Case details
Bluebook Citation
Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694 (1888)
Full caption
ANDREWS v. HOVEY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 20, 1888
ANDREWS v. HOVEY.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOB THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.
Submitted January 16, 1888. — Decided February 20,1888.
The decision of this court in Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U. S. 267, adjudging reissued letters-patent No. 4372, granted to Nelson W. Green, May 9, 1871, for an “improvement in the method of constructing artesian wells ” to be invalid, confirmed, on an application for a rehearing. The case of Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, and other cases examined. The question of the proper construction of the second clause of § 7 of the patent act of March 3, 1839, 5 Stat. 354, as affecting the validity of a patent, considered.
This was a petition for a rehearing of the case decided at this term and reported in 123 U. S. at page 267. The allegations and prayer of the petitioners were as follows:
Petition for Rehearing.
“ And now come your petitioners, the appellants herein, by their counsel, Joseph C. Clayton and Anthony Q. Keasbey, and respectfully suggest to this Honorable Court that, after having sustained the priority and novelty of the invention and the validity of their original patent and its reissue in numerous decisions of the Circuit Courts and in three decrees of this court, they are much aggrieved by the opinion lately rendered in this court (123 U. S. 267), declaring it to have been void ab initio, under the Patent Acts of 1836 and 1839, because it was admitted that subsequent to the invention and prior to the application others, without the consent or allowance of the inventor, had used the invention in public for more than two years.
“ And your petitioners respectfully suggest that this decision as to the construction of those acts was reached by reason of a plain omission and mistake as to the facts and authorities, and by the failure of counsel, in their abundant confidence in what they deemed a long-settled construction, to bring to the notice of the court in sufficient fulness the authorities by which such construction had been uniformly maintained, and to explain distinctly that their admission as to prior use related to the use of only a few wells made solely by Suggett and Mudge, who derived their knowledge from the inventor, and were afterwards defeated as contestants in an interference with Green concerning the patent in question.
“ Wherefore your petitioners respectfully pray for a reconsideration and rehearing on the following grounds, supported by their brief submitted herewith :
“ First. The court, in the present opinion, holds that the first clause of the 7th section of the act of 1839 protects any person who has purchased or constructed a specific machine before application for the patent, whether it was purchased or constructed with the consent of the inventor or not, and that therefore the second clause of the section invalidating the patent, if such use in public continued two years before the application, must be construed to mean a use whether with the consent of the inventor or not; and, in reaching this conclusion, the court declared that ‘ the question involved had
Petition for Rehearing.
never heen decided by this court' This was a plain mistake, probably arising out of the failure of counsel to refer to the cases. It had been decided by this court the other way in four well-considered cases, viz.: Kendall v. ~Winsor, 21 How. 322; Seymour n. McCormick, 19 How. 96; Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433; Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31, 46; and in McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202. The charge of Mr. Justice Baldwin at the Circuit Court, taking the same view of the statute, was affirmed, although the decision of this court rested on another point.
“ Second. The court in its opinion (page 269) declares that in Andrews v. Carman, 13 Blatchford, 307, the first driven-well case, ‘ the question of the use of his invention by others more than two years prior to his application does not appear to have been raised.’
“ This was a plain error of fact, and the court was naturally and inadvertently led into it by a clerical error in the printed opinion of Judge Benedict, as will be fully explained in the brief. The question was raised. The same facts as to prior use admitted here, were proved there and fully considered, and the construction of the statute contended for, distinctly approved.
“ Third. Being under the erroneous impression that this court had not construed the section, and that the construction of it had not arisen in the other driven-well cases, the court, in construing it, omitted to give due weight to the unbroken current of executive and judicial authority in favor of the construction upon which the appellants so confidently relied that they did not deem an oral argument on the point necessary.
“ They now beg leave to refer to their brief in support of the assertion that from 1839 to the decision of this case at the Circuit Court the construction of the section making the consent and allowance of the inventor to a use of more than two years necessary in order to invalidate the patent has been uniformly acted upon by the Patent Offico in promulgating its rules and making its grants to inventors under them, and has been sustained in very numerous opinions by the following justices of this court, viz., Justices Woodbury, Story, Baldwin,
Petition for Rehearing.
Grier, Nelson, Clifford, Daniel, Curtis, and Blatchford, and by the following judges of the Circuit Courts, viz., Judges Woodruff, Shepley, Lowoll, Blatchford, Benedict, Drummond, Nelson, Dillon, and Wheeler, and by the following judges of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, viz., Judges Cranch, Morsell, Merrick, Dunlop, and Fisher, and by the long line of Patent Commissioners from 1839 to 1870, and has been recognized by all text-books and counsel learned in patent law.
“Fourth. The principles laid down by this court in a number of decisions within a few years past (referred to in the brief) in applying the doctrine of stare decisis to the construction of statutes would, as your petitioners respectfully but confidently suggest (if attention had been properly called to the great and uniform current of authorities upon it and the extent to which private rights granted under it have reposed upon confidence in its permanency), have led the court, whatever might have been its own view of this section, to have left its long-settled construction undisturbed; and that the rule laid down in United States v. Pugh, 99 U. S. 265, would have been followed, in which case it was said, as to the construction of a statute:
“ ‘ While, therefore, the question is one by no means free from doubt, we are not inclined to interfere at this late day with a rule which has been acted upon by the Court of Claims and the executive for so long a time.’
“ Fifth. The counsel of your petitioners, in their confidence in this construction so long settled, failed to explain to the court, in making their admission as to use, that it was not at all a general use by others, but only the use of a few wells in the town where Green made the invention, by Lieutenant Mudge, a subordinate of his regiment, and Mudge’s hired man, Suggett, who derived knowledge through Green’s experiments, and who were afterwards defeated in the Patent Office as contestants with him, upon full proof of the public use they had made without his consent or knowledge, and that that use was surreptitious and a piracy of his invention.
“ Sixth. The construction of the section, as now made by the court, overthrowing the uniform decisions which your petitioners now submit for consideration, would produce the evils
Petition for Rehearing.
and hardships pointed out in the decisions cited, and would, in the case of all patents governed by the act of 1839, cause all specific articles surreptitiously made before application to be protected, and all patents to be invalidated by two years’ use by a pirate of the invention, contrary to equity, and to the real object of the statute as defined in all the cases in which it has been construed; whereas not even under the present act can the patentee be deprived of his franchise by a surreptitious prior use.
“ Seventh. The counsel of your petitioners, still relying too confidently on the settled construction of the section, wholly omitted to point out to the court, that said statute does not apply to Green’s patent at all, which is for a ‘process,’ but only to tangible specific articles capable of being constructed, used, or sold by delivery; and they neglected to refer the court to the authorities sustaining this position, which they now do in the brief submitted.
“ Eighth. The counsel for appellants referred the court to its statement in Hanning v. Isinglass Co., 108 IT. S. 462, that the ‘ statute of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, § 6, did not allow the issue of a patent when the invention had been in public use or on sale for any period, however short, with the consent or allowance of the inventor; and the statute of 1870,16 Stat. 201, § 24, does not allow the issue when the invention has been in »public use for more than two years prior to the application, either with or without the consent or allowance of the inventor.’
“ They regarded this as clearly showing the view of this court that this important change was made by the general revision of 1870 and not by the mere additional act of 1839, and they did not think it necessary to verify it by reference to the legislative records.
“ A careful examination of those records discloses the fact that this statement, made by Mr. Justice Woods, was strictly correct; that the Congress in making the revision of 1870 regarded the then existing law as requiring consent or allowance, and deliberately made the change.
“ If this be true, the present construction of the section is inconsistent with the view of the court in the Isinglass case, and with the legislative view in the revision of 1870.
Petitioners’ Citations.
“ To the end, therefore, that equity may be done, and that this court may, upon fuller consideration, and with the advantage of oral argument, revise its former opinion (if revision be right and proper) your petitioners pray that the court may be pleased to take their suggestions under careful consideration, and grant a rehearing upon the points upon which said decision was based, and grant such other relief and order as in equity and good conscience may be proper.
“Newark, N. J., January 16, 1888.
“ Joseph C. Clayton, Anthony Q. Keabbey, Of Counsel with Appellants”
Mr. Clayton and Mr. Keasbey filed a brief in support of the petition, in which they cited: A. Cases cited in their former brief: Pierson v. Eagle Screw Co., 3 Story, 402; Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatchford, 229, 235; American Hide <& Leather Co. v. American Tool Co., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 284; Andrews v. Carman, 13 Blatchford, 307; Andrews v. Cross, 19 Blatchford, 294; Ryan n. Goodwin, 3 Sumner, 514; Elizabeth v. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U. S. 126; Consolidated Fruit Ja/r Co. v. Wright, 94 U. S. 92; Manning v. Cape Ann Isinglass Co., 108 U. S. 462; McMillin v. Barclay, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 189: B. Cases not cited in their former brief: Henry v. Francestown Soapstone Co., 5 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 108; Davis v. Fredericks, 21 Blatchford, 567; Brickill v. Mayor c&c. of New York, 18 Blatchford, 273; Henry v. Francestown Soapstone Co., 2 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 221; Agawam Co. v. Jorda/n, 1 Wall. 583, 607; Jones v. Sewall, 3 Cliff. 563; Godfrey v. Eames, 1 Wall. 317; McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; Henry v. Providence Tool Co., 3 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 513; Smith & Griggs Co. v. Sprague, 123 U. S. 249; Sargent n. Seagrave, 2 Curtis, 553; Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322; Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 181, 299; Wright v. Sill, 2 Black, 544; Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31; Eva/ns v. Jorda/n, 1 Brock. 248; S. C. 9 Cranch, 201; Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 ; MeKeen v. De Lancey, 5 Cranch, 22; Brown v. United States, 113 (J. S. 568; The [p. 700] Laura, 114 U. S. 411; Heath v. Hildreth, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 12, 20; Arnold n. Bishop, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 27, 34; Hunt v. Howe, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 366, 373; Rugg v. Haines, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 420; Howry v. Barier, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 563; Carroll v. Gambrill, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 581 ; Ellithorp v. Robertson, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 585; Blackinton v. Douglass, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 622; Wickersham v. Singer, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 645; Salary v. Lauth, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 691; Spear v. Belson, 1 MacArthur, Pat. Cas. 699; Hovey v. Stevens, 1 Woodb. & Min. 290; McClurg v. Kingsla/nd, 1 Plow. 202 ; Sanders v. Logan, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 167; Howes n. McNeal, 3 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 376; Draper v. Wattles, 3 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 618; Campbell v. Mayor &c. of New York, 20 Blatchford, 67; McCormick v. Seymour, 2 Blatchford, 240; S. C. on appeal, 19 How. 486; Kelleher v. Darling, 4 Cliff. 424; Graham n. McCormick, 5 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 244.
Mr. George Ticknor Curtis filed a supplemental brief for petitioners.
Mr. Albert H. Walker filed suggestions in support of petitioners.
Mu. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a petition by the appellants in the case of Andrews v. Hovey, reported in 123 U. S. 267, for a rehearing of that case upon the points upon which the decision was based.
The suit was a suit in equity, brought by the appellants for the infringement of reissued letters-patent No. 4372, granted to Nelson W. Green, one of the appellants, May 9, 1871, for an “ improvement in the method of constructing artesian wells,” the original patent, No. 73,425, having been granted to said Green, as inventor, January 14, 1868, on an application filed March 17, 1866. The Circuit Court had dismissed the bill on the ground of the invalidity of the patent. The plaintiffs appealed, and this court affirmed the decree. In its opinion, it was said : “ The patent is [p. 701] familiarly known as the driven well patent. The specifications and drawings of the original and reissued patents are set forth in the opinion of this court in Eames n. Andrews, 122 U. S. 40. Numerous defences are set up in the answer in the present case, and voluminous proofs have been taken in respect to those defences; but it is necessary to consider only one of them, which in our view is fatal to the validity of the patent, and that is, that the invention was used in public, at Cortland, in the State of New York, by others than Green, more than two years before the application for the patent. The brief of the appellants concedes that it is shown in this case that other persons than Green put the invention into public use more than two years before his application was filed. It is contended for the appellants that this was done without his knowledge, consent, or allowance. The appellee contends that such knowledge, consent, or allowance was not necessary in order to invalidate the patent, while the appellants contend that it was necessary. The whole question depends upon the proper construction of § 7 of the act of March 3, 1839, 5 Stat. 354, interpreted in connection with §§ 6, 7, and 15 of the act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 119, 123.” 123 U. S. 269.
Our decision was, that the patent was invalid, because the invention covered by it had been in public use more than two years before Green applied for the patent, without reference to the question whether he consented to such use or not. The views which led to this conclusion were set forth at length in the opinion, and a further consideration of them, in the light of the arguments presented on this application for a rehearing, has only served to confirm us in the conviction that they were correct. But, as the briefs of counsel in support of the application proceed upon the ground that certain views and authorities, which they think bear upon the question involved, were not presented to us upon the original hearing, we deem it proper to state the reasons for our adherence to our conclusion.
The main proposition urged by the counsel for the appellants is, that the question involved was adjudged by this court in accordance with their views, in the case of Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, decided in 1858. In the same connection, [p. 702] other authorities, which, it is alleged, were not cited by counsel on the former hearing, are presented. It is also urged, that the court omitted to give due weight to what is said to be the current of executive and judicial authority in favor of the construction upon which the appellants rely; and that the 7th section of the act of 1839 does not apply to the patent in question, because it is a patent for a process.
The question involved arises upon the second clause of § 7 of the act of 1839, which section was in these words: “ That every person or corporation who has, or shall have, purchased or constructed any newly invented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, prior to the application of the inventor or discoverer for a patent, shall be held to possess the right to use, and vend to others to be used, the specific machine, manufacture, or composition of matter so made or purchased, without liability therefor to the inventor, or any other person interested in such invention; and no patent shall be held to be invalid by reason of such purchase, sale, or use prior to the application for a patent as aforesaid, except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public; or that such purchase, sale, or prior use has been for more than two years prior to such application for a patent.”
This section contains two clauses, all that precedes the first semicolon being the first clause, and all that comes after the first semicolon being the second clause. The first clause relates to the right of a person, as against a suit by the patentee for infringement, to use and sell the specific machine, manufacture, or composition of matter purchased or constructed prior to the application for the patent, and the use of which would otherwise be a violation of the patent. The second clause relates to the effect upon the validity of the patent, of such purchase, sale, or use prior to the application. The questions involved in the two clauses are quite different. The first clause relates to the particular right of a particular defendant to use a particular machine, manufacture, or composition of matter after the grant of the patent, and notwithstanding its grant, and in no manner relates to the validity or invalidity of the patent. The second clause relates wholly to the validity of the patent.
Most of the authorities laid before us and relied upon on the present application relate entirely to the first clause of the section.
The first case in which the 7th section of the act of 1839 appears to have come under consideration in this court was that of McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, decided in 1843. But that was a case which involved only the first clause of the section. The patent was for an improvement in the mode of casting chilled rollers. It was, therefore, a patent for an improvement in a process. The patentee invented it while he was a workman in the employ of the defendants. They put it into use in their business. He left their employment, and then applied for and obtained his patent. His assignees sued the defendants in an action at law for continuing to use the improvement. There was a verdict for the defendants, upon the ground that, by reason of their unmolested, notorious use of the invention before the application for the patent, they had a right to continue to use it, under the provisions of the first clause of the 7th section. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed by this court upon that ground. It held that the defendants were on the same footing as if they had had from the inventor a special license to use his invention, given before he applied for his patent, and that the first clause of the 7th section extended to the invention or thing patented in. that case, although it consisted of a new mode of operating an old machine, as contradistinguished from a patent for a machine. The court distinctly held that the words “newly invented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” and the words “ such invention,” in the first clause of the 7th section, meant the invention patented; and that the words “ the specific machine, manufacture, or composition of matter ” meant the thing invented, the right to which was secured by the patent. We see nothing in this case which sustains the position of the appellants.
The first reported case in a Circuit Court, involving any part of the 7th section, is that of Pierson v. Eagle Screw Co., 3 Story, 402, in 1844, in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, before Mr. Justice Story. That was a case [p. 704] which involved only the first clause of the section. The defendant had, prior to the patentee's application for his patent, purchased the right to use a certain number of machines embracing the patented improvement, from the assignee of an independent inventor thereof, and claimed the right, under the 7th section, to use the machines which it had actually in operation, notwithstanding the fact that the patentee was the first inventor. The Circuit Court charged the jury, that the first clause of the 7th section did not confer such right upon the defendant, because there was no license or consent by the patentee, as inventor, to the use of the machines by the defendant. In considering that question, the court observed, in regard to the second clause of the 7th section, that it limited the right to apply for a patent to the period of two years after the inventor had sold his invention or allowed it to be used by others. But the second clause was not directly in judgment in the case. This observation on the subject appears to have been the origin of much that has been said on the question in subsequent cases, for this case of Pierson v. Eagle Screw Co. is generally cited as the leading authority in favor of the posi tion taken by the appellants.
In Hovey n. Stevens, 1 Woodb. & Min. 290, in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, in 1846, before Mr. Justice Woodbury, a motion was made for a preliminary injunction, on a patent granted to Hovey. The question arose whether Stevens did not himself, before Hovey obtained his patent, discover or construct the patented invention. The court considered the question whether Stevens had not obtained a knowledge of Hovey’s invention through a workman in his employ, who had previously been in the employ of Hovey and had used the improvement, and whether Stevens did not copy the improvement from Hovey’s, without Hovey s consent, and before Hovey made his machine public or sold it. The court observed, that, in such a case, the use of the machine by Stevens, though begun before Hovey obtained his patent, would be a use by fraud, not contemplated and savea under the 7th section of the act of 1839. The question was solely as to the right of Stevens to continue to use the machine [p. 705] which he had so begun to use before Hovey obtained his patent. The court declined to determine the question of fact involved, as an action at law, to be tried by a jury, for a violation of the patent, between the same parties, was then pending, and refused to grant the injunction. As appears by the report of the case of Hovey v. Stevens, 3 Woodb. & Min. 17, 32, the bill in equity was dismissed and the jury case was tried, and the plaintiff was nonsuited upon grounds not involving those considered on the motion for the preliminary injunction.
The next case cited is Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatchford, 229, in 1851, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York, before Mr. Justice Nelson and Judge Conkling. In that case the only questions were whether the patentee had forfeited his right to his invention by using it in public more than two years prior to his application, or whether such use by him was only experimental, with a view to further improvements; and also whether he had dedicated or abandoned his invention to the public use. The case in no manner involved the question before us.
In McCormick v. Seymour, 2 Blatchford, 240, in 1851, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York, before Mr. Justice Nelson, the points involved related wholly to the acts of the patentee himself, more than two years prior to his application, in respect to his own use in public of the patented improvement; and to the question of his abandonment of the invention to the public within the two years. The jury having failed to agree upon a verdict, the case was again tried, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, thus overruling the defences set up. At December Term, 1853, this court reversed the judgment on the question of damages, but it approved the rulings below on the above points. Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480.
The case of Sa/rgent n. Seagrav'e, 2 Curtis, 553, in 1855, in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, before Mr. Justice Curtis, involved only the questions, on a motion for a preliminary injunction, of the exclusive possession of the right by the patentee, and the acquiescence of the public therein,
VOL. CXXIV—45
after the issue of the patent, for the period of about two years, and its acquiescence in the claim of the patentee to a right under a caveat, for about two years before the date of the patent.
Then came the case of Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, decided by this court at December Term, 1858. It was a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island, where the case was tried before Mr. Justice Curtis and a jury. The suit was an action at law for damages for the infringement of a patent granted to Winsor, who had a verdict and a judgment. The particular question in the case arose wholly under the first clause of the 7th section of the act of 1839. The defendants claimed a right to use certain specific machines under that clause. The application for the patent was made in November, 1854. Prior to that time, the defendants had constructed one machine containing the patented invention, and they constructed others in the autumn of 1854. In the course of that fall, Winsor had knowledge that the defendants had built, or were building, one or more machines like his invention, and did not interpose to prevent them. Winsor had completed in 1849 four machines containing the patented improvements, and had made on them articles which he had sold. But he kept the machines from the view of the public, allowed none of the hands employed by him to introduce persons to view them, and the hands pledged themselves not to divulge the invention. Among those hands was one Aldridge, who left the plaintiff’s employment in the autumn of 1852, and entered into an arrangement with the defendants to copy the plaintiff’s machine for them, and did so, and the defendants’ machines were built and put in operation by Aldridge, and under his superintendence, and by means of the knowledge which he had gained while in the plaintiff’s employment, under a pledge of secrecy. On the basis of these facts, the defendants counsel prayed the court to instruct the jury that, under the 7th section of the act of 1839, if the jury were satisfied that the machines for the use of which the defendants were sued were constructed and put in operation before the plaintiff applied for his patent, then the defendants possessed the right [p. 707] to use, and vend to others to be used, the specific machines made or purchased by them, without liability therefor to the plaintiff. The court did not grant this prayer, but instructed the jury that, if Aldridge, under a pledge of secrecy, obtained knowledge of the plaintiff’s machine, and thereupon, at the instigation of the defendants, and with a knowledge on their part of the surreptitiousness of his acts, constructed machines for the defendants, they would not have the right to continue to use the same after the date of the plaintiff’s patent; but that, if the defendants had the machines constructed before the plaintiff applied for his patent, under the belief, authorized by him, that he consented and allowed them so to do, they might lawfully continue to use the same after the date of the patent, and the plaintiff could not recover. It was on this state of the case that the question came before this court. The first clause of the 7th section was the only one involved in the instruction asked for and in that above recited as given. This court affirmed the judgment and the propriety of the action of the Circuit Court. In its opinion, it observed, that inventors were “entitled to protection against frauds or wrongs practised to pirate from them the results of thought and labor ; ” that “ the shield of this protection has been constantly interposed between the inventor and fraudulent spoliator by the courts of England, and most signally and effectually has this been done by this court, as is seen in the cases of Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, and of Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet. 292.” The opinion of the court treated the case as one in which the rights of Winsor could not be affected, because the knowledge of the invention had been surreptitiously obtained and communicated to the public; and went on to remark that the instruction to the jury at circuit was in strict conformity with that principle, and with the doctrines declared in Pennock v. Dialogue and Shaw v. Cooper. It closed the opinion by saying: “ That instruction diminishes or excludes no proper ground upon which the conduct and intent of the plaintiff below, as evinced either by declarations or acts, or by omission to speak or act, and on which also the justice and integrity of the conduct of the defendants, were to be examined and [p. 708] determined. It submitted the conduct and intentions of both plaintiff and defendants to the jury, as questions of fact to be decided by them, guided simply by such rules of law as had been settled with reference to issues like the one before them; and upon those questions of fact the jury have responded in favor of the plaintiff below, the defendant in error. We think that the rejection by the court of the prayers offered by the defendants at the trial was warranted by the character of those prayers, as having a tendency to narrow the inquiry by the jury to an imperfect and partial view of the case, and to divert their minds from a full comprehension of the merits of the controversy;”
It is thus seen, that this case not only turned upon a right claimed wholly under the first clause of the 7th section, but that it was held that a fraudulent, piratical, and surreptitious purchase or construction of a machine, like that shown in that case, was not such a purchase or construction as was covered by the first clause of the 7th section. The decision in that case does not affect the one now before the court.
It may well be that a fraudulent, surreptitious, and piratical purchase or construction or use of an invention prior to the application for the patent would not affect the rights of the patentee under either clause of the 7th section; but the present is not such a case as that which existed in Kendall n. Winsor. In the use of driven wells in public, at Cortland, by others than Green, more than two years before his application, we see nothing in the evidence under which such use can properly be characterized as fraudulent, piratical, or surreptitious. Green’s invention was made in 1861. The brief of the appellants at the former hearing contained this statement: “ But it is not denied that in this case there is proof that after the invention by Green in 1861, and his public exhibition of it m Cortland, the rumor of it spread, and the value of it became apparent, and other persons, without Green’s consent and allowance, did put the invention into public use without his knowledge.” The application for the patent was made March 17, 1866. It is true that the driven wells thus referred to were constructed, some by Mudge and some by Suggett, who [p. 709] obtained knowledge of the invention from Green. It is admitted in the appellants’ brief on the present application that, subsequently to Green’s invention, and more than two years prior to his application, Suggett put down four driven wells, for persons named Copeland, Seaman, Foster, and Samson respectively, and Mudge, five wells, for persons named Pomeroy, Bolles, Bates, Seaman, and Hicks respectively. But there is nothing that indicates in regard to these wells fraud or piracy or surreptitiousness, in the sense of the decision in Kendall v. Winsor. The invention was made by Green and publicly exhibited, the rumor of it spread and its value became apparent, and the persons for whom the wells so put down were made, had them constructed during the time when, for five years after the invention, Green failed to apply for a patent. Of course, Green, from the moment of the invention, had an inchoate property therein, which he could complete by taking a patent. The first clause of the 7th section of the act of 1839 gave to the persons for whom those wells were constructed a right to use them without the consent of Green, and the second clause of that section had the effect to make Green’s patent invalid because of the use of the invention by those persons more than two years before he applied for his patent.
In the case of Sanders v. Logan, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 167, in 1861, in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, before Mr. Justice Grier and Judge McCandless, the bill was dismissed because the patentee had abandoned his invention, and because it had been publicly used, with his knowledge, consent, and approbation, more than two years prior to the application for the patent.
In the case of American Hide Co. v. American Tool Co., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 284, in 1870, in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, before Judge Shepley, the question tried was, whether the invention was in public use or on sale, with the knowledge and consent of the inventor, more than two years before he applied for his patent, and whether he had abandoned his invention to the public prior to his application. On these issues the jury found for the defendants.
In McMilli/n v. Barclay, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 189, in 1871, in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania before Judge McKennan, two patents were involved. In. regard to one of them, the defence was, that the patentee had himself used the invention in public more than two years before he applied for his patent. It was held that, when it was so used, it was a complete invention, and the patent was held to be invalid. In regard to the other patent, the defence was that of abandonment by the patentee subsequently to the making of his application, the application having been made in 1855, and the patent having been granted in 1867, and the invention having gone into use subsequently to the application. The defence of the abandonment of the invention after the application was filed was overruled.
In Bussell de Erwin Co. v. Mallory, 10 Blatchford, 140, in 1872, in the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut, before Judges Woodruff and Shipman, the question involved related entirely to an abandonment of the invention and to the effect of the acts of the patentee within two years prior to the application.
In Jones v. Sewall, 3 Cliff. 563, in 1873, in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, before Mr. Justice Clifford, it was set up as a defence, that the several improvements covered by the patent sued on were in public use and on sale more than two years before the patentee made his application for the patent. The court overruled the defence, holding that there was no evidence to show that the inventions, or either of them, were in public use or on sale more than two years before the inventor applied for a patent, or for any shorter period, with his consent and allowance, or that he had any knowledge of any such sale or public use at the time it was made; and that, on the contrary, the evidence showed that he never gave his consent to any such sales, and that he constantly asserted that he intended to apply for a patent. The decision was placed upon the ground, that such consent and allowance were necessary to the invalidity of the patent. This was a direct adjudication upon the point involved in the present case.
In Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433, at October Term, 1873, the defence was want of novelty. The plaintiff had a judgment, which was affirmed by this court. At the trial, the defendant requested the court to charge the jury: “ 1st. That the invention, as described in the patent of February, 1870, is the treatment of bark-tanned sheep and lamb skins by the employment of fat liquor, and, if such treatment was known to others, and more than two years before the plaintiff applied for his patent, his patent is void.” He also requested the court to instruct the jury: “ 7th. That, if fat liquor had been used substantially in the manner specified in the plaintiff’s patent, for the purpose of rendering any kind of leather soft and supple, more than two years before the plaintiff applied for a patent, the plaintiff cannot recover, even though it had not been so used in dressing bark-tanned lamb or sheep skins.” These instructions were refused, and the failure to give them was alleged as error. The defendant in error contended, in this court, that the first request did not correctly or fully describe the invention; that the employment of fat liquor merely was not the whole of the invention, but that it was the employment of fat liquor in the condition and manner described in the specification; and that the refusal to charge the seventh request was proper.
In regard to the first request, this court said, that the instruction was properly refused, and that it stated inaccurately the rule of law which it involved. The court added: “ A patent relates back, where the question of novelty is in issue, to the date of the invention, and not to the time of the application for its issue. The jury had already been sufficiently instructed upon the subject. The instruction assumes that the reissue was for the use of fat liquor, without reference to the point whether it were hot or cold.” The court then proceeded to hold, that the two claims of the patent sued on required that the fat liquor should be heated, and that, therefore, the first instruction asked was improper. It is quite apparent that the court considered only the issue of novelty, and that it did not pass upon the question involved in the present case.
The seventh request, like the first, was inaccurate, because it referred to the time of the application, and not to the date of [p. 712] the invention; and, in regard to the seventh request, the court merely said, that it was satisfied with the rulings of the court below in regard to that request and four others which, it stated, might be “ grouped and disposed of together; ” and it added, that neither of them required any special remark. We cannot regard the case of Klein n. Russell as adjudicating the question now presented.
In Henry v. Fra/ncestown Co., 2 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 221, in 1876, in the Circuit Court for the District of New Hampshire, before Judge Shepley, the defence was the public use and sale of the invention by the patentee more than two years before he applied for his patent. It was held that the use and sales by him were experimental.'
In Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. n. Wright, 94 U. S. 92, at October Term, 1876, a patent granted in 1870, on an application made in January, 1868, the invention having been completed in June, 1859, was held void, because (1) there was a purchase, sale, and prior use of the invention more than two years before the application, and (2) at the time of the application the invention had been abandoned to the public. The sale and prior use were by the inventor himself. This case does not adjudge the point here involved.
In Kelleher v. Darling, 4 Cliff. 424, in 1878, in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, before Mr. Justice Clifford, the original patent was issued in 1871, under the act of July 8, 1870, and was divided, on its subsequent surrender, into two reissued patents. No question arose in the case under the act of 1839.
So, too, the case of Henry v. Providence Tool Co., 3 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 501. in 1878, in the Circuit Court for the District •of Rhode Island, before Mr. Justice Clifford, arose under the act of 1870.
In Draper v. Wattles, 3 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 618, in 1878, in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, before Judge Lowell, the original patent was issued in 1869, on an application made in June, 1868. The court held that, under the 7th section of the act of 1839, the sale or use more than two years prior to the application must have been with the consent or [p. 713] allowance of the inventor, in order to invalidate the patent, and that the patent was not invalidated by the sale by the inventor more than two years before he applied for his patent of an article which did not embody the whole of his invention as subsequently patented. The point involved in the present case was thus directly adjudged.
In Bates v. Coe, 98 IT. S. 31, at October Term, 1878, the original patent was issued in 1863. Mr. Justice Clifford, in delivering the opinion of the court, stated, that the answer did not set up as a defence that the invention had been in public use or on sale in this country for more than two years before the application for the patent, and that there was nothing in the record to support that proposition, if it had been well pleaded. His observation, therefore, citing Pierson v. Eagle Screw Co., 3 Story, 402, that, under the 7th section of the act of 1839, the public use or sale, in order to defeat the right of the inventor to the patent, must have been with his consent and allowance, for more than two years prior to the application, was an observation made in regard to a point not in issue or in judgment.
In Henry v. Francestown Co., 5 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 108, in the Circuit Court for the District of New Hampshire, in 1880, before Judge Lowell, the patent had been granted in 1859, on an application filed in 1857. On proof that the inventor had, more than two years prior to his application, sold articles containing his invention, not experimentally, the patent was held invalid.
In Graham v. McCormick, 10 Bissell, 39, and 5 B. & A. Pat. Cas. 247, in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in 1880, before Judge Drummond, the patent having been granted in 1868, the question was as to a use or sale by the inventor more than two years before his application; and it was held that, as a matter of fact, the sale and use by him were experimental.
In Brickill v. The Mayor, 18 Blatchford, 273, in 1880, in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, before Judge Wheeler, the patent had been granted in 1868, and the defendant, the city of New York, set up a right to use the [p. 714] invention, which was for the combination of a heating apparatus with a steam fire engine, by reason of the fact that the patentee had made it while in the employ of the Fire Department of the city, and had attached it to two of the city fire engines. The court held, notwithstanding the construction put upon the first clause of § 7 of the act of 1839 by this court in McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, that the defendants had acquired no right beyond the right to use the specific machines constructed prior to the application for the patent.
In Ca/mpbell v. The Mayor, 20 Blatchford, 67, in 1881, in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, before Judge Wheeler, the patent having been granted in 1864, and the invention having been made, sold, and used by others than the patentee after he had invented it, and more than two years before he applied for his patent, but without his consent and allowance, it was held by the court, that, under the second clause of the 7th section of the act of 1839, the public use and sale having been without the consent or allowance of the inventor, the patent was not invalid. This was a direct adjudication upon the point involved in the present case.
In Davis v. Fredericks, 21 Blatchford, 556, in 1884, in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, before Judge Wheeler, the patent having been granted in 1868, the invention had got into public use and on sale more than two years prior to the application for the patent, but without the inventor’s consent or allowance. The court held, following Campbell v. The Mayor, that the patent was not invalid, thus adjudging the point in question here.
Reference is also made in the brief for the appellants, to twelve cases reported in 1 MacArthur’s Patent Cases, running from 1841 to 1859, decided by the judges of the Circuit and Supreme Courts of the District of Columbia, on appeals from the Commissioner of Patents; but in none of them was the point here involved in judgment. In Heath v. Hildreth, p. 12, no question arose under the act of 1839. In Arnold v. Bishop, p. 27, consent by the applicant to the use of his invention for more than two years prior to his application was shown. In Hunt n. Howe, p. 366, the sale was made by the inventor.
In Rugg v. Haines, p. 420, the use and sale were with the consent and allowance of the applicant. In Howry v. Barber, p. 563, the making and selling were by the applicant. In Carroll v. Gambrill, p. 581, the applicant was defeated upon the ground of estoppel and of abandonment of the invention. In Ellithorp v. Robertson, p. 585, he was defeated upon the ground of laches on his part, amounting to abandonment. In Blackimton v. Douglass, p. 622, there was public use with the consent of the inventor. This was also the case in Justice v. Jones, p. 635. In Wickersham n. Singer, p. 645, there were abandonment by the inventor and consent and allowance by him. In Savary n. Lauth, p. 691, the applicants were defeated on the ground of laches by them and presumed acquiescence. In Spear v. Belson, p. 699, it was held that laches and delay on the part of the applicant had caused a forfeiture of his right.
The review we have given of the cases now cited on behalf of the appellants shows no adjudication by this court on the question involved, and a direct adjudication as to the effect of the second clause of the 7th section of the act of 1839, in accordance with that contended for by the appellants, in only four cases in Circuit Courts (not including Andrews v. Ca/r man). To the contrary effect is the case of Egbert v. Lipp mann, 15 Blatchford, 295, commented on in the former opinion 123 U. S. 270, 271.
It is alleged by the appellants, that this court was in error in stating, as it did in its former opinion, (123 IT. S. 269,) that in Andrews v. Carman, 13 Blatchford, 307, 324, the question of the use of Green’s invention by others more than two years prior to his application does not appear to have been raised; that it was in fact raised; and that the inference to the contrary grows out of a clerical error in the published opinion in Andrews v. Carman. It may be accepted that this is so, but the question of law involved is the very question now under consideration.
It is also alleged that the same question was distinctly raised, in proof and argument, in the interference case between Green and Suggett respecting this invention, and that Green’s patent [p. 716] was thereafter granted, with the understanding in the Patent Office that the Cortland wells now in question had been constructed subsequently to Green’s invention and more than two years before his application. But patents are often granted with a view to leaving open, to be decided by the courts, questions which the Patent Office does not deem it proper to adjudicate against the applicant by withholding the patent.
It is also urged, that, in the rules of the Patent Office, promulgated between the time of the passage of the act of March 3, 1839, and the enactment of the act of July 8, 1870, it was made known to applicants for patents that a patent would not be granted if the invention had been in public use or on sale, with the consent and allowance of the inventor, for more than two years before his application. It was undoubtedly true, that such a state of facts was sufficient ground for withholding a patent; but the promulgation and enforcement of such a rule cannot be regarded as having the effect of a judicial or authoritative adjudication of the question under consideration.
The argument sought to be founded upon the various phases assumed by the provisions of the act of July 8, 1870, in its passage through the two Houses of Congress, is very unsafe and unreliable, as a basis of judicial action, particularly when the only inference sought to be drawn is one as to what view Congress took of the act of 1839, in enacting the act of 1870. If any inference is to be drawn on the subject, it can only properly be drawn from the act of 1870 as it stands on the statute book, and that inference is commented on in the former opinion of this court, at page 275 of 123 IT. S.
The doctrine invoked by the appellants, that where the meaning of a statute has been settled by judicial construction, that construction becomes a part of the statute, is not applicable to the present case. A question arising in regard to the construction of a statute of the United States concerning patents for inventions cannot be regarded as judicially settled when it has not been so settled by the highest judicial authority which can pass upon the question. The earliest decision of a Circuit Court, directly adjudging the point here involved, was [p. 717] in 1873. This court has always had jurisdiction to review suits on patents to a specified extent, and that jurisdiction was extended by § 56 of the act of July 8th, 1870, 16 Stat. 207, to writs of error and appeals, in such suits, without regard to the sum or value in dispute. No question arising in any such case, reviewable by this court, can be regarded as finally settled, so as to establish the law for like cases, until it has been determined by this court. This view of the matter has been applied by this court in analogous cases. Thus, in Wilson v. City Bank, 17 Wall. 473, a decision was made as to the construction of §§ 35 and 39 of the bankruptcy act of March 2, 1867, which, this court said in its opinion, was contrary to the view taken by “ a large number of the district judges, to whom the administration of the bankrupt law is more immediately confided.” So, too, in Ex parte Wilson, (114 U. S. 417,) as to the proper construction of the constitutional provision that “ no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,” and as to what criminal prosecutions required an indictment, and in what an information was allowable, this court said (p. 425): “ Within the last fifteen years, prosecutions by information have greatly increased, and the general current of opinion in the Circuit and District Courts has been towards sustaining them for any crime, a conviction of which would not at common law have disqualified the convict to be a witness.” The court cited seven cases in the courts of the United States, besides the one before it, which had adopted such view; but that view was overruled, and a contrary one established.
Nor is this a case for the application of the doctrine, that, in cases of ambiguity, the practice adopted by an executive department of the Government in interpreting and administering a statute is to be taken as some evidence of its proper construction. The question before us, as to the validity of a patent, by reason of preexisting acts or omissions of the inventor, of the character of those involved in the present case, is not a question of executive administration, but is properly a judicial question. Although it may be a question which, to some extent, may [p. 718] come under the cognizance of the Commissioner of Patents, in granting a patent, yet, like all the questions passed upon by him in granting a patent, which are similar in character to the question here involved, his determination thereof, in granting a particular patent, has never been looked upon as concluding the determination of the courts in regard to those questions, respecting such particular patent, and, a fortiori, respecting other patents.
It is contended for the appellants, that the claim of the Green patent is for a process, being for “ the process of constructing wells by driving or forcing an instrument into the ground until it is projected into the water, without removing the earth upward as it is in boring, substantially as herein described;” that the 7th section of the act of 1839 applies only to “ a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter; ” and that, therefore, that section does not apply to the present case. In addition to the view to the contrary taken by this court in McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, before commented on, it was held by this court in Beedle v. Bennett, 122 U. S. 71, a suit on this very patent, that the patent covers the process of drawing water from the earth by means of a well driven in the manner described in the patent, and that the use of a well so constructed was, therefore, a continuing infringement, because every time water was drawn from it the patented process was necessarily used.
The most plausible argument presented on the part of the appellants is, that, under §§ 6, 7, and 15 of the act of July 4, 1836, a patent was invalid if the thing invented had been in public use or on sale, with the consent and allowance of the inventor, prior to his application for the patent; that § 7 of the act of 1839 was intended only to limit the effect on the validity of the patent of the acquisition of single specimens of the patented invention; that the interests of purchasers or constructors of such specific articles were the sole objects of that section; that the second clause of the section was intended only to provide that the patentee should hold his right against the general public unless there was proof of abandonment by him, or unless the purchase, sale, or prior use by or to [p. 719] individuals who had acquired such specific articles, had been for more than two years prior to the application for the patent; that in this respect alone were the provisions of the act of 1836 intended to be modified; and that a defendant, in order to show the invalidity of a patent, under § 7 of the act of 1839, must show that he claims exemption from liability to the patentee because he purchased or constructed a specific article covered by the patent prior to the application therefor, and must show that the invention was abandoned or that the purchase, sale, or prior use, or construction of the specific article occurred more than two years before the application for the patent, and with the consent and allowance of the inventor.
But our views in regard to the proper construction of the 7th section do not admit the soundness of this contention, and were fully set forth in the former opinion.
It is proper to notice the suggestion, that there is no declaration in the 7th section of the act of 1839, that either in the case of an abandonment of the invention, or of the existence, for more than two years prior to the application, of the purchase, sale, or prior use referred to in the second clause of the section, the patent shall be held to be invalid; and the further suggestion, that there is only a hypothetical implication that the patent shall be invalid in the excepted cases. But we cannot so interpret the statute. Under §§ 6, 7, and 15 of the act of 1836, a patent was made invalid if, at the time of the application therefor, the invention had been in public use or on sale, with the consent or allowance of the patentee, however short the time. The second clause of the 7th section seems to us to clearly intend, that, where the purchase, sale, or prior use referred to in it has been for more than two years prior to the application, the patent shall be held to be invalid, without regard to the consent or allowance of the inventor. Otherwise the statute cannot be given its full effect and meaning.
The result of these views is that
The applicationfor a rehearvng is denied.
Andrews v. Cone. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs in a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, from a decree dismissing the bill. The suit was brought for the infringement of the “ driven well ” patent which was the subject of the decision of this court in Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U. S. 267, and in which case an application for a rehearing has just been denied. The decree below in Andrews v. Hovey dismissed the bill, and this court affirmed it, holding the patent to have been invalid. In the present case there is a written stipulation, filed in this court, signed by the counsel of record here, that this case shall abide the result of the case of Andrews v. Hovey, in this court, and that the decree and mandate herein shall be the same as the decree and mandate in that case, except that no costs shall be taxed or awarded, or disbursements or officers’ fees allowed or awarded, in this case, in favor of or against either party hereto, and that each party shall pay his own costs and disbursements. In accordance with such stipulation,
The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, subject to the above recited provisions of the stipulation.
Mr. George F. Edmunds and Mr. J. C. Clayton for appellants.
Mr. Thomas Wilson for appellee.
PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK v. MIXTER.
SAME v. WHITNEY.
SAME v. DEMMON.
EEE0E TO THE CIECUIT COUET OF THE UNITED STATES FOB THE DISTBICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
BUTLER v. COLEMAN.
APPEAL FBOM THE CIECUIT COUET OF THE UNITED STATES FOB THE DISTBICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Argued January 9, 10, 11, 1888.— Decided February 20, 1888.
No attachment can issue from a Circuit Court of the United States, in an action against a national bank before final judgment in the cause; and if such an attachment is made on mesne process and is then dissolved by means of a bond with sureties conditioned to pay to plaintiff the judgment which he may recover, given in accordance with provisions of the law of the State in which the action is brought, the bond is void, and the sureties are under no liability to plaintiff.
The assets of a national bank having been illegally seized under a writ of attachment on mesne process, and a bond with sureties having been given to dissolve the attachment, which bond was invalid by reason of the illegality of the attachment, and the sureties having received into their possession assets of the bank to indemnify them against loss, and the bank having passed into the hands of a receiver appointed by the comptroller of the currency, a bill in equity may be maintained by the receiver to discharge the sureties and to compel them to transfer their collateral to him.
The court stated the case as follows: —
All of these cases involved the same general question, and they may properly be considered and decided together. From the records it appeared that the Pacific National Bank of Boston was an association for carrying on the business of banking, organized under the national bank act. On the 20th of November, 1881, it became embarrassed, and was placed in charge of a bank examiner, in whose control it remained until March 18, 1882, when its doors were opened for business with the consent of the comptroller of the currency.
vol. cxxrv—46
By statute, in Massachusetts civil actions are begun by original writ, which “may be framed either to attach the goods or estate of the defendant, and, for want thereof, to take his body; or it may be an original summons, with or without an order to attach the goods or estate.” Mass. Pub. Stat. 1882, c. 161, §§ 13, 14. “ All real and personal estate liable to be taken on execution . . . may be attached upon the original writ in any action in which debt or damages are recoverable, and may be held as security to satisfy such judgment as the plaintiff may recover.” § 38. “ A person or corporation whose goods or estate are attached on mesne process in a civil action may, at any time before final judgment, dissolve such attachment by giving bond with sufficient sureties, . . . with condition to pay to the plaintiff the amount, if any, that he may recover within thirty days after the final judgment in such action.” § 122.
At the time the bank resumed business, it was indebted to George Mixter in the sum of $15,000 ; to Henry M. Whitney also in the sum of $15,000 ; to Daniel L. Demmon in the sum of $25,000; and to Calvin B. Prescott in the sum of $5000.
On the 24th of March, 1881, Mixter and Prescott each began a suit against the bank in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, by writ directing an attachment to recover the amounts due them respectively. Demmon also began a suit in the same court and in the same way on the 28th of March, to recover the amount due him, and Whitney another on the 28th of April, upon the claim in his favor. At the time these suits were begun, the bank had money on deposit to its credit in the Maverick National Bank and in the Howard National Bank, and the necessary steps were taken to subject these deposits to the attachments which were issued in the several suits.
The bank arranged with Lewis Coleman and John Shepard to become its sureties upon bonds to dissolve attachments in any actions that might be brought against it, and placed in their hands a certificate of deposit in the Maverick National Bank for $100,000, to be held as their protection against all liabilities which should be thus incurred. This certificate was [p. 723] afterwards exchanged for $121,000 of the bonds of the Nantasket Company, $20,000 of the bonds of the Toledo, Delphos and Burlington Railroad Company, and $15,000 of the bonds of the Lebanon Springs Railroad Company.
Immediately after each of the attachments in the above actions had been made, the bank executed a bond to the plaintiff in a penal sum suited to the amount of the claim, with Coleman and Shepard as its sureties, reciting the attachment, and that the bank “ desires to dissolve said attachment according to law,” and conditioned to be void “if the Pacific National Bank of Boston shall, within thirty days after the final judgment in the aforesaid action, pay to the plaintiff therein named the amount, if any, which he shall recover in such action.” Upon the execution of the bond in each case, the attachment was dissolved.
After this the bank closed its doors a second time, and on the 22d of May, 1882, a receiver was appointed by the comptroller of the currency in accordance with the provisions of § 5234 of the Revised Statutes, and at once took possession of its assets and proceeded to wind up its affairs.
When the receiver was appointed he found the several suits which had been commenced still pending. In the cases of Mixter, Whitney, and Demmon he appeared, answered for the bank, filed motions to discharge the attachments, and motions to dismiss the suits. His motions were all overruled, and, his defences not being sustained, judgments were rendered against the bank in each of the cases for the amounts found to be due the several plaintiffs respectively. For the review of the action of the court in these cases the writs of error which are now under consideration were brought.
The suit of Prescott still remains undisposed of in the Circuit Court.
Failing in his motions and in his defences at law, the receiver filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court against the several attaching creditors, and the sureties on the bonds given to dissolve the attachments, the object of which was to reduce to his possession the securities which were held by the sureties for their protection against liability, and to restrain the several attaching [p. 724] creditors from enforcing the attachment bonds on the ground among others “ that the attachments made in said actions were unauthorized, illegal and void.” This bill was dismissed by the Circuit Court, 22 Fed. Rep. 694, and from that decree the appeal which is now one of the subjects of consideration was taken.
J/?. A. A. Ranney for Butler, receiver.
JZr. Joshua D. Ball for Mixter.
Air. Alfred D. Foster for Whitney.
J/r. Richard Stone for Coleman and Shepard.
Air. Henry Wheeler for Demmon. Air. E. W. Hutchins was with him on the brief.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the view we take of the case, the most important question to be considered is whether an attachment can issue against a national bank before judgment in a suit begun in the Circuit Court of the United States. Section 5242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States contains this provision: “ No attachment, injunction, or execution shall be issued against such association or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding, in any state, county, or municipal court.” The original national bank act contained nothing of this kind, but the prohibition first appeared in the act of March 8, 1873, 17 Stat. 603, c. 269, § 2, 13 Stat. 116, c. 106, as a new proviso added to § 57 of the act of June 3, 1864. That section was originally as follows:
“ That suits, actions, and proceedings against any association under this act, may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any state, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases: *Provided, [p. 725] however*, That all proceedings co enjoin the comptroller under this act shall be had in a circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States, held in the district in which the association is located.”
The amending act was as follows:
“That section fifty-seven ... be amended by adding thereto the following: ‘ And provided further, That no attachment, injunction, or execution shall be issued against such association, or its property, before final judgment in any such suit, action, or proceeding in any state, county, or municipal court.’ ” Section 52 of the original national bank act was as follows:
“That all transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt owing to any association, or of deposits to its credit; all assignments of mortgages, sureties on real estate, or of judgments or decrees in its favor; all deposits of money, bullion, or other valuable thing for its use, or for the use of any of its shareholders or creditors; and all payments of money to either, made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof, with a view to prevent the application of its assets in the manner prescribed by this act, or with a view to the preference of one creditor to another, except in payment of its circulating notes, shall be null and void.” 13 Stat. 115.
This was evidently intended to preserve to the United States that “ first and paramount lien upon all the assets of such association ” which was given by § 47 as security for the repayment of any amount expended by them to redeem the circulating notes, over and above the proceeds of the bonds pledged for that purpose, and to place all the other creditors on that equality in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent bank which was clearly provided for in § 50, where the comptroller of the currency is required to make ratable dividends of the proceeds of the assets of the association realized by the receiver “ on all such claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction, or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction.” National Bank v. Colby, 21 Wall. 609, 613.
In the Revision of the Statutes § 52 of the original act, and the amendment of § 57 adopted in 1873, relating to [p. 726] attachments and injunctions in state courts, were reenacted as § 5242, the amendment of § 57 being put in the revision at the end of what had been the original § 52. As the Revised Statutes were first adopted, the proviso of § 57, which related specially to proceedings to enjoin the comptroller, was reenacted as § 736, but all the rest of the original section was left out. That omission was, however, supplied by the act of February 18, 1875, 18 Stat. 316, 320, c. 80, which reenacted it as part of § 5198, putting it at the end of that section as it originally stood in the revision.
The fact that the amendment of 1873 in relation to attachments and injunctions in state courts was made a part of § 5242 shows the opinion of the revisers and of Congress that it was germane to the other provision incorporated in that section, and was intended as an aid to the enforcement of the principle of equality among the creditors of an insolvent bank. But however that may be, it is clear to our minds that, as it stood originally as part of § 57 after 1873, and as it stands now in the Revised Statutes, it operates as a prohibition upon all attachments against national banks under the authority of the state courts. That was evidently its purpose when first enacted, for then it was part of a section which, while providing for suits in the courts of the United States or of the State, as the plaintiff might elect, declared in express terms that if the suit was begun in a state court no attachment should issue until after judgment. The form of its reenactment in the Revised Statutes does not change its meaning in this particular. It stands now, as it did originally, as the paramount law of the land that attachments shall not issue from state courts against national banks, and writes into all state attachment laws an exception in favor of national banks. Since the act of 1873 all the attachment laws of the State must be read as if they contained a provision in express terms that they were not to apply to suits against a national bank.
The prohibition does not in express terms refer to attachments in suits begun in the Circuit Courts of the United States, but as by § 915 of the Revised Statutes those courts are not authorized to issue attachments in common law causes [p. 727] against the property of a defendant, except as “ provided by the laws of the State in which such court is held for the courts thereof,” it follows that, as by the amendatory act of 1873, now part of § 5242 of the Revised Statutes, all power of issuing attachments against national banks before judgment has been eliminated from state statutes, there cannot be any laws of the State providing for such a remedy on which the Circuit Courts may act. The law in this respect stands precisely as it would if there were no state law providing for such a remedy in any case. It was suggested in argument that the prohibition extended only to the use of the remedy by state courts, and that the remedy itself still remained to be resorted to in the courts of the United States. But we do not so understand the law. In our opinion the effect of the act of Congress is to deny the state remedy altogether so far as suits against national banks are concerned, and in this way it operates as well on the courts of the United States as on those of the States. Although the provision was evidently made to secure equality among the general creditors in the division of the proceeds of the property of an insolvent bank, its operation is by no means confined to cases of actual or contemplated insolvency. The remedy is taken away altogether and cannot be used under any circumstances.
It was further said that if the power of issuing attachments has been taken away from the state courts, so also is the power of issuing injunctions. That is true. While the law as it stood previous to the act of July 12, 1882, 22 Stat. 163, c. 290, § 4, gave the proper state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction in all ordinary suits against national banks, it was careful to provide that the jurisdiction of the federal courts should be exclusive when relief by attachment or injunction before judgment was sought. Until the act of 1882 the federal courts had ample authority to grant injunctions in proper cases, and all a person need do to invoke that authority was to bring his suit in one of those courts. Whether since the act of 1882 this remains so is a question for the consideration of Congress. Some amendment to existing legislation may be necessary, but this does not shed any fight on the interpretation of the old [p. 728] law. The difficulty arises from the change that has been made, not from the law as it stood originally.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the attachments in all the suits were illegal and void, because issued without any authority of law. But it is insisted that notwithstanding this the bonds are valid and may be enforced.
It is undoubtedly true that the sureties on a bond of this kind are estopped from setting up, as a defence to an action for a breach of its condition, any irregularities in the form of proceeding to obtain an attachment authorized by law which would warrant its discharge upon a proper application made therefor. As the purpose of the bond is to dissolve an attachment, its due execution implies a waiver both by the defendant and his sureties of all mere irregularities. So, too, it is no defence that the property attached did not belong to the defendant, or that it was exempt, or that the defendant has become bankrupt or is dead. In all such cases, where there was lawful authority for the attachment, the .simple question is, whether the condition of the bond has been broken; that is to say, whether there has been a judgment in the action against the defendant for the payment of money which he has neglected for thirty days afterwards to make.
In the present case, however, the question is whether the bond creates a liability when the attachment on which it is predicated was actually prohibited by law. In other words, whether an illegal and therefore a void attachment is sufficient to lay the foundation for a valid bond to secure its formal dissolution. The bond is a substitute for the attachment, although not affected by all the contingencies which might have discharged the attachment itself. Carpenter v. Turrell, 100 Mass. 450, 452 ; Tapley v'. Goodsell, 122 Mass. 176,182. Such being the case, it necessarily follows that if there was no authority in law for the attachment, there could be none for taking the bond. If the attachment itself is illegal and therefore void, so also must be the bond which takes its place. Objections can be made to an attachment issued on proper legal authority, which cannot be used as a defence to a bond taken under the statute for its dissolution; but if there can be
PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK v. MIXTER. T29
no lawful attachment, there can be no valid bond for its dissolution. The case is to be considered as though there was no law whatever for the seizure of property by attachment before judgment in any case. As the taking of the property under such circumstances would be unlawful, so also would be the act of the magistrate in accepting the bond.
Neither is the bond binding as a common law bond. If the attachment had been valid, and the bond taken had not been in all respects such as the statute had required, it could nevertheless have been enforced as a common law bond, because it was executed for a good consideration, and the object for which it was given had been accomplished. But here the difficulty is that there was no lawful attachment, and therefore no lawful authority for taking any bond whatever. The bond is consequently neither good under the statute nor at common law, because there is no sufficient foundation to support it.
Objection is made to the relief which is sought in equity, because if the attachment bonds are void there is an adequate remedy at law in the suits that may be brought for their enforcement. If the suit in equity had been brought by the sureties to get rid of their obligation, this objection might be good; but such is not its character. The sureties have in their hands assets of the bank which the receiver seeks to reduce to his possession, and which they claim the right to hold until they have been fully indemnified against or discharged from liability on the bonds. • The receiver says there is no liability, because the bonds are invalid; and to have that question settled once for all he has brought the persons interested, creditors as well as sureties, before the court in order that it may. be conclusively adjudicated between them. Such a suit is clearly cognizable in equity. The sureties are in a sense stakeholders. They do not claim the securities unless they are liable on the bonds, and the suit, although not brought by them, is in the nature of an interpleader to save them “ from the vexation of two proceedings on a matter which may be settled in a single suit.” The decree will bind all alike, and if the sureties are held not to be liable it will conclude the creditors from all further proceedings against them on the bonds, and leave them
Syllabus.
free to surrender the securities to the receiver. This will not affect the judgments that the creditors have recovered, any further than to limit their operation, so far as the receiver and the sureties on the attachment bonds are concerned, to the adjudication of the debts as claims entitled to dividends from the proceeds of the assets of the bank. To that extent, certainly, the court had jurisdiction in each of the suits after the insolvency; but as the attachments were void the judgments are inoperative as a basis of recovery upon the bonds.
The judgment in each of the suits at law is affirmed, but the decree in the suit in eguity is reversed, a/nd the cause remanded with instructions to enter a decree setting aside and a/nnulling the bonds which were given to dissolve the attachments, a/nd enjoining each and all of the creditors, and those claiming under them, from proceeding in a/ny ma/nner to enforce the same against the sureties, and directing the sureties to surrender to the receiver the securities they holdfor their indemnity.
SHOECRAFT v. BLOXHAM.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOB THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.
Argued and Submitted February 2,1888, — Decided February 20,1888.
A suit to enforce the performance of a contract is a suit to recover the contents of a chose in action, within the meaning of § 629 of the Revised Statutes.
A deed of trust, in the nature of a mortgage, set out in full a contract between the mortgagor and certain parties for the conveyance of several parcels of land to him, and then conveyed to the mortgagee all the right, title, and interest which he, the mortgagor, had, or might thereafter acquire, “ in and to ” the lands embraced by the contract: Held, that the conveyance was in legal effect an assignment of the contract; and that the assignee could not maintain a suit for the enforcement of this contract in the Circuit Court of the United States, under § 629 of the Revised Statutes, if the assignor could not have maintained the suit in such Circuit Court if no assignment had been made.
The case was stated by the court as follows:
This is a suit in equity to enforce the performance of a contract, made between the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida and the Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company, for the conveyance of certain lands in Florida, and to determine the rights of various parties claiming interests in them.
As alleged in the bill, by the act of Congress of September 28, 1850, to enable the State of Arkansas and other States to reclaim the swamp lands within their limits, 9 Stat. 519, there was granted to the State of Florida the whole of the swamp and overflowed lands within it, made unfit thereby for cultivation, which were at the date of the act unsold; and this grant was accepted by the State. By an act of the Legislature, approved January 6, 1855, all of these lands and the proceeds thereof were set apart as a separate fund, called the Internal Improvement Fund of the State, to be applied as there provided. To ensure the proper application of the fund to the purposes declared, the lands and the charge of the proceeds arising from their sale were vested in five trustees, namely, the Governor, the Comptroller of Public Accounts, the State Treasurer, the Attorney General, and the Register of Public Lands of the State, and their successors in office, in trust, with power to sell the lands, to receive payment thereof, and to make such disposition of the proceeds as the act directed, and, among other things, to pay the interest as it should become due on the bonds to be issued by different railroad companies under the authority of the act; and also to receive semiannually one-half of one per cent of the bonds of each separate line of railroad, and invest the same in certain specified securities. The act provided that all bonds issued under its provisions by any railroad company should be a first mortgage on its road-bed, iron, equipment, workshops, depots, and franchises, and that upon its failure to provide the interest on the bonds issued by it, and the sum of one per cent per annum as a sinking fund, the trustees should take possession of its road and property and sell the same, and apply the proceeds [p. 732] to the purchase and cancellation of the outstanding bonds on which default was thus made.
The provisions of the act were accepted by various railroad companies, namely, the Florida, Atlantic and Gulf Central Railroad Company, the Tallahassee Railroad Company, and the Florida Railroad Company, each of which was, prior to 1860, a corporation created under the laws of the State, and had issued its bonds, and prior to the year 1867 had made default in the payment of the interest on them and of the one per cent required for the sinking fund. These bonds, or at least the interest thereon in default, and the one per cent, were a first lien upon all the swamp lands granted to the State. The amount of the bonds, interest, and percentage in default reached nearly three millions of dollars. In 1868 and 1869 the trustees seized each of these roads and sold them to various purchasers for sums which in the aggregate were less by one million and a half of dollars than the amount in default, leaving the Internal Improvement Fund and the lands liable for the deficiency.
Among the holders of railroad bonds issued was one Francis Vose, a citizen of New York, who held bonds of the Florida Railroad Company, and he brought a suit in equity in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Florida against the trustees of the Improvement Fund, praying that the amount due him might be collected and enforced out of the lands conveyed to the trustees. On December 6, 1870j an injunction was issued in that suit, restraining the trustees from selling or disposing of the lands otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1855. At this time the Improvement Fund and the lands were encumbered fora very large amount; and the trustees, being desirous to arrange for the payment of the debts, including the claim of Vose, and to aid in the construction of a certain railroad, on May 31, 1871, entered into an agreement with the Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company, by which they were to convey to it all the lands held or to be held by them in trust under the act of 1855, with some few exceptions not necessary to be mentioned; and the railroad company, in consideration [p. 733] thereof, was to satisfy and pay all existing liabilities in the nature of liens on the Internal Improvement fund, to cancel and surrender the evidences thereof ,to the trustees, to pay the sum of $100,000 for the benefit of the fund, and to construct a certain railroad from Jacksonville to Mobile, by extending the road from Quincy, its then terminus, and complete it within five years. The trustees were to execute deeds of all of said lands and to deliver the same to the railroad company as soon as the injunction in the Vose case should be dissolved or modified. This contract was, in December, 1871, submitted to the court by Vose and the trustees for its consideration and approval, and the court thereupon decreed substantially as follows:
That there was due Vose by the trustees the sum of $211,- 885.45 upon the past due coupons of the bonds held by him, and also certain other sums, making in the aggregate $273,000; that the articles of agreement between the trustees and the railroad company be confirmed and made valid upon the following conditions: that the trustees should forthwith, upon the payment by the railroad company of the sum of $100,000 as provided, execute and deliver to one Littlefield, president of the company, or such person or corporation as he should designate, a deed of conveyance of a certain 100,000 acres of land, and also execute and deliver deeds of conveyance to the Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company of all the lands embraced in said articles of agreement, not in the decree otherwise provided for; which deeds were to be deposited with Brown Brothers and Company of New York City, and to be delivered by such firm to the railroad company upon the payment by it to said Vose of his claim upon the Internal Improvement Fund, upon such terms as should be arranged between him and the company, within ten months from the date of the decree.
Various transactions were had between the Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company and other parties subsequently to this contract, and, among others, it executed and delivered to the Security Construction and Trust Company eight hundred of its bonds, for the sum of $10,000 each, [p. 734] running to the complainant Matthew J. Shoecraft or bearer, and payable January 1, 1903, with interest annually at the rate of six per cent per annum, and, in order to secure the payment of the principal and interest of said bonds, executed to him a trust deed or mortgage, bearing date January 23d, 1883, upon the property and franchises of the railroad company and upon the right, title and interest which the company had or might thereafter acquire in and to the lands granted or agreed to be granted by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund by the contract of May 31, 1871. The trust thus created was accepted by Shoecraft, and to compel a performance of the contract of May 31, 1871, by the execution of a conveyance of the lands held by the trustees, and to determine the rights of others claiming interest in the lands, this suit is brought.
J/?. C. K. Davis for appellant submitted on his brief.
JZ?. R. 6r. Rrwin (with whom was Mr. W. S. Chisholm, on the brief) for the South Florida Railroad Company, the Florida Southern Railway Company, the Sanford and Indian River Railway Company, the Live Oak and Rowland’s Bluff Railroad Company, the Live Oak, Tampa and Charlotte Harbor Railway Company, the East Florida Railroad Company, and the Jacksonville, Tampa and Key West Railway Company, appellees.
Mr. Justice Field, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The conveyance to the company of the lands held by the trustees pursuant to the contract between those parties is essential to the value of the security offered for the bonds executed to the Security Construction and Trust Company, and to enable the complainant to discharge the trust accepted by him. But the contract being between citizens of the State of Florida, a suit upon it could not be maintained by the railroad company in the Circuit Court of the United States, and therefore could not be maintained by its assignee, the complainant. Section 629 [p. 735] of the Revised Statutes, which was in force when the suit was commenced, declares that “ no Circuit Court shall have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.” The terms used, “ the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action” were designed to-embrace the rights the instrument conferred which were capable of enforcement by suit. They were not happily chosen to convey this meaning, but they have received a construction substantially to that purport in repeated decisions of this court. They were so construed in the recent case of Corbin v. County of Black Hawk, 105 U. S. 659, where the subject is fully considered, and the decisions cited. There a suit brought to enforce the specific performance of a contract was held to be a suit to recover the contents of a chose in action, and therefore not maintainable, under the statute in question, in the Circuit Court of the United States, by an assignee, if it could not have been prosecuted there by the assignors had no assignment been made.
It is contended, however, that the complainant is not the assignee of the contract of May 31, 1871, but a mortgagee in trust of the lands mentioned therein, and can therefore maintain the suit by reason of his citizenship in New York. We cannot assent to this position. It is true the complainant is a mortagee in trust of such interest as the mortgagor had in the lands, but he brings the suit, not to foreclose the mortgage, but as one having a beneficial interest in the contract, and consequently a right to enforce it. The object of the suit is to perfect the title to the lands mortgaged by enforcing the performance of the contract. The deed of trust sets out in full the contract, and conveys all the right, title and interest which the railroad company had or might thereafter acquire in and to the lands granted by the trustees by their contract of May 31, 1871. This conveyance of all right, title and interest “in and to ” the lands granted, or agreed to be granted, by the contract of sale, carried with it to the complainant an interest in the contract so far as such lands were concerned, that is, the right [p. 736] to perfect the title to the lands by enforcement of the contract. It was in legal effect the assignment of the contract itself. If he cannot enforce that contract and thus secure the title to the company, the deed of trust, so far as the lands covered by the contract are concerned, is worthless as a security. If he has no interest in the contract he has no standing in court to ask its enforcement, and, if he is to be regarded as an assignee of the contract under the deed of trust, he is disabled from maintaining the suit in the Circuit Court by § 629 of the Revised Statutes. He is subject to the same disability in that respect as his assignor.
Decree affirmed.
APPENDIX.
i.
ASSIGNMENTS TO CIRCUITS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
October Term, 1887.
Order.
There having been an Associate Justice of this court appointed since the commencement of this term, it is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of said court among the circuits, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz.:
For the First Circuit, Horace Gray, For the Second Circuit, Samuel Blatcbford, For the Third Circuit, Joseph P. Bradley, For the Fourth Circuit, Morrison R. Waite, For the Fifth Circuit, Lucius Q. C. Lamar, For the Sixth Circuit, Stanley Matthews, For the Seventh Circuit, John M. Harlan, For the Eighth Circuit, Samuel F. Miller, For the Ninth Circuit, Stephen J. Field,
Associate Justice.
Associate Justice.
Associate Justice.
Chief Justice.
Associate Justice.
Associate Justice.
Associate Justice.
Associate Justice.
Associate Justice.
January 23, 1888.
vol. cxxiv—17
(no text on this page in the source reporter)
IL
APPOINTMENT OF MARSHAL.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Wednesday, January 4, 1888.
It is ordered by the court that the following letters and order be entered upon the minutes :
Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, Nov. 29, 1887.
My dear Sir:
As the literary and historical labors upon which I am engaged as a co-worker will, during the next few years, require the whole of my time, I herewith tender you my resignation as Marshal of the Supreme Court of the United States, to take effect on the day of December next.
In severing my official relations with the court I desire to convey to yourself and all its members my warm appreciation of their personal friendship and kindness during the whole of my fifteen years’ service.
Sincerely yours,
Jno. G. Nicolay.
Chief Justice Waite.
Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, Dec. 5, 1887.
My dear Mr. Nicolay:
I found no convenient opportunity of communicating to the other Judges the contents of your letter of the 29th ulto., resigning the office of Marshal of the Supreme Court, until we met in conference last Saturday. Knowing as we do the great importance of the literary and historical work in which you are engaged, and its constant demands on your time, we have not felt at liberty to [p. 740] withhold our acceptance of a resignation tendered on that account, but must ask you to allow us to fix the 31st of this month as the date of your retirement, rather than a day which is earlier.
You will take with you when you leave us the best wishes of every one of the Judges, and we shall all remember with gratitude your faithful attention to the duties of your office and your many acts of personal kindness.
Necessarily my intercourse with you has been closer than that of most of the Judges, and it has always been to me of the most agreeable kind.
I have relied on you implicitly in all that pertained to the administration of your office, and have never found my confidence misplaced in any particular.
Your accounts have all been scrupulously exact, and in the highest degree satisfactory. I shall part from you officially with sincere regret, but with the hope that our personal relations may continue to be in the future what they have always been in the past.
Very sincerely yours,
M. R. Waite.
John G. Nicolay, Esq.
Order.
It is ordered by the court, that John Montgomery Wright be, and he is hereby, appointed Marshal of this court in place of John G. Nicolay, resigned.
Mr. Wright thereupon took the following oath, presented a bond in the penal sum of twenty thousand dollars, as required by law, which was approved, and entered upon the duties of his office.
I, John Montgomery Wright, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute all lawful precepts directed to the Marshal of the Supreme Court of the United States and true returns make, and m all things well and truly and without malice or partiality perform the duties of the office of Marshal of the Supreme Court of the United States during my continuance in said office. So help me God.
Subscribed and sworn to before') me this fourth day of January, a .d. I 1888. - John Montgomery Wright.
James H. McKenney,
Clerk Supreme Court, U. S. „
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