Bryan v. Kales, 134 U.S. 126 (1890)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Bryan v. Kales, 134 U.S. 126 (1890)
Full caption
BRYAN v. KALES.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 3, 1890
BRYAN v. KALES.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.
No. 1287. Submitted. January 7, 1890. —Decided March 3, 1890.
The defence of laches on the part of a plaintiff seeking relief in equity may be set up under a general demurrer.
The granting or refusing relief in equity on the ground of laches in applying for it must depend upon the special circumstances of each case.
A bill in equity alleged that on the 24th September, 1883, letters of administration upon the estate of a deceased person were granted to one of his creditors whose several debts were secured by mortgages upon the estate of which he died seized; that on the 28th day of the same month, the administrator, though having in his possession money sufficient to discharge those claims, proceeded to foreclose the mortgages, and did on the 16th of the next October take judgment in his individual name against himself as administrator for the amount of the claims and for attorney’s fees, and in the following December caused the various parcels to be sold ; that the property brought much less than its real value, or than it would have brought at an open sale; that one of the tracts was bought by the administrator and assigned by him to the judge by whom the decree was rendered; that the wife of the deceased survived him; that all the property was acquired during marriage and was common property of the husband and wife, and, at the decease of the husband, descended to the wife; and that on the 20th of June, 1887, she conveyed her rights to the plaintiff. The bill which was filed July 18, 1887, made the several purchasers, the administrator, and the judge who rendered the decree, defendants, and asked to have the decree of sale and the sales thereunder set aside, artd for further relief. To this complaint the defendants demurred, and the demurrer was sustained. Held, that the circumstances set forth in the complaint were of so peculiar a character, that a court of equity should be slow in denying relief upon the mere ground of laches in bringing the suit.
The court stated the case as follows:
This suit was brought by the appellant on the 18th of July, 1887, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of Arizona, and was there heard upon demurrer to the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff refusing to amend, the suit was dismissed. That judgment having been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory, the only question is whether the facts alleged in the complaint p. 127assuming, as we must, that they are true — set forth a cause of action entitling the plaintiff to relief.
The case made by the complaint is as follows: Jonathan M. Bryan was the owner at the time of his death on the 29th of August, 1883, (1) of the southeast quarter section number thirty-three, in township two north, of range three east, of the district of lands subject to sale at the land office of the United States at Tucson, Arizona, and of the Gila and Salt River Meridian; (2) the northeast quarter of section five, in township one north, of range three east, of the same district and meridian, and lying one-half mile north of the city of Phoenix, in Maricopa County, Arizona, such piece of land being once called the “ Shortle ranch,” but now commonly known as “ Central Place; ” (3) the southeast quarter of section nine, in township one north, of range three east, of the same meridian and district ; and (4) all of block ninety-eight in the city of Phoenix, according to a map or plat of that city, made by William A. Hancock, surveyor of the town site of such city, and on file in the office of the county recorder of Maricopa County.
On or about the 24th of September, 1883, letters of administration upon his estate were issued by the probate court of Maricopa County to M. W. Kales, who immediately qualified and entered upon his duties as administrator, continuing to be and to act as such until December 6, 1884, when he was discharged. Since that date there has been no administrator of the decedent’s estate.
While Bryan was the owner and in possession of the above-described real estate, he executed to Kales, four promissory notes for the amounts, respectively, of $1200, $2500, $1500 and $500, dated December 11, 1882, February 23, 1883, February 26, 1883, and March 14, 1883, and payable, respectively, December 11, 1883, February 23, 1884, October 26, 1883, and September 14, 1883, —each note calling for interest payable every three months, at the rate of one and a half per cent Per m°nth, and, if not so paid, the note to become due and payable. At the date of each note he executed, acknowle ged and delivered to Kales a mortgage upon real estate to p. 128secure its payment; upon the first of the above-described pieces of real estate, to secure the note for $1200; upon the second, to secure the note for $2500; upon the third, to secure the note for $1500; and upon the fourth, to secure the note for $500. These mortgages were all duly recorded.
Before the notes fell due, and before they were presented for allowance against the estate of Bryan, in the probate court having jurisdiction thereof, and without application to any court for an order to pay the notes or any of them, or to sell any property of the estate to pay them, and “ while holding in his hands as administrator sufficient money to pay all the principal and interest which might become due on said notes or any of them,” Kales on the 28th of September, 1883, instituted, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of Arizona, in and for Maricopa County, in his individual name, an action against himself as administrator. He declared, in that action, upon the notes and mortgages, and prayed judgment against himself as administrator for the sum of fifty-seven hundred dollars, with interest on twelve hundred dollars of [that] sum from the 11th day of June, 1883, on twenty-five hundred dollars from the 23d day of May, 1883, on fifteen hundred dollars from the 26th day of May, 1883, and on five hundred dollars from June 14, 1883, the interest on each sum to be at the rate of one and a half per cent per month; with a like rate of* interest upon the principal sum named in any judgment or decree that may be obtained from the date thereof until the same shall be fully paid and satisfied; and for ten per cent for attorneys’ fees upon forty-two hundred dollars of the principal sum, and five per cent for attorneys’ fees upon twenty-five hundred dollars of the principal sum, and for costs of suit.
He also prayed that the usual decree be made for the sale of the premises by the sheriff according to law and the practice of the court; that the proceeds of sale be applied in payment of the amount due the plaintiff; that the defendant and all persons claiming under him or his decedent subsequent to the execution of the mortgages upon the premises, either as purchasers, incumbrancers, or otherwise, be barred and p. 129foreclosed of all right, claim, or equity of redemption in the premises and every part thereof, and that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant, as administrator of the estate of J. M. Bryan, deceased, for any deficiency remaining after applying the proceeds of the sale of the premises properly applicable to the satisfaction of the judgment, and that such deficiency be made a claim against the estate of the said J. M. Bryan, deceased, to be paid as other claims against said estate.
He further prayed that the plaintiff or any other party to the suit might become a purchaser at the sale; that the sheriff execute a deed to the purchaser; that the latter be let into the possession of the premises on production of the sheriff’s deed therefor; and that the plaintiff have such other or further relief in the premises as to the court seemed meet and equitable.
A summons was sued out by M. W. Kales as an individual against himself as administrator, requiring the latter to appear and answer the complaint. It was personally served on the day it was issued, and, on the succeeding day, October 6, 1883, in his capacity as administrator, he made the following answer to the complaint filed by himself in his individual capacity:
“ The defendant, M. W. Kales, administrator of the estate of J. M. Bryan, deceased, answering the complaint on file in this action, admits each and every material allegation in the said complaint, and consents that judgment and decree be entered in accordance with the prayer thereof.”
In other words, M. W. Kales consented that he might as an individual take judgment against himself as administrator.
On the 16th of October, 1883, the court, D. H. Pinney being the judge thereof, rendered a decree of foreclosure and sale, finding, upon the complaint, answer and proofs heard, that there was due to the plaintiff, M. W. Kales, from the defendant, M. W. Kales, administrator, the sums, with interest, specified in the several mortgages, with the attorney’s fee provided for in the mortgages and claimed in the complaint, and directing the proceeds of the sale of each parcel to be applied to the debt secured by the mortgage on that parcel.
VOL. CXXXIV—9
The decree further provided :
“That the defendant, M. W. Kales, as administrator as aforesaid, and all persons claiming or to claim from or under him or from or under the said J. M. Bryan, deceased, and all persons having liens subsequent to said mortgages by judgment, decree, or otherwise upon the lands described in said mortgages or either of them, and they or their personal representatives, and all persons having any lien, or claim by or under such subsequent judgment or decree, and their personal representatives, and all persons claiming under them, be forever barred and foreclosed of and from all equity of redemption and claim in, of, and to said mortgaged premises and every part and parcel thereof from and after the delivery of said sheriff’s deed.
* * * * *
“ And it is further adjudged and decreed that if the moneys arising from said sale of any of the separate parcels of said lands described in either of the respective mortgages shall be insufficient to pay the amount so found due to the plaintiff, as above stated, upon each of the respective mortgages, with interests and costs and expenses of sale as aforesaid, the sheriff specify the amount of such deficiency and balance due the plaintiff upon each of the respective mortgages separately in his return of sale, and that on the coming in and filing of said returns of deficiency the same shall become a claim against the estate of J. M. Bryan deceased, to be paid as other claims are paid.”
The remainder of the decree contains a description of the property or parcels of land covered by the respective mortgages.
On the 8th of November, 1883, the District Court made an order commanding the sheriff to sell upon notice all the property described in the mortgages, and make return thereof. Pursuant to that order, the sheriff, L. H. Orme, advertised, and on the 15th of December, 1883, sold, the property in parcels, as follows: The first parcel to Robert Garside for $1500; the second to M. W. Kales for $2975; the‘third to William Gilson for $1850; and the fourth to M. W. Kales for
$600. The amount bid for each parcel was much less than such parcel was worth in open market, or than it would have brought at the usual sheriff’s sale. The sheriff delivered to each purchaser a certificate of sale. He made his return of sales on the 26th of December, 1883, but the sales have never been confirmed by the District Court.
After the sales and before the making of any deeds, Kales assigned to-J. T. Simms the certificate of sale for the second parcel, and to D. H. Pinney the certificate of sale for the fourth parcel. On the 16th of June, 1884, the sheriff executed a deed for the first parcel to Garside, who, by deed of May 20, 1887, sold and conveyed to J. DeBarth Shorb. Simms, having received from the sheriff, June 10, 1884, a deed for the second parcel, sold and conveyed, by deed of February 28, 1887, to George T. Brasius, who subdivided it into blocks and lots as “ Central Place ; ” and, subsequently, May 3, 1887, sold and conveyed one lot to John W. Jeffries, and, May 5, 1887, another lot to Henry W. Ryder. Gilson received a sheriff’s deed for the third parcel, June 19, 1884, and, April 6, 1886, sold and conveyed to Cordelia L. Beckett, wife of C. G. Beckett. The fourth parcel was conveyed by the sheriff, June 16, 1884, to D. H. Pinney, who, September 10, 1886, sold and conveyed a portion thereof to the Bank of Napa, a corporation existing under the laws of California. Another portion of the fourth parcel was conveyed by Pinney, November 18, 1886, to F. Q. Story, who sold and conveyed to M. H. Sherman.
Bryan left no descendants. His wife, Vina Bryan, survived him. All the property in question was acquired by him during marriage, and, at the time of his death, — the complaint alleges, — was the common property of himself and wife, and, upon his death, she became and was his sole heir, and to her all of the common property descended, and in her remained until June 29, 1887, when, by deeds of conveyance, she granted, released and conveyed to the present plaintiff all of these lands, together with all her estate, right, interest and claim in the same and every part thereof.
The complaint makes all of the persons hereinbefore named
as having purchased at sheriff’s sale or received conveyances for these parcels of land defendants to this suit. It alleges that of “ all the facts herein alleged, the defendants and each of them, at all the times herein mentioned, had full notice; that the defendant, D. H. Pinney, was the judge of the said District Court, and acted as such in all the proceedings had in the said action, wherein said defendant, M. W. Kales, was plaintiff, and said M. W. Kales, as administrator of’ the estate of J. M. Bryan, deceased, was defendant; and said defendant, D. H. Pinney, rendered and made the said decree of foreclosure and order of sale therein and was so the judge of said District Court at the time of the assignment to him by said defendant, M. W. Kales, of the sheriff’s certificate of sale of said block number 98, in said city of Phoenix, and also at the time of the execution and delivery to him by the said sheriff of the said sheriff’s deed thereof.”
The plaintiff, after alleging that the premises described in the complaint are of the value of $125,000, prayed:
That the proceedings, judgment, decree and order of sale had, made, rendered or entered in the action brought by Kales be annulled, set aside, and declared void ;
That the sale of the property, and the certificate of sale and deeds made to Kales, Garside, Gilson, Pinney and Simms be set aside and declared void, and the parts and portions of the property 'conveyed to the several defendants be decreed to have been received by them and each of them with notice and in trust for Vina Bryan and her grantee, the plaintiff herein;
That the defendants and each of them, now pretending to claim or own the above property or any part thereof, be decreed to hold the same and each part claimed by them in trust for the plaintiff, and required to convey to him upon his doing whatever the court adjudged should be equitably done by him;
That the defendants and each of them be enjoined from selling, conveying, mortgaging or in any way interfering with the premises; and
That the plaintiff have such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.
Mr. William A. McKenney, for appellant, on the question of laches, cited : Moss v. Berry, 53 Texas, 632; Railroad Co. v. Dubois, 12 Wall. 47; Lux v. Haggin, 69 California, 255; Stockman v. Riverside Land (Sue. Co., 64 California, 57 ; Kelly v. Hurt, 61 Missouri, 463; Fielding do Gwynn v. DuBose, 63 Texas, 631; Hill.v. Epley, 31 Penn. St. 331; Knouff v. Thompson, 16 Penn. St. 357 ; Bales v. Perry, 51 Missouri, 449 ; Strong v. Ellsworth, 26 Vermont, 366 ; Sulphine v. Dunbar, 55 Mississippi, 255; Rice v. Dewey, 54 Barb. 455 ; Mayo v. Cartwright, 30 Arkansas, 407 ; Neal v. Gregory, 19 Florida, 356; Bramble v. Kingsbury, 39 Arkansas, 131; Terre Haute &c. Railroad v. Rodel, 89 Indiana, 128; Viele v. Judson, 82 N. Y. 32; Diffenback v. Vogeler, 61 Maryland, 370; Meley v. Collins, 41 California, 663.
Mr. William Pinckney Whyte and Mr. Clark Churchill, for appellees, cited to the same point: Harwood v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 78; Diefendorf v. House, 9 How. Pr. 243; The Key City, 14 Wall. 653; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87; Speidel n. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377; Richards v. Mackall, 124 U. S. 189 ; Smith v. Cla/y, 3 Bro. Ch. 639 n.; Piatt v. Vattier, 9 Pet. 405; McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161; Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 234; Hume v. Beale, 17 Wall. 336; Ma/rsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178 ; Sullivan v. Portland c& Kennebec Railroad, 94 U. S. 806; Godden v. Kimmel, 99 IT. S. 201.
Mr. Justice Harlan, having stated the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
The grounds upon which the District Court sustained the demurrer to the complaint are not shown by the record otherwise than from the statement in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the Territory that it was because of laches in bring’Dg suit. The latter court said : “ It appears that the grantor of the plaintiff stood by and saw all this property sold, and ad a right to redeem the same in six months after the sale; that her residence was Maricopa County at the death of her p. 134husband, and its continuance will be presumed to be there, the contrary not having been alleged; that there was no action brought to set aside the judgment; that from the 8th day of November, 1883, till the [2] 9th day of June, 188Y — nearly four years — she saw the property greatly enhancing in value, saw it sold time and again, then sells it to the plaintiff, who now comes into a court of equity and asks a cancellation of all those sales. If the bill had shown, and which plaintiff was allowed to show, that any disability existed on the part of any one having an interest in the property at the time of sale, we would grant the prayer of the bill. No such disability being shown, can we think of allowing the party who has so long slept upon her rights to divest the present owners of their valuable property ? ”
The difficulty with this view is that it has no foundation in the allegations of the complaint. From the mere fact that Mrs. Bryan’s residence at the time of her husband’s death was in Maricopa County, where the real estate in question is situated, the court below presumed not only that it continued there, but that she “ stood by ” for nearly four years, forbearing to exercise her right to redeem, and “ saw the property enhancing in value — saw it sold time and again” — without asserting any interest in it. No such presumption was justified by the allegations of the complaint. The case made by those allegations is that of an administrator, who, having claims against the estate he represented, which were secured bv mortgage upon real property of which his intestate died seized, and having in his hands money sufficient to discharge those claims, yet resorted to the expedient of taking judgment in his individual name against himself in his fiduciary capacity, for the amount of the claims and for attorneys’ fees, and caused the property to be sold. And of all those facts the demurrer admits — the defendants and each of them had full notice when they made their respective purchases. Referring to the allegation in the complaint, that the administrator, at the time he sued himself, had in his hands sufficient money to pay off his claims, the counsel for the defendants suggest that this might well be, if those moneys had been applied to the p. 135debts in question without providing for the payment of other debts against the estate, the expenses of administration, or preferred claims; and that for aught appearing in the complaint, it may have been the duty of the administrator to apply the moneys in his hands to other debts and claims. A sufficient answer to this suggestion is, that the allegation in the complaint upon this point imports a failure of the administrator to use the moneys in his hands to discharge the debts held by him, when he could properly have so used them.
It is true, as contended, that where the bill shows such laches upon the part of the plaintiff that a court of equity ought not to give relief, the defendant need not interpose a plea or answer, but may demur upon the ground of want of equity apparent on the bill itself. Lansdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391, 393; Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377, 387. But no such case is made by the bill. The limitation prescribed by the statutes of Arizona for the commencement of an action to recover real property, or the possession thereof, is five years. If this statute governs courts of equity as well as courts of law — and such is the plaintiff’s contention — the present action is not barred by limitation. If, as contended by the defendants, a court of equity may deny relief because of laches in suing, although the plaintiff commenced his action within the period limited by the statute for actions at law, still the granting or refusing relief, upon that ground, must depend upon the special circumstances of each case. Harwood v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 78; Brown v. County of Buena Vista, 95 U. S. 157, 160; Haywood n. National Banh, 96 U. S. 611, 617. The case made by the complaint in this suit is one of fraud upon the part of the administrator, and in that fraud — if the allegations of the complaint are sustained by proof — the defendants and each of them must be held to have participated. The circumstances as detailed in the complaint are so peculiar in their character, that a court of equity should be slow in denylng relief upon the mere ground of laches in bringing suit.
Other questions arise upon the face of the complaint, namely, as to whether Mrs. Bryan had such interest in the property as made her a necessary party to the suit of foreclosure
Syllabus.
instituted by Kales in his individual capacity, and as to how far the validity of the decree of foreclosure and sale was affected by the very unusual fact that the same person was both plaintiff and defendant in that suit. Perkins v. Se Ipsam, 11 R. I. 270; McElhanon v. McElhanon, 63 Illinois, 457 ; Hoag v. Hoag, 55 N. H. 172. But as these questions were not considered by the court below, and as their correct determination can be best made when all the facts are disclosed, we express at this time no opinion upon them, and place our decision upon the ground that the Supreme Court of the Territory erred in holding that the complaint failed to show that the plaintiff was entitled to relief from a court of equity. The defendants should be required to meet the case upon its merits.
The decree is reversed with directions that the demurrer to the complaint he overruled, andfor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Field, J. — I concur in the judgment of this court for the reasons stated ; but I wish to add that in my opinion the judgment recovered by Kales against himself as administrator is an absolute nullity.
In re WIGHT, Petitioner.1
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOE
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.
No. 1521. Argued and submitted January 10,1890. — Decided March 3,1890.
When it is found by a Circuit Court of the United States that the clerk has failed to put in the record an order which was made at the next preceding term of the court, remanding a case to the District Court, the Circuit Court may direct such an order to be entered nunc pro tunc.
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error to inquire into all the errors committed by the court below. An indictment against a letter carrier of the United States Postal Service,
1
The docket title of this case is Wight v. Nicholson, Superintendent of the Detroit House of Correction.
charging that “ he did wrongfully secrete and embezzle a letter which came into his possession in the regular course of his official duties, and which was intended to be carried by a letter carrier, which letter then and there contained five pecuniary obligations and securities of the government of the United States,” is a sufficient charge that the letter embezzled was intended to be carried by a letter carrier of the United States.
In an indictment against a letter carrier for the embezzlement of a letter received by him in his official character to carry and deliver, it is not necessary to aver that “ the letter has not been delivered ” if an embezzlement of it is charged.
In a proceeding for a habeas corpus to release from confinement a letter carrier charged with embezzling letters delivered to him for carriage, this court will not inquire into the motives with which the letter was put into the mail, even though the object was to detect or entrap the party into criminal practices.
This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was refused in the court below, and the petitioner appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Henry M. Duffield for appellant.
Mr. Solicitor General, for appellees, submitted on his brief, which adopted verbatim the brief by Mr. Charles T. Wilkins, the attorney for the United States in the court below.
Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan discharging a writ of habeas corpus on a hearing before that court. By this writ the appellant here, Charles H. Wight, sought to be relieved from imprisonment in the Detroit House of Correction, under sentence of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan. The petitioner was indicted in that court upon the charge that on the 28th day of June, 1888, while he was employed in one of the departments of the postal service of the United States, to wit, as superintendent of letter carriers in the post-office at Detroit, he wrongfully and unlawfully secreted and embezzled certain letters which came into his possession in the regular course of his official duty, and p. 138which, were intended to be carried by a letter carrier, and which letters contained obligations and securities of the United States of pecuniary value, called treasury notes. There were six other counts for a similar offence.
Upon the trial in the District Court, the jury found a verdict of guilty, against petitioner. He thereupon made a motion in that court for a new trial, and likewise a motion in arrest of judgment. Pending the argument of these motions, the District Court made an order transferring the cause to the Circuit Court for said district, which order is in the following language: .
“ It is now by the court ordered that this case be certified and remitted to the next Circuit Court of the United States for this district.”
These motions were heard in the Circuit Court on the 11th day of March, 1889, before Judges Howell E. Jackson, Circuit Judge, and Henry B. Brown, District Judge, and on the 12th day of March, 1889, the following order was entered of record:
“ United States of America )
v. >
Charles Wight. )
“ In this cause the defendant’s motion to set aside verdict and in arrest of judgment, after mature deliberation thereon, are by the court here now denied.”
And on the same day, at the District Court room in the city of Detroit, that court made the following entry:
“ The United States ) Convicted on indictment for embezzling
v. y
.Charles Wight. ) letters, etc.
“ The court now deliver judgment on the motions to set aside the verdict rendered by the jury herein and for a new trial, heretofore argued and submitted; and, thereupon, it is ordered that said motions be, and the same are hereby, denied, and that the order heretofore made herein certifying this cause to the Circuit Court of the United States for this district be, p. 139and the same is hereby, vacated as having been improvidently made.
“And the said defendant being now placed at the bar of the court for sentence, thereupon the court do now sentence him, the said Charles Wight, to be imprisoned and kept at hard labor, at and in the Detroit House of Correction, in the city of Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan, for the term of two years from and including this day, and to stand committed until the terms of this sentence are complied with.”
On the 25th of August, thereafter, an application was made to Mr. Justice Harlan of this court, who was the justice assigned at that time to the sixth circuit, for a writ of habeas corpus, to deliver the petitioner, Wight, from restraint in the Detroit House of Correction, by Joseph Nicholson, its superintendent. On this application Justice Harlan made an order that a rule issue from the Circuit Court against the marshal of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan and the superintendent of the Detroit House of Correction, returnable before that court within three days after service of process, to show cause why the habeas corpus should not issue as prayed in the petition. To this rule Nicholson made a return, in which he said that he held the said Wight in restraint of his liberty as a prisoner in the Detroit House of Correction, by virtue of the judgment and sentence of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, rendered on the 12th day of March, 1889, a copy of which he set out. To this return, Wight, by his counsel, made exception by way of answer, in which he said that the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan had not, at the time of the sentence referred to in said return, any jurisdiction over him, the said Wight, or any authority to pass sentence against him, because the said cause in which it pretended to pass sentence upon him on the 12th of March, 1889, had been duly certified and remitted from said District Court into the Circuit Court of the United States in said district, and the transcript thereof duly filed, and that up to the date of said alleged sentence, to wit, the 12th day of March, 1889, was and at the date hereof is still pending in the Circuit Court of p. 140the United States, as more fully and at length alleged and shown by the certified copies of the proceedings in said cause, in the petition filed in this matter.
Petitioner Wight also averred that the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan never
• had or obtained jurisdiction over him for the following reasons : That the indictment on which petitioner was arraigned and tried in said court did not charge the commission of any offence over which said court had jurisdiction, and because the' evidence in the case did not establish any offence against the laws of the United States, of which said District Court had jurisdiction.
Upon examination of the record of the Circuit Court in the case at this stage of the proceeding on the writ of habeas corpus, it was ascertained that no order remanding the case from the Circuit Court to the District Court had been entered on the journals of the former court, the last order on the subject being the one which we have already recited, overruling the motion for a new trial and the motion in arrest of judgment. Thereupon the judges of the Circuit Court caused the following order to be made:
“ United States of America )
v. (
Charles Wight. )
“ The defendant, being personally present in court, as well as by his counsel, Henry M. Duffield, Esq., and the court having its attention called to its records made and entered in the above-entitled cause on the 12th day of March, a .d. 1889, by the return of Joseph H. Nicholson, superintendent of the Detroit House of Correction, to the writ of habeas corpus heretofore allowed by this court on the petition of the above-named Charles Wight, and upon inspection of said records, so made and entered as aforesaid, it satisfactorily appears to the court that the same is not a full and correct record of the order which was in fact made by this court on the 12th day of March aforesaid, in this, that it fails to show the order of this court which was duly made on the said 12th day of
March, remitting said cause out of this court into the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan; therefore, after hearing the said Charles Wight, by his counsel, in opposition thereto, this court, upon its own motion, based upon its recollection of the facts of the making of said order remitting said cause as aforesaid into said District Court, now orders and directs that the same be entered now as of the said twelfth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine, according to the facts thereof, which are as follows: .
“ At a session of the Circuit Court of the United States for the sixth circuit and eastern district of Michigan, continued and held, pursuant to adjournment, at the district court room, in the city of Detroit, on the twelfth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine.
“ Present: The Hon. Howell E. Jackson, Circuit Judge; the Hon. Henry B. Brown, District Judge.
11 United States of America 1
v. f
Charles Wight. )
“ The defendant being personally present in court, as well as by his counsel, Henry M. Duffield, Esq., said United States being represented' by C. P. Black, U nited States attorney, and Charles T. Wilkins, assistant United States attorney, and the said United States attorney objecting to the consideration of said cause on the part of this court for the reason that there was no authority in law for the District Court to remit said cause to this court after verdict had in said District Court; therefore the court, upon its own motion, hereby remits said cause back into the said District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for such action as said District Court shall see fit to take.”
Thereupon the Circuit Court on the 30th day of September, 889, on the same day that it had ordered the nunc pro tunc entry of the order remanding the cause to the District Court, eing of the opinion that this order cured the defect of the record, which showed the case to be still pending in the Circuit p. 142Court and being further of opinion, as appears from their judgment in the matter, that the case had never been lawfully removed from the District into the Circuit Court, and that therefore said District’ Court had always retained jurisdiction of the case, made an order discharging the writ of habeas corpus.
It is mainly upon these orders about the several removals of the case from one court into the other that appellant relies to show that the District Court at the time of pronouncing its judgment of imprisonment against appellant had no jurisdiction of the case. But there is also a further point made, that the letters which the appellant embezzled were never put into the mail with intent that they should be carried, within the meaning of the statute.
Of course if the judge of the District Court is right in the opinion expressed by him in the orders which he made, that he had no power after the verdict in the District Court to transfer it to the Circuit Court, then the case had really never been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the District Court, and the question arising upon the absence of any record in the Circuit Court of an order remanding it back to the District Court is of no consequence, because all that was done in the Circuit Court, in that view, was without jurisdiction, and the case never was lawfully in that court, and the District Court had the right to make the order, which it did make, setting aside its former order transferring the case to the Circuit Court. In this view of the subject, the case having always been really under the jurisdiction and control of the District Court, its judgment sentencing the prisoner on the verdict was within its power, and is not examinable on this writ of habeas corpus.
But we are not satisfied that this view of the powers of the two courts is a sound one. While we do not decide the question now, because it is not necessary, (as our judgment is the same in either event,) we shall, for the purposes of the present case, treat it as if the order transferring the case from the District Court into the Circuit Court was a valid order, so that it could only be remanded from the Circuit Court into the District Court by some order or action, of the former.
No such order was found upon the records of the Circuit Court at the time sentence was imposed upon the prisoner in the District Court; if no such order had been made previous to that judgment, the case was still pending in the Circuit Court, and the District Court had no authority to pass the sentence it did upon the prisoner. This view of the subject calls upon us to inquire whether the nunc pro tunc order of September 30 was a valid order, and one within the power of the Circuit Court to make.
Our first impression was that whatever might be the powers of the courts in this regard over their records during the term in which the transactions are supposed to have occurred, the record of which, or failure to make any record of which, is the subject of amendment, yet when it was attempted to do this after an adjournment and at a subsequent term of the court, the powers of the court in making such changes in the records of the proceedings were limited to those in which there remained written memoranda of some kind in the case, and among the files of the court, by which the record could be amended, if erroneous, or the proper entry could be supplied, if one had been omitted. And especially that in criminal procedure this power to make such entries, at a subsequent term of the court, of what had transpired at a former term, as would establish the authority of the court to pass a sentence of fine or imprisonment, either did not exist at all, or, if it did, was limited to cases in which some written evidence of what was done remained in the papers connected with the case.
We are satisfied, however, upon an examination of the authorities, that this restriction upon the power of the court does not exist. Mr. Bishop, in his first volume on Criminal Proceedings, section 1160, states the doctrine in the following terms:
“ When the term of the court has closed, it is too late to undo, at a subsequent term, what was done at the former term. A judgment of the court, for instance, cannot then be opened, arid modified or set aside. Neither, it has been held, can the °erk, at a subsequent term, make an entry of what truly p. 144transpired at the preceding term. But this refers to the power of the clerk., proceeding of his own motion. The court may order nunc pro tunc entries, as they are called, made to supply some omission in the entry of what was done at the preceding term; yet this is a power the extent of which is limited, and not easily defined. In general, mere clerical errors may be amended in this way. So of the mistake of the clerk in the name of the judge before whom the indictment was found.”
The present case comes within the clause of this section which declares the power of the court to make nunc pro tunc entries to supply some omission in the record of what was done at the time of the proceedings. An extensive list of authorities is cited in the foot-note of Mr. Bishop, and among those which support the power of the court to make a record of some matter which was done at a former term, of which the clerk had made no entry, the following cases directly affirm that proposition: GaHlonocuy, Administrator v. McKeithen, 5 Iredell (Law), 12; Hyde n. Curling, 10 Missouri, 374; State v. Clark, 18 Missouri, 432; Nelson v. Barker, 3 McLean, 379; Bilansky V. The State of Minnesota, 3 Minnesota, 427.
The opinion of the court in this latter case contains a somewhat full reference to the history of this subject, as it is found in the reports of the English cases, and in Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 408, the result of which is to show that at an early day the English courts exercised this power so recklessly, when the pleadings were all ore tenus, and great liberality was necessarily alloWed in amendments, that the abuse was corrected by the king, who made the declaration that “ although we have granted to our justices to make record of pleas pleaded before them, yet we will not that their own records shall be a warranty for their own wrong, nor that they may rase their rolls, nor amend them, nor record them contrary to their original enrolment.” This, Blackstone declares, meant only that the justices should not by their own private rasure change a record already made Up, or alter the truth to any sinister purpose.
In the Minnesota case, the plaintiff in error had been p. 145convicted of the crime of murder, and after trial and verdict, and after the case had been carried to the Supreme Court of the State, the record of the proceedings on the trial was amended so as to show affirmatively that each juror was sworn as prescribed by law; that they were put in charge of the officer to keep them as prescribed by law; and that they were polled at the request of defendant on their coming in with- their verdict; matters which, it seems, had been omitted in the record of the judgment. The Supreme Court in that case, as we think, stated with force and precision the true rule on this subject.- They said: “ While we should go as far as any court in reprobating a rule to place the proceedings of a court almost entirely at the mercy of the subordinate officials thereof, we should be scrupulously careful in adopting any rule which would tend to destroy the sanctity or lessen the verity of the records. And while we admit the power to amend a record after the term has passed in which the record was made up, we deprecate the exercise of the power in any case where there was the least room for doubt about the facts upon which the amendment was sought to be made. . . . But when the facts stand undisputed, and the objection is based upon the technical point alone that the term is passed at which the record was made up, it would be doing violence to the spirit which pervades the administration of justice in the present age to sustain it. It is our opinion that this power, of necessity, exists in the District Court, and that its exercise must in a great measure be governed by the facts of each case.”
The case in 5 Iredell, although a civil suit, established the doctrine that a court has a right to amend the records of any preceding term by inserting what had been omitted either by the act of the court or clerk, and that when so amended it stands as if it had never been defective, or as if the entries had been made at the proper time.
The case of Hyde v. Curling, 10 Missouri, 227, which was also a civil suit, and seems to have been very well considered, is thus stated in the syllabus of the report: “ A court has power to order entries of proceedings had by the court at a previous term to be made nunc pro tunc, but where the court vol. cxxxiv—io p. 146has omitted to make an order which it might or ought to have made, it cannot at a subsequent term be made nunc pro tunc?'
In the case in 18 Missouri, of State v. Clark, it appeared that the prisoner had been tried on an indictment which was not signed at the time of the trial by the foreman as a true bill and that the clerk had not .marked the time of filing the same, on the indictment. It was held, on writ of error to the Supreme Court, that the court had a right, on motion at a subsequent term, to amend its record by a statement of these facts, not only by the endorsement upon the bill, but by a regular entry on the journal, that “ the grand jury returned into court the following true bills of indictment,” (naming the one under which the defendant was convicted). The court said that, if these acts had taken place, the failure of the clerk to make proper and formal entries on the records of the court might have been supplied or corrected by having such entries made nunc pro tunc.
In Nelson n. Barker, 3 McLean, 379, Mr. Justice McLean observed, in regard to an amendment of a declaration under a plea of misnomer, that it was objected to on the ground that there was nothing to amend by, to which he replied that at common law the court could only give leave to amend when there was something to amend by, and anciently amendments were required to be made at the term at which the error occurred, but now an amendment may be made at any time before judgment, and in some cases after judgment; and he refers to the 32d section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
This, which has been commonly called the statute of jeofails and amendments of the United States, may be found in section 954, Revised Statutes, and is as liberal in the powers which it confers on the courts to make amendments as any of those enacted in more modern times. We are forced to the conclusion that the action of the Circuit Court in making the order for a nunc pro tunc record, which showed that the case had been remanded from that court to the District Court prior to the time when the sentence was passed upon the prisoner, was a legitimate exercise of power.
With regard to the proposition which denies that the p. 147indictment in the District Court and the evidence by which it is sustained conferred jurisdiction on that court, we do not think it needs much comment. The grand jurors charged in the first count of this indictment that “ the said Wight, who was then and there a person employed in one of the departments of the postal service of the United States, to wit, employed as an assistant to the superintendent of letter carriers in the postofiice at Detroit aforesaid, unlawfully and wrongfully did secrete and embezzle a letter which came into his possession in the regular course of his official duties, and which was intended to be carried by a letter carrier, which letter then and there contained five pecuniary obligations and securities of the government of the United States,” and were the property of one Angus M. Smith, and with the letter were then and there enclosed in an envelope addressed to “ Oscar Singleton, Montevideo, Cook Co., Mich.” A similar statement is in effect made in all the other counts.
The law under which the prisoner was indicted is section 5467 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the language of which, applicable to the case, is as follows:
“Any person employed in any department of the postal service who shall secrete or embezzle or destroy any letter, packet, bag, or mail of letters intrusted to him, or which shall come into his' possession, and which was intended to be conveyed by mail, or carried or delivered by any mail-carrier, mail-messenger, route-agent, letter-carrier, or other person employed in any department of the postal service, or forwarded through or delivered from any post-office or branch post-office established by authority of the Postmaster General, and which shall contain any note, bond, draft, check, warrant, revenue stamp, postage-stamp, stamped envelope, postal-card, money-order, certificate of stock, or other pecuniary obligation er security of the Government, . . . any such person who snail steal or take any of the things aforesaid out of any letr, packet, bag, or mail of letters which shall have come into p. 148shall be punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than five years.”
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possession, either in the regular course of his official duties °r in any oth&r manner whatever, and provided the same shall Dot have been' delivered to the party to whom it is directed,
The argument of counsel assumes that in this proceeding, by writ of habeas corpus, we can inquire into and correct nearly all errors which may have been committed by the District Court in the control of the case originally. This has been so often denied by this court, and the proposition is so clear, that in a writ of habeas corpus nothing can be inquired into but the jurisdiction of the court, that it is unnecessary to pursue the entire line of argument' of counsel for appellant. Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280. We are of opinion, notwithstanding the allegation of counsel that there was no jurisdiction because the indictment did not charge that the letter embezzled was intended to be carried by a letter carrier, that it so alleged in the exact terms of the statute just cited, and is therefore sufficient.
With regard to the proposition “ that the failure to allege in some of these indictments that the letter had not been delivered to the party to whom it is directed renders the whole proceeding void,” we think it is unsound. While the purpose for which this clause was inserted in the act is not very clear, it was probably intended to repel the idea that the stealing or embezzling of such a letter after it had been carried through the mail or .delivered by the letter carrier to its owner and its purpose served, did not render the party guilty under this statute. At all events, the fact of its delivery being a matter of defence, when it was proved that the party in the course of his employment had embezzled the letter and stolen the money, it will be presumed that the defendant made the most he could of that defence on the trial. We are not of opinion that it is necessary for us to examine into the question raised on the evidence at the trial as to whether the securities were put into the letter and that into the mail, as a mere decoy or not. The question whether it was intended to be conveyed by the mail or by the letter carrier was a question of fact to be ascertained by the jury, and in a case like this, where the party has been convicted of embezzling a letter and valuable property in a letter passing through the regular course of the
Dissenting Opinion: Fuller, C. J., Harlan, J.
mail and the hands of the letter carrier, where the indictment is a good one, and where the party has been found guilty and sentenced, we are not disposed to inquire into the motives for which the letter was put into the mails, even though the object was to detect or entrap the party in his criminal practices. For these reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.
The Chief Justice (with whom concurred Mr. Justice Har - lan ) dissenting.
I am compelled to withhold my assent to the conclusion reached by the court in this case. In my judgment the District Court had power after the verdict to transfer the cause to the Circuit Court, and having done so, it required an order remitting the cause from the Circuit Court to the District Court, before the latter court could pronounce a lawful sentence. The petitioner was sentenced by the District Cour^ which, as the record then stood, had no jurisdiction, and was committed accordingly, and while undergoing imprisonment under that sentence sued out the writ of habeas corpus. The Circuit Court then entered an order nunc pro tunc as of the previous term, remitting the cause into the District Court, basing its action upon “ its recollection of the facts of the making of said order.” The record before us does not disclose the existence of any minutes of the clerk or notes of the judge that the entry of such an order had been directed, or of any other official evidence to that effect, and I do not understand it to be contended that there was any such. Granting that, as has been said, the judge during the term is a living record, and may alter and supply from memory any order, judgment or decree which has been pronounced, and this, because he is presumed to retain his own action in his recollection; yet after the term has elapsed, the exercise of such a power to the extent of supplying an order upon which jurisiction depends, in the absence of any entry, minute or memorandum to proceed by, or of any statutory provision expressly allowing it, ought not to be conceded in criminal cases. The statute of amendments and jeofails has no application.
Upon this ground, my brother Harlan and myself are of opinion that the judgment should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Gray was not present at the argument of this case and took no part in its decision.