Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U.S. 158 (1885)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U.S. 158 (1885)
Full caption
CHAPMAN v. BREWER, Assignee.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Mar. 30, 1885
CHAPMAN v. BREWER, Assignee.
APPEAU FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOE THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.
Submitted March 19,1885.—Decided March 30,1885.
Where, under the Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867, a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy was commenced in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan, before an attachment on land of the debtor, issued by a State Court of Michigan, was levied on the land, the assignment in bankruptcy, though made after the attachment, related back and vested title to the land in the assignee as of the commencement of the proceeding ; and, where the attachment was levied within four months before the commencement of the proceeding, it was dissolved by t e making of the assignment.
The proceeding in this case was held to have been commenced before t e attachment was levied.
The District Court which made the adjudication having had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the bankrupt having voluntarily appeared, and the adjudication having been correct in form, it is conclusive of the fact decreed, and cannot be attacked collaterally in a suit brought by the assignee against a person claiming an adverse interest in property of the bankrupt. The assignment in bankruptcy was made after a levy on the land under an execution on a judgment obtained in a suit in a State Court of Michigan, brought after the proceeding in bankruptcy was commenced: Held, that the assignee, being in possession, of the land, could maintain a suit in equity, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan, to remove the cloud on his title, and that that court could, under the exception in Rev. Stat. § 720, restrain by injunction a sale under the levy and a further levy.
On the 10th of October, 1873, John Whittlesey, a creditor of Benjamin C. Hoyt and Enoch C. Hoyt, copartners under the name of B. C. Hoyt & Son, filed a petition in bankruptcy, in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan, praying that the said two persons, “ partners as aforesaid,” might be declared bankrupts. The petition contained the prescribed allegations, and set forth, as the demand of the petitioner, a promissory note made by the partnership, in its firm name, to his order. It alleged as one act of bankruptcy, that the firm had “ fraudulently stopped payment” of its commercial paper “within a period of fourteen days,” omitting to add, “ and not resumed payment within said period.” It alleged, as a second act of bankruptcy, that the firm had “ suspended and not resumed payment ” of its commercial paper “ within a period of fourteen days.”
Before anything was done on this petition except to file it, and on the 12th of January, 1874, Daniel Chapman procured to be issued by the Circuit Court of the County of Berrien, in the State of Michigan, an attachment against the lands and personal property of the said persons, as such copartners, for the sum of $4,895.44, in a suit brought by him, in that court, against them, to recover a money demand, which attachment the sheriff, on that day, levied on certain real estate in that county. Enoch C. Hoyt died on the 25th of February, 1874.
On the 5th of March, 1874, a petition, indorsed “ Amended petition,” was filed by Whittlesey, in the bankruptcy court, con-taming the same averments as the first petition, with the [p. 160] addition of the words so omitted in the first petition. In the body of the petition there was no mention of its being an amended petition, nor did it allude to the first petition, or to the death of Enoch C. Hoyt, and its prayer was the same as that of the first petition. It was verified March 3, 1874.
On the 14th of April, 1874, an order was made in the suit in the State court, entering the default of Benjamin C. Hoyt, for want of an appearance, on proof of personal service on him of the attachment and of the filing of the declaration; and, on the 16th of April, 1874, an order was made, on affidavit, suggesting the death of Enoch C. Hoyt, since the issuing of the attachment, and ordering that the action proceed against the surviving defendant, Benjamin C. Hoyt.
On the 2d of May, 1874, an order was made by the bankruptcy court, stated in it to be made on the appearance and consent of “ solicitors for the alleged bankrupts,” reciting that it had been shown that Enoch C. Hoyt had “ departed this life since the commencement of the proceeding in said matter,” and ordering that all proceedings should stand against Benjamin C. Hoyt, survivor of himself and Enoch C. Hoyt, and that they might be prosecuted against him, with like effect as if Enoch C. Hoyt had not died, and that the individual property of Enoch C. Hoyt be surrendered by the marshal to his proper representatives. On the same day, Benjamin C. Hoyt filed a denial of bankruptcy, signed by his attorneys, as follows: “ And now the said Benjamin C. Hoyt appears and denies that he has committed the act of bankruptcy set forth in said petition, and avers that he should not be declared bankrupt for any cause in said petition alleged, and he demands that the same be inquired of by a jury.”
On the 8th of May, 1874, in the suit in the State court, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, against Benjamin 0. Hoyt, for $4,930.15, and costs ; and, on the same day, an execution was issued thereon, under which, on that day, the sheriff levied on the same real estate which he had levied on under the attachment.
On the 1st of June. 1874, an adjudication was made by the bankruptcy court, in these words:
“ Adjudication of Bankruptcy on Creditor’s Petition.
Western District of Michigan, ss:
In the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan. In Bankruptcy.
In the matter of Benjamin C. Hoyt, against whom a petition in bankruptcy was filed on the 19th day of October, a .d. 1873. At Grand Rapids, in said district, on the first day of June, a .d. 1874. Before Hon. Solomon L. Withey, District Judge.
This matter came on to be heard at Grand Rapids, in said court, and the respondent having withdrawn his denial and demand for a jury, and having, by his attorneys, Hughes O’Brien & Smiley, consented thereto.
And thereupon, and upon consideration of the proofs in saia matter, it was found that the facts set forth in said petition were true, and it is therefore adjudged, that Benjamin C. Hoyt became bankrupt, within the true intent and meaning of the act entitled ‘An act to establish a uniform system of bankraptcy throughout the United States,’ approved March 2,1867, before the filing of the said petition, and he is therefore declared and adjudged a bankrupt accordingly. And it is further ordered that the said bankrupt shall, within five days after this order, make and deliver, or transmit by mail, postpaid, to the marshal, as messenger, a schedule of his creditors, and inventory of his estate, in the form and verified in the manner required of the petitioning debtor by the said act.
Witness the honorable Solomon L. Withey, judge of the said District Court, and the seal thereof, at Grand Rapids, in said district, on the 1st day of June, a .d. 1874.
[seal.] Isaac H. Parrish,
Clerk of District Cowrtfor said District”
In the certificate made by the clerk of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan, certiying the copies of the bankruptcy papers, he certifies, “ that the foregoing is a true copy of the petition for adjudica-
VOL. CXIV—ii
tion filed October 10, 1873, copy of amended petition, order continuing proceedings, denial of bankruptcy by B. C. Hoyt, and adjudication of bankruptcy, on file in the proceedings of said court in said entitled matter.” This is mentioned because, in the adjudication, the petition is referred to as filed October 19, 1873.
On the 16th of December, 1873, an alias execution was issued in the suit in the State court, which the sheriff, on that day, levied on real estate in Berrien County other than that before levied on by him.
On the 1st of October, 1874, the register in bankruptcy executed to Joseph W. Brewer an assignment in these words:
“ In the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan. In Bankruptcy.
In the matter of Benjamin C. Hoyt, Bankrupt.
Western District of Michigan, ss:
Know all men by these presents, that Joseph W. Brewer, of the village of St. Joseph, in the county of Berrien, and State of Michigan, in said district, has been duly appointed assignee in said matter: Now, therefore, I, J. Davidson Burns, register in bankruptcy in said district, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the 14th section of an act of Congress, entitled ‘An Act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States,’ approved March 2, a .d. 1867, do hereby convey and assign to the said Joseph W. Brewer, assignee as aforesaid, all the estate, real and personal, of the said Benjamin C. Hoyt, bankrupt aforesaid, including all the property of whatever kind, of which he was possessed, or in which he was interested or entitled to have, on the tenth day of October, a .d. 1873, with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, excepting such property as is exempted from the operation of this assignment by the provisions of said fourteenth section of said act; to have and to hold all the foregoing premises to the said Joseph W. Brewer, and his heirs, forever, in trust, nevertheless, for the use and purposes, with the powers, and subject to the conditions and limitations, set forth in said act. ,
In witness whereof, I, the said register, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of said court to be affixed, this first day of October, a .d. 1874.
[seal.] J. Davidson Burns,
Register in BankruptcyB
On the 27th of January, 1876, Brewer filed a bill in equity, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan, against Chapman (the judgment creditor), and the sheriff who had levied under the first execution, and the deputy sheriff who had levied under the second execution, setting forth the filing of the first petition in bankruptcy, and its contents; averring “ that the usual order to show cause was thereupon made by said District Court, and a certified copy thereof duly served on said Benjamin C. and Enoch C. Hoyt, who subsequently, and in due time, appeared in said bankruptcy matter;” and alleging the death of Enoch C. Hoyt, the making of the order of March 2, 1874, the adjudication of bankruptcy, the appointment of, and assignment to, the assignee, the facts in regard to Chapman’s judgment, executions and levies, and threats by the officers to sell the real estate levied on. The bill made no mention of the amended petition in bankruptcy or of the attachment. It stated that the executions were outstanding; that the real estate so levied on was the separate property of Benjamin C. Hoyt at the date of filing the petition; that the plaintiff, as assignee, was the owner, and in possession, of all of it, except certain specified lots; and that said levies constituted a cloud on his title, and embarrassed and hindered him in disposing of the property, and that notices of the levies had been recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county. The prayer of the bill was, that the levies be decreed void as against the plaintiff, as assignee, and the defendants be decreed to release to the plaintiff, as assignee, all their right and title and interest, acquired under the levies, in and to the real estate he was so in possession of, and, on their failure to o so, the decree be ordered to have the effect of said release, and e have leave to record the same in the office of said register of eeds, and the defendants be enjoined from selling or [p. 164] interfering with the real estate the plaintiff was so in possession of. The bill also prayed for such other and further relief as should be equitable and just.
The answer denied the validity of the petition set forth in the bill, and denied that Benjamin C. Hoyt was adjudicated a bankrupt on the footing of that petition, or on any petition of which he had notice, and denied the validity of the adjudication. It set up the attachment levy, and admitted the existence of most of the material facts alleged in the bill, and that the property was the separate property of Benjamin C. Hoyt, but denied that the plaintiff was entitled to any equitable relief. A replication was filed and proofs were taken, establishing the facts above set forth, and that Brewer had acted as assignee since October 3, 1874, and had had the management and custody and possession of the property, and paid taxes on it, since October 10th, 1874, and that it was worth about $10,000.
The Circuit Court made a decree, on April 15, 1880, adjudging, that Benjamin C. Hoyt, “ at the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him, namely, on the 10th day of October, 1873, was the owner in fee of the” lands described in the bill as those of which the plaintiff was in possession; that the plaintiff succeeded to the interest which said Hoyt had in those lands on the 10th of October, 1873, and was and is the owner in fee, and in the actual possession, of them; that each of said execution levies was and is a cloud on the title of the plaintiff, as assignee, to said lands, and was and is void as against him; that the defendants execute to the plaintiff a release of their interest in said lands under said levies, and, on their failure to do so, the decree should have all the force and effect of such release, and might be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of said county; and that an injunction issue restraining the defendants from selling, disposing of, or interfering with, said lands, under said levies and from making any new or further levies on any of said lands, under said judgment. An injunction to that effect was issued and served January 3,1881. Chapman appealed to this court.
J/r. II. F. Severens for appellant.—I. The allegations of the [p. 165] bill do not show very distinctly whether the complainant claims anything upon the supposed ground of invalidity of the proceedings in the State court. Some parts of its frame would indicate that he did. In any event, it is well settled that an action to remove a cloud cannot be sustained when it is apparent that the facts set up in the pleading, if true, would not legally affect the title of the complainant. Nor will a bill be sustained when the matters relied upon as the basis for removing the cloud are of record and not in pais. Farnham n. Campbell, 34 N. Y. 480; Marsh v. City of Brooklyn, 59 N. Y. 280; Ward v. Dewey, 16 N. Y. 519, per Selden J.—II. Touching the question whether the United States Circuit Court had rightful authority to interfere with the proceedings of the State court, we submit that the general doctrine is well settled that the Federal courts have no authority, in cases not within their appellate jurisdiction, to issue injunctions to judgments in State courts, or in any manner to interfere with their jurisdiction or proceedings. Story, Constitution, §§ 375, 376. This doctrine has been steadily maintained. See Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch. 179; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400; Peck v. Jenness, \ How. 612; v. Benedict, 8 How. 107; Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 368; Pulliam v. Osborne, 17 How. 471; Taylor v. Caryll, 20 How. 583; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Buck n. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334. There is nothing in the bankruptcy laws which changes this general doctrine, and confers upon Federal courts power to arrest the proceedings of State courts. The Circuit Court erred in enjoining the sheriff from enforcing the execution issued by the State court. Peck v. Jenness, 1 How. 612; Ma/rshall v. Knox, 16 Wall. 551; Doe v. Childress, 21 Wall. 642; Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521; Burba/nk v. Bigelow, 92 U. S. 179 ; Horton v. Switzer, 93 U. S. 355 ; Jerome n. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734; Davis v. Friedlander, 104 U. S. 570; Thatcher v. Bockwell, 105 U. S. 467.—III. If the assignee desired to contest these matters he should have made himself a party to the proceedings in the State court. The provision of the statute authorizing him to prosecute and defend all suits pending at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy seems to be decisive on this point. See also Peck v. Jen/ness, Doe v. ChiL [p. 166] dress and Eyster v. Gaff already cited above, and Hill v. Hard img, 107 U. S. 631.—IV. The bill is not framed to present or contest the substantial question as to the defendant’s lien. It ignores altogether the attachment, and is not therefore adapted to make a contest on its validity under the bankrupt law. The allegations and the proof are not harmonious. It is also submitted that in substance and legal effect the adjudication in bankruptcy must be construed to have reference to the last petition and not to the former, under which nothing was done. The caption of the order was no part of it. Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 148. This would make a variance from the bill and would make tjbe initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings subsequent to the attachment of the plaintiff, and present a question not competent to be litigated, on such pleading as the complainant’s bill. Aforam v. Palmer, 13 Mich. 367; Piatt v. Vattier, 9 Pet. 405; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 177; Story, Equity Pl., § 23. Counsel for appellee relies upon Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 IT. S. 276, and Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. 8.
176. It is submitted that Covell v. Heymam strongly supports our second position. It affirms that property levied on by attachment or taken in execution is brought within the scope of the jurisdiction of the court whose process it is. The State court having lawful custody of the property was the proper forum for determining adverse claims to it. Krippendorf v. Hyde confirms our third position, and supplements the doctrine of Covell v. Heymam, by designating the appropriate line of procedure for one asserting rights, claimed to be paramount to those of the court having custody of the property.
Afr. Johm TV Stone for appellee.
Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the foregoing language, he continued :
The principal question considered by the Circuit Court, as appears from its opinion, accompanying the record, was, whether, the judgment and levies in the suit in the State court being prior to the appointment of the assignee in bankruptcy, although that suit was not begun till after the first petition in [p. 167] bankruptcy was filed, the Circuit Court had authority to enjoin a sale of the lands on the executions.
The appellant takes the points, that nothing appears to have been done under the first petition in bankruptcy ; that no order appears to have been made, or notice given, thereon; that the second petition was a new petition, and does not profess to be, and was not, an amended petition, and was not filed under any order authorizing it as an amendment; and that the adjudication recites the date of filing of the petition as October 19th, instead of October 10th. The questions presented here by the appellant are, (1) Whether the alleged cloud on the plaintiff’s title was a proper ground for equitable jurisdiction; (2) Whether the Circuit Court had authority to interfere with the proceedings of the State court; (3) Whether the assignee should not have made himself a party to the proceedings in the State court, or have intervened therein ; (4) Whether the bill and the proof correspond, and whether the bill is adapted to contest the validity of such lien as arose by virtue of the attachment.
All the bankruptcy proceedings, except the appointment of the assignee, and the assignment to him, and all the proceedings in the suit in the State court, except the issuing and levy of the second execution, took place before the enactment of the Revised Statutes, on the 22d of June, 1874. The Revised Statutes purport to re-enact the statutes in force on December 1,1873. At the latter date none of the proceedings in bankruptcy had taken place save the filing of the first petition, and the State court proceedings had not been begun.
The bankruptcy act in force on December 1, 1873, was the act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, the 14th section of which provided that the assignment to an assignee in bankruptcy “ shall relate back to the commencement of said proceedings in bankruptcy, and thereupon, by operation of law, the title to all such property and estate, both real and personal, shall vest in said assignee, although the same is then attached °n mesne process as the property of the debtor, and shall dissolve any such attachment made within four months next preceding the commencement of said proceedings.” The provision of Rev. Stat. § 5044 is, that the assignment “ shall relate back [p. 168] to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property and estate, both real and personal, in the assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne process as the property of the debtor, and shall dissolve any such attachment made within four months next preceding the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings.” Under these provisions, if the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced October 10, 1873, they were begun before the State court attachment was made, and the assignment, when made, related back to October 10,1873, and vested title in the assignee as of that date, and overreached and defeated all claim under the attachment. Bank v. Sherman, 101 U. S. 403; Conner n. Long, 104 U. S. 228. If the bankruptcy proceedings were not begun till March 5,1874, the attachment, having been made within four months next preceding that date, was dissolved by the making of the assignment, and the title of the assignee vested as of March 5, 1874, which was before any execution levy. In this view it would not be necessary to notice any of the objections made as to the first petition, or as to the second petition regarded as an amended petition, were it not that the bill is founded on the first petition.
The date of October 19th in the adjudication must be regarded as a clerical or typographical error. The proper date is stated in the bill and admitted in the answer, and is stated in the clerk’s certificate and in the bankruptcy assignment, and in a stipulation signed by the solicitors. Enoch C. Hoyt died February 25, 1874, before the second petition was filed, and the order made by the bankruptcy court, May 2, 1874, states that he had died “ since the commencement of the proceeding in said matter; ” and it was that fact, in connection, probably, with the fact that no order to show cause had been served on Enoch 0. Hoyt, which made it necessary for that order to direct the marshal to surrender to the representatives of Enoch C. Hoyt all his individual property.
It is also objected by the defendant, that the petition was filed against the firm, and that the record does not show that the petitioner filed any proof of his claim, or any proof of bankruptcy.
By § 36 of the act of 1867, Rev. Stat. § 5121, where two persons, partners in trade, should be adjudged bankrupt, not only was the property of the firm, to be taken and administered, but also the separate estate of each partner. When Enoch C. Hoyt died, the partnership estate vested in the survivor, and the proceedings were, by consent of attorneys then appearing for the survivor, ordered to stand against him as survivor and to proceed against him as survivor. He appeared by attorney and consented to an adjudication. By § 41 of the act of 1867, Rev. Stat. § 5026, the appearance and consent of the debtor were made a waiver of other notice. The adjudication states that, on consideration of the proofs, it was found that the facts set forth in the petition were true. It was not necessary to show in this case what the proofs were. If the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the bankrupt voluntarily appeared, and the adjudication was correct in form, it is conclusive of the fact decreed, and can be impeached only by a direct proceeding in a competent court, and can no more be attacked collaterally in a suit like the present than any other judgment. Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398.
The adjudication and the assignment embraced the individual property of Benjamin C. Hoyt; and it is alleged in the bill, and admitted in the answer, that the property levied on by the defendants was his individual property.
These views cover all the objections made to the bankruptcy proceedings, and it must be held that the adjudication was regular and valid, and refers to, and was made on, the first petition, as amended by the second, and on a proceeding commenced when the first petition was filed.
It is objected that the bill makes no mention of the attachment. But the answer sets up the attachment and the levy thereunder. The question as to whether a priority of right was acquired thereby was raised by the pleadings, and the decree makes no reference to the attachment, but annuls the execution levies.
By § 2 of the act of 1867, the Circuit Court of the district has jurisdiction of all suits in equity brought by an assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest [p. 170] touching any property of the bankrupt transferable to or vested in the assignee. This provision is re-enacted in Bev. Stat. § 4979. By Rev. Stat. § 720 it is provided, that “ the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States, to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.” It is contended for the appellant (1) that a suit in equity will not lie for the relief granted; (2) that, at all events, there was no power to award the injunction.
That the defendant claimed an adverse interest touching the property is clear. The question is, whether the plaintiff can have relief in equity. He was in possession of the land, and, as he says, of the only building there was on it. By statutory provisions in Michigan, commencing with § 29 of the act of April 23, 1833 (Code of 1833, p. 358,) followed by § 1 of the act of March 28, 1840, (No. 76, p. 127,) and the Revised Statutes of 1846, (title 21, chap. 90, sec. 36, p. 360,) and now in force as § 6626 of Howell’s Statutes, “ any person having the actual possession, and legal or equitable title to, lands, may institute a suit in chancery against any other person setting up a claim thereto in opposition to the title claimed by the complainant, and, if the complainant shall establish his title to such lands, the defendant shall be decreed to release to the complainant all claim thereto.” If there should be a sale on the executions, there would be a sheriff’s deed; and, by another statute of the State such deed is made prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale. Act of February 19, 1867, No. 20, § 2, now in force as § 5678 of Howell’s Statutes. It is held by the Supreme Court of Michigan, that the statute first cited covers a claim to a lien on land, and that a lien which may result in a sale and a deed constitutes such a cloud that equity will afford relief. Scofield v. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437, 447, 448. Especially will this be done, if the lien is not void on its face, as the lien here is not, but is a cloud on the plaintiff’s title. Therefore, the plaintiff could obtain, under the Michigan statute, and in a court of Michigan, the relief he has had. In such a case a Circuit Court of the United States, [p. 171] having otherwise jurisdiction in the case, will, as a general rule, administer the same relief in equity which the State courts can grant. Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 203; Brodericks Will, 21 Wall. 503, 519, 520 ; Van Norden v. Norton, 99 U. S. 378, 380; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 157; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15; Reynolds v. Crawfordsville Bank, 112 U. S. 405. It has general power given to it, irrespective of citizenship, to grant equitable relief, in a suit in equity by an assignee in bankruptcy against any person who claims an adverse interest touching the assigned property.
We are not disposed, however, to rest the case upon jurisdiction arising from the Michigan statute. We hold that, under the equity jurisdiction conferred by the bankruptcy act, the Circuit Court had authority to remove this cloud on the plaintiff’s title. It was the duty of the assignee to remove it, and to obtain a title which would enable him to sell the land for the benefit of the estate. The claim of the defendants, under the levies, is one which ought not to be enforced. It has no validity as against the rights of the plaintiff; it throws a cloud on his title; he is in possession, and cannot sue at law; and the papers supporting the defendant’s claim are not void on their face. Story Eq. Jur. §§ 700, 705; 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. §§ 1398,1399, and cases cited ; Pettit n. Shepherd, 5 Paige, 493; Carroll v. Safford, 3 How. 441, 463; Ward v. Dewey, 16 N. Y. 519; Mustain v. Jones, 30 Geo. 951; Martin v. Graves, 5 Allen, 601: Stout v. Cook, 37 Ill. 283 ; Clouston v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 209; Sullivan n. Finnega/n, 101 Mass. 447; Anderson v. Talbot, 1 Heiskell, 407; Marsh n. City of Brooklyn, 59 N. Y. 280$ O'Hare n. Downi/ng, 130 Mass. 16, 19. In Pettit v. Shepherd, it was held that a Court of Chancery might interpose to prevent the giving of a conveyance, under pretence of right, which would operate as a cloud upon the title to real estate. In O’Hare v. Downi/ng it is said, that “ a Court of Chancery will restrain by injunction a threatened levy of execution upon real estate which is not legally subject to such a levy, and thus prevent a cloud upon the title, without compelling the owner of the land to wait until the levy has been completed, and then admit himself to be disseised, in order to [p. 172] maintain a writ of entry.” Much more will it prevent a sale after a levy.
But it is contended that the Circuit Court had no authority to award or issue the injunction. The jurisdiction of that court in this case is conferred by the “ law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy; ” and we think the injunction was authorized by that law. The court of bankruptcy was authorized, by § 40 of the act of 1867, § 5024 Rev. Stat., where a petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed, to restrain all persons, by injunction, from interfering with the debtor’s property. The jurisdiction of suits in equity, given to the Circuit Court by § 2 of the act of 1867, § 4979 Rev. Stat., was given to it concurrently with the district courts, jit must be held that Congress, in authorizing a suit in equity, in a case like the present, has, in order to make the other relief granted completely effective, authorized an injunction, as necessarily incidental and consequent, to prevent further proceedings under the levies already made and new levies under the judgment. But for the supposed inhibitory force of § 720, a court of equity, in granting, on the merits, the other relief here granted, would necessarily have power to award the injunction. We think the Circuit Court was authorized to award it here, within the exception in § 720."^
It is urged, thaFtne plaintiff should have made himself a party to the proceedings in the State Court, and have contested the matter there, under the authority given to him by § 14 of the act of 1867, (§ 5047 of the Revised Statutes), to defend suits pending against the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication. As the assignment in bankruptcy was not made till October 1, 1874, and the judgment and the levy under the first execution were in May, 1874, we do not think the assignee was called upon to take any steps in the State court, after the assignment, to obtain relief. He was entitled to pursue the remedy he did.
The cases of Krippendorf n. Hyde, 110 IT. S. 276, and Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, are relied on by the appellant to show that the decree in this case was erroneous. The view urged is, that, by virtue of the levy by the sheriff, the State [p. 173] court acquired custody, control, and jurisdiction of the property, which could not be disturbed by the Circuit Court. But the doctrine of those cases has no application in favor of the appellant, in a case like the present. In the first case it was held, that, after 'property had been attached by a marshal of the United States, on mesne process from a Circuit Court of the United States, a third person, claiming its ownership, could, without reference .to citizenship, come into the Circuit Court for redress, by ancillary proceedings. In the second case, it was held, in pursuance of the decision in Freeman, v. Howe, 24 How. 450, that possession of property by a marshal of the United States, under a writ of execution from a Circuit Court of the United States, could not be disturbed by virtue of a writ of replevin from a State court, issued by a third person. E converse, as was held in Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, property seized by a sheriff, under process of attachment from a State court, cannot be taken from the sheriff by initial admiralty process issuing from a District Court of the United States. But those were none of them cases where, under the bankruptcy act, an assignee in bankruptcy claimed a paramount title, and resorted to regular judicial proceedings to first vacate and declare void the adverse title, and sweep it away, and then have such final process in regard to the subject-matter of the title as should be necessary to make the decree effective. And, in Covell v. Heyman, the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Matthews, after explaining the point of the decision in Freeman n. Howe says: “ The same principle protects the possession of property, while thus held by process issuing from State courts, against any disturbance under process of the courts of the United States; excepting, of course, those cases wherein the latter exercise jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States.” This exception includes the present case. The bankruptcy proceeding dissolved the State attachment, and the bankruptcy act conferred on the assignee a paramount title, which he was empowered, by that act, to enforce, by proper equitable remedies, m the Circuit Court, against the adverse title set up by virtue of the suit in the State court. Decree affirmed-
EX PARTE MORGAN & Another.
ORIGINAL.
Argued March 30, 31, 1885.—Decided April 6, 1885.
A writ of mandamus may be used to require an inferior court to decide a matter within its jurisdiction, and pending before it for judicial determination, but not to control the decision.
The plaintiff in the suit below, believing that the judgment as recorded did not conform to the finding, moved the court to amend it in that particular. The court heard and denied the motion: Held, That this was a judicial act which could not be reviewed by mandamus.
This was an application for a writ of mandamus. The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court.
J/r. Edward Roby for petitioner.
Mr. Willia/m EL Calkins, (Mr. A. L. Osborn and Mr. A. C. Harris were with him), opposing.
Me. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an application for a writ of mandamus requiring the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana to amend a judgment entered January 20, 1883, in a cause wherein the relators were plaintiffs and Frederick Eggers, defendant, “ so as to conform to the complaint in said cause, and to the finding or verdict of the court rendered upon the trial of said cause.”
The suit was ejectment to recover the possession of “ all of the north part of lot 2, in sec. 36, T. 38, N. R. 10 W. of the second principal meridian, which lies west of the track of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad, and north of a line parallel with the north line of said lot 2, and seven hundred and fifty-three feet south therefrom.”
The judgment entry, which includes the only finding in the case, is as follows:
“ And the court, having heard the evidence and being fully
EX PARTE MORGAN. 175
advised, finds for the plaintiffs, and orders and adjudges that they are entitled to, and shall have and recover of defendant, the possession of so much of said lot two (2) as lies south of the south line of lot number one (1), as indicated by a fence constructed and maintained by the defendant as and on said south line, said fence running from the State line easterly to Lake Michigan, and assessing the damages at $1 and costs taxed at $—, which the plaintiffs shall recover of defendant. All of which is finally ordered, adjudged, and decreed.”
After this entry the petitioner moved the court to amend and reform the judgment so that it would “ conform to the complaint in said court and to the finding or verdict; ” but the court, on full consideration, decided that the finding and judgment were not separate and distinct, and that the meaning was clear. The entry was to be construed as finding and adjudging that the plaintiffs were only entitled to recover the possession of so much of the premises sued for as lies south of the fence indicated. For this reason the motion was denied.
It is an elementary rule that a writ of mandamus may be used to require an inferior court to decide a matter within its jurisdiction and pending before it for judicial determination, but not to control the decision. Ex parte Flippin, 94 U. S. 350; Ex pa/rte Railway Co., 101 U. S. 720; Ex pa/rte Burtis, 103 U. S. 238. Here a judgment has been rendered and entered of record by the Circuit Court in a suit within its jurisdiction. The judgment is the act of the court. It is recorded ordinarily by the clerk as the ministerial officer of the court, but his recording is in legal effect the act of the court, and subject to its judicial control. The clerk records the judgments of the court, but does not thereby render the judgments. If there is error in the judgment as rendered it cannot be corrected by mandamus, but resort must be had to a writ of error or an appeal. Ex pa/rte Loring, 94 U. S. 418; Ex parte Perry, 102 IT. S. 183.
If a clerk in performing the ministerial act of recording a judgment has committed an error, the court may on motion at the proper time correct it, or it may do so in a proper case upon its own suggestion without waiting for the parties. Here [p. 176] the plaintiffs, believing that the judgment as recorded did not conform to the finding, moved the court to amend it in that particular. This motion the court entertained, but, being of the opinion that the judgment had been correctly recorded, refused the amendment which was asked. In this the court acted judicially, and its judgment on the motion can no more be reviewed by mandamus than that which was originally entered in the cause.
The writ is denied with costs.
CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY v. MILLER, Auditor.
IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA.
Argued March 18,19, 1885.—Decided April 6,1885.
The provision in the act of the Legislature of West Virginia incorporating the Covington & Ohio Railroad Company that “ no taxation upon the property of the said company shall be imposed by the State until the profits of said Company shall amount to ten per cent, on the capital ” was personal to that company and did not inhere in the property so as to pass by a transfer of it.
Immunity from taxation conferred on a corporation by legislation is not a franchise. Morgan v. Louisicma, 93 U. S 217, quoted and affirmed.
A statute of West Virginia regulated sales under foreclosure of mortgages by railroad companies, and provided that “ such sale and conveyance shall pass to the purchaser at the sale, not only the works and property of the company, as they were at the time of making the deed of trust or mortgage, but any works which the company may, after that time and before the sale, have constructed ; ” and that “upon such conveyance to the purchaser, the said company shall ipso facto be dissolved and further, that “said purchaser shall forthwith be a corporation” and “shall succeed to all such franchises, rights and privileges ... as would have been had. • • by the first company but for such sale and conveyance : ” Held, (1) That purchasers thus becoming a corporation derived the corporate existence and powers of the corporation from this act, and were subject to general laws as to corporations then in force ; (2) That an immunity from taxation enjoyed by the former corporation was not embraced in the words of description in the act, and did not pass to the new corporation.
This suit was begun by a bill in equity in a court of the State of West Virginia against the auditor of that State to restrain the collection of a tax, alleged to be illegal, on the ground that the plaintiff in error enjoyed an immunity from taxation. Being decided against the claim of exemption, the cause was brought here by writ of error. The grounds of the claim and the other facts which make the federal question are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. IF. G. Robertson and Mr. George F. Edmunds for plaintiff in error.
Jfr. Cornelius C. Watts, Attorney-General of West Virginia, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court.
This writ of error brings into review a final decree of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia dismissing the bill of complaint filed by the plaintiff in error, the error assigned being that that court gave effect to a statute of the State alleged to be void, on the ground that it impaired the obligation of a contract between the plaintiff in error and the State of West Virginia.
The statute thus drawn in question is an act of the Legislature of West Virginia, passed March 7, 1879, subjecting the property of the plaintiff in error in that State to taxation.
The contract alleged to be thus broken by the State is one of exemption from taxation, contained in the seventh section of an act of the Legislature of West Virginia, passed March 1, 1866, entitled “ An Act to incorporate the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company,” and is in the following words:
‘ 7. The rate of charge by said company for passengers and freight transported on the main line and branches of said railroad shall never exceed the highest allowed by law to other railroads in the State, and no discrimination shall be made in such charges against any connecting railroad or canal company chartered by the State, and no taxation upon the property of the said company shall be imposed by the State until the profits
VOL. CXIV—12 [p. 178] of said, company shall amount to ten per cent, on the capital of the company.”
The plaintiff in error, complainant below, alleging that it was entitled to the benefit df this exemption by way of contract with the State, and that no profits had been made by it upon its capital, prayed for an injunction to restrain the appellee, the auditor of West Virginia, from proceeding under the act of March 7, 1879, to assess and collect any tax upon its property within the State.
The plaintiff in error became a party to the contract contained in the act of March 1,1866, to incorporate the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company, in the following manner. This act was similar in its terms to one passed about the same date by the General Assembly of the State of Virginia. Both had in view the completion of a railroad from Covington, in Virginia, to some point on the Ohio River, the construction of which had been undertaken by the State of Virginia as a public work by its own means, but which was suspended, after an expenditure of several millions of dollars, in consequence of the breaking out of the civil war in 1861. A portion of it was within the territory that became West Virginia, and thenceforward that part of the work fell within the jurisdiction and ownership of the new State. To provide for its completion was the object of the act of March 1, 1866, to incorporate the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company. That act did not, by its terms, create a corporation, but authorized a future organization under it. It ceded to the company, when constituted and certified as thereinafter provided, “ all the rights, interest and privileges of whatsoever kind, in and to the Covington and Ohio Railroad and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now the property of the State of West Virginia, upon condition that it shall within six months after its incorporation, as provided in the tenth section of the act, commence, and within six years complete, equip and operate a railroad,” &c., as therein described ; and a failure to comply with this condition operated to forfeit the title to the road, which should then revert to the State.
The act also appointed commissioners on the part of the [p. 179] State to act in conjunction with others appointed by the State of Virginia, whose duty it was to offer the benefits of the charter “ for the acceptance of capitalists, so as to secure the speediest and best construction, equipment and operation of said railroad.” “ To this end,” it added, “ they are empowered to make a contract with any parties who shall give the best terms and the most satisfactory assurances of capacity and responsibility, and to introduce into said contract any additional stipulations for the benefit of the State and in furtherance of the purposes herein declared and not inconsistent with this act, which contract shall be, to all intents and purposes, as much a part of this charter as if the same had been herein included at the time of the passage of this act.” The certificate of these commissioners of the due execution of such a contract, and the organization of the company, should operate to confer upon said company all the benefits of this charter, subject only to the provisions of the Code of Virginia for the government of internal improvement companies, so far as not inconsistent with that act.
On February 26, 1867, the Legislature of West Virginia passed an act to provide for the completion of a line or lines of railroad from the waters of the Chesapeake to the Ohio River, which authorized the consolidation of the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company, when organized under the act of March 1, 1866, with one or more of several other railroad companies, including the West Virginia Central Railway Company; the consolidated company to be known as the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, and to be vested with “ all the rights, privileges, franchises and property which may have been vested in either company prior to the act of consolidation.” It was also thereby provided that the Virginia Central Railroad Company and the West Virginia Central Railway Company, or either of them, “may contract with the Covington and Ohio Railroad Commissioners for the construction of the railroad from Covington to the Ohio River, and in the event such contract be made, the said Virginia Central Railroad Company, or the West Virginia Central Railway Company, shall be known as the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, and shall be [p. 180] entitled to all the benefits of the charter of the Covington and Ohio Railroad, and to all the rights, interests and privileges which by this act are conferred upon the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company when organized.”
Accordingly, on August 31, 1868, the Commissioners of Virginia and of West Virginia entered into a contract with the Virginia Central Railroad Company by which the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company was formed and under which it was organized, and the same was approved, ratified and confirmed by an act of the Legislature of West Virginia, “confirming and amending the charter of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, passed January 26, 1870.” Among other things, it was therein provided that the company might borrow such sums of money, at a rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent, per annum, as might be necessary in addition to the funds arising from stock subscriptions for the completion of the road, and should have power to execute a lien on its property and resources to secure the payment of the principal and interest of such loans; and the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company was thereby declared to be entitled to all the benefits of the charter of the Covington and Ohio Railroad, and to all the rights, interests, benefits and privileges, and be subject to all the duties and responsibilities provided and declared in the said contract and in the statutes therein referred to.
In pursuance of these powers, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company completed the contemplated line of railroad and put the same in operation, not, indeed, strictly within the time limited in the charter, but the forfeiture thereby incurred was released by an act of the Legislature of West Virginia passed February 20, 1877.
In the meantime, to raise the funds necessary to complete the construction and equipment of the road, a large amount of bonds had been issued by the company, secured by several deeds of trust, the particulars of which are fully set out in the bill; and default in the payment of interest having occurred, due proceedings for the foreclosure and sale of the property embraced in the deeds of trust were prosecuted to final decrees [p. 181] in the courts of Virginia and West Virginia; so that, in the latter, all of the railroad and other property situate in that State were brought to sale under a decree of the Circuit Court for the County of Kanawha, in West Virginia, rendered on December 18, 1877, and were sold and conveyed to the purchasers, who, in pursuance of the statute then in force applicable thereto, became a corporation under the name of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, the plaintiff in error in these proceedings.
The statute under which these proceedings took place was an act of the Legislature of West Virginia passed February 18,1871, relating to sales made under deeds of trust or mortgages by railroads or other internal improvement companies in that State, as amended by an act passed February 20, 1877, extending its provisions to judicial sales.
It was provided by these acts that “ if a sale be made under a deed of trust or mortgage executed by a railroad or other internal improvement company in this State, on all its works and property, and there be a conveyance pursuant thereto, such sale and conveyance shall pass to the purchaser at the sale, not only the works and property of the company, as they were at the time of making the deed of trust or mortgage, but any works which the company may, after that time and before the sale, have constructed, and all other property of which it may be possessed at the time of the sale, other than debts due to it. Upon such conveyance to the purchaser, the said company shall ipso facto be dissolved. And the said purchaser shall forthwith be a corporation by any name which may be set forth in said conveyance, or in any writing signed by him or them, and recorded in the recorder’s office of any county wherein the property so sold, or any part thereof, is situated, or where said conveyance is recorded.
‘ 2. The corporation created by or in consequence of such sale and conveyance shall succeed to all such franchises, rights and privileges and perform all such duties as would have been had, or should have been performed by the first company, but for such sale and conveyance ; save only that the corporation so created shall not be entitled to debts due to the first company, [p. 182] and shall not be liable for any debts of, or claims against, the said first company, which may not be expressly assumed in the contract of purchase; and that the whole profits of the business done by such corporation shall belong to the said purchaser and his assigns. His interest in the corporation shall be personal estate, and he, or his assigns, may create so many shares of stock therein as he or they may think proper, not exceeding, together, the amount of stock in the first company at the time of the sale, and assign the same in a book kept for that purpose. The said shares shall thereupon be on the footing of shares in joint stock companies generally, except only that the first meeting of the stockholders shall be held on such day and at such place as shall be fixed by the said purchaser, of which notice shall be published for four successive weeks in a newspaper printed in each county in the State wherein said corporation may do business.”
These provisions are copied from the Code of Virginia of 1860, ch. 61, §§ 28, 29 and 31. This circumstance is material to the case, as urged by the plaintiff in error, in view of the provision of the first section of the act of the Legislature of West Virginia of March 1, 1866, to incorporate the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company, which provided for its future organization as a corporation, “according to the provisions of the Code of Virginia, second edition, for the government of incorporated companies.” It remains to be added that the Legislature of West Virginia passed an act on January 31, 1879, to amend section 7 of the act to incorporate the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company, so as to omit from it altogether the clause containing the exemption from taxation. Chap. 5 West Va. Acts, 1879.
That the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, by virtue of its organization as a corporation under the act of March 1, 1866, became entitled to the exemption from taxation secured by § 7 of that act, and that as a matter of contract, is not denied or disputed. Whether the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company succeeded to that right and immunity, is the question to be determined.
It is quite clear that, as a contract originally entered into [p. 183] between the State of West Virginia and the stockholders who organized the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, under the act of March 1, 1866, it was personal to that corporation, and intended to benefit those who should be induced to subscribe to its stock. Every circumstance that is referred to for the purpose of proving its nature as a contract, such as, that the State had already sunk a large amount of money in an incomplete and therefore unprofitable public work, that it was very desirous to induce private capitalists to finish its construction, and to that end was willing to cede to them the property itself, and the franchises of a railroad connected with it, and by way of further inducement, to exonerate the property in their hands from all burdens of taxation until the investment yielded a profit equal to ten per cent, upon the capital invested, also prove that the only persons in contemplation as beneficiaries of these privileges and immunities were those who were willing to risk their money in an enterprise the future success of which could only be regarded as doubtful. The contract was not for the benefit of those who should become creditors of the company, further than the fact that the property of the company was itself exempted from the charge of taxation would enhance its credit by securing to mortgage bondholders a lien which could not be subordinated by the State. It was not made with the creditors of the company, nor was it conferred as a franchise inhering in the property itself, so as to pass by way of incumbrance or assignment to mortgagees or purchasers. The language of the clause which contains the exemption is explicit. It is, that“ no taxation upon the property of the said company shall be imposed by the State until the profits of the said company shall amount to ten per cent, on the capital of the company.” But one company is spoken of, and that is the company to be incorporated under the act. The property to be exempt is the property of that company and of no other, and while it continues to be the property of that company and no longer. And the exemption is to cease when the profits of that particular company have reached the limit designated, and that limit is measured by a ratable proportion fixed with reference to the capital to be [p. 184] subscribed to form that company and no other. And there are no words of assignability attached, either expressly or by any implication, to this immunity. The reasons for considering such an exemption to be a privilege pertaining to the corporation, and not inhering in the property, and passing to an assignee, were fully stated by Mr. Justice Field in delivering the opinion of the court in the case of Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217, and have been uniformly applied to similar cases subsequently. v. Gaines, 103 U. S. 417; Louisville Nashville Railroad Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; Memphis & Little Roch Railroad Co. v. Railroad Commissioners, 112 U. S. 609; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Railroad Commissioners, 113 U. S. 465. And the circumstances of the case distinguish it from that of Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244.
There is no claim made that the exemption passed to the trustees in the trust deeds or mortgages given to secure the payment of the bonds of the company ; and none can be made, that it passed to the purchasers by the judicial sale made under the decree for foreclosure and sale, by force of the statute declaring what such a sale should pass. The language of the act upon this subject is, that “ such sale and conveyance shall pass to the purchaser at the sale, not only the works and property of the company, as they were at the time of making the deed of trust or mortgage, but any works which the company may, after that time and before the sale, have constructed and all other property of which it may be possessed at the time of the sale, other than debts due to it.” So far, nothing is said of what rights, privileges, franchises, and immunities shall vest in the purchaser in respect to the property, the title to which is thus conveyed. The act, however, proceeds to say, that, “upon such conveyance to the purchaser, the said company shall ipso facto be dissolved.” From this, it necessarily follows that all privileges, which by the terms of its charter were personal to it, ceased with its dissolution. But the statute adds: “ And the said purchaser shall forthwith be a corporation by any name which may be set forth in said conveyance, or in any writing signed by him or them and recorded in the [p. 185] recorder’s office of any county wherein the property, so sold or any part thereof, is situated, or where said conveyance is recorded.” Thus is formed a new corporate body, succeeding to the title of the property sold and conveyed to it, but deriving its existence from this law and not from the original act of incorporation, which constituted the charter of its predecessor, and with such powers, rights, privileges, franchises and immunities only as are conferred upon it by the law which has brought it into being.
These are defined in the next succeeding section. So far as material to the question its language is: “ The corporation created by or in consequence of such sale and conveyance shall succeed to all such franchises, rights and privileges, and perform all such duties as would have been had, or should have been performed, by the first company, but for such sale and conveyance,” &c.
It is earnestly contended, on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that by virtue of this language, it is entitled to enjoy the property formerly belonging to the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, its predecessor, precisely as though it had been incorporated under the charter of that company, and therefore with the exemption from taxation which was conceded to that company. But broad, general and comprehensive as the language is, we cannot, in reference to the subject-matter now in hand, apply it with that force and meaning. The words used are, it will be observed, “franchises, rights and privileges, • • . as would have been had, ... by the first company, but for such sale,” &c. There is no express reference to a grant of any exemption or immunity; nothing is said m relation to the subject of taxation. The words actually used do not necessarily embrace a grant of such an exemption. As was said, on this point, in Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217, 223: “ Much confusion of thought has arisen in this case and in similar cases from attaching a vague and undefined meaning to the term ‘ franchises.’ It is often used as synonymous with nghts, privileges, and immunities, though of a personal and temporary character; so that, if any one of these exists, it is loosely termed a ‘ franchise,’ and is supposed to pass upon a [p. 186] transfer of the franchises of the company. But the term must always be considered in connection with the corporation or property to which it is alleged to appertain. The franchises of a railroad corporation are rights or privileges which are essential to the operations of the corporation, and without which its road and works would be of little value; such as the franchise to run cars, to take tolls, to appropriate earth and gravel for the bed of its road, or water for its engines, and the like. They are positive rights or privileges, without the possession of which the road of the company could not be successfully worked. Immunity from taxation is not one of them. The former may be conveyed to a purchaser of the road as part of the property of the company ; the latter is personaland incapable of transfer without express statutory direction.”
Here, there is no such express statutory direction. Nor is there an equivalent implication by necessary construction. There is nothing in the language itself, nor the context, nor the subject-matter of the legislation, nor the situation and relation of the parties to be affected, which indicates that a grant of an exemption from taxation to a particular railroad corporation, or to a class of such, was in the contemplation of the Legislature. The subject matter of this legislation was not the original construction of railroads, but the operation of railroads already constructed. The State was not in the attitude of a contractor, soliciting subscriptions of capital, in the formation of companies to undertake the risk of public improvements, for the benefit of the State, with the hazard of loss and perhaps financial ruin to the first promoters, and offering exemp tions from taxation as a consideration, by way of contract, for the acceptance of its proposals. It was legislating in reference to enterprises already undertaken, prosecuted and completed by companies originally thus incorporated, and who, by reason of insolvency, had been stripped of their property by creditors and sentenced by the law to dissolution ; and the purpose of the statute was simply to provide suitable means of incorporating the purchasers, to facilitate their use of the property, m operating it for the benefit of the public, as designed from the beginning. These purchasers had not bought the immunity [p. 187] now demanded either from the State or the prior possessor. The contract of the creditors would be fully met, on failure of payment of the stipulated debt, by subjecting to sale the property pledged for its payment, with such rights, franchises and privileges only as were necessary for its beneficial use and enjoyment. The immunity from taxation, as we have already said, was not necessarily included in that designation. The debtor corporation, and its creditors combined, could not confer upon the purchasers any rights which were not assignable ; and, as no consideration moved to the State for a renewal of the grant, there is no motive for finding, by mere construction and implication, what the words of the law have failed to express. That certainly is not a reasonable interpretation for which no sufficient reason can be assigned.
We conclude, therefore, that the act from which the plaintiff in error derives its corporate existence and powers in West Virginia does not contain a renewal of the grant by exemption from taxation, which, in the 7th section of the act of March 1,1866, applied to the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company.
Were it otherwise, so that we should be constrained to hold that the language of the act of West Virginia of February 18, 1871, as amended by that of February 20, 1877, had the force of a grant to the plaintiff in error of the exemption of taxation vested by the 7th section of the act of March 1,1866, in the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, nevertheless we should be compelled also to hold on distinct grounds, that the exemption thus conferred did not take effect as a contract, protected from repeal by the Constitution of the United States. On the supposition now made, it would still be true, that all the rights of the plaintiff in error, as a corporation, other than the title to the property it acquired by the judicial sale, had their origin in, and depended upon, the acts of 1871-77, under and by which it was created a corporation. It can, in no sense, he regarded as the identical corporate body, of which it became the successor, merely discharged by a process of insolvency from further liability for past debts, which is the view pressed upon us in argument by counsel for plaintiff in error. [p. 188] The language of the statutes expressly contradicts this assumption. The old corporation in terms is dissolved. The purchasers are as explicitly declared to become a corporation, and its corporate powers are conferred by reference to those which had belonged to their predecessor. The language of the law, the reason involved in its provisions and the precedents of cases heretofore decided by this court, foreclose further controversy on this point. Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Railroad Co. v. Mai/ae, 96 U. S. 499 ; Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; L. & N. Railroad Co. n. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244.
That being the case, all grants of corporate powers, rights, privileges, franchises and immunities are taken subject to existing laws, remaining unrepealed. At the time the plaintiff in error became a corporation, ch. 53, § 8, of the Code of West Virginia of 1869, which took effect April 1, 1869, was in force, and has never been repealed. It enacted, among other things, as follows : . . . “ And the right is hereby reserved to the Legislature to alter any charter or certificate of incorporation hereafter granted to a joint stock company, and to alter or repeal any law applicable to such company.” The Constitution of the State of West Virginia of 1863, Art. 11, § 5, also provides as follows:
“ 5. The Legislature shall pass general laws whereby any number of persons associated for mining, manufacturing, insuring, or other purpose useful to the public, excepting banks of circulation and the construction of works of internal improvement, may become a corporation, on complying with the terms and conditions thereby prescribed; and no special act incorporating or granting peculiar privileges to any joint stock company or association, not having in view the issuing of bills to circulate as money or the construction of some work of internal improvement, shall be passed. No company or association, authorized by this section, shall issue bills to circulate as money. No charter of incorporation shall be granted under such general laws, unless the right be reserved to alter or amend such charter at the pleasure of the Legislature, to be declared by general laws. No act to incorporate any bank of circulation or internal improvement company, or to confer additional [p. 189] privileges on the same, shall be passed, unless public notice of the intended application for such act be given under such regulations as shall be prescribed by law.”
The incorporation of the plaintiff in error comes within the provisions, both of the Constitution and of the Code of 1868. Its charter is the law of 1871 as amended by that of 1877. Its certificate of incorporation is the conveyance to it, by the name it has chosen, as a purchaser at the judicial sale, or set forth in some writing signed by such purchaser, and recorded as required. It is a charter granted under a general law, which the Constitution declares to be subject to legislative alteration and amendment. The laws subjecting its property to taxation, and which form the subject of the present controversy, are but the exercise of that legislative discretion, which, as it became the law of the contract itself, cannot be complained of as a breach of the contract.
The conclusion is not weakened by the suggestion that the rights of the plaintiff in error originate in the provisions of the Code of Virginia, referred to in the act of March 1, 1866, incorporating the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company, and of which the acts of 1871-77 are re-enactments. For even then they would not antedate the provision of the Constitution of 1863, nor avoid the effect of the reasoning of this court in the case of The St. .Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railwy Co. n. Rail/road Commissioners, 113 U. S. 465. The rights of the plaintiff in error, as a corporation, are determined by the law in force when it came into being, although there is no ground on which it can be contended that there was any legislative contract in the act of March 1, 1866, for the further creation of any corporation in favor of possible purchasers at judicial sales under decrees of foreclosure of deeds of trust or mortgages.
In either view the result is the same, and for the reasons given the decree of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia is
Affirmed.
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