Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010)
Full caption
SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. BUONO
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 28, 2010
SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v.
BUONO
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 08–472. Argued October 7, 2009—Decided April 28, 2010
In 1934, members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) placed a Latin cross on federal land in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) to honor American soldiers who died in World War I. Claiming to be of fended by a religious symbol’s presence on federal land, respondent Buono, a regular visitor to the Preserve, filed this suit alleging a viola tion of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and seeking an injunction requiring the Government to remove the cross. In the litiga tion’s first stage (Buono I), the District Court found that Buono had standing to sue and, concluding that the presence of the cross on federal land conveyed an impression of governmental endorsement of religion, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612–613, it granted Buono’s re quested injunctive relief (2002 injunction). The District Court did not consider whether the Government’s actions regarding the cross had a secular purpose or caused entanglement with religion. While the Gov ernment’s appeal was pending, Congress passed the Department of De fense Appropriations Act, 2004, § 8121(a) of which directed the Secretary of the Interior to transfer the cross and the land on which it stands to the VFW in exchange for privately owned land elsewhere in the Pre serve (land-transfer statute). Affirming the District Court’s judgment both as to standing and on the merits, the Ninth Circuit declined to address the statute’s effect on Buono’s suit or the statute’s constitution ality (Buono II). Because the Government did not seek review by this Court, the Court of Appeals’ judgment became final. Buono then re turned to the District Court seeking injunctive relief against the land transfer, either through enforcement or modification of the 2002 injunc tion. In 2005, that court rejected the Government’s claim that the transfer was a bona fide attempt to comply with the injunction, conclud ing, instead, that it was actually an invalid attempt to keep the cross on display. The court granted Buono’s motion to enforce the 2002 injunc tion; denied as moot his motion to amend it; and permanently enjoined the Government from implementing the land-transfer statute (Buono III). The Ninth Circuit again affirmed, largely following the District Court’s reasoning.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
502 F. 3d 1069 and 527 F. 3d 758, reversed and remanded.
Justice Kennedy, joined in full by The Chief Justice and in part by Justice Alito, concluded:
1. Buono has standing to maintain this action. Whatever the validity of the Government’s argument that Buono’s asserted injury—offense at a religious symbol’s presence on federal land—is not personal to him and so does not confer Article III standing, that argument is not available at this stage of the litigation. The District Court rejected the argument in Buono I, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in Buono II, and the Court of Appeals’ judgment became final and unreviewable upon the expiration of the 90-day deadline for filing a certiorari petition, 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). Moreover, Buono had standing in Buono III to seek application of the injunction against the land-transfer statute. A party that obtains a judgment in its favor acquires a “judicially cognizable” interest in ensur ing compliance with that judgment. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737. Buono’s entitlement to an injunction having been established in Buono I and II, he sought in Buono III to prevent the Government from frus trating or evading that injunction. His interests in doing so were suf ficiently personal and concrete to support his standing, given the rights he obtained under the earlier decree against the same party as to the same cross and the same land. The Government’s contention that Buono sought to extend, rather than to enforce, the 2002 injunction is not an argument about standing, but about the merits of the District Court’s order. Pp. 711–713.
2. The District Court erred in enjoining the Government from im plementing the land-transfer statute on the premise that the relief was necessary to protect Buono’s rights under the 2002 injunction. Pp. 713–722.
(a) A court may order an injunction only after taking into account all the circumstances bearing on the need for prospective relief. See, e. g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114. Here, the District Court did not engage in the appropriate inquiry. The land-transfer statute was a substantial change in circumstances bearing on the propri ety of the requested relief. By dismissing as illicit the motives of Con gress in passing it, the District Court took insufficient account of the context in which the statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage. Placement of the cross on federal land by private persons was not an attempt to set the state’s imprimatur on a particular creed. Rather, the intent was simply to honor fallen soldiers. Moreover, the cross stood for nearly seven decades before the statute was enacted, by which time the cross and the cause it commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness. The 2002 injunction thus presented the Government with a dilemma. It could not maintain the cross without violating the injunction, but it could not remove the cross without con veying disrespect for those the cross was seen as honoring. Deeming p. 702neither alternative satisfactory, Congress enacted the land-transfer stat ute. The statute embodied a legislative judgment that this dispute is best resolved through a framework and policy of accommodation. The statute should not have been dismissed as an evasion, for it brought about a change of law and a congressional statement of policy applicable to the case. Pp. 713–717.
(b) Where legislative action undermines the basis for previous re lief, the relevant question is whether an ongoing exercise of the court’s equitable authority is supported by the prior showing of illegality, judged against the claim that changed circumstances render prospective relief inappropriate. The District Court granted the 2002 injunction based solely on its conclusion that the presence of the cross on federal land conveyed an impression of governmental endorsement of religion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the same grounds. Neither court considered whether the Government had acted based on an improper purpose. Given this sole reliance on perception, any further relief grounded on the injunction should have rested on the same basis. But the District Court used an injunction granted for one reason (perceived governmental endorsement) as the basis for enjoining conduct that was alleged to be objectionable for a different reason (an illicit governmental purpose). Ordering relief under such circumstances was improper. The court failed to consider whether the change in law and circum stances effected by the land-transfer statute had rendered the “reason able observer” standard inappropriate to resolve the dispute. Nor did the court attempt to reassess Buono I’s findings in light of the accommo dation policy embraced by Congress. Rather, it concentrated solely on the religious aspects of the cross, divorced from its background and context. Pp. 717–721.
(c) The same respect for a coordinate branch of Government that forbids striking down an Act of Congress except upon a clear showing of unconstitutionality, see, e. g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 607, requires that a congressional command be given effect unless no legal alternative exists. Even if, contrary to the congressional judg ment, the land transfer were thought an insufficient accommodation in light of the earlier endorsement finding, it was incumbent upon the Dis trict Court to consider less drastic relief than complete invalidation of the statute. See, e. g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 320, 329. On remand, that court should conduct a proper inquiry into the continued necessity for injunctive relief in light of the statute. Pp. 721–722.
Justice Alito concluded that this case should not be remanded for the lower courts to decide whether implementation of the land-transfer statute would violate the District Court’s injunction or the Establish p. 703ment Clause. Rather, because the factual record has been sufficiently developed to permit resolution of these questions, he would decide them and hold that the statute may be implemented. The case’s singular circumstances presented Congress with a delicate problem. Its solu tion was an approach designed to eliminate any perception of religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the cross on federally owned land, while avoiding the disturbing symbolism that some would associate with the destruction of this historic monument. The mechanism Con gress selected is quite common in the West, a “land exchange,” whereby ownership of the land on which the cross is located would be transferred to the VFW in exchange for another nearby parcel of equal value. The land transfer would not violate the District Court injunction, the obvi ous meaning of which was simply that the Government could not allow the cross to remain on federal land. Nor would the statute’s implemen tation constitute an endorsement of religion in violation of the Estab lishment Clause. The so-called “endorsement test” views a challenged religious display through the eyes of a hypothetical reasonable observer aware of the history and all other pertinent facts relating to the display. Here, therefore, this observer would be familiar with the monument’s origin and history and thereby appreciate that the transfer represents an effort by Congress to address a unique situation and to find a solution that best accommodates conflicting concerns. Finally, the statute was not enacted for the illicit purpose of embracing the monument’s religious message but to commemorate the Nation’s war dead and to avoid the disturbing symbolism that would have been created by the monument’s destruction. Pp. 723–729.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that this Court need not—indeed, cannot—decide this case’s merits because Buono lacks Article III standing to pursue the relief he seeks, which is not enforcement of the original injunction but expansion of it. By en joining the Government from implementing the statute at issue, the Dis trict Court’s 2005 order went well beyond the original injunction’s pro scription of the cross’s display on public property. Because Buono seeks new relief, he must show that he has standing to pursue that relief by demonstrating that blocking the land transfer will “redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to [him] caused by pri vate or official violation of law.” Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 492. He has failed, however, to allege any such injury. Even assuming that being offended by a religious display constitutes a cognizable injury, it is merely speculative whether the cross will remain in place, and in any event Buono has made clear, by admitting he has no objection to Christian symbols on private property, that he will not be offended. Neither district courts’ discretion to expand injunctions p. 704they have issued nor this District Court’s characterization of its 2005 order as merely enforcing the existing injunction makes any difference. If in fact a court awards new relief, it must have Article III jurisdiction to do so. Pp. 729–735.
Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., joined, and in which Alito, J., joined in part. Roberts, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 723. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 723. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 729. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 735. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 760.
Solicitor General Kagan argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Acting Assistant Attorney Gen eral Cruden, Deputy Solicitor General Katyal, Jeffrey B. Wall, Andrew C. Mergen, Charles R. Shockey, and Kathryn E. Kovacs.
Peter J. Eliasberg argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Steven R. Shapiro, Michael C. Small, Daniel Mach, and William B. Rubenstein.
Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice joins and Justice Alito joins in part.
In 1934, private citizens placed a Latin cross on a rock outcropping in a remote section of the Mojave Desert. Their purpose and intent was to honor American soldiers p. 706who fell in World War I. The original cross deteriorated over time, but a reconstructed one now stands at the same place. It is on federal land.
The Court is asked to consider a challenge, not to the first placement of the cross or its continued presence on federal land, but to a statute that would transfer the cross and the land on which it stands to a private party. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108–87, § 8121(a), 117 Stat. 1100. The District Court permanently enjoined the Government from implementing the statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude that its judgment was in error.
I
A
The Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) spans approxi mately 1.6 million acres in southeastern California. The Preserve is nestled within the Mojave Desert, whose pictur esque but rugged territory comprises 25,000 square miles, exceeding in size the combined area of the Nation’s five smallest States. See Merriam-Webster’s Geographical Dic tionary 755, 1228–1230 (3d ed. 1997). Just over 90 percent of the land in the Preserve is federally owned, with the rest owned either by the State of California or by private par ties. The National Park Service, a division of the Depart ment of the Interior, administers the Preserve as part of the National Park System. 16 U. S. C. §§ 410aaa–41 and 410aaa–46.
Sunrise Rock is a granite outcropping located within the Preserve. Sunrise Rock and the area in its immediate vicin ity are federal land, but two private ranches are located less than two miles away. The record does not indicate whether fencing is used to mark the boundary of these ranches. In 1934, members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) mounted a Latin cross on the rock as a memorial to soldiers who died in World War I. A Latin cross consists of two p. 707bars—a vertical one and a shorter, horizontal one. The cross has been replaced or repaired at various times over the years, most recently in 1998 by Henry Sandoz. Sandoz is a private citizen who owns land elsewhere in the Preserve, a portion of which he is prepared to transfer to the Govern ment in return for its conveyance to the VFW of the land on which the cross stands, all pursuant to the statute now under review.
The cross, as built by Sandoz, consists of 4-inch diameter metal pipes painted white. The vertical bar is less than eight feet tall. It cannot be seen from the nearest highway, which lies more than 10 miles away. It is visible, however, from Cima Road, a narrow stretch of blacktop that comes within 100 feet of Sunrise Rock.
The cross has been a gathering place for Easter services since it was first put in place; and Sunrise Rock and its imme diate area continue to be used as a campsite. At one time the cross was accompanied by wooden signs stating “ ‘The Cross, Erected in Memory of the Dead of All Wars,’ and ‘Erected 1934 by Members of Veterans of Foregin [sic] Wars, Death Valley post 2884.’ ” Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F. 3d 758, 769 (CA9 2008). The signs have since disappeared, and the cross now stands unmarked.
B
Frank Buono, respondent here, is a retired Park Service employee who makes regular visits to the Preserve. Buono claims to be offended by the presence of a religious symbol on federal land. He filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. He alleged a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amend ment and sought an injunction requiring the Government to remove the cross.
The litigation proceeded in what can be described as four stages. In the first, the District Court ruled in Buono’s favor on opposing motions for summary judgment. Buono p. 708v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (2002) (Buono I). As an initial matter, the court found that Buono had standing to maintain his Establishment Clause challenge. Id., at 1210–1214. On the merits, the parties agreed that the dispute should be governed by the so-called Lemon test, which the District Court formulated as follows:
“A government religious practice or symbol will survive an Establishment Clause challenge when it (1) has a sec ular purpose, (2) has a primary effect that neither ad vances nor inhibits religion, and (3) does not foster ex cessive state entanglement with religion.” Buono I, supra, at 1214–1215 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612–613 (1971)).
The court expressly declined to consider whether the Gov ernment’s actions regarding the cross had a secular purpose, 212 F. Supp. 2d, at 1214–1215, or whether they caused exces sive entanglement with religion, id., at 1217, n. 9. Instead, the court evaluated the primary effect of the cross by asking how it would be viewed by a “reasonable observer.” Id., at 1216. Concluding that presence of the cross on federal land conveyed an impression of governmental endorsement of re ligion, the court granted Buono’s request for injunctive re lief. The court’s order in Buono I (2002 injunction) perma nently forbade the Government “from permitting the display of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the 2002 injunction to the extent that it required the cross to be removed or dismantled but did not forbid alterna tive methods of complying with the order. The Government covered the cross, first with a tarpaulin and later with a plywood box.
On appeal, the judgment of the District Court was af firmed, both as to standing and on the merits of Buono’s Es tablishment Clause challenge. Buono v. Norton, 371 F. 3d p. 709543 (CA9 2004) (Buono II). Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals did not decide whether the Government’s action, or nonaction, with respect to the cross had been moti vated by a secular purpose. Id., at 550. Its ruling was based instead on the conclusion that a reasonable observer would perceive a cross on federal land as governmental en dorsement of religion. Id., at 549–550. The Government did not seek review by this Court, so that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Buono II became final.
C
During the relevant proceedings, Congress enacted cer tain statutes related to the cross:
(1) Before Buono I was filed, Congress passed an appro priations bill that included a provision forbidding the use of governmental funds to remove the cross. Consolidated Ap propriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106–554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763A–230.
(2) While Buono I was pending before the District Court, Congress designated the cross and its adjoining land “as a national memorial commemorating United States participa tion in World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war.” Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. 107–117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278. The Secre tary of the Interior was directed to expend up to $10,000 to acquire a replica of the original cross and its memorial plaque and to install the plaque at a suitable nearby loca tion. § 8137(c).
(3) Three months after Buono I was decided, Congress again prohibited the spending of governmental funds to re move the cross. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. 107–248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551.
(4) While the Government’s appeal in Buono II was pend ing, Congress passed a statute (land-transfer statute) direct ing the Secretary of the Interior to transfer to the VFW the Government’s interest in the land that had been designated a p. 710national memorial. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, § 8121(a), 117 Stat. 1100. In exchange, the Gov ernment was to receive land elsewhere in the preserve from Henry Sandoz and his wife. Ibid. Any difference in value between the two parcels would be equalized through a cash payment. §§ 8121(c), (d). The land-transfer statute pro vided that the property would revert to the Government if not maintained “as a memorial commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring the Ameri can veterans of that war.” § 8121(e). The statute presents a central issue in this case.
The Court of Appeals in Buono II did not address the effect on the suit of a potential land transfer under the stat ute. The court noted that the transfer might “take as long as two years to complete,” 371 F. 3d, at 545, and that its effect was not yet known, id., at 545–546. The court thus “express[ed] no view as to whether a transfer completed under [the statute] would pass constitutional muster.” Id., at 546.
D
After the Court of Appeals affirmed in Buono II, Buono returned to the District Court seeking to prevent the land transfer. He sought injunctive relief against the transfer, either through enforcement or modification of the 2002 in junction. In evaluating his request the trial court described the relevant question as whether the land transfer was a bona fide attempt to comply with the injunction (as the Gov ernment claimed), or a sham aimed at keeping the cross in place (as Buono claimed). Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178 (CD Cal. 2005) (Buono III). In Buono III, the court did not consider whether the transfer itself was an “in dependent violation of the Establishment Clause.” Id., at 1182, n. 8. The court nevertheless concluded that the trans fer was an attempt by the Government to keep the cross atop Sunrise Rock and so was invalid. The court granted Buono’s motion to enforce the 2002 injunction; denied as p. 711moot his motion to amend it; and permanently enjoined the Government from implementing the land-transfer statute. Id., at 1182.
The Court of Appeals again affirmed, largely following the reasoning of the District Court. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F. 3d 1069 (CA9 2007). The Government’s motion for re hearing en banc was denied over a dissent by Judge O’Scann lain, 527 F. 3d 758, and this Court granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1169 (2009).
II
Before considering the District Court’s order on the mer its, the first inquiry must be with respect to Buono’s standing to maintain this action. To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Horne v. Flores, 557 U. S. 433, 445 (2009) (in ternal quotation marks omitted). The Government argues that Buono’s asserted injury is not personal to him and so does not confer Article III standing. As noted above, Buono does not find the cross itself objectionable but instead takes offense at the presence of a religious symbol on federal land. Buono does not claim that, as a personal matter, he has been made to feel excluded or coerced, and so, the Government contends, he cannot object to the presence of the cross. Brief for Petitioners 12–17.
Whatever the validity of the objection to Buono’s standing, that argument is not available to the Government at this stage of the litigation. When Buono moved the District Court in Buono I for an injunction requiring the removal of the cross, the Government raised the same standing objec tions it proffers now. Rejecting the Government’s position, the District Court entered a judgment in Buono’s favor, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in Buono II. The Gov ernment did not seek review in this Court. The judgment became final and unreviewable upon the expiration of the 90-day deadline under 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c) for filing a petition p. 712for certiorari. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399, 418 (1923); see Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 45 (1990) (90-day deadline is “mandatory and jurisdictional”). The Government cannot now contest Buono’s standing to ob tain the final judgment in Buono I.
Of course, even though the Court may not reconsider whether Buono had standing to seek the 2002 injunction, it is still necessary to evaluate his standing in Buono III to seek application of the injunction against the land-transfer statute. That measure of relief is embodied in the judgment upon which we granted review.
This was a measure of relief that Buono had standing to seek. A party that obtains a judgment in its favor acquires a “judicially cognizable” interest in ensuring compliance with that judgment. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 763 (1984) (plaintiffs’ right to enforce a desegregation decree to which they were parties is “a personal interest, created by law, in having the State refrain from taking specific actions”). Having obtained a final judgment granting relief on his claims, Buono had standing to seek its vindication.
The Government does not deny this proposition as a gen eral matter. Instead, it argues that Buono was not seeking to vindicate—but rather to extend—the 2002 injunction. The first injunction prohibited the Government from main taining the cross on Sunrise Rock; yet in Buono III he sought to preclude the land transfer, a different governmen tal action. The Government contends that Buono lacked standing to seek this additional relief. Reply Brief for Petitioners 5.
The Government’s argument, however, is properly ad dressed to the relief granted by the judgment below, not to Buono’s standing to seek that relief. The Government has challenged whether appropriate relief was granted in Buono III in light of the relevant considerations and legal prin ciples, and we shall consider these questions. The stand ing inquiry, by contrast, turns on the alleged injury that p. 713prompted the plaintiff to invoke the court’s jurisdiction in the first place. Buono’s entitlement to an injunction having been established in Buono I and II, he sought in Buono III to prevent the Government from frustrating or evading that injunction. Based on the rights he obtained under the ear lier decree—against the same party, regarding the same cross and the same land—his interests in doing so were suf ficiently personal and concrete to support his standing. Al though Buono also argued that the land transfer should be prohibited as an “independent” Establishment Clause viola tion, the District Court did not address or order relief on that claim, which is not before us. Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182, n. 8. This is not a case in which a party seeks to import a previous standing determination into a wholly different dispute.
In arguing that Buono sought to extend, rather than to enforce, the 2002 injunction, the Government in essence con tends that the injunction did not provide a basis for the Dis trict Court to invalidate the land transfer. This is not an argument about standing but about the merits of the District Court’s order. Those points now must be addressed.
III
The procedural history of this litigation must be consid ered to identify the issues now subject to review. The Dis trict Court granted the 2002 injunction after concluding that a cross on federal land violated the Establishment Clause. The Government unsuccessfully challenged that conclusion on appeal, and the judgment became final upon completion of direct review. At that point, the judgment “became res judicata to the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey, 557 U. S. 137, 152 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Govern p. 714ment therefore does not—and could not—ask this Court to reconsider the propriety of the 2002 injunction or the Dis trict Court’s reasons for granting it.
The question now before the Court is whether the District Court properly enjoined the Government from implementing the land-transfer statute. The District Court did not con sider whether the statute, in isolation, would have violated the Establishment Clause, and it did not forbid the land transfer as an independent constitutional violation. Buono III, supra, at 1182, n. 8. Rather, the court enjoined compli ance with the statute on the premise that the relief was nec essary to protect the rights Buono had secured through the 2002 injunction.
An injunction is an exercise of a court’s equitable author ity, to be ordered only after taking into account all of the circumstances that bear on the need for prospective relief. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932). See also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312 (1982); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944); 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Proce dure § 2942, pp. 39–42 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). Equitable relief is not granted as a matter of course, see Weinberger, 456 U. S., at 311–312, and a court should be particularly cautious when contemplating relief that implicates public interests, see id., at 312 (“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraor dinary remedy of injunction”); Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334, 338 (1933) (“Where an important public interest would be prejudiced, the reasons for denying the injunction may be compelling”). Because injunctive re lief “is drafted in light of what the court believes will be the future course of events, . . . a court must never ignore sig nificant changes in the law or circumstances underlying an injunction lest the decree be turned into an ‘instrument of p. 715wrong. ’ ” Wright & Miller § 2961, at 393– 394 (quoting Swift & Co., supra, at 115).
Here, the District Court did not engage in the appropriate inquiry. The land-transfer statute was a substantial change in circumstances bearing on the propriety of the requested relief. The court, however, did not acknowledge the stat ute’s significance. It examined the events that led to the statute’s enactment and found an intent to prevent removal of the cross. Deeming this intent illegitimate, the court con cluded that nothing of moment had changed. This was error. Even assuming that the land-transfer statute was an attempt to prevent removal of the cross, it does not follow that an injunction against its implementation was appropriate.
By dismissing Congress’ motives as illicit, the District Court took insufficient account of the context in which the statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage. Pri vate citizens put the cross on Sunrise Rock to commemorate American servicemen who had died in World War I. Al though certainly a Christian symbol, the cross was not emplaced on Sunrise Rock to promote a Christian message. Cf. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 661 (1989) (Ken nedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he [Establishment] Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall . . . because such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government’s weight behind an obvi ous effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion”). Placement of the cross on Government-owned land was not an attempt to set the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed. Rather, those who erected the cross intended simply to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers. See Brief for VFW et al. as Amici Curiae 15 (noting that the plaque accompany ing the cross “was decorated with VFW decals”).
Time also has played its role. The cross had stood on Sun rise Rock for nearly seven decades before the statute was enacted. By then, the cross and the cause it commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness. See ibid. Members of the public gathered regularly at Sunrise Rock to pay their respects. Rather than let the cross deteriorate, community members repeatedly took it upon themselves to replace it. Congress ultimately designated the cross as a national memorial, ranking it among those monuments honoring the noble sacrifices that constitute our national heritage. See note following 16 U. S. C. § 431 (listing offi cially designated national memorials, including the National D-Day Memorial and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial). Re search discloses no other national memorial honoring Ameri can soldiers—more than 300,000 of them—who were killed or wounded in World War I. See generally A. Leland & M. Oboroceanu, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics 2 (2009). It is reasonable to interpret the congressional designation as giving recognition to the historical meaning that the cross had attained. Cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 702–703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“40 years” without legal challenge to a Ten Commandments display “suggest that the public visiting the [surrounding] grounds has considered the reli gious aspect of the tablets’ message as part of what is a broader moral and historical message reflective of a cul tural heritage”).
The 2002 injunction thus presented the Government with a dilemma. It could not maintain the cross without violat ing the injunction, but it could not remove the cross without conveying disrespect for those the cross was seen as honor ing. Cf. id., at 704 (to invalidate a longstanding Ten Com mandments display might “create the very kind of reli giously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause p. 717seeks to avoid”). Deeming neither alternative to be satis factory, Congress enacted the statute here at issue. Con gress, of course, may not use its legislative powers to reopen final judgments. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 225–226 (1995). That principle, however, was not a bar to this statute. The Government’s right to transfer the land was not adjudicated in Buono I or compromised by the 2002 injunction.
In belittling the Government’s efforts as an attempt to “evade” the injunction, Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182, the District Court had things backwards. Congress’ pre rogative to balance opposing interests and its institutional competence to do so provide one of the principal reasons for deference to its policy determinations. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 513 (1982). Here, Congress adopted a policy with respect to land it now owns in order to resolve a specific controversy. Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary all have a duty to support and defend the Constitution. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703 (1974) (“In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others”). The land-transfer statute embodies Congress’ legislative judgment that this dispute is best resolved through a framework and policy of accommodation for a symbol that, while challenged under the Establishment Clause, has complex meaning be yond the expression of religious views. That judgment should not have been dismissed as an evasion, for the statute brought about a change of law and a congressional statement of policy applicable to the case.
Buono maintains that any governmental interest in keep ing the cross up must cede to the constitutional concerns on which the 2002 injunction was based. He argues that the land transfer would be “an incomplete remedy” to the consti p. 718tutional violation underlying the injunction and that the transfer would make achieving a proper remedy more diffi cult. Brief for Respondent 54.
A court must find prospective relief that fits the remedy to the wrong or injury that has been established. See Swift & Co., 286 U. S., at 114 (“A continuing decree of injunc tion directed to events to come is subject always to adapta tion as events may shape the need”). See also United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U. S. 244, 249 (1968). Where legislative action has undermined the basis upon which relief has previously been granted, a court must con sider whether the original finding of wrongdoing continues to justify the court’s intervention. See Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642, 648–649 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 430–432 (1856). The relevant question is whether an ongoing exer cise of the court’s equitable authority is supported by the prior showing of illegality, judged against the claim that changed circumstances have rendered prospective relief inappropriate.
The District Court granted the 2002 injunction based solely on its conclusion that presence of the cross on federal land conveyed an impression of governmental endorsement of religion. The court expressly disavowed any inquiry into whether the Government’s actions had a secular purpose or caused excessive entanglement. Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d, at 1215, 1217, n. 9. The Court of Appeals affirmed the in junction on the same grounds, similarly eschewing any scru tiny of governmental purpose. Buono II, 371 F. 3d, at 550.
Although, for purposes of the opinion, the propriety of the 2002 injunction may be assumed, the following discussion should not be read to suggest this Court’s agreement with that judgment, some aspects of which may be questionable. The goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not re quire eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm. A cross by the side of a public highway marking, for instance, p. 719the place where a state trooper perished need not be taken as a statement of governmental support for sectarian beliefs. The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 598 (1992) (“A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitu tion”). See also Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327, 334 (1987) (“This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate re ligious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, it leaves room to accommodate divergent values within a constitutionally permissible framework.
Even assuming the propriety of the original relief, how ever, the question before the District Court in Buono III was whether to invalidate the land transfer. Given the sole reliance on perception as a basis for the 2002 injunction, one would expect that any relief grounded on that decree would have rested on the same basis. But the District Court en joined the land transfer on an entirely different basis: its suspicion of an illicit governmental purpose. See Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182. The court made no inquiry into the effect that knowledge of the transfer of the land to private ownership would have had on any perceived governmental endorsement of religion, the harm to which the 2002 injunc tion was addressed. The District Court thus used an in junction granted for one reason as the basis for enjoining conduct that was alleged to be objectionable for a different reason. Ordering relief under such circumstances was im proper—absent a finding that the relief was necessary to ad dress an independent wrong. See ibid., n. 8 (noting that the court “need not consider [Buono’s] other contention that the land transfer itself is an independent violation of the Estab lishment Clause”).
The District Court should have evaluated Buono’s modifi cation request in light of the objectives of the 2002 injunc tion. The injunction was issued to address the impression conveyed by the cross on federal, not private, land. Even if its purpose were characterized more generally as avoiding the perception of governmental endorsement, that purpose would favor—or at least not oppose—ownership of the cross by a private party rather than by the Government. Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 471 (2009) (“[P]ersons who observe donated monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf ”).
Buono argues that the cross would continue to stand on Sunrise Rock, which has no visual differentiation from the rest of the primarily federally owned Preserve. He also points to the reversionary clause in the land-transfer statute requiring that the land be returned to the Government if not maintained as a World War I memorial. Finally, he notes that the cross remains designated a national memorial by an Act of Congress, which arguably would prevent the VFW from dismantling the cross even if it wanted to do so. Brief for Respondent 37–48.
The District Court failed to consider whether, in light of the change in law and circumstances effected by the land-transfer statute, the “reasonable observer” standard contin ued to be the appropriate framework through which to con sider the Establishment Clause concerns invoked to justify the requested relief. As a general matter, courts consider ing Establishment Clause challenges do not inquire into “reasonable observer” perceptions with respect to objects on private land. Even if, however, this standard were the ap propriate one, but see County of Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the “reasonable observer” test); Capi tol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. p. 721753, 763–768 (1995) (plurality opinion) (criticizing reliance on “perceived endorsement”), it is not clear that Buono’s claim is meritorious. That test requires the hypothetical con struct of an objective observer who knows all of the perti nent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement. See id., at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But see id., at 767–768 (plu rality opinion) (doubting the workability of the reasonable observer test). Applying this test here, the message con veyed by the cross would be assessed in the context of all relevant factors. See Van Orden, 545 U. S., at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (the Establishment Clause in quiry “must take account of context and consequences”); Lee, 505 U. S. at 597 (“Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains a delicate and fact-sensitive one”).
The District Court did not attempt to reassess the findings in Buono I in light of the policy of accommodation that Con gress had embraced. Rather, the District Court concen trated solely on the religious aspects of the cross, divorced from its background and context. But a Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an hon ored place in history for this Nation and its people. Here, one Latin cross in the desert evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen are forgotten.
Respect for a coordinate branch of Government forbids striking down an Act of Congress except upon a clear show ing of unconstitutionality. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 607 (2000); El Paso & Northeastern R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, 96 (1909). The same respect re quires that a congressional command be given effect unless no legal alternative exists. Even if, contrary to the congres p. 722sional judgment, the land transfer were thought an insuffi cient accommodation in light of the earlier finding of reli gious endorsement, it was incumbent upon the District Court to consider less drastic relief than complete invalida tion of the land-transfer statute. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 320, 329 (2006) (in granting relief, “we try not to nullify more of a legisla ture’s work than is necessary, for we know that [a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected repre sentatives of the people” (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678, 684 (1987). For instance, if there is to be a convey ance, the question might arise regarding the necessity of fur ther action, such as signs to indicate the VFW’s ownership of the land. As we have noted, Congress directed the Secre tary of the Interior to install near the cross a replica of its original memorial plaque. One of the signs that appears in early photographs of the cross specifically identifies the VFW as the group that erected it.
Noting the possibility of specific remedies, however, is not an indication of agreement about the continued necessity for injunctive relief. The land-transfer statute’s bearing on this dispute must first be determined. To date, this Court’s ju risprudence in this area has refrained from making sweeping pronouncements, and this case is ill suited for announcing categorical rules. In light of the finding of unconstitutional ity in Buono I, and the highly fact-specific nature of the in quiry, it is best left to the District Court to undertake the analysis in the first instance. On remand, if Buono contin ues to challenge implementation of the statute, the District Court should conduct a proper inquiry as described above.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring.
At oral argument, respondent’s counsel stated that it “likely would be consistent with the injunction” for the Gov ernment to tear down the cross, sell the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and return the cross to them, with the VFW immediately raising the cross again. Tr. of Oral Arg.
44. I do not see how it can make a difference for the Gov ernment to skip that empty ritual and do what Congress told it to do—sell the land with the cross on it. “The Constitu tion deals with substance, not shadows.” Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (1867).
Justice Alito, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Justice Kennedy’s opinion in all respects but one: I would not remand this case for the lower courts to decide whether implementation of the land-transfer statute enacted by Congress in 2003, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, § 8121, would violate the District Court’s injunc tion or the Establishment Clause. The factual record has been sufficiently developed to permit resolution of these questions, and I would therefore decide them and hold that the statute may be implemented.
The singular circumstances surrounding the monument on Sunrise Rock presented Congress with a delicate problem, and the solution that Congress devised is true to the spirit of practical accommodation that has made the United States a Nation of unparalleled pluralism and religious tolerance. In brief, the situation that Congress faced was as follows.
After service in the First World War, a group of veterans moved to the Mojave Desert, in some cases for health rea sons.1 They joined the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), p. 724Death Valley Post 2884, and in 1934, they raised a simple white cross on an outcropping called Sunrise Rock to honor fallen American soldiers.2 These veterans selected Sunrise Rock “in part because they believed there was a color shad ing on the Rock in the shape of an American soldier or ‘doughboy.’ ”3
1
See Memorandum from Mark Luellen, Historian, Dept. of Interior, to Superintendent, Mojave National Preserve (Jan. 31, 2000) (Luellen Memo), Decl. of Charles R. Shockey in Buono v. Norton, No. EDCV01–216–RT (SGLx) (CD Cal., Mar. 13, 2002) (Exh. 17); Brief for VFW et al. as Amici Curiae 6–7, 15 (hereinafter VFW Brief); see also B. Ausmus, East Mojave Diary 116 (1989) (hereinafter Ausmus).
One of these men was John Riley Bembry, a miner who had served as a medic and had thus presumably witnessed the carnage of the war firsthand.4 It is said that Mr. Bem bry was not a particularly religious man, but he nevertheless agreed to look after the cross and did so for some years.5
The Sunrise Rock monument was located on land belong ing to the Federal Government, but in this part of the coun try, where much of the land is federally owned, bounda ries between Government and private land are often not marked,6 and private citizens are permitted to go on and to use federal land for a variety of purposes.7 Although Sun rise Rock was federally owned, Mr. Bembry and his fellow p. 725veterans took it upon themselves to place their monument on that spot, apparently without obtaining approval from any federal officials, and this use of federal land seems to have gone largely unnoticed for many years, in all likelihood due to the spot’s remote and rugged location.
2
See Luellen Memo; VFW Brief 15–16.
3
Id., at 15.
4
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 55; VFW Brief 7, 16; see also Ausmus 116.
5
See VFW Brief 7, 16.
6
See App. 79, 81 (testimony of respondent) (noting that when he first saw the monument, he did not know whether it was on public or private land); id., at 80 (describing Mojave Preserve as “primarily federal land with a large amount of inholdings of non-federal land”); see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U. S. 537, 541–543 (2007).
7
See Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 315 et seq.; General Mining Act of 1872, Rev. Stat. § 2319, 30 U. S. C. § 22; An drus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U. S. 657, 658 (1980); see also E. Nystrom, Dept. of Interior, National Park Service, From Neglected Space To Protected Place: An Administrative History of Mojave National Preserve, ch. 2 (Mar. 2003) (describing mining and grazing in Mojave Preserve), online at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/moja/adhi.htm (all Internet materials as visited Apr. 23, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
Sunrise Rock is situated far from any major population center; temperatures often exceed 100 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer; and visitors are warned of the dangers of trav eling in the area.8 As a result, at least until this litigation, it is likely that the cross was seen by more rattlesnakes than humans.
Those humans who made the trip to see the monument appear to have viewed it as conveying at least two signifi cantly different messages. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 474 (2009) (“The meaning con veyed by a monument is generally not a simple one,” and a monument may be “interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways”). The cross is of course the preeminent symbol of Christianity, and Easter services have long been held on Sunrise Rock, Buono v. Norton, 371 F. 3d 543, 548 (CA9 2004). But, as noted, the original reason for the place ment of the cross was to commemorate American war dead and, particularly for those with searing memories of the Great War, the symbol that was selected, a plain unadorned white cross, no doubt evoked the unforgettable image of the white crosses, row on row, that marked the final resting places of so many American soldiers who fell in that conflict.
This is roughly how things stood until the plaintiff in this case, an employee of the National Park Service who some times viewed the cross during the performance of his duties and claims to have been offended by its presence on federally owned land, brought this suit and obtained an injunction re p. 726straining the Federal Government from “permitting the dis play of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision, and the Government elected not to seek review by this Court, Congress faced a problem.
8
See Dept. of Interior, National Park Service, Mojave National Pre serve, Operating Hours & Seasons, http://www.nps.gov/moja/planyourvisit/hours.htm; D. Casebier, Mojave Road Guide: An Adventure Through Time 114 (1999); Buono v. Norton, 371 F. 3d 543, 549 (CA9 2004).
If Congress had done nothing, the Government would have been required to take down the cross, which had stood on Sunrise Rock for nearly 70 years, and this removal would have been viewed by many as a sign of disrespect for the brave soldiers whom the cross was meant to honor. The demolition of this venerable, if unsophisticated, monument would also have been interpreted by some as an arresting symbol of a Government that is not neutral but hostile on matters of religion and is bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of our country’s religious heri tage. Cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
One possible solution would have been to supplement the monument on Sunrise Rock so that it appropriately recog nized the religious diversity of the American soldiers who gave their lives in the First World War. In American mili tary cemeteries overseas, the graves of soldiers who per ished in that war were marked with either a white cross or a white Star of David.9 More than 3,500 Jewish soldiers gave their lives for the United States in World War I,10 p. 727and Congress might have chosen to place a Star of David on Sunrise Rock so that the monument would duplicate those two types of headstones. But Congress may well have thought—not without reason—that the addition of yet an other religious symbol would have been unlikely to satisfy the plaintiff, his attorneys, or the lower courts that had found the existing monument to be unconstitutional on the ground that it impermissibly endorsed religion.
9
See D. Holt, American Military Cemeteries 473, 474 (1992); see also American Battle Monuments Commission, http://www.abmc.gov/cemeteries/cemeteries.php (containing photographs of the two types of markers). This policy presumably reflected the religious makeup of the Armed Forces at the time of the First World War. Today, veterans and their families may select any of 39 types of headstones. See Dept. of Veterans Affairs, Available Emblems of Belief for Placement on Government Head stones and Markers, http://www.cem.va.gov/hm/hmemb.asp.
10
See J. Fredman & L. Falk, Jews in American Wars 100–101 (5th ed. 1954); Brief for Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 33.
Congress chose an alternative approach that was designed to eliminate any perception of religious sponsorship stem ming from the location of the cross on federally owned land, while at the same time avoiding the disturbing symbolism associated with the destruction of the historic monument. The mechanism that Congress selected is one that is quite common in the West, a “ land exchange. ”11 Congress enacted a law under which ownership of the parcel of land on which Sunrise Rock is located would be transferred to the VFW in exchange for another nearby parcel of equal value. Congress required that the Sunrise Rock parcel be used for a war memorial, § 8121(a), 117 Stat. 1100, but Congress did not prevent the VFW from supplementing the existing mon ument or replacing it with a war memorial of a different design. Although Justice Stevens characterizes this land exchange as one that endorses “a particular religious view,” post, at 760 (dissenting opinion), it is noteworthy that Con gress, in which our country’s religious diversity is well repre sented, passed this law by overwhelming majorities: 95–0 in the Senate and 407–15 in the House. See 149 Cong. Rec. 23110 (2003); id., at 23306. In my view, there is no legal ground for blocking the implementation of this law.
11
See G. Draffan & J. Blaeloch, Commons or Commodity? The Dilemma of Federal Land Exchanges 10 (2000). Congressionally authorized land exchanges are common. See, e. g., Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, § 101(d), 122 Stat. 758; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, § 2845, 122 Stat. 554; City of Yuma Improvement Act, § 3, 120 Stat. 3369; Act of Dec. 23, 2004, § 1, 118 Stat. 3919.
Justice Stevens contends that the land transfer would violate the District Court injunction, but that argument, for the reasons explained in Justice Scalia’s opinion, see post, at 730 (concurring in judgment), is plainly unsound. The ob vious meaning of the injunction was simply that the Govern ment could not allow the cross to remain on federal land.
There is also no merit in Justice Stevens’ contention that implementation of the statute would constitute an en dorsement of Christianity and would thus violate the Estab lishment Clause. Assuming that it is appropriate to apply the so-called “endorsement test,” this test would not be vio lated by the land exchange. The endorsement test views a challenged display through the eyes of a hypothetical reason able observer who is deemed to be aware of the history and all other pertinent facts relating to a challenged display. See ante, at 720–721 (plurality opinion). Here, therefore, this observer would be familiar with the origin and history of the monument and would also know both that the land on which the monument is located is privately owned and that the new owner is under no obligation to preserve the monument’s present design. With this knowledge, a reasonable observer would not view the land exchange as the equivalent of the construction of an official World War I memorial on the National Mall. Cf. post, at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rather, a well-informed observer would appreciate that the transfer represents an effort by Congress to address a unique situation and to find a solution that best accommo dates conflicting concerns.
Finally, I reject Justice Stevens’ suggestion that the en actment of the land-transfer law was motivated by an illicit purpose. Post, at 757. I would not be “so dismissive of Congress.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 460 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Congress has shown notable solicitude for the rights of religious minorities. See, e. g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq.; p. 729Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc et seq. I would not jump to the conclusion that Congress’ aim in enacting the land-transfer law was to embrace the religious message of the cross; rather, I see no reason to doubt that Congress’ consistent goal, in legislating with regard to the Sunrise Rock monu ment, has been to commemorate our Nation’s war dead and to avoid the disturbing symbolism that would have been cre ated by the destruction of the monument.
For these reasons, I would reverse the decision below and remand with instructions to vacate the order prohibiting the implementation of the land-transfer statute.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, con curring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court’s order enjoining the transfer of the memorial to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). My reason, however, is quite different: In my view we need not—indeed, cannot—decide the merits of the parties’ dis pute, because Frank Buono lacks Article III standing to pur sue the relief he seeks. The District Court had no power to award the requested relief, and our authority is limited to “ ‘announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869)).
The plurality is correct that Buono’s standing to obtain the original injunction is not before us. See ante, at 711–712.1 p. 730Nor is Buono’s standing to request enforcement of the origi nal injunction at issue. If he sought only to compel compli ance with the existing order, Article III would not stand in his way.
1
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Buono had standing to seek the original injunction does not, however, control our decision here under the law-of-the-case doctrine. That doctrine comes into play only if an issue we are asked to resolve has already been decided in the same litigation. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 347, n. 18 (1979). In its earlier deci sion, the Ninth Circuit addressed only Buono’s standing to seek the origi nal injunction barring the display of the cross on public land. See Buono v. Norton, 371 F. 3d 543, 546–548 (2004). It had no occasion to address his standing to seek an expansion of the injunction to bar a transfer en abling the cross’s display on private property. Moreover, Buono failed to raise the issue in his brief in opposition to certiorari, and we may deem it waived. See this Court’s Rule 15.2; cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 116, n. 2 (1998).
As the plurality all but admits, however, the relief Buono requests and the District Court awarded in this proceeding is not enforcement of the original injunction but expansion of it. See ante, at 719. The only reasonable reading of the original injunction, in context, is that it proscribed the cross’s display on federal land. Buono’s alleged injuries arose from the cross’s presence on public property, see App. 50, 59, and the injunction accordingly prohibited the Govern ment, its “employees, agents, and those in active concert with [them] . . . from permitting the display of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a. Barring the Gov ernment from “permitting” the cross’s display at a particular location makes sense only if the Government owns the loca tion. As the proprietor, it can remove the cross that private parties have erected and deny permission to erect another. But if the land is privately owned, the Government can pre vent the cross’s display only by making it illegal. Prohibi tory legislation does not consist of a mere refusal to “per mi[t],” nor is the enactment of legislation what the injunction commanded (a command that would raise serious First Amendment and separation-of-powers questions).2
2
The principal dissent does not dispute that the original injunction did not require the Government to ban the cross’s display on private land, yet it insists that the injunction nonetheless forbade transferring the land to a private party who could keep the cross in place. Post, at 740–741 (opin ion of Stevens, J.). But there is no basis in the injunction’s text for treating a sale of the land to a private purchaser who does not promise to take the cross down as “permitting” the cross’s display, when failing to forbid the cross’s presence on already-private land within the Mojave Na tional Preserve would not be treated as such. The latter no less involves “allow[ing] the act or existence of ” or “tolerat[ing]” the display of the cross. Webster’s New International Dictionary 1824 (2d ed. 1954). The principal dissent responds that in determining whether the transfer com plies with the original injunction we “cannot start from a baseline in which the cross has already been transferred.” Post, at 741. But the effect of transferring the land to a private party free to keep the cross standing is identical, so far as the original injunction is concerned, to allowing a party who already owned the land to leave the cross in place.
The District Court’s 2005 order purporting to “enforce” the earlier injunction went well beyond barring the display of the cross on public property. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (CD Cal. 2005). At Buono’s request, the court enjoined certain Government officials and “anyone acting in concert with them . . . from implementing the provisions of Section 8121 of Public Law 108–87,” the stat utory provision enacted after the original injunction that directs the Executive Branch to transfer the memorial to the VFW. Ibid.
Because Buono seeks new relief, he must show (and the District Court should have ensured) that he has standing to pursue it. As the party invoking federal-court jurisdiction, Buono “bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought,” Summers v. Earth Island Insti tute, 555 U. S. 488, 493 (2009); see Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 105 (1983). A plaintiff cannot sidestep Article III’s requirements by combining a request for injunctive relief for which he has standing with a request for injunctive relief for which he lacks standing. And for the same reason, a plain tiff cannot ask a court to expand an existing injunction unless he has standing to seek the additional relief.
Buono must therefore demonstrate that the additional re lief he sought—blocking the transfer of the memorial to a private party—will “redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to [him] caused by private or official viola tion of law.” Summers, supra, at 492. He has failed, p. 732however, to allege any actual or imminent injury. To begin with, the predicate for any injury he might assert—that the VFW, after taking possession of the land, will continue to display the cross—is at this stage merely speculative.3 Nothing in the statutes compels the VFW (or any future pro prietor) to keep it up. The land reverts to the Government only if “the conveyed property is no longer being maintained as a war memorial,” Pub. L. 108–87, § 8121(e), 117 Stat. 1100, which does not depend on whether the cross remains.4
Moreover, Buono has not alleged, much less established, that he will be harmed if the VFW does decide to keep the cross. To the contrary, his amended complaint averred that “he is deeply offended by the display of a Latin Cross on government-owned property” but “has no objection to Chris tian symbols on private property.” App. 50. In a subse quent deposition he agreed with the statement that “[t]he only thing that’s offensive about this cross is that [he has] discovered that it’s located on federal land.” Id., at 85. And in a signed declaration several months later, he reiter ated that although the “presence of the cross on federally owned land in the Preserve deeply offends [him] and impairs p. 733[his] enjoyment of the Preserve,” he “ha[s] no objection to Christian symbols on private property.” Id., at 64–65. In short, even assuming that being “deeply offended” by a reli gious display (and taking steps to avoid seeing it) constitutes a cognizable injury, Buono has made clear that he will not be offended.5
3
Buono argues that the Government’s continued supervision of the site, its reversionary interest in the property, and the memorial’s ongoing des ignation as a national memorial add to the Establishment Clause violation. Brief for Respondent 37–48. But those aspects would be irrelevant if the cross were no longer displayed.
4
The principal dissent insists, post, at 738–739, n. 2, that it is clear the cross will remain because the VFW asserted in an amicus brief that it “intends to maintain and preserve the Veterans Memorial as a memorial to United States veterans,” and elsewhere referred to “the seven-foot-tall cross and plaque that comprise the Veterans Memorial,” Brief for VFW of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae 4, 7. But the group’s stated intentions do not prove that the cross will stay put. The VFW might not follow through on its plans (this VFW post already became “defunct” once during this litigation, id., at 34); it might move the cross to another private parcel and substitute a different monument on Sunrise Rock; or it might sell the land to someone else who decides to honor the dead without the cross.
These same considerations bear upon the plurality’s asser tion that Buono has standing to “prevent the Government from frustrating or evading” the original injunction, ante, at 713. If this refers to frustration or evasion in a narrow sense, the injunction is in no need of—indeed, is insusceptible of—protection. It was issued to remedy the sole complaint that Buono had brought forward: erection of a cross on public land. And it was entirely effective in remedying that com plaint, having induced Congress to abandon public ownership of the land. If meant in this narrow sense, the plurality’s assertion of a need to prevent frustration or evasion by the Government ignores the reality that the District Court’s 2005 order awarded new relief beyond the scope of the origi nal injunction. The revised injunction is directed at Buono’s new complaint that the manner of abandoning public owner ship and the nature of the new private ownership violate the Establishment Clause. Now it may be that a court has subject-matter jurisdiction to prevent frustration or evasion p. 734of its prior injunction in a broader sense—that is, to elimi nate an unconstitutional manner of satisfying that prior in junction. But it surely cannot do so unless it has before it someone who has standing to complain of that unconstitu tional manner. If preventing frustration or evasion of an injunction includes expanding it to cover additional actions that produce no concrete harm to the original plaintiff, our standing law in this area will make no sense.
5
The principal dissent argues that despite these disclaimers in Buono’s complaint, deposition, and declaration, his real injury is his inability “to freely use the area of the Preserve around the cross because the Gov ernment’s unconstitutional endorsement of the cross will induce him to avoid the Sunrise Rock area.” Post, at 739, n. 2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the only “endorsement” of which Buono complained was “[t]he placement of the Cross on federally-owned land,” App. 59, which “offend[s]” him only because the property “is not open to groups and individuals to erect other freestanding, permanent displays,” id., at 50. Nothing in Buono’s complaint, deposition, or declaration estab lishes that he will be unable “to freely use the area of the Preserve” if Sunrise Rock is made private property and its new proprietor displays the cross.
It is no answer that a district court has discretion to ex pand an injunction it has issued if it finds the existing terms are not fulfilling the original purpose. Doubtless it can do that, and is in that sense the master of its own injunctions. But whether the District Court abused that discretion by enlarging the injunction is beside the point. What matters is that it granted relief beyond the existing order, and that Buono must have had standing to seek the extension.
It also makes no difference that the District Court said it was merely enforcing its original injunction. The question is whether in fact the new order goes beyond the old one. If so, the court must satisfy itself of jurisdiction to award the additional relief—which includes making certain the plaintiff has standing. See Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 94. That is true whether the court revisits the injunction at a par ty’s request or on its own initiative; Article III’s case-or controversy requirement is not merely a prerequisite to re lief, but a restraint on judicial power. See Summers, 555 U. S., at 492–493.6
6
I agree with Justice Breyer that in interpreting an ambiguous in junction we should give great weight to the interpretation of the judge who issued it. Post, at 761–762 (dissenting opinion). But that does not mean we must accept any construction a district court places upon an order it has issued. Here there is no reasonable reading of the original injunction that would bar the land transfer but would not also require the Government to ban “the display of the Latin cross” on private land “in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a—an implausible interpretation no one advocates.
* * *
Keeping within the bounds of our constitutional authority often comes at a cost. Here, the litigants have lost consider able time and money disputing the merits, and we are forced to forgo an opportunity to clarify the law. But adhering to Article III’s limits upon our jurisdiction respects the author ity of those whom the people have chosen to make and carry out the laws. In this case Congress has determined that transferring the memorial to private hands best serves the public interest and complies with the Constitution, and the Executive defends that decision and seeks to carry it out. Federal courts have no warrant to revisit that decision—and to risk replacing the people’s judgment with their own—un less and until a proper case has been brought before them. This is not it.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
In 2002 Congress designated a “five-foot-tall white cross” located in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) “as a national memorial commemorating United States participa tion in World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war.” Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 107–117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278. Later that year, in a judgment not open to question, the District Court de termined that the display of that cross violated the Estab lishment Clause because it “convey[ed] a message of en dorsement of religion.” Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1217 (CD Cal. 2002) (Buono I). The question in this case is whether Congress’ subsequent decision to transfer ownership of the property underlying the cross cured that violation.
“The Establishment Clause, if nothing else, prohibits gov ernment from ‘specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ.’ ” Van Orden v. Perry, 545 p. 736U. S. 677, 718 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). A Latin cross necessarily symbolizes one of the most impor tant tenets upon which believers in a benevolent Creator, as well as nonbelievers, are known to differ. In my view, the District Court was right to enforce its prior judgment by enjoining Congress’ proposed remedy—a remedy that was engineered to leave the cross intact and that did not alter its basic meaning. I certainly agree that the Nation should memorialize the service of those who fought and died in World War I, but it cannot lawfully do so by continued en dorsement of a starkly sectarian message.
I
As the history recounted by the plurality indicates, this case comes to us in a procedural posture that significantly narrows the question presented to the Court. In the first stage of this litigation, the District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the Government violated the Establish ment Clause by permitting the display of a single white Latin cross at Sunrise Rock. Those courts further ruled that the appropriate remedy was an injunction prohibiting the Government from “permitting the display of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.” App. 39. The Government declined to seek a writ of certiorari following those rulings. Accordingly, for the purpose of this case, it is settled that “the Sunrise Rock cross will project a message of government endorsement [of religion] to a reasonable observer,” Buono v. Norton, 371 F. 3d 543, 549 (CA9 2004) (Buono II), and that the District Court’s remedy for that endorsement was proper.
We are, however, faced with an additional fact: Congress has enacted a statute directing the Secretary of the Interior to transfer a 1-acre parcel of land containing the cross to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), subject to certain condi tions, in exchange for a 5-acre parcel of land elsewhere in the p. 737Preserve. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108–87, § 8121, 117 Stat. 1100. The District Court found that the land transfer under § 8121 “violate[d] [the] court’s judgment ordering a permanent injunction” and did not “actually cur[e] the continuing Establishment Clause violation.” Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (CD Cal. 2005) (Buono III). The District Court therefore en forced its 2002 judgment by enjoining the transfer, without considering whether “the land transfer itself is an independ ent violation of the Establishment Clause.” Ibid., n. 8. Be cause the District Court did not base its decision upon an independent Establishment Clause violation, the constitu tionality of the land-transfer statute is not before us. See ante, at 714. Instead, the question we confront is whether the District Court properly enforced its 2002 judgment by enjoining the transfer.
In answering that question we, like the District Court, must first consider whether the transfer would violate the 2002 injunction. We must then consider whether changed circumstances nonetheless rendered enforcement of that judgment inappropriate; or conversely whether they made it necessary for the District Court to bar the transfer, even if the transfer is not expressly prohibited by the prior injunction, in order to achieve the intended objective of the injunction. The plurality correctly notes that “ ‘a court must never ignore significant changes in the law or circum stances underlying an injunction,’ ” ibid. (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Proce dure § 2961, pp. 393–394 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Wright & Miller)), and “ ‘[a] continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need,’ ” ante, at 718 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932)).1 At the same time, p. 738it is axiomatic that when a party seeks to enforce or mod ify an injunction, the only circumstances that matter are changed circumstances. See Swift, 286 U. S., at 119 (“The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not subject to im peachment in its application to the conditions that existed at its making”).
1
One point of contention: I accept as a general matter that a court must consider whether “legislative action has undermined the basis upon which relief has previously been granted.” Ante, at 718. But the effect of the legislative action in this case is different from its effect in our cases es pousing that principle, which stand for the proposition that if a statutory “right has been modified by the competent authority” since the decree, then an injunction enforcing the prior version of that right must be modi fied to conform to the change in the law. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 432 (1856); see also Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642, 651 (1961) (“In a case like this the District Court’s authority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce. . . . [I]t [must] be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives”). In a constitutional case such as this, legislative action may modify the facts, but it cannot change the applica ble law.
I further accept that the District Court’s task was to eval uate the changed circumstances “in light of the objectives of the 2002 injunction.” Ante, at 720. This case does not sim ply pit a plaintiff ’s “prior showing of illegality” against a defendant’s claim that “changed circumstances have ren dered prospective relief inappropriate.” Ante, at 718. That formulation implies that the changed circumstances all cut in one direction, against prospective relief, and that the de fendant has asked the court to alleviate its obligations. But it is important to note that in this case, the Government did not move to “alleviate or eliminate conditions or restrictions imposed by the original decree” so as to permit the transfer. Wright & Miller § 2961, at 397. Rather, it was the benefi ciary of the original injunction who went back into court seeking its enforcement or modification in light of the trans fer. Plainly, respondent had standing to seek enforcement of a decree in his favor.2
2
To the extent the Government challenges respondent’s standing to seek the initial injunction, that issue is not before the Court for the reasons the plurality states. See ante, at 711–712. Moreover, in my view respondent has standing even under the analysis that Justice Scalia undertakes. It is not at all “speculative,” ante, at 732 (opinion concurring in judgment), that the VFW will continue to display the cross. VFW Post 385, the beneficiary of the land transfer, has filed an amici brief in this case indicat ing it “intends to maintain and preserve the Veterans Memorial,” Brief for VFW et al. 4, by which it means the cross, id., at 7 (identifying the Veterans Memorial as the “cross and plaque”). Respondent did, in his amended complaint, aver that he was offended specifically “by the display of a Latin Cross on government-owned property.” App. 50. But his claimed injury is that he is “unable to freely use the area of the Preserve around the cross,” Buono II, 371 F. 3d 543, 547 (CA9 2004) (internal quota tion marks and brackets omitted), because the Government’s unconstitu tional endorsement of the cross will induce him to avoid the Sunrise Rock area, even though it offers the most convenient route to the Preserve, App. 65. That endorsement and respondent’s resulting injury not only persist, but have been aggravated by the Government’s actions since the complaint was filed.
Respondent argued that such action was necessary, either to enforce the plain terms of the 2002 injunction or to “achieve the purposes of the provisions of the decree,” United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U. S. 244, 249 (1968); see Wright & Miller § 2961, at 393 (“[A] court must continually be willing to redraft the order at the re quest of the party who obtained equitable relief in order to insure that the decree accomplishes its intended result”). Only at that point did the Government argue that changed circumstances made prospective relief unnecessary. This difference in focus is a subtle one, but it is important to em phasize that the question that was before the District Court—and that is now before us—is whether enjoining the transfer was necessary to effectuate the letter or logic of the 2002 judgment.
Although I agree with the plurality’s basic framework, I disagree with its decision to remand the case to the District Court. The District Court already “engage[d] in the appro priate inquiry,” ante, at 715, and it was well within its rights to enforce the 2002 judgment. First, the District Court p. 740properly recognized that the transfer was a means of “per mitting”—indeed, encouraging—the display of the cross. The transfer therefore would violate the terms of the court’s original injunction. Second, even if the transfer would not violate the terms of the 2002 injunction, the District Court properly took into account events that transpired since 2002 and determined that barring the transfer was necessary to achieve the intended result of the 2002 decree, as the trans fer would not eliminate government endorsement of religion.
II
The first step in the analysis is straightforward: The Dis trict Court had to ask whether the transfer of the property would violate the extant injunction. Under the terms of that injunction, the answer was yes.
The 2002 injunction barred the Government from “permit ting the display of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.” App. 39. The land-transfer statute mandated transfer of the land to an or ganization that has announced its intention to maintain the cross on Sunrise Rock. That action surely “permit[s]” the display of the cross. See 11 Oxford English Dictionary 578 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “permit” as “[t]o admit or allow the doing or occurrence of; to give leave or opportunity for”). True, the Government would no longer exert direct control over the cross. But the transfer itself would be an act per mitting its display.
I therefore disagree with Justice Scalia that the “only reasonable reading of the original injunction . . . is that it proscribed the cross’s display on federal land.” Ante, at 730. If the land were already privately owned, Justice Scalia may be correct that the cross’ display on Sunrise Rock would not violate the injunction because the Government would not have to do anything to allow the cross to stand, and the Gov ernment could try to prevent its display only by making such p. 741a display illegal. But the Government does own this land, and the transfer statute requires the Executive Branch to take an affirmative act (transfer to private ownership) de signed to keep the cross in place. In evaluating a claim that the Government would impermissibly “permit” the cross’ display by effecting a transfer, a court cannot start from a baseline in which the cross has already been transferred.
Moreover, § 8121 was designed specifically to foster the display of the cross. Regardless of why the Government wanted to “accommodat[e]” the interests associated with its display, ante, at 717 (plurality opinion), it was not only fore seeable but also intended that the cross would remain stand ing. Indeed, so far as the record indicates, the Government had no other purpose for turning over this land to private hands. It was therefore proper for the District Court to find that the transfer would violate its 2002 injunction and to enforce that injunction against the transfer.
III
As already noted, it was respondent, the beneficiary of the injunction, who moved the District Court for relief. When the beneficiary of an injunction seeks relief “to achieve the purposes of the provisions of the decree,” United Shoe Ma chinery Corp., 391 U. S., at 249, a district court has the au thority to “modify the decree so as to achieve the required result with all appropriate expedition,” id., at 252. Thus, regardless of whether the transfer was prohibited by the plain terms of the 2002 judgment, the District Court prop erly inquired into whether enjoining the transfer was neces sary to achieve the objective of that judgment. The Gov ernment faces a high burden in arguing the District Court exceeded its authority. A decree “may not be changed in the interests of the defendants if the purposes of the litigation . . . have not been fully achieved.” Id., at 248 (em phasis deleted). And contrary to the Government’s position, p. 742the changed circumstances in this case support, rather than count against, the District Court’s enforcement decision.
The objective of the 2002 judgment, as the plurality grudg ingly allows, was to “avoi[d] the perception of governmental endorsement” of religion. Ante, at 720; see Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1178 (analyzing “ ‘whether government action endorsing religion has actually ceased’ ” in light of the trans fer). The parties do not disagree on this point; rather, they dispute whether the transfer would end government en dorsement of the cross. Compare Brief for Petitioners 21 (“Congress’s transfer of the land . . . ends any governmental endorsement of the cross”) with Brief for Respondent 34 (“[T]he government’s endorsement of the Christian cross is not remedied” by the land transfer). The District Court rightly found that the transfer would not end government endorsement of the cross.
A government practice violates the Establishment Clause if it “either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.” County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 592 (1989). “Whether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits govern ment from appearing to take a position on questions of reli gious belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political commu nity.’ ” Id., at 593–594 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
The 2002 injunction was based on a finding that display of the cross had the effect of endorsing religion. That is, “the Sunrise Rock cross . . . project[s] a message of government endorsement [of religion] to a reasonable observer.” Buono II, 371 F. 3d, at 549. The determination that the Govern ment had endorsed religion necessarily rested on two prem ises: first, that the Government endorsed the cross, and p. 743second, that the cross “take[s] a position on questions of re ligious belief ” or “ ‘mak[es] adherence to a religion relevant . . . to a person’s standing in the political community,’ ” County of Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 594. Taking the District Court’s 2002 finding of an Establishment Clause violation as res judicata, as we must, the land transfer has the potential to dislodge only the first of those premises, in that the trans fer might change the Government’s endorsing relationship with the cross. As I explain below, I disagree that the transfer ordered by § 8121 would in fact have this result. But it is also worth noting at the outset that the transfer statute could not (and does not) dislodge the second prem ise—that the cross conveys a religious message. Continuing government endorsement of the cross is thus continuing gov ernment endorsement of religion.
In my view, the transfer ordered by § 8121 would not end government endorsement of the cross for two independently sufficient reasons. First, after the transfer it would con tinue to appear to any reasonable observer that the Govern ment has endorsed the cross, notwithstanding that the name has changed on the title to a small patch of underlying land. This is particularly true because the Government has desig nated the cross as a national memorial, and that endorsement continues regardless of whether the cross sits on public or private land. Second, the transfer continues the existing Government endorsement of the cross because the purpose of the transfer is to preserve its display. Congress’ intent to preserve the display of the cross maintains the Government’s endorsement of the cross.
The plurality does not conclude to the contrary; that is, it does not decide that the transfer would end government endorsement of the cross and the religious message it con veys. Rather, the plurality concludes that the District Court did not conduct an appropriate analysis, and it re mands the case for a do-over. I take up each of the pur ported faults the plurality finds in the District Court’s analy p. 744sis in my examination of the reasons why the transfer does not cure the existing Establishment Clause violation.
Perception of the Cross Post-Transfer
The 2002 injunction was based upon a finding of impermis sible effect: The “Sunrise Rock cross . . . project[s] a message of government endorsement [of religion] to a reasonable ob server.” Buono II, 371 F. 3d, at 549. The transfer would not end that impermissible state of affairs because the cross, post-transfer, would still have “the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement . . . of religion.” Lynch, 465 U. S., at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As the Court of Appeals correctly found, “[n]othing in the present posture of the case alters” the conclusion that a “reasonable observer would perceive governmental endorsement of the message” the cross conveys. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F. 3d 758, 783 (CA9 2008) (Buono IV).3
3
The plurality faults the District Court for not engaging in this analysis, but the District Court did implicitly consider how a reasonable observer would perceive the cross post-transfer when it analyzed the terms of the transfer, the Government’s continuing property rights in the conveyed land, and the history of the Government’s efforts to preserve the cross. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order on the express ground that a reasonable observer would still perceive government endorsement of the cross. See Buono IV, 527 F. 3d, at 782–783. The Chief Justice suggests this is much ado about nothing because respondent’s counsel conceded that the injunction would not be violated were the Government to have gone through an “empty ritual” of taking down the cross before transferring the land. Ante, at 723 (concurring opin ion). But in the colloquy to which The Chief Justice refers, counsel assumed that the Government would not retain a reversionary interest in the land, and that the cross would not retain its designation as a national memorial. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44–45. Even under The Chief Jus tice’s revised version of the hypothetical, I would not so quickly decide that taking down the cross makes no material difference. And counsel’s statement takes no position as to whether the hypothetical poses any con stitutional problem independent of the injunction. Regardless, we must deal with the substance of the case before us, which involves much more than Congress directing the Government to execute a simple land transfer.
In its original judgment, the Court of Appeals found that a well-informed reasonable observer would perceive govern ment endorsement of religion, notwithstanding the cross’ ini tial “placement by private individuals,” based upon the fol lowing facts: “that the cross rests on public land[,] . . . that Congress has designated the cross as a war memorial and prohibited the use of funds to remove it, and that the Park Service has denied similar access for expression by an adher ent of the . . . Buddhist faith.” Buono II, 371 F. 3d, at 550. After the transfer, a well-informed observer would know that the cross was no longer on public land, but would addi tionally be aware of the following facts: The cross was once on public land, the Government was enjoined from permit ting its display, Congress transferred it to a specific pur chaser in order to preserve its display in the same location, and the Government maintained a reversionary interest in the land. From this chain of events, in addition to the fac tors that remain the same after the transfer, he would per ceive government endorsement of the cross.4
Particularly important to this analysis is that although the transfer might remove the implicit endorsement that pres ence on public land signifies, see Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 801 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The very fact that a sign is installed on pub lic property implies official recognition and reinforcement of its message”), it would not change the fact that the Govern ment has taken several explicit actions to endorse this cross. In its decision upholding the initial entry of the injunction, the Court of Appeals found those actions contributed to a p. 746reasonable observer’s perception of government endorse ment. Buono II, 371 F. 3d, at 550. Their significance does not depend upon the ownership of the land.
4
A less informed reasonable observer, see Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 807 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting), would reach the same conclusion because the cross would still appear to stand on Government property. The transfer merely “carv[es] out a tiny parcel of property in the midst of this vast Preserve—like a donut hole with the cross atop it.” Buono IV, 527 F. 3d 758, 783 (CA9 2008). For any reasonable observer, then, the transfer simply would not change the effect of the cross.
In 2000, and again after the District Court had entered its initial injunction, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the use of any federal funds to remove the cross from its location on federal property. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106–554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763A–230; Depart ment of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. 107–248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551. Thus, beyond merely acquiescing in the continued presence of a cross on federal property, Con gress singled out that cross for special treatment, and it af firmatively commanded that the cross must remain.
Congress also made a more dramatic intervention. With out the benefit of any committee hearings or floor debate in either the Senate or the House of Representatives—indeed, without a moment of discussion in any official forum—Con gress passed legislation officially designating the “five-foot tall white cross” in the Mojave Desert “as a national memo rial commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war.” § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278. Thereafter, the cross was no longer just a local artifact; it acquired a formal national sta tus of the highest order. Once that momentous step was taken, changing the identity of the owner of the underlying land could no longer change the public or private character of the cross. The Government has expressly adopted the cross as its own.5
5
The plurality barely mentions this designation, except to assert that the designation gave recognition to the historical meaning of the cross. See ante, at 716. But the plurality does not acknowledge that when the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 2002 judgment, it concluded that the designa tion is one of the factors that would lead a reasonable observer to perceive government endorsement of religion. See Buono II, 371 F. 3d, at 550. Nor does the plurality address the effect of that designation on a reason able observer’s perception of the cross, regardless of whether the cross sits on private land. See ante, at 720.
Even though Congress recognized this cross for its mili tary associations, the solitary cross conveys an inescapably sectarian message. See Separation of Church and State Comm. v. Eugene, 93 F. 3d 617, 626 (CA9 1996) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in result) (“[T]he City’s use of a cross to memo rialize the war dead may lead observers to believe that the City has chosen to honor only Christian veterans”). As the District Court observed, it is undisputed that the “[L]atin cross is the preeminent symbol of Christianity. It is exclu sively a Christian symbol, and not a symbol of any other religion.” Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d, at 1205. We have rec ognized the significance of the Latin cross as a sectarian symbol,6 and no participant in this litigation denies that the cross bears that social meaning. Making a plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross secular. It makes the war memorial sectarian.7
6
See, e. g., Pinette, 515 U. S., at 760 (characterizing Ku Klux Klansponsored cross as religious speech); id., at 776 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he cross is an especially potent sectarian symbol”); id., at 792 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concur ring in judgment) (“[T]he Latin cross . . . is the principal symbol of Chris tianity around the world, and display of the cross alone could not reason ably be taken to have any secular point”); id., at 798, n. 3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Latin cross is identifiable as a symbol of a particular religion, that of Christianity; and, further, as a symbol of particular denom inations within Christianity”); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he [Establishment] Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall . . . because such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion”).
7
Context is critical to the Establishment Clause inquiry, and not every use of a religious symbol in a war memorial would indicate government endorsement of a religious message. See, e. g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]o deter mine the message that the text here conveys, we must examine how the text is used. And that inquiry requires us to consider the context of the display”); County of Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 598 (“[T]he effect of a cre` che display turns on its setting”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Every government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorse ment or disapproval of religion”). But this cross is not merely one part of a more elaborate monument that, taken as a whole, may be understood to convey a primarily nonreligious message. Rather, the cross is the only symbol conveying any message at all.
More fundamentally, however, the message conveyed by the cross is not open to reconsideration given the posture of this case. The plurality employs a revealing turn of phrase when it characterizes the cross as “a symbol that, while chal lenged under the Establishment Clause, has complex mean ing beyond the expression of religious views.” Ante, at 717. The days of considering the cross itself as challenged under the Establishment Clause are over; it is settled that the gov ernment is not permitted to endorse the cross. However complex the meaning of the cross, the Court of Appeals in 2004 considered and rejected the argument that its dual sym bolism as a war memorial meant that government endorse ment of the cross did not amount to endorsement of religion. See Buono II, 371 F. 3d, at 549, n. 5. All we are debating at this juncture is whether the shift from public to private ownership of the land sufficiently distanced the Government from the cross; we are no longer debating the message the cross conveys to a reasonable observer. In arguing that Congress can legitimately favor the cross because of its pur ported double meaning, the plurality implicitly tries to re open what is closed.8
8
The plurality’s assertions regarding the meaning of the cross are there fore beside the point. For the record, however, I cannot agree that a bare cross such as this conveys a nonsectarian meaning simply because crosses are often used to commemorate “heroic acts, noble contributions, and pa tient striving” and to honor fallen soldiers. Ante, at 721. The cross is not a universal symbol of sacrifice. It is the symbol of one particular sacrifice, and that sacrifice carries deeply significant meaning for those who adhere to the Christian faith. The cross has sometimes been used, it is true, to represent the sacrifice of an individual, as when it marks the grave of a fallen soldier or recognizes a state trooper who perished in the line of duty. Even then, the cross carries a religious meaning. But the use of the cross in such circumstances is linked to, and shows respect for, the individual honoree’s faith and beliefs. I, too, would consider it tragic if the Nation’s fallen veterans were to be forgotten. See ibid. But there are countless different ways, consistent with the Constitution, that such an outcome may be averted.
The plurality also poses a different objection to consider ation of whether the transfer would change a reasonable observer’s perception of the cross. The plurality suggests that the “ ‘reasonable observer’ standard” may not “be the appropriate framework” because “courts considering Estab lishment Clause challenges do not,” as a general matter, “inquire into ‘reasonable observer’ perceptions with respect to objects on private land.” Ante, at 720. Once again, the plurality’s approach fails to pay heed to the posture of this case.
At the risk of stating the obvious, respondent is not simply challenging a private object on private land. Although “an Establishment Clause violation must be moored in govern ment action of some sort,” Pinette, 515 U. S., at 779 (O’Con nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), re spondent’s objection to the transfer easily meets that test for two reasons. First, he is currently challenging official legislation, taken in response to an identified Establishment Clause violation. That legislation would transfer public land to a particular private party, with the proviso that the transferee must use the land to fulfill a specific public function or else the land reverts to the Government. Sec ond, even once the transfer is complete, the cross would re main a national memorial. The cross is therefore not a purely “private” object in any meaningful sense.
Notwithstanding these facts, the plurality appears to con clude that the transfer might render the cross purely private speech. It relies in part on the plurality opinion in Pinette for its suggestion that the reasonable observer standard may p. 750not be apposite, and Pinette addressed a privately owned cross displayed in a public forum. The Pinette plurality would have rejected the idea that “a neutrally behaving gov ernment” can ever endorse “private religious expression,” id., at 764, even if a reasonable observer would perceive gov ernment endorsement, id., at 768. But the Pinette plurality acknowledged that government favoritism of private reli gious speech is unconstitutional, as when a government “giv[es] sectarian religious speech preferential access to a forum close to the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter).” Id., at 766. And in this case, the Govern ment is not acting neutrally: The transfer statute and the Government actions preceding it have all favored the cross.
Furthermore, even assuming (wrongly) that the cross would be purely private speech after the transfer, and even assuming (quite implausibly) that the transfer statute is neu tral with respect to the cross, it would still be appropriate for the District Court to apply the reasonable observer standard. The majority of the Pinette Court rejected the per se rule proposed by the plurality. Instead, the relevant standard provides that the Establishment Clause is violated whenever “the State’s own actions . . . , and their relationship to the private speech at issue, actually convey a message of endorsement.” Id., at 777 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). More over, the Establishment Clause “imposes affirmative obliga tions that may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message.” Ibid. It is particularly ap propriate in this context—when the issue is whether the transfer cures an already identified Establishment Clause violation—for the District Court to consider whether the Government, by complying with § 8121, would have taken sufficient steps to avoid being perceived as endorsing the cross.
As I explained at the outset of this section, the answer to that inquiry is surely no. The reasonable observer “who p. 751knows all of the pertinent facts and circumstances surround ing the symbol and its placement,” ante, at 721, would per ceive that the Government has endorsed the cross: It pro hibited the use of federal funds to take down the cross, designated the cross as a national memorial, and engaged in “herculean efforts to preserve the Latin Cross” following the District Court’s initial injunction, Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182. Those efforts include a transfer statute designed to keep the cross in place. Changing the ownership status of the underlying land in the manner required by § 8121 would not change the fact that the cross conveys a message of gov ernment endorsement of religion.
Purpose in Enacting the Transfer Statute
Even setting aside that the effect of the post-transfer cross would still be to convey a message of government endorse ment of religion, the District Court was correct to conclude that § 8121 would not cure the Establishment Clause viola tion because the very purpose of the transfer was to pre serve the display of the cross. That evident purpose main tains government endorsement of the cross. The plurality does not really contest that this was Congress’ purpose, ante, at 715, so I need not review the evidence in great detail. Suffice it to say that the record provides ample support. The land-transfer statute authorizes a conveyance to the par ticular recipient that has expressed an intent to preserve the cross. See Brief for VFW et al. as Amici Curiae 4 (transfer recipient “intends to maintain and preserve the Veterans Memorial”); id., at 7 (identifying Veterans Memorial as the “cross and plaque”). And it conveys the particular land that has already been designated “as a national memorial” com memorating the veterans of World War I, § 8121(a), 117 Stat. 1100, subject to a reversionary clause requiring that a memo rial “commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war” be p. 752maintained, § 8121(e), ibid. If it does not categorically re quire the new owner of the property to display the existing memorial meeting that description (the cross), see § 8137, 115 Stat. 2278, the statute most certainly encourages this result. Indeed, the Government concedes that Congress sought to “preserve a longstanding war memorial” at the site, Brief for Petitioners 28 (emphasis added), and the only memorial that could be “preserved” at Sunrise Rock is the cross itself.
The plurality insists, however, that even assuming the pur pose of the land transfer was to preserve the display of the cross, enjoining the transfer was not necessarily appropriate. It contends the District Court failed to give adequate consid eration to “the context in which the [land-transfer] statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage,” ante, at 715, and it directs the District Court’s attention to three factors: the message intended by the private citizens who first erected the cross, ibid.; the time the cross stood on Sunrise Rock and its historical meaning, ante, at 716; and Congress’ balancing of “opposing interests” and selection of a “policy of accommodation,” ante, at 716–717; see also ante, at 721.
The first two of these factors are red herrings. The Dis trict Court, in its enforcement decision, had no occasion to consider anew either the private message intended by those who erected the cross or how long the cross had stood atop Sunrise Rock. Neither of these factors constituted a novel or changed circumstance since the entry of the 2002 injunc tion. Whatever message those who initially erected the cross intended—and I think we have to presume it was a Christian one, at least in part, for the simple reason that those who erected the cross chose to commemorate Ameri can veterans in an explicitly Christian manner—that histori cal fact did not change between 2002 and 2005. I grant that the amount of time the cross had stood on Sunrise Rock did change, from 68 years to 71 years, but no one can seriously maintain that “the historical meaning that the cross had at p. 753tained,” ante, at 716, was materially transformed in that 3 year increment.9
This brings us to the final factor identified by the plurality: Congress’ “policy of accommodation” for the cross.10 Of course, the District Court did consider Congress’ “policy” in the sense that it considered the result Congress was trying to achieve with respect to the cross, i. e., to keep it in place. See Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182 (“[T]he proposed transfer of the subject property can only be viewed as an attempt to keep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually curing the continuing Establishment Clause viola tion”). But I understand the plurality to be faulting the p. 754District Court for failing to inquire into a deeper level of motivation: If the purpose of the transfer was to keep the cross in place, what was the purpose of keeping the cross in place?
9
I also disagree with the plurality’s factual premise that “the cross and the cause it commemorated had become entwined in the public conscious ness” in a secular manner, ante, at 716. Although some members of the community knew that the cross had been originally erected as a war memorial, there is no support in the record for the idea that members of the public “gathered regularly at Sunrise Rock to pay their respects,” ibid., to the fallen of World War I or any other veterans. The study con ducted by a National Park Service historian indicates that a group of vet erans gathered at the cross as early as 1935 for Easter sunrise services. Memorandum from Mark Luellen to Superintendent, Mojave National Preserve (Jan. 31, 2000), Decl. of Peter J. Eliasberg in Buono v. Norton, No. EDCV 01–216–RT (SGLx) (CD Cal., Mar. 13, 2002), p. 20 (Exh. 7). But there is no evidence that gatherings were ever held for Armistice Day or Veterans Day. The study further reveals that a local club organized social events for the community at the cross from 1950 to 1975 and that after a local veteran passed away in 1984, the “memory and associations of the white cross . . . as a war memorial” faded but locals were “inspired . . . to reinstate the Easter sunrise services” at the cross. Ibid.
10
Although the plurality uses the term “accommodation,” I do not read its opinion to suggest that Congress’ policy vis-a` -vis the cross has any thing to do with accommodating any individual’s religious practice. Cf. County of Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 601, n. 51 (“Nor can the display of the cre` che be justified as an ‘accommodation’ of religion. . . . To be sure, prohibiting the display . . . deprives Christians of the satisfaction of seeing the government adopt their religious message as their own, but this kind of government affiliation with particular religious messages is precisely what the Establishment Clause precludes”).
I do not see why it was incumbent upon the District Court to examine this second-order purpose when determining whether the transfer violated the 2002 injunction. As dis cussed in Part II, supra, the injunction barred the Govern ment from permitting the display of the cross, which fairly encompasses any act providing an opportunity for the cross’ display. It was entirely appropriate for the District Court to characterize a transfer with the purpose of preserving the cross as an attempt to evade that injunction, and to find that the Government’s purpose to preserve the cross maintains government endorsement of the cross.
The plurality would have the District Court revise its en tire analysis of whether the transfer would end government endorsement, in light of the plurality’s view of the land-transfer statute’s putative second-order purpose. That analysis ignores the procedural posture of the case. If the question before the Court were whether § 8121 itself violated the Establishment Clause, then this argument might have merit. But we are instead examining whether action taken with the purpose of preserving the display of the cross cures or continues government endorsement. In my view, that purpose continues the impermissible endorsement of—in deed, favoritism toward—the cross, regardless of why Con gress chose to intervene as it did.
In any event, Congress’ second-order purpose does little for the plurality’s position. Without relying on any legisla tive history or findings—there are none—the plurality opines that Congress wanted to keep the cross in place in order to accommodate those who might view removal as “conveying disrespect for those the cross was seen as honor ing,” ante, at 716, and it suggests that this decision was an acceptable method of “balanc[ing] opposing interests” be p. 755cause the cross “has complex meaning beyond the expression of religious views,” ante, at 717. As I have already ex plained, the meaning of the cross (complex or otherwise) is no longer before us, and the plurality’s reliance on a “con gressional statement of policy,” ibid., as negating any gov ernment endorsement of religion finds no support in logic or precedent. The cross cannot take on a nonsectarian charac ter by congressional (or judicial) fiat, and the plurality’s eval uation of Congress’ actions is divorced from the methodology prescribed by our doctrine.11
Our precedent provides that we evaluate purpose based upon what the objective indicia of intent would reveal to a reasonable observer. See McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 862 (2005) (“The eyes that look to purpose belong to an objective observer, one who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or comparable official act” (internal quotation p. 756marks omitted)). “[R]easonable observers have reasonable memories, and our precedents sensibly forbid an observer ‘to turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose.’ ” Id., at 866 (quoting Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290, 315 (2000)). The plurality nowhere en gages with how a reasonable observer would view Congress’ “policy of accommodation” for this cross. Instead, the plu rality insists that deference is owed because of “Congress’ prerogative to balance opposing interests and its institu tional competence to do so.” Ante, at 717.
11
Justice Alito similarly affords great weight to Congress’ purported interest in “avoiding the disturbing symbolism associated with the de struction of the historic monument.” Ante, at 727 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But we surely all can agree that once the government has violated the Establishment Clause, as has been ad judged in this case and is now beyond question, a plaintiff must be afforded a complete remedy. That remedy may sometimes require removing a re ligious symbol, and regrettably some number of people may perceive the remedy as evidence that the government “is bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of our country’s religious heritage,” ante, at 726. But it does not follow that the government can decline to cure an Establishment Clause violation in order to avoid offense. It may be the case that taking down the symbol is not the only remedy. The proper remedy, like the determination of the violation itself, is necessarily context specific, and even if it involves moving the cross, it need not in volve the “demolition” or “destruction” of the cross, see ante, at 726, 727. Regardless, in this case the only question before us is whether this partic ular transfer provided a complete remedy. We have no way of knowing whether Congress’ motivation was to minimize offense, but in any event that interest does not ameliorate the remedial ineffectiveness of § 8121.
The proper remedy for an Establishment Clause violation is a legal judgment, which is not the sort of issue for which Congress “ ‘has both wisdom and experience . . . that is far superior to ours.’ ” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 461 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 650 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Moreover, the inference that Congress has exercised its institutional competence—or even its considered judgment—is signifi cantly weaker in a case such as this, when the legislative action was “buried in a defense appropriations bill,” Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1181, and, so far as the record shows, undertaken without any deliberation whatsoever. I am not dismissive of Congress, see ante, at 728 (opinion of Alito, J.), but § 8121 presents no factual findings, reasoning, or long history of “ ‘careful legislative adjustment,’ ” Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 461 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 162, n. 9 (2003)), to which I could possibly defer. Congress did not devote “years of careful study” to § 8121, Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 463 (opinion of Stevens, J.), nor did it develop a record of any kind, much less an exhaustive one, see id., at 411–412 (noting the legislative record for the Bi partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 spanned 100,000 p. 757pages). The concurrence’s attempt to draw an equivalence between a provision tucked silently into an appropriations bill and a major statute debated and developed over many years is, to say the least, not persuasive. All legislative acts are not fungible.
Furthermore, in the Establishment Clause context, we do not accord any special deference to the legislature on account of its generic advantages as a policymaking body, and the purpose test is not “satisfied so long as any secular purpose for the government action is apparent,” McCreary County, 545 U. S., at 865, n. 13 (emphasis added). Nor can the gov ernment pursue a secular aim through religious means. See Van Orden, 545 U. S., at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Though the State of Texas may genuinely wish to combat juvenile delinquency, and may rightly want to honor the Ea gles for their efforts, it cannot effectuate these admirable purposes through an explicitly religious medium”). It is odd that the plurality ignores all of these well-settled principles in exalting this particular legislative determination.
A reasonable observer, considering the nature of this sym bol, the timing and the substance of Congress’ efforts, and the history of the Sunrise Rock site, could conclude that Con gress chose to preserve the cross primarily because of its salience as a cross. Cf. McCreary County, 545 U. S., at 873 (“If the observer had not thrown up his hands, he would probably suspect that the Counties were simply reaching for any way to keep a religious document on the walls . . . ”). But no such conclusion is necessary to find for respondent.12 p. 758The religious meaning of the cross was settled by the 2002 judgment; the only question before us is whether the Gov ernment has sufficiently distanced itself from the cross to end government endorsement of it. At the least, I stress again, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Gov ernment’s purpose in transferring the underlying land did not sufficiently distance the Government from the cross. In deed, § 8121 evidenced concern for whether the cross would be displayed. The District Court was therefore correct to find that the transfer would not end government endorse ment of religion.
12
I have not “jump[ed] to the conclusion that Congress’ aim in enacting the land-transfer law was to embrace the religious message of the cross.” Ante, at 729 (opinion of Alito, J.). I think a reasonable observer could come to that conclusion, but my point is that so long as we agree that Congress’ aim was to preserve the cross (which Justice Alito does not dispute), Congress’ reason for preserving the cross does not matter. But if we were debating whether Congress had a religious purpose in passing the transfer statute, I would contest the relevance of the vote count to that inquiry, see ante, at 727, and particularly so in this case. One cannot infer much of anything about the land-transfer provision from the fact that an appropriations bill passed by an overwhelming majority.
IV
In sum, I conclude that the transfer ordered by § 8121 will not end the pre-existing Government endorsement of the cross, and to the contrary may accentuate the problem in some respects. Because the transfer would perpetuate the Establishment Clause violation at issue in the 2002 injunc tion, I further conclude that enjoining the transfer was nec essary to secure relief. Given the transfer statute’s funda mental inadequacy as a remedy, there was—and is—no need for the District Court to consider “less drastic relief than complete invalidation of the . . . statute.” Ante, at 722. Allowing the transfer to go forward would interfere with the District Court’s authority to enforce its judgment and de prive the District Court of the ability to ensure a complete remedy. Nor could allowing the transfer to go forward be made a complete remedy with add-on measures, such as signs or fences indicating the ownership of the land. Such measures would not completely end the government en dorsement of this cross, as the land would have been trans ferred in a manner favoring the cross and the cross would remain designated as a national memorial. Enjoining p. 759compliance with § 8121 was therefore a proper exercise of the District Court’s authority to enforce the 2002 judgment.
* * *
Congressional action, taken after due deliberation, that honors our fallen soldiers merits our highest respect. As far as I can tell, however, it is unprecedented in the Nation’s history to designate a bare, unadorned cross as the national war memorial for a particular group of veterans. Neither the Korean War Memorial, the Vietnam War Memorial, nor the World War II Memorial commemorates our veterans’ sacrifice in sectarian or predominantly religious ways. Each of these impressive structures pays equal respect to all members of the Armed Forces who perished in the service of our country in those conflicts. In this case, by contrast, a sectarian symbol is the memorial. And because Congress has established no other national monument to the veterans of the Great War, this solitary cross in the middle of the desert is the national World War I memorial. The sequence of legislative decisions made to designate and preserve a soli tary Latin cross at an isolated location in the desert as a memorial for those who fought and died in World War I not only failed to cure the Establishment Clause violation but also, in my view, resulted in a dramatically inadequate and inappropriate tribute.
I believe that most judges would find it to be a clear Es tablishment Clause violation if Congress had simply directed that a solitary Latin cross be erected on the Mall in the Na tion’s Capital to serve as a World War I memorial. Con gress did not erect this cross, but it commanded that the cross remain in place, and it gave the cross the imprimatur of Government. Transferring the land pursuant to § 8121 would perpetuate rather than cure that unambiguous en dorsement of a sectarian message.
The Mojave Desert is a remote location, far from the seat of our Government. But the Government’s interest in hon p. 760oring all those who have rendered heroic public service re gardless of creed, as well as its constitutional responsibility to avoid endorsement of a particular religious view, should control wherever national memorials speak on behalf of our entire country.
I respectfully dissent.
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
The District Court in this case entered a permanent in junction forbidding the Government to “permi[t] the display of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.” App. 39. Subsequently, Government authorities covered the cross with a plywood box so that it could not be seen. Congress then enacted a statute direct ing the Secretary of the Interior to convey to a private entity approximately one acre of land upon which the cross stood, presumably so that the cross could be displayed uncovered. The plaintiff, returning to the District Court, asked that court to “ ‘hold that the transfer violates the . . . injunction.’ ” Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (CD Cal. 2005) (quoting plaintiff ’s motion). The court held that it did. Id., at 1182. And the question before us is whether the law per mits the District Court so to interpret its injunction.
To answer this question we need not address any signifi cant issue of Establishment Clause law. Because the Gov ernment has already lost the case, taken an appeal, and lost the appeal, we must take as a given the lower court’s resolu tion of the Establishment Clause question before the land transfer. That is to say, as the plurality points out, ante, at 713–714, we must here assume that the original display of the cross violated the Constitution because “the presence of the cross on federal land conveys a message” to a “reason able observer” of governmental “endorsement of religion.” Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1216–1217 (CD Cal. 2002). See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey, 557 U. S. 137, 152 (2009) (once orders become final on direct review, they p. 761are res judicata to the parties). For the same reason, we must here assume that the plaintiff originally had standing to bring the lawsuit. Ante, at 711–712; see also ante, at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Travelers, supra, at 152 (orders are no less preclusive when the collateral attack is jurisdictional). And, as the plurality also points out, the plaintiff consequently has standing now to seek enforce ment of the injunction. Ante, at 712–713; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 763 (1984).
Moreover, we are not faced with the question whether changed circumstances require modification of the injunction. The Government did not ask the District Court to modify it. In fact, the Government did not ask the District Court for any relief at all. Rather, it was the plaintiff who asked the District Court either (1) to “ ‘hold that the [land] transfer violates the current injunction,’ ” or (2) to “ ‘modify that in junction to prohibit the land transfer because it violates the Establishment Clause.’ ” 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1177 (quoting plaintiff ’s motion). The District Court did the former, i. e., it interpreted the injunction as prohibiting the Government from transferring the land for purposes of displaying the cross. And having granted the plaintiff ’s request to enforce the injunction, it dismissed the plaintiff ’s alternative request to modify the injunction as moot.
Thus, as I said at the outset, the only question before us is whether the law permits the District Court to hold that the land transfer (presumably along with the subsequent public display of the cross) falls within the scope of its origi nal injunctive order, an order that says the Government must not “permi[t] the display of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.” App. 39. In my view the law authorizes the District Court to do so.
The legal principles that answer the question presented are found not in the Constitution but in cases that concern the law of injunctions. First, the law of injunctions grants a district court considerable leeway to interpret the meaning p. 762and application of its own injunctive order. Members of this Court have written that the “construction given to” an “in junction by the issuing judge . . . is entitled to great weight.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 795 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis senting in part). And the Courts of Appeals have consist ently held that district courts have considerable discretion in interpreting and applying their own injunctive decrees. See, e. g., JTH Tax, Inc. v. H & R Block Eastern Tax Servs., Inc., 359 F. 3d 699, 705 (CA4 2004); Alabama Nursing Home Assn. v. Harris, 617 F. 2d 385, 388 (CA5 1980). This princi ple is longstanding and well established, as reflected in a prominent treatise writer’s summary of the case law: “The court granting the injunction is necessarily invested with large discretion in enforcing obedience to its mandate, and . . . courts of appellate powers are exceedingly averse to interfering with the exercise of such judgment and discre tion.” 2 J. High, Law of Injunctions § 1458, pp. 1467–1468 (4th ed. 1905).
Second, a court should construe the scope of an injunction in light of its purpose and history, in other words, “what the decree was really designed to accomplish.” Mayor of Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U. S. 259, 273 (1913). Courts have long looked to “the objects for which the [injunctive] relief was granted, as well as the circumstances attending it,” in deciding whether an enjoined party has complied with an injunction. 2 High, supra, § 1446, at 1455, and n. 68 (citing cases); see also John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 128 F. 2d 981, 983 (CA2 1942). And they have long refused to “permit defendants to evade responsibility for violating an injunction, by doing through subterfuge a thing which is not in terms a violation, yet produces the same effect by accomplishing substantially that which they were enjoined from doing.” Stodder v. Rosen Talking Mach. Co., 247 Mass. 60, 68, 141 N. E. 569, 571 (1923).
These two principles adequately support the District Court’s interpretation and application of the injunctive lan guage at issue here. As an initial matter, the plain text of the injunction is reasonably read to prohibit the transfer. Right now, the cross is covered with a plywood box; after the transfer, the box will be removed and the cross will be displayed. The transfer thus “permits” the public “display” of the cross. Indeed, that is the statute’s objective.
Consideration of the injunction’s purpose points in the same direction. The injunction rested upon the District Court’s determination that the display of the cross “conveys a message of endorsement of religion” to “a reasonable ob server” in violation of the Establishment Clause. 212 F. Supp. 2d, at 1216–1217. (As I have said, for present pur poses we must assume that this is so.) The purpose of the injunction is to prevent the conveyance of such a message to the reasonable observer.
With that purpose in mind, consider the following facts that confronted the District Court when the plaintiff asked it to enforce the decree:
• The Government had designated the “white cross . . . as well as a limited amount of adjoining [land]” as a national memorial. Pub. L. 107–117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278.
• The new statute directed the transfer of the “prop erty . . . designated . . . as a national memorial” to a private entity with an interest in maintaining the cross in its current location, in exchange for a parcel of land located elsewhere in the preserve owned by private indi viduals who have taken a similar interest in the cross. Pub. L. 108–87, §§ 8121(a) and (b), 117 Stat. 1100.
• After the transfer, the cross would sit on 1 acre of pri vately owned land in a 1.6 million acre national preserve, over 90% of which is federally owned. 212 F. Supp. 2d, at 1205.
• Congress had previously prevented the use of federal funds to remove the cross from its present location. Pub. L. 107–248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551; Pub. L. 106–554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763A–230.
The District Court considered the facts before it through the lens of the injunction’s original purpose. See 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1180 (explaining that the “[G]overnment’s con tinuing control over the Latin cross” and the involvement of private parties who “desir[e] its continued presence in the Preserve” “demonstrat[e]” that the transfer would not end “the [G]overnment’s apparent endorsement of a particular religion”); id., at 1182 (considering the historical context of the transfer statute); see also Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F. 3d 758, 783 (CA9 2008) (“carving out a tiny parcel of prop erty in the midst of this vast Preserve . . . will do nothing to minimize the impermissible governmental endorsement” perceived by the reasonable observer). And it concluded that the land transfer would frustrate that purpose. See 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182 (the transfer would “keep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually curing the continu ing Establishment Clause violation”); see also 527 F. 3d, at 783 (finding that “[n]othing in the present posture of the case alters . . . earlier conclusions” regarding what a reasonable observer would perceive). In my view, this is a reasonable conclusion.
The injunction forbids the Government to permit the dis play of the cross on Sunrise Rock, and its basic purpose was to prevent a reasonable observer from believing that the Government had endorsed the cross. Under the circum stances presented to the District Court, the transfer would have resulted in such a display and might well have conveyed p. 765such a message. Consequently, the District Court’s decision that the land transfer violated the injunction as written and intended was not an abuse of discretion. And that is what the Ninth Circuit properly held on appeal. What the Estab lishment Clause implications of the changed circumstances may be is a matter not before us. Cf. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U. S. 431, 442 (2004) (“If the [enjoined defendant] establishes reason to modify the decree, the court should make the nec essary changes; where it has not done so, however, the de cree should be enforced according to its terms”).
Because my conclusion rests primarily upon the law of in junctions, because that law is fairly clear, and because we cannot properly reach beyond that law to consider the under lying Establishment Clause and standing questions, I can find no federal question of general significance in this case. I believe we should not have granted the petition for certio rari. Having granted it, the Court should now dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Since the Court has not done so, however, I believe that we should simply affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
With respect, I dissent.