The Corsair, 145 U.S. 335 (1892)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
The Corsair, 145 U.S. 335 (1892)
Full caption
THE CORSAIR.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 16, 1892
• THE CORSAIR.
appeal from the circuit court of the united states for
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.
No. 344. Submitted April 26, 1892. — Decided May 16, 1892.
Admiralty rules 12 to 20 inclusive allow, in certain cases, a joinder of ship and freight, or ship and master, or alternative actions against ship, master or owner alone; but in no case within the rules can ship and owner
be joined in the same libel: whether they may in cases not falling within the rules is not decided.
A District Court sitting in admiralty cannot entertain a libel in rem for damages incurred by loss of life where, by the local law, a right of action survives to the administrator or relatives of the deceased, but no lien is expressly created by the act.
When the collision of two vessels causes great pain and suffering to a passenger on one of them, followed so closely by death as to be substantially contemporaneous with it, a libel in rem, where a right of action exists under a state statute, will not lie for those injuries as distinguished from death as a cause of action.
The court stated the case as follows:
This was an appeal from, a decree? of the Circuit Court dismissing a libel for damages sustained by the death of Ella Barton, against the steam tug Corsair and her owners. Suit, was begun on April 5,1888, by the filing of a libel by Edward S. Barton and Elizabeth Barton, his wife, against the steam tug Corsair upon two distinct causes of action, viz.: one for damages for the pains and sufferings endured by Ella Barton, a daughter of the said Elizabeth Barton, in a collision caused by the said tug Corsair, on which the said Ella Barton was at the time a passenger, running at full speed into the right bank of the Mississippi Biver, on the 14th of April, 1887, at a point about ten miles above Algiers, (which is opposite to the city of New Orleans,) in consequence of which said tug filled with water and sank in ten minutes. The other cause for action was for damages sustained by the said Elizabeth Barton in the loss of the life of her said daughter, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the officers and crew of the tug.
The right to bring this libel was alleged to have accrued under Article 2315 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, as amended in 1884, which reads as follows :
“Article 2315. Every act whatever, of man, that causes, damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened, to repair it; the right of this action shall survive, in case o death, in favor of the minor children or widow of the deceased, or either of them, and in default of these, in favor of p. 337the surviving father and mother, or either of them, for the space of one year from the death. The survivors above mentioned may also recover the damages sustained by them by the death of the parent, or child or husband, or wife, as the case may be.”
By virtue of an attachment issued upon this libel, the vessel was arrested April 5, 1888, and was released upon a stipulation given by Samuel S. Brown and Harry Brown, by their duly authorized agent, “ claimants and owners of the steam tug Corsair.” Upon the same day they filed their claim as owners, averring that “ no other persons have any interest therein,” and subsequently filed exceptions to the libel upon the ground that it set forth no cause of action cognizable by proceedings in rem in admiralty. Upon the hearing of these exceptions, the court, “ considering that no action in rem lies in this case,” “ ordered that the exception be sustained to the extent of releasing the tug Corsair from the seizure made under the admiralty warrant issued in the cause, the court being of the opinion that the statute of Louisiana creates no lien upon the vessel.” It was “further ordered that libellants be allowed to amend their pleadings and proceed in personam against the owners of the vessel within ten days if they see fit.” On the following day an amended libel was filed against Samuel S. Brown and Harry Brown in personam as “ owners of the steam tug Corsair,” adopting and reiterating all the allegations contained in the original libel, and praying for a citation against the owners and for an attachment, in case they should not be found, against their goods and chattels, credits and effects wherever found.
Process of arrest and attachment, in the form provided for by Admiralty Rule 2, was allowed by the District Judge, and returned served by the marshal, by seizing and taking into his possession the steam tug Corsair, and placing a keeper in charge, and taking another bond from W. H. Brown & Sons, with a surety, conditioned that if “ said owners of the fug Corsair, William H. Brown & Sons, Samuel S. Brown and Harry Brown, shall abide by all orders,” etc. On the same ay a claim was filed by Samuel S. Brown and Harry Brown
VOL. CXLV—22
Argument for Appellant.
as sole owners of the tug Corsair, etc. Exceptions were filed to the amended libel by the claimants upon the ground that process had not been served upon them; that a warrant of arrest ought not to have issued, under Admiralty Rule 7, without affidavit or other proper proof showing the propriety thereof; that proceedings in rem, and in personam, could not be joined in the same libel; that “ there was no power in the court to allow the libellants to change this suit from a suit in rem, to a suit in personam j and that the cause of action was barred by the prescription of one year according to the law of the State.”
The cause was heard upon these exceptions, and the court “ being of the opinion that the suit and the amended libel is an action under a special statute of the State of Louisiana subjecting the owners to liability, whereas the action under the original libel sprang from the general liability of ships arrested as offending things under the admiralty law; that the amendment introduced a new party, and since, at the time of the amendment being made, more than a year had elapsed,” the exception was allowed and the suit dismissed.
On appeal to the Circuit Court this decree was affirmed, and an appeal taken by the libellants to this court.
Mr. Richard De Gray for appellant.
As we have seen, two separate and distinct causes of action are set out in the libel; one for the pains and sufferings endured by Ella Barton during her lifetime between the time of the collision and her death; the other for the damages sustained by the libellants directly by the death of Ella Barton.
The present case, as to either cause of action, is not a suit for damages for a death caused by negligence on the high seas, but a suit for damages caused by negligence on the Mississippi River, about one hundred miles above its mouth, and, therefore, under the jurisdiction of the State of Louisiana.
The second cause of action, although occurring in the State of Louisiana, being for the recovery of damages for the death of a human being, may, if the Louisiana statutes did
THE CORSAIR. 339.
Argument for Appellant.
not apply, be governed by the Harrisburg and Alaska Cases, 119 U. S. 199 and 130 U. S. 201; but the first cause of action, wherein damages are claimed, for the pains and sufferings Ella Barton sustained, cannot be governed by those cases, for it is in no sense a suit to recover damages for the death of Ella Barton, but is a suit to recover damages which a passenger, during her lifetime, sustained, through the negligence of the officers and crew of the steam tug Corsair.
This brings us to the inquiry as to what is the right of action and the remedy in admiralty of a passenger for damages sustained on a vessel on which such passenger is being carried.
Numerous decisions have been rendered by this court, in proceedings in rem, giving passengers damages for injuries sustained on vessels through the fault of their officers. The Hoses Taylor, 4 Wall. 427; The Nero World, 16 How. 469; The City of Panama, 101 U. S. 453.
Now, suppose Ella Barton had survived her injuries and brought her suit in admiralty in rem for the pains, injuries and shock which she sustained in this collision, and thereafter died, would that suit have died with her ? It certainly would not, because it would pass (if in no other way) by subrogation, under the first part of Art. No. 2375 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, to the parties therein named. In fact, prior to the amendment to the Code in 1884, only the claims for the recovery of such damages as she sustained passed to the parties named.
In Earhart v. Nero Orleans (& Carrollton Railroad, 17 La. Ann. 243, (which was a suit by the father and mother,) the law of Louisiana on this subject, under the above article of the Code, was stated as follows: “ In the words of the statute, it is a legal subrogation in favor of the persons designated, to the right of action, of the deceased sufferer, and in case of suit under that subrogation, the plaintiff should allege his cause of action as derived from the deceased under the statute.”
Therefore, we say the right of action in rem, which existed in favor of Ella Barton for the injuries and pains she suffered
Argument for Appellant.
during her lifetime, by reason of the negligence of the officers and crew of the tug on which she was a passenger, certainly passed, under the Code, to her father and mother, and that the suit by them should have been sustained.
3. In response to the third exception, that proceedings in rem and in personam cannot be joined in the same action, we say there is nothing in the Admiralty Rules of the United States Supreme Court or those of the District Court of Louisiana prohibiting such a joinder, and the amendment from a proceeding in rem to one in personam, as we have already shown, is abundantly supported, and by the best of authority.
4. This exception is the one on which the court dismissed the suit, because, as it said, said suit was prescribed, under the state law, by the lapse of one year from the time the disaster occurred, on the 14th of April, 1887.
The suit was filed on April 5, 1888, and seizure was made and appearance was entered on that day by the defendants’ filing their claim, and on the same day giving their bond for the release of the property.
The suit, therefore, which began in rem, became by the appearance of the defendants, to all intents and purposes, a suit in personam on the day the bond was filed, for thereafter no judgment could be rendered against the vessel, (which was discharged from all lien,) but only in personam against claimants and sureties.
The effect of such an appearance and giving bond was decided in the Fifth Circuit in Roberts v. The Huntsville, 3 Woods, 386. There a ship was libelled for salvage, and a decree for salvage was rendered. The sureties for the claimants — the owners — were compelled to pay the salvage decree, and it was held that the sureties, although subrogated to the rights of the libellants, could not seize the vessel as against valid mortgagees. Judge Bradley said : “ The salvors themselves ceased to have any lien on the ship after she was claimed and released from their seizure on the stipulation. Their claim then became a personal one against the owners and stipulators. It has been repeatedly held, that except where fraud has been practised in procuring the vessel’s p. 341release, the libellants cannot reseize her. By their discharge she becomes free, and all anterior liens stand good against her as before the seizure; so that, if the present libellants were invested with every right of the salvors, they could not have recourse to the ship again for the cause of salvage, except as they would have recourse against any other property of the owner. See also The Union, 4 Blatchford, 90; The White Squall, 4 Blatchford, 103, and cases there cited by Mr. Justice Nelson.
The practice in England is substantially the same. The St. Johan, 1 Hag. Adm. 334; The Triune, 3 Hag. Adm. 114.
Mr. Joseph P. Hornor and Mr. Guy M. Hornor for appellees.
Mr. Justice Brown, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a libel in rem against the tug Corsair, by the mother of one Ella Barton, to recover for the loss of her life in a collision alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of those in charge of the tug. Exceptions to this libel were sustained, upon the ground that a suit in rem would not lie for injuries resulting in death; but leave was given to amend by proceeding in personam against the owners of the tug. Exceptions were also filed to the amended libel upon the ground that the amendment introduced a new party to the suit, and, as against such party, the year had elapsed within which, under the law, the action must be brought.
1. The decree of dismissal so far as it operated upon the amended libel, was proper for two reasons: First, the amendment to the original libel by introducing the owners of the tug as parties defendants was in violation of Admiralty Rule 15, providing that “ in all suits for damage by collision, the libellant may proceed against the ship and master, or against the ship alone, or against the master or owner alone in personam.^ These rules, from 12 to 20 inclusive, were intended to prescribe a remedy appropriate to each class of cases in p. 342admiralty, allowing in certain cases a joinder of ship and freight, or ship and master, or alternative actions against the ship, master or owner alone. In no case, however, under these rules, except in possessory suits, can the ship and owner be joined in the same libel, though perhaps they may be in cases not falling within the rules. These rules were adopted in pursuance of an act of Congress of August 23, 1842, (5 Stat. 516,) authorizing this court, amongst other things, to prescribe “ the forms and modes of proceedings to obtain relief ” in suits in admiralty, and have always been regarded as having the force of law. They are little more than a recognition and formulation of the previous practice of courts of admiralty in this country and in England. They have come before this court in several instances, and have always been treated as obligatory. Thus in Newell v. Norton, 3 Wall. 257, the District Court, in accordance with the prayer of the libel, issued process in rem against the vessel for a collision, and citations in personam against the master, owner and pilot. On exceptions being filed for misjoinder, the court ruled that an action against the owner and pilot could not be joined with the proceeding in rem, and that the libellant must elect which remedy he would pursue; and, he having elected to proceed in rem, against the steamboat and in personam against the master, the libel was dismissed as to the owners and pilot, and sustained as against the steamboat and master. The allowance of this amendment was held by this court to be proper, Judge Grier observing, however, that the objection that a libel in rem against a vessel and in personam against the “ owner ” cannot be joined was properly overruled. The word “ owner ” here is evidently a misprint for “ master,” as appears from the syllabus and statement of the case on page 259. Rule 19, prescribing the mode of proceeding in cases of salvage, was discussed by Mr. Justice Clifford in the case of The Sabine, 101 U. S. 384, >in which he said that there was no authority for holding that salvors may proceed against the ship and cargo in rem, and in personam against the consignees of the cargo, in the same libel, as the rule gave only an alternative remedy in rem against the property saved, or in personam against the p. 343party at whose request or for whose benefit the service had been performed. He found there was no well-considered authority which gave any countenance to the theory that the two modes of proceeding in rem against the ship and cargo, and in personam against the owners of the same, might be joined in the same libel; citing Schooner Boston, 1 Sumner, 328, and The Hope, 3 C. Rob. 215. He spoke of the nineteenth rule as “ expressed throughout in the disjunctive form, and plainly requires the action, if against the. property saved or the proceeds thereof, to be in rem, the alternative clause clearly referring to a case where the property saved has been sold, and the proceeds of the sale have been deposited in the registry of the court.”
A like construction has uniformly been given to this rule by the Circuit and District Courts. The Richard Doane, 2 Ben. Ill, (Mr. Justice Blatchford ;) The Zodiac, 5 Fed. Rep. 220, 223, (Judge Choate;) Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Alexandre, 16 Fed. Rep. 279, (Judge Brown;) The Young America, Brown’s Admiralty, 462. Judge Longyear’s citations in the last case intimate that a similar practice prevailed in England, at least until the adoption of the Judicature Act. 2 Conkling’s Admiralty, 43; 2 Parsons’ Shipping and Admiralty, 378.
Second. If the so-called amended libel be considered as an independent libel against the owners in personam, then it is clearly defective in failing to aver that the respondents were the owners of the tug at the time of the accident.
2. An important question arises in connection with the dismissal of the original libel, which has never been squarely presented to this court before, and that is as to the power of the District Court to entertain a libel in rem for damages incurred by loss of life, where by the local law a right of action survives to the administrator or relatives of the deceased, but no lien is expressly created by the act. A similar question arose in the case of Ex parte Gordon, 104 IT. S. 515, where a writ of prohibition was applied for to enjoin the prosecution of an action in rem for loss of life ; but the writ was denied upon the ground that the liability was within the jurisdiction of p. 344the District Court to decide, and any error it might commit in this particular could only be corrected by appeal. Subsequently in the case of The Harrisburg, 119 IT. S. 199, it was held that in the absence of an act of Congress or a state statute giving a right of action therefor, a suit in admiralty could not be maintained to recover damages for the death of a human being, caused by negligence. This was a mere application to the court of admiralty of a principle which had been announced by this court as applicable to courts of common law in Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 TJ. S. 754. The Harrisburg was a Pennsylvania vessel, and the collision occurred in the waters of Massachusetts, both of which States gave a remedy by civil action, with a proviso that such action should be brought within one year after the death; and while the question of the right to sue in rem for the recovery of such damages when an action at law had been given therefor by the state statute, was presented in that case, it was not decided, since the suit was not begun until nearly five years after the death, and the case went off upon that ground.
Prior to this decision, a number of libels both in rem and in persona/m had been brought for loss of life in the courts of different districts, and, as a rule, the liability was held to exist, but the question whether such liability should be enforced in rem or in personam does not seem to have been discussed, except in the cases of The Sylvan Glen, 9 Fed. Rep. 335, and The Manhassett, 18 Fed. Rep. 918, in one of which Judge Benedict, and in the other Judge Hughes, held, that, while the state statute created a right it did not create a lien, and that a libel in rem could not be maintained. Since the decision in the Harrisburg Case, that no libel can lie, except where a right to sue is given by a local statute, the question has been presented only in the case of The North Cambria, 40 Fed. Rep. 655, in which Judge Butler adopted the views expressed in The Sylvan Glen and The Hanhassett. In The Oregon, 45 Fed. Rep. 62, a lien was given by the state statute and was enforced in the Admiralty.
A similar question under Lord Campbell’s Act allowing damages to be recovered “ whensoever the death of a person p. 345shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default,” has been the subject of much discussion in the courts of England. By the Admiralty Court Act of 1861, sec. 7, jurisdiction was given to the High Court of Admiralty over “ any claim for damage done by any ship,” and by sec. 35 “ the jurisdiction conferred by this act on the High Court of Admiralty may be exercised either by proceedings in rem or by proceedings in personam.” Giving a construction to these provisions, it was held by Sir Robert Phillimore in 1867, in The Sylph, L. R. 2 Ad. & Ec. 24, that personal injuries were included by the words “ damage done by a ship,” and that proceedings in rem might be taken for damages occasioned by such injuries. In the subsequent case of The Guldfaxe, L. R. 2 Ad. & Ec. 325, the same rule was applied to a suit for damages instituted by the personal representatives of a seaman who had been killed in a collision. This was subsequently affirmed in The Explorer, L. R. 3 Ad. & Ec. 289, decided in 1870. The same question came before the Court of Queen’s Bench upon an application for a writ of prohibition in the case of Smith v. Brown, L. R. 6 Q. B. 729, in 1871, wherein it was held that the word “ damage ” did not include loss of life and personal injury, and that the Admiralty Court Act conferred no jurist diction upon the High Court of Admiralty to entertain a suit under Lord Campbell’s Act. The judgment of the court in this case was delivered by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, and concurred in with some doubt by Mr. Justice Blackburn. Notwithstanding this prohibition, however, the Court of Admiralty continued to assume jurisdiction of actions in rem brought by the personal representatives of a deceased person. This appears from the case of The Franconia, 2 Prob. Div. 163, Sir Robert Phillimore being of the opinion that he was bound by the case of The Beta, L. R. 2 P. C. 447, in which the judicial committee of the Privy Council had held that the word “ damage ” referred to injuries to the person as well as to property. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, his judgment was affirmed by a divided court. The question was again raised before the Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, in the case of The Vera Cruz, 9 Prob. Div. 88, in p. 346which Mr. Justice Butt did not discuss the question, but held, in deference to the previous decisions of Dr. Phillimore, that an action in rem would lie by the widow and administratrix of the master of a British schooner against the Vera Cruz, and that the plaintiff should recover a moiety of the damage she had sustained, both vessels being adjudged to be in fault. On appeal the Court of Appeal, 9 Prob. Div. 96, held that it was not bound by its former decision by a divided court in the case of The Franconia, and reversed the judgment of the Admiralty Division. The case was again appealed to the House of Lords, and the judgment of the court below was affirmed. 10 App. Cas. 59, 65, 66, 67, 73. Lord Chancellor Selborne in delivering the opinion held that the 35th section of the Admiralty Court Act above cited showed that “ while an option to proceed in rem or in personam is given as to the jurisdiction conferred by the act, yet from the very nature of such an option every case provided for by the act is regarded as a proper case for a proceeding in rem; and accordingly the appellant, considering that the 7th section brought cases under Lord Campbell’s Act within the purview of the Admiralty jurisdiction, justly upon that hypothesis held it to mean such actions as were capable of being brought by a proceeding like the present in rem; and if the action cannot be so brought, then I apprehend it will follow ex converso that the 7th section does not extend to this description of claim.” “No one can say,” said he, “ that Lord Campbell’s Act relates expressly to claims for damage done by ships; and this section m the act of 1861 relates to that and to nothing else. . • • Every word of that legislation ” (Lord Campbell’s Act) “ being as it appears to me, legislation for the general case, and not for particular injury by ships, points to a common law action, points to a personal liability, and a personal right to recover, and is absolutely at variance with the notion of a proceeding in rem” Lord Watson concurring, said: “ I entertain no doubt that a right of action such as is given by Lord Campbell’s Act in a case like the present is not a ‘ claim for damage done by a ship’ within the meaning of the 7th section of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861.”
THE CORSAIR. 34T
This is the last expression of the highest court of England upon the question of proceeding in rem under Lord Campbell’s Act, and must be regarded as settling the law of that country that such jurisdiction is not conferred. That, notwithstanding-this, an action in personam will lie in the Admiralty Division is evident from the case of The Bernina, 11 Prob. Div. 31, in which the Admiralty took cognizance of the case, and upon appeal to the Court of Appeal, 12 Prob. Div. 58, and subsequently to the House of Lords, 13 App. Cas. 1, the jurisdiction was sustained, a trial by jury being now permitted in that-court, although the main question discussed was as to the principle involved in the case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, which was overruled. While these cases turn upon the construction of the English acts, the courts have been guided in such construction by principles which are of general application both in this country and in England.
A maritime lien is said by writers upon maritime law to be the foundation of every proceeding in rem in the Admiralty. In much the larger class of cases, the lien is given by the general Admiralty law, but in other instances, such for example as insurance, pilotage, wharfage, and materials furnished in the home port of the vessel, the lien is given, if at all,' by the local law. As we are to look, then, to the local law in this instance for the right to take cognizance of this class of cases, we are bound to inquire whether the local law gives a lien upon the offending thing. If it merely gives a right of action in personam for a cause of action of a maritime nature, the District Court may administer the law by proceedings in personam, as was done with a claim for half pilotage dues, under the law of New York, in the case of Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, but unless a lien be given by the local law, there is no lien to enforce by proceedings in rem in the Court of Admiralty.
The Louisiana act declares, in substance, that the right of action for every act of negligence, which causes damage to another, shall survive, in case of death, in favor of the minor children or widow of the deceased; and in default of these, in favor of the surviving father and mother, and that such p. 348survivors may also recover the damages sustained by them by the death of the parent, child, husband, or wife. Evidently nothing more is here contemplated than an ordinary action according to the course of the law as it is administered in Louisiana. There is no intimation of a lien or privilege upon the offending thing, which, as we have already held, is necessary to give a court of admiralty jurisdiction to proceed in rem.
3. We do not find it necessary to express an opinion whether a libel in rem will lie for injuries suffered by the deceased before her death, a right of action for which passes to the immediate relatives, under the Louisiana statute, since there is no proper averment in the libel to show that such damages were suffered. It is true that the seventh paragraph alleges that from the time the “ tug struck the bank of the river to the time she sunk,” (about ten minutes,) “ and the said Ella Barton was drowned, she, said Ella Barton, suffered great mental and physical pains and shock, and endured the tortures and agonies of death.” But there is no averment from which we can gather that These pains and sufferings were not substantially cotemporaneous with her death and inseparable as matter of law from it. Kearney v. Boston <& Worcester Bailroad, 9 Cush. 108; Hollenbeck v. Berkshire Bailroad Co., 9 Cush. 478; Kennedy v. Standard Sugar Befinery, 125 Mass. 90; Moran n. Holdings, 125 Mass. 93. Had she suffered bodily wounds and bruises, from the result of which she lingered and ultimately died, it is possible that her sufferings during her illness would give a separate cause of action; but the very fact that she died by drowning indicates that her sufferings must have been brief, and, in law, a mere incident to her death. Her fright for a few minutes is too unsubstantial a basis for a separate estimation of damages.
The decree of the court below is, therefore,
Affirmed.
Syllabus.
PEWABIC MINING COMPANY v. MASON.
MARCUS v. MASON.
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.
Nos. 1340, 1416. Argued March 16, 17, 1892. —Decided May 16,1892.
When a sale of property is decreed by a court of equity as the result of a litigation, it is the policy of the law that it shall not be set aside for trifling causes or matters which the complaining party might have attended to.
When such a sale is attacked the court will scrutinize all previous action of the parties during the litigation, which may throw light upon or explain their action at the sale.
It cannot be tolerated that either party should designedly wait until the property has been struck off to the other, and then open the bidding and defer the sale by an increased offer.
When a corporation owning real estate is wound up by reason of the expiration of the term for which it was incorporated, and its real estate is sold by decree of court under directions of a master, stockholders may purchase it, and there is no fraud on other stockholders if a part of the stockholders combine to purchase it for the benefit of an adjoining property owned by them.
Litigants prolonging litigation to the extent of their ability in a suit in equity seeking the sale of real estate, and prolonging their resistance by having the sale postponed after the decree, cannot complain if it takes place finally in a time of financial depression.
The court decreed in this case that the assets of the mining company should be sold at public vendue, that the debts of the company should be ascertained by a master as a basis for the bid, and that the sale should take place on the confirmation of his report. Held, that it was not intended that the sale should be delayed till every claim arising since the commencement of the suit should have passed to final judgment; but that a mere statement of the amount should be presented as a basis for fixing an upset price.
No leave of court is necessary to enable a litigating stockholder to bid at such sale of the assets of the corporation under a decree in the suit in which he is a litigant.
The provisions in equity rule 83 respecting exceptions to a master’s report do not apply to a report of a mere ministerial matter like a sale, but only to a report upon matters heard and determined by him.
The master’s sale under the decree was advertised to take place in Michigan
on Saturday, January 24. Late in the evening of Friday, January 23, the master received from M. a telegram from Boston, in Massachusetts, stating that he was a holder of nearly 3000 shares of stock, that he had just heard of the sale, that it was to take place on the Jewish Sabbath, that his Jewish friends wished to buy but would not attend on the Sabbath, and asking for a postponement. The sale took place on the 24th as announced, whereupon, on the 26th M. again telegraphed protesting and making an offer in advance of the purchaser’s bid. The master reported this in his report of the sale. The sale was confirmed. The day after the confirmation M. asked leave to intervene and have the sale set aside. In the subsequent proceedings no proof was offered that M. was a shareholder, and it appeared affirmatively that he had no financial responsibility. Held, that if it had been planned he could not have been more opportunely ignorant before the sale, or more accurately informed after the confirmation, and that his intervention was too late.
The court stated the case as follows :
These cases spring out of the same litigation and may be considered together. The preliminary facts are these: On April 4, 1853, the Pewabic Mining Company was organized as a corporation for mining copper, under the laws of the State of Michigan. The term of the corporation was for thirty years, and expired April 4, 1883. The capital stock at that time consisted of 40,000 shares, of $25 each. Notwithstanding the termination of the life of the corporation, the directors then in office continued its business without change. On March 26, 1884, at a meeting of the stockholders, by a vote of 27,919 against 6754 shares, the directors were authorized to dispose of the property at a sum not less than $50,000, and a sale was directed to be made to a new corporation, to be organized on the basis of 40,000 shares, the shares in the old to be exchanged in full payment for shares in the new, the stockholders in the old, not electing to join the new, to receive their pro rata interest in money. The present appellees were stockholders in the old corporation, owning 2650 shares, and protested against these resolutions. A new corporation was organized, but, before the transfer had been made, the appellees filed their bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan, the purpose of which was to enjoin the proposed transfer of the property of p. 351the old to the new corporation, and to have it sold at public auction, and the proceeds divided ratably among the stockholders. This bill was filed March 31,1884. On final hearing a decree was entered sustaining the prayer of the bill, and directing a sale of the property at public vendue, for cash, to the highest bidder, and referring the cause to Peter White as special master, with power to ascertain the assets and debts of the mining company, and directing that, after ascertaining and making report thereof to the court, he should proceed to sell the property at public vendue. (25 Fed. Rep. 882.)
From that decree an appeal was taken, and thereafter this court sustained the decree so far as it ordered a sale. In reference to the accounting before the master, it, however, directed that it should be widened so as to include the proceedings of the directors since the dissolution of the corporation. The opinion of this court was announced January 13, 1890. (133 U. S. 50.) The mandate was issued February 6, and was filed in the Circuit Court on March 14, 1890. In the execution of the decree a sale was made by the master on the 24th of January, 1891, more than a year after its affirmance by this court, the purchasers being Thomas Henry Mason and William Hart Smith, two of the original plaintiffs, and the price paid being $710,000. The sale was confirmed; and to set aside the confirmation and to open the sale were the matters sought to be accomplished by the three appeals taken in these two cases.
The specification of errors in the Pewabic Mining Company case was as follows:
“ 1. That the.court below erred in overruling the first exception taken by the appellant to the report of the sale of the special master, viz.: ‘ That the said sale mentioned in said report was made before the debts and the assets of said defendants, the Pewabic Mining Company, were ascertained as provided for and required in the decree entered in said cause,’
“2. That the court below erred in overruling the fifth exception taken by the appellant to the report of the sale of the special master, viz.: ‘ Because said property was sold p. 352for an inadequate price or sum, and for much less than it is worth.’
“ 3. That, under the mandate of this court, nothing less than ‘ all the assets and property of the said Pewabic Mining Company ’ ‘ in one body ’ could be sold by said master; but that by the order of the court confirming the sale, an exception was made therefrom of the claims against the directors, so that in fact all of said assets and property were not sold in one body.
“ 4. That in disregard of the rules governing the equity practice of the Circuit Courts of the United States, said report was confirmed within one month from the filing of the report in court.
“ 5. That promptly and without laches, and before any confirmation of said sale had been made as authorized by the rules governing such practice, and before any confirmation whatever had become absolute, beyond the power of the said Circuit Court to set aside, bona fide and well assured offers of a price largely advanced beyond the highest bid at the reported sale were presented to this court in support of an application, from the party so offering and of this appellant, for the setting aside of said reported sale, and the ordering of another sale.
“ 6. That Thomas H. Mason and William Hart Smith, complainants in this cause, bid at said auction, and that their bid, as the highest bid, was accepted by the special master, and the property exposed to sale was struck off to them as purchasers, when: (a) They had not obtained leave from the court to bid at said auction; (Z>) They had advised the court in the matter of the sale, and pressed forward the sale as parties interested only as sellers to obtain the highest price, and not at all as buyers interested to obtain the property for the lowest sum, and that therefore they had no right to bid;
(c) Before so bidding they had concerted with the Quincy Mining Company a scheme to take the property (if bought) off their hands at a very large personal profit; and they did not disclose this fact to the court, in any of their representations to the court, in the matter of the sale, and they procured p. 353affidavits from officers of the Quincy Company and presented them to the court, in which this fact was not disclosed; (<Z) Neither did they disclose this fact of their having secured a sale of this property to the Quincy Mining Company at a large profit, to the master, their fellow stockholders or the other bidders at said sale, nor allow the same then and there to be disclosed, but concealed the same; (e) On the other hand, while they had obtained this contract and agreement with the Quincy Mining Company, in accordance with which they were to buy this property for the purpose of transferring it to that company, they advised the court that said Quincy Mining Company would, at the auction ordered, bid as an independent bidder, in fair and free competition, and pressed forward the sale for this reason, that if deferred the Quincy Company might not bid, concealing from the court this contract and agreement, and all their relations with the Quincy Mining Company in this matter; (/) As a matter of fact the scheme was carried out. The complainants were both buyers and sellers. They advised the court, made the sale, purchased the property, and resold it at an advance which they pocketed themselves for their own personal benefit, and in fraud of the other stockholders.
“ 7. That as against a bid accented under all these circumstances, the Pewabic Mining Company, having, for a reasonable time, an undoubted right to elect whether to ratify and enforce the sale, and to demand and receive into its own assets the advance upon the sum bid, which was to be paid to the accepted bidders, or to have the accepted bid rejected, and the biddings reopened, has exercised that right entirely within such reasonable time, and is not guilty of laches in the premises.
“ 8. That the advance price offered to be bid for the property sold, in case a new sale should be ordered, was large enough to induce and require the court to open the biddings and to order such resale, and that such order was amply secured and guaranteed, and was seasonably made for that purpose.”
In Marcus’s case the following additional specifications We filed.
VOL. CXLV—23
Argument for Appellants.
“ 1. Because, as a large stockholder, and as making a bona fide offer of a great advance over the amount bid at the sale, he had a right to intervene.”
“ 4. If the sale had not been confirmed prior to the filing of Marcus’s petition, the bona fide offer of so large an advance price was proper ground for opening the sale and ordering a resale.
“ 5. Even if the sale had been confirmed prior to the filing of Marcus’s petition, the action of the court at the same term in entertaining the petition and in directing order of notice to issue thereon, suspended the operation of the order of confirmation.
“ 6. But, even if the sale had been regularly confirmed and the decree of confirmation had become of full effect, under all the circumstances of this case the sale should have been opened and a resale ordered.
“ 7. The petitioner, Marcus, has not been guilty of laches which should defeat the granting of his petition.”
Mr. Thomas H. Talbot for the Pewabic Mining Company, and Mr. Robert M. Morse and Mr. J. Lewis Stackpole for the Pewabic Mining Company and Marcus. Mr. Russell C. Ostrander was on the briefs for the company and for Marcus, and Mr. Charles E. ELellier on the brief for Marcus.
I. The directions of the mandate have been disregarded, in that the debts and assets of the Pewabic Company were not finally ascertained and adjudicated before a sale of any of the property of the company was ordered and made.
II. The property was sold for an inadequate price.
III. Under the mandate of this court, nothing less than “all the assets and property of the said Pewabic Mining Company in one body” could be sold by said master; but by the order of the court confirming the sale, an exception was made therefrom of the claims against the directors, so that in fact all of said assets and property were not sold in one body.
IV. The report of sale was confirmed, in disregard of the
Counsel for Appellees.
rules governing the equity practice of the Circuit Courts, within thirty days from the filing of the report. •
V. Before any valid confirmation of the sale, bona fide offers for a largely advanced price were presented to the court below on an application for a resale.
VI. The sale to the complainants, made without leave of the court to bid, in pursuance of a secret scheme entered into with a rival company, in which they were large stockholders, to turn over the property to it at a large private profit, undisclosed to either the court, the master, or other bidders, is contrary to the plainest principles of equity, and must be annulled. Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 IT. S. 50; O’ Connor n. Richards, San. & Sc. 246; Ryder v. Gower, 6 Bro. P. C. 306; Sidny v. Ranger, 12 Sim. 118; Byrne v. Lafferty, 8 Ir. Eq. 47; Guest n. Smythe, L. R. 5 Ch. 551; Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 625; Lister v. Lister, 6 Ves. 631; Nelthorpe v. Pennyman, 14 Ves. 517; Downes v. Grazebrook, 3 Meriv. 200; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 555; Ex parte James, 8 Ves. 337; Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves. 423; Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 381; Parkes v. White, 11 Ves. 210, 226; Patch n. Hatch, 9 Ves. 292.
VII. The defendants had the right of election between a confirmation of the sale and receipt of the profits of the buyers on the one hand, and of its annulment on the other. This election is a question independent of the date of confirmation by the court below. They have seasonably exercised it and have been guilty of no laches.
VIII. The advance price offered to be bid for the property sold, in case a new sale should be ordered, was large enough to induce and require the court to open the biddings and to order such resale, and such offer was abundantly secured and guaranteed and was seasonably made for that purpose.
IX. The petitioner Marcus, as a large stockholder and as making a bona fide offer of a great advance on the amount bid at the sale, had the right to intervene.
Mr. Don M. Dickinson (with whom were Mr. Thomas B. Dunstan and Mr. Alfred Russell on the brief) for appellees.
Mr. Justice Brewer, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The question in this case is whether the master’s sale shall stand. It may be stated generally that there is a measure of discretion in a court of equity, both as to the manner and conditions of such a sale, as well as to ordering or refusing a resale. The chancellor will always make such provisions for notice and other conditions as will in his judgment best protect the rights of all interested, and make the sale most profitable to all; and after a sale has once been made, he will, certainly before confirmation, see that no wrong has been accomplished in and by the manner in which it was conducted. Yet the purpose of the law is that the sale shall be final; and to insure reliance upon such sales, and induce biddings, it is essential that no sale be set aside for trifling reasons, or on account of matters which ought to have been attended to by the complaining party prior thereto. And in this respect regard may properly be had to all that has transpired before, for the conduct of the parties, their acts and omissions, may largely interpret their action at the time of the sale. In order, therefore, to understand fully the merits of these present appeals we must notice the course of the litigation and the conduct of the parties prior to the sale.
In 1883 the Pewabic Mining Company ceased to exist; its property then belonged to the different stockholders as tenants'in common. They could not agree among themselves. The minority appealed to the courts, and there the litigation was carried on for years; the minority insisting upon a sale, the majority upon the transfer of the property to a new corporation. At the end of six years the controversy was finally determined by this court; and in January, 1890, a decree of the Circuit Court directing a sale was affirmed. During these years each party was fully aware of the purpose and contention of the other, and, therefore, had ample time to prepare for whatever might be the outcome of the litigation. In January, 1890, as stated, the final decision was announced; at that time each party knew that a sale was to be had, and p. 357that if it intended to buy it must make all its arrangements therefor, and in such, arrangement must be included a determination of the full amount it was willing to bid for the property. It cannot be tolerated that it be in the contemplation of either to wait until after the property has been struck off to the other, and then open the bidding and defer the sale by an increased offer. Though the final decision in favor of the sale was announced on January 13, 1890, the sale was not made until January 24, 1891, more than a year thereafter. It was advertised to take place, first on October 30, 1890, but on application of the defendant was postponed till December 20, and again, on like application, to January 24, 1891. It was fully advertised not only in the local, but also in Detroit, New York, Boston and Chicago papers. There can be no pretence, therefore, of haste or a lack of notice, personal and general.
It is insisted by defendant that, the plaintiffs were acting in the interest of the Quincy Mining Company, a corporation owning adjoining and rival mining property; that solely in its interest, and not for the benefit of the stockholders in the Pewabic Mining Company, they carried on this litigation, secured the sale, bought at it, and, in final consummation of the wrong to their cobwners, have since their purchase conveyed the property to the Quincy Mining Company. There is a counter-charge by the appellees that the majority of the stockholders who sought to convey the property to the new corporation, and who have been practically the. adverse party in this litigation and who may hereafter be considered as described by the term defendant, were acting in the interest of the Franklin Mining Company, another corporation also owning property adjacent to the Pewabic mine. We are inclined to think there is truth in each allegation, and that it is not difficult to read between the lines that the minority of the stockholders were interested in the Quincy and the niajority in the Franklin Company, and that these respective corporations were seeking to obtain possession and control of the Pewabic. But there was no wrong or fraud in this, and no deception. Each party evidently knew the interests and p. 358relations of the other. In the answer originally filed by the defendant, in 1884, it was charged upon the plaintiffs that they were acting in the interest of a rival mining company.
It is also contended that the sale was made at a time when a severe financial condition existed in the country, especially affecting mining stocks and mining property. But the sale had once been postponed on this ground at defendant’s instance, the affidavits as to such depression were met by counter-affidavits on the part of the plaintiffs, and it is a doubtful question, under those affidavits, whether such depression did in fact exist. Even if it were clear that it did, that would not necessarily be a reason for further postponement. There comes a time in the history of a litigation like this when, though the times may be depressed, there must be a sale. The rights of the one party are to be respected as well as those of the other; and it does not always lie in the mouth of one who, by strenuous and protracted resistance, has delayed for years a sale, to claim still further delay on account of the then depressed financial condition. A speedy end of litigation, as speedy as is consistent with the rights of each party, is to be desired; and they who prolong litigation by appeal from court to court must not complain if sometimes they find themselves, at the end, under burdens which would not have rested upon them but for such delay. We think it must be affirmed that, so far as the general equitable considerations attending these cases are concerned, they make in favor of the appellees, and that a court should not for any light or technical reason disturb a sale consummated at the end of seven years of litigation.
We pass, therefore, to some of the special matters presented. First, it is claimed that under the terms of the decree the sale was prematurely made. That decree directed “ that all the assets and property of the said Pewabic Mining Company be sold at public vendue, for cash, to the highest bidder: Provided, however, That if at such sale the bid for the aggregate of the property and assets of said company should not be m excess of fifty thousand dollars above the amount of the debts of said company existing at the time of the sale hereinafter p. 359decreed, then that the arrangement for the sale of the property of said company made at the stockholders’ meeting in Boston, on the 26th day of March, a .d. 1884, and as set up in the defendant’s answer, shall be carried out under the direction of the special master hereinafter designated. . . . It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that this cause be, and is hereby, referred to Peter White, as special master,” for the following purpose and with the following powers, to wit, “ That said master proceed to ascertain the assets and property and the amount of the debts of the said Pewabic Mining Company,” and “ after ascertaining the assets and debts of said company and making a report thereof to this court, as hereinabove provided, and the confirmation thereof, said master shall proceed to sell said property at public vendue, to the highest bidder, in one body, after giving the notices of said sale required by law and the practice of this court, and that he make report thereof, and that said property be offered for sale at the front door of the court-house, in the village of Houghton, in the county of Houghton and State of Michigan.” This decree was affirmed by this court, the only modification being in respect to an accounting with the directors for moneys received by them after the expiration of the charter. It is insisted that by these terms no sale could be had until there had been a final ascertainment, a judicial determination, of all debts owing at the time of the sale, as well as of all assets, including therein claims due to the corporation; that by the modification directed by this court, there was also to be had an accounting with the directors, and until that was finished no sale could be had, because it was not as yet judicially ascertained whether they owed the corporation or the corporation owed them; in other words, whether there were more debts or more assets. The master to whom this matter was referred reported that all debts of the corporation which existed at the commencement of the suit had been paid; that all the personal property had been disposed of, leaving only the mine and its appurtenances; and that the total amount of all the claims against the company, added to $50,000, was less than the amount for which he had the pledge of a responsible bid, p. 360secured by a certificate of stock. This report was filed September 18. On November 4 the court confirmed so much of the report as found that the indebtedness due at the time of the commencement of the suit had been paid. Other exceptions to the report were sustained, but the court added these findings and orders:
“ Fourth, that for the purpose of fixing the upshot price at the sale the amount of such indebtedness on said day is hereby found and determined by the court to have been the sum of $80,191.20; fifth, that the last-named sum, with interest thereon from the last-named date, plus $50,000, shall be the starting point for the bidding at the sale; sixth, that the sale heretofore decreed in this cause do take place after six weeks’ notice thereof subsequent to the date of this order shall have been- given by said master, who is hereby directed to postpone sale until after such notice and then to make said sale; seventh, all questions of any of the parties with respect to their dealings with the indebtedness of said company or any part thereof are hereby expressly reserved.”
The contention of the appellees is, that the purpose of requiring an ascertainment of the debts prior to the sale was the fixing of an upset price, in order that, if no bid be made in excess of $50,000 above the amount of the debts of said company, the arrangement made in 1884 by the majority of the stockholders for the transfer of the property to the new company should be carried into effect, and that it was not contemplated that the sale should be absolutely postponed until after a final judicial determination of the amount of the several claims against the corporation—a matter which, by reason of possible appeals from the circuit to this court, might delay the sale' for many years, ihey further insist that the conduct of the appellant showed a purpose to promote delay, and, therefore, that, even if a strict construction sustained appellant’s claim, the court was justified in modifying the mere order of procedure. They urge, that though all debts due at the time of the commencement of the suit, and when the life of the corporation was ended,' were paid, the defendant caused to be presented a series of claims, for services of counsel and p. 361officers of the Pewabic Mining Company, and for money claimed to have been loaned to it, and then, on behalf of that company, filed exceptions to the legality and sufficiency of these claims, and having thus a form of controversy arranged before the master, neglected and delayed in the matter of hearing the same; and in support of this they call attention to a letter written by the master to the trial court in response to inquiries as to why the report was delayed.
With respect to this last matter it is sufficient to say that obviously the defendant was dilatory; and with reference to the construction of the decree, we think the appellees are right. It cannot be that the sale was intended to be the last act of this litigation, and that it must be delayed till every claim arising since the commencement of the suit had been passed to final judgment; for as the property remained in the hands of the appellant, new claims for care and services might arise as fast as old ones were determined; and, indeed, there were at the time of the sale no debts save those arising since the commencement of the suit. The purpose of the decree was a sale, provided such sale would produce more than the plan proposed by the majority of the stockholders; and it was enough, the debts due at the time having all been paid, that a mere statement of the amount of the claims be presented, and upon that the upset price be fixed. It will also be noticed that the court for the purposes of the sale found and determined the amount of the indebtedness, and that ample provision was made in the orders for the rights of all creditors, and the collection of all debts, and a fund was received from the sale large enough to satisfy all possible claims $710,000, instead of the $50,000 named in the resolution of
the company in March, 1884. We think, therefore, this contention of the appellant must fail.
A second contention is, that the sale was made to complainants without leave given by the court to them to bid. But no leave was necessary. The complainants were not the vendors. The English practice does not obtain in this country. A sale made by a special master under the directions of a court of chancery is not a sale made by either of p. 362the parties to a litigation or under his direction. The master is a representative of the court, as a marshal or sheriff is in an action at law. He is not under the control of either party; he is not the agent of either to make the sale. At such public judicial sale, either party as a rule may bid. Richards v. Holmes, 18 How. 143; Smith v. Black, 115 U. S. 308; Allen v. Gillette, 127 U. S. 589; Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 414, 420. In that case Judge Story said: “In sales directed by the court of chancery, the whole business is transacted by a public officer, under the guidance and superintendence of the court itself. Even after the sale is made, it is not final until a report is made to the court and it is approved and confirmed.”
In Blossom v. Railroad Company, 3 Wall. 196, 208, this court said: “ Officers appointed uipler such decrees, and directed to make such sales, have the power to accomplish the object; but they are usually invested with a reasonable discretion as to the manner of its exercise, which they are not at liberty to overlook or disregard. Acting under the decree, they have duties to perform to the complainant, to the vendor and purchaser, and to the court, and they are bound to exercise their best judgment in the performance of all those duties. Such an officer, in acting under such a decree, if directed to sell the property, should adopt all necessary and proper means to fulfil the directions; but he should, at the same time, never lose sight of the fact that, unless he is restricted by the terms of the decree, the time and manner of effecting the sale are, in the first instance, vested in his sound discretion. Usual practice undoubtedly is, that the officer in selling the property acts under the advice of the solicitor of the complainant; but it cannot be admitted that his advice is, under all circumstances, obligatory upon the officer.”
Nor is this a case where the complainants stood in any such fiduciary relations as forbade them to purchase or prevented even their acting for others in bidding. They had litigated with the defendant for years in establishing the right to have that property sold; and when finally they had succeeded m getting a decree that it be sold, they did not then assume a p. 363duty to the defendant and become charged with the care of its interests, or become incapacitated from bidding freely for themselves or for others. None of those matters of a fiduciary character, which sometimes enter into and avoid sales, existed in this case.
Another matter complained of is that the sale was prematurely confirmed. It took place on the 24th of January, 1891, and the report of sale was filed February 4. On the 7th of February an order nisi was entered, that, unless cause to the contrary was shown within eight days, the sale would be confirmed. On February 13 reasons why the sale should not be confirmed were filed by the defendant, and on the same day exceptions to the report of sale. On the 2d day of March, upon notice, the objections and exceptions of the defendant were heard by the court and overruled, and the sale confirmed.
In support of this complaint reliance is placed on general equity rule number 83 : “ The master, as soon as his report is ready, shall return the same into the clerk’s office, and the day of the return shall be entered by the clerk in the order book. The parties shall have one month from the time of filing the report to file exceptions thereto, and, if no exceptions are within that period filed by either party, the report shall stand confirmed on the next rule day after the month is expired.” It is worthy of note, however, that exceptions were filed, were heard and determined by the court, and no objection was made by the appellant to the time of the hearing, or any suggestion of a right to longer time in which to file exceptions. It would seem that if there were error in this respect, the appellant was not in a position to avail itself thereof. But there was no error. Rule 83 has no reference to a report by a master of a mere ministerial matter like a sale, but only to his report upon matters heard and determined by him. In McMicken v. Perin^ 18 How. 507, 510, it was observed: “ In Story v. Livingston^ 13 Pet. 359, this court decided that no objections to a master’s report can be made which were not taken before the master; the object being to save time, and to give him an opportunity to correct his errors and reconsider his opinion.” But surely in the matter of a sale p. 364there is no opportunity for objections before the master, or any correction by him of his errors or any reconsideration of his opinion. The course pursued in this case in reference to the confirmation was the correct practice; an order nisi followed if no objections were taken in time by an order of confirmation. In 2 Daniell’s Chancery Pleading and Practice, page 1274, 4th Am. ed., the author says: “ After the report has been filed, and an office copy taken by the purchaser, he must, at his own expense, apply to the court by motion, that the purchase may be confirmed. This motion requires no previous notice, and the order made upon it will be that the purchase may be confirmed nisi; i.e. unless cause is shown against it within eight days after service of the order. The purchaser must, at his own expense, procure an office copy of this order from the registrar, and he may serve it on the solicitors for all the parties in the cause. If no cause is shown within the eight days, the purchaser must, at his own expense, apply to the court to confirm the order absolutely, which will be ordered of course, on the production of an affidavit of the service of the order nisi, and a certificate of no cause having been shown.” And, again, on page 1305, in which he thus notes the reason of the rule in respect to a report of sale: “ With respect to which it is to be observed, that the object of requiring this report to be confirmed is not to enable the parties to bring the decision of the master under the review of the court, but to afford time between the service of the order nisi and the absolute confirmation of the report, to others to come in and open the bidding, so as to secure the sale of the estate to the best possible advantage.” And in 8 American and English Encyclopaedia of Law, p. 254, the practice is thus stated : “ The master or commissioner making the sale should report his action to the court, to the end that the sale may be confirmed. A motion to confirm the sale, with notice to the parties adversely interested to the confirmation, should be made. Confirmation nisi will be ordered, to become absolute within a designated time, unless cause is shown against it. If cause is not shown it stands confirmed.” See also Mayhew v. West Virginia Oil Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 205, p. 365215, and as to the practice in the state courts of Michigan, Jennison’s Ch. Pr. p. 157, Rule 79. We think, therefore, that this objection also must be overruled.
The remaining objections made by the appellant can be more conveniently considered in connection with the appeal of Alfred A. Marcus. The first appearance of Marcus in this litigation was in this wise: The sale was made on the 24th of January, and at the village of Houghton, county of Houghton, and State of Michigan. The 24th was Saturday, and late in the evening of January 23 the master received this dispatch:
“ Boston, Mass., January 23, 1891.
“To Petee White, special master :
“Please postpone sale of Pewabic mine; just found out the sale on our Jewish Sabbath; never notified of sale until to-day. We hold nearly three thousand shares. Our Jewish friends in London will buy the mine. There are other Jewish buyers who will not attend sale on Saturday; will most cheerfully pay all expenses for postponement; if not, please announce at sale ‘ we will protest against this legality.’
“ Alfeed A. Maecus.”
On Monday, the 26th, he received the following:
“ Boston, Mass., January 26, 1891.
“ To Petee White, special master:
“You ignored my dispatch; sold the Pewabic mine. I protest against the sale, as you were bound to do all to get the highest price. I claim the right now to bid seven hundred twenty-one thousand dollars cash, being twenty thousand dollars more than bid at the illegal sale. I shall claim the mine, being the highest bidder, and protest against any transfer being made to any one except myself, and shall hold you personally responsible.
“ Alfeed A. Maecus.”
In his report of sale he gave copies of these dispatches, Simply adding that the sender of the dispatches was wholly p. 366unknown to him, and that he paid no attention whatever to them. On the 3d day of March, the day after the sale had been confirmed, and more than five weeks after the sale had been made, Marcus filed a petition for leave to intervene, in which he alleged that “ he is the owner of 3017 shares of the capital stock of the Pewabic Mining Company; that he, for himself and other parties, whose names he is willing to disclose, was desirous and fully intended to be present or represented at the sale of the property of the said Pewabic Mining Company by the special master duly appointed by this honorable court in the above-entitled cause; that he was ready to and would have bid at said sale and paid a large amount of money for the property of said company advertised for sale by said special master; that on January 23, 1891, that being the day before the sale of said property took place, your petitioner discovered for the first time that the sale was advertised for Saturday, January 24; that thereupon and immediately your petitioner, using all haste and dispatch possible, sent by telegraph a message to the said special master, a copy whereof is hereto annexed, marked A, asking to have the sale of said property postponed, at his own expense, for the reason that he was never notified of the sale until said date, and that said sale was advertised to take place on the seventh day of the week, which is the Sabbath of your petitioner, and upon which day he is forbidden by his creed to do any business.” He further alleged that the master ignored the dispatch and sold the property for an inadequate sum, and for much less than it was worth; that his offer on January 26 was bona fide; that he was willing and ready to pay all the expenses of a resale; and that he would start with a bid not less than $800,000, afterwards by amendment raised to $900,000, and would give a bond with satisfactory sureties for his good faith and ability to carry out his offer. On the presentation of this petition the parties were ordered to show cause why it should not be granted. It is a singular fact that his first appearance in the case was the day before the sale, and his first appearance in court the day after the confirmation. If it had all been planned, he could not have p. 367been more opportunely ignorant before and more accurately late after. To this order to show cause the parties appeared, testimony was taken, and a hearing had. It is worthy of note that, outside of the petition of Marcus, there is no evidence of his ownership of stock, and nothing in that tending to show how or when he obtained title to that which he claimed to own; neither is there anything to show what steps he had taken, prior to the sale, to inform himself of what was going on in the affairs of the company. It would seem from the multitude of judgments and attachments against him appearing on the records of the courts in Boston, that he was of no financial responsibility. On the other hand, it is also true that the affidavits of several responsible parties were presented, showing that Marcus was a man of large transactions; that he was an orthodox Jew, who did no business on- Saturday; and that the parties named were willing to give the proffered bond if a resale were ordered. It would not be a strained inference from the testimony that Marcus was acting for others, and was really put forward with the idea of introducing a new factor into the litigation. But we deem it unnecessary to inquire into the real character of this intervention. It is enough that it comes too late. Surely no one would suppose that an officer having charge of the sale of property of such value, a sale made at the end of prolonged litigation, should at the last moment, in response to a dispatch from a stranger, postpone the sale. The master’s action was unquestionably proper, and if the party desired the intervention of the court, his duty was to apply at once and not wait until after confirmation; for then the rights of the purchaser are vested, and something more than mere inadequacy of price must appear before the sale can be disturbed. Indeed, even before confirmation the sale would not be set aside for mere inadequacy, pnless so great as to shock the conscience. See Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180, 191, where the matter is discussed at some length by Mr. Justice Bradley. As the price bid by the appellees, and at which the property was struck off to them, was about 8580,000 in excess of the upset price, it is hardly necessary to say that there is no shocking inadequacy of price.
Syllabus.
In conclusion, we may add that, after reviewing all the facts disclosed by these records in the light of the prior history of the litigation, it seems to us that the equities of the case are decidedly with the appellees, and the decrees will he
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Gray did not hear the argument and takes no part in the decision of this case.