Waples v. United States, 110 U.S. 630

In March, 1865, the plaintiff purchased for the sum of $7,400 p. 631certain real property in New Orleans at a sale upon a decree rendered by the District Court of the United States in proceedings for its confiscation under the act of July 17th, 1862, and subsequently obtained a deed of the property from the marshal. The proceedings were instituted in the usual form by a libel of information filed on the 7th of August, 1862, by the district attorney of the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of the United States, against ten lots of ground alleged to be the property of Charles M. Conrad. The libel sets forth that the marshal of the district, under authority from the district attorney, given pursuant to instructions of the Attorney-General, had seized the lots of ground, which are fully described, as forfeited to the United States; that they were owned by Conrad then, and on the 17th of July, 1862, and previously; that after that date he had acted as an officer of the army or navy of the rebels in arms against the government of the United States, or as a member of Congress, or as a judge of a court, or as a cabinet officer, or as a foreign minister, or as a commissioner, or as a consul of the so-called Confederate States. Indeed, many other official positions he is charged in the alternative with holding, the district attorney evidently regarding him as a person of so much consequence that he must have been called to some official position by the Confederate government, in which he gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States, and therefore his right, title, and estate in the property was forfeited, and ought to be condemned. Publication of monition followed, and nd one appearing to answer, judgment by default was entered, declaring that the lots of land, the property of Conrad, were condemned as forfeited to the United States, and a decree for their sale was entered. In the writ issued to the marshal and in his deed of sale, the lots are described as the property of Conrad. Under the act of Congress no other interest than that of Conrad was forfeited, and no other interest was sold. It was for his alleged offences that the libel was filed and the forfeiture sought. It was undoubtedly in the power of Congress to provide for the confiscation of the entire property as being within the enemy’s country, without restricting it to the estate of the defendant, but Congress p. 632did not see fit to so enact; and as we said in speaking of the proceedings in this case: “ The court cannot enlarge the operations of the stringent provisions of the statute. The plaintiff had notice of the character and legal effect of the decree of condemnation when he purchased, and is therefore presumed to have known that if the alleged offender possessed no estate in the premises at the time of their seizure, nothing passed to the United States by the decree or to him by his purchase.” Burbank, v. Conrad, 96 U. S. 291.

But because of the general language used in the description of the property in the libel of infornlation and in the deed of the marshal, it is contended that something more than the estate of the offender Conrad was warranted by the United States to the purchaser, and the warranty having failed, that he is entitled to a return of the purchase money; but this position is without even plausible foundation. As already stated, the plaintiff was presumed to know the law on the subject, and that by his purchase under the decree he could only acquire such an estate as the alleged offender possessed, to hold during the offender’s life; and that if the offender had no estate none was forfeited to the United States, or sold under the decree of the court. So no false assurance could have been made to the purchaser which p. 633could, be suggested, as a possible ground, for the return of the money; nor could there have been any mistake of fact which would be recognized as a ground, for relief even in equity, for the fact suggested as having been misunderstood was declared by the law.

“ And now come said defendants, by leave of court, for amended answer to plaintiff’s petition, admit the execution of said lease and the occupancy of said premises under and by virtue of the same as alleged in said petition; and defendants say that after the making of said lease, to wit, on or about the first of May, a .d . 1861, certain evil-disposed and wicked persons in the State of Missouri, and in other of the United States, did raise an insurrection and rebellion against the lawful government of the United States, and did seek by force and arms to overthrow said government, and for this purpose did raise a large force of armed men, and did incite and carry on a civil war with said government of the United States ; that during all the year, 1862, and for a long time prior and subsequent thereto, civil war prevailed throughout the State of Missouri, where said premises were located and where defendants and plaintiff resided; that in order to suppress said insurrection and rebellion and maintain the lawful authority of the government of the United States said government was compelled to raise, and did raise, equip, and put into the field in said State of Missouri, where said war was raging, a large army, and did place said State of Missouri and the city of St. Loftis, where said premises were located and defendants resided, under military law ; and the said city and county of St. Louis were under military law, and under the military control of J. M. Schofield, a Major-General of the Army of the United States, as the military commander of the District of Missouri, which embraced the entire p. 635State of Missouri aforesaid ; that by reason of said civil war the courts of said State of Missouri were suspended and unable to perforin their ordinary functions and administer the law of the land, except as they were protected and allowed to do so by the said military authorities thus in control of said State ; that in order to prosecute said civil war on behalf of the government of the United States, and put down and suppress said insurrection and rebellion, and overpower the insurgents and rebels and protect the loyal citizens of the said State of Missouri, it became and was necessary for the military authorities in control of said State of Missouri as aforesaid to take, seize, and appropriate to the public use the private property of the citizens of Missouri ; and the said military authorities who were in lawful command and control in said State, by order of said Schofield, then the lawful commanding general in said State, did seize and appropriate to the public use in suppressing said rebellion the private property of divers citizens of said State, and among other things did levy upon, seize, and appropriate to such public use the property, credits, and effects of said plaintiff, especially the rents due and owing from defendants under and by virtue of said lease of defendants in their hands for said months of August, September, and October, 1862 ; and the said defendants were compelled by the overpowering military force then in lawful control of said State to pay, and did pay long before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on or about the 24th day of November, 1862, the said rents for said months of August, September, and October, 1862, and every part thereof, to said military authorities, for and on account and as the property and effects of said plaintiff so seized and appropriated to the public use as aforesaid; that said seizure and appropriation were necessary means for carrying on said war for the suppression of said insurrection and rebellion and for the defence and protection of the loyal citizens of Missouri. Wherefore defendants say that plaintiff ought not to have or maintain his aforesaid action against them, and they pray judgment, &c.

“ And for a further defence defendants say that the said rents reserved in said lease and due and owing for said months of August, September, and October, 1862, were seized in the hands of defendants and appropriated as the property of plaintiff for public use in the city of St. Louis, while said city was under military law, under the authority, or color of authority, exercised by said p. 636General Schofield, who was then and there duly vested with the military command of said city by the President of the United States and under his authority, and said payment was made by defendants for and on account of plaintiff, as aforesaid, under said authority; and defendants plead and set up as a defence to this action the act of Congress entitled ‘ An Act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases, approved March 3d, 1863, and say that by reason thereof and of the payment aforesaid plaintiff ought not to have and to maintain this action, and they pray judgment, &c.

“ And for a further defence to said action defendants say that the cause of action in plaintiff’s petition alleged, if any such does or ever did exist, arose out of certain acts done, that is to say, out of or from an alleged failure or omission to pay the rent reserved in said lease for the months of August, September, and October, a . d . 1862, to the said plaintiff, and from a payment thereof made for and on account of plaintiff by defendants to the provost-marshal of said district of Missouri, for the public use, under and by virtue of the order and command of General J. M. Schofield, who was then in military command of the military district of Missouri, which embraced the State of Missouri; that said payment was omitted to be paid to the plaintiff, and was in fact made for and on account of the plaintiff, for the public use as aforesaid, as a necessary means of carrying on the military opeiations of the government of the United States against the insurgents, who were then seeking to overthrow said government in said State of Missouri, by virtue or under color of authority derived from and exercised under the President of the United States ; and said cause of action, if any such there be or ever p. 637was, arose more than two years before the commencement of this action, and said action was commenced more than two years after the passage of an act by the Congress of the United States entitled, ‘An Act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases,’ approved March 3d, 1863.

“ That no suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, shall be p. 639maintained for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wrongs done or committed, or act omitted to be done, at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue or under color of any authority derived from or exercised by or under the President of the United States, or by or under any act of Congress, unless the same shall have been commenced within two years next after such arrest, imprisonment, trespass, or wrong may have been done or committed, or act may have been omitted to have been done ; Provided, That in no case shall the limitation herein provided commence to run until the passage of this act, so that no party shall, by virtue of this act, be debarred of his remedy by suit or prosecution until two years from and after the passage of this act.”

vol . ex—41 p. 642if judgment goes against him, what it received, with interest and costs. It has a right to. say in such cases that the suit, which is to establish this liability, must be brought within reasonable time in whatever court it is brought, and to determine what is that reasonable time. The government which thus exposes its officers and others, acting under its compulsory exercise of power, to be sued, while not denying redress for the illegal exercise of such power, must have the authority to require that suits brought for such redress shall be commenced within reasonable time.

The Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of The State v. Gatzweiler, 49 Mo. 17, held that the seventh section of the act of 1863 is not only valid, but is binding on the State courts. Quoting from the case of Clark v. Dick, 1 Dillon, 8, it concurs p. 643with the Circuit Court that if Congress has the right to determine in what courts such questions must be tried, it must necessarily have the power to regulate the remedy, including the right to prescribe the time within which the suit must be brought. That court further cites from the same opinion with approval, as follows:

These provisions furnish the rules by which the manner of setting up the defence is to be governed, and they leave no doubt in our mind that the liberality which they intended to p. 646prescribe in the matter requires that the present plea of the statute of limitations, being good in substance, is sufficient in form of statement.

The enforced payment in question could, therefore, be no defence to the claim of the plaintiff. And it is difficult to understand how the act of Congress of March 3d, 1863, 12 Stat. 755, or the amendatory act of May 11, 1866, 14 Stat. 46, fixing a limitation to actions against military officers for certain acts done by them during the war, or against parties acting under their direction, can be invoked in this case. The fourth section of the act of March 3d, 1863, makes the order or authority of the President a defence only to actions “ for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of such order or under color of any law of Congress.” It has reference to acts affecting the person or such property as is subject to physical seizure. It does not apply to actions for breaches of contract between citizens in loyal States, or to any questions arising out of such contracts. Debts being intangible things, were incapable of seizure in any proper sense of that term; and the debtors were not discharged from liability because of p. 648an unlawful exaction from them of equivalent sums. What was thus exacted could under no circumstances be regarded as anything more than a forced loan. By no possible alchemy could it be converted into the payment of their debt to another. Its effect upon others was not a matter which concerned the military officer. His object, according to the defendant’s theory, was to raise funds for military operations; if so the relations of debtor to creditor were not affected by his exactions from one of them. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176,187. The debt of the defendants to the plaintiff was not thereby discharged; it is still owing. It can only be discharged when paid to him or to others by his direction. Independently of this consideration, the statute cannot be construed to give protection to any one in the commission of unlawful acts. Neither the President nor Congress can confer immunity for acts committed in violation of the rights of citizens. An army in the enemy’s country may do all things allowed by the rules of civilized warfare, and its officers and soldiers will be responsible only to their own government. But in loyal States, or in such parts as are not in insurrection, or declared to be so, and in which the courts are open, the rights of citizens are just as much under constitutional security and protection in time of war as in time of peace. Because civil war was raging in one part of the country the constitutional guaranties of the rights of person and property were not suspended where no such war existed. We sometimes hear the opposite doctrine advanced; but it has no warrant in the principles of the common law, or in the language of the Constitution. As I observed on a former occasion, our system of civil polity is not such a rickety and ill-jointed structure that when one part is disturbed the whole is thrown into confusion and jostled to its foundation. The existence of insurrection and war in other States than Missouri, or in parts of that State distant from St. Louis, did not suspend the Constitution or any of its guaranties in that city. . No proclamation of the President had ever declared Missouri to be in a state of insurrection, and it is a matter within our judicial knowledge that St. Louis, so far from being the theatre of actual warfare, was a city where supplies were p. 649collected for military operations in other quarters, and where the courts were in the undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is true that where rebellion exists, and the public safety requires it, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, and to that extent one of the safeguards of the right of personal liberty may be withdrawn, but this suspension in no respect affects the claims of private citizens against each other arising out of contracts between them, or the means of their enforcement. The Constitution does not forbid, during such suspension or by reason of it, the institution of suits for such claims, or authorize Congress to forbid it.

As the fourth section of the act of 1863 refers only to seizures, arrests and imprisonments committed, or acts omitted, by order or authority of the President, or under color of an act of Congress, it has no bearing upon actions for breaches of contract between citizens. The seventh section, fixing a limitation to actions for such arrests, imprisonment and other trespasses, does not therefore apply to the case before us. And the amendatory act of 1866 only extends the benefit of the limitation to actions for similar acts or omissions, when committed by a person acting under the order of the President, or the Secretary of War, or of a military commander. It does not, any more than the act of 1863, govern actions for breaches of contract between private parties. Could it be construed to embrace a case like the present, it would clearly be unconstitutional. The right of a lessor to sue his lessees for breach of contract, is in no way dependent upon any act or authority of Congress. It is a matter purely of State concern, and Congress can no more declare within what time he shall sue for his rent, than it can prescribe the court in which the action shall be p. 650brought, or the form of the proceedings by which it shall be conducted. Its power to fix a limitation to actions can apply only to such as are in the first instance brought in the courts of the United States, and to those wherein the right or interest claimed depends upon a law of Congress. If such a law gives the right or interest claimed, it may prescribe the time in which it shall be asserted, but not otherwise. It would hardly be pretended that Congress can enlarge the time prescribed by the State for bringing in her courts actions upon contracts; and if it cannot enlarge, how can it limit the time ? Indeed, it cannot be held that Congress may interpose a limitation to the right of enforcing in the courts of a State debts existing between her citizens, unless it be also held that, as to all actions in State tribunals, it can say when they may and when they may not be brought. It will be long, I trust, before the States will become thus helpless to enforce in their own tribunals contracts between their own citizens.

The argument of the court, in its opinion, is substantially this:—an action in which a defence under an act of Congress is set up may be removed from a State court to a federal court; therefore Congress may prescribe the law of limitation for it in the latter court; and if in that court, it may in all courts, as otherwise there would be two rules of limitations of actions in different courts holding pleas of the same cause. It is easy to see that this mode of reasoning would necessarily lead to the conclusion that Congress may prescribe the limitation to all actions in State courts between citizens, because actions commenced there may be removed to a federal court when they are between citizens of different States; and, on the assumption of the argument, Congress may prescribe the law of limitation for such cases in the federal court; and if in that court, it may, says the opinion, in all courts, as otherwise there would be two rules of limitations of actions upon the same causes in different courts, one if the action remain in the State court and another if it be removed to the federal court. The length to which the argument leads proves the error of the assumption on which it is founded. The true doctrine is the reverse of this; the limitation of actions in the State courts for p. 651the enforcement of rights which are not dependent upon acts of Congress or upon the Constitution, is a matter purely of State regulation, which the federal courts must follow when such actions are transferred to them. The object of the Constitution in extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between citizens of different States, was to avoid, what was at the time of its adoption apprehended, the existence of State attachments and State prejudices, which might injuriously affect the administration of justice in the State courts against non-residents. To carry out this purpose the Judiciary Act provides for the removal to a Federal court of actions commenced in a State court involving such controversies. It has no other object ; and the removal in no respect affects the rights of the parties, either the claims on the one hand or the defences on the other. Only the tribunal and, in some respects, the modes of procedure are changed. The limitations prescribed by the State law govern in both tribunals.

Errors of law committed by a Circuit Court which passed sentence upon a prisoner, cannot be inquired into in a proceeding on an application for habeas corpus to test the jurisdiction of the court which passed sentence. An indictment which charges in the first count that the defendants conspired to intimidate A. B., a citizen of African descent, in the exercise of his right to vote for a member of the Congress of the United States, and that in the execution of that conspiracy they beat, bruised, wounded, and otherwise p. 652maltreated him ; and in the second count that they did this on account of his race, color, and previous condition of servitude, by going in disguise and assaulting him on the public highway and on his own premises, contains a sufficient description of an offence embraced within, the provisions of §§ 5508, 5520 Rev. Stat.

The court, on the filing of this petition, issued a rule on the p. 653marshal, or on any person in whose custody the prisoners might be found, to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus should not issue for their release.

It is, however, to be carefully observed that this latter principle does not authorize the court to convert the writ of habeas corpus into a writ of error, by which the errors of law committed by the court that passed the sentence can be reviewed here; for if that court had jurisdiction of the party and of the offence for which he was tried, and has not exceeded its p. 654powers in the sentence which it pronounced, this court can inquire no further.

“We, the grand jurors of the United States, chosen, selected, and sworn in and for the Northern District of Georgia, upon our oaths, present : That heretofore, to wit, on the twenty-fifth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, Jasper Yarbrough, James Yarbrough, Dilmus Yarbrough, Neal Yarbrough, Lovel Streetman, Bold Emory, State Lemmons, Jake Hayes, and E. H. Green, all late of said Northern District of Georgia, did, within the said Northern District of Georgia, and within the jurisdiction of this court, commit the offence of conspiracy, for that the said Jasper Yarbrough, James Yarbrough, Dilmus Yarbrough, Neal p. 656Yarbrough, Lovel Streetman, Bold Emory, State Lemmons, Jake Hayes, and E. H. Green did then and there, at the time and place aforesaid, combine, conspire, and confederate together, by force, to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate Berry Saunders, a person of color and a citizen of the United States of America of African descent, on account of his race, color, and previous condition of servitude, in the full exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege of suffrage in the election of a lawfully qualified person as a member of the Congress of the United States of America, and because the said Berry Saunders had so exercised the same, and on account of such exercise, which said right and privilege of suffrage was secured to the said Berry Saunders by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, the said Berry Saunders being then and there lawfully entitled to vote in said election, and having so then and there conspired the said Jasper Yarbrough, James Yarbrough, Dilmus Yarbrough, Neal Yarbrough, Lovel Streetman, Bold Emory, State Lemmons, Jake Hayes, and E. H. Green did unlawfully, feloniously, and wilfully bod't, bruise, wound, and maltreat the said Berry Saunders,^contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America.

“ Second Count.—And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present: That heretofore, to wit, on the twenty-fifth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, Jasper Yarbrough, James Yarbrough, Dilmus Yarbrough, Neal Yarbrough, Lovel Streetman, Bold Emory, State Lemmons, Jake Hayes, and E. H. Green, all late of said Northern District of Georgia, within the said Northern District of Georgia and within the jurisdiction of this court, did commit the offence of conspiracy, forthat the said Jasper Yarbrough, James Yarbrough, Dilmus Yarbrough, Neal Yarbrough, Lovel Streetman, Bold Emory, State Lemmons, Jake Hayes, and E. H. Green, having then and there conspired together, by force, to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate Berry Saunders, a person of color and a citizen of the United States of America of African descent, on account of his race, color, and previous condition of servitude, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously go in disguise on the highway, and on the premises of Berry Saunders, with the intent to prevent and hinder his free exercise and p. 657enjoyment of the right to vote at an election for a lawfully qualified person as a member of the Congress of the United States of America, which said right had. then and there been guaranteed to the said Berry Saunders by the Constitution and. laws of the United States of America, the said Berry Saunders being then and there lawfully qualified to vote at said election ; and having so conspired, with intent as aforesaid, the said Jasper Yarbrough, James Yarbrough, Dilmus Yarbrough, Neal Yarbrough, Lovel Streetman, Bold Emory, State Lemmons, Jake Hayes, and E. H. Green did then and there beat, bruise, wound, and maltreat the said Berry Saunders, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America.

vol . ex—42 p. 658of which, is superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption.

When early in the late civil war the enforcement of the acts of Congress for obtaining soldiers by draft brought the officers engaged in it into hostile neighborhoods, it was found necessary to pass laws for their protection. Accordingly, in 1863, an act was passed making it a criminal offence to assault or p. 660obstruct any officer while engaged in making the draft or in any service in relation thereto. 12 Stat. 731. And the next year the act was amended by making it applicable to the enrolment and resistance made thereto, and adding that if any assault on any officer or other person engaged in making such enrolment shall result in death, it shall be murder and punished accordingly. 13 Stat. 8, § 12. Under this statute Scott was found guilty of murder in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, and the case was brought here by a certificate of division of opinion.

It was not until 1842 that Congress took any action under the power here conferred, when, conceiving thgt the system of electing all the members of the House of Representatives from a State by general ticket, as it was called, that is, every elector voting for as many names as the State was entitled to representatives in that house, worked injustice to other States which did not adopt that system, and gave an undue preponderance p. 661of power to the political party which had a majority of votes in the State, however small, enacted that each member should be elected by a separate district, composed of contiguous territory. 5 Stat. 491.

This proposition answers also another objection to the constitutionality of the laws under consideration, namely, that the right to vote for a member of Congress is not dependent upon p. 663the Constitution or laws of the United States, but is governed by the law of each State respectively.

It is not true, therefore, that electors for members of Congress owe their right to vote to the State law in any sense p. 664which, makes the exercise of the right to depend exclusively on the law of the State.

The reference to cases in this court in which the power of Congress under the first section of the Fourteenth p. 666Amendment has been, held to relate alone to acts done under State authority, can afford petitioners no aid in the present case. For, while it may be true that acts which are mere invasions of private rights, which acts have no sanction in the statutes of a State, or which are not committed by any one exercising its authority, are not within the scope of that amendment, it is quite a different matter when Congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise of rights conferred by the Constitution of the United States essential to the healthy organization of the government itself.

Such has been the history of all republics, and, though ours p. 667lias been comparatively free from both, these evils in the past, no lover of his country can shut his eyes to the fear of future danger from both sources.