Case details
Bluebook Citation
Jessup v. United States, 106 U.S. 147
Full caption
Jessup v. United States.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jess up v . Unite d States .
Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.
This was an action at law brought by the United States against William H. Jessup, as principal, and Jabez Howes and others, sureties on his bond, dated Nov. 3, 1869, payable to the United States, in the sum of $10,000, and conditioned as follows: —
“The condition of the foregoing obligation is such, that whereas t e said William Henry Jessup is a manufacturer of friction or other matches, cigar-lights, or wax-tapers; and whereas, under the proV1sions of the 161st section of an act entitled ‘ An Act to provide p. 148internal revenue to support the government, to pay interest on the public debt, and for other purposes,’ approved June 30, 1864, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized, from time to time, to furnish, supply, and deliver to any manufacturer of friction or other matches, cigar-lights, or wax-tapers, a suitable quantity of adhesive or othei' stamps, such as may be prescribed for use in such cases, without prepayment therefor, on a credit not exceeding sixty days, requiring in advance such security as he may judge necessary to secure payment therefor to the treasury of the United States within the time prescribed for such payment; and whereas adhesive stamps have been delivered, or hereafter may be delivered, to said William Henry Jessup by virtue of said authority: Now, therefore, if the said William Henry Jessup shall make a faithful return, whenever so required, of the moneys received by him for such adhesive stamps as have been or may hereafter be delivered to him, and of all quantities or amounts thereof undisposed of, whenever required so to do, and shall do and perform all other acts of him required to be done in the premises according to law and regulations, shall well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, to the Treasurer of the United States, for the use of the United States, all and every such sum or sums of money as the said William Henry Jessup may owe to the United States for adhesive stamps which have been or shall be delivered to him, or which have been or shall be forwarded to him, according to his request or order, within the time prescribed for payment for the same according to law, and shall and will pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Treasurer, for the use aforesaid, each and every sum of money as shall become due or payable to the United States, at the time and on the days each sum shall respectively become due or payable, then the above obligation to be void and of no effect; otherwise to be and remain in full force and virtue.”
1
Section 161 of the act of June 30,1864, c. 173, entitled “ An Act to provide interna! revenue to support the government, to pay interest on the public debt, and for other purposes,” does not require that when, pursuant to its provisions, adhesive and other stamps are furnished to the manufacturer on credit, the bond to secure the payment therefor shall be executed to the Treasurer of the United States.
2
Even if taken without the authority of a statute, a bond payable to the United States, with a condition that the manufacturer shall pay such sums as he shall owe the United States for adhesive stamps, would be binding at common law, and an action might be maintained thereon.
3
Under such a bond, any competent evidence to establish the manufacturer’s indebtedness for stamps is admissible, whether they were from time to time furnished by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or the Assistant Treasurer of the United States.
Section 161 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 173, entitled “An Act to provide internal revenue to support the government, to pay interest on the public debt, and for other purposes,” provides as follows: “ That the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, from time to time, furnish, supply, and deliver to any manufacturer of friction or other matches, cigar-lights, or wax-tapers, a suitable quantity of adhesive or other stamps, such as may be prescribed for use in such cases, without prepayment therefor, on a credit not exceeding sixty days, requiring in advance such security as he may judge necessary to secure p. 149payment therefor to the Treasurer of the United States within the time prescribed for such payment. And upon all bonds or other securities taken by said commissioner, under the provisions of this act, suits may be maintained by said Treasurer in the Circuit or District Court of the United States, in the several districts, where any persons giving said bonds or other securities reside or may be found, in any appropriate form of action.”
While these provisions of the law were in force, Jessup, a manufacturer of friction-matches in San Francisco, Cal., desiring to avail himself of the privilege of obtaining internal revenue stamps on a credit of sixty days, gave to the United States the bond in suit.
The breach of the bond assigned is that he had received from the United States adhesive stamps amounting to the sum of $8,000, which he had neither accounted for nor paid.
The answer admits the execution of the bond, but denies generally the other allegations of the complaint. It avers performance, and sets up, by way of separate defence, that under the law and regulations, and the condition of the bond, all stamps, of whatsoever kind or denomination, delivered to Jessup, were to be so delivered to him upon a credit not exceeding sixty days; that after the delivery and execution of the bond, and before the pretended liability mentioned in said complaint had accrued, to wit, on the 18th of April, 1870, the United States, or some of its officers, made a new contract with Jessup, without the knowledge or consent of the defendants, the sureties on said bond, or either of them, whereby the credits for stamps supplied and delivered to him were extended indefinitely, and beyond the term of sixty days. The answer further avers that if he became indebted to the United States for stamps furnished, supplied, or delivered to him, such indebtedness accrued since the making of and under said new contract, and not otherwise.
The parties waived a jury, and submitted the cause to the court for trial. The court found all the issues of fact for the plaintiff, and rendered judgment in its favor for the sum of $7,272, with interest thereon from March 1, 1876.
To reverse that judgment this writ of error was brought.
Mr. William W. Morrow and Mr. John E. Ward for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney’General Maury for the United States.
Mb . Justice Wood s , after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The answer of the defendants admits the execution of the bond which is the basis of the suit. The finding by the court below in favor of the United States of all the issues of fact raised by the pleadings establishes, beyond the reach of controversy, that Jessup did not perform the condition of his bond; that he did not pay for revenue stamps advanced to him; and that the United States, or some of its officers, did not, without the knowledge or consent of his sureties, make a new contract, whereby credits for stamps furnished him were extended indefinitely, and beyond the term of sixty days.
The finding of the court also shows that Jessup was indebted to the United States for stamps received by him, the payment of which was secured by his bond, in the sum for which judgment was rendered against his sureties.
The finding has eliminated from the case some of the questions discussed by the counsel for plaintiffs in error. The facts found by the Circuit Court are not open to review in this court, and we can only consider questions of law arising upon the trial, and duly presented by bill of exceptions, and errors of law apparent on the face of the pleadings. Insurance Company v. Folsom, 18 Wall. 237;. Cooper v. Omohundro; 19 id. 65.
These questions we shall now consider. It appears from the bill of exceptions that the defendants moved to dismiss the action, on the ground that the bond in suit was given to the United States, and not to the Treasurer of the United States, and on the ground that the suit was not brought in his name, as provided by sect. 161 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 173, as amended.
The first of these grounds is based on the assumption that the section referred to requires the bond to be given to the Treasurer of the United States and not to the United States, and, as the bond in suit is payable to the United States, that it p. 151is absolutely void; the contention of the plaintiffs in error being that the United States cannot take a valid bond except when and in the terms directed by the statute. But the bond is not required to be made payable to the Treasurer. It may be payable directly to the United States, and conditioned that payment for stamps advanced shall be made to the Treasurer, and not depart from any express provision of the law.
But conceding the section to mean that the bond shall be payable to the Treasurer, still we are of opinion that a bond in which the United States is the obligee, and which is conditioned that payment for stamps advanced shall be made to the Treasurer, is a valid and binding obligation.
In United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115, the question was made how far a bond voluntarily given to the United States and not prescribed by law is a valid instrument,, and binding upon the parties; in other words, whether the United States have in their political capacity a right to enter into a contract or to take a bond in cases not previously provided for by some law. And the court declared: “Upon full consideration of this subject, we are of opinion that the United States have such a capacity to enter into contracts. It is in our opinion an incident to the general right of sovereignty, and the United States being a body politic may, within the sphere of the constitutional powers embodied in it, enter into contracts not prohibited by law, and appropriate to the just exercise of these powers.”
To the same effect is United States v. Bradley, 10 id. 343.
In United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. 395, it was held, in substance, that when a distiller’s bond was given under sect. 53 of the act now in question, which required the bond to be conditioned for the performance of several particular acts which it specifically stated, and the agent of the government took the bond conditioned, not in the specific way directed by the statute, but for the parties’ compliance with all the provisions of the act and such other acts as were then or might thereafter be in that behalf enacted, the bond was binding on the parties.
United States v. Linn, 15 Pet. 290, was an action against a receiver of public moneys and his sureties. The statute required him to give bond for the faithful discharge of his trust. p. 152The instrument given and sued on was without seal, and, therefore, not the security required by the statute. The court, nevertheless, held it to be a valid and binding obligation.
These authorities show that the United States can, without the authority of any statute, make a valid contract, and that when the form of a contract is prescribed by the statute, a departure from its directions will not render the contract invalid. The bond is good at common law.
The Circuit Court was, therefore, right in overruling the motion of the defendants to dismiss the suit on the ground that the bond was given to the United States and not to the Treasurer of the United States.
This conclusion disposes also of the second ground upon which the motion to dismiss was based. For if the United States can, without the authority of any statute, take a valid bond payable to the United States, they can maintain a suit upon it in their own name. It would be absurd to hold a bond to be valid on which a suit in the name of the obligee could not be maintained.
The objection to the admissibility of the bond in evidence, which the bill of exceptions shows was taken, on the ground that the condition of the bond did not conform strictly to the condition prescribed by the statute, falls for the same reasons and upon the same authorities.
It further appeared from the bill of exceptions that on the trial of the case the United States, to prove the breach of the condition of the bond by Jessup, offered in evidence the account kept by the Assistant Treasurer of the United States at San Francisco, from which it appeared that, on Jan. 1, 1876, for adhesive stamps advanced by him to Jessup there was due from the latter to the United States the sum of $8,000. The court admitted the account in evidence notwithstanding the objection of defendants, and this is now assigned for error.
The first ground of objection urged to the admissibility of this evidence was that the account appeared to be for stamps supplied by the Assistant Treasurer, and the law under which the bond was given contemplated that the stamps should be furnished by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
But the penalty of the bond was payable directly to the p. 153United States, and its condition was that Jessup should pay, or cause to be paid, to the Treasurer of the United States, for the use of the United States, all and every such sum or sums as he might owe the United States for adhesive stamps. This being a valid bond, any evidence which tended to show that Jessup was indebted to the United States for adhesive stamps was competent, and it was quite immaterial whether the stamps were furnished by the Assistant Treasurer or by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The account was objected to on the further ground that it appeared on its face that the credits were continuously for a greater period than sixty days, and, therefore, that the account was not within the statute, and was incompetent and irrelevant to the issue in the action. The contention of the plaintiffs in error is that the operation of the bond extended to but one credit of sixty days ; that by the security for stamps advanced on credit required by sect. 161, is meant a new security for each and every advance of stamps, and that manufacturers needing stamps from time to time must give security as often as a lot of stamps is advanced, and consequently that the bond in suit was security only for the first advance of stamps, and that all subsequent advances were made entirely without security. But the language of the condition of the bond clearly excludes any such construction. The condition is that Jessup shall pay such sum or sums of money as he may owe to the United States for adhesive stamps which have been or shall be delivered to him, or which have been or shall be forwarded to him, according to his request or order, within the time prescribed for payment for the same, and shall and will pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Treasurer, for the use aforesaid, each and every such sum of money as shall become due or payable to the United States at the time and on the days such sums shall respectively become due and payable. The idea that the bond secured the payment of but one sum of money due for stamps purchased at one time on a single credit of sixty days, finds no support in the language of the bond. The payment of sums due at different times, for stamps purchased at different times, is expressly secured in the condition of the bond.
The bond in this respect conforms to the statute, which p. 154authorizes the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from time to time to supply and deliver to any manufacturer of friction-matches a suitable quantity of adhesive or other stamps, without prepayment therefor, on a credit not exceeding sixty days. What we have said covers all the errors assigned.
We find no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.
The “Nevada .”
1. An ocean steamer starting from a crowded slip, the motion of her propeller caused a canal-boat to break her fastenings and swing around against the propeller, whereby she was sunk. The steamer had no lookout at her stern, by whom the peril of the canal-boat might have been seen in time to stop the propeller and prevent the collision. Held, that the steamer was in fault. 2. Towage should be employed, when necessary to enable a large steamer to
leave a crowded slip or harbor without damaging other vessels. 3. Steamers and locomotives should be so managed and operated as to do the
least possible injury consistent with their substantial usefulness. 4. Those in charge of the canal-boat, in this case, having done all that reasonable
prudence required of them, by properly fastening their boat, were held free from blame.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Stephen P. Nash for the appellant.
Mr. Eugene H. Lewis and Mr. Robert D. Benedict for the appellee.
Mr . Just ice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court.
This case arises upon a libel filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York by S. J. Quick, master and owner of the canal-boat “ Kate Green,” for himself and for F. A. McKnight, against the steamship “Nevada,” in a cause of collision. The libel alleges that McKnight was invested by subrogation, or otherwise, with the interest of the Western Insurance Company of Buffalo, who were insurers of 8,100 bushels of corn, the cargo of the “ Kate Green ” at the time of the collision; that on the 27th of September, 1871, whilst the p. 155boat was lying securely fastened in a slip in New York City, between piers No. 46 and No. 47 on the North River, the “Nevada,” which had been moored in the same slip on the north side of pier No. 46, proceeded on her way to sea, and carelessly and negligently ran into and struck the “ Kate Green ” with her propeller, causing her to sink, whereby she was greatly injured and her cargo destroyed, resulting in a total damage of $12,000.
The Liverpool and Great Western Steam Company appeared as claimants of the “Nevada,” and answered the libel, setting up that the collision was occasioned solely by the carelessness and negligence of the master and crew of the “ Kate Green.”
McKnight filed a petition for leave to intervene, setting forth his interest in the cargo, to wit, that it had been insured by the Western Insurance Company, which became liable for and paid the full value thereof to the owners, and afterwards became bankrupt, and at the sale of its assets, he, McKnight, became the purchaser of its claims arising from the loss and destruction of said cargo. He was allowed to intervene accordingly.
Proofs being taken, a decree was made by the District Court that the libellants recover their damages and costs against the “Nevada,” and it was referred to a commissioner to ascertain the amount of damage.
The commissioner reported that the damage done to, the “Kate Green,” her furniture, loss of freight, and interest, amounted to $4,289.72; and that the damage to the cargo, with interest, was $8,109.64. A decree was made for these sums, with costs.
Upon appeal to the Circuit Court this decree was affirmed, and a new decree was entered (including interest to the date of the decree) in favor of Quick for the sum of $4,577.65, besides costs; and in favor of McKnight for the sum of $8,653.98, besides his costs.
The owners of the “Nevada” have appealed from this decree. So far as relates to Quick, the owner of the “ Kate Green,” under the recent ruling of this court in Ex parte Baltimore f Ohio Railroad Co., ante, p. 5, the appeal must be dismissed; as to McKnight, it is necessary to examine the case at large.
The Circuit Court found the facts in detail, of which it is sufficient to state, that about 3 o’clock P. M., Sept. 27,1871, the propeller steamship “ Nevada,” belonging to one of the regular lines between New York and Liverpool, was lying alongside of pier No. 46 in the slip between that pier and pier No. 47 on the North River, New York, about to start on her voyage to Liverpool. She had been advertised to start at that hour, had rung her bells and blown her whistle several times, and her signals for starting were flying at mast-head. At that instant, before her screw was put in motion, a steam-tug entered the slip with the canal-boat “ Kate Green ” in tow, and placed her alongside of another canal-boat, the “ C. H. Hart,” lying fastened to a grain elevator, which was in turn fastened to the steamship “ Scotia,” lying alongside pier No. 47, on the north side of the slip. The master and steersman of the “Kate Green,” which lay about sixty feet from the “Nevada,” instantly made her fast to the “ C. H. Hart,” and at that moment the propeller of the “Nevada” began to revolve, and produced a suction and commotion of the water which caused the “ C. H. Hart” to break her fastenings, and the “Kate Green ” to swing around under the stern of the “Nevada,” where she was struck by the propeller and sunk, and much injured, and her cargo was lost. She was not seen from the “ Nevada ” when she came in, and no special notice was given to her that the “ Nevada ” was about, to leave, and those in charge of her had no actual knowledge of the fact until the propeller of the “ Nevada ” began to move. As soon as she began to swing around her master called loudly to the “ Nevada ” to stop her propeller, but he was not heard, or, if heard, not heeded.
The court further found as follows: —
“ 10. No one on board of the ‘ Nevada ’ knew of the parting of the ‘ Hart’s ’ lines, or of the swinging of the ‘ Green,’ or of the accident, until after they arrived in Liverpool. If a man had looked from her deck over her side into the slip, he could not have failed to see what was going on all the time, from the first movement of the propeller, and before, until she got out.
“ 11. There was an abundance of time after the breaking of the fastenings of the ‘ Hart,’ and after the ‘ Green ’ began to p. 157swing, and after the hail of her master, to have stopped the propeller, before the collision.
“ 12. The report of the commissioner as to the damages is warranted by the evidence, and the libellant, McKnight, was the owner of the claim for damages when the libel was filed.”
The conclusions of law found by the Circuit Court were as follows: —
“ 1. The ‘ Nevada ’ was in fault for not keeping a sufficient lookout aft and on the side next the slip, and in not seeing the ‘ Kate Green ’ when she came in, or as she swung over, and in not stopping the propeller in time to avoid the collision.
“ 2. The ‘ Kate Green,’ under the peculiar circumstances in which she was placed, was not in fault.
“ 3. The libellants are entitled to recover the damages reported by the commissioner.”
It seems hardly necessary to do more than to state the case as the facts are found by the court in order to decide it. The “ Kate Green ” came into the slip, it is true, at the time the “ Nevada ” was about to leave; and those in charge of her ought to have known this fact from the ringing of the “ Nevada’s ” bells and her visible signals for starting. But supposing they did know it, what more could they do than they did do ? They immediately made fast to the “C. H. Hart,” which was also made fast to the ship lying at the North Pier. It was reasonable for them to suppose that the fastening of the “ C. H. Hart” was secure. They could not know that it would break. It was that break which set them adrift, subject to the suction caused by the motion of the “ Nevada’s ” propeller. Their own fastenings were sufficient. We do not see how the court could find otherwise than that they were free from fault or negligence. Perhaps they might have done something else which would have been better. The event is always a great teacher. They might have stayed out in the river and not entered the slip; or, having entered, they might have gone back to the bulk-head, and stayed there till the “ Nevada ” left. But these possibilities are not the criteria by which they are to be judged. The question is, Did they do all that reasonable prudence required them to do under the circumstances ? And this question, we think, must be answered in the affirmative.
Then, how is it with the “ Nevada ? ” Did those on board of her do all that was reasonably required of them ? It is significantly asked by her counsel, whether a steamship is to be precluded from the use of her own means of locomotion ? Must she be subjected to the inconvenience and expense of employing a tug to tow her out into open water? That does not necessarily follow. If, indeed, the action of her propellers is such as to cause unavoidable injury to other craft in a crowded harbor, or in a confined space like that of a slip or dock used by vessels of every kind, she might be justly required to find other means of moving in a position involving so much peril. This is no more than is required in analogous cases. Railroad companies are compelled to slacken the speed of their trains in passing through cities, and are often either prohibited from using ordinary locomotive engines in the more public streets, or required to guard their tracks by means of gates, bars, or fences, in order to prevent accidents and collisions. Incidental inconveniences, it is true, attach to the use of many of the great improvements of the age; inconveniences which must be submitted to in order that the public may have the benefit of those improvements. Almost every new machine inflicts loss of employment upon some portion of the laboring class, which are thus obliged to seek other fields of industry. Steamboats have taken the place of sailing-vessels; railroads have interfered with steamboats, and have rendered useless thousands of stage-coaches, and the appliances connected with them. The vast power and speed of the modern locomotive engine, carrying its thousand passengers, or its hundreds of tons of merchandise, require the private carriage and the country team to await its passage and give it the right of way. The large steamer which navigates our rivers creates an agitation of the waters which cannot be prevented without staying its speed and crippling its usefulness, and which requires from smaller vessels in its neighborhood increased attention and care to avoid being foundered or injured. Horse railroads in cities incumber the streets with their iron tracks, and render the passage of private vehicles more difficult and dangerous. But whilst these incidental and unavoidable inconveniences must be submitted to in order that the greater benefit derived from p. 159the new improvements may be enjoyed, there still remains the duty of so managing and operating them as to do the least possible injury consistent with the fair attainment of their substantial benefits. The ocean steamer is one of the great inventions of the century, and one of the advanced instrumentalities of modern civilization ; but whilst it may freely exercise its powerful propeller and sport its leviathan proportions on the ocean or in deep and open waters, it is justly required to observe extraordinary care and watchfulness when surrounded by feebler craft in a crowded harbor.. Under some circumstances, and within a limited space, it may even be required to dispense with the use of its ordinary means of locomotion, and resort to the employment of towage or other safe and quiet means of changing its position and effecting its necessary movements. Such a modification of the use of its power, when absolutely required for the safety of other vessels rightfully located in its vicinity, would produce no material diminution of its efficiency in the accomplishment of its principal design.
However, we do not mean to say that, in the application of these principles to the present case, it was the duty of the “Nevada” to remit the use of her propeller in leaving her place in the slip where she lay. The court does not find her in fault for using it, but for not having a lookout at her stern, and on the side next to the slip, who could have seen the breaking away of the “ Hart ” and the “ Kate Green ” from their fastenings, and, by giving timely alarm, could have averted the disaster by a.momentary stopping of the “ Nevada’s ” engine. In such a place, and in the midst of such a crowd of vessels as then filled the slip, since she did put her propeller in motion, she was bound to use the utmost caution and circumspection in order to avoid doing injury. The least that could be expected of her was a constant lookout at every part. But the court finds that “ no one on board of the ‘ Nevada ’ knew of the parting of the * Hart’s ’ lines, or of the swinging of the ‘ Green,’ or of the accident, until after they arrived at Liverpool. If a man had looked from her deck over her side into the slip, he could not have failed to see what was going on all the time, from the first movement of the propeller, and before, until she got out.” And the court further finds that “ there p. 160was abundant time after the breaking of the fastenings of the 4 Hart,’ and after the ‘ Green ’ began to swing, and after the hail of her master, to have stopped the propeller before the collision.”
This, as it seems to us, settles the case, and amply justifies the conclusion of law made by the court below, that “ the ‘ Nevada ’ was in fault for not keeping a sufficient lookout aft and on the side next the slip, and in not seeing the ‘ Kate Green ’ when she came in, or as she swung over, and in not stopping the propeller in time to avoid the collision.” In view of the principles to which we have adverted, and which ought to control this case, no other conclusion could have been reached.
We see no error in the decree of the Circuit Court, and it is therefore, with interest and costs,
Affirmed.
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