COE v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
COE v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886)
Full caption
COE v. ERROL.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 25, 1886
COE v. ERROL.
EEEOE TO THE SUPEEME COUET OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIEE.
Submitted October 13, 1885.—Decided January 25, 1886.
Goods and chattels within a State are equally taxable whether owned by a citizen of the State, or a citizen of another State, even though the latter be taxed in his own State for the value of the same goods as part of his general personal estate.
Goods, the product of a State, intended for exportation to another State, are ' liable to taxation as part of the general mass of property of the State of their origin, until actually started in course of transportation to the State of their destination, or delivered to a common carrier for that purpose ; the carrying of them to, and depositing them at, a depot for the purpose of transportation is no part of that transportation.
When goods, the product of a State, have begun to be transported from that State to another State, and not till then, they have become the subjects of inter-state commerce, and, as such, are subject to national regulation, and / cease to be taxable by the State of their origin. // Goods on their way through a State from a place outside thereof to another pla'ce outside thereof, are in course of inter-state or foreign transportation, and are subjects of inter-state pr foreign commerce, and not taxable by the State through which they are passing, even though detained within that, State by low water or other temporary cause.
Logs cut at a place in New Hampshire were hauled down to the town of Errol, on the Androscoggin River, in that State, to be transported from thence upon the river to Lewiston, Maine ; and waited at. Errol for a convenient opportunity for such transportation : Held, That they were still part of the general mass of property of the State, liable to taxation, if taxed in the / usual way in which such property is taxed in the State.
In September, 1881, Edward S. Coe filed a petition in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire for the county of Coos, against the Town of Errol, for an abatement of taxes, and p. 518therein, amongst other things, alleged that on the 1st of April, 1880, he and others, residents of Maine and Massachusetts, owned a large number of spruce logs that had been drawn down the winter before from Wentworth’s location, in New Hampshire, and placed in Clear Stream and on the banks thereof, in the town of Errol, county of Coos, New Hampshire, to be from thence floated down the Androscoggin River to the State of Maine to be manufactured and sold; and that the selectmen of said Errol for that year appraised said logs for taxation at the price of $6000, and assessed thereon State, county, town, and school taxes, in the whole to the amount of $120, and highway taxes to the amount of $60. A further allegation made the same complaint with regard to a lot of spruce logs belonging to Coe and another person, which had been cut in the State of Maine, and were on their way of being floated to Lewiston, Maine, to be manufactured, but were detained in the town of Errol by low water. Similar allegations were made with regard to logs cut the following year, 1880, and drawn from Wentworth’s location, and part of them deposited on lands of John Akers, and part on land of George C. Demeritt, in said town of Errol, to be from thence taken to the State of Maine; and, also, with regard to other logs cut in Maine and floated down to Errol on their passage to Lewiston, in the State of Maine, and both which classes of logs were taxed by the selectmen of Errol in the year 1881. The petition also contained the following allegations, to wit.:
“ Said Coe further says that said logs of both years, so in the Androscoggin River, have each year been taxed as stock in trade in said Lewiston to said Coe and Pingree, and said Coe claims and represents that none of said logs were subject to taxation in said Errol for the reason that they were in transit to market from one State to another, and also because they had all been in other ways taxed.
“ That said Androscoggin River, from its source to the outlet of the Umbagog Lake in the State of New Hampshire, through said State and through the State of Maine to said Lewiston, is now, and for a long time has been, to wit, for more than twenty years last past, a public highway for the p. 519floatage of timber from said lakes and rivers in Maine, and from the upper waters of said Androscoggin River and its tributaries in New Hampshire down said river to said Lewiston, and has been thus used by the petitioner and his associates in the lumber business for more than twenty years last past.”
Without further pleading, the parties made an agreed case, the important part of which was as follows, to wit:
“ It is agreed that the facts set forth in the petition are all true except what is stated as to the taxation of the logs as stock in trade in Lewiston, Maine; and if that is regarded by the court as material, the case is to be discharged and stand for trial on that point. It is agreed that upon this petition the legality of the taxation is intended to be brought before the court for adjudication, and all formal objections to the proceedings in the town meeting, &c., and all other matters of form, are waived, and we submit the matter to the court for a legal adjudication as to whether or not any or all of the taxes shall be abated.
“ And it is agreed that for many years the petitioner and his associates in the lumber business have cut large quantities of timber on their lands in Maine and floated them down the said lakes and rivers in Maine and down the Androscoggin River to the mills at said Lewiston; and timber thus cut has always lain over one season, being about a year, in the Androscoggin River, in this State, either in Errol, Dummer, or Milan; and the timber referred to in this petition as having been cut in Maine had lain over in Errol since the spring or summer before the taxation, according to the above custom.”
Upon this case the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in September term, 1882, adjudged as follows, to wit: “ Now, at this terra, the said questions of law having been fully determined in said law term, and an order made that that portion of said tax assessed upon the legs cut as aforesaid in said State of Maine be abated, and that the tax assessed upon all of said logs cut in the State of New Hampshire be sustained, and said order having been fully made known to the parties of this case and become a part of the record thereof, it is therefore ordered and decreed by the court that there be judgment in p. 520accordance with said order made at said law term, without • costs to either party.”
The petitioner took a bill of exceptions, setting forth the agreed case, and stating, amongst other things, the points raised on the hearing before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and the decision of that court thereon, as follows:
“On said hearing the petitioner claimed that said taxes named in the petition and the statutes of this State, under the provisions of which said taxes were assessed, were illegal and void, because said taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes of this State are in violation of and repugnant to, the general provisions of the Constitution of the United States; because said taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes of this State are in violation of and repugnant to, that part of section 2, art. 4, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that ‘The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States; ’ because said taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes of this State are in violation of and repugnant to, those parts of sec. 8 of art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States which provide thatc The Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,’ and section 10 of said article 1, which provides that ‘ No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.’ ”
Mr. Henry Heywood for plaintiff in error.
The legal situs of this property, for the purposes of taxation, is not in the town or place where the property, thus in transit, happens to be on the first day of April or other date of taxation. Conley n. Chedic, 7 Nev. 336 ; Parker Mills v. Tax Commissioners, 23 N. Y. 242, 245; Ellsworth v. Brown, 53 Maine, 519; Camplyell v. Machias, 33 Maine, 419. By the statute of Maine, the logs taxed in Errol, were subject to taxation at Lewiston, where the owners occupied a mill and one of them resided. For the purposes of taxation Lewiston was the legal p. 521situs of this personal property. Desmond v. Machias, 48 Maine, 478. Revised Statutes of Maine, 1871, 131 §§ 13 and 14, as amended by ch. 182, laws of 1877. To sustain a taxation of the same property in New Hampshire must lead to double taxation and the statute attempting to authorize such taxation is in conflict with the Constitution of New Hampshire. Opinion of the Justices, 4 N. H. 565.
The resident owner of personal property in the State of New Hampshire has the right to use the public rivers of the State for the purposes of navigation without subjecting his property to the burden of double taxation. It is the privilege of the citizens of each State to use the public rivers and highways of the State for the purposes of transporting himself or property; and the like privilege or right is secured by the Federal Constitution to citizens of the other States upon equal terms. Article 4, section 2. To hold that the property of a citizen of Maine in transit through New Hampshire upon one of our public watercourses and legally liable to taxation in Maine, is also liable to taxation in New Hampshire, would not be according to the citizen of Maine the privilege of the citizen of New Hampshire, and the State statute attempting to authorize such taxation of the property of the citizen of Maine is to that extent in violation of the provision of the Federal Constitution just cited. Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268. In Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, a State law assessing a tax on passengers through the State was held void. For the same reasons given in that case the citizen of another State has the right to transport his property from or through the State of New Hampshire upon its public highways by land or water without subjecting it to taxation in New Hampshire. Brown v. Naryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Guv v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 439.
We further claim that any taxation under the laws of any of the States of this property, at the time of the taxation being the subject of inter-state commerce, is in violation of the provisions of article 12, section 8, par. 3 of the United States Constitution, and of section 10, par. 2. It has uniformly p. 522been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that a tax assessed under a State law, upon property being in transit through the State, or from a point in the State to another State, is in violation of these last provisions of the United States Constitution, or rather as we understand it, in violation of the above cited provision giving Congress power “ to regulate commerce . . . among the several states.” Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; Almy v. California, 24 How. 169; .Woodruff n. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 ; Pailroad Co. n. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566. Wherever the subjects, in regard to which a power to regulate commerce is asserted, are in their nature national or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they are exclusively within the regulating control of Congress. Transportation of merchandise through a State or from one State to another is of this nature. State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; HoIIn. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485. “ The power to regulate commerce among the several states was vested in Congress, in order to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse against discriminating state Legislation.” Field, J., in Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584, 589; Welton v. Missouri, above cited; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344. The non-exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the States, is equivalent to a declaration by that body that such commerce shall be free from any restriction. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275.
It will be said that these taxes, as is said by Blodgett, J., in the opinion in this case in the State court, is no attempt to regulate commerce upon the Androscoggin River passing from New Hampshire into Maine, and the like in relation to the Connecticut and other large rivers in the State, but is a tax upon property in fact located within the State and legally taxable there. The answer to this position is the practical effect of taxes assessed under State laws upon property thus situated. Admit the power of the State to assess taxes upon property in transit between the States, and inter-state commerce will be regulated by State taxation irrespective of any p. 523laws or regulations Congress can devise for that purpose, under the power given by the constitutional provision just cited. This position has always been taken to sustain State taxation, and has been answered by the Supreme Court substantially in the same way: Mr. Justice Strong in the case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 272, says: “It has repeatedly been held that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a state tax is to be determined, not by the form or agency through which it is to be collected, but by the subject upon which the burden is laid. The same has been decided in the following- cases: Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black, 620; The Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200; Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259. See also State v. Eagle, 34 N. J. L. 425; and Currier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio St. 605.
The facts show that the property was in transit. At the date of the taxation the logs were the subject of inter-state commerce. A temporary delay on the way did not terminate the transit. The property is all the time, while in motion or at rest, in transit, and is during the whole time of its transit the subject of inter-state commerce. Just as much so as the logs that come from Maine, or as these Wentworth Location logs would have been had they started from that location just prior to the first day of April and had passed through the town of Errol on the spring freshet on the first day of April.
It has been recently decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire that the petition for abatement given by the statute is the only relief the property owner has in that State against an illegal assessment, which is not fraudulently made. Edes n. Boardman, 58 N. H. 580. And in our case we were denied the right to an abatement of the taxes upon the ground that the assessment was not in any manner in violation of any provision of the United States Constitution. So it cannot be said that this is not a proceeding in which we are entitled to a writ of error to this court.
Mr. S. B. Bond for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the language above reported he continued :
The case is now before us for consideration upon writ of error to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and the same points that were urged before that court are set up here as grounds of error.
The question for us to consider, therefore, is, whether the products of a State (in this case timber cut in its forests) are liable to be taxed like other property within the State, though intended for exportation to another State, and partially prepared for that purpose by being deposited at a place of shipment, such products being owned by persons residing in another State.
We have no difficulty in disposing of the last condition of the question, namely, the fact (if it be a fact) that the property was owned by persons residing in another State; for, if not exempt from taxation for other reasons, it cannot be exempt by reason of being owned by non-residents of the State. We take it to be a point settled beyond all contradiction or question, that a State has jurisdiction of all persons and things within its territory which do not belong to some other jurisdiction, such as the representatives of foreign governments, with their houses and effects, and property belonging to or in the use of the gov-“ ernment of the United States. If the owner of personal property within a State resides in another State which taxes him for that property as part of his general estate attached to his person, this action of the latter State does not in the least affect the right of the State in which the property is situated to tax. it also. It is hardly necessary to cite authorities on a point so elementary. The fact, therefore, that the owners of the logs in question were taxed for their value in Maine as a part of their general stock in trade, if such fact were proved, could have no influence in the decision of the case, and may be laid /lout of view.
We recur, then, to a consideration of the question freed from this limitation: Are the products of a State, though intended for exportation to another State, and partially prepared for p. 525that purpose by being deposited at a place or port of shipment within the State, liable to be taxed like other property within the State ?
Do the owner’s state of mind in relation to the goods, that is, his intent to export them, and his partial preparation to do so, exempt them from taxation ? This is the precise question for solution.
This question does not present the predicament of goods in course of transportation through a State, tho.ugh detained for a time within the State by low water or other causes of delay, as was the case of the logs cut in the State of Maine, the tax on which was abated by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Such goods are already in the course of commercial transportation, and are clearly under the protection of the Constitution. And so, we think, would the goods in question be when actually started in the course of transportation to another State, or delivered to a carrier for such transportation. There must be a point of time when they cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic law and begin to be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, and that moment seems to us to be a legitimate one for this purpose, in which they commence their final movement for transportation from the State of their origin to that of their destination. When the products of the farm or the forest are collected and brought in from the surrounding country to a town or station serving as an entrepot for that particular region, whether on a river or a line of railroad, such products are not yet exports, nor are they in process of exportation, nor is exportation begun until they are committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the State to the State of their destination, or have started on their ultimate passage to that State. Until then it is reasonable to regard them as not only within the State of their origin, but as a part of the general mass of property of that State, subject to its jurisdiction, and liable to taxation there, if not taxed by reason of their being intended for exportation, but taxed without any discrimination, in the usual way and manner in which such property is taxed in the State.
Of course they cannot be taxed as exports; that is to say, p. 526they cannot be taxed by reason or because of their exportation or intended exportation; for that would amount to laying a duty on exports, and would be a plain infraction of the Constitution, which prohibits any State, without the consent of Congress, from laying any imposts or duties on imports or exports; and, although it has been decided, Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, that this clause relates to imports from, and exports to, foreign countries, yet when such imposts or duties are laid on imports or exports from one State to another, it cannot be doubted that such an imposition would be a regulation of commerce among the States, and, therefore, void as an invasion of the exclusive power of Congress. A See Walling v. Michigan, ante, 446, decided at the present term, and cases cited in the opinion in that case. But if such goods are not taxed as exports, nor by reason of their exportation, or intended exportation, but are taxed as part of the general mass of property in the State, at the regular period of assessment for such property and in the usual manner, they not being in course of transportation at the time, is there any valid reason why they should not be taxed ? Though intended for exportation, they may never be exported; the owner has a perfect right to change his mind; and until actually put in motion, for some place out of the State, or committed to the custody of a carrier for transportation to such place, why may they not be regarded as still remaining a part of the general mass of property in the State ? If assessed in an exceptional time or manner, because of their anticipated departure, they might well be considered as taxed by reason of their exportation or intended exportation; but if assessed in the usual way, when not under motion or shipment, we do not see why the assessment may not be valid and binding.
The point of time when State jurisdiction over the commodities of commerce begins and ends is not an easy matter to designate or define, and yet it is highly important, both to the shipper and to the State, that it should be clearly defined so as to avoid all ambiguity or question. In regard to imports from foreign countries, it was settled in the case of Brovon v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, that the State cannot impose any tax or duty on p. 527such goods so long as they remain the property of the importer, and continue in the original form or packages in which they were imported; the right to sell without any restriction imposed by the State being a necessary incident of the right to import without such restriction. This rule was deemed to be the necessary result of the prohibitory clause of the Constitution, which declares that no State shall lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports. The law of Maryland, which was held to be repugnant to this clause, required the payment of a license tax by all importers before they were permitted to sell their goods. This law was also considered to be an infringement of the clause which gives to Congress the power to regulate con> merce. This court, as before stated, has since held that goods transported from one State to another are not imports or exports within the meaning of the prohibitory clauses before referred to; and it has also held that such goods, having arrived at their place of destination, maybe taxed in the State to which they are carried, if taxed in the same manner as other goods are taxed, and not by reason of their being brought into the State from another State, nor subjected in any way to unfavorable discrimination. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 ; Brown v. Houston^XAA: IT. S. 622. \~/
But no definite rule has been adopted with regard to the point of time at which the taxing power of the State ceases as to goods exported to a foreign country or to another State. What we have already said, however, in relation to the products of a State intended for exportation to another State will indicate the view which seems to us the sound one on that subject, namely, that such goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another State, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey. We think that this must be the true rule on the subject. It seems to us untenable to hold that a crop or a herd is exempt from taxation merely because it is, by its owner, intended for exportation. If such were the rule in many States there would be nothing but the lands and real p. 528estate to bear the taxes. Some of the Western States produce very little except wheat and corn, most of which is intended for export; and so of cotton in the Southern States. Certainly, as long as these products are on the lands which produce them, they are part of the general property of the State. And so we think they continue to be until they have entered upon their final journey for leaving the State and going into another State. It is true, it was said in the case of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall, 557, 565: “ Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that commodity between the States has commenced.” But this movement does’ not begin until the articles have been shipped or started for transportation from the one State to the other. The carrying of them in carts or other vehicles, or even floating them, to the depot where the journey is to commence is no part of that journey. That is all preliminary work, performed for the purpose of putting the property in a state of preparation and readiness for transportation. Until actually launched on its way to another State, or committed to a common carrier for transportation to such State, its destination is not fixed and certain. It may be sold or otherwise disposed of within the State, and never put in course of transportation out of the State. Carrying it from the farm, or the forest, to the depot, is only an interior movement of the property, entirely within the State, for the purpose, it is true, but only for the purpose, of putting it into a course of exportation ; it is no part of the exportation itself. Until shipped or started on its final journey out of the State its exportation is a matter altogether in fieri, and not at all a fixed and certain thing.
The application of these principles to the present case is obvious. The logs which were taxed, and the tax on which was not abated by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, had not, when so taxed, been shipped or started on their final voyage or journey to the State of Maine. They had only been drawn down from Wentworth’s location to Errol, the place from which they were to be transported to Lewiston in the State of Maine. There they were to remain until it should be convenient to send them to their destination. They come precisely within
Syllabus.
the character of property which, according to the principles herein laid down, is taxable. But granting all this, it may still be pertinently asked, How can property thus situated, to wit, deposited or stored at the place of entrepot for future exportation, be taxed in the regular way as part of the property of the State ? The answer is plain. It can be taxed as all other property is taxed, in the place where it is found, if taxed, or assessed for taxation, in the usual manner in which such property is taxed; and not singled out to be assessed by itself in an unusual and exceptional manner because of its destination. If thus taxed, in the usual way that other similar property is taxed, and at the same rate, and subject to like conditions and regulations, the tax is valid. In other words, the right to tax the property being founded on the hypothesis that it is still a part of the general mass of property in the State, it must be treated in all respects as other property of the same kind is treated.
These conditions we understand to have been complied with in the present case. At all events there is no evidence to show that the taxes were not imposed in the regular and ordinary way. As the presumption, so far as mode and manner are concerned, is always in favor of, and not against, official acts, the want of evidence to the contrary must be regarded as evidence in favor of the regularity of the assessment in this case.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire is
Affirmed.
IRON SILVER MINING COMPANY v. CHEESMAN & Another.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.
Argued December 18, 21,1885.—Decided January 25,1886.
The act of Congress, § 2322 Revised Statutes, gives to the owner of a mineral vein or lode, not only all that is covered by the surface lines of his established claim as those lines are extended vertically, but it gives him the right vol. cxvi—34
to possess and enjoy that lode or vein by following it when it passes outside of those vertical lines laterally.
But this right is dependent, outside of the lateral limits of the claim, upon its being the same vein as that within those limits. For the exercise of this right it must appear that the vein outside is identical with and a continuation of the one inside those lines.
The acts of Congress use the words vein, lode, or ledge as embracing a more or less continuous body of mineral, lying within a well-defined boundary of other rock, in the mass within which it is found, or, it may be said, to be a body of mineral, or a mineral body of rock within defined boundaries in this general mass.
A vein is by no means always a straight line or of -uniform dip or thickness, or richness of mineral matter, throughout its course. The cleft or fissure in which a vein is found may be narrowed or widened in its course, and even closed for a few feet and then found further on, and the mineral deposit may be diminished or totally suspended for a short distance, but, if found again in the same course with the same mineral within that distance, its identity may be presumed.
But if the mineral disappears, or the fissure with its walls of the same rock disappears, so that its identity can no longer be traced, the right to pursue it outside of the perpendicular lines of claimants’ survey is gone.
Whether any deposit of mineral matter, about which a contest arises before a court or jury, has been shown to belong to one of these veins within a prior location, is a question to be decided by the application of these principles to all the evidence in the case.
When the court instructs the jury in a manner sufficiently clear and sound as to the rules applicable to the case, it is not bound to give other instructions asked by counsel on the same subject, whether they are correct or not.
This was an action in ejectment to recover possession of mineral lands in Colorado. The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court.
J/k Walter H. Smith and J/k G. G. Symes for plaintiff in error.
J/k C. S. Thomas for defendants in error. Mr. T. M. Patterson was with him on the brief.
Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court.
The Iron Silver Mining Company brought its suit in the nature of an action of ejectment against Walter S. Cheesman, Walter S. Clarke, and Thomas Bennett, to recover possession of a part of^a vein or lode of mineral deposit, the right to which p. 531it asserted under a patent from the United States. The action was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. The defendants denied the title of the plaintiff to the vein at the point in controversy, and though they did not assert a claim under a patent, they did show such proceedings under the mining laws of the United States as justified their possession, unless plaintiffs had a better right.
There were three trials by jury in the case. The first resulted in a verdict in favor of the defendants. That was set aside and a new trial ordered under the statute of Colorado, which gives the unsuccessful party in such actions an absolute right to this second trial. The second trial failed by reason of a divided jury, and on the third trial the verdict was again for the defendants. It is to review the judgment rendered on this verdict that the present writ of error is taken.
The plaintiff relies on the accepted proposition, that the owner of a mineral vein covered by the superficial lines of his claim may not only pursue that vein perpendicularly within those lines, but may, when the vein passes beyond the side lines of this claim or survey, pursue that vein outside of a line drawn vertically from the superficial side lines, as far as the vein extends.
In pursuit of what is asserted to be a continuation of the vein on which its patent is located, but outside of the perpendicular of its side lines, the Iron Silver Mining Company, owning what it called the Lime lode and mining claim, came into collision with defendants, who were working the lode which they called the Smuggler. Of course the defendants, being in possession, could only be deprived of that possession by virtue of a superior title in the plaintiff. As the exterior surface lines of plaintiff’s patent, when extended vertically to the plane of this deposit, did not include the piece of mineral which is the subject of this controversy, plaintiff could only recover by showing that this was a part of the same vein which his patent did cover, which, passing from his side lines, was such a continuation of that vein as gave the right to pursue it.
It seems to have been conceded throughout the long trials in the case, that if plaintiff could establish the sufficiency and p. 532continuity of his Lime lode, so as to make the defendants’ Smuggler lode identical with it, he was entitled to recover; and on the other hand, if he did not do this, he had no right to the Smuggler lode, which was in that case a different lode, outside of the vertical extension of plaintiff’s side lines.
This involved the consideration of the true definition of a lode or vein as used in the acts of Congress on the subject, and under what circumstances of continuity and of interruption a vein may be followed in the surrounding rock in which it is found, so as to preserve its identity.
On this subject a large mass of testimony was given to the jury, and to this point the charge of the court was directed.
If there were exceptions taken to the admission of any of this evidence, or to the refusal to admit other evidence, no assignment of error is based upon such admission or refusal; but the errors assigned relate solely to the charge given by the court to the jury, and to the refusal to give twenty-eight several instructions asked by the counsel of plaintiff.
As we have already said, the only question for the jury, the one on which their verdict depended, was whether plaintiff had identified the Lime lode or vein, and traced it continuously from its connection, inside of the lines of its patent, as the same vein in which defendants were working under the name of the Smuggler lode.
As the charge of the court was very full and clear as to the rules of law by which this was to be determined, there is no occasion to inquire into the soundness of each of the twenty-eight propositions of plaintiff on the same subject. If any of these propositions were covered by the charge made by the court, there was no obligation on the • judge to repeat it in the language of counsel. If there was a conflict in the law as laid down by the court and that requested by plaintiff’s prayer for instructions, the correctness of the charge of the court is raised by the exceptions to that charge, and can be best considered in these exceptions. Clymer v. Dawkins, 3 How. 674, 689; Mills v. Smith, 8 Wall. 27; Indianapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. n. Horst, 93 U. S. 291; Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161.
The act of Congress which confers the right under which plaintiff claims is in the following language of the Revised Statutes:
“ Sec. 2322. The locators of all mining locations heretofore made, or which shall hereafter be made, on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public domain, their heirs and assigns, where no adverse claim exists on the tenth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, so long as they comply with the laws of the United States, and with state, territorial, and local regulations, not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations. But their right of possession to such outside parts of such veins or ledges shall be confined to such portions thereof as lie between vertical planes drawn downward, as above described, through the end lines of their locations, so continued in their own direction that such planes will intersect such exterior parts of such veins or ledges. And nothing in this section shall authorize the locator or possessor of a vein or lode which extends in its downward course beyond the vertical lines of his claim to enter upon the surface of a claim owned or possessed by another.”
It is obvious‘that the vein, lode, or ledge of which the locator may have “the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment” is one whose apex is found inside of his surface lines extended vertically; and this right follows such vein, though in extending downward it may depart from a perpendicular and extend laterally outside of the vertical lines of such surface location.
What constitutes a lode or vein of mineral matter has been no easy thing to define. In this court no clear definition has been given. On the circuit it has been often attempted. Mr. Justice Field, in the Eureka Case, 4 Sawyer, 302, 311, shows p. 534that the word is not always used in the same sense by scientific works on geology and mineralogy, and by those engaged in the actual working* of mines. After discussing* these sources of information, he says:
“ It is difficult to give any definition of the term as understood and used in the acts of Congress which will not be subject to criticism. A fissure in the earth’s crust, an opening in its rocks and strata made by some force of nature, in which the mineral is deposited, would seem to be essential to a lode in the judgment of geologists. But, to the practical miner, the fissure and its walls are only of importance as indicating the boundaries within which he may look for and reasonably expect to find the ore he seeks. A continuous body of mineralized rock lying within any other well-defined boundaries on the earth’s surface and under it, would equally constitute, in his eyes, a lode. We are of opinion, therefore, that the term as used in the acts of Congress is applicable to any zone or belt of mineralized rock lying within boundaries clearly separating it from the neighboring rock.”
This definition has received repeated commendation in other cases, especially in Stevens v. Williams, 1 McCrary, 480, 488, where a shorter definition by Judge Hallett, of the Colorado Circuit Court, is also approved, to wit: “Tn general it may be said, that a lode or vein is a body of mineral, or mineral body of rock, within defined boundaries, in the general mass of the mountain.”
This lode, ledge, or vein, which may thus be possessed and enjoyed outside of the limits of the surface side lines extended vertically, must be the same vein or lode on the apex or outcrop of which the claim of the party has been located. He can only go outside of this imaginary perpendicular wall to possess or enjoy a vein which, being his inside of that artificial line, he has the right to follow or pursue in its extension outside of these lines. The identity of the vein is, therefore, essential to his right to its possession there.
Now, a vein containing the precious metals is by no means always a straight line of uniform dip, or thickness, or richness of mineral matter throughout its course. Generally, the veins p. 535are found in what, when the mineral is taken out of them, constitute clefts or fissures in the surrounding rock, with a well-defined wall above and below of different kinds of rock, as porphyry on one side, above or below, and limestone on the other.
So l®ng as these enclosing walls can be distinctly and continuously traced, and the mineral matter of the same character found between them, there can be no doubt that it is the same vein. But sometimes the cleft between the enclosing rocks, called in mining parlance the country rock, diminishes so as to be scarcely perceptible. Sometimes for a short distance the fissure disappears entirely and again is found distinctly to exist a little further on. Again it is seen that, though the underlying and superposing country rock is there, the mineral deposit ceases to be found, but, following the fissure, it reappears again very soon.
It also happens that both fissure and mineral come to an end and are found no more in that direction, or, if found, so far off, or so deflected from the original line as to constitute no part of that vein.
Of course it is sometimes easy to see that it is the same vein all through. It is also easy to see in some instances that the vein is run out; is ended.
But there are other cases of a class of which that before us is one, where it is a matter of extreme difficulty to lay down such rules for the guidance of the jury as will best aid them in arriving at a just verdict.
We are not able to see how the judge who presided at the trial of the case could have better discharged this delicate task than he has in the charge before us to which the exceptions are taken, and we give here verbatim that part of it relating to this point, as found in the bill of exceptions:
“ Upon the evidence before you, these parties are to be regarded as owning the surface of the land by them respectively claimed, and all that rightfully goes with the surface under the law. No question is presented as to the right of the plaintiff to the Lime location. Holding by patent from the Government, the plaintiff must be regarded as the owner of that claim, p. 536and all lodes and veins existing therein. The statute gives the owner of a lode, the one who may locate it at the top and apex, the right to follow it to any depth, although it may enter the land adjoining. And if the Lime location was made on a lode or vein which descends from thence into the Smuggler location, the right of the plaintiff to follow the lode into the Smuggler ground and to take out ore therefrom cannot be denied. Thus, the principal question for your consideration is, whether there is a lode or vein in the Lime location which extends from that claim into the Smuggler claim? If a lode is found in that claim, all the evidence tends to prove that the top and apex of such lode is in that claim. There is no room for controversy on that point. To determine whether a lode or vein exists, it is necessary to define those terms; and, as to that, it is enough to say that a lode or vein is a body of mineral, or mineral-bearing rock, within defined boundaries in the general mass of the mountain. In this definition the elements are the body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock and the boundaries; with either of these things well established, very slight evidence may be accepted as to the existence of the other. A body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock in the general mass of the mountain, so far as it may continue unbroken and without interruption, may be regarded as a lode, whatever the boundaries may be. In the existence of such body, and to the extent of it, boundaries are implied. On the other hand, with well-defined boundaries, very slight evidence of ore within such boundaries will prove the existence of a lode. Such boundaries constitute a fissure, and if in such fissure ore is found, although at considerable intervals and in small quantities, it is called a lode or vein. To maintain the issue on its part, the plaintiff must prove that a lode as here defined extends from the Lime to and into the Smuggleroo claim,
“ Reverting to that definition, if there is a continuous body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock extending from one claim to the other, it must be that there are boundaries to such body and the lode exists. Or if there is a continuous cavity or opening between dissimilar rocks in which ore in some quantity and value is found, the lode exists. These propositions are cor-
Opinion, of the Court.
relative and not very different in meaning, except that the first gives prominence to the mineral body, and the second to the boundaries.
“ Proof of either proposition goes far establish a lode, and it may be said without proof of one of them a lode cannot exist. The proposition of the plaintiff is that the evidence before you shows that a lode exists in the ground in controversy as already defined. The defendants deny that proposition, and the case turns on that question. They concede that there is, in the territory open by the works, ore in detached masses or fragments, but so intermingled with the enclosing rocks that it cannot be regarded as a continuous body, or as marking the line of a lode or vein. All that has been said by witnesses about rock in place is valuable only as it tends to prove or disprove the existence of a crevice or opening extending from one claim to the other. Excluding the wash, slide, or debris on the surface of the mountain, all things in the mass of the mountain are in place. A continuous body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock, extending through loose and disjointed rocks, is a lode as fully and certainly as that which is found in more regular formation; but if it is not continuous, or is not found in a crevice or opening which is itself continuous, it cannot be called by that name. In that case it lacks the individuality and extension which is an essential quality of a lode or vein. Recognizing this, the plaintiff has given evidence to establish the existence of porphyry and lime in regular order with an opening between them, filled with vein matter.
“ The defendants sought to show that the ground is broken and disjointed, and the several parts so intermingled that no lode can extend from one claim to the other.
“ It is a question to be decided by the weight of testimony rather than the number of witnesses; upon the effect which the testimony has on your minds, accepting that which seems to you to be worthy of belief and rejecting the other. And that I believe, gentlemen, is the one and the only question in the case. If you find it affirmatively, of course you will return your verdict for the plaintiff, and if in the negative, you will find for the defendants.”
Syllabus.
“And to so much of said charge as reads as follows: ‘But if it is not continuous or is not found in a crevice or opening which is itself continuous, it cannot be called by that name. In that case it lacks the individuality and extension which is an essential quality of a lode or vein.’ To which plaintiffs counsel then and there excepted.”
If the language here excepted to stood alone it would be correct, though possibly too general or exclusive. Certainly the lode or vein must be continuous in the sense that it can be traced through the surrounding rocks, though slight interruptions of the mineral-bearing rock would not be alone sufficient to destroy the identity of the vein. Nor would a short partial closure of the fissure have that effect if a little farther on it recurred again with mineral-bearing rock within it. And such is the idea conveyed in the previous part of the charge. “ On the other hand,” said the judge, “ with well defined boundaries, very slight evidence of ore within such boundaries will prove the existence of a lode. Such boundaries constitute a fissure, and if in such fissure ore is found, although at considerable intervals and in small quantities., it is called a lode or vein.”
The charge seems to us to be as favorable to plaintiffs as the principles we have laid down would justify.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore
Affirmed.