Forncrook v. Root, 127 U.S. 176 (1888)

showing the various recesses and grooves with which it is sup-vol . cxxvn—12 p. 178plied. Fig. 2 is an edge view of the blank, and shows the form and depth of the angular grooves which form the corners of the frame. Fig. 3 shows the blank bent into a square form, with the ends united, making a complete frame ready for use. Fig. 4 shows a modification of the groove or mitre c, Fig. 2. The blanks for these frames are preferably formed from some light, tasteless, and comparatively tough wood, which will bend at the corners without steaming or boiling, such as bass wood or white wood, the material being produced by cutting it from the log in the form of a thick veneer, or by sawing into thin stuff and then planing both surfaces. The blanks A are then cut from this material, of the proper width and length, the ends dentated, as shown at a a, by means of a series of circular saws placed close together upon an arbor or other suitable tool, so that they will interlock when brought together. The recesses b b are then formed in its edges, at such points in its length as will bring them at the top and bottom of the frames when set up in the hive. These recesses form openings which allow space for the passage of the bees between the frame, and for the ventilation of this part of the hive. Three triangular grooves c c c are then cut across the blank at such points in its length as will divide it into four nearly equal parts, each of which forms one side of the frame after the blank is bent into a quadrangular shape. These triangular grooves are cut nearly through the blank, sufficient wood only being left to hold the parts firmly together. As the sides of the grooves c are inclined toward each other at a right angle, it follows that, when the blank is bent into the form of a frame, these grooves make perfectly fitting interjoints at three of its corners, the fourth corner being that at which the ends of the blank are united to each other by means of the interlocking teeth formed thereon. In one of these spaces, between two of the grooves c, and preferably that which will form the top of the frame when placed in the hive, is formed a longitudinal groove, d, for the guide-strip, which makes a secure point of attachment for the comb, when the bees begin to build in the frames set side by side in the hive, with the parts of the frame containing the recesses b b at top. These p. 179frames meet a want long felt by bee keepers, as those in common use are either dovetailed or nailed together at the comers* and, if set up at the manufactory, form a large bulk for transportation, and are very liable’to breakage in handling; but, if sold to the user in pieces, to be put together by him, the numerous joints to be made cause loss of time and produce a very fragile article when finished, which loses its rectangular shape with the slightest rough usage, as the joints at the corners lack the necessary strength and rigidity to hold them in shape. My frame will be found to possess none of the above named defects, as it is intended for transportation in solid packages before being set up, and, when set up, possesses great strength and rigidity, preserving its form without difficulty during all the rough handling to which such frames are frequently subjected. Having thus described my invention, I claim as new, and desire to secure by letters-patent, the following: As a new article of manufacture, a blank for honey-frames formed of a single piece of wood, having transverse angular grooves c, longitudinal groove d, and recesses all arranged in the manner shown and described.”

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS., ।: v/; No. 1388. Submitted April 2, 1888. — Decided April 23,1888. A 'claim by the State of Louisiana to 5 per cent of the net proceeds of the p. 183of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, and §§ 1 and 2 of the act of March 2, 1855, c. 147, 10 Stat. 634. Sections 1, 2, and 4 of the act of 1850 read as follows: “ That, to enable the State of Arkansas to construct the necessary levees and drains to reclaim the swamp and overflowed lands therein, the whole of those swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation, which shall remain unsold at the passage of this act, shall be, and the same are hereby granted to said State. Sec . 2. That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior, as soon as may be practicable after the passage of this act, to make out an accurate list and plats of the land described as aforesaid and transmit the same to the governor of the State of Arkansas, and, at the request of said governor, cause a patent to be issued to the State therefor; and on that patent, the fee-simple to said lands shall vest in the said State of Arkansas, subject to the disposal of the legislature thereof: Provided, however, that the proceeds of said lands, whether from sale or by direct appropriation in kind, shall be applied exclusively, as far as necessary, to the purpose of reclaiming said lands by means of the levees and drains aforesaid.” “Sec . 4. That the provisions of this act be extended to, and their benefits be conferred upon, each of the other States of the Union in which such swamp and overflowed lands, known and designated as aforesaid, may be situated.” Section 1 of the act of 1855 provided that the President should cause patents to be issued to purchasers or locators who had made entries of public lands claimed as swamp lands, prior to the issue of patents to the State, as provided for by § 2 of the act of 1850, except in certain specified cases. Section 2 of the same act provided as follows: “ That upon due proof, by the authorized agent of the State or States, before the Commissioner of the General Land Office, that any of the lands purchased were swamp lands, within the true intent and meaning of the act aforesaid, the purchase money shall be paid over to the said State or States.”

The State alleged, in its petitions in the Court of Claims, (for there were two suits, which were consolidated,) that the moneys due to it under the act of 1811, instead of being paid p. 184over to it by the United States, had been unlawfully credited upon certain bonds alleged to have been issued by the State, and claimed to be held by the United States as an investment of certain Indian Trust funds; that, as to the acts of 1850 and 1855, moneys were due to the State thereunder, which had been legally ascertained and certified, but, instead of being paid over to the State, had been credited on bonds of the same kind; and that the sums referred to as being ascertained and found due to the State were trust funds, to be devoted to specific purposes, under the provisions of the acts granting them to the State.

The Court of Claims found as facts (1) that, of the 5 per cent fund accruing to the State under the act of 1811, there remains due from the United States to the State, as credited on the books of the Treasury Department, the following sums: May 8, 1879, $13,602.71; June 8, 1882, $63.47; February 7, 1884, $22,773.51; making a total of $36,439.69; and that, of the swamp-land fund accruing to the State under the acts of 1850 and 1855, there remains due from the United States to the State, as credited on the books of the Treasury Department, the following sums: May 26, 1886, $3803.02 ; September 9, 1886, $1110.00; May 2, 1887, $1730.41; May 4,1887, $489.59; making a total of $7133.02; (2) that the First Comptroller of the Treasury, at the dates stated in finding 1, admitted and certified the above sums to be due to the State on account of the 5 per cent fund and the indemnity for swamp lands purchased by individuals within the State, but directed those amounts to be credited on moneys due the United States, as stated in finding 3; and that it does not appear that the state authorities had knowledge of this proceeding ; (3) that the United States own coupon bonds issued by the State, amounting to $37,000, payable in 1894, known as the Indian Trust bonds, and also hold and own overdue p. 185coupons attached to those bonds, representing the interest from May 1, 1874, to November 1, 1887, amounting to $31,080. The court gave a judgment in favor of the claimant for the total of the two amounts of $36,439.69 and $7133.02, namely, $43,572.71.

The provisions of the swamp-land act of 1850 have been before this court in several cases. In Emigrant Co. v. County of Wright, 97 U. S. 339, at October Term, 1877, the State of Iowa had, by statute, granted the swamp lands to the counties of the State in which they might be found, with an injunction p. 186that the lands and their proceeds should be appropriated to reclaiming the swamp lands; and if, when this was accomplished, anything was left, to building roads and bridges over the same; and lastly, the remainder to be used in building roads and bridges in other parts of the county. By subsequent legislation of the State, the counties were authorized to depart from this injunction, and to use the lands for public buildings and internal improvements; but the assent of the majority of the voters of the county to such purpose was required. The State also authorized the sale of all' the lands to any person or corporation by a written contract, to be in like manner submitted to the vote of the county; but the sale was to be subject to the proviso that the vendee should take the lands subject to all the provisions of the act of Congress of 1850. Wright County, with the assent of a majority of the voters of the county, having contracted in writing with the Emigrant Company to sell to it all the swamp lands in the county, and the claim of the county for indemnity against the United States for swamp lands which had been sold by the United States, and having executed a deed of a quantity of the lands to the company, the county filed a bill in equity to set aside the contract and deed, and obtained a decree to that effect in the Circuit Court. In the opinion of this court, delivered by Mr. Justice Miller, the proposition urged by the plaintiff in the suit was considered, namely, that the contract was void on its face, because it contemplated a diversion of the fund in violation of the original grant. As regarded that proposition, the court said : “It is not necessary to decide it in this case, and we do not decide that the contract is, for that reason alone, void. But we are of opinion that any purchaser of these lands from the county, or of the claim of the county to indemnity, must be held to know that in the hands of the county they were impressed with an important public trust, and that, in examining into the fairness and honesty o such a purchase, this consideration constitutes an importan element of the decision.” The court then proceeded, in its opinion, to hold that the contract must be rescinded, because of what amounted to fraud in the manner in which it was p. 187procured, namely, that the officers and citizens of the county were ignorant of the nature and value of what they were selling ; that the vendee was well informed in regard to both, and withheld such information unfairly from the officers of the county; and that there was a provision in the contract “ for a diversion of the fund to other purposes, a gross inadequacy of consideration, and a successful speculation at the expense of the rights of the public.”

purpose of education, for the building of bridges, roads, and highways, and for building institutions of learning, or for making railroads through the county or counties to which such lands belonged. The opinion then proceeded: “The contract in dispute was made under this law, and our first impression was that it introduced a scheme subversive of the trust imposed upon the State by the act of Congress ; that its effect was to devote the lands and proceeds thereof to purposes different from those which the original grant was intended to secure ; that it threw off, or endeavored to throw off, all public responsibility in relation to the trust ; and hence that the scheme itself and the contract based upon it were void. But a reconsideration of the subject has brought us to a contrary conclusion. The argument against the validity of the scheme is, that it effects a diversion of the proceeds of the lands from the objects and purposes of the congressional grant. These were declared to be to enable the State to reclaim the lands by means of levees and drains. The proviso of the second section of the act of Congress declared that the proceeds of the lands, whether from sale or direct appropriation in kind, should be applied exclusively, as far as necessary, to these purposes. This language implies that the State was to have the full power of disposition of the lands ; and only gives direction as to the application of the proceeds, and of this application only ‘ as far as necessary ’ to secure the object specified. It is very questionable whether the security for the application of the proceeds thus pointed out does not rest upon the good faith of the State, and whether the State may not exercise its discretion in that behalf without being liable to be called to account, and without affecting the titles to the lands disposed of. At all events, it would seem that Congress alone has the power to enforce the conditions of the grant, either by a revocation thereof, or other suitable action, in a clear case of violation of the conditions. And, as the application of the proceeds to the named objects is only prescribed ‘ as far as necessary,’ room is left for the exercise by the State of a large discretion as to the extent of the necessity. In the present case it is not shown by allegations in the bill, or p. 189otherwise, (if such a showing would be admissible,) that any necessity existed for devoting the proceeds of the lands in question to the purposes of drainage. No case is shown as the basis of any complaint, even on the part of the general government, much less on the part of the county of Adams, which voluntarily entered into the arrangement complained of. Our conclusion, therefore, is that this objection to the validity of the contract cannot prevail.” The opinion then overruled the other grounds urged in favor of the plaintiff, reversed the decree below, and directed a decree to be entered dismissing the bill, without prejudice to the right of the county to bring an action at law for any breach of the terms of the contract.

In the case of Louisiana n . United States, 22 C. Cl. 284, the State of Louisiana sued the United States for claims arising under the 5 per cent act of 1811, and under the swamp-land acts of 1850 and 1855, and had a judgment for both claims, amounting to $71,385.83, which was affirmed by this court in United States v. Louisiana, 123 U. S. 32. In that case, the United States interposed the defence of the limitation of six years, as to the swamp-land claim. The Court of Claims held that the action of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under § 2 of the act of 1855, in determining, on proof by the agent of the State, that any of the swamp land had, within the meaning of the act, been sold by the United States, so as to bring into force the requirement that the purchase money should be paid over to the State, was necessary to a right of action for the money on the part of the State, and that, as such action in that case did not occur more than p. 191six years before the bringing of the suit, the limitation prescribed by § 1069 of the Revised Statutes did not apply. A set-off or counter-claim was interposed in that case by the United States, they alleging that the amount due by citizens of the State of Louisiana to the United States for the direct tax levied by the act of August 5, 1861, 12 Stat. 292, was a proper subject of set-off against the claim of the State in the suit. This contention of the United States was overruled by the Court of Claims, on the ground that the State had never assumed the payment of the tax assessed under the act of 1861. On the appeal to this court by the United States, 123 U. S. 32, it was said in the opinion of the court delivered by Mr. Justice Field, that the statute of limitations did not seem to have any application to the demand arising upon the swamp-land acts; and that, as the Commissioner of the General Land Office had not found and certified the amount due to the State from the sales of swamp lands until the 30th of June, 1885, and the suit was commenced in September, 1886, the limitation of the statute did not apply to the case. It was further held, that the State was not liable for the taxes assessed under the act of August 5, 1861, against the real property of private individuals in the State, and that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction of the action. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed.

Under the act of 1850, the swamp lands are to be conveyed to the State as an absolute gift, with a direction that their proceeds shall be applied exclusively, as far as necessary, to t e purpose of reclaiming the lands. The judgment of the tate as to the necessity is paramount, and any application of e proceeds by the State to any other object is to be taken as p. 192the declaration of its judgment that the application of the proceeds to the reclamation of the lands is not necessary. By the 2d section of the act of 1855, it is provided that the purchase money received by the United States for the swamp lands sold by them shall be paid over to the State. There is nothing in these provisions of the character of a property trust, and nothing to prevent the application by the State of the swamp-land fund to general purposes. If the power exists anywhere to enforce any provisions attached to the grant, it resides in Congress and not in the court.