Case details
Bluebook Citation
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624
Full caption
ROBB v. CONNOLLY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
ROBB v. CONNOLLY.
IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
Submitted April 7th, 1884.—Decided May 5th, 1884.
Constitutional Law—Fugitives from Justice—Conflict of Law. An agent, appointed by the State in which a fugitive from justice stands charged with crime, to receive such fugitive from the State by which he is surrendered, is not an officer of the United States within the meaning o former adjudications of this court.
Congress has not undertaken to invest the judicial tribunals of the United States with exclusive jurisdiction of issuing writs of habeas corpus in proceedings for the arrests of fugitives from justice, and their delivery to the authorities of the State in which they stand charged with crime.
Subject to the exclusive and paramount authority of the national government by its own judicial tribunals to determine whether persons held in custody by authority of the courts of the United States, or by commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the general government acting under its laws, are so held in conformity with law, the States have the right, by their own courts, or by the judges thereof, to inquire into the grounds upon which any person, within their respective territorial limits, is restrained of his liberty, and to discharge him, if it be ascertained that such restraint is illegal, and this notwithstanding such illegality may arise from a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
On the 20th day of November, 1883, one C. H. Bayley was arrested in the city of San Francisco, California, and delivered to W. L. Robb, who had been empowered by the Governor of the State of Oregon to take and receive him from the proper authorities of the State of' California, and convey him to the former State, to be there dealt with according to law.
The arrest and delivery were in pursuance of the warrant of the Governor of California, as follows:
“ State of California, Executive Department. “ The people of the State of California to any sheriff, constable, marshal, or policeman of this State, greeting :
“ Whereas it has been represented to me by the Governor of the State of Oregon that C. H. Bayley stands charged with the crime of embezzlement, committed in the county of Clatsop, in said State, and that he has fled from the justice of that State, and has taken refuge in the State of California ; and the said Governor of the State of Oregon having, in pursuance of the Constitution and laws of the United States, demanded of me that I shall cause the said C. H. Bayley to be arrested and delivered to W. L. Robb, who is authorized to receive him into his custody and convey him back to said State of Oregon ;
“And whereas the said representation and demand is accompanied by a certified copy of the information filed in the office of the justice of the peace of the precinct of Astoria, Clatsop county, State of Oregon, whereby the said C. H. Bayley stands charged with said crime, and with having fled from said State and taken vol. cxi—10 [p. 626] refuge in the State of California, which is certified by the Governor of the State of Oregon to be authentic :
“ You are, therefore, required to arrest and secure the said C. H. Bayley, wherever he may be found within this State, and to deliver him into the custody of the said W. L. Robb, to be taken back to the State from which he fled, pursuant to the said requisition, he, the said W. L. Robb, defraying all costs and expenses incurred in the arrest and securing of said fugitive. You will make return to this department of the manner in which this warrant has been executed.
il In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the great seal of the State to be affixed, this, the twentieth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-xhree.
“ [seal.] “ Geoee Stoneman,
“ Governor of the State of California,
“ By A. E. Shattuck, Deputy.
“ By the Governor :
“ Thos. L. Thompson, Secretary of State.”
Bayley sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the judge of the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco, directed to Robb, and commanding him to have the body of the petitioner before said judge, together with the time and cause of his detention, &c. His application for the writ proceeded upon the ground that the imprisonment and detention were illegal, in that “ no copy of an indictment found or affidavit made, before a magistrate, charging petitioner with any crime, was produced to the Governor of California,” and consequently, that the warrant of arrest was issued without compliance with the act of Congress.
Robb made return that he held Bayley “ under the authority of the United States,” as evidence whereof he produced a copy of the warrant of the Governor of California, with his commission from the Governor of Oregon, authorizing him to take and receive the prisoner as a fugitive from justice. Be refused “ to produce said C. H. Bayley, on the ground that, under the laws of the United States, he ought not to produce said prisoner, because the honorable Superior Court has no [p. 627] power or authority to proceed in the premises.” For this refusal—the court finding that the body of the petitioner could be produced—Robb was adjudged guilty of contempt of court, and by order of the judge he was arrested by the sheriff and committed to jail until he “ obeys said writ and produces the body of the said C. H. Bayley,” or “ until he be otherwise legally discharged.” He thereupon sued out a writ of habeas carpus from the Supreme Court of California. His application proceeded on the ground that Bayley was in his custody “ under and by virtue of the authority of the United States, and that said Superior Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the premises,” and “ his [Robb’s] imprisonment is contrary to the laws of the United States and in excess of the jurisdiction of said court.” Upon hearing, the writ was dismissed, and Robb remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
“It is no part of our duty,” said the Supreme Court of California, “ to decide whether the authority under which Robb holds the prisoner Bayley is sufficient or not. Neither is it incumbent on us to decide whether Bayley is held under the authority of the United States, and if so, how far it is competent for the court below to inquire into the legality of the proceedings under which he is held. Whether an affidavit or indictment must accompany the requisition or not; whether the recitals in the governor’s warrant of arrest are conclusive or simply prima facie evidence of the facts they recite, all these are matters for the consideration of the court issuing the writ and before whom the prisoner is to be brought. The only inquiry in this case relates to the power of the court below to compel the production of the body of the prisoner before it, so that the cause of his imprisonment and detention can be inquired into, and on this point we have no doubt. It was not the duty of the court issuing the writ, nor was it obliged to accept as true, the return of the party. It was within the jurisdiction of the court, at least, to inquire into the facts of the case and the alleged cause of detention, and to this end it was proper that the prisoner should be brought into the presence of the court, in obedience to the command of the Writ, whereupon the prisoner would have had a right to [p. 628] traverse the return. People v. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 438; People v. Brady, 56 Id. 182 ; Norris v. Newton, 5 McLean, 92; State v. Schlemn, 4 Harr. (Del.) 577. This the petitioner refused to do, and by such refusal was guilty of a contempt of court.”
From the judgment dismissing the writ and remanding Robb to the custody of the sheriff, he prosecuted this writ of error.
Mr. H. G. Sieberst and Mr. Alfred Clarke, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. A. C. Searle and Mr. E. C. Marshal, Attorney-General of California, for defendant in error.
Me. Justice Haelan delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:
For the purpose of giving effect to the second section of article four of the Constitution of the United States, declaring that “ a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall on the demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime,” Congress passed the act of February 12th, 1793, in relation to fugitives from justice. 1 Stat. 302. The provisions of its first and second sections have been re enacted in sections 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes, which are as follows :
“Sec . 5278. Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fug1' [p. 629] tive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appear, within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the State or Territory making such demand, shall be paid by such State or Territory.
“Sec. 5279. Any agent so appointed who receives the fugitive into his custody, shall be empowered to transport him to the State or Territory from which he has fled. And every person who, by force, sets at liberty or rescues the fugitive from such agent while so transporting him, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year.”
The penal code of California, in conformity with the constitution of that State, provides, in reference to the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, that “ said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody in their respective counties.”
The authority and duty of the judge of that court to issue a writ of habeas corpus upon Bayley’s application is not disputed in argument. But the contention of the plaintiff in error is, that in receiving and holding Bayley for the purpose of transporting him to Oregon he was, and is, acting under the author\ity and executing the power of the United States; and, therefore, that neither the Superior Court of San Francisco, nor one of its judges, could legally compel him to produce the prisoner, or commit him, as for contempt, for refusing to do so. If that court was without jurisdiction, by reason of the paramount authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States, to compel the plaintiff in error, in response to the writ of habeas corpus, to produce the prisoner, then his committal for contempt was the denial of a right, privilege, and immunity secured by the supreme law of the land. The claim by the plaintiff in error that there was such a denial constitutes the foundation of our jurisdiction.
It is contended that the principles announced in Ableman v.
and United States v. Booth, 21 How. 506, and in Tarblds [p. 630] Case, 13 Wall., 397, sustain the refusal of the plaintiff in error to produce the prisoner. The soundness of this position will be the subject of our first inquiry.
In Ableman v. Booth, the general question was as to the authority of a justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, upon a writ of habeas carpus, to compel the marshal of the United States to produce the body of one, committed to his custody by an order of a commissioner of a circuit court of the United States, for failing to give bail for his appearance in the district court of the United States for that State, to answer a charge of having violated the provisions of the fugitive slave act of September 18th, 1850. In other words, a judge of the supreme court of the State claimed and exercised the right to supervise and annul the proceedings of that commissioner, and to discharge a prisoner committed by him for an offence against the laws of the general government. In United States v. Booth, the question was as to the authority of a justice of the supreme court of the same Stat.e, upon a writ of habeas corpus, to discharge one in custody, under a judgment of the district court of the United States, in which he had been indicted for an offence against the laws of the United States, and by which he had been sentenced to be imprisoned for one month, to pay a fine of $1,000 and costs of prosecution, and to remain in custody until the sentence was complied with. The authority claimed by the justice who issued the writ and discharged the prisoner was affirmed by the supreme court of the State, and hence, as was said, the State court claimed and exercised jurisdiction over the proceedings and judgment of a district court of the United States, and, upon a summary and collateral proceeding, by habeas corpus, set aside and annulled its judgment, and discharged a prisoner who had been tried and found guilty of an offence against the laws of the United States, and sentenced to imprisonment by the district court. 21 How. 513, 514.
It was held that no such paramount power existed in any State, or her tribunals, since its existence was inconsistent wit the supremacy of the general government, as defined an limited by the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and could not be recognized wit [p. 631] out bringing within the control of the States the entire criminal code of the United States, including all offences, from the highest to the lowest, involving imprisonment as a part of the punishment inflicted. While the sovereignty of the State within its territorial limits to a certain extent was conceded, that sovereignty, the court adjudged, was so limited and restricted by the supreme law of the land, that the sphere of action appropriated to the United States was as entirely beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as the proceedings in one of the States were beyond the reach of the process of the judicial tribunals of another State.
“We do not question,” said this court, “the authority of a State court, or judge, who is authorized by the laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas corpus, to issue it in any case where the party is imprisoned within its territorial limits, provided it does not appear, when the application is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United States. The court or judge has a right to inquire, in this mode of proceeding, for what cause and by what authority the prisoner is confined within the territorial limits of the State sovereignty. And it is the duty of the marshal, or other person having the custody of the prisoner, to make known to the judge or court, by a proper return, the authority by which he holds him in custody. This right to inquire by process of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a return, grows, necessarily, out of the complex character of our government, and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted m its powTers, and each, within its sphere of action prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, independent of the other. But, after the- return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprized that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus, nor any other process issued under State authority, can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and [p. 632] exclugive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has committed an offence against their laws, their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him redress. And although, as we have said, it is the duty of the marshal, or other person holding him, to make known, by a proper return, the authority under which he detains him, it is at the same time imperatively his duty to obey the process of the United States, to hold the prisoner in custody under it, and to refuse •obedience to the mandate or process of any other government. And, consequently, it is his duty not to take the prisoner, nor suffer him to be taken, before a State judge or court upon a habeas corpus issued under State authority. No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him, or to require him to be brought before them. And if the authority of a State, in the form of judicial process or otherwise, should attempt to control the marshal or other authorized officer or agent of the United States, in any respect, in the custody of his prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force that might be necessary to maintain the authority of law against illegal interference. No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.” 21 How., 523.
Before considering the scope and effect of that decision, it is proper to examine Tarblds case, 13 Wall. 397, which is, also, relied on to support the proposition that the judge of the State court was without jurisdiction to compel the plaintiff in error to produce the body of the alleged fugitive from justice. In that case the question was whether a judicial officer of a State, or a commissioner of a State court, had jurisdiction, upon habeas corpus, to inquire into the validity of the enlistment of soldiers in the military service of the United States, and to discharge them from such service when, in his judgment, their enlistment had not been made in conformity with law. “ It is evident, [p. 633] said the court, “ if such jurisdiction may be exercised by any judicial officer of a State, it may be exercised by the court commissioner within the county for which he is appointed; and if it may be exercised with reference to soldiers detained in the military service of the United States, whose enlistment is alleged to have been illegally made, it may be exercised with reference to persons employed in any other department of the public service when their illegal detention is asserted. It may be exercised in all cases where parties are held under the authority of the United States, whenever the invalidity of the exercise of that authority is affirmed. The jurisdiction, if it exist at all, can only be limited in its application by the legislative power of the State. It may even reach to parties imprisoned under sentence of the National courts, after regular indictment, trial and conviction, for offences against the laws of the United States.” 13 Wall., 402.- The grounds of the decision in Ableman v. Booth and United States v. Booth were fully examined, and the conclusion reached is indicated in the following extract from the opinion: “ State judges and State courts, authorized by laws of their States to issue writs of habeas corpus, have undoubtedly a right to issue the writ in any case where a party is alleged to be illegally confined within their limits, unless it appear, upon his application, that he is confined under the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, by an officer of that government. If such fact appear upon the application the writ should be refused. If it do not appear, the judge or court issuing the writ has a right to inquire into the cause of imprisonment, and ascertain by what authority the person is held within the limits of the State; and it is the duty of the marshal, or other officer having the custody of the person, to give, by a proper return, information in this respect.” Ib., 409. Alluding to the fact that the language used in Ableman v. Booth and United States v. Booth had been construed by some as applying only to cases where a person is held in custody under the undisputed lawful authority of the United States, as distinguished from his imprisonment under mere claim and color of such authority, the court rejected any such limitation upon the [p. 634] decisions in those cases, and said: “ All that is meant by the language used is, that the State judge or State court should proceed no further when it appears, from the application of the party, or the return made, that the prisoner is held by an officer of the United States under what, in truth, purports to be the authority of the United States; that is, an authority, the validity of which is to be determined by the Constitution and laws of the United States. If a party thus held be illegally imprisoned, it is for the courts or judicial officers of the United States, and those courts and officers alone, to grant him release.” 75., 411. It was adjudged that the State court commissioner was without jurisdiction to issue the writ for the discharge of the prisoner in that case, because it appeared, upon the application presented for the writ, that “ the prisoner was held by an officer of the United States, under claim and color of the authority of the' United States, as an enlisted soldier mustered into the military service of the national government; and the same information was imparted to the commissioner by the return of the officer.”
From this review of former decisions, it is clear that the question now presented has never been determined by this court. In Ableman v. Booth, the prisoner, as we have seen, was held in custody by an officer of the United States, under a warrant of commitment from a commissioner of a Circuit Court of the United States, for an offence against the laws of the general government. In IJnited States v. Booth, he was in custody in pursuance of a judgment of a court of the United States founded upon an indictment, charging him with an offence against the laws of the United States. In Tarblds case, the person "whose discharge was sought was held as an enlisted soldier of the army, by an officer of that army acting directly under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
No such questions are here presented, unless it be, as claimed, that the plaintiff in error is, within the principles of former adjudications, an officer of the United States, wielding the authority and executing the power of the nation. We are all of opinion that he was not such an officer, but was and is simply an agent of the State of Oregon, invested with authority [p. 635] to receive, in her behalf, an alleged fugitive from the justice of that State. By the very terms of the statute under which the executive authority of Oregon demanded the arrest and surrender of the fugitive, he is described as the “ agent of such authority.” It is true that the executive authority of the State in which the fugitive has taken refuge, is under a duty imposed by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to cause his surrender upon proper demand by the executive authority of the State from which he has fled. It is equally true that the authority of the agent of the demanding State to bring the fugitive within its territorial limits, is expressly conferred by the statutes of the United States, and, therefore, while so transporting him, he is, in a certain sense, in the exercise of an authority derived from the United States. But these circumstances do not constitute him an officer of the United States, within the meaning of former decisions. He is not appointed by the United States, and owes no duty to the national government, for a violation of which he may be punished by its tribunals or removed from office. His authority, in the first instance, comes from the State in which the fugitive stands charged with crime. He is, in every substantial sense, her agent, as well in receiving custody of the fugitive, as in transporting him to the State under whose commission he is acting. What he does, in execution of that authority, is to the end that the violation of the laws of his State may be punished. The fugitive is arrested and transported for an offence against her laws, not for an offence against the United States. The essential difference, therefore, between the cases heretofore determined and the present one is, that in the former, the judicial authorities of the State claimed and exercised the right, upon habeas corpus, to release persons held in custody in pursuance of the judgment of a court of the United States, or by order of a Circuit Court commissioner, or by officers of the United States in execution of their laws ; while, in the present case, the person who sued out the writ was in custody of an agent of another State, charged with an offence against her laws.
Underlying the entire argument in behalf of the plaintiff in error is the idea that the judicial tribunals of the States are ex- [p. 636] eluded altogether from the consideration and determination of questions involving an authority, or a right, privilege, or immunity, derived from the Constitution and laws of the United States. But this view is not sustained by the statutes defining and regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. In establishing those courts, Congress has taken care not to exclude the jurisdiction of the State courts from every case to which by the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends. In the Judiciary Act of 1789 it is declared that the Circuit Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, “ concurrent with the courts of the several States,” of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, involving a certain amount, in which the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State. By section 711 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended by the act of February 18th, 1875, jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the several States, is vested in the courts of the United States of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States ; of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under their laws ; of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; of seizures under the laws of the United States, on land or on waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; of all cases arising under the patent-right or copyright laws of the United States; of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy; and of all controversies of a civil nature, where a State is a party, except between a State and its citizens, or between a State and citizen of other States, or aliens; the jurisdiction of the States remaining unaffected in all other cases to which the judicial power of the United States may be extended. And by the act of March 3d, 1875, the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States is enlarged so as to embrace all suits of a civil nature, at common law or equity, involving a certain amount, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or in which the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a [p. 637] controversy between citizens of different States, or a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, or a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. But it is expressly declared that in such cases their jurisdiction is “ concurrent with the courts of the several States ”—the jurisdiction of the latter courts being, of course, subject to the right to remove the suit into the proper court of the United States, at the time and in the mode prescribed, and to the appellate power of this court, as established and regulated by the Constitution and laws of the United States. So, that a State court of original jurisdiction, having the parties before it, may, consistently with existing Federal legislation, determine cases at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or involving rights dependent upon such Constitution or laws. Upon the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before them; for the judges of the State courts are required to take an oath to support that Constitution, and they are bound by it, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under their authority, as the supreme law of the land, “ anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” If they fail therein, and withhold or deny rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, the party aggrieved may bring the case from the highest court of the State in which the question could be decided to this court for final and conclusive determination.
The recognition, therefore, of the authority of a State court, or of one of its judges, upon writ of habeas corpus, to pass upon the legality of the imprisonment, within the territory of that State, of a person held in custody—otherwise than under the judgment or orders of the judicial tribunals of the United States, or by the order of a commissioner of a Circuit Court, or by officers of the United States acting under their laws— [p. 638] cannot be denied merely because the proceedings involve the determination of rights, privileges, or immunities derived from the nation, or require a construction of the Constitution and laws of the United States. Congress has not undertaken to invest the judicial tribunals of the United States with exclusive jurisdiction of issuing writs of habeas corpus in proceedings for the arrest of fugitives from justice and their delivery to the authorities of the State in which they stand charged with crime. When a demand has been made, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, by the State from which the fugitive has fled, upon the executive authority of the State in which he is found, that instrument, indeed, makes it the duty of the latter to cause his arrest and surrender to the executive authority of the demanding State, or to the agent of such authority. But if it should appear, upon the face of the warrant issued for the arrest of the fugitive, that such demand was not accompanied or supported by a copy, certified to be authentic, of any indictment found against the accused, or of any affidavit made before a magistrate of the demanding State, charging the commission by him of some crime in the latter State, could it be claimed that the arrest of the fugitive would be. in pursuance of the acts of Congress, or that the agent of the demanding State had authority from the United States to receive and hold him to be transported to that State ?
This question could not be answered in the affirmative, except upon the supposition, not to be indulged, that, so far as the Constitution and the legislation of Congress are concerned, the transporting of a person beyond the limits of the State m which he resides, or happens to be, to another State, depends entirely upon the arbitrary will of the executive authorities of the State demanding and of the State surrendering him. Whether the warrant of arrest, issued by the Governor o California for the arrest of Bayley, appeared, upon its face, to be authorized and required by the act of Congress; that is, whether, upon its face, a case was made behind which the State courts or officers could not go, consistently with the Constitution and laws of the United States, are questions upon whic it is unnecessary to express an opinion. What we decide an [p. 639] the present case requires nothing more—is, that, so far as the Constitution and laws of the United States are concerned, it is competent for the courts of the State of California, or for any of her judges — having power, under her laws, to issue writs of habeas corpus, to determine, upon writ of habeas corpus, whether the warrant of arrest and the delivery of the fugitive to the agent of the State of Oregon, were in conformity with the statutes of the United States; if so, to remand him to the custody of the agent of Oregon. And, since the alleged fugitive was not, at the time the writ in question issued, in the custody of the United States, by any of their tribunals or officers, the court or judge issuing it did not violate any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States in requiring the production of the body of the fugitive upon the hearing of the return to the writ, to the end that he might be discharged if, upon hearing, it was adjudged that his detention was unauthorized by the act of Congress providing for the arrest and surrender of fugitives from justice, or by the laws of the State in which he was found. The writ was without value or effect unless the body of the accused was produced. Subject, then, to the exclusive and paramount authority of the national government, by its own judicial tribunals, to determine whether persons held in custody by authority of the courts of the United States, or by the commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the general government, acting under its laws, are so held in conformity with law, the States have the right, by their own courts, or by the judges thereof, to inquire into the grounds upon which any person, within their respective territorial limits, is restrained of his liberty, and to discharge him, if it be ascertained that such restraint is illegal; and this, notwithstanding such illegality may arise from a violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
It is proper to say, that we have not overlooked the recent elaborate opinion of the learned judge of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California in In Re Robb, 19 Fed. Rep., 26. But we have not been able to reach the conclusion announced by him.
Syllabus.
For the reasons we have stated, and without considering other questions discussed by counsel, the judgment of the Supreme Court of California must be
Affirmed.
JOHNSON, Dative Testamentary Executor v. WATERS, Administrator.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.
Argued October 16th, 17th, 1883.—Decided May 5th, 1884.
Donation {inter vivos), (mortis causa)—Equity—Jurisdiction—Parties—Pleading—Prescription.
In Louisiana a donation to take effect at the death of the donor, so far as it is gratuitous, is a donation mortis causd, which can be made only by will and testament, or by an instrument clothed with the forms required for validity as such, and clearly showing by its provisions that it is a disposition by will.
In Louisiana a donation of land inter vivos, reserving the use to the donor until his death, is void if made without consideration :—if made with a partial consideration, the value of the object given exceeding by one-half or more that of the charges or services—quaere whether the gift will not be of a mixed nature, one part sale and valid, and one part donation and invalid. A Circuit Court of the United States has jurisdiction in equity of proceedings under a bill filed by a creditor of the estate of a deceased person to set aside for fraud a sale of the real estate of the deceased which was made and confirmed by order of a State court having competent jurisdiction, when the inquiry is not into irregularities of proceeding in the other court, but into actual fraud in obtaining the judgment or decree of sale and confirmation. A creditor of the estate of a deceased person may maintain an independent suit in Equity to set aside for fraud a sale of real estate of the deceased made under ordei of Court, though a party to the proceedings, if he was no party to the fraud, and was ignorant of it until after confirmation or homologation of the sale, and no question about it was before the court which confirmed the sale and passed upon the executor’s accounts.
In Louisiana the acknowledgment of a succession debt by an executor or administrator, and the ranking of it by the judge in the manner provided by the Code of Practice, suspend the prescription.
A complaint which sets forth as cause of action a subject which is prescribe, without setting forth the matter which takes it out of the prescription, may be amended so as to set that matter forth, if the answer admits its truth. [p. 641] A defective description of the representative capacity of a defendant in the subpoena which summons him in is cured if he is properly described in the bill, and if he appears, even by the defective title, and answers generally without objection.
In a creditor’s bill, brought on behalf of the plaintiff and such other creditors as may become parties, it is error in granting relief to confine it to the creditor complaining. The usual and correct practice is, by means of a reference to a master, to give to all valid creditors an opportunity to come in and have the benefit of the decree.
On the facts in this case the sale of the testator’s real estate made by order of a Parish court in Louisiana, and confirmed by that court, is void for fraud as against bona fide creditors.
The facts are stated in. the opinion of the court.
Mr. John JL. Ca/mpbeU for appellants.
Mr. Henry B. Kelly and Mr. Julius Aroni (Mr. Henry L. Lazarus and Mr. John G. Simrall were with them) for appellee.
Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was commenced by a creditor’s bill filed by William Gay, a citizen of Kentucky, on behalf of himself and all other creditors of Oliver J. Morgan, late of Louisiana, deceased, against Oliver T. Morgan, his testamentary executor, John A. Buckner, Ferdinand M. Goodrich, Edward Sparrow, and J. West Montgomery, citizens of Louisiana.
The bill alleges that Oliver J. Morgan, at the time of his decease (which occurred in October, 1860), was indebted to the complainant and to divers other persons; that he owed the complainant $33,250, for which he had given him three drafts or bills of exchange; one for $13,000, dated January 7th, 1860, payable twelve months after date; one for $10,250, dated February 2d, 1860, payable 13th January, 1861; and one for $10,000, dated February 10th, 1860, payable 25th January, 1861; all of which were unpaid at maturity, and were duly protested; and that on the 23d day of December, 1870, the complainant obtained judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana against the succession of the deceased, for the amount of the drafts and interest thereon, which judgment it is alleged has never been paid.
VOL. CXI—41
The main, object of the bill is to set aside as fraudulent and void certain sales of the testator’s lands made by the testamentary executor in January, 1869, to the defendants, Buckner, Montgomery and Goodrich, and to have the said lands resold in due course of administration for the purpose of paying the debts of the complainant and the other creditors, and for an account of assets and debts, an injunction and a receiver.
It is alleged in the bill, amongst other things, that, at the time of his decease, Oliver J. Morgan was the owner of a large estate, valued at nearly a million of dollars, consisting mostly of lands, abundantly sufficient, if honestly applied, to pay all his debts; but the bill charges, in substance, that the defendants have fraudulently combined to defeat the claims of the creditors by procuring the sale which is sought to be set aside. It is stated that this sale was made under an order of the Probate Court of the Parish of Carroll (where the lands are situated) on application of Buckner, as guardian of his daughter, and of the executor; the petition being signed by the other defendants as attorneys, and untruly representing that the lands were unproductive, and that it was necessary to sell them all to pay the debts of the estate. It is further stated that a simultaneous order was made, on the application of Oliver T. Morgan as executor of the will of Julia Morgan (adverse to and irreconcilable with his duties and trust as executor of Oliver J. Morgan), for the sale of three-fourths of the same lands as belonging to the estate of Julia Morgan; and that the sale was made under both orders. It is also stated that, before the sale, the confederates procured a false and fraudulent appraisement of the lands to be made at $2.75 per acre, reducing the whole value thereof to $43,205.25, instead of $947,153.80, at which they had been correctly appraised in the inventory. It is further stated that, at the sale, Buckner became the purchaser of 9,171 acres of the lands at $3 per acre; Montgomery, of 5,040 acres, and Goodrich, of 1,500 acres, at the same price; and it is charged that this price was grossly inadequate, and that the sale was a sham sale, intended as a means of securing the lands to the benefit of the family, and of cheating and de-
Opinion, of the Court.
frauding the creditors. Various allegations are contained in the bill tending to establish the charge of fraud.
The defendants filed separate answers, denying generally the charges of fraud, and setting up various matters in explanation of the sale complained of, and in opposition to the equity of the bill.
They concurred in admitting the plaintiff’s demand, and the recovery by him of a judgment thereon in the Circuit Court of the United States; but say that the judgment was allowed to be taken by an arrangement between the attorneys of plaintiff and defendant that the plaintiff, Gay, should acquiesce in the provision made for the creditors at the sale complained of, which provision was the purchase at said sale, by the defendant Montgomery, of 5,040 acres of land for the common benefit of the creditors; in making which arrangement, they allege that E. D. Farrar acted as attorney for Gay, and Edward Sparrow for the estate.
They also admitted the various appraisements made in 1860 and 1868 ; but deny that the latter was a false appraisement, or that it was procured by fraud; and referred to various circumstances in explanation of the great depreciation of the-land at the latter period, such as the depressed and unsettled state of the country, the uncertainty of labor, and the high rate of taxation.
All the answers rely upon the regularity and validity of the mortuary proceedings in which the sale was made ; and for the purpose of showing that as much was done for the creditors as could fairly have been demanded, they place great stress upon the alleged fact that three-fourths of all the lands sold belonged to the succession of Julia Morgan, the deceased daughter of Oliver J. Morgan, and wife of Oliver T. Morgan, and not to the succession of Oliver J. Morgan; and also upon another alleged fact, that John A. Buckner, as tutor of his daughter, had a mortgage lien, or privilege, on the whole property for ^ore than $100,000, which (as they contended) was more than the whole property could possibly have produced at the time °f the sale.
If these statements were true, they would go far to remove [p. 644] the imputation of fraud in the proceedings complained of; for there would have been no motive for fraud if the just rights of the heirs precluded the possibility of a surplus for the general creditors. The matter will be better understood, however, by a short history of Oliver J. Morgan’s estate.
His wife, Narcissa Deeson, had died in 1844, leaving two children by him, namely, Julia and Ann. Julia married, first, one Keene, by whom she had several children ; and, secondly, Oliver T. Morgan (a nephew of Oliver J.), by whom she had a daughter. Ann married a Mr. Kellam, by whom she had a son, Oliver H. Kellam ; and the latter had a son, Oliver H. (whom, for convenience, we will call Oliver H. Kellam, Junior), and died leaving a widow, Melinda M., and his infant son, Oliver H., Jr. Thus Oliver H. Kellam, Jr., became sole heir of his grandmother, Ann, and was himself represented by his mother, Melinda, as his natural tutrix. Melinda afterward married John A. Buckner, and by him had a daughter.
Oliver J. Morgan (sometimes called General Morgan), had a large landed estate, situated on the Mississippi River, in Carroll Parish, La., consisting of five plantations contiguous to each other, Albion and Wilton in the centre, Melbourne to the southeast, down the river, and Westland and Morgana to the west and northwest, amounting altogether to over 15,000 acres of land, much of it rich cotton land. He also had a large number of slaves, and considerable movable estate. The greater part of this property was community property ; but some of it had been acquired after the wife’s death. Only one-half of the community property belonged to Oliver J. Morgan; the other half belonging to his two daughters as heirs of their mother. Ann having died, her share was inherited by her grandson, Oliver H. Kellam, Jr.
In 1857 Oliver J. Morgan filed a petition in the District Court of Carroll Parish for a partition of the estate. An inventory was taken, answers were filed by Julia Morgan (who was then living), and by Melinda M. Kellam, as tutrix of her minor son, and evidence was taken as to the amount of improvements. The slaves were inventoried at $125,715.60, and were divided between the parties. The lands were inventoried, but t e [p. 645] appraisers reported that they could not be conveniently divided, and recommended that they should be sold. An order of sale was accordingly made, and the sale took place January 18th, 1858, and Oliver J. Morgan himself purchased all the lands for $362,201.80. The value of his improvements was appraised at $92,219, leaving a balance of $269,982.80, the one-half of which, $134,991.40, belonged to the heirs. One-half of this sum, or $67,495.70, was due to Julia Morgan, and the other half to the minor, Oliver H. Kellam, Jr. Although the sale was for cash, no money was paid. Julia Morgan-and her husband, Oliver T. Morgan, executed a request that the money coming to her should be left in her father’s hands; and Mrs. Kellam acquiesced in the same course with regard to the share of her infant son. Thus Oliver J. Morgan became absolute owner of the whole landed property, but was indebted to his daughter, Julia, and to his great-grandson, Oliver H. Kellam, Jr., each in the sum of $67,495.70. A certificate of the sale, signed by the sheriff and O. J. Morgan, was filed in the court, as part of the proceedings in the cause, stating the fact that the money was not paid, but remained in O. T. Morgan’s hands.
By virtue of this sale a vendor’s privilege arose in favor of the heirs; but it is declared by the Civil Code of Louisiana, art. 3238, that “ the vendor of an immovable or slave only preserves his privilege on the object when he has caused to be duly recorded at the office for recording mortgages his act of sale.” It appears from the recorder’s certificate that this was never done in this case.
As Oliver J. Morgan had but one descendant by his daughter Ann, and several by his daughter Julia, he desired, as far as possible, to equalize their ultimate portions in the succession of his estate; but having two heirs, his daughter Julia and great-grandson Oliver H. Kellam, Jr., he had the power of disposing of only one-half of his estate, and the two heirs would be forced heirs for one-fourth each. (Civil Code, art. 1480.) He determined, therefore, that his great-grandson, Oliver H. Kellam, Jr., should have only the one-fourth which the law secured to him as forced heir, and that his daughter Julia should have the other three-fourths of his estate. To [p. 646] insure this object, on the 9th of March, 1858, he executed an act of sale and donation to his daughter Julia, in which it was stated that for the purpose of paying her the sum of $67,495.70 which he owed her, and to give her three-fourths of his landed estate and to Oliver H. Kellam one-fourth, according to the estimates put upon the portions conveyed to each, he gave to her, by way of donation, certain described lands, composing the Wilton and Albion plantations, 3,047.86 acres, estimated at $50 per acre; and the Morgana and Westland plantations, estimated at from $45 to $10 per acre; the whole amounting to 11,477.79 acres, estimated at $304,254.22; and leaving the Melbourne plantation for his great-grandson, though there is no evidence that it was ever conveyed to him. The act of donation to Julia reserved the donor’s usufruct for life, and declared that he was to retain possession of the property, with the revenues arising therefrom, till his death. And it was further declared that the act of donation, as [well as] delivery under it, was to take place and effect on the day of the donor’s death. This act was signed by Oliver J. Morgan, Julia Morgan, and Julia’s husband, Oliver T. Morgan, and was duly recorded in the recorder’s office.
Such a donation, namely, to take effect at the death of the donor—so far at least as it is gratuitous—is a donation mortis causa. Article 1455 of the Civil Code of Louisiana defines a donation’mortis causa to be an act to take effect when the donor shall no longer exist. And article 1563 declares that “ no disposition mortis causa shall be made otherwise than by will and testament. All other form is abrogated.” It is added that the name is of no importance, “ provided that the act be clothed with the forms required for the validity of a testament, and the clauses it contains, or the manner in which it is made clearly establish that it is a disposition by will.”
The donation in question had not the form of a will, and was never treated or proved as such; and by the last will of Oliver J. Morgan, executed but a few months before his death, he revoked all former wills made by him.
If the document in question could be regarded as a donation inter vivos, it would still be void for another reason. By it the
JOHNSON V. WATERS. G47
donor reserves the usufruct of the land to himself, during his life; but by article 1520 of the Civil Code, treating of donations inter vivos, it is declared that “ the donor may dispose for the advantage of another of the enjoyment or usufruct of the immovable given, but cannot reserve it for himself.” It has been decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a number of cases, that a donation of land or of a slave, reserving the use to the donor for life, is void. Lagrange n. Barre et al., 11 Robinson, 302; Dawson v. Holbert, 4 La. Ann. 36; Haggerty v. Corri, 5 Ann. 433; Davis v. Carroll, 11 Ann. 705; Carmouche v. Carmouche, 12 Ann. 721.
It may be urged that there was a consideration for the act, and that this prevented it from being void. But that consideration, as shown by the account contained in the act itself, was only $67,495.70 due to Julia (which the act was to satisfy), and $9,530.72 to be paid by her to Oliver H. Kellam; amounting in all to $77,026.42; whilst (by the same account) the value of the land conveyed by the act was $304,254.22. So that the consideration, or charge, in pecuniary estimation, was only one-fourth of the value of the whole property conveyed.
The exact account of the value of the lands, and of the rights of the heirs in reference thereto, as made up by Gen. Morgan himself, and embodied in the act of sale and donation to Julia, is as follows:
“ Whole amount of community lands.........................$362,201 80
“ Lands acquired since the dissolution of the com-
munity............................................................. 75,760 00
“Whole amount of land..............................................$437,961 80
“ Deduct amount due to heirs arising from sale of
community lands on the 18th of January, ’58,
to each $67,495.70........................................ 134,991 40
“ Balance divided by four....................... $302,970 40
“Portion coming to Oliver H. Kellam................... $75,742 60 “Amount due him as above...................................... 67,495 60 “ Entire interest of Oliver H. Kellam, in estimated
value of lands................................................. $143,238 20 [p. 648] “ Three-fourths interest for Julia Morgan............... $227,227 80 “ Amount due as above............................................... 67,495 70 “Entire interest of Julia Morgan...............................$294,723 50
“Value of land conveyed in this deed to Julia Morgan........................................................... $304,254 22 “ Deduct entire interest........................................ 294,723 50 “ Excess to be accounted as before stipulated.......... $9,530 72.”
This account, better than anything else, explains to the eye the motives and intent of Oliver J. Morgan in executing the act of sale and donation under consideration.
Now, the Civil Code, article 1510, divides donations inter vivos into three kinds—the purely gratuitous; the onerous, which is burthened with charges; and the remunerative, of which the object is to recompense services rendered. By article 1513 it is declared that “ the rules peculiar to donations inter vivos do not apply to onerous and remunerative donations, except when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half that of the charges, or of the services.”
In the present case the value of the object given exceeded, not merely by one-half, but by nearly three times that of the charge or consideration. The act is subject, therefore, to the incidents and conditions of a donation, and it is void by the express letter of the code, unless it can be sustained in part by virtue of its being a sale in part and a donation for the residue.
Pothier, writing under the old law, says that where the charges of an onerous donation are of less value than the thing given, for example, 2,000 livres, when the thing given has the value of 3,000 livres, the act will be of a mixed nature, a sale for two-thirds and a donation for one-third. Contrat de Vente, No. 613, 614. Zachariae, professing to give the modern French law under the code, states it substantially as the former law is stated by Pothier, and this would probably be the construction of the Civil Code of Louisiana. By this ru e, the act in question would have been a sale for one-quarter o the land contained in it, and a donation for three-quarters, o^ to speak with accuracy, the proportion would be as $77,026.
to $227,227.80; the whole amount conveyed by the act being $304,254.22. If the old rule applies under the specific provisions of the code, the act was a good conveyance for the above proportion, and void as to the residue. As this matter (of validity in part) was not discussed before us it may come up for consideration by the Circuit Court, if called upon to instruct the master as to the ulterior disposition of the proceeds of any sales that may be made of the lands in controversy. As the representatives of Julia Morgan allowed the lands to be sold in 1869, they cannot claim any portion of them now specifically as lands; but they may be entitled in equity to such proportion of the proceeds, as the act of sale and donation was a sale and not a donation. The whole value of the lands was shown by the account to be $437,961.80. Of this amount the sum of $77,026.42, the only real consideration of the act, is about 17T%- per cent. Should all the lands be sold, the heirs of Julia Morgan may be entitled to this proportion of the proceeds free and clear of all debts. We do not now decide this question. For the present purpose, it is enough to say that it is very clear that the act of donation did not convey to Julia Morgan three-fourths of the land as claimed, and did not, in fact, convey to her even one-fifth of the land, if it conveyed any portion thereof. •
But prior to these transactions, and probably not long after his wife’s death, Oliver J. Morgan had placed his daughter Julia on the Westland, and (perhaps) on the Morgana plantation, and his grandson Oliver H. Kellam on Melbourne; the latter being succeeded by his widow, Melinda M. Kellam, and her minor son. The two families continued to occupy these portions of the property, respectively, until the sale made in 1869, and Julia Morgan and her representatives also succeeded to the possession of Wilton and Albion plantations after her father’s death.
Whether Oliver J. Morgan had doubts of the validity of the donation made to his daughter, or not, he subsequently made a will by which he substantially confirmed to her the benefit which he intended by it. This will is dated May 1st, 1860, and the testator, after directing the payment of [p. 650] all his debts and giving certain legacies, gave and directed as follows:
“ Fourth. I give and bequeath unto my beloved daughter, Julia Morgan, one-half of all the residue of my estate, it being my intention thereby to give to her all that portion of my estate that I have a right to dispose of over and above the portions going to my forced heirs; and in the event of my said daughter Julia dying before I do, then it is my will and I do hereby bequeath unto her children, Narcissa Keene, Alexander C. Keene, William B. Keene, Morgan Keene, and Julia H. Morgan, or such of them as may be living at my death, the said one-half of my entire estate as above, it being my will that my said daughter shall have, inclusive of her forced heirship, three-fourths of my entire estate; but in the event that should she die before I do, then it is my will and the express intention of this testament that those of her children who may be living at my death shall have the said three-fourths of my estate.
“ Fifth. I do hereby appoint and ordain Oliver T. Morgan, my nephew and son-in-law, executor of this my last will and testament, without requiring him to give security as such.”
Oliver J. Morgan died October 4th, 1860, and his will was proved in the same month, and an inventory of his estate was made November 7th, in which his lands were appraised at $947,153.80, his slaves at $196,961, and his movable property at $38,200: total, $1,182,314.80.
Julia Morgan died prior to 1868, leaving a will of which her husband, Oliver T. Morgan, was executor. Melinda M. Kellam married John A. Buckner, by whom she had a daughter, Mollie Buckner. Oliver H. Kellam, Jr., died without issue, leaving his mother as his sole heir; and she soon after died, leaving her infant child, Mollie Buckner, her sole heir, who thus came to be the sole heir and representative of Ann Kellam.
Notwithstanding the large estate left by Oliver J. Morgan, he died considerably in debt, and owed, amongst others, to William Gay, the complainant, the amount before stated. The [p. 651] coming on of the Civil War produced a great change in the value of the property; the slaves were a total loss, and, no doubt, much other property was injured or destroyed; but through the management of agents, and in other ways, considerable income was derived from the lands prior to the sale which took place in 1869. The crop of 1860 was over 2,500 bales of cotton, which must have produced at least $90,000 soon after Gen. Morgan’s death. The sum of $21,870.68 was recovered from the government for cotton collected under the superintendence of army officers in 1862. The defendant Buckner, being examined as a witness, states that “ Montague had charge of and cultivated Melbourne and Wilton in the year 1863, and H. B. Tebbetts had charge of some of the places during the years 1864 and 1865. In 1866 H. B. Tebbetts rented Wilton and Melbourne. Don’t think he took Albion. He was to pay ten dollars per acre rent for all the land that he cultivated. Tebbetts promised Matt. F. Johnson and witness to pay ten dollars per acre for such land as he should cultivate on Melbourne and Wilton in 1866. The most of the land was overflowed on Melbourne in 1866, and witness don’t know how much land was cultivated. Wilton was not overflowed in 1866, to his knowledge. Witness states that Tebbetts paid him $3,000 for the rent of Melbourne in 1866. Don’t know how much he paid Matt. F. Johnson for Wilton, but that the rent was coming to Matt. F. Johnson from Tebbetts, according to the contract. Matt. F. Johnson and Samuel L. Clambliss cultivated Wilton in 1867 together; that is to say, a portion of the place. Charles Atkins cultivated a small portion of Melbourne in 1868, as witness’ agent and manager. Very little was made on the place in 1868. Witness don’t remember who cultivated Wilton and Albion in 1868.”
Henry Goodrich, a plantet, nephew of Oliver J. Morgan, states that he had charge of Wilton and Albion in behalf of the heirs from December, 1868, till April, 1873, and that in 1869 these plantations produced 800 or 900 bales of cotton; and about 700 bales in each of the years 1870,1871, and 1872 ; and that during these four years the price of cotton averaged [p. 652] about $60 per bale net. Dr. Devine, another witness, states that he, with two others, hired about 100 acres of Wilton in 1869, and they received about 30 bales apiece, or nearly a bale to the acre, and sold it for 27 to 30 cents per pound, or about $120 per bale. So that the annual product of Wilton and Albion alone in these years was not less than from $40,000 to $50,000, and that of Melbourne, half that amount; and whilst the result in the previous years, from the close of the war to the beginning of 1869 was undoubtedly less, it must have amounted to a considerable sum. Adding together the amount of the movable estate, the proceeds of the crop of 1860, the sum received from government, and the income realized from the landed estate down to 1869, the aggregate was probably not less than $200,000 ; all of which was first applicable to the payment of the debts due from the estate. But as the outside debts were not paid, the heirs or executors must have received it. The executor’s final account is in evidence, and does not show that this money ever came into his hands; and the proof is very strong that he allowed the heirs to appropriate it. The amount which they thus appropriated, as well as the rental value of the plantations occupied by them before General Morgan’s death, was properly chargeable against any claims that they had against the estate. How much they did receive nowhere appears. No credit is given therefor.
As to Julia Morgan’s interest, it is not claimed that the estate was in debt to her; but it is claimed, and was claimed at the time of the sale in 1869, that her succession was entitled to three-fourths of the property by virtue of the act of donation made to her in 1858, and that this portion of the property was not subject to the debts of General Morgan, except the debt due to Buckner as tutor of his minor child. It was conceded to be subject to this debt, perhaps for the purpose of giving greater force to the sale, as therd was evidently an understanding between the parties, as we shall hereafter see. But we think we have conclusively shown that the entire interest of Julia Morgan in the property of her father was subject, at his death, to all his debts, inasmuch as it was derived to her partly by last will, and partly as forced heir. If any portion of her [p. 653] interest was not thus subject, it could only have been a small fraction at most—less than one-fifth of the whole property.
As to the Kellam interest, John A. Buckner, as tutor of his infant daughter (who represented Oliver H. Kellam, Jr., through the mother of both), claimed the entire sum of $67,495.50 and interest thereon from 1858, amounting at the time of the sale (January, 1869) to more than $100,000. At 5 per cent, interest it amounted to $104,618.33.
As to this claim, it may be remarked that as Oliver J. Morgan intended to pay to his daughter Julia what was due to her from her mother’s estate by giving to her the lands which she succeeded to and received, so he evidently intended to pay to his great-grandson, Oliver H. Kellam, what was due to him on the same account, although, so far as the record discloses, he executed no act of donation for that purpose. But the careful statement in the act of donation to Julia, of the account between Oliver J. Morgan and the two heirs of his wife, in relation to the landed estate shows that the lands conveyed to Julia exceeded by $9,530.72 the three-fourths intended for her, including the $67,495.70 due to her from her mother’s estate; and the donor directed that she should pay this sum of $9,530.72 to Oliver II. Kellam. This payment, according to the account, together with the remaining lands not given to Julia, but appropriated to Kellam, completely paid and satisfied the debt of $67,495.72 due to him, and the one-fourth to which he was entitled as forced heir. So that it is quite clear that Oliver J. Morgan regarded the debt as paid, with the exception of the small sum of $9,530.72 to be paid by Julia Morgan.
In other words, by means of the sale of the lands in the partition suit, and the subsequent distribution of his estate, Oliver J. Morgan intended that his great-grandson should receive just what, if no sale had been made, the law would nave given him, and no more; and that Julia Morgan should receive the remainder; so that in reality, and in equity, there was no such thing as a debt due from him to his great-grandson, any more than to his daughter Julia. Whatever debt there might have been was paid by the property which he [p. 654] received—except the said sum of $9,530.72, which was made a charge upon Julia’s share.
This, as it seems to us, was clearly the intention and understanding of Oliver J. Morgan. Why should he have been indebted to his heirs for the land or any part of it, when they received every foot of it at his death, and had enjoyed a great deal of it in his life-time; he being entitled by law to the use of it during his life? The idea of an existing debt seems to have been an after-thought.
This supposed debt was claimed and represented to be a mortgage on the estate, and as having priority over all other debts. But we have seen that this claim was untenable, since Article 3238 of the Civil Code declares that the vendor of an immovable or slave only preserves his privilege on the object, by recording the act of sale at the office for recording mortgages, which was never done in this case. John A. Buckner, in his petition for the sale of the property, in December, 1868, makes the following allegation on the subject, namely: “ That your petitioner, Buckner, tutor, is creditor by judgment of the district court in said parish [Carroll], as appears by reference in the suit in said court styled---------v.---------- , No.----- , on the docket as---------.” The only judgment to which reference could have been made (so far as appears in the record) was the judgment in the partition suit instituted by Oliver J. Morgan in 1857. The judgment for partition was made November 7th, 1857, and the judgment for selling the lands was made December 2d, 1857. The certificate of sale, showing the amount bid for the lands, and the sums due to the heirs of Narcissa Deeson, was filed in the court on the 19th day of January, 1858. If this certificate of sale could have been called a judgment, it might have been a judicial mortgage; but it would have had no effect as such until recorded in the office of mortgages for the parish. Civil Code, Articles 3290, 3297, 3314, 3318. The only exception to this rule is made in favor of the legal mortgages of minors and interdicted and absent persons, on the property of their tutors, curators, &c., and of the wife on the property of her husband for her dotal rights. Civil Code, Arts. 3298, 3333. In the present case, neither the judgment in the [p. 655] partition suit, nor the certificate of sale, was ever recorded in the mortgage office; and Oliver J. Morgan was not the tutor or curator of Oliver H. Kellam, Jr., who was under the tutorship of his mother, Melinda M. Kellam. The claim, therefore, that the debt due from Oliver J. Morgan and his succession, to Oliver H. Kellam, Jr. (if any such debt existed), was a first lien upon the lands of the succession, secured by mortgage, and entitled to be first paid, was entirely unfounded. Yet this pretended debt, and its pretended priority over all other claims against the estate, and the mortgage by which it was declared to be secured, were used throughout the whole of the proceedings instituted in 1868 for the sale of the land, as potent factors in getting up the idea and impression that it was useless for any other creditors to interfere or make opposition, inasmuch as this privileged debt was sufficient to absorb the entire property, and that if anything at all should be conceded to the general creditors, it would be a mere matter of grace and generosity on the part of Mr. Buckner.
We next come to the proceedings for selling the property, commenced in December, 1868, and consummated in March, 1869.
First comes the petition, and as it is important, we state it in full. It was presented to the parish judge December 9th, 1868, and is as follows:
“To the Honorable the Judge of the Parish Court in and for the Parish of Carroll, State of Louisiana.
“The petition of John A. Buckner, who applies as natural tutor of his minor child, Mollie Buckner, issue of his marriage with Matilda M. Mason, widow of Oliver H. Kellam, and of Washington Jackson, and Dudley and Nelson and Ann B. Wilkins, all of which petitioners appear as creditors of the succession of Oliver J. Morgan, deceased, represent:
‘‘That your petitioners are creditors of said estate ; that your petitioner Buckner, tutor, is creditor by judgment of the district court in said parish, as appears by reference in the suit in said court styled v. , No. , on the docket as ; that your petitioners Washington Jackson [p. 656] and Ann B. Wilkins have claims which have been acknowledged and ranked according to law.
“ Petitioners show that said estate of O. J. Morgan is under administration in the hands of Oliver T. Morgan, executor; that said estate is possessed of landed property situated in this parish, but which is not yielding any revenues, and that the only means for paying the debts of said estate is by a sale of the property thereof. Wherefore petitioners pray that said O. T. Morgan, executor, may be ordered to sell the property of said estate for the purpose of paying the debts thereof ; that an order may be granted for the sale of the property of said succession, as mentioned in the inventory, and for general relief, &c.
“And the said Oliver T. Morgan, executor of the last will and testament of Oliver J. Morgan, dec’d, appears and intervenes in this proceeding and shows to your honorable court that said succession is indebted to the creditors aforesaid and various other creditors, and that as said estate is without any means or funds on hand in order to pay said debts, a sale of said property is necessary.
“ Wherefore, petitioners and intervenor pray that an order may be granted for the sale of the lands of said estate according to law, and that inventory and appraisement of said lands may be made ; that a commission may issue for that purpose to the recorder of the parish, and that a writ of sale may issue to said executor, authorizing him to make said sale, and for general relief in the premises.
“Sparrow & Montgomery,
‘ ‘ A tfys for Creditors.
“Ferd. M. Goodrich,
“ At€y for Executor
The following order was thereupon made by the judge:
“ The foregoing petition being considered, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the prayer of the petition may be granted ; that a commission .to take an inventory be directed to the recorder of the parish ; that the lands of said estate be sold in subdivisions in such manner as the said executor may direct, and in other respects according to law ; and that such subdivisions be sold in block, and after making such sale the said [p. 657] executor shall file a tableaux of distribution, and that a commission issue to said executor, O. T. Morgan, to make such sale.
“Done and signed in chambers this the 9th day of December, AD. 1868.
“ C. A. De France, Parish Judged
Thereupon a commission was issued to the recorder of the parish, who appointed Michael Gingery and W. D. Davis appraisers, and the appraisers made an inventory as follows :
1. Certain specified lots, comprising the Melbourne
plantation, 2,171 acres, at $2.75............... $5,970 20
2. Certain lots, composing the Wilson and Albion
plantations, 7,000 acres, at $2.75.............. 19,250 00
3. Certain lots, composing Westland plantation, 5,040
acres, at $2.75............................................. 13,860 00
4. Certain lots, composing the Morgana plantation,
1,500 acres, at $2.75.................................. 4,125 00 Total, 15,711 acres, at $2.75............................. $43,205 25
This inventory was dated December, 1868.
Then followed a writ of sale, directed to the executor, Oliver T. Morgan, and dated December 18th, 1868, directing him to sell the said lots ; terms, cash on the spot.
On the same day (Dec. 18th) the executor, according to his return, advertised the sale for the 19th of January, 1869 ; but before the day of sale arrived, the idea occurred to the parties, that Julia Morgan owned three-fourths of the property; and hence, on the 13th day of January, 1869, Oliver T. Morgan, as executor of the estate of Mrs. Julia Morgan, presented to the judge another petition, stating the fact of having presented the previous petition, and of the order of sale and advertisement, and then adding as follows :
“ Your petitioner shows that said Julia Morgan claimed to be owner of three-fourths undivided interest in said land, although they are claimed in toto by the estate of said Oliver J. Morgan, and are offered for sale in order to pay his debts ; that the debts due by him to the heirs of Oliver H. Kellam, who are also heirs of Mrs. Narcissa Morgan, deceased, late wife of said Oliver J.
vol. cxi—42 [p. 658] Morgan, amounts to $137,000.00, being for one-fourth of the interest of said Mrs. Narcissa in the community existing between her and her said husband, which devolved to said *heirs, and which community had been adjudicated to said Oliver J. Morgan at said sum ; that said sum of money, so due by said Oliver J. Morgan, is secured by legal mortgage on all of said land; that in order that said property may be sold to the benefit of said estate, it is necessary that the interest of said Mrs. Julia Morgan may be sold; that her said interest is under the incumbrance of said mortgage, existing against said Oliver J. Morgan, for the amount so due to the heirs of Oliver H. Kellam ; that for the purpose of paying the said sum the said heirs of Kellam, the interest of said Julia Morgan, deceased, should also be sold.
“ Wherefore petitioners pray that an order for the sale of the interest of said Julia Morgan, deceased, in said land, maybe made for the purpose of paying said debt, and that the proceeds of such sale may be paid by preference to the settlement thereof.
“ That for this purpose, a writ of sale may issue to your petitioner, in his capacity of executor, to make such sale ; that such sale take place on the premises, at Wilton plantation, in block, and for general relief, &c.
“Feed. M. Goodrich,
“ AtCy for Executor."1'
And upon this petition the following order was granted:
“The foregoing petition being considered, it is ordered that the prayer of the petition be granted ; that the undivided interest of said Mrs. Julia Morgan, deceased, in said land, be sold at public sale, in order to pay said debt; that said sale be made at the * Wilton plantation ’ for cash, in block, and that for this purpose a writ do issue to said executor, and that he be authorized to make said sale.
“ Carroll Parish, La., January 13th, 1869.
“ C. A. De France, Parish Judge."
On the same day a writ of sale was issued in pursuance of this order.
The sale took place (as advertised) on the 19th day of January, 1869, and the lands were bid off as follows: The Me - bourne plantation (2,171 acres), and the Wilton and Albion [p. 659] plantations (7,000 acres), to John A. Buckner, for $3 per acre; The Westland plantation (5,040 acres), to J. W. Montgomery, for $3 per acre ; and the Morgana plantation (1,500 acres), to Ferdinand M. Goodrich, for $3 per acre; total, $47,133. Deeds were given to the purchasers on the 23d of January, 1869. On the 26th separate petitions were filed by Buckner and Goodrich for monitions to be published and the sales to them homologated. Publication was accordingly made, and decrees of homologation were entered on the 2d of March, 1869.
This is an outline of what took place in the formal proceedings, and of what appears on paper. Several things outside and behind the mere forms are to be noticed, all tending to corroborate the conclusion, that this sale was projected and carried out, not for the purpose of paying the debts due to the creditors of the estate, but for the purpose of defeating their payment, and of preserving the estate for the benefit of the heirs.
The general scheme seems to have been, first, to circulate and give currency to the fact that a large indebtedness of the succession existed in favor of one of the heirs, sufficient in amount to absorb the entire estate, and secured by a mortgage giving it priority over all other claims; secondly, to depreciate the value of the property so that this supposed indebtedness would cover it all; thirdly, to put forward the claim of Julia Morgan to three-fourths of the property which, even, if not sustained, would show a complication of the title that would affect the salable value of the land; and fourthly, to procure a judicial sale by which the title might be cleared of all incumbrances, and the land might be distributed to the heirs according to their prior interests therein, free from all liability to the debts of the estate. If this scheme was not distinctly formed in the minds of the parties, it seems nevertheless to have been substantially carried into effect, with the added circumstance °i providing a liberal compensation to the attorneys and counsel by whose aid it was accomplished.
The following is the account given by J. W. Montgomery °f the manner in which the proceedings were initiated and carried out:
“ He thinks it was in the fall of 1867 John A. Buckner called on him in the town of St. Joseph, where he (witness) was attending court, with a request that he should take charge of the collection of a claim against the estate of Oliver J. Morgan, which, with interest, amounted to about $100,000, and which he was attempting to collect as a representative of one of the minor heirs of the estate of Mrs. Oliver J. Morgan, and which claim he represented to be, and which witness knew to be, in judgment against Oliver J. Morgan during his lifetime, and secured by mortgage on all of his property and was really the only mortgage on it.
“ When witness returned home he mentioned the proposition of Buckner to his law partner, General Edward Sparrow, who refused to go into it unless some arrangement was made by which something could be secured to some othgr creditors whom they represented. Witness himself was willing to take charge of Buckner’s claim and give up the others, because the heirs whom Buckner represented had always been their client, and had a preferred claim by which witness thought he, the heir, could sweep the whole property ; but General Sparrow adhered to the proposition that something must be done for the other ordinary creditors whom their firm represented, and insisted on a compromise by which something should be secured to them. Afterwards it was agreed between counsel, Sparrow & Montgomery and Buckner, that the creditors should be protected to a certain extent. In the meantime F. M. Goodrich, attorney-at-law, representing certain creditors, also insisted that his clients should participate in such an arrangement. Subsequently Oliver T. Morgan, the executor of Oliver J. Morgan, insisted that there should be no preference among the ordinary creditors. If one was to come in, all weie to come in ; that if Buckner was willing to make a concession in favor of the creditors represented by Sparrow & Montgomery, e did not see any reason why all the other creditors should not come in too. It was therefore agreed that other creditors, whom their law firm did not represent, should participate in any com promise which might be made in that respect. It was then agreed between Sparrow & Montgomery and Buckner that a the creditors of Judge Morgan might be permitted to bid upon the 5,040 acres before mentioned, without interference from 1S mortgage claim ; that he would not press his mortgage c^a1^ against the land that they should bid on, and that they mi& [p. 661] bid on it free from interference on his part, though there was no contract or understanding that the creditors should absolutely buy it, but only had a right to bid on it so far as their attorneys might deem it to their interest.
“ Witness had no further authority than this for buying in for the creditors. In the exercise of a fair discretion, witness thought he was doing the best for those which he represented, knowing that Buckner’s claim was sufficient to sweep the whole property, and that whatever he might get for his clients under such an arrangement was. just so much clear gain, and so F. M. Goodrich, attorney for other creditors, and Oliver T. Morgan, executor, thought. Accordingly, after Buckner had made his concession in this form, recognizing their right to bid on some of the property without interference from him or the claim he represented, they then, as his attorneys, and as attorneys for some of the other creditors whom they represented, presented a petition to the court asking for a sale of the property to pay debts against the estate of Oliver J. Morgan.”
The witness added that, at the sale, by request of some of the representatives of the creditors, and by understanding between himself and his law partner, he. Montgomery, bid upon the 5,040 acres [Westland] for the creditors; and Buckner permitted him to buy in said property free from interference by his preferred claim, which “was the result of.a pressure brought to bear upon Buckner; ” and he holds said 5,040 acres for the benefit of such creditors as choose to come into the arrangement;
This statement is certainly a very remarkable one in view of all the facts of the case as they have been demonstrated by the evidence. The gravity with which the “compromise” was made between Buckner and the other creditors, after “the pressure brought to bear upon Buckner,” is certainly interestlng, when we recollect, what was clearly proved in the cause, that the Westland plantation, consisting of 5,040 acres, which was thus allowed to be bid off for the benefit of the other creditors, was, at the time, overflowed with water, and was estimated by several credible witnesses as worth not over a dollar and a quarter per acre, whilst the Wilton and Albion [p. 662] plantations bought in by Buckner were worth probably $25 per acre, as will be shown more fully hereafter.
The first thing that was done after the presentation of the petition for a sale, was to appoint appraisers and have the property appraised; since no bid could be accepted which did not equal the appraised value of the property. Of course it was essential to the accomplishment of the supposed object of the parties that this appraised value should be as small as possible. It certainly was small enough—two dollars seventy-five cents per acre for each of the five plantations. They were all razeed down to one uniform value per acre, when the proof is overwhelming that they were very unequal in value. But the appraisement was a mere sham. The appraisers knew nothing about the plantations; they never saw them. They seem to have been picked up in the street and made their appraisement at guess, if not at the dictation of some of the parties interested. Their names were Davis and Gingery.
Ingram, one of the witnesses, who had been Gen. Morgan’s overseer for several years, and now a planter himself, says he was well acquainted with Davis, who lived in West Carroll [the Morgan estate being in East Carroll]. He had the reputation of being somewhat of an idiot. His mental weakness was notorious in the country, and he was usually known by the name of “fool Davis.” He also knew Michael Gingery. He resided in the western part of the parish, and was a man of very poor judgment—a carpenter. Witness would not feel safe in buying or selling by their judgment. He said further, that he would not think it a fair appraisement to appraise lands like Wilton, Albion, and Melbourne at five dollars per acre; that such lands were worth from eight to ten dollars per acre rent ever since the war. That before the war they could have been sold for $70 or $80 per acre; and that they were worth half as much since the war.
Davis himself, when examined as a witness, admits that he had no knowledge of the Morgan property except a general knowledge he had of all the swamp lands of Carroll Parish, that he had no knowledge of the condition of the Morgan property in 1869, except what he heard from others. He [p. 663] admits that he got his ideas of the value of property in the parish from the prices at which property was sold at succession and other public sales about the court-house.
A number of witnesses were examined as to the real value of the property; but, perhaps, none more competent tnan Mr. Henry Goodrich, a nephew of Gen. Morgan, and manager of his plantations from 1838 to 1843; and again manager for Matthew F. Johnson from 1868 to 1873. He thought the appraisement of the land in 1860 was rather high, and that about $500,000 would have been a fair valuation. He said that $3 dollars per acre, the price bid at the sale in January, 1869, was a low valuation ; thought that the open lands in 1869 were worth $75 per acre, and the wood lands worth $15. He spoke particularly of the Wilton, Albion, Morgana, and Melbourne plantations—not of the Westland.
Mr. Le May, who had been a planter most of his life, testified that he had known the Morgan property since the year 1858, and in 1862 he managed the Westland plantation for the succession. He added:
“Westland plantation and the adjacent lands are subject to overflow and have been overflowed every year since the war. Said Westland plantation and adjacent lands are of little value, and witness says he could not estimate them to be worth more than one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre at present and ever since the war. He means to say that Westland plantation and adjacent lands belonging to the succession of Oliver J. Morgan he could not estimate higher than one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.
“ Wilton, Albion, Melbourne, and Morgana plantations are not included in this estimate. Westland plantation is established on the lands of the succession of Oliver J. Morgan furthest back from the Mississippi River, and the adjacent lands referred to are wild lands belonging to said succession. Says that Wilton, Albion, and Melbourne plantations have always been regarded as first-class plantations in the Parish of Carroll. Regards the lands embraced in said plantations as worth about seventy-five dollars per acre before the war, and twenty-five dollars now and since the [p. 664] war, cash valuation. Such lands have been renting for from eight to ten dollars per acre since the war. . . .
“ Witness having heard read to him the deposition of witness N. D. Ingram, corroborates in the main his testimony in regard to the location and description of the property, but does not appraise the lands since the war quite as high. Witness does not think that the appraisement of said Wilton, Albion, and Melbourne plantations at three (3) dollars per acre in 1868 was a fair valuation of said property. Witness considers that the same were worth in cash at that time twenty-five (25) dollars per acre.
“ Witness was acquainted with Michael Gingery and W. D. Davis, who were the appraisers of said property. Gingery was a carpenter by trade, and resided in the western portion of the parish of Carroll, now West Carroll. . . . Witness considered Mr. Gingery to be an illiterate man, and not competent to fix a value on said property. Witness says he has known W. D. Davis as a citizen of the western portion of the Parish of Carroll, now West Carroll, for several years. Witness says he does not know of two more incompetent persons than Gingery and Davis to appraise property. Thinks that more incompetent persons could not have been found to make said appraisement in 1868.”
Testimony of a different character was adduced, it is true, but in our judgment the result of the evidence is, that the appraisement, as we said before, was a mere sham. We have little doubt that the property of the estate which, in the aggregate, was bid off by Buckner, Goodrich, and Montgomery for $47,133, was worth at least five times that amount.
But there is no wonder that the property sold at a mere nominal price; there was no competition. The facts which were circulated, that Buckner had a preferred claim for over $100,000, and that three-fourths of the property belonged to Mrs. Julia Morgan or her heirs, were sufficient to drive away all bidders; and, as if this were not sufficient, one person at least, who had intended to bid on the property, was actually deterred from attending the sale by being told that it was to be a sale for the benefit of the heirs, or a family affair. Rhodes, one of the witnesses, says:
“ That on the morning of the sale of the succession property of Oliver J. Morgan, in January, 1869, he and John Lynch went to the Wilton plantation, where the sale was to occur, expecting to attend the sale, and Lynch was calculating upon buying some of the property. When they reached Wilton they found no person present authorized to make the sale. Passed above said plantation and met Judge J. W. Montgomery and Ferdinand M. Goodrich, attorneys, going down to the sale. Major Lynch spoke of going back to attend the sale and questioned them as to the terms of the same. Mr. F. M. Goodrich replied to him that it was to be a sale for the benefit of the heirs, or a family affair. Lynch was informed that if he went back and purchased at the sale, he would get a long litigation on his hands, and they induced him not to attend the sale. . . . Witness is satisfied that if John Lynch had been let alone by Mr. Goodrich he would have attended the sale and would have bid something like the value of the property, and it would not have been sacrificed for the nominal price of three dollars per acre. Lynch, Ruggles & Co. paid about forty dollars per acre for the Illanara plantation, situated about four miles below Wilton, and it is far inferior to Wilton and Melbourne plantations in value per acre. Witness is satisfied that Lynch would have given more than twenty-five dollars per acre for Wilton, Albion, and Melbourne plantations had he attended the sale, and believed he could have obtained a valid title.”
J. W. Montgomery was examined on the subject of the conversation between Lynch and Goodrich, to contradict Rhodes, and he says, “ that F. M. Goodrich stated to Major Lynch • . . that the property was being sold to pay in part a large claim against it held by the family. This is what I remember of Goodrich’s statements.”
We do not see that the contradiction materially affects the result of the evidence.
Besides, the actual events which ensued, the proceedings at the sale itself, and what took place after the sale, go to prove most conclusively that it was intended as a mere family arrangement for securing the property, against the demands of the creditors, in the hands of the two branches of the family precisely as they had always held it,—except that for the sake [p. 666] of appearances, the Westland plantation of 5,040 acres, then overflowed, and not worth more than a dollar and a quarter an acre, was bid off by Montgomery for the creditors ;—and Morgana, consisting of 1,500 acres, was given to Montgomery and Goodrich for their services, and was afterward sold by the latter for about $10,000. The Wilton and Albion plantations, although bid off by Buckner, never changed hands, but continued to remain, and still remain in the possession of Julia Morgan’s heirs, whilst Buckner himself kept Melbourne and occupied it as before. This is conceded by all the parties, Buckner and Montgomery being fully examined on the subject and admitting the fact. The pretence that the sale was made to satisfy Buckner’s claim of over $100,000 was nothing but a pretence; when pressed on the subject, he admitted that, although the aggregate amount of his bids on the three plantations sold to him (which was $27,513) was legally a credit on the amount of the debt, yet that he did not claim the plantations held by the representatives of Julia Morgan, namely, Wilton and Albion. He was examined as a witness in 1878, nine years after the sale, and testified, amongst other things, as follows:
u The heirs of Julia Morgan have held possession of the land they had before the war ; and witness has held possession of the land he had before the war. Witness does not hold the property in common ; there is only a temporary division.
“ Witness has held possession of Melbourne ever since the war, and the heirs of Julia Morgan have, held possession of Wilton and Albion, except that the heirs recognized Oliver T. Morgan as executor, but he did not require of them any account of the rents and revenues.
“ Witness says that his understanding was, at the time of the sale, in January, 1869, when he bought in the property for the heirs, that they were to receive their proportion of the land purchased in witness’ name, and he was to retain his proportion.
“ They were (the heirs of Julia Morgan) to take three-fourths of the land and witness one-fourth, and this understanding was had as to the exact amount in the division after the sale. There [p. 667] was no conversation or agreement with the heirs, or any other parties, as to how the division should be made.”
It is unnecessary to pursue the subject further in relation to the question of fraud. We are entirely satisfied that the sale was a sheer fraud as against the general creditors of the estate.
The next question is, whether the complainant is in a situation to contest the validity of the sale by the present suit. It is contended that he is concluded by the proceedings in the Probate Court of Carroll Parish, which is alleged to have had exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter, and its decision is alleged to be conclusive against all the world, but especially against the complainant, who was a party to the proceedings.
The administration of General Morgan’s succession undoubtedly properly belonged to the Probate Court of the Parish of Carroll, and, in a general sense, it is true that the decisions of that court in the matter of the succession are conclusive and binding, especially upon those who were parties. But this is not universally true. The most solemn transactions and judgments may, at the instance of the parties, be set aside or rendered inoperative for fraud. The fact of being a party does not estop a person from obtaining in a court of equity relief against fraud. It is generally parties that are the victims of fraud. The Court of Chancery is always open to hear complaints against it, whether committed in pais or in or by means of judicial proceedings. In such cases the court does not act as a court of review, nor does it inquire into any irregularities or errors of proceeding in another court; but it will scrutinize the conduct of the parties, and if it finds that they have been guilty of fraud in obtaining a judgment or decree, it will deprive them of the benefit of it, and of any inequitable advantage which they have derived under it. Story’s Eq. Jur. §§ 1570-1573; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 352-353. This subject was discussed in Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 IT. S. 10, and Barrow v. Sunton, 99 IT. S. 80. In the latter case, speaking of the proceeding in the Louisiana practice to procure nullity of a judgment, we said: “ If the proceeding is merely tantamount to the common law practice of moving to set aside a judgment for [p. 668] irregularity, or to a writ of error, or to a bill of review on appeal, it would belong to the latter category ” [that is a supplementary proceeding, connected with the original suit],“ and the United States Court could not properly entertain jurisdiction of the case. . . . On the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill in equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof, then they constitute an original and independent proceeding; . . . a new case arising upon new facts, although having relation to the validity of an actual judgment or decree, &c.”
These considerations apply with full force to the argument based on the monition proceedings which were resorted to after the sale for the purpose of procuring a homologation thereof as against all the world. The monition, as issued by and published under the direction of the Probate Court, called upon “ all persons who could set up any right to the property, in consequence of any informalities in the orders and decrees under ■which the sale was made, or any irregularity or illegality in the appraisement or advertisement, or time and manner of sale, or of any other defect whatsoever, to show cause within thirty days why the sale should not be homologated and confirmed.”
.In the case of Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, we held that the judgment of. confirmation, or homologation, on such a monition, has relation only to mistakes and omissions of the officers of the law, and not to the question whether the purchasers obtained their title by fraud or were trustees mala fide for others; and that such a judgment is conclusive of nothing but that there have been no fatal irregularities of form. The concluding remarks of the opinion in that case have a strong bearing upon the present. It is there said: “ A sale may have been conducted legally in all its process and forms, and yet the purchaser may have been guilty of fraud, or may hold the property as a trustee. In this case the complainants rely upon no irregularity of proceeding, upon no absence of form. The forms of law were scrupulously observed. But they rely upon faithlessness to trusts and common obligations, upon combinations against the policy of the law and fraudulent, and upon confederate and successful efforts to deprive them wrongfully [p. 669] of property in which they had a large interest, for the benefit of persons in whom they had a right to place confidence. Homologation is no obstacle to such a claim.” In our judgment it is equally no obstacle to the claim of the complainant in the case before us. The same observation may be made with regard to the proceedings had in reference to the executor’s final account and discharge.
Had the question of fraud been before the Probate Court in any of these proceedings, and had the complainant been apprised of them, the case might have been different. This court would not try over again a case already tried, nor permit the complainant to litigate matters which he had notice of, and which he had an opportunity to litigate in the probate proceedings. But one of the grounds of complaint made by the bill is, that the very attorneys whom he had employed to secure his claim acted as attorney for the succession and heirs, and conducted the proceedings for the sale, and participated as active parties therein, without giving him any notice of what was being done. These allegations were substantially proven. It was shown that Gay, the complainant, resided in Louisville, Kentucky; that early in 1866 he sent his documents (the three bills of exchange described in his original bill), to Gen. Sparrow, of the firm of Sparrow & Montgomery (lawyers), in Louisiana, to secure his claim against Oliver J. Morgan’s succession. The bills were presented by the attorney to the executor, Oliver T. Morgan, in April, 1866, and he endorsed and signed on each an acknowledgment that it was a just claim against the succession, to be paid in due course of administration; and thereupon they were submitted to the probate judge, who endorsed on each bill an order that it be ranked as a just claim, to be paid in due course of administration according to law. The bills remained in the hands of Sparrow & Montgomery until the commencemement of the proceedings for sale (or about that time). Buckner having applied to them to conduct these proceedings, the farce (for it seems to us nothing but a farce) of making a compromise with the creditors took place in Sparrow & Montgomery’s office, and the claims which they held against the estate were handed over to other attorneys. [p. 670] Montgomery, when examined as a witness, admitted that the bills of exchange belonging to Gay were handed over to Farrar, and did not pretend that Gay was ever consulted on the subject. When pressed for an answer on this point, he admitted that his partner, Gen. Sparrow, “did voluntarily and of his own accord put the claim in Farrar’s hands.” He further stated that this was only six or eight weeks before the day of sale, and that Farrar had the bills on the day of the adjudication, that is, the day of sale; and there is not the slightest proof to show that Gay had any notice of any of the proceedings. After having put himself, in his bill, upon want of notice, and after this evidence on the subject, drawn from one of the defendants, it was incumbent on the defendants to have shown, if they could, that he had notice.
It is alleged, however, that since the commencement of this suit, the judgment obtained by the complainant on the bills of exchange has been reversed by this court on writ of error, and that the claim on the original securities is prescribed.
It is true that the judgment was reversed in March, 1874; and that the complainant, by leave of the court below, filed an amended bill setting forth the acknowledgment and recognition of the original bills of exchange, and relying on these evidences of his debt, thus sanctioned, instead of the judgment. This raises a question of law, whether a debt thus presented to and acknowledged by the executor, and ranked by the judge of probate, is subject to prescription like ordinary demands.
By the Code of Practice of Louisiana it is declared:
“ Art. 984. No bearer of a claim of money against a succession administered by a curator appointed by a judge or by a testamentary executor shall commence an action against such succession before presenting his claim to the curator or executor.
“ Art. 985. If such claim be liquidated and be acknowledged by the curator or testamentary executor or administrator, he shall write on the evidence of the claim, or on a paper which he shall annex to it, a declaration signed by him, and stating that he has no objection to the payment of the claim, after which the bearer of such claim shall submit it to the judge, that it may be ranked among the acknowledged debts of the succession.”
Article 986 provides that if the claim is not liquidated, or is objected to by the curator, &c., the bearer may bring his action in the ordinary manner.
These articles show very conclusively that when a claim has been duly acknowledged by the executor, and ranked by the judge (as this was), no judgment on it is necessary. And such is the doctrine of the Supreme Court of Louisiana. In a late case, Renshaw v. Stafford, Executor, 80 La. Ann. 853, the subject was very fully discussed, and it was held that the acknowledgment of a succession debt suspends the prescription of it as long as the property of the succession remains in the hands of the executor under administration. The court say: “We think it manifest that the law never contemplated that a creditor whose debt has been formally acknowledged should bring a suit to establish his claim. The policy of the law discourages such proceeding; would punish it by inflicting the costs thereof on the creditor. True the law gives him, after a reasonable time, ... a right to compel the administrator to account.”
After referring to previous decisions, the court concludes as follows: “We therefore conclude that after a creditor of an estate has had his claim duly acknowledged by the administrator, the law does not contemplate any further proceeding on his part to establish it as against the estate. That, in principle, the administrator is his trustee, and holds in possession for his benefit the property of the estate which is the common pledge of the creditors.”
From this authoritative exposition of the law of Louisiana, we think it clear that the plea of prescription cannot avail the defendants in this case. The bill was filed in January, 1872, just three years after the sale complained of, and within six years after the bills of exchange were acknowledged and ranked among the just debts of the succession. The bills could not have been prescribed before acknowledgment, because they came to maturity in January, 1861, and the Civil War interrupted prescription as against the complainant (a citizen of Kentucky), from April 27th, 1861, to April 2d, 1866. The acknowledgment and recognition in April, 1866, had the effect [p. 672] to place the claim on the tableau of succession, and obviated the necessity of any other legal demand. Although this was sufficient to preserve the status of the debt free from prescription, yet there was another interruption by the legal demand made by the action which was brought in 1870, and which was in the course of prosecution until the reversal of the judgment by this court in 1874, if not longer. Such a legal demand interrupts prescription “ whether the suit has been brought before a court of competent jurisdiction or not.” Civil Code, Art. 3518 (3484). It is clear, therefore, that the debt was not prescribed when this suit was brought.
The defendants, however, place some reliance on the fact that the bill was not amended until March 28th, 1879, then first stating the fact that the claim was presented to the executor, and acknowledged and recognized, a period of more than five years after the reversal of the judgment. We do not regard this as material. The making of the bills of exchange was fully stated and set forth, and the bills described, in the original bill of complaint, and it was admitted and stated in the answer of the defendant, that the said claim of the complainant was duly acknowledged by the executor as a just claim against the estate. With such a statement in their own pleading they could hardly be heard to aver that the claim was prescribed. Besides, it is difficult to see how it could possibly be prescribed, any way, during the pendency of this suit, brought for the purpose of securing its payment.
It is not insisted, as it could not be, that the fraudulent sale is prescribed.
We are clearly of opinion that the complainant is not precluded from obtaining relief in the present suit.
Some technical points have been made in the case which we have examined and think untenable. One is that after the decease of Oliver T. Morgan, Matthew F. Johnson was substituted in his place in the suit as dative executor of the said Oliver T. Morgan, and not as dative executor of Oliver J. Morgan. He was in fact both, and the bill of revivor, as amended, distinctly states that subsequent to the filing of his plea, answer and demurrer, by Oliver T. Morgan, testamentary [p. 673] executor of Oliver J. Morgan, in the year 1873, the said Oliver T. Morgan died; and that subsequent to his death, Matthew F. Johnson had been appointed dative testamentary executor of the last will of said Oliver J. Morgan; and that assets of said Oliver J. Morgan had come into said Johnson’s hands in that capacity, and prays that he may answer and set forth whether any and what assets of said estate of Oliver J. Morgan had come into his hands, and for an account, &c. Upon this bill a subpoena was issued commanding the marshal to summon Matthew F. Johnson, dative testamentary executor of Oliver T. Morgan, to appear and answer the bill of revivor. Matthew F. Johnson did appear, entering his appearance as “ dative testamentary executor of Oliver T. Morgan ” to the bill of revivor, and to the amendments thereof, “wherein Stephen Waters, adminstrator of the succession of Wm. Gay, deceased, is complainant, and said Matthew F. Johnson and others are defendants.” This appearance was entitled in the cause by its true title and number. The subpoena was mere process to bring the defendant into court. When he came into court and read the bill of revivor, he was informed that he was called upon to answer as dative executor of Oliver J. Morgan. This was sufficient. From that day until the cause came here on appeal, he defended the cause as representative of the estate of Oliver J. Morgan, and made no objection to the technical defect in the subpoena. The defect was cured when he entered his appearance without raising the objection, and it is certainly too late to raise it now.
There is nothing else in the case, except the form of the decree, to which we deem it necessary to give our attention.
The decree made by the Circuit Court in the first place affirmed the debt due to the complainant, and, secondly, declared the sales made on the 19th of January, 1869, null and void as against the estate of William Gay, complainant, and directed that the lands be seized and sold by the marshal to satisfy the debt due to the estate of Gay, with interest and costs. We think that the latter part of the decree ought to be modified. The bill was filed by William Gay “in behalf
vol. cxi—43 [p. 674] of himself and of all others, creditors of Oliver J. Morgan, . . . who shall come in and seek relief by and contribute to the expense of this suit.” In other words, it is a creditor’s bill filed on behalf of the complainant and of all other creditors that choose to come in and share the expenses, for the purpose of securing the due administration and application of a trust fund, namely, the estate belonging to the succession of Oliver J. Morgan, deceased. On such a bill it is the usual and correct course to open a reference in the master’s office and to give other creditors, having valid claims against the fund, an opportunity to come in and have the benefit of the decree. In our judgment, therefore, the decree should be modified so as to declare and direct as follows, that is to say:
I. That the estate of said Oliver J. Morgan, deceased, herein represented by Matthew F. Johnson, dative executor of the last will of said Oliver J. Morgan, is indebted to the estate of said William Gay, deceased, herein represented by Stephenson Waters, administrator, in the sum of $33,250, with interest at five per cent, per annum until final payment on $13,000 from the 10th of January, 1861; on $10,250 from the 16th of January, 1861, and on $10,000 from the 28th of January, 1861, and for all costs of this suit.
II. That the sales of the lands of said estate of Oliver!. Morgan, adjudicated in parcels and subdivisions on the 19th of January, 1869, to John A. Buckner, J. West Montgomery, agent, and Ferdinand M. Goodrich, respectively, and conveyed to them respectively by Oliver T. Morgan, executor, by notarial acts passed before D. C. Jenkins, notary public, on the 23d of January, 1869, and recorded in the office of the parish recorder of the parish of Carroll, in notarial book N, at folios 212, 213, and 214, be declared null and void as against the estate of the said William Gay, complainant herein, and against the other creditors of said estate of Oliver J. Morgan, deceased; and that it be referred to , one of the masters of the court, to take and state an account of the assets belonging to said estate in the hands of said dative testamentary executor, Matthew F. Johnson; and that the said master be authorized to summon said Johnson to appear before him and [p. 675] render account of said assets; and that said master give three months’ public notice by advertisement in a newspaper published in the Parish of Carroll, and in a newspaper published in New Orleans, to all creditors of the said estate of Oliver J. Morgan, deceased, to appear before him, the said master, and establish their several debts.
III. If other sufficient available assets of said estate to pay the said debt be not found in the hands of said Johnson, dative executor as aforesaid, the said master is authorized and required to sell so much of said lands in proper parcels as may be necessary to pay and satisfy said debts; and the lands so sold shall be free and discharged of any lien, claim, or title arising from, or by reason of said sales so made on the 19th day of January, 1869. If the available assets and the proceeds of said lands should not be sufficient to pay all the debts of said estate established before said master, including the debt due to the complainant, there shall be & pro rata distribution thereof after the payment of all costs and expenses of the complainant, and of said reference and sale. The sale shall be advertised and proceeded in according to the laws of Louisiana in reference to succession sales.
IV. The said master may apply to the court from time to time for further directions, which are hereby reserved, especially as to the question whether the succession of Julia Morgan, deceased, is entitled to any portion, and what portion, of the proceeds arising from the sale of said lands by virtue of the act of sale and donation made to her by Oliver J. Morgan in 1858, so far as said act was a sale and not a donation.
It is further our opinion, and We order and adjudge that each pa/rty pay his and their own costs on this appeal, except the cost of printing the record, which shall be equally divided between the appellants and appellees.
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