Case details
Citation
102 U.S. 180
Full caption
Railway Company v. Renwick.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Majority
Waite (Chief Justice)
Railw ay Comp any v . Renwick .
The second section of the act of the General Assembly of Iowa, entitled “ An Act in relation to riparian owners on the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, approved March 18, 1874, is not in conflict with any statute of the United States. Where, therefore, the owner of lands on the Mississippi had made an embankment in front of them, and at its outer end beyond low-water mark erected, without the direction or consent of the Secretary of War, a stone pier or crib, this court affirms the judgment of the Supreme Court of that State, declaring that under that section a railway company cannot construct its road over the embankment between high and low water mark, unless the damages to such owner shall first be ascertained and paid.
Motio n to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, coupled with a motion under Rule 6 to affirm the judgment.
This was a proceeding, under the statute of Iowa, by the Davenport and Northwestern Railway Company for the assessment of damages sustained by its appropriating lands for the p. 181construction of its road. Among others is a strip situate in the city of Davenport between high and low water mark on the Mississippi River. It fronts certain lots, on which were erected a steam saw-mill, a planing-mill, and other houses. Renwick and others were in possession of the lots, and they or those under whom they claimed had made an embankment extending therefrom into the river, and erected at the end of it a stone pier, without having obtained the consent or direction of the Secretary of War. A boom was thus formed for holding logs in front of and convenient to the mill. The line of the railroad passes over this embankment between high and low water* mark.
The railway company was authorized by law to construct its road, and the city of Davenport gave its consent to laying the tracks within its limits.
A judgment, rendered against the company by the Scott Circuit Court for the damages aforesaid, was affirmed by the Supreme Court. This writ of error was then sued out.
Sect. 5254 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides: —
“ The owners of saw-mills on the Mississippi River are authorized and empowered, under the direction of the Secretary of War, to construct piers or cribs in front of their mill property on the banks of the river for the protection of their mills and rafts against damage by floods and ice: Provided, however, that the piers or cribs so constructed do not interfere with or obstruct the navigation of the river, and in case any pier or crib constructed under authority of this section shall at any time, and for any 'cause, be found to obstruct the navigation of the river, the government expressly reserves the right to remove or direct the removal of it, at the cost and expense of the owners thereof.”
An act of the General Assembly of Iowa, approved March 18,1874 (Public Laws of Iowa, 1874, p. 28), is as follows: —
“An Act in relation to Riparian Owners on the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers.
“Sect . 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Iowa, that all owners and lessees of lands or lots situate upon the Iowa banks of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, upon which p. 182property there is now, or may hereafter be, carried on any business which is in any way connected with the navigation of said rivers, or to which the said navigation is a proper or convenient adjunct, are hereby authorized to construct and maintain, in front of their said property, piers, cribs, booms, and other proper and convenient erections and devices for the use of their respective pursuits and the protection and harbor of rafts, logs, floats, and other water-crafts: Provided, that the same present no material or unreasonable obstruction to the navigation of the stream, or to a similar use of adjoining property.
“ Sect . 2. It shall not be lawful for any person or corporation to construct or operate any railroad or other obstruction between such lots or lands and either of said rivers, or upon the shore or margin thereof, unless the injury and damage to such owners occasioned thereby shall be first ascertained and compensated in the manner provided by chap. 4, title 10, of the Code.”
The company claimed in the courts below that the title to the soil between high and low water mark being vested in the State, a riparian owner is not entitled to damages by reason of the company’s obstructing his access to the Mississippi River by their railroad in front of his premises, and that Congress, in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over the navigable waters of the United States, having prescribed certain conditions on which the owners of saw-mills on the Mississippi River may erect piers or cribs in front of their property, the above act of the General Assembly of Iowa is void.
Mr. James T. Lane and Mr. John N. Rogers in support of the motions.
Mr. James Grant, contra.
Mr . Chief Justic e Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
Although the Supreme Court of Iowa decided that Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, had jurisdiction over the Mississippi River, and having exercised that power in the way specified in sect. 5254, Rev. Stat., all State legislation in conflict therewith was void, still the question remains, whether, if a riparian proprietor improves his property with a view to its use in connection with the river, without complying wit p. 183this act of Congress, a railroad company, under the power of eminent domain granted by the State, can appropriate his improvements to its own use without his consent and without making him compensation. This, we think, is a Federal question giving us jurisdiction, but it is a question on which we do not care to hear argument. The controversy is not between the public and the riparian owner as to his right to keep up his improvements. The public does not complain, but the railroad company wants the improvements. In the hands of the company they will be just as much a nuisance, so far as the public is concerned, as they can be if kept up by the owner. As between these two parties the improvements are the property of the riparian proprietor, and if the company wants them for its own use it must make compensation. So the court below has decided, and to our minds its decision was clearly right. While in Iowa it has been held that the State owns the lands lying along the river between high and low water mark, care was taken in the act of March 18, 1874, to provide that it should not be lawful for any person or corporation to construct or operate any railroad or other obstruction between the shore and the river without compensation to the shore owners. The second section of the act is good, even though the first may conflict with what Congress had before done.
The motion to dismiss is denied, but that to affirm granted.
Judgment affirmed.
Ex parte Perry .
This court will not by mandamus compel an inferior court to reverse a decision made in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Petition for mandamus.
The petitioners filed their libel against the ship “Civiltà” and the steam-tug “ Restless,” in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The vessels were seized under process sued out of that court, but were released on the claimant of each giving the requisite stipulation for value.
From a decree against the claimants they respectively prayed and perfected an appeal to the Circuit Court. A decree was there rendered, Oct. 26,1877, in favor of the libellants, amounting in damages, interest, and costs to the sum of $11,400.90, which was apportioned equally between the two vessels. The decree provided that on the payment by the claimant of either vessel of one-half of the amount, with interest thereon to the date of payment, the proceedings against such vessel and her claimant be stayed for the collection of the residue until the return by the marshal of an execution unsatisfied against the claimant of the other vessel for the other half part of said amount, or until it should otherwise appear that the libellants were unable to enforce or collect the other part of said damages, costs, and interest against the claimant of the other vessel by process from that court.
The court further adjudged that unless the decree be fulfilled or satisfied, or proceedings stayed on appeal by filing security within ten days after service of a copy of the decree upon the proctors for the claimants, the stipulators, on the appeal to that court for damages and costs, should perform their engagements, or show cause within four days after the expiration of said ten days, or on the first day of jurisdiction thereafter, why execution should not issue against them, their goods, chattels, and lands.
Notice of an appeal to this court was given. The claimant of the “ Civilta ” alone perfected his appeal within the required time, and rendered it a supersedeas.
A. summary judgment for $17,323.22 was rendered by the Circuit Court, March 15,1878, in favor of the libellants against John G. Baker, William B. Hatch, and Edward P. Hatch, stipulators on the appeal to that court, Baker being the claimant of the “ Restless.” A transcript of this judgment was filed in the office of the county clerk of Kings County, New York..
Edward P. Hatch was the owner of certain real estate in Brooklyn, which he had contracted to sell, but, by reason of the summary judgment, the vendee declined to complete the purchase. The Circuit Court, Jan. 4, 1879, ordered, on notice to all the parties, that on his depositing the sum of $6,200, the p. 185price of said real estate, in the United States Trust Company simultaneously with the delivery to him of the deed, the lien of the judgment on said real estate should be vacated, and that, if the judgment should be set aside, the Trust Company should pay to said Hatch such sum so deposited, with its accumulations, — “ if not, the deposit, with its accumulations, to be held subject to the further order of the court.”
The deposit was made. The court, Jan. 3, 1879, denied a motion to set aside the judgment. An execution was sued out thereon May 7, 1879. The court, June 16, refused to direct that the amount so deposited be applied upon the execution, and made the further* order, “ that said sum of six thousand two hundred dollars ($6,200) remain in the United States Trust Company, provided the sureties, William B. Hatch and Edward P. Hatch, as principals, will give a bond to the libellants, with a satisfactory surety, in the penalty of five thousand dollars ($5,000), conditioned that if, by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the ‘Restless’ and her sureties shall be held liable for the amount decreed against them by this court; to wit, five thousand seven hundred dollars and forty-five cents ($5,700.45), and interest thereon, then in such case John G. Baker, the claimant of the ‘ Restless,’ and said sureties, shall pay into the registry of this court such an amount as will cover the difference between interest upon said six thousand two hundred dollars ($6,200), at the legal rate, and the sum which shall have been earned by the said sum of six thousand two hundred dollars ($6,200) in the United States Trust Company.
“And the said William B. Hatch and Edward P. Hatch having now presented such a bond to this court, and the surety named in said bond being satisfactory to, and said bond having in all things been approved by, this court,” the court further ordered “ that all proceedings on the part of said libellants and of the marshal of this court, under the execution herein issued to said marshal on the seventh day of May, 1879, to collect out of the property of the said William B. Hatch or Edward P. Hatch the amount of the decree against the tug ‘ Restless ’ now presently due, to wit, five thousand seven hundred dollars and forty-five cents ($5,700.45), and interest, be and the same p. 186are hereby stayed, with leave to said libellants to move thia court, on notice, for leave to proceed under said execution.”
June 27, the court denied the motion of the libellants for leave to proceed under the execution.
The petitioners pray this court for a rule upon the circuit judge to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued, commanding him to vacate and set aside the order granting a stay of proceedings under the execution, and direct the payment of the money deposited in the United States Trust Company to the marshal of the United States, under said execution as aforesaid, or why they should not have such other or further order, writ, or relief as may be just.
Mr. Robert D. Benedict for the petitioners.
Mr. John E. Parsons, contra.
Mr . Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
We cannot by mandamus correct the judicial errors committed by an inferior court in the progress of a cause. Ex parte Schwab, 98 U. S. 240. We can in this way, in a proper case, compel an inferior court to act, but cannot control its decisions while acting. In the present case it appears that the Circuit Court has acted on the motion of the petitioner, and denied him what he asked. The object of this proceeding is to obtain from us an order requiring that court to reverse its former decision and grant the relief it has once refused. That is the office of a writ of error or an appeal, and not of a writ of mandamus. Ex parte Flippin, 94 U. S. 248; Ex parte Loring, id. 418. Neither is the case changed because the appropriate remedy may involve an inconvenient delay. In Ex parte Whitney (13 Pet. 404), it was held that a writ of mandamus ought not to be used to correct orders made by a judge in the exercise of his authority, even though such orders “ may seem to bear harshly or oppressively upon the party ” complaining.
Mandamus refused»
County of Greene v . Daniel .
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