Briggs v. United States, 143 U.S. 346 (1892)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Briggs v. United States, 143 U.S. 346 (1892)
Full caption
BRIGGS v. UNITED STATES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 29, 1892
BRIGGS v. UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 722. Submitted January 4, 1892. — Decided February 29, 1892.
During the civil war two citizens of the United States, residing in loyal States could make a valid contract for the sale or mortgage of cotton growing on a plantation within one of the insurgent States, and such a contract would pass existing cotton on the plantation, and also crops to be subsequently raised thereon.
In Kentucky the common law rule prevails that a sale of personal property is complete, and title passes as between vendor and vendee, when the terms of transfer are agreed upon, without actual delivery.
The contract in this case for the sale of cotton growing and to be grown did not come within the statute of frauds, and the only question to be decided is whether it was a contract of sale or a contract of mortgage. The captured and abandoned property act was a surrender by the United States of its right as a belligerent to appropriate property of a particular kind taken in the enemy’s country, and belonging to a loyal citizen.
The court stated the case as follows :
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of Claims, dismissing the petition of the appellant, praying judgment for the amount of the proceeds of certain cotton, the property of his testator, which was seized by the forces of the United States and sold and the proceeds paid into the Treasury. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows:
Charles S. Morehead was a citizen of Kentucky at the breaking out of the late civil war. He was a man of distinction in that State, and had once been its governor. He was a lawyer by profession, and before and until the war practised law in partnership with C. M. Briggs. In the spring of 1861 he was the owner of two plantations near Egg’s Point, in Mississippi, and at the opening of the war he was on the plantations; but some time in the following May or June, when a prolonged struggle seemed inevitable, he left one of the plantations in charge of an overseer and the other in charge of his son, and returned to Kentucky. Not long afterwards he was arrested and confined in Fort Warren as a suspected rebel, because of his sympathy with the Confederate cause, but, upon taking the oath of allegiance to the United States, he was, in February, 1862, released. On the 18th of April following he sold to C. M. Briggs, his former partner, by a bill of sale in writing, all the cotton on his plantations, baled and unbaled, gathered and ungathered, and all that should be raised in 1862, to satisfy certain indebtedness to him and to secure him for certain debts which he was under obligation to pay for Morehead. The bill of sale was as follows:
“For and in consideration of money loaned and advanced heretofore by C. M. Briggs, and further valuable considerations by way of suretyship for me by said Briggs, I hereby sell and transfer to said C. M. Briggs all the cotton on my two plantations in Mississippi, near Egg’s Point and Greenvale. Said cotton so sold embraces all that I may have, baled and unbaled, gathered and ungathered. This is intended to coyer all cotton that I have now or may have this year on said two plantations, supposed to be about two thousand bales. “April 18, 1862. C. S. Morehead.”
The bill of sale was delivered to 0. M. Briggs on the day of its execution, and at the time both parties were citizens and residents of Kentucky.
The agents left in charge of the plantations in Mississippi superintended the raising of cotton on them, and had general direction of the affairs of the plantations in the years 1861, 1862 and 1863. The son of Morehead sold some of the cotton in order to obtain money to carry on the plantations, and some of the sales werd made to an agent of the Confederate government; but it does not appear that Morehead gave any directions to his agents as to the disposition of any of the cotton, or had any communication with them in 1862 or 1863.
None of the cotton belonging to Morehead which was on the plantations at the time of the sale to Briggs came into the possession of the United States; all that came into their possession was raised subsequently. In 1862, after the sale, the agents left in charge of the plantations raised a crop of cotton, a portion of .which, in December, 1862, or in January, 1863, was hauled to Wilson’s Burn, a place then used for the storage of cotton belonging to, or intended to be sold to, the Confederate. government, and also for the storage of the cotton of individuals. The cotton was marked by the agents, “C. 8. A.,” in order to save it from destruction by Confederate soldiers, but it was not so marked by direction of Morehead.
Whilst the cotton was there three hundred and eighty bales of it were, in March, 1863, taken by Captain Osband of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, acting under orders of General Grant, to Worthington’s Landing on the Mississippi River, where it was intermingled with other cotton from adjacent plantations, and shipped to Memphis, Tennessee, and there turned over to Captain Fort, Assistant Quartermaster General of the United States Army. The whole amount of cotton received by him was twenty-one hundred and thirty bales, which, after being rebaled and thereby reduced to twenty-one hundred and eleven bales, was sold by him, and the proceeds accounted for to the United States, amounting to $422,125.70. The cotton, including the three hundred and eighty bales mentioned above, which came from the plantations of Morehead, amounted to p. 349four hundred and fifty-five bales, and their proportional part of the proceeds was $91,000. There is a discrepancy between this amount and that which is subsequently claimed in the amended petition. There is also a discrepancy between the number of bales stated in the findings to have been received by the Quartermaster General and the number mentioned in the act of Congress of June 4, 1888. But these discrepancies are slight, and do not affect the questions considered.
The exact state of the indebtedness from Morehead to Briggs, at the time of the execution of the bill of sale, does not appear. Briggs had paid eight or ten thousand dollars for Morehead, and the latter had collected Briggs’s portion of a fee amounting to five thousand dollars, and was in the habit of borrowing money from him during the continuance of their law partnership, until the commencement of the war. It does not appear that any definite settlement was had between them. C. M. Briggs having died, his brother, James A. Briggs, was on the 15th of July, 1815, appointed executor of his estate by the county court of Jefferson County, in Kentucky, of which county the deceased was at the time of his death a citizen and resident. He accepted the trust and qualified by taking the necessary oath and executing the required bond.
By a special act of Congress, passed on the 4th of June, 1888, (25 Stat. 1075, c. 348,) the Court of Claims was given, subject to certain conditions hereafter named, like jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim of the legal representatives of C. M. Briggs for the proceeds of four hundred and fifty-five bales of cotton, stated in the act to be then in the Treasury of the United States, and alleged to have been owned in whole or in part by the deceased, as was given to that court by the acts of March 12, 1863, and July 2, 1864, upon petition to be filed in that court within two years from the passage of the act, notwithstanding any statute of limitations to the contrary. One of the conditions named was that on a preliminary inquiry the court should find that Briggs was in fact loyal to the United States government, and that the assignment to him from Morehead was hona fide j the sale from Morehead being thus designated in the act. A further p. 350condition was, that if the court should find that the alleged assignment from Morehead to Briggs, under which Briggs claimed the cotton, was intended only as security for indebtedness and against contingent liabilities assumed for More' head, then judgment should be rendered for such portion of the proceeds of the said cotton as would satisfy the debts and claims. It was also provided that the judgment should not be paid out of the general fund in the Treasury arising from the sale of captured and abandoned property, but should be paid out of the special fund charged to and accounted for by Captain Fort, Assistant Quartermaster, arising from the sale of the twenty-two hundred and nine bales of cotton received by him, with which claimant’s cotton was intermingled; the claimant to receive only the proportionate part which his cotton might bear to the net proceeds accounted for by Captain Fort.
The executor accordingly filed his petition, in which, as amended, he alleges that, of the net proceeds of the cotton accounted for by Captain Fort, there remains in the Treasury, after deducting the payments properly chargeable to the same, and which have been paid out to various claimants on judgments of the Court of Claims, the sum of $138,523.92, being the net proceeds of six hundred and twenty-one bales of cotton, for which no claim has ever been made on which judgment has been rendered, or payment obtained from the Treasury. And the petitioner alleges that of this sum he is entitled to recover his pro rata share, corresponding to his four hundred and fifty-five bales, amounting in the aggregate to $101,794.57, for which he prays judgment.
A preliminary inquiry was had by the Court of Claims as to the loyalty of the testator, C. M. Briggs, during the war, and as to the bona fide character of the assignment to him by Morehead; and it was found that the testator was in fact loyal to the United States government, and that the assignment to him by Morehead of April 18, 1862, was bona fide..
The case being thus freed from these preliminary inquiries, the only questions remaining for consideration were, first, the effect of that assignment in passing title to the cotton raised p. 351on. the plantations and seized by the forces of the United States and sold; second, the right of the owner or assignee to the proceeds received, he being loyal to the government of the United States during the war; and, third, the amount of the claims of the deceased against Morehead payable out of such proceeds.
The court held that cotton raised in the Confederate States during the war was hostile property which the United States had the right to and did apply to their own uses while it continued; that the fact that the owner or assignee of the cotton was a loyal man during the war did not affect the right of the United States to thus apply it, or the proceeds of its sale, to their own use; and that therefore no liability rested upon the government of the United States to account for the property, or its proceeds when sold, to the owner .or assignee. The petition was accordingly dismissed, (25 C. Cl. 126,) and from the decree of dismissal the case is brought to this court on appeal. >
Mr. Philip B. Thompson, Jr., and Mr. W. J. Moberley for appellant.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury for appellee.
Mr. Justice Field, having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Though at the time the sale, or assignment, as it is termed in the act of Congress, was made of the cotton on the plantations in Mississippi, or to be raised thereon during the year 1862, the late civil war was flagrant, there was no rule of law arising from the existence of hostilities between the different sections of the country which in any respect impaired the validity of the transaction. Both parties were then residents and citizens of Kentucky, and no agreement was made for the transportation and delivery of the cotton across the lines separating the insurrectionary States from those which maintained their loyalty and adhered to the Union. Morehead, the owner, was in the spring of 1861, at the commencement p. 352of the war, on the plantations in Mississippi; and in May or June following, when a prolonged struggle seemed inevitable, he placed one of them in charge of his son and the other in charge of an overseer, and returned to Kentucky. It does not appear that ever afterwards during the continuance of the war he had any communication with either. They superintended the plantations, and in 1862 raised a crop of cotton thereon, the greater part of which, if not the whole, was afterwards seized by the forces of the United States, placed in the custody of an assistant quartermaster of the army, sold by him, and the proceeds paid over or accounted for to the Treasury of the United States.
In Conrad v. Waples, 96 U. S. 279, 286, we said of a sale of real property within the Confederacy between two persons residents there during the war:
“ The character of the parties as rebels or enemies did not deprive them of the right to contract with and to sell to each other. As between themselves, all the ordinary business between people of the same community in buying, selling and exchanging property, movable and immovable, could be lawfully carried on, except in cases where it was expressly forbidden by the United States, or where it would have been inconsistent with or have tended to weaken their authority. It was commercial intercourse and correspondence between citizens of one belligerent and those of the other, the engaging in traffic between them, which were forbidden by the laws of war and by the President’s proclamation of non-intercourse. So long as the war existed, all intercourse between them inconsistent with actual hostilities was unlawful. But commercial intercourse and correspondence of the citizens of the enemy’s country among themselves were neither forbidden nor interfered with, so long as they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority or the rights of loyal citizens. No people could long exist without exchanging commodities, and, of course, without buying, selling and contracting. And no belligerent has ever been so imperious and arbitrary as to attempt to forbid the transaction of ordinary business by its enemies among themselves.
No principle of public law and no consideration of public policy could be subserved by any edict to that effect; and its enforcement, if made, would be impossible.”
The property in this case was real estate, but we do not perceive how that fact would alter the validity of a transaction, if it could be affected by the character of the parties. If residents of the enemy’s country may contract for property situated within it, there would seem to be no objection to similar transactions by persons residing outside of the Confederate lines and adhering to the national government, so long as no intercourse or connection is kept up with the inhabitants of the enemy’s country. As stated in the case from which we have cited, it was commercial intercourse and correspondence between citizens of one belligerent and the other, and the engagement in traffic between them, leading to the transmission of money or property from one belligerent country to the other, which was forbidden.
There was, therefore, nothing in the sale of the cotton on the plantations, or of cotton to be raised thereon, there being no agreement respecting its movement across the border of the contending sections, which brought the transaction within the prohibitions of any rule of international law or the proclamations of the President of the United States in 1861. (12 Stat. 257, 1262 ; 13 Stat. 731.)
Those who may desire to examine the decisions of the courts as to the nature and extent of the prohibitions upon transactions between subjects of countries at war, or between subjects of. the same country respecting property situated in the enemy’s country, will find in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561, the subject ably and exhaustively considered, with an analysis of the most important decisions of the English and American courts.
The sale not being open to objection as relating to property within the hostile territory, the question arises whether it was sufficient to pass the existing cotton on the plantations and crops to be subsequently raised thereon; and on that question we have no doubt. The crop which was afterward seized by
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the forces of the United States was not then in existence, but from the fact that it was raised during the year we conclude it was already planted; though if otherwise, the fact would not be material. The sale would take effect the moment the crop appeared. In Butt v. Ellett, 19 Wall. 544, the question was as to the effect of an instrument purporting to be a mortgage of a crop, the seed of which had not been sown. A plantation in Mississippi was leased for one year for $3500, for which the lessee gave his note, and to secure it embodied in the lease a mortgage of all the crops raised on the plantar tions during a certain designated year. It was held that the mortgage clause could not operate as a mortgage, because the crops to which it related were not in existence, but that when they grew the lien attached and bound them effectually from that time.
In Andrew v. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417, 421, the Court of Appeals of New York held that in the case of crops to be sown, the title vests potentially from the time of the bargain, and actually as soon as the subject arises. The court cited several cases, going back as far as the time of Chief Justice Hobart, to sustain this doctrine, observing that they sufficiently showed that crops to be raised were an exception to the general rule that title to property not in existence cannot be affected so as to vest the title when it comes into being.
The delivery of the crops was not essential to pass the title as between Morehead and Briggs. The law on the subject of the sale of personal property does not require impossibilities, as would be a delivery in a case of that kind. The cotton was not at the time grown, and even if the sale be deemed incomplete until the actual appearance of the crop, it could not then be removed from the soil for delivery; besides, it was within the limits of a recognized enemy’s country, and any attempt to transport it to the Union side for delivery would have been unlawful.
By the common law a sale of personal property is complete and the title passes as between vendor and vendee when the terms of transfer are agreed upon, without actual delivery.
In Simmons v. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857, 862, it was so held by p. 355the Court of King’s Bench, Justice Bailey using this language: “Generally speaking, where a bargain is made for the purchase of goods, and nothing is said about payment or delivery, the property passes immediately, so as to cast upon the purchaser all future risk, if nothing further remains to be done to the goods, although he cannot take them away without paying the price.”
In Gilmour n. Supple, 11 Moore P. C. 551, 566, the Privy Council, in giving its judgment, said: “ By the law of England, by a contract for the sale of specific ascertained goods, the property immediately vests in the buyer, and a right to the price in the seller, unless it can be shown that such was not the intention of the parties.”
In Kentucky, where the sale in this case was made, the common law rule prevails. In Willis v. Willis, 6 Dana, 48, the Court of Appeals of that State said: “ So soon as a bargain of sale of personal goods is struck the contract becomes absolute without actual payment or delivery, and the property and risk of accident to the goods vest in the buyer.”
Nor was the sale void within the statute of frauds. There was no creditor or purchaser who could question the transfer of title to the vendee. The government stood in no such relation and could raise no such objection. It had no preexisting demand or equity against the property. All the rights of the government resulted from capture.
And this brings us to the consideration of the most important question in the case: Whether the United States acquired title to the property by its capture, and can, therefore, disregard the claim of ownership by the testator or petitioner, and treat the cotton as property confiscated to their use. The Court of Claims held that the United States rightfully appropriated the property and its proceeds, and were not under any obligation to account for them to the owner or his representative.
It proceeded upon the doctrine that the Confederate States and the States which adhered to the Union were engaged in a civil war, having such proportions as to be attended with the incidents of an international war, and that therefore the United p. 356States could treat all property within the Confederate lines as enemy’s property, and in the exercise of their belligerent rights seize and appropriate to their own use any of it which could be of service to them in the prosecution of the war; and that the property which was most beneficial to the Confederacy in furnishing funds was cotton, and it was for that reason particularly sought by the national forces for capture. The Court of Claims recognized the doctrine, also, that the right of capture extended to the products of the soil, whether owned by citizens of the Confederacy or strangers to both belligerents, and that the capture of movable property within the Confederacy transferred the title when reduced to firm possession; and it therefore held that when the cotton for the proceeds of which this action is brought was captured by the national forces and sold and the proceeds paid into the treasury of the United States, the title to the property and proceeds passed absolutely to the general government..
This decision of the Court of Claims would have been correct, and been sustained, had the government of the United States confined its action simply to the enforcement of its rightful powers as a belligerent, and had not surrendered its rights as a belligerent to appropriate property of a particular kind taken in the enemy’s country, belonging to a loyal citizen.
In Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, 110, 122, 123, the court said that it was conceded that war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found, and observed that the mitigations of this rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of modern times had introduced into practice, might more or less affect the exercise of this right, but could not impair the right itself.
Substantially the same thing was said in Young n. United States, 97 U. S. 39, 60: “ All property,” was the language of the court in that case, “ within enemy territory is in law enemy property, just as all persons in the same territory are enemies. . A neutral, owning property within the enemy’s lines, holds it as enemy property, subject to the laws of war; and, if it is hostile property, subject to capture.”
But in another case, that of Mrs. Alexander’s Cotton, 2 Wall. 404, 419, this court said that “ this rule, as to property on land, has received very important qualifications from usage, from the reasonings of enlightened publicists, and from judicial decisions. It may now be regarded as substantially restricted ‘ to special cases dictated by the necessary operation of the war,’ and as excluding, in general, ‘ the seizure of the private property of pacific persons for the sake of gain.’ ”
The circumstances in which the late war originated, and the fact that within the Confederate lines there were multitudes of people who were sincerely attached to the government of the Union and desired its success, gave ample reason to the Federal government for a modification of the harsh rules of war in regard to the capture of property on land, so as not to bring within the same calamity friend and foe. It was a desire to ameliorate as much as possible the exercise of the necessary belligerent, right of capture of property within the rebel lines, in its application to the property of persons thus friendly to the Union, so far as cotton was concerned, which led to the passage of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act of March, 1863, and the subsequent amendments thereto.
Cotton was considered the great means of procuring supplies for the Confederate government. It is well known to have been its chief reliance for the purchase of arms and other munitions of war abroad; indeed, without this resource, the Confederacy would have been deprived of its greatest means of obtaining the necessary supplies to continue the struggle. As said by this court in the case of Mrs. Alexander’s Cotton, 2 Wall. 420, cited above, no principle of equity or just policy required, when the national occupation was itself precarious, that it should be spared from capture and allowed to remain, in case of the withdrawal of the Union troops, an element of strength to the rebellion.
The act of Congress of March 12, 1863, providing for the collection of abandoned and captured property in the insurrectionary territory, (12 Stat. 820, c. 120,) declared that all such property might be appropriated to the public use or sold. But it also said, in substance, that the property of friend and foe p. 358cannot at the time be separated; and all the property of that kind found within the Confederate lines will be taken, sold, and when sold its proceeds will be deposited in the Treasury; but if afterwards within two years after the suppression of the rebellion the owner can establish to the satisfaction of the Court of Claims his title to the property thus taken, and his loyalty to the Union cause, then the portion of the proceeds belonging to him shall be restored, after deducting the expenses attendant upon its capture, removal and custody. United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 67.
Under this act immense amourfts of property belonging to citizens of the United States, who sincerely mourned the origin of the Confederacy, and longed for the re-establishment of the national government, and who kept faith in their hearts through the whole of the long struggle, were accounted for and the proceeds restored to the rightful owners; and certainly it must be regarded as a most beneficent act on the part of the general government. The records of the Court of Claims show a multitude of cases where this law has been administered, and many loyal people have had the proceeds of their property returned to them, which had been captured because of the fact that it was situated within hostile territory.
In the present case, the petitioner was allowed the same right to present his claim for the proceeds of the property belonging to his testator which would have been allowed if the testator himself had presented his claim within two years after the capture. The question was as to the loyalty of the testator of the claimant, and also as to his ownership of the cotton. His loyalty was found by the court, and also the bona fides of the.sale of the property. After these facts had been established the only question that could have been properly considered was the amount of the proceeds which the petitioner should receive. That was not considered by the Court of Claims.
In passing the act, Congress considered that a question might arise whether the transaction between Morehead and Briggs constituted a sale, or an assignment by way of mortgage, although it purports to be a sale and transfer. The act p. 359provides that if the transaction was intended only as security for indebtedness and against contingent liabilities, only such portion of the proceeds should be awarded to the petitioner as would satisfy the debts and claims of the testator, to secure which the assignment, as it is termed in the act, was made.
The case, therefore, will be Reversed, and sent back to the Court of Claims, with instructions to pass upon the question whether the transaction was an absolute sale or merely a mortgage or pledge; and according to the view adopted the amount of the proceeds due and pa/yable to the petitioner should be ascertained, and it is so ordered.
NEBRASKA w IOWA.
ORIGINAL.
No. 4. Original. Argued January. 29, 1892. — Decided February 29, 1892.
When grants of land border on running water, and the banks are changed by the gradual process known as accretion, the riparian owner’s boundary line still remains the stream; but when the boundary stream suddenly abandons its old bed and seeks a new course by the process known as avulsion, the boundary remains as it was, in the centre of the old channel: and this rule applies to a State when a river forms one of its boundary lines.
The law of accretion controls on the Missouri River, as elsewhere; but the change in the course of that river in 1877 between Omaha and Council Bluffs does not come within the law of accretion, but within that of avulsion.
The court stated the case as follows:
This is an original suit brought in this court by the State of Nebraska against the State of Iowa, the object of which is to have the boundary line between the two States determined. Iowa was admitted into the Union in 1846, and its western boundary as defined by the act of admission was the middle of the main, channel of the Missouri River. Nebraska was p. 360admitted in. 1867, and its eastern boundary was likewise the middle of the channel of the Missouri River. Between 1851 and 1877, in the vicinity of Omaha, there were marked changes in the course of this channel, so that in the latter year it occupied a very different bed from that through which it flowed in the former year. Out of these changes has come this litigation, the respective States claiming jurisdiction over the same tract of land. To the bill filed by the State of Nebraska the State of Iowa answered, alleging that this disputed ground was part of its territory, and also filed a cross-bill, praying affirmative relief, establishing its jurisdiction thereof, to which cross-bill the State of Nebraska answered. Replications were duly filed and proofs taken.
J/r. J. M. Woolworth for the State of Nebraska. Mr. C. J. Greene and the Attorney General of that State were with him on the brief, in which were cited Jefferis n. East Omaha Land Co., 134 IT. S. 178; 8 Opinions Attorneys General, 177; India/na v. Kent/ucky, 136 IT. S. 479.
Mr. Smith McPherson for the State of Iowa. The Attorney General of that State and Mr. J. J. Stewart were with him on, the brief, in which were cited St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 IT. S. 226; Mul/ry v. Norton, 100 N. Y. 424.
Mr. Justkje Brewer delivered the opinion of the court.
It is settled law, that when grants of land border on running water, and the banks are changed by that gradual process known as accretion, the riparian owner’s boundary line still remains the stream, although, during the years, by this accretion, the actual area of his possessions may vary. In New Orleams v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 717, this court said: “ The question is well settled at common law, that the person whose land is bounded by a stream of water which changes its course gradually by alluvial formations, shall still hold by the same boundary, including the accumulated soil. No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every p. 361proprietor whose land is thus bounded is subject to loss by the same means which may add to his territory; and, as he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain.” (See also Jones n. Soulard, 24 How. 41; Banks n. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57; Saulet v. Shepherd, 4 Wall. 502; St. Clair County n. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46; Jefferis v. East Omaha La/nd Co., 134 U. S. 178.)
It is equally well settled, 'that where a stream, which is a boundary, from any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such change of channel works no change of boundary; and that the boundary remains as it was, in the centre of the old channel, although no water may be flowing therein. This sudden and rapid change of channel is termed, in the law, avulsion. In Gould on Waters, sec. 1.59, it is said: “But if the change is violent and visible, and arises from a known cause, such as a freshet, or a cut through which a new channel is formed, the original thread of the stream continues to mark the limits of the two estates.” 2 Bl. Com. 262; Angell on Water Courses, § 60 ; Trustees of Hopkins' Academy v. Dickinson, 9 Cush. 544; Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 123 Illinois, 535; Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Porter (Ala.) 9; Murry v. Sermon, 1 Hawks (N. C.) 56.
These propositions, which are universally recognized as correct where the boundaries of private property touch on streams, are in like manner recognized where the boundaries between States or nations are, by prescription or treaty, found in running water. Accretion, no matter to which side it adds ground, leaves the boundary still the centre of the channel. Avulsion has no effect on boundary, but leaves it in the centre of the old channel. In volume 8, Opinions of Attorneys General, 175, 177, this matter received exhaustive consideration. A dispute arose between our government and Mexico, in consequence of changes in the Bio Bravo. The matter having been referred to Attorney General Cushing, he replied at length. We quote largely from that opinion. After stating the case, he proceeds:
“ With such conditions, whatever changes happen to either hank of the river by accretion on the one or degradation of the other, that is, by the gradual, and, as it were, insensible p. 362accession or abstraction of mere particles, the river as it runs continues to be the boundary. One country may, in process of time, lose a little of its territory, and the other gain a little, but the territorial relations cannot be reversed by such imperceptible mutations in the course of the river. The general aspect of things remains unchanged. And the convenience of allowing the river to retain its previous function, notwithstanding such insensible changes* in its course, or in either of its banks, outweighs the inconveniences, even to the injured party, involved in a detriment, which, happening gradually, is inappreciable in the successive moments of its progression.
“ But, on the other hand, if, deserting its original bed, the river forces for itself a new channel in another direction, then the nation, through whose territory the river thus breaks its way, suffers injury by the loss of territory greater than the benefit of retaining the natural river boundary, and that boundary remains in the middle of the deserted river bed. For, in truth, just as a stone pillar constitutes a boundary, not because it is a stone, but because of the place in which it stands, so a river is made the limit of nations, not because it is running water bearing a certain geographical name, but because it is water flowing in a given channel, and within given banks, which are the real international boundary.
“ Such is the received rule of the law of nations on this point, as laid down by all the writers of authority. (See ex. gr. Puffend. Jus. Nat. lib. iv, cap. 7, s. ii; Gundling, Jus. Nat. p. 248; Wolff, Jus. Gentium, s. 106-109; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i, chap. 22, s. 268, 270; Stypmanni, Jus. Marit, cap. v. n. 476-552; Rayneval, Droit de la Nature, tom. i, p. 307; Merlin, Repertoire, ss. voc. alluv.) ”
Further reference is made in the opinion to the following authorities:
“ Don Antonio Riquelme states the doctrine as follows:
“ ‘ When a river changes its course, directing its currents through the territory of one of the two coterminous States, the bed which it leaves dry remains the property of the State (or States) to which the river belonged, that being retained as the limit between the two nations, and the river enters so far p. 363into the exclusive dominion of the nation through whose territory it takes the new course. Nations must, of necessity, submit their rights to these great alterations which nature predisposes and consummates. . . . But, when the change is not total, but progressive only, that is to say, when the river does not abandon either State, but only gradually shifts its course by accretions, then it continues still to be the boundary, and the augmentation of territory, which one country gains at the expense of the other, is to be held by it as a new acquisition of property.’ (Derecho International, tom. i, p. 83.)
“Don Andres Bello and Don Jose Maria de Pando both enunciate the doctrine in exactly the same words, namely :
“ ‘ When a river or lake divides two territories, whether it belong in common to the conterminous riparian States, or they possess it by halves, or one of them occupies it exclusively, the rights, which either has in the lake or river, do not undergo any change by reason of alluvion. The lands insensibly invaded by the water are lost by one of the riparian States, and those which the water abandons on the opposite bank increase the domain of the other State. But if, by any natural accident, the water, which separated the two States, enters of a sudden into the territory of the other, it will thenceforth belong to the State whose soil it occupies, and the land, including the abandoned river-channel or bed, will incur no change of master.’ (Bello, Derecho International, p. 38; Pando, Derecho International, p. 99.)
“Almeda refers to the same point, briefly, but in decisive terms. He says:
“ ‘ As the river belongs to the two nations, so, also, the river-bed, if by chance it become dry, is divided between them as proprietors. When the river changes its course, throwing itself on one of two conterminous states, it then comes to belong to the state through whose territory it runs, all community of right in it so far ceasing.’ Derecho Publico, tom. L p. 199.
“ Leaving authorities of this class, then, let us come to those which discuss the question in its relation to private rights, and as a doctrine of municipal jurisprudence.
“ The doctrine is transmitted to us from the laws of Rome. (Justinian, Inst. lib. ii, tit. i, s. 20-24; Dig. lib. xii, tit. i, 1. I. See J. Voet ad Pandect, tom. i, p. 606, 607. Heinec. Recit. lib. ii, tit. 2, s. 358-369; Struvii Syntag. ex. 41, c. 33-25; Bowyers’s Civil Law, ch. 14.)
“Don Alfonso transferred it from the civil law to the Partidas. (Partida iii, tit. 28,1. 31.) Thus it came to be, as it still remains, an established element of the laws of Spain and of Mexico. (Alvarez, Instituciones, lib. ii, tit. i, s. 6; Asso, Instituciones, p. 101; Gomez de la Serna, Elementos, lib. ii, tit. 4, sec 3, no. 2; Escriche, Die. s. vocc. accession natural, alluvion, avulsion; Febrero Mexicano, tom. 1, p. 161; Sala Mexicano, ed. 1845, tom. ii, p. 62.)
“The same doctrine, starting from the same point of departure, made its way through the channel of Bracton, into the laws of England, and thence to the United States. (Bracton de Legg. Angliae, lib. 2, cap. 2, fol. 9; Blacks. Comm. vol. ii, p. 262; Woolrych on Waters, p. 34; Angell on Water Courses, ch. 2; Lynch n. Allen, 4 De. & Bat. N. C. R. p. 62; Murry n. Sermon, 1 Hawks, N. C. R. p. 56; The King v. Lord Scarborough, 3 B. & C. p. 91; S. C. 2 Bligh, K. S. p. 147.
“ Such, beyond all possible controversy, is the public law of modern Europe and America, and such, also, is the municipal law both of the Mexican Republic and the United States.”
Vattel states the rule thus (Book 1, c. 22, secs. 268, 269, 270)
1
§ 268. Du droit d’alluvion. Si le territoire qui aboutit a un fleuve limitrophe n’a point d’autres limites que le fleuve meme, il est an nombre des territoires a limites naturelles, ou indetermines (territoria arcifinia'), et il jouit du droit; e’est-a-dire que les atterrissements qui peuvent s’y former peu & peu par le cours du fleuve, les accroissements insensibles, font des accroissements de ce territoire, qui en suivent la condition et appartiennent au meme maitre. Car si je m’empare d’un terrain en declarant que je veux pour limites le fleuve qui le baigne, ou s’il m’est donn6 sur ce pied-la, j’occupe par cela meme d’avance le droit d'alluvion, et, par consequent, je puis seul m’approprier tout ce que le courant de 1’eau ajoutera insensiblement a mon terrain. Je dis insensiblement, parce que dans le cas tres-rare que 1’on nomme avulsion, lorsque la violence de 1’eau d6tache une portion considerable d’un fonds et la joint a une autre, milieu, quoiqu’il ait changS de place, continuera a etre la ligne de separation des deux voisins. L’un perd, il est vrai, tandis que 1’autre gagne; mais la nature seule fait ce changement: elle dStruit le terrain de l’un, pendant qu’elle en forme un nouveau pour 1’autre. La chose ne peut pas etre autrement d^s qu’on a pris le fleuve seul pour limites. § 270. De ce qui arrive quand le fleuve change son cours. Mais si, au lieu d’un dfiplacement successif, le fleuve, par un accident purement naturel, se d6tourne entierement de son cours, et se jette dans l’un des deux £tats voisins, le lit qu’il abandonne reste alors pour limites; il demeure au maitre du fleuve (§ 267). Le fleuve pfirit dans toute cette partie, tandis qu’il natt dans son nouveau lit, et qu’il y nait uniquement pour 1’^ tat dans lequel il coule.
“ If a territory which terminates on a river has no other boundary than that river, it is one of those territories that have natural or indeterminate bounds (ferritoria arcifinid)^ and it enjoys the right of alluvion; that is to say, every gradual increase of soil, every addition which the current of the river may make to its bank on that side, is an addition to that territory, stands in the same predicament with it, and belongs to the same owner. For, if I take possession of a piece of land, declaring that I will have for its boundary the river which washes its side — or if it is given to me upon that footing, I thus acquired beforehand the right of alluvion; and, consequently, I alone may appropriate to myself whatever additions the current of the river may insensibly make to my
en sorte qu’elle est encore reconnaissable, cette pifece de terre demeure naturellement & son premier maitre. De particulier a particulier, les lois civiles ont prevu et decide le cas; ils doivent combiner l’6quit6 avec le bien de 1’Etat et le soin de pr^venir les proces.
En cas de doute, tout territoire aboutissant a un fleuve est prSsumfi n’avoir d’autres limites que le fleuve meme, parce que rien n’est plus naturel que de le prendre pour bornes, quand on s’^tablit sur ses bords ; et dans le doute, on presume toujours ce qui est plus naturel et plus profitable.
§ 269. Si l’alluvion apporte quelque changement aux droits sur le fleuve.
Des qu’il est Stabli qu’un fleuve fait la separation de deux territoires, soit qu’il demeure commun aux deux riverains opposes, soit qu’ils le partagent par moitifi, soit enfln qu’il appartienne tout entier a 1’un des deux, les divers droits sur le fleuve ne souffrent aucun changement par l’alluvion. S’il arrive done que, par un effet naturel du courant, 1’un des deux territoires regoive de l’accroissement, tandis que le fleuve gagne pen a peu sur la rive opposSe, le fleuve demeure la borne naturelie des deux territoires, et chacun y conserve ses memes droits, malgrfi son dSplacement successif; en sorte, par exemple, que s’il est partagS par le milieu entre les deux riverains, ce p. 366land. I say ‘ insensibly,’ because, in the very uncommon case called avulsion, when the violence of the stream separates a considerable part from one piece of land and joins it to another, but in such manner that it can still be identified, the property of the soil so removed naturally continues vested in its former owner. The civil laws have thus provided against and decided this case, when it happens between individual and individual; they ought to unite equity with the welfare of the state, and the care of preventing litigations.
“ In case of doubt, every territory terminating on a river is presumed to have no other boundary than the river itself; because nothing is more natural than to take a river for a boundary, when a settlement is made; and wherever there is a doubt, that is always to be presumed which is most natural and most probable.
“As soon as it is determined that a river constitutes the boundary line between two territories, whether it remains common to the inhabitants on each of its banks, or whether each shares half of it, or, finally, whether it belongs entirely to one of them, their rights, with respect to the river, are in nowise changed by the alluvion. If, therefore, it happens that, by a natural effect of the current, one of the two territories receives an increase, while the river gradually encroaches on the opposite bank, the river still remains the natural boundary of the two territories, and, notwithstanding the progressive changes in its course, each retains over it the same rights which it possessed before; so that, if, for instance, it be divided in the middle between the owners of the opposite banks, that middle, though it changes its place, will continue to be the line of separation between the two neighbors. The one loses, it is true, while the other gains; but nature alone produces this change; she destroys the land of the one, while she forms new land for the other. The case cannot be otherwise determined, since they have taken the river alone for their limits.
“ But if, instead of a gradual and progressive change of its bed, the river, by an accident merely natural, turns entirely out of its course and runs into one of the two neighboring
States, the bed which it has abandoned becomes thenceforward their boundary, and remains the property of the former owner of the river, (sec. 267,) the river itself is, as it were, annihilated in all that part while it is reproduced in its new bed, and there belongs only to the State in which it flows.”
The result of these authorities puts it beyond doubt that accretion on an ordinary river would leave the boundary between two States the varying centre of the channel, and that avulsion would establish a fixed boundary, to wit: the centre of the abandoned channel. It is contended, however, that the doctrine of accretion has no application to the Missouri River, on account of the rapid and great changes constantly going on in respect to its banks; but the contrary has already been decided by this court in Jefferis v. land Company, 134 IT. S. 178, 189. A question between individuals, growing out of changes in the very place now in controversy, was then before this court; and in the opinion, after referring to the general rule, it was observed : “ It is contended by the defendant that this well settled rule is not applicable to land which borders on the Missouri River, because of the peculiar character of that stream and of* the soil through which it flows, the course of the river being tortuous, the current rapid, and the soil a soft, sandy loam, not protected from the action of water either by rocks or the roots of trees; the effect being that the river cuts away its banks, sometimes in a large body, and makes for itself a new course, while the earth thus removed is almost simultaneously deposited elsewhere, and new land is formed almost as rapidly as the former bank was carried away. But it has been held by this court that the general law of accretion is applicable to land on the Mississippi River; and, that being so, although the changes on the Missouri River are greater and more rapid than on the Mississippi, the difference does not constitute such a difference in principle as to render inapplicable to the Missouri River the general rule of law.” It is true that that case came here on demurrer to a bill, and it was alleged in the bill that the land was formed by “imperceptible degrees,” and that the process of accretion “ went on so slowly that it could not be observed in its p. 368progress; but, at intervals of not less than three or more months, it could be discerned by the eye that additions greater or less had been made to the shore.” The state of facts disclosed by this averment was held not to take the case out of the law concerning accretion, and, after referring to some English authorities, it was said: “ The doctrine of the English cases is, that accretion is an addition to land coterminous with the water, which is formed so slowly that its progress cannot be perceived, and does not admit of the view that in order to be accretion the formation must be one not discernible by comparison at two distant points of time.” And then was quoted from the opinion in St. Clair v. Lovingston^ 23 Wall. 46, these words: “ The test as to what is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is, that though the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on.”
The case before us is presented on testimony, and not on allegation. But what are the facts apparent from that testimony? The Missouri River is a winding stream, coursing through a valley of varying width, the substratum of whose soil, a deposit of distant centuries, is largely of quicksand. In building the bridge of the Union Pacific Railway Company across the Missouri River, in the vicinity of the tracts in controversy, the builders went down to the solid rock, sixty-five feet below the surface, and there found a pine log a foot and a half in diameter — of course, a deposit made in the long ago. The current is rapid, far above the average of ordinary rivers; and by reason of the snows in the mountains there are two well known rises in the volume of its waters, known as the April and June rises. The large volume of water pouring down at the time of these rises, with the rapidity of its current, has great and rapid action upon the loose soil of its banks. Whenever it impinges with direct attack upon the bank at a bend of the stream, and that bank is of the loose sand obtaining in the valley of the Missouri, it is not strange that the abrasion and washing away is rapid and great. Fr®' quently, where above the loose substratum of sand there is a deposit of comparatively solid soil, the washing out of the p. 369underlying sand causes an instantaneous fall of quite a length and breadth of the superstratum of soil into the river; so that it may, in one sense of the term, be said that the diminution of the banks is not gradual and imperceptible, but sudden and visible. Notwithstanding this, two things must be borne in mind, familiar to all dwellers on the banks of the Missouri River, and disclosed by the testimony: that, while there may be an instantaneous and obvious dropping into the river of quite a portion of its banks, such portion is not carried down the stream as a solid and compact mass, but disintegrates and separates into particles of earth borne onward by the flowing water, and giving to the stream that color which, in the history of the country, has made it known as the “ muddy ” Missouri; and, also, that while the disappearance, by reason of this process, of a mass of bank may be sudden and obvious, there is no transfer of such a solid body of earth to the opposite shore, or anything like an instantaneous and visible creation of a bank on that shore. The accretion, whatever may be the fact in respect to the diminution, is always gradual and by the imperceptible deposit of floating particles of earth. There is, except in such cases of avulsion as may be noticed hereafter, in all matter of increase of bank, always a mere gradual and imperceptible process. There is no heaping up at an instant, and while the eye rests upon the stream, of acres or rods ou the forming side of the river. No engineering skill is sufficient to say where the earth in the bank washed away and disintegrating into the river finds its rest and abiding place. The falling bank has passed into the floating mass of earth aud water, and the particles of earth may rest one or fifty miles below, and upon either shore. There is, no matter how rapid the process of subtraction or addition, no detachment of earth from the one side and deposit of the same upon the other. The only thing which distinguishes this river from other streams, in the matter of accretion, is in the rapidity of the change caused by the velocity of the current; and this in itself, in the very nature of things, works no change in the principle underlying the rule of law in respect thereto.
Our conclusions are that, notwithstanding the rapidity of vol. cxLin—24 p. 370the changes in the course of the channel, and the washing from the one side and on to the other, the law of accretion controls on the Missouri River, as elsewhere; and that not only in respect to the rights of individual land owners, but also in respect to the boundary lines between States. The boundary, therefore, between Iowa and Nebraska is a varying line, so far as affected by these changes of diminution and accretion in the mere washing of the waters of the stream.
It appears, however, from the testimony, that in 1877 the river above Omaha, which had pursued a course in the nature of an ox-bow, suddenly cut through the neck of the bow and made for itself a new channel. This does not come within the law of accretion, but of that of avulsion. By this selection of a new channel the boundary was not changed, and it remained as it was prior to the avulsion, the centre line of the old channel; and that, unless the waters of the river returned to their former bed, became a fixed and unvarying boundary, no matter what might be the changes of the river in its new channel.
We think we home by these observations indicated as clearly as is possible the boundary between the two States, and upon these pri/nciples the parties may agree to a designation of such boundary, and such designation will pass into a final decree. If no agreement is possible, then the court will appoint a commission to survey a/nd report in accordance with the views Herein expressed. .
The costs of this suit will be divided between the two States, because the matter involved is one of those governmental guestions in which each pa/rty has a real and vital, and yet not a litigious, interest.
WINONA AND ST. PETER RAILROAD COMPANY
v. PLAINVIEW.
SAME v. ELGIN.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.
Nos. 171,172. Argued January 27, 28, 1892. — Decided February 29,1892.
In this case, which was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of a State, it was contended that that court did not give to a judgment of a Circuit Court of the United States such faith and credit as it was entitled to under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and that it disregarded the provision of the Constitution of the United States that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract. Held, that the first contention was incorrect; that the question as to the impairment of the obligation of a contract was raised for the first time in this court, and was not accurate in fact; and that the writ of error must be dismissed.
By an act of the legislature of the State of Minnesota, approved March 5,1877, (General Laws of Minnesota of 1877, c. 106,) it was enacted, by sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 thereof, as is printed in the margin.1
1 Sec. 4. Whenever any such railroad company, specified in the first section of this act, shall desire aid in the construction of its railroad from any county, town, city or village specified in said first section, it shall make and deliver to the county auditor of such county, the town clerk of such town or the clerk of such incorporated city or village, as the case may be, a definite proposition in writing, signed by the president and secretary of said railroad company, and sealed with its seal, which proposition shall contain a statement of the amount of bonds desired, the time when payable, and whether payable before maturity at the option of such municipality, the rate of interest which they shall bear, and such proposition shall contain a statement specifying when said bonds are to be delivered with reference to the time of the entire or partial construction of said railroad, and may contain a statement that such bonds may be deposited in escrow prior to the delivery to the railroad company; and such proposition shall contain a statement that the said railroad company will, in consideration of said bonds, at the election of such municipality, issue to the municipality from
Purporting to proceed under sections 4 and 7 of that act, the Plainview Railroad Company, a Minnesota corporation, on the
which it is to receive the same, such number of the shares of its capital stock as will at par value of such stock correspond with the principal sum of such bonds. In case such bonds are proposed to be deposited in escrow as aforesaid, the proposition shall also state that the certificate of the stock to be exchanged therefor shall be placed with the same depository at the same time, and in that case the proposition shall set forth the full name and residence of the trustee or trustees, who shall be the custodian of the stock of said company and of the bonds of such city, village, town or county; the auditor or clerk with whom any such proposition shall be filed shall immediately endorse thereon the date of its receipt by him, and transcribe the same into the record book of the county, town, city or village, as the case may be, of which he is such clerk.
Sec. 5. The mode of arriving at such mutual agreement as is hereinbefore specified, shall be as follows:
First — Upon receiving such proposition, the county auditor of such county, the town clerk of such town, or the clerk of such incorporated city or village, as the case may be, shall immediately publish a notice of an election to be held by the legal voters of such county, town incorporated city or village, at the usual place or places of holding elections therein, and at such time as such clerk may designate, not less than ten (10) days or more than twenty (20) days from the date of such notices, which notice shall contain a substantial statement of the proposition made by said railroad company for the issue of the bonds of such municipality, and shall notify the legal voters thereof to deposit a ballot upon which shall be written or printed the words, “for the railroad proposition,” or the words, “against the railroad proposition.” And such notice shall be posted in three (3) public places in each election precinct in the district in which aid is desired, at least seven (7) days before the day of such election, and shall also be published at least twice before such election in one newspaper in such city, village or town, if any is published therein, and if the aid is asked of a county, in one newspaper in each village and city in such county in which a newspaper is published, and if there is no newspaper published in such city, village, town or county, then such notice shall be so published in a newspaper published at the nearest place thereto in which one is published.
*******
Fourth — If a majority of the legal voters who shall vote upon the question at any election to be held in any such county, town, city or village, in pursuance of the provisions of this act, shall, as indicated by the official returns of any such election, vote “ for the railroad proposition,” then such mutual agreement for the issue of bonds by such municipality and of stock by such railroad company, as provided in this act, shall be deemed and considered to have been arrived at and perfected, and thereupon such bonds
31st of January, 1878, delivered to the town clerk of the town of Plainview a proposition in writing, signed by the president
and stock shall be issued and delivered by the proper officer in conformity with the true intent of such proposition and with the provisions of this act.
* * * * * * *
And provided further, That the board of county commissioners of any such county, or the board of supervisors of any such town, or the common council of any such village or city, may, in case it shall deem it for the interest of such county, town, village or city, to do so, waive the issuance by such railroad company of any such stock to such county, town, village or city.
Sec. 6. No bonds shall be delivered to the company under such proposition until the road, branch or extension thereof for the construction of which the aid has been granted shall have been completed ready for the passage of cars continuously from one terminus through or to the district granting the aid or to. the nearest point in its line to such district, or from such terminus to such point as the company in its proposition shall have proposed to construct said road where the line of the road shall not lie through the district.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7. Another mode of arriving at such mutual agreement shall be as follows:
First — Within three (3) months after the filing of any such proposition as is specified in the fourth (4th) section of this act with any oounty auditor, town clerk or clerk of any city or village, as the case may be, the said railroad company shall cause notice to be given as prescribed in the fifth (5th) section of this act, in three (3) public places in each election precinct in the district in which aid is desired, stating that after a day named in said notice, which shall be at least five (5) days after its date, a petition to the proper authorities of such county, town, city or village will be presented to the resident taxpayers of such county, town, city or village for their signatures, asking such authorities to agree to such proposition, and such petition shall be appended to a substantial copy of such proposition.
Second—If, within four months after the filing of such proposition with any such county auditor, town clerk, or clerk of any city or village, as the case may be, the said railroad company shall deliver to such clerk a substantial copy or copies of such proposition, so filed, with such petition to the proper authorities of such county, town, city or village, asking such authorities to agree to such proposition appended thereto, bearing the signatures of a majority of the persons residing in such county, town, city or village, who were assessed for taxes upon real or personal estate, in such county, town, city or village, as the case may be, as shown by the last assessment roll of the district of which aid is desired, which signatures shall be verified by the affidavit of some person witnessing such signatures; then p. 374and secretary of the company, containing the statements and specifications required by section 4 of the act, and stating that the amount of the bonds of the town desired by the company was $50,000. The town clerk endorsed on the proposition the date of filing, and transcribed the proposition in his records on March 30, 1878. On the 31st of January, 1878, the company posted in three public places in the town a notice that, after February 6, 1878, a petition to the supervisors of the town, appended to a copy of said proposition, would be presented to the resident taxpayers of the town, asking the supervisors to agree to the proposition. The notice and the proposition were published in a newspaper printed and published in the town.
On the 30th of March, 1878, within three months after the filing of the proposition with the town clerk, the company delivered to him four petitions, in the form required by section 7 of the act, addressed to the town board of supervisors, stating that the petitioners, being residents of the town and assessed for taxes upon real or personal estate therein, as shown by its last assessment roll, asked the supervisors, as the proper authorities of the town, to agree to the proposition of the company to which the petition was appended. The petitions bore the signatures of a majority of the persons residing in the town who were assessed for taxes on real or personal estate therein, as shown by its then latest assessment roll, and the signatures were verified by the affidavits of the persons witnessing such signatures; but the petitions were not signed by a majority of the electors or legal voters of the town. Those petitions were the only ones ever made asking the authorities of the town to agree to the proposition of the company, and they and section 7 of the act constituted the only authority had or claimed for the issue of the bonds hereinafter mentioned. No election was held in the town to author-
such mutual agreement for the issue of bonds by such municipality and of stock by such railroad company shall be deemed and considered to have been arrived at and perfected, and thereupon such bonds and stock shall be issued and delivered in conformity with the true intent and meaning of such proposition, and with the provisions of this act.
ize its supervisors to agree to the proposition or to the issue of any such bonds.
On the 30th of March, 1878, the board of supervisors of the town adopted and placed on file in the office of the town clerk resolutions which recited the proposition of the company, the posting of the notices and the presenting of the petitions, with signatures and affidavits, from which it appeared that a majority of the resident taxpayers of the town, assessed for taxes upon real or personal estate therein, as shown by its last assessment roll, had signed the petitions, and that the construction of the railroad by the company, as set forth in its proposition, would promote the general prosperity and welfare of the taxpayers of the town. The resolutions were, that the proposi- . tion of the company was accepted, so far as related to the issue of bonds; that bonds of the town to the amount of $50,000, with interest coupons attached and payable as requested in the proposition, be issued to the company as soon as it should have its railroad completed, with the cars running thereon; and that the issue of stock to the town by the company, in consideration of the bonds, was waived.
The company constructed its railroad, had the cars running thereon, and performed what was stated in the proposition, except that it never issued to the town any stock of the company.
Before any bonds of the town were issued to the company, one George W. Harrington, a resident citizen and taxpayer of the town, brought a suit in the District Court for Wabasha County, in which county the town is situated, against the town and its officers and the railroad company, setting forth the proceedings on which the bonds were to be issued; that they were illegal; and that it was intended to issue the bonds; and praying that the town and its officers, particularly the chairman of the board of supervisors and the town clerk, might be enjoined from issuing, and the railroad company from accepting or receiving, any such bonds. The town answered the complaint, and in January, 1879, the case was tried by the District Court, which, on February 6, 1879, gave judgment for the defendants and dismissed the suit. p. 376Harrington took an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, but, before it was perfected, the bonds were issued and delivered to the company. The Supreme Court, on October 6,1880, reversed the judgment below, its opinion being reported in 27 Minnesota, 224. It held that, under the Constitution of Minnesota, it was not competent for the legislature to authorize any person or class of persons, other than the electors of a town or the officers chosen by such electors, to determine what action, requiring local taxation, the town would take in any particular case; that, therefore, section 7 of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1877, which assumed to empower a majority of the “ resident taxpayers,” whether they were electors or not, to, bind a town to issue its bonds to aid in the construction of a railroad, was unconstitutional and void ; and that, although the mode for authorizing the issue of bonds provided by section 7 was invalid, yet, as the same act provided another mode for authorizing such issue, which was valid, and as the bonds need not recite under which of the two provisions of the act they were issued, but only that they were issued under and pursuant to such act generally, and a purchaser would then have the right to presume that they were issued under its valid provisions, and there might thus be bona fide purchasers of the bonds, a suit for an injunction would lie to restrain the issuing of the bonds by the town officers under the invalid mode provided by section 7 of the act.
On the 18th of March, 1879, the town board of supervisors passed a resolution that the town issue to the company its bonds in the sum of $50,000, dated on January 1, 1879, to become due on or before 20 years from that date, with interest thereon, payable annually, at seven per cent per annum; that the bonds be signed and issued by the chairman of the board and the town clerk ; and that the issue of stock by the company to the town in a corresponding amount was waived. The bonds were issued on the 19th of March, 1879, being one hundred in number, and numbered consecutively from 1 to 100, each purporting to be the bond of the town of Plainview, payable to the Plainview Railroad Company or bearer, for $500, dated January 1,1879, due on or before January 1,1899, p. 377with interest at seven per cent per annum, payable annually, according to the conditions of the twenty interest coupons attached, one of them payable January 1, 1880, and one on January 1 of each year thereafter until the maturity of the bond. Each bond contained on its face the following statement: “ This bond is issued in pursuance of a mutual agreement between the said town and the said railroad company, which agreement was made in accordance with the laws of the State of Minnesota, and through and by a proposition made by said railroad company, and duly accepted by said town upon petition therefor signed by a majority of the resident taxpayers of said town, said agreement having been fully performed by the said railroad company on its part. This bond * is issued in pursuance of the authority given for that purpose by the laws of the State of Minnesota and in compliance with a resolution of the board of supervisors of said town.”
The company, on or about July 9, 1879, sold, transferred and delivered the bonds and coupons to citizens of the State of Wisconsin, who purchased the same without notice of any facts invalidating the bonds, and paid the company $50,000 for them. The bonds and coupons were purchased and acquired by Samuel Marshall and Charles F. Ilsley, citizens of Wisconsin, who purchased them in good faith, for value, without notice of any facts invalidating them. On the 29th of January, 1881, Marshall and Ilsley commenced an action at law in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota against the town of Plainview, to recover the amount of 46 coupons for $35 each, cut from said bonds, which coupons fell due January 1, 1881. The action was defended by the town, and was tried before the Circuit Court without a jury, which found in favor of the plaintiffs and entered a judgment in their favor for $1746.98. The opinion of the Circuit Court of the United States is reported in 3 Me Crary, 35. It held that the recitals in the bonds were conclusive evidence in favor °f a purchaser without further information; that the conditions precedent prescribed by the statute had been complied with; that, as the law under which the bonds were issued had been recognized as valid by the highest court of the State of p. 378Minnesota, before they were purchased by Marshall and Ilsley, no subsequent decision could affect their validity in the hands of such purchasers ; and that the rule charging every one with notice of pending suits was inapplicable where negotiable securities constituted the subject matter. The case referred to by the Circuit Court, as that in which the Supreme Court of Minnesota had recognized section 7 of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1877 as constitutional and valid, was that of State v. Town of Highland, 25 Minnesota, 355, decided January 10, 1879. The Circuit Court arrived at the conclusion that, as the bonds in question had been purchased by Marshall and Ilsley before the case of Harrington v. Plainview Railroad Company had been decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and that court had said nothing on the subject previously except what was contained in its opinion in State v. Town of Highland, the bonds were not affected by the decision in the Harrington Case. As to the point that the bonds were invalid in the hands of Marshall and Ilsley, from the fact that they were purchased during the pendency of the Harrington suit, the Circuit Court made answer that said purchasers were not parties to that suit and had no knowledge of it, and that the rule that all persons were bound to take notice of a pending suit did not apply to negotiable securities, citing County of Warren n. Harcy, 97 IT. S. 96.
Thereafter, Marshall and Ilsley brought five other suits against the town of Plainview, to recover severally upon coupons cut from said bonds, which coupons became due from year to year, two of which suits were defended by the town, and in all of them judgments were recovered against it, amounting respectively to $1717.31, $4154.08, $2595.57, $771.15 and $3906.22, three of which six judgments the town paid.
Like judgments with those against the town of Plainview were recovered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota by Marshall and Ilsley against the town of Elgin, Minnesota, and one of the judgments against each of the two towns was brought to this court by a writ of error. Neither of the two judgments exceeding $5000, this court dismissed the writ of error in each case, 106 U. S. 578,
583, for want of jurisdiction in this court, although the defendants in error were holders and owners of bonds to the amount of more than $5000, from which the coupons sued on in the two cases were cut.
On the 3d of March, 1881, an act passed by the legislature of Minnesota was approved by the governor, entitled “An act to authorize the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company to purchase the stock and to purchase or lease the property and franchises of the Plainview Railway Company,” Special Laws of Minnesota of 1881, c. 414, the provisions of which were as follows: “ Section 1. The Winona and Saint Peter railroad company is hereby authorized to purchase the stock or to purchase or lease the property and franchises of the Plainview railway company; and said last-named company hereby authorized to sell and convey or to lease its property and franchises to the said first-named company, upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the respective boards of directors of said companies, so as to make the property and franchises of the last-named company a part of the property and franchises of said Winona and Saint Peter railroad company to be used and operated by it under its charter. Provided, that, any such purchase of the property or franchises of the Plainview railway company shall be made, and all such property held by said Winona and Saint Peter railroad company, subject to all demands, claims and rights of action against said Plainview railway company, arising or growing out of the latter company’s having heretofore obtained and disposed of certain bonds and coupons purporting to have been issued by the towns of Plainview, Elgin and Viola to said Plainview railway company, and in taking such transfer under this act said purchasing company shall assume all claims and demands against said Plainview railway company to the extent and value only of the property and franchises so transferred. Sec. 2. The Winona and Saint Peter railroad company is hereby authorized to issue its capital stock to an amount necessary to make and complete the purchase aforesaid. Sec. 3. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”
In September, 1884, the town of Plainview brought a suit against the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company, in the District Court for the county of Wabasha in the State of Minnesota, the complaint in which set forth the making by the Plainview Railroad Company of the proposition in writing and the aforesaid acts of compliance with the provisions of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1877, and the filing with the town clerk of the petitions signed by the taxpayers, and alleged that the petitions were not signed by a majority of the electors or legal voters of the town : that no election was held in the town to authorize the supervisors to agree to the proposition or to issue any • bonds; that the board of supervisors adopted the resolutions before referred to without authority or right from the electors of the town or otherwise, the supervisors and the railroad company well knowing that a majority of the electors or legal voters of the town had not signed the petitions and that no election had been held authorizing the passing of the resolutions; that there was no authority to pass the same, or to bind the town thereby, or to issue the bonds; that the bonds were issued and delivered to the company; and that the latter, on or about July 9, 1879, intending to injure and defraud the town and deprive it of any defence to the bonds or coupons as against hona fide holders thereof for value, sold and transferred the bonds to citizens of Wisconsin, who purchased the same of the company bona fide, without notice of any of the facts invalidating the bonds, and paid the company $50,000 therefor. The complaint then set out the suits and judgments against the town by Marshall and Ilsley, and the passing of the act of March 3,1881, and averred that the passage of that act was procured by the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company, and the act duly accepted and assented to by that company; that the bonds and coupons mentioned in that act were the same before referred to, and the said company under said act issued and disposed of its stock to an amount necessary to make and complete the purchase authorized by the act; and that, about May, 1881, that company, acting solely under the provisions of the act, purchased all the property and franchises of the Plainview p. 381Railroad Company, of the value of $200,000, and in making such purchase, and as part of the consideration therefor, assumed all claims, demands and rights of action against the Plainview Railroad Company, as provided in the act, including the claim, demand and right of action set forth in the complaint, and agreed to pay the same. The complaint demanded judgment against the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company for $50,000, with interest from January 1, 1879, at seven per cent per annum.
The record shows that on the 11th of May, 1881, the Plainview Railroad Company conveyed, by an instrument in writing, to the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company all its railroad, about sixteen miles in length, and all its franchises and property, for the consideration of $225,000 paid, “ and by virtue of the power and authority conferred upon the parties ” by the act of March 3, 1881.
The defendant put in an answer to the complaint, denying its liability, to which answer the plaintiff replied. Evidence was given as to the suit of Harrington and the suits of Marshall and Ilsley against the town, and the case was tried in June, 1885, before the District Court for Wabasha County, which made findings of fact and conclusions of law, on December 26, 1885, and entered a judgment for the plaintiff for $74,451.31, being $50,000 with interest from January 1, 1879, at seven per cent per annum.
The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied in May, 1886, and it then appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota from the order denying the motion. The case was decided by that court April 28, 1887, (36 Minnesota, 505,) and it affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial, and adjudged that the plaintiff have judgment accordingly. On the mandate of the Supreme Court, the District Court gave judgment for the plaintiff for $80,031.86 damages and $257.09 costs and disbursements, being in all $80,288.95. From that judgment the defendant took a further appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, which court affirmed the judgment below, for the reasons given in the opinion of the court, reported in 36 Minnesota, 505, and directed judgment accordingly, which p. 382was entered in the Supreme Court. To review that judgment, a writ of error was sued out from this court on the allowance of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota.
The writ of error in 'the case of Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company v. Town of Elgin, (No. 172,) is presented for consideration at the same time with the case of the town of Plainview, and was argued at the same time on the same briefs. The two cases have gone' along together pari passu in the lower courts, and the proceedings in them have been alike, mutatis mutandis. The bonds in the case of the town of Elgin were for $40,000, being eighty in number, of $500 each, bearing date January 1, 1879, and containing the same recital as in the case of the town of Plainview. The judgments in favor of Marshall and Ilsley against the town of Elgin were five in number, being respectively for $1696.85, $1443.91, $2852.85, $2745.12, and $3175.82, all recovered upon coupons. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota against the plaintiff in error here in the suit brought against it by the town of Elgin was rendered July 30, 1887, for $64,245.77. In 36 Minnesota, 517, the Supreme Court says that the case of the town of Elgin against the railroad company was argued and submitted with the case of the town of Plainview against the same defendant, and involved the same questions; and that court affirmed the order of the lower court.
In the decision reported in 36 Minnesota, 505, the first opinion was given by Judge Vanderburgh and concurred m by Judge Berry. A second opinion was given by Chief Justice Gilfillan and Judge Dickinson. Judge Mitchell dissented. In the first opinion, it was said that the question of the validity of the bonds was considered and determined in Harri/ngton v. Town of Plainview, 27 Minnesota, 224; that the bonds were not issued on the vote of the electors of the town, in pursuance of section 5 of chapter 106 of the Laws of 1877, but in pursuance of section 7 of that statute, on the petition of a majority of the resident taxpayers; that the proceedings to procure the bonds were initiated and prosecuted by the railroad company under the act, by filing with the town clerk its p. 383proposition in writing, as provided by section 4 of the act, for the issue to it of the bonds of the town, and thereafter by securing and filing the petition of the taxpayers, as directed by section 7; and that the evidence in the case was sufficient to uphold the finding of the trial court that the bonds in controversy were issued to the Plainview Kailroad Company, and by its agents transferred to the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company, at their par value, in consideration of the amount due to the latter company, which it had previously advanced in aid of the construction of the other company’s railroad. The first opinion then proceeded as follows: “ Before the issuance of the bonds, the action above referred to was commenced to enjoin the same, and, while the case was pending in this court, the bonds were issued and transferred. The evidence, however, does not warrant the conclusion that there was any actual fraud in the procurement or transfer of the bonds. Both railway companies were cognizant of the pendency of the action, and of the grounds of the alleged invalidity of the bonds; but the legal questions involved were still open and in dispute, and they were advised and believed them to be legal and valid. It is affirmed by the trial court, upon sufficient evidence, that, except as appears upon the face of the bonds, Marshall and Ilsley, and others, to whom they were subsequently transferred, had no notice o^ the suit, and were bona fide purchasers and holders for value. The Chicago and Northwestern Kailway Company was a foreign corporation, and the subsequent purchasers of the bonds were and are citizens of other States. The bonds all recite on their face that they were issued in pursuance of the authority given for that purpose by the laws of the State of Minnesota, and in compliance with a resolution of the board of supervisors of the town, and also ‘ in pursuance of a mutual agreement, between the said town and the said railroad company, which agreement was made in accordance with the laws of the State of Minnesota, and through and by a proposition made by said railroad company and duly accepted by said town, upon petition therefor signed by a majority of the resident taxpayers of said town, said agreement having been duly performed by said railroad p. 384company on its part.’ This court held in the Harrington Case that an agreement, consummated by proceedings under the provisions of the statute referred to, between the railway company and the majority of the taxpayers, could not, under the Constitution, be considered as the lawful agreement of the town, nor be of any binding obligation as such, and that bonds issued in pursuance thereof would be void, except in the hands of bona fide purchasers.”
The first opinion then said, that the bonds were invalid in the hands of the Plainview company, and could not have been enforced by it; that although that company had built its road, there was no agreement made with the town; that the town, in its corporate capacity, had received nothing, been guilty of no laches, and waived nothing, and there was no estoppel; and that it was entitled to be protected against the unauthorized acts of its own officers, when that could be done without injury to third parties, citing Thomas v. City of Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 356, and Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260. The first opinion also said, that, while the recitals in the bonds were sufficient to put the purchasers upon inquiry as to the authority for the issue of the bonds and the manner in which they were in fact issued, and by the recitals all purchasers were chargeable with notice of the invalidity of the bonds, Marshall and Ilsley had brought suit upon the coupons in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, and the bonds had been duly adjudged and determined, in a trial upon the merits in that court, to be valid in their hands, and the result of that judgment was to make the bonds valid negotiable securities, held by them as bona fide purchasers; that, as the Plainview company and the Winona and Saint Peter company were not parties to that action, the town was not estopped from litigating in the state courts the questions involved in the case; that the judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States could not be reviewed or modified by the state courts; that the result of its decision and judgment was to fix irrevocably the liability of the town for the whole amount of the indebtedness evidenced by the bonds; and that it must be deemed, therefore, to have been settled p. 385conclusively that the bonds had been transferred to parties in whose hands they had become valid and legal obligations against the town.
It was further said, that it was determined conclusively, by the judgment in Harrington v. Town of Plainview, that the bonds were void in the hands of the Plainview company, that company having had its day in court in that case; that the issuing and disposition of the bonds must be ■ treated by the state courts as unlawful and wrongful; that, as the bonds, when once placed on the market, were liable to pass into the hands of purchasers, who would be entitled to enforce the same as valid negotiable securities in the United States courts* it followed that the town had a cause of action for damages; that the Plainview company transferred the bonds for full value, in payment of moneys advanced for building its road, and Marshall and Ilsley paid nearly par for them; that they were treated by all parties as valuable commercial securities, placed on the market and sold, and enforced as such against, the town; and that, as the bonds were invalid and the Plainview company acquired no title to them as obligations of the town, it could not claim to be entitled to the proceeds of them as its property.
It was further said that, as the Plainview company received the full face value of the bonds, the amount of the recovery would be the same whether the suit was one for money had and received or one for a conversion; that the allegations of the complaint and the findings of fact were sufficient to support the action in either form; that the title to the bonds had been confirmed in the present holders of them, who had recovered, or would recover, the full amount thereof; that the liability of the town had been fixed through the acts of the Plainview company in procuring and negotiating the bonds, which acts were unauthorized and wrongful; that such proceedings as would result in the enforcement of the bonds must be presumed to have been intended and contemplated by the lainview company, either in its own hands or by purchasers who might occupy a more advantageous position, and it could not be permitted to object that the bonds were of no value, or
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allege its own wrong, for the purpose of defeating the action, (citing Comstock, v. Hier, 73 N. Y. 269; Lamb v. Clark, 15 Pick. 193, 197;) and that the town was not estopped or concluded by the result of the suit of Marshall and Ilsley, to which the Plainview company was not a party.
The first opinion further held that, under the provision of the act of March 3, 1881, that the Winona and Saint Peter company should make the purchase from the Plainview company “subject to all demands, claims and rights of action against' said Plainview Railway Company arising or growing out of the latter company’s having heretofore obtained and disposed of certain bonds and coupons purporting to have been issued by the towns ” named to the Plainview company, the Winona and Saint Peter company acquired the property and franchises of the Plainview company by virtue of that act, and of course took the grant cum onere and subject to the provisions and conditions of the act. The conclusion was that the town was entitled to recover, and that the order denying a new trial should be affirmed.
The second opinion concurred in the conclusion of the first opinion, but based the responsibility of the company on the following considerations, viz.: That the company, having procured the unauthorized execution and delivery to itself of the bonds, in form expressing the obligation of the town, and having negotiated them so that they had come into the hands of parties who had enforced a recovery upon them by proper action in a competent tribunal, was answerable for its own unauthorized acts, which had resulted in that injury to the town, unless the recovery upon the bonds, was to be deemed to be too remote a consequence to afford a ground of legal liability; that, as to the acts of the company, the injurious consequence was not remote, but proximate; that, when the company procured and disposed of the bonds, it must be deemed to have contemplated that the town should pay the bonds, either voluntarily or by legal compulsion; that it made no difference if the judgment by which the liability of the town to pay the bonds had been conclusively established was erroneous; an that that did not make remote the damage complained of.
The Federal questions alleged to be involved in these cases are thus stated by the plaintiff in error: (1) Did the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in rendering its judgments in these cases, fail to give to the judgments of the United States Circuit Court in the Marshall and Ilsley cases such faith and credit as they were entitled to under the Constitution and laws of the United States ? (2) Did it, in rendering these judgments, disregard the provision of the Constitution of the United States that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract ? They are otherwise stated in another of the briefs for the plaintiff in error as follows: (1) The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in rendering the judgments under review, disregarded the provision of the Constitution of the United States that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract, in that it erroneously decided that the contracts and bonds of the towns were invalid, and on that ground gave effect to the act of March 3,1881, as making the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company liable for the transfer of the bonds; (2) The Supreme Court, in rendering its judgments in these cases, disregarded the Constitution and laws of the United States in deciding that the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company was liable to the towns, because it was responsible for the consequences to them of the judgments in the Marshall and Ilsley cases, although the company would not have been liable but for said judgments.
The towns have moved to dismiss the writs of error for want of jurisdiction in this court, on the ground that the records present no Federal question.
Mr. Lloyd TV. Bowers (with whom was Mr. Thomas Wilson on the brief) for plaintiff in error.
I- It is not necessary, in order that a subsequent statute shall Wpair a previous contract’s obligation, that the statute should itself be made the reason for declaring the contract invalid or for restricting the contract’s full and proper operation. Even if, as here, the state court declares the contract invalid on grounds independent of the later statute, still if the de- p. 388dared invalidity of the contract, though placed upon such independent or general grounds, is made the reason for giving the subsequent statute an effect which it could not have but for the contract’s invalidity, the contract is impaired by the later act. The essential thing is only that the subsequent act be given an effect which it cannot properly have if the contract is valid. An inconsistency between the subsequent statute, as judicially given effect, and the rights growing out of the contract, correctly construed, makes a case of impairment of the obligation of the contract. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116, 144, 145; Delmas v. Merchants Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661; University v. People, 99 U. 8. 309; Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, 793, 794; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens* Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683, 696; Southwestern Bailroad v. Wright, 116 U. S. 231; Vicksburg &c. Railroad n. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665; Given v. Wright, 117 IT. S. 648; Chicago, Burlington &c. Railroad v. Guffey, 120 IT. S. 569; Hoadley n. San Francisco, 124 U. S. 639; New Orleans Water Works v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S. 18; Yazoo ch Miss. Valley Railroad v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174.
It is the effect actually given to a statute, subsequent to a contract and claimed to impair it, which determines whether, if the contract exists, the statute does in fact impair it. The statute, as construed by the state court, and with the operation there accorded it, is what this court looks at to decide whether a contract has had its obligation impaired.
II. It is settled on principle and by the express adjudications of this court that due effect is not given to the judgments of Federal courts sitting in a particular State unless they are accorded such effect as would in a like case, under similar circumstances, be accorded to the judgments of the state courts of equal authority in such State; and the question whether a state court has given such effect to any such judgment is a question arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States and falls within the jurisdiction of this court. Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141; Embry v. PM mer, 107 U. S. 3; Dupasseurv. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130.
Did the Supreme Court of Minnesota in these cases give to p. 389the judgments of the United States Circuit Court in Marshall and Ilsley’s cases such force and effect as it would have allowed them had they been rendered by it ? That it did not hardly admits of discussion; and it follows that it did not accord to them such credit and effect as it should have accorded under the Constitution.
To break the force of this conclusion counsel are understood to argue that the state courts are not bound to give full faith and credit, or any faith and credit, to judgments of the Federal courts except in a suit and between parties where such judgments would operate as a technical estoppel. This court has in well-considered language answered this contention. Speaking of the Federal courts, it says: “ Their judgment or decree when rendered is binding and perfect between the parties until reversed, without regard to any adverse opinion or judgment of any other court of merely concurrent jurisdiction. Its integrity, its validity, and its effect are complete in all respects between all parties in every suit and in every forum where it is legitimately produced as the foundation of an action, or of a defence, either by plea or in proof, as it would be in any other circumstances. While it remains in force it determines the rights of the parties between themselves, and may be carried into execution in due course of law to its full extent, furnishing a complete protection to all who act in compliance with its mandate.” Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers’ Union, 120 U. S. 141, 157. The learned counsel of the defendants in error rely on the case of Dupassev/r v. Rochereau. 21 Wall. 130, which they claim is on all fours with this case and decisive of this question.
If I have intelligently read that case, all it decides is that, inasmuch as the judgment of the United States Circuit Court relied on by Dupasseur as a defence did not touch or affect the rights of either party or any question involved in that suit, the state court acted properly in not regarding it. It has no application to the question to which it is cited. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; S. C. 7 Wall. 139; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Factord de Traderi Ins. Co. v. FLwrphy, 111 U. S. 738; Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141.
J/k Cushma/n K. Davis and Mr. Frank B. Kellogg for defendants in error. Mr. C. W. Bunn was with, them on the brief.
Mr. Justice Blatchford, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
To present a Federal question on the ground that full faith and credit were not given by the state court to the judgments of the Circuit Court of the United States in the Marshall and Ilsley cases, it must appear that the state court denied to the plaintiff in error, within the terms of § 709 of the Revised Statutes, “ some title, right, privilege or immunity ” held by the plaintiff in error under the judgments of the Circuit Court of the United States in those cases, and claimed by it in the state court under the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and that the decision of the state court was against the title, right, privilege or immunity specially set up or claimed by the plaintiff in error under such Constitution or statute. This does not appear by the records. The Marshall and Ilsley cases were suits by citizens of Wisconsin against the towns. Neither the plaintiff in error nor the Plainview company was a party to those suits, nor was any one in privity with either company such party. Those cases settled only the question whether the towns were liable to Marshall and Ilsley on the bonds. They did not settle the rights of the towns, and of the Plainview company or the plaintiff in error, as between each other, with regard to the bonds. The Circuit Court of the United States sustained the validity of the bonds on the ground that Marshall and Ilsley were l)ona fide holders of them. The fact that the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the present cases, did not acquiesce in the correctness of the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States, did not constitute a Federal question. Neither the Constitution of the United States nor any act of Congress guarantees to a suitor that the same rule of law shall be applied to him by a state court which would be applied if his citizenship were such that his suit might be brought in a Federal court. Dupasseur p. 391Boohereau, 21 Wall. 130; Brooks v. Missouri, 124 IT. S. 394; French v. Hopkins, 124 IT. S. 524; Chappell v. Bradshaw, 128 IT. S. 132; Cla/rk v. Pennsylvania, 128 IT. S. 395; Hale n. Akers, 132 IT. S. 554;. Manning v. French, 133 IT. S. 186; Giles v. Little, 134 IT. S. 645; County of Cook v. Calumet <& Chicago Canal Co., 138 IT. S. 635.
The cases cited by the plaintiff in error, of G-reen v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, and 7 Wall. 139; Crapo n. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Factors' and Traders' Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 111 IT. S. 738; and Crescent Live /Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 IT. S. 141, are not applicable to the present cases.
The state court gave to the decisions of the Circuit Court of the United States all the effect which they could possibly have, namely, the conclusive settlement of the liability of the towns on the bonds to Marshall and. Ilsley, as hona fide purchasers. The right of action of the towns depended upon sustaining the Marshall and Ilsley judgments as conclusive and not to be reviewed by the state courts. It was an essential element of the suits of the towns to show that they had been legally compelled to pay the bonds, in suits by hona fide holders of them. In pursuance of that claim, the state court held that the judgments of the Circuit Court of the United States were valid and conclusive in favor of the towns in the present suits. There was no question before the Circuit Court of the United States as to the liability of the towns to the Plainview company upon the bonds. The decisions of the Circuit Court of the United States held that Marshall and Ilsley, as l>ona fide purchasers of the bonds, acquired rights which were superior to those of the Plainview company. The judgments in the present suits are founded on the fact that the wrongful acts of the Plainview company enabled Marshall and Ilsley to acquire those rights.
The contention that the act of March 3, 1881, impaired the obligation of a contract is raised for the first time in this court. The records do not show that any such proposition was set up or considered by, the state court. Butler v. Gage, 138 U. S. 52.
Ho Federal question was involved in Harrington n. Town p. 392of Plainview, 27 Minnesota, 224; but the bonds were held invalid on grounds independent of the act of March 3,1881. That decision was made in October, 1880, before the act of March 3, 1881, was passed, and was- followed by the state court in the present cases. The act of 1881 had no ben,ring upon the question of the validity of the bonds, and the state court gave to that act no effect on that question; so that these cases fall within the principle of TV. 0. Water Works Co. v. La. Sugar Refi/ning Co., 125 U. S. 18, 38, 39, because the state court decided them just as if the act of March 3, 1881, had not been passed. There was a perfect right of action in the towns against the Plainview company before the act of 1881 was passed; and such liability of the Plainview company was what the plaintiff in error assumed by proceeding under the act of 1881. That statute did not impose, and was not the cause of, such liability, but simply allowed the plaintiff in error to contract to assume such liability. The act of 1881 does not affect any prior contract. It merely declares that, if the Plainview company was liable to the towns for having obtained and disposed of the bonds, the plaintiff in error, if it should purchase the property and franchises of the Plainview company, must assume the liability of that company to the towns; and the plaintiff in error accepted and acted under the terms of the statute, on the express condition that it should be liable to the towns if the Plainview company were so liable.
The Plainview company could have raised no such question based on the act of 1881 as the plaintiff in error now seeks to raise. The bonds had been declared void by the state court, as between the Plainview company and the towns, in a suit to which the town of Plainview and the Plainview company were parties. The company had made the bonds, which were invalid in its hands, valid in the hands of bona fide purchasers, by transferring them. This took place before the act of 1881 was passed, and a right of action arose at that time in favor of the towns and against the Plainview company. Such right of action was made fruitless by the purchase of the property and franchises of the Plainview company by the plaintiff in error. It was necessaryJ for the legislatureo to authorize the p. 393sale and purchase, in order to make them valid, and, as a condition of such purchase, the statute imposed the liability in question on the plaintiff in error. The liability expressly covered all demands, claims and rights of action against the Plainview company arising out of its having “ obtained and disposed of ” the bonds and coupons purporting to have been issued by the towns. Therefore, the only question in the present suits left to be determined by the state court was whether, as the Plainview company had disposed of the bonds and coupons to Iona fide purchasers, who had enforced them against the towns, a cause of action was created thereby in favor of the towns against the Plainview company. Inasmuch as, if these suits had been between the towns and the Plainview, company, no Federal question would have been presented, there can be none in the present suits.
This court has jurisdiction only when the state court has given effect to a legislative enactment which impairs the obligation of a prior contract. No such thing exists in the present cases. The act of 1881 did not attempt to render invalid any contract between the towns and the Plainview company. Although the plaintiff in error was held liable by the state court by virtue of the act of 1881, that did not raise a Federal question, because the liability was one assumed voluntarily by the plaintiff in error. The liability of the Plainview company must first be established, before the act of 1881 can have any effect. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held the bonds invalid by reason of provisions in the constitution of the State, which were in force at the time of the passage of the act of 1877; and it did not hold them invalid by reason of the act of 1881. Bethell n. Demaret, 10 Wall. 537; West Tenn. Bank v. Citizend Bank of La., 13 Wall. 432, and 14 Wall. 9; Delmas v. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661, 666; Tarver v. Keach, 15 Wall. 67; Stevenson v. Williams, 19 Wall. 572; N. O. Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18, 35.
Moreover, the liability of the Plainview company to the towns, which is sought to be enforced in the present suits against the plaintiff in error, was founded on tort, and did not arise out of any contract relations. That liability was what p. 394was assumed by the plaintiff in error; and no question can arise as to the impairment by the act of 1881 of the obligation of any contract.
The writs of error must be Dismissed.
Mr. Justice Brewer did not sit in these cases or take any part in their decision.