United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 (1993)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 (1993)
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 22, 1993
UNITED STATES v. NACHTIGAL
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 92–609. Decided February 22, 1993
Respondent was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a national park while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a federal misdemeanor carrying a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. As an alternative to imprisonment, a court may impose a probation term not to exceed five years. Relying on this Court’s decision in Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U. S. 538, a Magistrate Judge denied respondent’s motion for a jury trial, concluding that DUI’s maximum imprisonment term made it presumptively a “petty” offense which is not embraced by the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, and that the additional penalties did not transform it into a “serious” offense for Sixth Amendment purposes. Respondent was tried, convicted, and sentenced to a fine and one year’s probation. The District Court reversed, holding that respondent was entitled to a jury trial under relevant Ninth Circuit precedent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Blanton was inapposite to respondent’s case.
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to recognize that this case was controlled by the opinion in Blanton rather than its own precedent. Applying the Blanton rule, DUI, with its 6-month maximum prison term established by Congress, is presumptively a petty offense. The additional penalties imposed are not sufficiently severe to overcome this presumption, for neither a fine nor a parole alternative can approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.
Certiorari granted; 953 F. 2d 1389, reversed.
2 UNITED STATES v. NACHTIGAL
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
Respondent Jerry Nachtigal was charged with operating a motor vehicle in Yosemite National Park while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of 36 CFR §§ 4.23(a)(1) and (a)(2) (1992). Driving under the influence (DUI) is a class B misdemeanor and carries a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment, § 1.3(a); 18 U. S. C. § 3581(b)(7), and a $5,000 fine, §§ 3571(b)(6) and (e). As an alternative to a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court may impose a term of probation not to exceed five years. §§ 3561(a)(3), (b)(2). The sentencing court has discretion to attach a host of discretionary conditions to the probationary term. § 3563(b).
Respondent moved for a jury trial. Applying our decision in Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U. S. 538 (1989), the Magistrate Judge denied the motion. He reasoned that because DUI carries a maximum term of imprisonment of six months, it is presumptively a “petty” offense which is not embraced by the jury trial guaranty of the Sixth Amendment. He rejected respondent’s contention that the additional penalties transformed DUI into a “serious” offense for Sixth Amendment purposes. Respondent was then tried by the Magistrate Judge and convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992). He was fined $750 and placed on unsupervised probation for one year.
The District Court reversed the Magistrate Judge on the issue of entitlement to a jury trial, commenting that the language in our opinion in Blanton was “at variance with the Ninth Circuit precedent of United States v. Craner, [652 F. 2d 23 (1981)],” and electing to follow Craner because our opinion in Blanton did not “expressly overrule” Craner. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a, 20a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court, holding that Blanton is “[in]apposite,” that Craner controls, and that respondent is entitled to a jury trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a–4a, judgt. order re-
Cite as: 507 U. S. 1 (1993) 3
Per Curiam
ported at 953 F. 2d 1389 (1992). The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the Secretary of the Interior, and not Congress, set the maximum prison term at six months, “[t]here is no controlling legislative determination” regarding the seriousness of the offense. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a; see also United States v. Craner, 652 F. 2d 23, 25 (CA9 1981). The court also found it significant that the Secretary of the Interior, in whom Congress vested general regulatory authority to fix six months as the maximum sentence for any regulatory offense dealing with the use and management of the national parks, monuments, or reservations, see 16 U. S. C. § 3, chose the harshest penalty available for DUI offenses. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a–4a; see also Craner, supra, at 25. Finally, the court noted that seven of the nine States within the Ninth Circuit guarantee a jury trial for a DUI offense. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a–4a; see also Craner, supra, at 27.
Unlike the Court of Appeals and the District Court, we think that this case is quite obviously controlled by our decision in Blanton. We therefore grant the United States’ petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
In Blanton, we held that in order to determine whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense, the court must examine “objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.” Blanton, 489 U. S., at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted). The best indicator of society’s views is the maximum penalty set by the legislature. Ibid. While the word “penalty” refers both to the term of imprisonment and other statutory penalties, we stated that “[p]rimary emphasis . . . must be placed on the maximum authorized period of incarceration.” Id., at 542. We therefore held that offenses for which the maximum period of incarceration is six months or less are presumptively “ ‘petty.’ ” A defendant can overcome this presumption, and become entitled to a jury trial, p. 44 UNITED STATES v. NACHTIGAL
Per Curiam
only by showing that the additional penalties, viewed together with the maximum prison term, are so severe that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a “ ‘serious’ ” one. Id., at 543. Finally, we expressly stated that the statutory penalties in other States are irrelevant to the question whether a particular legislature deemed a particular offense “ ‘serious.’ ” Id., at 545, n. 11.
Applying the above rule, we held that DUI was a petty offense under Nevada law. Since the maximum prison term was six months, the presumption described above applied. We did not find it constitutionally significant that the defendant would automatically lose his license for up to 90 days, and would be required to attend, at his own expense, an alcohol abuse education course. Id., at 544, and n. 9. Nor did we believe that a $1,000 fine or an alternative sentence of 48 hours’ community service while wearing clothing identifying him as a DUI offender was more onerous than six months in jail. Id., at 544–545.
The present case, we think, requires only a relatively routine application of the rule announced in Blanton. Because the maximum term of imprisonment is six months, DUI under 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992) is presumptively a petty offense to which no jury trial right attaches. The Court of Appeals refused to apply the Blanton presumption, reasoning that the Secretary of the Interior, and not Congress, ultimately determined the maximum prison term. But there is a controlling legislative determination present within the regulatory scheme. In 16 U. S. C. § 3, Congress set six months as the maximum penalty the Secretary could impose for a violation of any of his regulations. The Court of Appeals offered no persuasive reason why this congressional determination is stripped of its “legislative” character merely because the Secretary has final authority to decide, within the limits given by Congress, what the maximum prison sentence will be for a violation of a given regulation.
Cite as: 507 U. S. 1 (1993) 5
Per Curiam
The additional penalties imposed under the regulations are not sufficiently severe to overcome this presumption. As we noted in Blanton, it is a rare case where “a legislature packs an offense it deems ‘serious’ with onerous penalties that nonetheless do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line.” Blanton, 489 U. S., at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the federal DUI offense carries a maximum fine of $5,000, and respondent faced, as an alternative to incarceration, a maximum 5-year term of probation. While the maximum fine in this case is $4,000 greater than the one in Blanton, this monetary penalty “cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.” Id., at 542.
Nor do we believe that the probation alternative renders the DUI offense “serious.” * Like a monetary penalty, the liberty infringement caused by a term of probation is far less intrusive than incarceration. Ibid. The discretionary probation conditions do not alter this conclusion; while they obviously entail a greater infringement on liberty than probation without attendant conditions, they do not approximate the severe loss of liberty caused by imprisonment for more than six months.
We hold that the Court of Appeals was wrong in refusing to recognize that this case was controlled by our opinion in Blanton rather than by its previous opinion in Craner. An individual convicted of driving under the influence in viola- p. 66 UNITED STATES v. NACHTIGAL
*
There are 21 discretionary conditions which the sentencing court may impose upon a defendant. Under 18 U. S. C. § 3563(b), a court may require, among other things, that the defendant (1) pay restitution; (2) take part in a drug and alcohol dependency program offered by an institution, and if necessary, reside at the institution; (3) remain in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights and weekends for a period not exceeding the term of imprisonment; (4) reside at or participate in a program of a community correctional facility for all or part of the probationary term; or (5) remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours, and, if necessary, this condition may be monitored by telephonic or electronic devices. §§ 3563(b)(3), (b)(10), (b)(11), (b)(12), (b)(20).
Per Curiam
tion of 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992) is not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The petition of the United States for certiorari is accordingly granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 1992 7
Supplemental Decree
UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA et al. (ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI BOUNDARY CASE)
on joint motion for entry of supplemental decree No. 9, Orig. Decided May 31, 1960, February 26, 1985, and March 1, 1988—Final decree entered December 12, 1960—Supplemental decree entered November 5, 1990—Supplemental decree entered February 22, 1993
Supplemental decree entered.
Opinions reported: 363 U. S. 1, 470 U. S. 93, and 485 U. S. 88; final decree reported: 364 U. S. 502; supplemental decree reported: 498 U. S. 9.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE
By its decision of February 26, 1985, the Court overruled the exceptions of the United States to the Report of its Special Master insofar as it challenged the Master’s determination that the whole of Mississippi Sound constitutes historic inland waters, and, to this extent, adopted the Master’s recommendations and confirmed his Report.
On March 1, 1988, the Court resolved the disagreement between the United States and Mississippi as to that portion of the Mississippi coastline at issue in the above-captioned litigation and directed parties to submit to the Special Master a proposed appropriate decree defining the claims of Alabama and Mississippi with respect to Mississippi Sound. On August 17, 1990, the parties agreed on and submitted to the Special Master a proposed decree in accordance with the Court’s decision of March 1, 1988, which was approved by the Court on November 5, 1990. Pursuant to that supplemental decree, the baseline (coastline) of the State of Mississippi as well as a portion of the baseline of the State of Alabama was delimited and, by stipulation of the parties, fixed, as described by coordinates in that decree. That portion of the Alabama coastline not described by coordinates in the decree remained ambulatory.
8 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
Supplemental Decree
Thereafter, a dispute arose between the State of Alabama and the United States regarding their respective claims under the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., to offshore areas in which the baseline had not been fixed by the Court’s November 5, 1990, Decree. The parties thereafter filed a joint motion with this Court, requesting that the Court invoke its continuing jurisdiction to supplement the November 5, 1990, Decree. 498 U. S. 9 (1990). With that motion the parties submitted for the Court’s consideration a supplemental decree which would fix that portion of the Alabama baseline that had heretofore remained ambulatory, resolve the existing dispute, and avoid future jurisdictional controversies over the State of Alabama Submerged Lands Act grant.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. The parties’ joint motion to supplement the Court’s Decree of November 5, 1990, is granted.
2. For the purpose of the Court’s Decree herein dated December 12, 1960, 364 U. S. 502 (defining the boundary line between the submerged lands of the States bordering the Gulf of Mexico), the coastline of the States of Alabama and Mississippi shall be determined on the basis that the whole Mississippi Sound constitutes state inland waters;
3. For the purposes of the said Decree of December 12, 1960, the coastline of Alabama includes:
(a) That portion of a straight line from a point on the eastern tip of Petit Bois Island where X = 215985 and Y = 77920 in the Alabama plane coordinate system, west zone, and X = 637152.89 and Y = 198279.25 in the Mississippi plane coordinate system, east zone, to a fixed point previously described as the western tip of Dauphin Island by the Court’s Decree of November 5, 1990, where X = 238690 and Y = 84050 in the Alabama plane coordinate system, west
Cite as: 507 U. S. 7 (1993) 9
Supplemental Decree
zone, and X = 659783.79 and Y = 204674.56 in the Mississippi plane coordinate system, east zone, lying on the Alabama side of the Alabama-Mississippi boundary;
(b) A straight line from the fixed point previously described as the western tip of Dauphin Island where X = 238690 and Y = 84050 in the Alabama plane coordinate system, west zone, to a point on the western tip of Dauphin Island where X = 240239.49 and Y = 85266.90 in the same coordinate system;
(c) The baseline delimiting Dauphin Island determined by the following points in the Alabama plane coordinate system, west zone:
E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
A LINE FROM 240491.79 84972.10 THROUGH 240848.85 84605.82 THROUGH 241013.42 84311.65 THROUGH 241205.05 84118.32 THROUGH 241590.69 84065.03 THROUGH 242142.09 83879.22 THROUGH 242413.48 83796.45 THROUGH 242694.43 83824.75 THROUGH 243220.74 83810.88 THROUGH 243580.37 83798.21 THROUGH 244027.43 83744.51 THROUGH 244536.27 83740.89 THROUGH 244878.06 83687.95 THROUGH 245246.75 83715.64 THROUGH 245641.25 83672.44 THROUGH 245973.56 83518.55 THROUGH 246464.50 83464.57 THROUGH 246886.11 83532.32 THROUGH 247307.57 83579.87 THROUGH 247711.06 83566.93 THROUGH 248158.99 83634.51 THROUGH 248606.77 83681.89 p. 1010 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
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X Y
248905.97 83811.13 249204.96 83910.07 249538.75 83968.36 249890.17 84036.63 250276.60 84094.56 250934.57 84090.00 251636.34 84075.04 252313.25 84272.42 252936.89 84379.26 253683.35 84485.27 254464.61 84550.64 255158.29 84636.83 255930.50 84661.89 256527.80 84768.97 257100.01 85058.07 257636.92 85317.12 258244.41 85636.31 258841.55 85723.22 259456.50 85850.44 260045.14 85977.84 260695.58 86165.45 261143.78 86283.70 261758.98 86451.36 262312.84 86629.54 262734.31 86687.37 263076.76 86735.63 263313.48 86713.86 263594.99 86833.24 264034.80 87012.20 264447.62 87090.31 264763.68 87128.65 265255.32 87186.05 265712.59 87354.81 266107.99 87453.26
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E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
266626.20 87550.92 267179.63 87668.56 267829.73 87815.89 268532.21 87922.49 269120.58 88019.73 269691.59 88147.40 270166.31 88306.00 270736.80 88352.87 271281.56 88490.83 271843.72 88608.49 272300.62 88726.82 272915.73 88894.67 273600.55 88991.37 274162.58 89088.86 274601.79 89187.13 274953.35 89296.05 275348.70 89394.61 275796.68 89492.83 276227.06 89581.07 276657.61 89699.62 277219.49 89776.96 277763.57 89814.00 278326.00 89982.26 278870.45 90079.93 279397.35 90177.72 280073.43 90284.70 280530.15 90382.93 281179.60 90439.59 281697.41 90486.95 282180.19 90544.63 282829.76 90621.52 283435.09 90638.07 284014.48 90715.40 284698.99 90771.91 p. 1212 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
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X Y
285269.60 90849.31 285910.08 90875.79 286568.75 91013.31 287138.94 91020.03 287726.72 91036.75 288393.56 91073.23 288937.49 91090.23 289499.19 91147.55 290086.68 91113.81 290674.16 91080.07 291340.88 91096.39 291946.02 91082.78 292454.92 91110.14 293078.13 91187.37 293674.68 91204.14 294332.04 91119.55 294753.40 91177.75 295306.03 91184.70 296007.66 91170.61 296717.82 91116.07 297498.39 91101.56 298419.12 91055.97 299339.74 90990.20 300171.70 90753.20 300916.74 90658.14 301609.33 90593.70 302275.16 90448.59 302836.46 90435.40 303432.29 90321.01 303913.82 90156.74 304570.40 89920.81 305148.05 89685.31 305664.13 89419.86 306268.49 89254.95
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Supplemental Decree
E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
THROUGH 306924.94 88988.76 THROUGH 307634.62 88833.42 THROUGH 308274.89 88819.89 THROUGH 308748.98 88898.18 THROUGH 309476.70 88833.70 THROUGH 310161.04 88860.38 THROUGH 310880.04 88806.08 THROUGH 311616.90 88812.31 THROUGH 312309.75 88788.48 THROUGH 312985.68 88885.98 THROUGH 313459.92 88994.64 THROUGH 314171.36 89172.79 THROUGH 314847.17 89250.12 THROUGH 315672.47 89397.41 THROUGH 316234.25 89475.35 THROUGH 316839.88 89553.08 THROUGH 317515.17 89529.44 THROUGH 318086.23 89708.38 TO 318359.83 90040.37
A LINE FROM 309362.32 80499.88 THROUGH 309370.61 80408.91 THROUGH 309540.79 79407.88 THROUGH 309801.70 78972.10 THROUGH 310106.82 78596.70 THROUGH 310446.88 78190.81 THROUGH 310769.82 77865.84 THROUGH 311163.33 77611.21 THROUGH 311591.47 77265.49 THROUGH 312045.73 76879.23 THROUGH 312526.96 76614.06 THROUGH 312920.66 76389.76 THROUGH 313348.99 76074.36 THROUGH 313707.54 75840.15 THROUGH 314162.68 75615.55 p. 1414 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
Supplemental Decree
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X Y
THROUGH 314485.89 75331.01 THROUGH 314809.52 75127.30 THROUGH 315220.95 74933.24 THROUGH 315449.46 75002.79 TO 315572.98 75133.48
A LINE FROM 316237.86 74736.09 THROUGH 316429.31 74421.94 THROUGH 316761.32 74137.39 THROUGH 317252.83 74155.09 THROUGH 317805.05 74031.07 THROUGH 318216.92 73917.86 THROUGH 318681.85 73885.21 TO 318858.57 74126.77
A LINE FROM 319734.51 73809.20 THROUGH 320172.46 73645.37 THROUGH 320408.54 73472.46 THROUGH 320793.59 73258.39 THROUGH 321144.45 73226.34 TO 321276.78 73367.11
A LINE FROM 324818.43 70814.04 THROUGH 324993.50 70722.27 TO 325117.15 70883.31
A LINE FROM 333064.90 81503.36 THROUGH 333168.82 81209.91 THROUGH 333378.02 80915.98 THROUGH 333719.43 80752.77 THROUGH 334061.32 80690.57 THROUGH 334420.93 80668.71 THROUGH 334780.79 80697.36 THROUGH 335324.74 80694.87 THROUGH 335772.51 80763.53 THROUGH 336194.09 80862.63
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X Y
336896.51 80980.66 337327.09 81130.25 337696.35 81300.31 338047.46 81339.14 338539.04 81397.54 339083.93 81607.24 339549.41 81716.29 339935.70 81775.18 340348.53 81884.47 340752.50 81973.59 341217.96 82082.66 341613.15 82171.83 342087.16 82230.36 342526.61 82410.27 342992.15 82539.57 343554.02 82628.03 344124.44 82665.97 344633.62 82744.58 345090.33 82863.83 345608.10 82902.01 346011.57 82880.08 346477.09 83009.42 347117.85 83087.50 347715.13 83256.70 348180.05 83244.63 348759.47 83343.21 349479.14 83410.91 349953.03 83449.33 350514.82 83527.81 351102.43 83484.96 351672.90 83543.21 352155.65 83601.84 352726.25 83690.42 353331.77 83738.45 p. 1616 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
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353946.10 83796.56 354516.48 83834.66 355069.16 83832.42 355771.25 83900.31 356288.91 83918.44 356806.58 83936.58 357359.37 83964.69 357736.51 83942.99 358245.00 83860.16 358771.24 83827.79 359323.76 83785.21 360034.18 83742.03 360569.58 83810.66 361341.53 83797.57 362166.47 83875.22 362885.71 83842.16 363675.39 83879.57 364131.80 83938.45 364509.47 84058.25 364922.01 84117.31 365369.37 84105.53 365939.40 84052.89 366456.94 84040.86 367044.73 84048.78 367588.41 83986.16 368141.19 84014.43 368606.17 84022.83 369237.28 83879.10 369728.32 83816.71 370034.56 83593.35 370420.34 83531.35 370885.00 83448.86 371446.45 83446.85 371999.16 83454.98
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372481.55 83422.96 372972.64 83370.71 373630.59 83368.39 374130.53 83336.33 374534.11 83345.02 375069.34 83373.46 375692.20 83371.30 376314.99 83348.95 376999.09 83296.09 377595.43 83233.44 378306.08 83251.23 378762.13 83209.28 379288.29 83146.90 379919.72 83084.17 380604.06 83102.10 381261.98 83089.82 381919.70 83016.94 382638.87 82953.97 383288.02 82941.75 383910.69 82879.13 384480.86 82857.08 385129.91 82814.60 385840.54 82822.43 386393.38 82871.19 386998.58 82828.88 387621.32 82786.52 388147.40 82693.96 388629.75 82641.95 389191.09 82599.81 389708.53 82547.71 390182.42 82596.77 390901.73 82574.37 391393.04 82582.99 391954.59 82611.60 p. 1818 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
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392533.59 82609.86 393059.69 82517.38 393550.70 82425.00 394094.65 82433.50 394726.24 82411.44 395217.46 82389.80 395629.90 82429.01 396077.20 82387.30 396349.16 82386.52 396744.02 82415.69 397173.87 82404.35 397516.09 82433.68 398016.32 82492.87 398446.30 82532.06 398893.83 82571.21 399472.64 82498.87 399955.51 82628.85 400394.60 82789.26 400448.04 83082.07 400930.74 83151.45 401264.13 83160.63 401737.85 83159.33 402027.37 83168.64 402299.46 83218.41 402711.92 83267.80 403133.25 83357.58 403501.78 83386.90 403984.25 83375.50 404291.45 83435.30 404695.09 83474.63 405081.54 83645.34 405423.99 83765.66 405801.76 83976.81 406144.39 84167.85
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E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
406530.27 84126.44 406924.90 84074.90 407372.42 84124.26 407811.04 84123.13 408258.70 84223.00 408837.85 84292.24 409522.28 84361.22 409934.81 84451.11 410470.17 84550.79 410996.78 84660.60 411637.61 84840.85 412418.71 84990.47 413068.07 85079.81 413586.09 85270.50 414183.03 85450.90 414849.99 85570.54 415657.42 85740.36 416491.02 85849.54 417324.66 85978.93 418000.45 86128.91 418798.97 86248.32 419597.59 86418.26 420141.58 86477.66 421115.65 86657.34 421861.76 86888.05 422712.94 87037.74 423397.41 87167.60 423967.70 87227.00 424573.05 87276.23 424836.41 87376.70 425003.05 87366.25 425652.12 87354.80 426275.28 87535.35 426696.34 87544.59 p. 2020 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH Supplemental Decree
E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
427108.82 87654.87 427617.80 87764.96 427889.90 87855.33 428232.02 87874.85 428609.22 87884.20 428986.33 87853.14 429425.10 87953.30 429933.91 87982.61 430293.61 88022.32 430653.32 88062.03 431057.06 88192.57 431486.95 88242.26 431934.31 88251.51 432329.06 88270.97 432750.24 88350.99 433294.10 88370.18 433759.13 88450.14 434180.17 88459.47 434469.79 88549.85 434882.19 88629.92 435329.59 88669.52 435768.30 88749.55 436119.30 88829.73 436487.85 88920.00 436891.52 89030.41 437312.61 89070.08 437751.30 89150.13 438128.62 89240.39 438602.47 89360.80 439006.13 89471.24 439471.18 89581.57 439865.91 89601.11 440208.02 89620.74 440532.73 89731.32
Cite as: 507 U. S. 7 (1993) 21
THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH Supplemental Decree
E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
440866.22 89852.00 441190.85 89912.07 441559.38 90002.39 441919.07 90052.31 442348.83 90041.52 442787.44 90081.23 443024.36 90151.56 443357.69 90171.24 443691.00 90180.82 444112.06 90220.57 444550.67 90260.29 445006.90 90350.51 445375.32 90380.25 445708.79 90500.97 446147.42 90560.92 446506.95 90509.87 446884.06 90489.11 447164.82 90549.31 447375.35 90569.20 447813.96 90619.07 448331.42 90608.22 448857.71 90637.77 449278.79 90697.79 449734.96 90757.76 450182.35 90817.74 450866.72 90998.63 451454.54 91139.26 452112.64 91360.62 452630.45 91622.58 453095.47 91763.39 453551.80 91964.84 454078.26 92145.99 454683.58 92276.55 455209.95 92397.11 p. 2222 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH Supplemental Decree
E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
455710.07 92568.22 456096.04 92628.36 456534.65 92708.64 456990.81 92799.01 457385.59 92899.55 457885.64 93020.19 458280.44 93140.95 458675.19 93221.31 458955.89 93271.49 459271.79 93422.66 459675.36 93553.53 460149.07 93674.22 460596.54 93855.56 461070.28 93996.47 461421.21 94127.42 461912.46 94248.11 462377.40 94378.95 462772.12 94449.25 463079.18 94570.15 463210.60 94438.69 463570.26 94539.35 464087.77 94629.74 464631.61 94740.32 465079.00 94881.31 465570.28 95062.67 466131.66 95193.46 466596.60 95354.65 467061.55 95525.95 467552.76 95646.73 468158.10 95918.94 468798.42 96090.10 469307.24 96322.01 469780.91 96463.03 470193.23 96664.72
Cite as: 507 U. S. 7 (1993) 23
THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH Supplemental Decree
E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
470772.13 96815.78 471245.77 96946.72 471833.42 97087.68 472368.41 97178.18 472903.44 97319.20 473263.04 97409.84 473850.70 97591.24 474473.39 97712.02 474911.95 97873.34 475447.00 98075.00 475894.29 98185.82 476402.97 98316.81 476920.39 98397.28 477393.97 98498.00 477806.18 98629.07 478428.87 98790.32 478946.30 98921.33 479411.09 99001.88 479919.72 99082.41 480366.90 99041.75 480893.00 99001.06 481199.70 98606.93 481322.14 97990.65 481479.95 97929.96 481970.97 97838.79 482269.23 98070.98 482400.89 98333.57 482646.54 98585.99 482909.74 98868.72 483111.46 98959.54 483435.89 98918.98 483953.36 99191.50 484391.89 99403.44 485058.36 99544.58 p. 2424 UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA
Supplemental Decree
THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH THROUGH TO
E. COORD. N. COORD.
X Y
485488.00 99504.00 485716.07 99705.94 486058.04 99715.91 486408.84 99867.30 486908.66 99917.63
487320.85 100109.42 487820.68 100200.16 488469.63 100452.49 488934.38 100543.26 489407.93 100775.46 489898.99 100906.64 490293.63 101159.08 491003.88 101249.81 491547.53 101370.90 492029.80 101481.91 492617.29 101613.11 493160.94 101734.22 493748.41 101825.03 494142.98 101915.88.
4. The baseline described in Paragraph 3 above shall be fixed as of the date of this decree for the purposes of determining the Submerged Lands Act grant to the State of Alabama and shall from that date no longer be ambulatory.
5. The parties shall bear their own costs of these proceedings.
6. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such writs as from time to time may be deemed necessary or advisable to effectuate and supplement the decree and the rights of the respective parties.