Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892)
Full caption
CLYDE MATTOX v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 14, 1892
CLYDE MATTOX v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOE THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.
No. 1008. Submitted October 31, 1892. — Decided November 14,1892.
When the trial court excludes affidavits offered in support of a motion for a new trial, and due exception is taken, and that court, in passing upon the motion exercises no discretion in respect of the matters stated in the affidavits, the question of the admissibility of the affidavits is preserved for the consideration of this court on a writ of error, notwithstanding the general rule that the allowance or refusal of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the application is addressed. * In determining what may or may not be established by the testimony of jurors to set aside a verdict, public policy forbids that a matter resting in the personal consciousness of one juror should be received to overthrow it; but evidence of an overt act, open to the knowledge of all the jury, may be so received.
Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kansas, 539, approved and followed.
On a motion for a new trial on the ground of bias on the part of one of the jurors, the evidence of jurors as to the motives and influences which affected their deliberations is inadmissible either to impeach or support the verdict; but a juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence,, although not as to how far that influence operated on his mind; and he may also testify in denial or explanation of acts or declarations outside of the jury room, where evidence of such acts has been given as ground for a new trial. Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, approved and followed.
The jury in this case, (an indictment for murder,) retired October 7, to consider their verdict. On the morning of October 8, they had not agreed on their verdict. A newspaper article was then read to them, the tendency of which was injurious to the accused. They returned a verdict of guilty. Affidavits of jurors of this fact were offered in support of a motion for a new trial, and were rejected. Held, that this was reversible error.
Dying declarations are admissible on a trial for murder as to the fact of the homicide and the person by whom it was committed, in favor of the defendant.
In this case, a few hours after the commission of the act, and while the wounded man was perfectly conscious, the attending physician informed him that the chances were all against him, and that there was no show for him. He was then asked who did the shooting. He replied that he did
not know. The evidence of this was received without objection. Defendant’s counsel then asked whether in addition to saying that he did not know who shot him, he did not say further that he knew the accused and knew that it was not he. This was objected to on the ground of incompetency, and the objection sustained. Held, that this was error.
This was an indictment charging Clyde Mattox with the murder of one John Mullen, about December 12, 1889, in that part of the Indian Territory made part of the United States judicial district of Kansas by section two of the act of Congress of January 6, 1883, (22 Stat. 400, c. 13,) entitled “ An act to provide for holding a term of the District Court of the United States at Wichita, Kansas, and for other purposes.”
Defendant pleaded not guilty, was put upon his trial, October 5, 1891, and on the eighth of that month was found guilty as charged, the jury having retired on the seventh to consider of their verdict. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were severally made and overruled, and Mattox sentenced to death. This writ of error was thereupon sued out.
The evidence tended to show that Mullen was shot in the evening between eight and nine o’clock, and that he died about one or two o’clock in the afternoon of the next day; that three shots were fired and three wounds inflicted; that neither of the wounds was necessarily fatal, but that the deceased died of pneumonia produced by one of them described as “ in the upper lobe of the right lung, entering about two or three inches above the right nipple, passing through the upper lobe of the right lung, fracturing one end of the fourth rib, passing throtfgh and lodging beneath the skin on the right side beneath the shoulder blade.” The attending physician, who was called a little after nine o’clock and remained with the wounded man until about one o’clock in the morning, and visited him again between eight and nine o’clock, testified that Mrs. Hatch, the mother of Clyde Mattox, was present at that visit; that he regarded Mullen’s recovery as hopeless; that Mullen, being “ perfectly conscious ” and “ in a normal condition as regards his mind,” asked his opinion, and the doctor said to him : “The chances are all against you ; I do not think [p. 142] there is any show for you at all.” The physician further testified, without objection, that, after he had informed Mullen as to his physical condition, he asked him as to who shot him, and he replied, “he didn’t have any knowledge of who shot him. I interrogated him about three times in regard to that — who did the shooting — and he didn’t know.” Counsel for defendant, after a colloquy with the court, propounded the following question: “Did or did not John Mullen, in your presence and at that time, say in reply to a question of Mrs. Hatch, 11 know your son, Clyde Mattox, and he did not shoot me ; I saw the parties who shot me and Clyde was not one of them.’ ” This question was objected to as incompetent, the objection sustained, and defendant excepted. Counsel also propounded to Mrs. Hatch this question: “ Did or did not John Mullen say to you on the morning you visited him, and after Dr. Graham had told him that all the chances for life were against him, 11 know Clyde Mattox, your son, and he was not one of the parties who shot me ? ’ ” This was objected to on the ground of incompetency, the objection sustained, and defendant excepted.
In support of his motion for new trial the defendant offered the affidavits of two of the jurors that the bailiff who had charge of the jury in the case after the cause had been heard and submitted, “ and while they were deliberating of their verdict,” “ in the presence and hearing of the jurors or a part of them, speaking of the case, said: ‘ After you fellows get through with this case it will be tried again down there. Thompson has poison in a bottle that them fellows tried to give him.’ And at another time, in the presence and hearing of said jury or a part of them, referring to the defendant, Clyde Mattox said: ‘ This is the third fellow he has killed.’ ” The affidavit of another juror to the same effect in respect of the remark of the bailiff as to Thompson was also offered, and in addition, the affidavits of eight of the jurors, including the three just mentioned, “ that after said cause had been submitted to the jury, and while the jury were deliberating of their verdict, and before they had agreed upon a verdict in the case, a certain newspaper printed and published in the city of
Wichita, Kansas, known as The Wichita Daily Eagle, of the date of Thursday morning, October 8, 1891, was introduced into the jury room; that said paper contained a comment upon the case under consideration by said jury, and that said comment upon said case so under consideration by said jury, was read to the jury in their presence and hearing ; that the comment so read to said jury is found upon the fifth page of said paper, and in the third column of said page, and is as follows:
“ ‘ The Mattox case — The jury retired at noon yesterday and is still out.
“ ‘ The destiny of Clyde Mattox is now in the hands of the twelve citizens of Kansas composing the jury in this case. If he is not found guilty of murder he will be a lucky man, for the evidence against him was very strong, or at least appeared to be to an outsider. The case was given to the jury at noon yesterday, and it was expected that their deliberations would not last an hour before they would return a verdict. The hour passed and nine more of them with it, and still a verdict was not reached by 10.30 last night, when the jury adjourned and went to their rooms at the Carey. Col. Johnson, of Oklahoma City, defended him, and made an excellent speech in his behalf to the jury. Mr. Ady also made a fine speech and one that was full of argument and replete with the details of the crime committed as gathered from the statements of witnesses. The lawyers who were present and the court officers also agree that it was one of the best and most logical speeches Mr. Ady ever made in this court. It was so strong that the friends of Mattox gave up all hope of any result but conviction. Judge Riner’s instructions to the jury were very clear and impartial, and required nearly half an hour for him to read them. When the jury filed out, Mattox seemed to be the most unconcerned man in the room. His mother was very pale and her face indicated that she had but very little hope. She is certainly deserving of a good deal of credit for she has stuck by her son, as only a mother can, through all his trials and difficulties, and this is not the first one by any
Argument for Defendant in Error.
means, for Clyde has been tried for his life once before. He is a youthful-looking man of light build, a beardless face and a nervous disposition. The crime for which he has just been tried is the killing of a colored man in Oklahoma city over two years ago. Nobody saw him do the killing and the evidence against him is purely circumstantial, but very strong, it is claimed, by those who heard all the testimony.’ ”
The bill of exceptions states that these affidavits and a copy of the newspaper referred to “ were offered in open court by the defendant in support of his motion for a new trial and by the said District Court excluded; to which ruling the defendant, by his'counsel then and there excepts and still excepts.” And the defendant excepted to the overruling of his motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment.
J/r. J. TF. Johnson and J/r. T. F. McMeekan for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury for defendant in error.
I. The first assignment of error relates to the rejection of the prisoner’s offer to prove a statement or declaration of the deceased, John Mullen, made shortly before his death.
For that purpose the defence called Dr. Samuel Graham, the physician who attended Mullen after the shooting. The witness said that he told the deceased “ The chances are all against you; I don’t think there is any show for you at all.”
This was between 8 and 9 o’clock in the morning, and about 1 or 2 o’clock that day Mullen died. The witness then said that, after making the above statement, he interrogated Mullen about three times as to who shot him, and that he replied, “he didn’t have any knowledge of who shot him.”
The question that elicited this testimony was not objected to by the counsel for the government.
The counsel for the defence then asked the witness whether the deceased, after he had been told by the witness what his condition was, as above, made any statement to Mrs. Hatch
Argument for Defendant in Error.
“ as to who it was shot him, or as to what knowledge he had as to who shot him.” To this question the counsel for the prosecution objected, stating, “ It has not been proven that the party knew that death was impending.” The question, as thus propounded, was objected to by the prosecution, and the objection was sustained by the court, and thereupon the defence excepted.
The offer to prove the alleged statement of the deceased to Mrs. Hatch, the mother of the accused, came from the defence, and it was incumbent on the party thus offering the evidence to show, satisfactorily, that it was admissible as a dying declaration and was not on the footing of mere hearsay. But Dr. Graham, the witness, was not asked whether the deceased had said or done anything that indicated that he regarded death as impending before or at the time the alleged declaration was made. Why some such question was not put, particularly after the remark of the court that counsel knew he had not laid a proper foundation for the evidence, and that the question was not what the doctor thought, but “ what the man thought about it,” is not readily perceived.
It is true that what the deceased said to the doctor about the shooting went in without objection, and without even the usual inquiries from the court as to the circumstances under which the statements were made, but that was no reason why some other and different conversation between the deceased and another person, Mrs. Hatch, should have been admitted over the prosecution’s objection.
The point we make is not that the deceased made no remark with reference to Dr. Graham’s statement of his condition, but that he made no manifestation of any sort showing that he regarded himself as in extremis. The mere fact that the physician told the deceased that “the chances are all against you; I don’t think there is any show for you at all,” shows, as the court remarked, that the “ doctor didn’t have much hope,” but does not show that the deceased was without hope. It is never safe to conclude in such cases that the declarant believed death impending because his physician told him so. See Bex v. Beany, 7 Cox, C. C. 209; Woodcock's
VOL. CXLVI—io
Argument for Defendant in Error.
Case, 1 Leach, 500; Van ButcheWs Case, 3 C. & P. 631; Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Gratt. 594; Donnelly v. State, 2 Dutcher, (26 N. J. Law,) 463, 498, 499, a case in which the late Mr. Justice Bradley bore a prominent part; Regina v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox, C. C. 341; Rex n. Spilsbury, 7 C. & P. 187; Rex v. Hayward, 6 C. & P. 157; Rex v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 605, 608; Regina v. Hind, 8 Cox, C. C. 300; Moore v. Alabama, 12 Alabama, 764; S. C. 46 Am. Dec. 276; Moeck n. People, 100 Illinois, 242.
It would seem that these cases proceeded on a safe principle. To allow such evidence to be received would be a temptation to the unscrupulous to wring from the dying victim some statement favorable to his assailant. It would be a dangerous obstruction to the enforcement of criminal justice if those on trial for murder could shelter themselves behind such evidence.
But the question propounded to Mrs. Hatch was objectionable, also, because of its leading character, and properly ruled out on that ground alone.
II. The remaining assignments of error, except the eighth, may be grouped together and disposed of under one principle.
It will be observed that they are all founded on so much of the bill of exceptions as relates to the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial and the several grounds thereof. But nothing is better settled than that the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion in allowing or denying a motion for a new trial is not reviewable by this court by writ of error. This court says in Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581, 583, 584: “ It has long been the established law in the courts of the United States that to grant or refuse a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the motion is addressed, and that the result cannot be made the subject of review upon a writ of errorC See also Insurance Co. v. Barton, 13 Wall. 603.
A motion for a new trial, whatever be its technical merits, should never be allowed against the real justice of the case. It is because the determination of such a motion involves the exercise of a wide equitable discretion, and requires such an appreciation of the case as the judge before whom it was tried [p. 147] can generally, alone possess, that the granting or denying of such a motion will not be reviewed by writ of error. A court of error could not, in many instances, be made to see the case as the trial judge saw it, and therefore could not, in such cases certainly, safely review his action. It follows, therefore, that the alleged misconduct of the bailiff and jury cannot be considered by this court.
It being clear that the judge below was not guilty of an abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, it is quite unnecessary to inquire whether the affidavits of the jurors rejected by the court were admissible. Should, however, that question be to be determined, the court will be glad to have a reference to the valuable opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kansas, 539, delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer, then a judge of that court.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The allowance or refusal of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the court to which the application is addressed, and the result cannot be made the subject of review by writ of error, Henderson v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 11 ; Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581; but in the case at bar the District Cqurt excluded the affidavits, and, in passing upon the motion, did not exercise any discretion in respect of the matters stated therein. Due exception was taken and the question of admissibility thereby preserved.
It will be perceived that the jurors did not state what influence, if any, the communication of the bailiff and the reading of the newspaper had upon them, but confined their statements to what was said by the one and read from the other.
In United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366, affidavits of two jurors were offered in evidence to establish the reading of a newspaper report of the evidence which had been given in the case under trial, but both deposed that it had no influence [p. 148] on their verdict. Mr. Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ The first branch of the second point presents the question whether the, affidavits of jurors impeaching their verdict ought to be received. It would, perhaps, hardly be safe to lay down any general rule upon this subject. Unquestionably such evidence ought always to be received with great caution. But cases might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse them without violating the plainest principles of justice. It is, however, unnecessary to lay down any rule in this case, or examine the decisions referred to in the argument. Because we are of opinion that the facts proved by the jurors, if proved by unquestioned testimony, would be no ground for a new trial. There was nothing in the newspapers calculated to influence their decision, and both of them swear that these papers had not the slightest influence on their verdict.” The opinion thus indicates that public policy which forbids the reception of the affidavits, depositions or sworn statements of jurors to impeach their verdicts, may in the interest of justice create an exception to its own rule, while, at the same time, the necessity of great caution in the use of such evidence is enforced.
There is, however, a recognized distinction between what may and what may not be established by the testimony of jurors to set aside a verdict.
This distinction is thus put by Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the Supreme Court of Kansas in Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kans. 539, 545: “ Public policy forbids that a matter resting in the personal consciousness of one juror should be received to overthrow the verdict, because being personal it is not accessible to other testimony; it gives to the secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of twelve; its tendency is to produce bad faith on the part of a minority, to induce an apparent acquiescence with the purpose of subsequent dissent; to induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the verdict. But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors; if one affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven can deny; one cannot disturb the action of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for the eleven [p. 149] may be heard. Under this view of the law the affidavits were properly received. They tended to prove something which did not essentially inhere in the verdict, an overt act, open to the knowledge of all the jury, and not alone within the personal consciousness of one.”
The subject was much considered by Mr. Justice Gray, then a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, where numerous authorities were referred to and applied, and the conclusions announced, “ that on a motion for a new trial on the ground of bias on the part of one of the jurors, the evidence of jurors as to the motives and influences which affected their deliberations, is inadmissible either to impeach or to support the verdict. But a juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind. So a juryman may testify in denial or explanation of acts or declarations outside of the jury room, where evidence of such acts has been given as ground for a new trial.” See, also, Ritchie v. Holbrooke, 7 S. & K. 458; Chews v. Driver, 1 Coxe (N. J.), 166; Nelms v. Mississippi, 13 Sm. & Marsh. 500; Hawkins v. Neio Orleans Printing Co., 29 La. Ann. 134, 140; Whitney v. Whitman, 5 Mass. 405; Hix v. Drury, 5 Pick. 296.
We regard the rule thus laid down as conformable to right reason and sustained by the weight of authority. These affidavits were within the rule, and being material their exclusion constitutes reversible error. A brief examination will demonstrate their materiality.
It is vital in capital cases that the jury should pass upon the case free from external causes tending to disturb the exercise of deliberate and unbiassed judgment. Nor can any ground of suspicion that the administration of justice has been interfered with be tolerated. Hence, the separation of the jury in such a way as to expose them to tampering, may be reason for a new trial, variously held as absolute; or prima facie, and subject to rebuttal by the prosecution; or contingent on proof indicating that a tampering really took [p. 150] place. Wharton Cr. PL and Pr. §§ 821, 823, 824, and cases cited.
Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear.
Indeed, it was held in People v. Knapp, 42 Michigan, 267, that the presence of an officer during the deliberations of the jury is such an irregular invasion of the right of trial by jury as to absolutely vitiate the verdict in all cases without regard to whether any improper influences were actually exerted over the jury or not. And in Kansas v. Snyder, 20 Kansas, 306, where the bailiff, who had charge of the jury, had been introduced and examined as a witness on behalf of the State, and had testified to material facts against the accused, his presence in the jury room during the deliberations of the jury was held fatal to the verdict.
In Gainey v. People, 97 Illinois, 270, the Supreme Court of Illinois was of opinion that the presence of a bailiff, in charge of a jury in a capital case, in the jury room during a part of their deliberations, was a grave irregularity and a breach of duty on the part of the officer, which would or would not vitiate the verdict, depending upon the circumstances in each particular case, and the application of the rule in Kansas^. Snyder, was approved; but the conclusion reached in People v. Knapp was not fully sanctioned. The text-books refer to many cases in which the action of the officer having a jury in charge, when prejudice might have resulted; or unauthorized communications having a tendency to adverse influence; or the reading of newspapers containing imperfect reports of the trial, or objectionable matter in the form of editorial comments or otherwise, have been held fatal to verdicts.
The jury in the case before us retired to consider of their verdict on the 7th of October, and had not agreed on the morning of the 8th, when the newspaper article was read to them. It is not open to reasonable doubt that the tendency of that article was injurious to the defendant. Statements that the defendant had been tried for his life once before;
that the evidence against him was claimed to be very strong by those who had heard all the testimony; that the argument for the prosecution was such that the defendant’s friends gave up all hope of any result but conviction; and that it was expected that the deliberations of the jury would not last an hour before they would return a verdict, could have no other tendency. Nor can it be legitimately contended that the misconduct of the bailiff could have been otherwise than prejudicial. Information that this was the third person Clyde Mattox had killed, coming from the officer in charge, precludes any other conclusion. We should, therefore, be compelled to reverse the judgment because the affidavits were not received and considered by the court; but another ground exists upon which we must not only do this, but direct a new trial to be granted.
Dying declarations are admissible on a trial for murder as to the fact of the homicide and the person by whom it was committed, in favor of the defendant as well as against him. 1 East P. C. 353; Rex v. Scaife, 1 Mood. & Rob. 551; United States v. Taylor, 4 Cranch, C. C. 338; Moore v. Alabama, 12 Alabama, 764; Commonwealth v. Matthews, 89 Kentucky, 287. But it must be shown by the party offering them in evidence that they were made under a sense of impending death. This may be made to appear from what the injured person said; or from the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted, being obviously such that he must have felt or known that he could not survive; as well as from his conduct at the time and the communications, if any, made to him by his medical advisers, if assented to or understandingly acquiesced in by him. The length of time elapsing between the making of the declaration and the death is one of the elements to be considered, although as stated by Mr. Greenleaf, “it is the impression of almost immediate dissolution, and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the testimony admissible.” 1 Greenleaf Ev. 15th ed. §§ 156, 157, 158; State n. Wensell, 98 Missouri, 137; Commonwealth v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455 ; Kehoe v. Commonwealth, 85 Penn. St. 127; Swisher v. Commonwealth, 26 Gratt. 963; State v. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 469. In [p. 152] Regina v. Perkins, 9 C. & P. 395, the deceased received a severe wound from a gun loaded with shot, of which wound he died at five o’clock the next morning. On the evening of the day on which he was wounded, he was told by a surgeon that he could not recover, made no reply, but appeared dejected. It was held by all the judges of England that a declaration made by him at that time was receivable in evidence on the trial of a person for killing him, as being a declaration in articulo mortis. There the declaration was against the accused, and obviously no more rigorous rule should be applied when it is in his favor. The point is to ascertain the state of the mind at the time the declarations were made. The admission of the testimony is justified upon the ground of necessity, and in view of the consideration that the certain expectation of almost immediate death will remove all temptation to falsehood, and enforce as strict adherence to the truth as the obligation of an oath could impose. But the evidence must be received with the utmost caution, and if the circumstances do not satisfactorily disclose that the awful and solemn situation in which he is placed is realized by the dying man because of the hope of recovery, it ought to be rejected. In this case the lapse of time was but a few hours; the wounds were three in number and one of them of great severity; the patient was perfectly conscious, and asked the attending physician his opinion, and was told that the chances were all against him, and that the physician thought there was no “ show for you [him] at all.” He was then interrogated as to who did the shooting, and he replied that he did not know. All this was admitted without objection. Defendant’s counsel then endeavored to elicit from the witness whether, in addition to saying that he did not know the parties who shot him, Mullen stated that he knew Clyde Mattox, and that it was not Clyde who did so. The question propounded was objected to on the sole ground of incompetency, and the objection sustained. In this, as the case stood, there was error. So long as the evidence was in the case as to what Mullen said, defendant was entitled to refresh the memory of the witness in a proper manner and bring out, if he could, what more, if any-
Syllabus.
thing, he said in that connection. It was not inconsistent with Mullen’s statement that he did not know the parties, for him also to have said that he knew Mattox was not one of them. His ignorance of who shot him was not incompatible with knowledge of who did not shoot him. We regard the error thus committed as justifying the awarding of a new trial.
The judgment is reversed, a/nd the cause remanded to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, with a direction to gra/nt a new trial.
ROBY v. COLEHOUR AND ANOTHER.
ROBY v. COLEHOUR.
ROBY v. COLEHOUR AND ANOTHER.
ROBY v. COLEHOUR AND ANOTHER.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
Nos. 990, 987, 988, 989. Submitted May 2,1892. —Decided November 7, 1892.
In error to a state court, although it may not appear from the opinion of the court of original jurisdiction, or from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State, that either court formally passed upon any question of a Federal nature, yet, if the necessary effect of the decree was to determine, adversely to the plaintiff in error, rights and immunities in proceedings in bankruptcy, claimed by him in the pleadings and proof, the jurisdiction of this court may be invoked on the ground that a right or immunity, specially set up and claimed under the Constitution or authority of the United States, has been denied by the judgment sought to be reviewed.
A bankrupt who purchases from his assignee in bankruptcy real estate to which he held the legal title at the time of the assignment is not thereby discharged from an obligation to account to a third party for an interest in the land as defined in a declaration of trust by the bankrupt, made before the bankruptcy, but takes title subject to that claim.
Whether such relations existed between the bankrupt and such third party
as prevented him from acquiring such absolute title, discharged from all obligations growing out of the declaration of trust, is not a Federal question.
This was a motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Henry S. Monroe and Mr. William C. Goudy for the motions.
Mr. John M. Palmer opposing.
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
The principal facts appearing upon the present motion to dismiss these writs of error for want of jurisdiction in this court or to affirm the decrees, are as follows:
By deed of date of July 18, 1871, Henry F. Clarke and others conveyed to William H. Colehour certain lands in Cook County, Illinois, embracing those here in dispute, subject to a mortgage for $4000 held by Mary P. M. Palmer. The sum of $10,000 was paid in cash, and the grantee executed his notes, aggregating $86,000, for the balance of the purchase money; and, for the purpose of securing them, executed a deed conveying the lands to V. C. Turner in trust. William Hansbrough, Charles W. Colehour, Wesley Morrill and Francis M. Corby were interested in the profits tt> be derived from their sale. Hansbrough sold and assigned his interest to Charles W. Colehour and Edward Roby; and Charles W. Colehour acquired the interests of Corby and Morrill. Roby executed to Hansbrough his notes for $4400, and subsequently paid them. The Colehours and Roby made an arrangement for subdividing and selling the property. That arrangement was evidenced by a written declaration of trust made by William H. Colehour in October, 1873, which Charles W. Colehour and Edward Roby accepted, and by which it was provided, among other things, that after the payment of all sums due on the notes secured on the land, and all moneys advanced for its [p. 155] development, Roby should be entitled to one-fourth, Charles W. Colehour to one-half, and William H. Colehour to one-fourth of the net profits. Subsequently, a part of the land was subdivided and improved by grading streets, making ditches, etc., and a part sold, freed from the lien created by the deed of trust given to Turner.
It may be here stated that another writing was produced bearing date August 16, 1873, and purporting to be a declaration of trust with respect to this property.
Charles W. Colehour, September 22, 1876, released and conveyed to William II. Colehour all his right, title and interest in certain lands, including those here in controversy; and, subsequently, August 30,1878, filed his petition in bankruptcy, showing debts to the amount of over $800,000. Having been adjudged a bankrupt, he conveyed his property and interests of every kind, according to the course and practice of the court, to an assignee in bankruptcy; and thereafter — the answer of Roby in the principal case alleges — “ said Charles W. Colehour had no right or interest therein.” The same answer, referring to this petition in bankruptcy, further states: “Said Charles W. Colehour having in 1876, for a sufficient and valuable consideration, conveyed all his interest in and to said land and all claims thereon to said William H. Colehour, and having no interest in said land or the proceeds thereof, or in the title in said William H. Colehour, did not mention the same or any part thereof in his inventory filed in said District Court of the United States in such proceeding in bankruptcy; and said Charles W. Colehour had not, at said date, to wit, on the 30th day of August, 1878, any right, title or interest in or to, or claim on, said lands, or any of the proceeds thereof.”
Roby, August 31, 1878, filed his petition in bankruptcy. Having been adjudged a bankrupt, he conveyed, September 7, 1878, all his assets to his assignee, and afterwards, November 23, 1880, was discharged from all debts and claims provable against his estate existing on the day his petition in bankruptcy was filed.
On the 1st day of May, 1879, William H. Colehour executed to Charles W. Colehour a deed, covering the lands in dispute, [p. 156] subject to the terms of certain declarations of trust which the grantor had previously made.
On the 30th of January, 1890, Charles W. Colehour brought a suit in equity (the principal one of the above cases) in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against Edward Roby and William H. Colehour. For the purposes of the present hearing it is only necessary to state that the theory of the bill was that Roby, by fraud and in violation of his obligations as attorney for the plaintiff and the defendant, William H. Colehour, had acquired, at execution sales and otherwise, the legal title to the lands in.dispute, embraced by the deed of trust of October, 1873; and that if not barred in equity by his acts and conduct from claiming any interest in them, he was entitled to only one-quarter of the net profits after all debts and liens against them were paid. The relief prayed was a decree declaring a certain deed from W. H. Colehour to Roby to be void, and that it be set aside as a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff and W. H. Colehour; that a receiver be appointed to whom should be conveyed the titles claimed by the respective parties; that the lands be sold and the proceeds held subject to the final decree in the cause; that the plaintiff and W. H. Colehour be decreed to be the owners of the equity of redemption ; and that such other relief be given as was agreeable to equity.
The defendants answered the bill, and W. H. Colehour filed a cross-bill for a decree establishing the interests of the parties to be one-fourth in Roby and W. H. Colehour, each, and one-half in Charles W. Colehour.
In his answer to the original bill, which stood as his answer to the cross-bill, Roby denied that he had acted in bad faith, or that the relation of attorney and client existed between him and the Colehours, or either of them, at the time he purchased the lands in dispute. Referring to the proceedings in bankruptcy against him, his answer alleged that after the 31st day of August, 1878, the date of the filing of his petition in bankruptcy, “ to wit, on the 4th day of February, a .d. 1882, the assignee in bankruptcy of this defendant sold the assets of this defendant, including all his interest derived [p. 157] under the said declarations of trust, unto this defendant, and duly assigned and conveyed the same, including all interest in the said lands embraced in said declarations of trust from said William H. Colehour to this defendant, and said sale was duly approved and made absolute by the said District Court; and from thenceforward this defendant has been the owner of said declaration of trust from said William H. Colehour to this defendant, and also of an undivided half of the said declaration of trust from said William H. Colehour to William Hansbrough, and of all interests and claims arising under the same, or either of them.”
The court, while acquitting Roby of any actual or intentional fraud, held that, consistently with the relations existing between him and the Colehours, he could not, at the time of acquiring the titles under which he claims, buy the lands and hold them adversely to those jointly interested with him. Judge Tuley, delivering the opinion of the Circuit Court of Cook County, said: “ The law will hold Mr. Roby to be a trustee for the Colehours, for C. W. Colehour to the extent of one-half, and W. H. Colehour one-quarter, of all the property so purchased by him under or through such judgment proceedings, he, however, to be refunded the moneys which he has paid therefor. He cannot hold the property, because he must be treated as acquiring it while the relation of attorney and client existed.”
A decree, in accordance with these views, was entered, appointing a receiver of the property, requiring Roby, William H. Colehour and Charles W. Colehour to convey to him all the titles to the lands respectively acquired or held by them, etc.
At the same time the court dismissed for want of equity certain suits — three of the suits mentioned in the title to this opinion — which Roby had instituted for the recovery of part of the lands under the titles which, as stated, he had acquired by purchase at execution sales and otherwi^b. These suits had been previously consolidated with the suit, just above mentioned, brought by Charles W. Colehour.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the decrees [p. 158] of the Circuit Court of Cook County were affirmed. The several cases have been brought here for review upon writs of error. In the record is a certificate of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in which it was stated that the court decided:
1. That, in opposition to the contention of Roby, the proceedings whereby he was adjudged a bankrupt and discharged from his obligations, etc., “ did not operate in law or equity to discharge said Roby from all his obligations, liabilities, duties and trusts with respect to and growing out of his interest in said lands and of his relations to said parties.”
2. That Roby claimed and insisted that under and by virtue of the provisions of the laws of the United States he, as purchaser from his assignee in bankruptcy, took such interest as a stranger, free and clear from any duties or obligations or connections existing, prior to his petition in bankruptcy, between him and the Colehours, or either of them, and that the above deed of May 1, 1879, was void, both as to his assignee in bankruptcy and to him as purchaser from such assignee, and passed no right to Charles W. Colehour; “but this court [the Supreme Court of Illinois] decided against all the said claims so made by said Roby, and also decided that such deed was and is valid against said assignee in bankruptcy, and against said Roby as purchaser from such assignee.”
3. That Roby insisted that by the proceedings in bankruptcy against Charles W. Colehour the latter was divested of all interest in and claims upon the lands in his present bill mentioned or the profits thereof, and of all interest in common with W. H. Colehour or either of them, and that he, Roby, was by operation thereof exempted from all claims of Charles W. Colehour and from his suit on account of said land, and that the necessary effect of such record and proceedings in bankruptcy was that he was not chargeable to Charles W. Colehour; “ but this court,” the certificate of the Chief Justice proceeds, “ in considering the law and facts of the cases, decided against the claims of said Roby so pleaded, claimed and insisted on, and decided that such was not the legal operation and effect of such proceedings; and that Charles W. Colehour [p. 159] had a right to sue upon said instrument, dated May 29, 1873, [being a power of attorney from William H. to Charles W. Colehour;] that said deed dated May 1, 1879, was and is valid as against said assignee in bankruptcy and against said Roby as purchaser from said assignee, and gives said Charles W. Colehour the right to defend the first three above-entitled cases against said Roby and to prosecute the fourth against said Roby, and to claim and enforce all rights of partner, trustee and co-tenant against said assignee in bankruptcy of said Roby and against said Roby as purchaser from such assignee.”
Has this court jurisdiction to review the decree in these consolidated causes under the statute, (Rev. Stat. § 709,) providing that “a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a State where any title, right, privilege or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any . . . authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by either party, under such Constitution, . . . or authority, may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court upon a writ of error ? ”
This question is a close one. But although it does not appear from the opinion of the court of original jurisdiction, or the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, that either court formally passed upon any question of a Federal nature, the necessary effect of the decree was to determine, adversely to Roby, the rights and immunities claimed by him, in the pleadings and proof, under the proceedings in bankruptcy to which reference has been made. We must not be understood as holding that the certificate from the Chief Justice of the latter court is, in itself, and without reference to the record sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this court to reexamine the judgment below. Our jurisdiction being invoked upon the ground that a right or immunity, specially set up and claimed under the Constitution or authority of the United States, has been denied by the judgment sought to be reviewed, it must appear from the record of the case either that the right, so set up and claimed, was expressly denied, or that such was the [p. 160] necessary effect in law t>f the judgment. Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 36, 38; Proven v. Atwell, Administrator, 92 U. S. 327, 329; Gross v. United States Mortgage Co., 108 U. S. 477, 485 ; Felix v. Scharnweber, 125 U. S. 54, 59. The present case may be held to come within this rule. In view of the certificate by the Chief Justice of the state court, the office of which, as said in Parmelee v. Lawrence, was, as respects the Federal question, “ to make more certain and specific what is too general and indefinite in the record,” we are not disposed to construe the pleadings so strictly as to hold that they did not sufficiently set up and claim the Federal rights which that certificate states were claimed by Roby, but were withheld, and were intended to be withheld, from him by the court below.
While the motion to dismiss must, therefore, be overruled, yet, as there was color for it, we must inquire whether the questions on which jurisdiction depends are such as, in the language of our rule (6), not to need further argument. We are of opinion that they are of that class. When Charles W. Colehour was adjudged a bankrupt he does not appear to have held any interest in the lands now in controversy. The answer of Roby distinctly states that he, Charles W. Colehour, in 1876, for a sufficient and valuable consideration, conveyed all his interest to W. H. Colehour, and had no interest in Said lands at the date of his petition in bankruptcy filed in 1878. The decree is evidently based, so far as Charles W. Colehour is concerned, upon the deed to him by William H. Colehour, executed in 1879, although the respective interests of the parties were established with reference to the declaration of trust made in October, 1873. There is, consequently, no ground upon which to rest the contention that Charles W. Colehour had any interest or right in the lands that passed to his assignee in bankruptcy.
Equally without force is the contention that the adjudication of Roby to be a bankrupt, followed by his conveyance to his assignee in bankruptcy, and his purchase from such assignee, had any effect upon the rights of William H. Colehour or Charles W. Colehour. The respective interests of
Roby and the Colehours in the lands, at the date of Roby’s bankruptcy, could have been determined in a suit or proceeding to which they and Roby’s assignee in bankruptcy were parties, so that the purchaser at the assignee’s sale would have acquired a title discharged from any claim upon them by either of the Colehours. But it does not appear that any such suit was brought or that the conflicting interests of the parties were determined as between them, or either of them, and Roby’s assignee in bankruptcy. Roby’s claim is that his purchase of the lands from his assignee in bankruptcy, the legal title to which was in him, of record, discharged him from all obligation to recognize any claim, upon the part of either of the Colehours, arising out of the relations existing between them and him prior to his bankruptcy. If, at the time of filing his petition in bankruptcy, he was bound by his relations to the Colehours, although holding the legal title, to account to them for their portions of the lands, as defined in any previous declaration of trust to which he was a party or to which he assented, or by which he was bound, he was not discharged from that obligation by merely purchasing the lands from his assignee in bankruptcy. It does not appear that any issue was framed and determined in the bankruptcy court as between him or his assignee and the Colehours. The conveyance to his assignee passed to the latter only such interest as he, in fact, had, and when he bought from the assignee he purchased only such as he could rightfully have conveyed, originally, to his assignee. If, before he went into bankruptcy, the Colehours had any interest in the lands, which they could assert, as between themselves and him, he could not, by simply purchasing it from his assignee, acquire an absolute title, freed from their claim. We are of opinion that the proceedings in bankruptcy against Roby, and the purchase from his assignee, did not defeat the claims now asserted by the Colehours in these lands, and which were recognized by the decree below.
Whether such relations, in fact, existed between the Colehours and Roby as prevented him, consistently with those relations, from purchasing the lands for himself, in other
VOL. CXLVI—11
words, whether he was the attorney of the Colehours when he acquired the legal title, or whether, upon principles of equity, Roby should be deemed to have acquired the title for them and himself, subject to the declaration of trust referred to in the pleadings and decree, are not questions of a Federal nature. The decree below, in respect to those matters, is not subject to reexamination by this court. The Federal questions having been decided correctly, and those questions being such as not to need any further argument beyond that presented in the briefs of counsel, the decree in each of the cases must be
Affirmed.
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