Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Dover Stamping Co., 111 U.S. 319

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Dover Stamping Co., 111 U.S. 319
Full caption
TURNER & SEYMOUR MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. DOVER STAMPING COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
TURNER & SEYMOUR MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. DOVER STAMPING COMPANY.
APPEAL EROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.
Submitted March 31st, 1884.—Decided April 14th, 1884.
Patent.
When an inventor takes out a patent founded on a claim which does not include his whole invention, and rests for twelve years, and then surrenders his patent and takes a reissue with a broader claim, under circumstances which warrant the conclusion that the act is caused by successful competition of a rival, he will be held to have dedicated to the public so much of his invention as was not included in the original claim. Miller v. Brass Company, 104 U. S. 350, cited and followed.
This was a bill in equity brought by the appellees to enjoin 1 e appellants from infringing their rights as assignees of a patent for an improvement in egg-beaters. The decree below granted the injunction and determined the amount of profits, rom this decree the defendant below appealed. The invenion and claims are set forth in the opinion of the court.
Mr. John 8. Beach and Mr. John K. Beach for appellant.
Mr. E. Merwin and Mr. T. IF. Clarke for appellee.
R. Jus tice Matt hew s delivered the opinion of the court. is is a bill in equity filed by the appellees as assignees of [p. 320] Timothy Earle, for an injunction and an account, against the appellants, as infringers of reissued letters patent No. 6,542, for an improvement in egg-beaters, dated July 13th, 1815, for which the application was filed June 8th, 1815, the original No. 39,134, dated July 7th, 1863.
The bill was filed July 14th, 1877, an interlocutory decree declaring the infringement and granting a perpetual injunction was pronounced July 9th, 1879, and a final decree in favor of the complainants confirming the master’s report of the amount of profits made by the defendants was entered April 26th, 1881. From this decree the present appeal is prosecuted.
The following is a copy of the reissued letters patent, in which the parts in italics are not in the original, and the parts enclosed in [ ] are in the original, and excluded from the reissue :
“ To all whom it may concern :
“Be it known that I, Timothy Earle, of Lincoln (formerly Smithfield), in the County of Providence and State of Rhode Island, have invented [a] certain new and useful improvements in ’ egg-beaters ; and I' do hereby declare that the following specification, taken in connection with the drawing, making a part of the same, is a full, clear, and exact description thereof.
“ Figure 1 is a view of the beater. Fig. 2 is another view of the same, with the rack which works it shown. Fig. 3 is a top view of the same.
“Various devices have been employed for the purpose of beating eggs more expeditiously than by the familiar hand process. One of these devices consists of two wire frames, one within the other, and made to revolve in opposite directions ; another consists of a propeller-blade inside of a wire frame, thé frame and blades being made to revolve in opposite directions ; and still another consists of a propeller-blade, which is made to rotate, while a pair of beaters have at the same time a reciprocating motion.
“All these machines, and all others with which I am acquainted, possess the common fault that the beaters, whether of wire or of the form of propeller-blades, do not cut the yolk and white of the egg, but literally beat them.
“Now, as the albumen of an egg consists of a peculiar thick, [p. 321] glairy substance, it can be worked more effectually with a cutting instrument than with one which has a blunt edge. In fact, so well is this understood that housewives [universally] commonly make use of the blade of a knife for the purpose.
“ My invention is designed to obviate the difficulty referred to ; and consists in the use of a revolving frame, A, formed of thin strips of metal of the form shown, and mounted upon a spindle, B, around which it can freely rotate ; and also of an outer fixed frame, C, of the same general form as the inner one, but large enough to permit the inner frame to rotate within it. The outer frame is attached to the spindle B, and with it furnishes a support or frame for the operative parts of the machine [for it.] The inner frame is further provided with a series of cutters or blades [a a a a] a a, etc., arranged in any manner suitable for cutting through the fluid in many different [planes] places. These cutters or blades are simply pieces of sheet-tin or other suitable metal of the width of the inner frame, and are attached to the same by their ends, as is shown, and they are all so placed that their edges shall cut the material to be agitated when the frame A is rotated. The blades which form the outer fixed frame C are also placed in a similar position, and when the machine is in operation, cut through the current of material which is carried past them by the revolving frame, and thus aid in the operation in a similar manner. Upon the top of the frame A is attached a tooth wheel, D, through which, by means of the rack, E, Fig. 3, worked by the hand, a rotary motion is given to the inner frame A in alternate directions. The frame C, at its upper end, is so formed and arranged in relation to the pinion D as to leave the proper space between them, upon either side, to receive the rack, E, and serve as a guide or bearing to keep the rack in gear with the pinion ; and H is a circular flange attached to the lower side of the pinion to prevent the rack from falling down.
“ My invention also relates to the method of holding the machine m position while it is used. In the previous machines for this purpose the machine has been generally attached to or supported upon and in connection with the vessel which contained the materials to be operated upon, thus requiring a specific kind of vessel for the purpose, which, in effect, formed part of the machine or the frame of the machine was fixed to some stationary object, with the revolving beater or beaters projecting downward below the ma-vol. cxi—21 [p. 322] chine, into the vessel which contained the matters to be treated, the vessel being held below the machine, and entirely detached from it. Sut by my improvement the machine becomes a separate detached implement, which can be used in any vessel, and without any mechanical fastening of the machine to the vessel or to any other object. This part of my invention, therefore, consists in providing the bottom of the fixed frame C of the machine with a foot, F, or other suitable support, to rest upon the bottom of the vessel to support the lower part of the machine and raise the revolving-beater frame A above the fixed frame C sufficiently to permit it to revolve freely ; and also providing the top of the machine with a handle, G-, by which the machine can be held upright upon the bottom of the vessel by one hand, while the beater-frame is operated by the other, as is described.
“ When the machine is to be used it is placed with its foot F resting upon the bottom of the vessel containing the broken eggs. The left hand bears upon the handle G and holds the machine in position. The rack E, held by the handle in the right hand, is engaged with the pinion D, and the proper motion imparted to the frame A.
“ It is obvious that a continuous rotary motion may be easily imparted to the frame A by means of a crank and suitable gearing, and the beneficial effect of the blades or cutters [a a a] A, a, etc., would be obtained as well; but I prefer the method described of communicating motion to frame A, for the reason that the machine is more easily cleaned and is more convenient for domestic use.
“ [What I claim as my invention and desire to secure by letters patent is the use of a series of cutting edges a a a a when attached to a frame A, which is capable of being rotated substantially as described for the purpose specified.]
“ What I claim is:
“ 1. The revolving beater-frame formed of thin plain blades or cutters, arranged to cut edgewise through the material by their rotation, substantially as described.
“2. The combination of thefixed frame, which contains and supports the operative machinery, provided with afoot or support at the bottom, the handle at the top, and suitable mechanism for rotating the beater, substantially as described?
The following is a copy of Fig. 2 annexed to specifications and sufficiently illustrates them:
The cutting portion of the appellant’s beater consists of an outer frame and inner frame, each of which is made to revolve around a central spindle by means of a cog-wheel and pinion. Each frame is composed of two curved pieces of tin joined together, or of one piece joined at its two ends so as to make nearly a circle; these pieces are thin, plain, flat pieces of tin, and are so arranged as to cut edgewise through the material by their rotation. In neither the inner nor the outer frame are there any additional blades or cutters like the blades a, a, a, a.
It is represented in the following drawing:
The controversy in the Circuit Court seemed to be mainly on the question of infringement; and that turned on the construction to be given to the first claim of the reissued patent, no point being made as to the second claim. It was insisted by the defendants below that their device was not an infringement of the claim as contained in the original patent, and that a fair construction of the first claim in the reissued patent would limit it substantially to the same thing. In deciding the point, the learned judge, holding the Circuit Court, said:
“ The question of infringement of the first claim of the reissued patent depends upon the construction of the claim. If it should be properly limited so as to be confined to the frame with the cutters or blades, which are described in the specification and in the drawings, to wit: a frame with the cutters, a, a, a, a, then there is no infringement; but if the claim is to be construed so as to include a beater frame formed of thin, pl^ blades, then the invention which is recited in the first claim is found in the defendants’ egg-beater.
“ The devices which were in use prior to the invention of e plaintiffs’ assignor were composed of round wire, which, y their rotation, broke rather than cut the material. The pa o [p. 325] the invention which is the subject of the first claim consisted in such an introduction of the knife-blade of the housewife and the mechanism for operating the blade into an egg-beater, that the egg could be rapidly cut, and the egg matter could be aerated, and be beaten into froth. The original, and also the reissued specification, dwelt upon the particular form of the cutters of the inner frame, and the original claim limited the invention to the cutters a, a, &c., but the scope of the invention was larger, and the principle was embodied in any revolving frame composed of thin and plain, as distinguished from corrugated, cutting surfaces, so arranged as when rotated to cut edgewise through the material, provided the frame was constructed and arranged substantially in the manner described in the specification. It is not claimed that the reissue is void, upon the ground that it is for a different invention from that shown or indicated in the original specification, but such a construction is attempted to be given to the reissued claim, as would limit it to the precise language of the surrendered patent. The patent was surrendered because the grant was not co-extensive with the invention, and it would be an unnatural construction of the reissued patent, which should cramp the claim within the limitations which had been discarded. In my opinion, the natural meaning of the words which were used is to be permitted, and giving to the claim such a freedom of construction, the defendants’ device is an infringement.”
We are quite satisfied that the difference between the original claim and the first claim of the reissued patent, is substantial and not verbal. The former is necessarily limited to the particular device described as a frame, with a series of cutting edges attached, in the mode designated, and capable of rotation. The latter embraces every revolving beater-frame, formed of thin, plain blades or cutters, arranged to cut edgewise through the material by their rotation. It is immaterial whether or not the latter might have been covered by the language of the specification, as included in the invention. We are dealing with the claims, and nothing else. And it cannot e successfully contended that the original claim implicitly
contained all that is expressed in the claim of the reissued [p. 326] patent. The original claim has been made broader by the reissue, so as to embrace the device used by the appellants, which was not previously an infringement.
And that raises the question, whether, under the circumstances disclosed by this record, the reissue is valid.
To avoid this question, it is, indeed, contended now by the appellees, that the two claims under examination are identical; that their apparent differences are merely literal; that their meaning is the same; and this conclusion is thought to be reached, not by restraining the reissue to the language of the original, but by a process of construction, by the use of supposed implications, to expand the words of the original so as to cover everything embraced in the reissue; the only alternative, indeed, that could be adopted, to escape the inconsistency of maintaining that claims, which were diverse upon the question of infringement, were identical upon the question of the validity of the patent.
But, as already intimated, this position is not tenable. There is nothing in the language or recitals of the original patent, nor are there any just and reasonable inferences of which they are susceptible, which justify a construction of the claim that would embrace any device other than that described in the specifications and represented in the drawings; much less to include every mechanical arrangement which embodies a cutting edge with a revolving frame, to cut instead of break the egg material upon which it is meant to operate.
The question then recurs, what are the circumstances which affect the validity of the reissue, and how do they affect it ?
They are few, but decisive. The original patent was issued July 7th, 1863. Eleven years after, in 1874, the competition of the appellants’ device became apparent and was felt. In 1875, application was made for the reissue ; the original patent was surrendered and the reissued patent granted, July 13th, 1875. Here is a delay of nearly twelve years, without the offer of an explanation or excuse, without even the suggestion of inadvertence or mistake in the original application. The only inference that can be drawn is, that the discovery and experience of successful competition in 1874 suggested first and led [p. 327] to the discovery, that the original claim did not cover everything that might have been embraced, and was not broad enough to maintain the monopoly desired but not secured.
This brings the case directly within the principle of Miller v. Brass Company, 104 U. S. 350, and the numerous others which have followed it, including that of Clements v. Odorless Apparatus Company, 109 U. S. 641, all of which have been decided since the interlocutory decree in this case was pronounced.
For these reasons, The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to dismiss the hill, and it is so ordered.
IRVINE v. DUNHAM.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.
Argued March 31st, April 1st, 1884.—Decided April 14th, 1884.
Trust.
On the facts in this case the court finds that the deed in controversy was not a mere gratuity and left in escrow; but that it was delivered, and imposed upon the appellant a trust in favor of the grantor of the appellee to which the appellee has succeeded. When a trustee denies the trust and refuses to perform it a court of equity
will appoint a new trustee in his place, and the old trustee will not be entitled to retain the property under cover of having an account as trustee, before paying over the net proceeds.
The bill of complaint in this case was filed by Dunham, the appellee, against Irvine, the appellant. It averred that on March 28th, 1874, Irvine and one Richard H. Sinton were the joint and equal owners of one undivided half of the Morgan Mine in Calaveras County, in the State of California; that the legal title to such undivided half was vested in Irvine, but was eld by him in trust for himself and Sinton equally, share and
share alike; that the undivided half of the mine had been [p. 328] acquired by Irvine and Sinton by their common efforts and at their common expense, and pursuant to an agreement between them to acquire the title thereto and sell and otherwise dispose of the same, and share equally the profits and losses. The other undivided half of the mine was, so the bill alleged, held by Irvine in trust for certain other persons.
The bill further alleged, that on the said March 28th, 1874, Irvine executed to Sinton an instrument and declaration of trust in writing of that date, of which the following is a copy:
“This is to declare that I, William. Irvine, of San Francisco, California, am the owner of one undivided half of that certain gold-bearing quartz lode or mine situated on Carson Hill, Calaveras County, California, and known familiarly as the ‘Morgan Mine,’ and that I hold said half interest equally for myself and R. H. Sinton, also of San Francisco, share and share alike; and I hereby promise and bind myself, my heirs and assigns, whenever said mine shall be sold or otherwise disposed of, to account fully and truly to said Sinton, his heirs or assigns, for the one-half of all net proceeds of such sale or other disposition of said half interest.
“ All necessary expenses, including counsel fees heretofore incurred, or that may hereafter be incurred, in and about the property, up to the time of such sale or other disposition thereof, to be first paid before division of such proceeds.
“Witness my hand and seal, this 28th day of March, a .d . 1874.
“ Willi am Ievin e . [Seal.]
“ Witnesses :
“T. K. Wils on .
“H. J. Tild en .”
The bill also averred, that on September Sth, 1874, Sinton assigned and conveyed to one George P. Ihrie all his right and title in the mine, and declaration of trust, and everything coming or that might come to him by virtue thereof, that on March 17th, 1875, Irvine, and the owners of the other undivided half of the mine, organized under the laws of California a corporate body called the Morgan Mining Company, and that on April 9th following, Irvine and the other persons having an interest in the mine, except Ihrie, sold and conveyed [p. 329] the same to the corporation, and received in consideration thereof shares of stock in the company, in proportion to their interest in the property conveyed, Irvine receiving ten thousand shares for the undivided half held by him for himself in trust and for Ihrie, as the grantee of Sinton, and that Ihrie then and there became entitled to the one-half of the ten thousand shares.
It was further alleged, that on June 29th, 1875, Ihrie conveyed all his title and interest in the mine and in the five thousand shares of the stock of the Morgan Mining Company to Dunham, the complainant, for whose use and benefit Irvine held the shares subject to the payment of the expenses, &c., mentioned in the declaration of trust.
The bill further alleged, that after the conveyance by Ihrie of his interest in the stock of the Morgan Mining Company to complainant, the latter applied to Irvine for an account of the necessary expenses and fees incurred by him in and about thd mine up to the conveyance thereof to the company, and offered to pay him one-half thereof, and demanded a transfer to himself of the shares of stock in the company held in trust for him by Irvine, but Irvine refused to render any account, denied the complainant’s right to the stock or any part of it, denied that he held any stock in trust for complainant, and claimed all of the ten thousand shares as his own, and denied that he was ever trustee in the premises for Sinton, or Ihrie, or the complainant.
The bill further averred that the complainant was ready, and that he then offered to pay into court, the one-half of all the expenses and fees paid by Irvine, on account of the mine, up to the conveyance thereof to the Morgan Mining Company, and such further sums as the court might deem equitable and just; that Irvine had it in his power to transfer the stock held in trust by him for the complainant to a l)ona fide purchaser, for value, without notice, and that he would do so unless restrained »y injunction.
The prayer of the bill was that Irvine be decreed to hold m trust for the complainant said five thousand shares of the capital stock; that the court would declare what sum was [p. 330] justly due to Irvine from the complainant on account of the necessary expenses, &c., incurred by him in and about the mine, and that upon the payment of the same by complainant to Irvine the latter might be decreed to assign and transfer said five thousand sfiares to him.
The answer of Irvine denied that Sinton was ever the owner of an undivided fourth of said mine, or of any share or interest therein or any part thereof; denied that Irvine ever held the legal title to the mine or to any part or share thereof, in trust for himself and Sinton ; denied that the undivided half thereof was acquired by himself and Sinton by their common efforts and at their common expense for their equal benefit, but averred that he acquired said undivided half for his own sole and exclusive use and benefit, and that Sinton contributed neither effort nor expense towards its acquisition.
The answer further averred that Irvine, on March 28th, 1874, being about to leave California for a trip to the Atlantic States, to be absent for several months, signed the declaration of trust as a mere gratuity to Sinton, upon the express agreement between him and Sinton that the same should be left in the custody of T. K. Wilson, who was Irvine’s attorney, and that it was not to take effect except in case of the death of Irvine upon his proposed journey, and in case he should return to California that the instrument should be delivered up to him; that the instrument was never in any manner delivered to Sinton, and that Irvine, after so signing it, did perform his journey and returned therefrom to the State of California in the month of August, 1874. The answer of Irvine was put at issue by general replication.
Upon final hearing the Circuit Court decreed that Irvine hold as trustee, for the use and benefit of the complainant, the one-half of 9,997 shares of the capital stock of the Morgan Mining Company, the shares being the gross proceeds received by Irvine as the consideration of a conveyance and disposition by him to the Morgan Mining Company of one-half of the mining property, the half of the stocks so held by Irvine in trust for the complainant being subject to a claim of Iryine for one-half of all the necessary expenses referred to in the [p. 331] declaration of trust, and of assessments on said stock made by the Morgan Mining Company and paid by Irvine. And the court confirmed the report of the master to whom the case had been referred, finding that the one-half of the expenses and assessments paid by Irvine was $14,221.76; and decreed that upon the payment of that sum by the complainant to Irvine, the latter should assign and transfer to complainant 4,998| shares of the capital stock of the Morgan Mining Company. From this decree Irvine appealed.
Mr. Geo. W, Towle, Jr., and Mr. James M. Johnston for appellant.
Mr. Skellal)a/rger for appellee.
Mr . Jus ti ce Woo ds delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language and continued:
It is not disputed that the appellee has succeeded to all the rights of Sinton and Ihrie, if they had any, set forth in the bill of complaint. The question of fact at issue between the parties is, whether or not before the conveyance by the appellant to the Morgan Mining Company of the Morgan Mine, he held the title to an undivided fourth of the mine in trust for Sinton.
The declaration of trust signed by Irvine on March 28th, 1874, unless impeached, is evidence which settles this question conclusively in favor of the appellee. The appellant, however, contends, as appears from his answer and testimony, that his promise to hold one-fourth of the mine in trust for the complainant was a mere gratuity; that Sinton never paid any money or rendered any services in obtaining title to the mine;
at the declaration of trust was never delivered, and that it was to take effect and bind him in case he never returned from proposed journey. The burden is on the appellant to make this appear.
It is shown by the record that in December, 1869, or Janu’at ’ ,aPPellant purchased at a tax sale the title to 29th 1°P^an m^ne’ that he received a deed therefor dated June
’ 870, from the sheriff, and was put in possession of the operty by a writ of assistance. Prior to the purchase at the [p. 332] tax sale James G. Fair and A. A. Selover had been in possession of the mine ; they claimed that Irvine had purchased the mine at the tax sale for them. Irvine demanded a large sum for his services, and after some delay gave them notice that if they did not accede to his demand he would hold the title for himself, Fair and Selover never paid the sum demanded by appellant, or any part of it, and appear to have abandoned all claim to the property. About this time, Henry D. Bacon and his associates, seven in number, were claiming title to the mine. On April 14th, 1873, they compromised their controversy with the appellant by an agreement that he should apply for a patent for the property in his own name, and, having obtained it, should sell the property and divide its proceeds, retaining one-half himself and turning over the other half to Bacon and his associates. The appellant accordingly applied for and obtained a patent in his own name for the property. When the Morgan Mining Company was formed, and the mine was conveyed to it, Bacon and his associates got half the stock in consideration of their interest in the mine held in trust for them by the appellant, who received the other half of the stock.
Without going into a discussion of the evidence, we state our opinion to be, after a careful examination of the record, that it is established by the testimony that Sinton, who was an experienced dealer in real property, contributed money and aided the appellant by his advice and co-operation in obtaining the tax title to the Morgan mine, and afterwards in getting the patent therefor from the United States, and in compromising the controversy between the appellant and Bacon and his associates in regard to the ownership of the mine; and that the money and services were contributed by Sinton on the agreement and understanding that he and the appellant were to share equally in the results of the enterprise. The fact that Sinton furnished the appellant money on account of the mine is found by the master to whom the case was referred, and no exception was taken to that part of his report. It is established that the appellant, after the compromise with Bacon and others, agreed to hold the title to the undivided half of the mine in trust for himself and Sinton, share and share alike, [p. 333] subject to the payment of the proportion of such undivided half in the costs and expenses incurred in securing title to and managing the property. The declaration signed by the appellant on March 28th, 1874, was simply an admission in writing by him of the contract between him and the appellee in relation to their interest in the Morgan mine.
The contention of the appellant that the declaration of trust was a mere gratuity is not sustained by the proof. On the contrary, independently of the declaration, the testimony in the record establishes the trust and its terms, as set up in the bill of complaint, and shows that the declaration of trust was not voluntary, but was based on a valuable consideration.
The appellant contends that the declaration of trust was put in the hands of Wilson as an escrow, to be delivered to Sinton only in case the appellant died on his proposed journey, and to be redelivered to the appellant in case he returned to California, and that as he did return, the declaration of trust became ineffectual to bind him. This contention amounts to this, that by accepting the declaration of trust upon the terms alleged by the appellant, Sinton agreed that if the appellant returned from his trip to the Eastern States, he would give up all claim to his share of the property. If such had been the agreement of the parties, they would naturally have embodied it in the written instrument. It contains no such stipulation. It is an unqualified and unconditional admission by the appellant that he held the property in trust for Sinton and himself, and that when it was sold or disposed of, he would divide its net proceeds equally between Sinton and himself. We find no evidence in the record sufficient to sustain the improbable story that Sinton agreed, in case appellant should return in safety from his trip to the Atlantic States, that he would give up his interest in this valuable property, to secure which he had contributed money, and services extending over a period of several years. In other words, we do not find that the declaration of trust was subject to any such condition.
The next contention of the appellant is that the decree s onld be reversed, because there has been no sale or disposal 0 his property, and that by the terms of the trust Sinton [p. 334] had only a right to the net proceeds after its sale or disposal.
But the record shows that the property had been disposed of by conveyance to the Morgan Mining Company. The deed of the appellant to the company effectually divested him of all title to the property. It became the property of the corporation, in which he retained no interest or estate. Mr. Justice Bradley, in Morgan v. The Railroad Company, 1 Woods, 15. The conveyance was, therefore, a disposal of the property, and whether the consideration was cash or shares of the capital stock of the company, was immaterial. The appellant having parted with the title to the property, was bound to account for its proceeds to the beneficiary of the trust according to the terms of the trust.
The appellant next contends that he is entitled, under the terms of the trust, to hold on to the stock, which he received as a consideration for the conveyance of the trust property, until there has been an accounting and the expenses and counsel fees have been paid. But by his answer he denies the trust, he claims to hold the stock for himself alone, he wants no accounting and does not offer to account, or to hand over any net proceeds of the property after an accounting. In other words, he seeks to hold on to the trust property until it suits him to execute a trust, the existence of which he denies.
Where there is a failure of suitable trustees to perforin a trust, either from accident or from the refusal of the old trustees to act, or from their original or supervenient incapacity to act, or from any other cause, courts of equity will appoint new trustees. Ellison n . Ellison, 6 Ves. 656, 663 ; Lake v. De Lambert, 4 Ves. 592; Hibbard n . Lamb, Ambler, 309; 2 Mad. Pn Ch. 133; Com. Dig. Chancery, 4 W. 7. No trustee can be more unsuitable than one who not only refuses to act, but denies the trust. When, therefore, appellant denied that he held in trust the stock claimed by the appellee, the latter, having established the trust, was entitled to have, if he demanded it, a new trustee appointed, or if the appointment of a new trustee were not necessary for the preservation of his rights, to have an account taken by the court of the expenses
Syllabus.
and assessments with which his share of the trust property was chargeable, and upon their payment to have a transfer to himself of his share of the stock. The decree of the Circuit Court has given him these rights. There has been an accounting, and the sum with which the appellee’s interest in the stock is chargeable has been ascertained, and when the sum so found is paid by appellee, and not till then, the decree of the court requires a transfer to him of his share of the stock. The decree of the court simply executes and winds up a trust, the existence of which it finds, but which the trustee denies and refuses to execute. Both parties got their rights under the decree. It must, therefore, be
Affirmed.
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