Wm. F. Mattingly, A. A. Hoehling , Jr.,
Attorneys for Howard J. Schneider.
by the Constitution of the United States, to be tried by an impartial jury.
Under section 846 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, this court has jurisdiction, upon writ of error or appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in the same cases, and in like manner, as provided by law in reference to the final judgments, orders and decrees of the Circuit Courts of the United States.
Section 847 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia provides that “ no cause shall be removed from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the Supreme Court of the United States by appeal or writ of error unless the matter in dispute shall be of the value of one thousand dollars, or upward, exclusive of costs, except in the cases provided for in the following section.”
The cases provided for in the following section (sec. 848) are cases in which the matter in dispute shall be of the value of one hundred dollars and less than one thousand dollars, involving questions of law of such extensive interest and operation as to render the final decision of them by the Supreme Court of the United States desirable.
Section. 847 was amended February 27, 1877, “ by striking out the last words in the following section,” and inserting the words “ authorized by law; ” so that, as amended, that section would read: “No cause shall be removed from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the Supreme Court of the United States by appeal or writ of error unless the matter in dispute in such case shall be of the value of one thousand dollars or upward,- exclusive of costs, except in the cases provided for authorized by law.”
What cases are provided for, authorized by law?
By section 699 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, a writ of error may be allowed to review any final judgment at law, and an appeal shall be allowed from any final decree in equity hereinafter mentioned, without regard to the sum or value in dispute. Omitting clauses 1, 2 and 3, the section continues:
“ Fourth. Any final judgment at law or decree in equity of p. 161any Circuit Court, or of any District Court acting as a Circuit Court, in any case brought on account of the deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.”
This proceeding in the court below for the writ of habeas corpus is a civil case, brought on account of the deprivation of the right and privilege to be tried by an impartial jury secured the petitioner by the Constitution of the United States, and on which the judgment of the court below was final, denying the writ and dismissing the petition.
The act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 443, c. 355, provides: That no appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or in the Supreme Court of any of the Territories of the United States, unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars.
Sec. 2. That the preceding section shall not apply to any case wherein is involved the validity of any patent or copyright, or in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United States; but in all such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute.
It may be claimed that the above act is a repeal or a substitute for section 847 of the Revised Statutes of the District; but we submit that repeals by implication of law are not favored, nor permitted, where the two acts can stand together. See Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 549, 550, and cases cited.
If this act of 1885 is a repeal of said section 847, then, inasmuch as the act of 1885 also includes the Territories, upon the same principle it would involve the repeal of section 1909, which gives this court jurisdiction on writs of error and appeal from the final decisions of the supreme courts of certain named Territories, where the value of the property or the amount in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars, or upon writs of habeas corpus involving the question of personal freedom.
VOL. CXLVIH—11
That section 1909 has not been considered by this court as repealed by said act of 1885, is manifest from the decisions of this court upon questions of habeas corpus from those Territories. Ilans Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 LT. S. 176.
The Chief Justice : The application for a writ of error or appeal is denied upon the authority of Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82; In re Reath, Petitioner, 144 U. S. 92; Cross, Petitioner, 146 U. S. 271; Cross v. United States, 145 U. 8. 571. See also Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398; Dennison v. Alexander, 103 U. S. 522; United States ex rel. Trask v. Wanamaker, 147 U. S. 149.
Writ denied.
In re SCHNEIDER, Petitioner. (No. 2.)
ORIGINAL.
No number. Submitted March 13,1893. — Decided March 14,1893.
Leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or the officers of the District acting under a judgment of that Court, will be denied, when the ground of the application relates to an error in the proceedings of that Court, and does not go to its jurisdiction or authority.
This was a petition to this court by Howard J. Schneider, and Jeremiah M. Wilson, William F. Mattingly, and A. A. Hoehling, Jr., his attorneys, and in his behalf. The allegations in the petition were substantially identical with those in the petition set forth in the margin in In re Schneider, Petitioner, (No. 1) ante, 157. The prayer was as follows:
“ Wherefore your petitioners pray that the writ of habeas corpus issue to Jerome B. Burke, the warden of the United States jail, in the District of Columbia, commanding him to produce the body of the petitioner, Schneider, in court fort - with, together with the cause of his detention as a prisoner by said warden, and that petitioner, Schneider, may be dis charged and set at liberty; and petitioners furthermore pray p. 163that the writ of certiorari may issue to John R. Young, clerk of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, commanding him to certify to this court all the proceedings of record of the United States against Howard J. Schneider in that court, to the end that the errors therein, as set forth in this petition, may be fully corrected by this court.”
The same reasons were given as were given there for the action of the attorneys in uniting in the petition, and for its non-verification by Schneider.
Jfr. Jeremiah M. Wilson, Mr. William F. Mattingly and Jfr. A. A. Hoehling, Jr., for the petitioner.
This is an application to this court for it to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the warden of the United States jail in this District, and a writ of certiorari to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to send up the record.
This application is based upon the averment that the petitioner was deprived of his right and privilege, secured him by the Constitution of the United States, to be tried by an impartial jury.
That this court has, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the right to issue this writ has been decided by it time and time again.
It has also been frequently decided by this court that its appellate jurisdiction in this connection, in contradistinction to its original jurisdiction under the Constitution, is the right which it has thus to review the decision of any inferior court of the United States, and does not mean that the case must be such as it would have appellate jurisdiction over.
This was decided very early in the history of this court in respect to the old Circuit Court of the District, which preceded the present Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. ® parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448; Ex parte Bollma/n de bwartwoiit, 4 Cranch, 75.
These two cases have been commented on and approved by is court in numerous decisions from that time to the present.
bee Evs Pari(i McCardle, 6 Wall. 318, 324 ; 8. C. 7 Wall. 506; p. 164Ehn parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 376; Hans Nielson, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 176.
The claim in this case is that the petitioner, under the circumstances shown in the record, did not have an impartial jury, such as he was entitled to under the Constitution of the United States, and that, for that reason, the court below was without jurisdiction and power to proceed further with the trial and to enter judgment and sentence upon the verdict.
In Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1, on habeas corpus, this court held that, where the indictment had been changed by the court below, in striking out a few words, alleged to be surplusage, there was no indictment by the grand jury, and that the proceedings were a nullity.
In Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, on habeas corpus, this court held that where the sentence passed by the court was not authorized by law, it was a nullity, and the prisoner was discharged. See, also, Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 102.
In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, where the petitioner had been indicted for sending prohibited matter through the mails, while the court held that the law under which he was indicted was constitutional, and denied the writ, within the opinion the court states that the constitutional guaranty of the people to be secured in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures, extends to letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage in the mails; that there was no question before the court as to the evidence upon which the conviction was had, nor does it appear whether the envelope was sealed or left open for examination ; the inference being that if the evidence had shown that the package had been sealed, bearing letter postage, and had been opened by a post office inspector, and the evidence secured in that manner upon which conviction was had, the petitioner would have been entitled to the writ on the ground of the infringement of his constitutional right.
Suppose the court below in this case had decided that the defendant should be tried by eleven jurors, clearly any verdict of such a jury, and judgment based thereon, would be void for want of jurisdiction and power in the court below to proceed, p. 165and the prisoner would be entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus.
Suppose there were twelve jurors in the box, one of whom, upon his examination on his voir dire had declared that he had a fixed and decided opinion that the defendant was guilty; that he was satisfied that no evidence could be produced that could change that opinion, and that if he went into the jury box he would convict, and the court had decided, after all the peremptory challenges of the defendant had been exhausted, that he was a competent juror, and put him on the jury, would not, from that moment, the court have been without jurisdiction to proceed further in the case on the ground that the jury was not impartial ?
In Commonwealth v. Essex Company, 15 Gray, 239, 253, Chief Justice Shaw, in what has become a leading case, puts, for the purpose of testing a leading principle, a case as extreme as the one we above put, and remarks that “extreme cases are allowable to test a legal principle.”
The record shows that the petitioner was compelled to exhaust peremptory challenges upon incompetent jurors who were held to be competent by the court, men who declared that they had not only read the reports in the papers, but also the proceedings at the coroner’s inquest; that they formed fixed and decided opinions, which they still entertained, and which it would require strong evidence to remove.
Charles W. Morris stated on his direct examination, in answer to the question of the District Attorney as to whether he could listen to the evidence given in court, and under the direction of the judge bring in a verdict based solely on the law and the evidence as he might hear it in court, answered, No, sir; I don’t know that I could.” He stated on cross-examination that he had read all the proceedings; that he had formed a very decided opinion, which he still entertained, and that it would require certainly very positive evidence to change his mind, and that, if he took his seat in the jury box, he would be there with an opinion already formed, and which it would require strong evidence to remove.
The question decided by this court in the Heath Case, 144 p. 166U. S. 92, was that a writ of error to the Supreme Court of this District would not lie to review the judgment below, and that the act of March 3, 1891, providing for appeals and writs of error in capital cases from existing Circuit Courts, did not apply to this District.
In Cross v. United States, 145 U. S. 571, which was also a writ of error, the court held that under the act of February 6, 1889, to provide for writs of error in capital cases, the writ would not lie.
That case again came up on appeal from the court below denying the writ of habeas corpus. The court held that the act of March 3,1885, extending its jurisdiction over cases from the Circuit Court to the United States did not enlarge its jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of this District, under its Circuit Court jurisdiction. In re Cross, Petitioner, 146 U. 8. 271.
So that the question involved in the present case has not been decided by this court, and we respectfully request an opportunity to be heard in the premises.
The Chief Justice: Leave to file petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari is denied. The ground of the application does not go to the jurisdiction or authority of the Supreme Court of the District, and mere error cannot be reviewed in this proceeding. Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417; Nidsen, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 176.