Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)

GREGG v. GEORGIA

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

No. 74-6257. Argued March 31, 1976—Decided July 2, 1976

Petitioner was charged with committing armed robbery and mur-

der on the basis of evidence that he had killed and robbed two men. At the trial stage of Georgia’s bifurcated procedure, the jury found petitioner guilty of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. At the penalty stage, the judge instructed the jury that it could recommend either a death sentence or a life prison sentence on each count; that it was free to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances, if any, as presented by the parties; and that it would not be authorized to consider imposing the death sentence unless it first found beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of other capital félonies, viz., the armed robberies of the victims; (2) that he committed the murder for the purpose of receiving the victims’ money and automobile; or (3) that the murder was “outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” in that it “involved the depravity of [the] mind of the défendant.” The jury found the first and second of these aggravating circumstances and retumed a sentence of death. The Georgia Suprême Court affirmed the convictions. After reviewing the trial transcript and record and comparing the evidence and sentence in similar cases the court upheld the death sentences for the murders, concluding that they had not resulted from préjudice or any other arbitrary factor and were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty applied in similar cases, but vacated the armed robbery sentences on the ground, inter alia, that the death penalty had rarely been imposed in Georgia for that offense. Petitioner challenges imposition of the death sentence under the Georgia statute as “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. That statute, as amended following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (where this Court held to be violative of those Amendments death sentences imposed under statutes that left juries with untrammeled discrétion to impose or withhold the death penalty), retains the death penalty for murder and five other crimes. Guilt or innocence is determined in the first stage

of a bifurcated trial; and if the trial is by jury, the trial judge must charge lesser included offenses when supported by any view of the evidence. Upon a guilty verdict or plea a presentence hearing is held where the judge or jury hears additional extenuating or mitigating evidence and evidence in aggravation of punishment if made known to the défendant before trial. At least one of 10 specified aggravating circumstances must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and designated in writing before a death sentence can be imposed. In jury cases, the trial judge is bound by the recommended sentence. In its review of a death sentence (which is automatic), the State Suprême Court must consider whether the sentence was influenced by passion, préjudice, or any other arbitrary factor; whether the evidence supports the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance; and whether the death sentence “is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the défendant.” If the court affirms the death sentence it must include in its decision reference to similar cases that it has considered. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 168-207 ; 220-226; 227. 233 Ga. 117, 210 S. E. 2d 659, affirmed.

Mr . Just ice Stew art , Mr . Just ic e Pow el l , and Mr . Just ice

Stev en s concluded that:

(1) The punishment of death for the crime of murder does

not, under ail circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 168-187.

(a) The Eighth Amendment, which has been interpreted

in a flexible and dynamic manner to accord with evolving standards of decency, forbids the use of punishment that is “excessive” either because it involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or because it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Pp. 169-173.

(b) Though a législature may not impose excessive punish-

ment, it is not required to select the least severe penalty possible, and a heavy burden rests upon those attacking its judgment. Pp. 174-176.

(c) The existence of capital punishment was accepted by the

Framers of the Constitution, and for nearly two centuries this Court has recognized that capital punishment for the crime of murder is not invalid per se. Pp. 176-178.

(d) Legislative measures adopted by the people’s chosen représentatives weigh heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards of- decency; and the argument that such standards require that the Eighth Amendment be construed as prohibiting the death penalty has been undercut by the fact that in the four years since Furman, supra, was decided, Congress and at least 35 States hâve enacted new statutes providing for the death penalty. Pp. 179-183.

(e) Rétribution and the possibility of deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders are not impermissible considérations for a législature to weigh in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed, and it cannot be said that Georgia’s legislative judgment that such a penalty is necessary in some cases is clearly wrong. Pp. 183-187.

(f) Capital punishment for the crime of murder cannot be viewed as invariably disproportionate to the severity of that crime. P. 187.

2. The concerns expressed in Furman that the death penalty not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adéquate information and guidance, concerns best met by a System that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of that information. Pp. 188-195.

3. The Georgia statutory System under which petitioner was sentenced to death is constitutional. The new procedures on their face satisfy the concerns of Furman, since before the death penalty can be imposed there must be spécifie jury findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the défendant, and the State Suprême Court thereafter reviews the comparability of each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated défendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate. Petitioner’s contentions that the changes in Georgia’s sentencing procedures hâve not removed the éléments of arbitrariness and capriciousness condemned by Furman are without merit. Pp. 196-207.

(b) Petitioner’s arguments that certain statutory aggravating circumstances are too broad or vague lack merit, since they need not be given overly broad constructions or hâve been already narrowed by judicial construction. One such provision was held impermissibly vague by the Georgia Suprême Court. Petitioner’s argument that the sentencing procedure allows for arbitrary grants of mercy reflects a misinterpretation of Furman and ignores the reviewing authority of the Georgia Suprême Court to détermine whether each death sentence is proportional to other sentences imposed for similar crimes. Petitioner also urges that the scope of the evidence and argument that can be considered at the presentence hearing is too wide, but it is désirable for a jury to hâve as much information as possible when it makes the sentencing decision. Pp. 200-204.

(c) The Georgia sentencing scheme also provides for automatic sentence review by the Georgia Suprême Court to safeguard against préjudiciai or arbitrary factors. In this very case the court vacated petitioner’s death sentence for armed robbery as an excessive penalty. Pp. 204r-206.

Mr . Just ice Whi te , joined by The Chi ef Just ice and Mr . Just ice Reh nq ui st , concluded that:

2. Petitioner’s argument that the prosecutor’s decisions in plea

bargaining or in declining to charge capital murder are standardless and will resuit in the wanton or freakish imposition of the death penalty condemned in Furman, is without merit, for the assumption cannot be made that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decisions by factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts; the standards by which prosecutors décidé whether to charge a capital felony will be the same as those by which the jury will décidé the questions of guilt and sentence. Pp. 224-225.

3. Petitioner’s argument that the death penalty, however im-

posed and for whatever crime, is cruel and unusual punishment is untenable for the reasons stated in Mr . Just ice Whi te ’s dissent in Roberts v. Louisiana, post, at 350-356. P. 226.

Mr . Just ice Bla ck mun concurred in the judgment. See Fur-

man v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 405-414 (Bla ck mu n , J., dissenting), and id., at 375 (Burg er , C. J., dissenting) ; id., at 414 (Pow ell , J., dissenting) ; id., at 465 (Reh nq ui st , J., dissenting). P. 227.

Judgment of the Court, and opinion of Ste war t , Pow el l , and Ste ve ns , JJ., announced by Ste war t , J. Bur ge r , C. J., and Reh nq ui st , J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 226. Whi te , J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Bur ger , C. J., and Reh nq ui st , J., joined, post, p. 207. Bla ck mun , J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 227. Bre nn an , J., post, p. 227, and Mar sha ll , J., post, p. 231, filed dissenting opinions.

G. Hughel Harrison, by appointaient of the Court, 424 U. S. 941, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

G. Thomas Davis, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs II, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard L. Chambers, Deputy Attorney General, John B. Bdllard, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Bryant Huff.

Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief was Deputy Solicitor General Randolph. William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of California as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General.*

Judgment of the Court, and opinion of Mr . Justice Stew art , Mr . Justic e Powel l , and Mr . Justice Ste - vens , announced by Mr . Justice Stewart .

The issue in this case is whether the imposition of the sentence of death for the crime of murder under the law of Georgia violâtes the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

I

The petitioner, Troy Gregg, was charged with committing armed robbery and murder. In accordance with Georgia procedure in capital cases, the trial was in two stages, a guilt stage and a sentencing stage. The evidence at the guilt trial established that on November 21, 1973, the petitioner and a traveling companion, Floyd Allen, while hitchhiking north in Florida were picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore. Their car broke down, but they continued north after Simmons purchased another vehicle with some of the cash he was carrying. While still in Florida, they picked up another hitchhiker, Dennis Weaver, who rode with them to Atlanta, where he was let out about 11 p. m.

*Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Peggy C. Davis, and Anthony G. Amsterdam filed a brief for the N. A. A. C. P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversai.

A short time later the four men interrupted their journey for a rest stop along the highway. The next morning the bodies of Simmons and Moore were discovered in a ditch nearby.

On November 23, after reading about the shootings in an Atlanta newspaper, Weaver comunicated with the Gwinnett County police and related information concerning the journey with the victims, including a description of the car. The next afternoon, the petitioner and Allen, while in Simmons’ car, were arrested in Asheville, N. C. In the search incident to the arrest a .25-caliber pistol, later shown to be that used to kill Simmons and Moore, was found in the petitioner’s pocket. After receiving the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and signing a written waiver of his rights, the petitioner signed a statement in which he admitted shooting, then robbing Simmons and Moore. He justified the slayings on grounds of self-defense. The next day, while being transferred to Lawrenceville, Ga., the petitioner and Allen were taken to the scene of the shootings. Upon arriving there, Allen recounted the events leading to the slayings. His version of these events was as follows: After Simmons and Moore left the car, the petitioner stated that he intended to rob them. The petitioner then took his pistol in hand and positioned himself on the car to improve his aim. As Simmons and Moore came up an embankment toward the car, the petitioner fired three shots and the two men fell near a ditch. The petitioner, at close range, then fired a shot into the head of each. He robbed them of valuables and drove away with Allen.

A medical examiner testified that Simmons died from a bullet wound in the eye and that Moore died from bullet wounds in the cheek and in the back of the head. He further testified that both men had several bruises

Opininn of Ste wa rt , Pow el l , and Stev en s , JJ. 428 U. S.

and abrasions about the face and head which probably were sustained either from the fall into the ditch or from being dragged or pushed along the embankment. Although Allen did not testify, a police détective recounted the substance of Allen’s statements about the slayings and indicated that directly after Allen had made these statements the petitioner had admitted that Allen’s account was accurate. The petitioner testified in his own defense. He confirmed that Allen had made the statements described by the détective, but denied their truth or ever having admitted to their accuracy. He indicated that he had shot Simmons and Moore because of fear and in self-defense, testifying they had attacked Allen and him, one wielding a pipe and the other a knife?

The trial judge submitted the murder charges to the jury on both felony-murder and nonfelony-murder théories. He also instructed on the issue of self-defense but declined to instruct on manslaughter. He submitted the robbery case to the jury on both an armed-robbery theory and on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. The jury found the petitioner guilty of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder.

The judge further charged the jury that in determining what sentence was appropriate the jury was free to consider the facts and circumstances, if any, presented by the parties in mitigation or aggravation.

Finally, the judge instructed the jury that it “would not be authorized to consider [imposing] the penalty of death” unless it first found beyond a reasonable doubt one of these aggravating circumstances:

“One—That the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of two other capital félonies, to-wit the armed robbery of [Simmons and Moore]. “Two—That the offender committed the offense of murder for the purpose of receiving money and the automobile described in the indictment. “Three—The offense of murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman, in that they [sic] involved the depravity of [the] mind of the défendant.” Tr. 476-477. Finding the first and second of these circumstances, the jury returned verdicts of death on each count.

The Suprême Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the imposition of the death sentences for murder. 233 Ga. 117, 210 S. E. 2d 659 (1974). After reviewing the trial transcript and the record, including the evidence, and comparing the evidence and sentence in similar cases in accordance with the requirements of Georgia law, the court concluded that, considering the nature of the crime and the défendant, the sentences of death had not resulted from préjudice or any other arbitrary factor and were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty applied in similar cases.2 The death

We granted the petitioner’s application for a writ of certiorari limited to his challenge to the imposition of the death sentences in this case as “cruel and unusual” punishment in violation of the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 423 U. S. 1082 (1976).

II

Before considering the issues presented it is necessary to understand the Georgia statutory scheme for the imposition of the death penalty.3 The Georgia statute, as amended after our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), retains the death penalty for six categories of crime : murder,4 kidnaping for ransom or where

3 Subséquent to the trial in this case limited portions of the Georgia statute were amended. None of these amendments changed significantly the substance of the statutory scheme. Ail references to the statute in this opinion are to the current version.

4 Georgia Code Ann. §26-1101 (1972) provides: “(a) A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow créature, which is manifested by extemal circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considérable provocation appears, and where ail the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

“(b) A person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice.

If trial is by jury, the trial judge is required to charge lesser included offenses when they are supported by any view of the evidence. Sims n . State, 203 Ga.668, 47 S. E. 2d 862 (1948). See Linder v. State, 132 Ga. App. 624, 625, 208 S. E. 2d 630, 631 (1974). After a verdict, finding, or plea of guilty to a capital crime, a presentence hearing is conducted before whoever made the détermination of guilt. The sentencing procedures are essentially the same in both bench and jury trials. At the hearing:

“[T]he judge [or jury] shall hear additional evidence in exténuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the défendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, however, that

5 Section 26-1902 (1972) provides: “A person commits armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he takes property of another from the person or the immé- diate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon. The offense robbery by intimidation shall be a lesser included offense in the offense of armed robbery. A person convicted of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.”

6 These capital félonies currently are defined as they were when Furman was decided. The 1973 amendments to the Georgia statute, however, narrowed the class of crimes potentially punishable by death by eliminating capital perjury. Compare § 26-2401 (Supp. 1975) with §26-2401 (1972).

only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the défendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The judge [or jury] shall also hear argument by the défendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney . . . regarding the punishment to be imposed.” §27-2503 (Supp. 1975).

The défendant is accorded substantial latitude as to the types of evidence that he may introduce. See Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644, 647-650, 220 S. E. 2d 922, 925-926 (1975).7 Evidence considered during the guilt stage may be considered during the sentencing stage without being resubmitted. Eberheart n . State, 232 Ga. 247, 253, 206 S. E. 2d 12, 17 (1974).8

In the assessment of the appropriate sentence to be imposed the judge is also required to consider or to include in his instructions to the jury “any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of [10] statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence... §27-2534.1 (b) (Supp. 1975). The scope of the non-statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances is not delineated in the statute. Before a convicted défendant may be sentenced to death, however, except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, the jury, or the trial judge in cases tried without a jury, must find beyond a reasonable doubt one of the 10 aggravating circumstances speci-

7 It is not clear whether the 1974 amendments to the Georgia statute were intended to broaden the types of evidence admissible at the presentence hearing. Compare § 27-2503 (a) (Supp. 1975) with §27-2534 (1972) (délétion of limitation “subject to the laws of evidence”).

9 The statute provides in part: “(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft hijacking or treason, in any case.

“(b) In ail cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:

“(1) The offense of murder, râpe, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serions assaultive criminal convictions.

“(2) The offense of murder, râpe, armed robbery’, or kidnapping was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.

“(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

“(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.

“(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or soliciter during or because of the exercise of his official duty.

“(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employée of another person.

“(7) The offense of murder, râpe, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.

In addition to the conventional appellate process available in ail criminal cases, provision is made for spécial expedited direct review by the Suprême Court of Georgia of the appropriateness of imposing the sentence of death in the particular case. The court is directed to consider “the punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way of appeal,” and to détermine:

“(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed

ofïicer, corrections employée or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.

“(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.

“(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.

“(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make such désignation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in section 27-2534.1 (b) is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.” § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975).

The Suprême Court of Georgia, in Arnold n . State, 236 Ga. 534, 540, 224 S. E. 2d 386, 391 (1976), recently held unconstitutional the portion of the first circumstance encompassing persons who hâve a “substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions” because it did not set “sufficiently 'clear and objective standards.’ ”

under the influence of passion, préjudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and

“(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or air-

craft hijacking, the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in section 27.2534.1 (b), and

“(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or

disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the défendant.” § 27-2537 (Supp. 1975). If the court affirms a death sentence, it is required to include in its decision reference to similar cases that it has taken into considération. § 27-2537 (e) (Supp. 1975).10

A transcript and complété record of the trial, as well as a separate report by the trial judge, are transmitted to the court for its use in reviewing the sentence. § 27-2537 (a) (Supp. 1975). The report is in the form of a 6^-page questionnaire, designed to elicit information about the défendant, the crime, and the circumstances of the trial. It requires the trial judge to characterize the trial in several ways designed to test for arbitrariness and disproportionality of sentence. Included in the report are responses to detailed questions concerning the quality of the defendant’s représentation, whether race played a rôle in the trial, and, whether, in the trial court’s judgment, there was any doubt about

III

We address initially the basic contention that the punishment of death for the crime of murder is, under ail circumstances, “cruel and unusual” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. In Part IV of this opinion, we will consider the sentence of death imposed under the Georgia statutes at issue in this case.

The Court on a number of occasions has both assumed and asserted the constitutionality of capital punishment. In several cases that assumption provided a necessary foundation for the decision, as the Court was asked to décidé whether a particular method of carrying out a capital sentence would be allowed to stand under the Eighth Amendment.12 But until Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the Court never confronted squarely the fundamental claim that the punishment of death always, regardless of the enormity of the offense or the procedure followed in imposing the sentence, is cruel and

11 See Ga. Const., Art. 5, §1, T12, Ga. Code Ann. §2-3011 (1973); Ga. Code Ann. §§77-501, 77-511, 77-513 (1973 and Supp. 1975) (Board of Pardons and Paroles is authorized to commute sentence of death except in cases where Govemor refuses to suspend that sentence).

A

The history of the prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishment already has been reviewed at length.16 The phrase first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which was drafted by Parliament at the accession of William and Mary. See Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 852-853 (1969). The English version appears to hâve been directed against punishments unauthorized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, as well as those disproportionate to the offense involved. Id., at 860. The

13 408 U. S., at 375 (Bur ge r , C. J., dissenting) ; id., at 405 (Bla ck mu n , J., dissenting) ; id., at 414 (Pow el l , J., dissenting) ; id., at 465 (Reh nq ui st , J., dissenting).

14 Id., at 257 (Bre nn an , J., concurring) ; id., at 314 (Mar sha ll , J., concurring).

15 Id., at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring) ; id., at 306 (Stew art , J., concurring); id., at 310 (Whi te , J., concurring).

Since five Justices wrote separately in support of the judgments in Furman, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds—Mr . Just ice Ste wa rt and Mr . Just ic e Whi te . See n. 36, infra.

In the earliest cases raising Eighth Amendment claims, the Court focused on particular methods of execution to détermine whether they were too cruel to pass constitutional muster. The constitutionality of the sentence of death itself was not at issue, and the criterion used to evaluate the mode of execution was its similarity to “torture” and other “barbarous” methods. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 136 (1879) (“[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and ail others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment . . .”) ; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death . . .”). See also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 464 (1947) (second attempt at electrocution found not to violate

Eighth Amendment, since failure of initial execution attempt was “an unforeseeable accident” and “[t]here [was] no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution”).

But the Court has not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to “barbarous” methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th century. Instead, the Amendment has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner. The Court early recognized that “a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.” Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 ( 1910). Thus the Clause forbidding “cruel and unusual” punishments “is not fastened to the obsolète but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” Id., at 378. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 429-430 (Powell , J., dissenting) ; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1958) (plurality opinion).

In Weems the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Philippine punishment of cadena temporal for the crime of falsifying an official document. That punishment included imprisonment for at least 12 years and one day, in chains, at hard and painful labor ; the loss of many basic civil rights; and subjection to lifetime surveillance. Although the Court acknowledged the possibility that “the cruelty of pain” may be présent in the challenged punishment, 217 U. S., at 366, it did not rely on that factor, for it rejected the proposition that the Eighth Amendment reaches only punishments that are “inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like.” Id., at 368. Rather, the Court focused on the lack of proportion between the crime and the offense :

“Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who hâve formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice

of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.” Id., at 366-367.18 Later, in Trop v. Dulles, supra, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the punishment of denationalization imposed upon a soldier who escaped from an Army stockade and became a deserter for one day. Although the concept of proportionality was not the basis of the holding, the plurality observed in dicta that “[f]ines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime.” 356 U. S., at 100.

The substantive limits imposed by the Eighth Amendment on what can be made criminal and punished were discussed in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). The Court found unconstitutional a state statute that made the status of being addicted to a narcotic drug a criminal offense. It held, in effect, that it is “cruel and unusual” to impose any punishment at ail for the mere status of addiction. The cruelty in the abstract of the actual sentence imposed was irrelevant: “Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.” Id., at 667. Most recently, in Furman v. Georgia, supra, three Justices in separate concurring opinions found the Eighth Amendment applicable to procedures employed to select convicted défendants for the sentence of death.

It is clear from the foregoing precedents that the

But our cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord with “the dignity of man,” which is the “basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.” Trop n . Dulles, supra, at 100 (plurality opinion). This means, at least, that the punishment not be “excessive.” When a form of punishment in the abstract (in this case, whether capital punishment may ever be imposed as a sanction for murder) rather than in the particular (the propriety of death as a penalty to be applied to a spécifie défendant for a spé- cifie crime) is under considération, the inquiry into “excessiveness” has two aspects. First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 392-393 (Bur - ger , C. J., dissenting). See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S., at 136; Weems v. United States, supra, at 381. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 100 (plurality opinion) (dictum) ; Weems v. United States, supra, at 367.

B

Of course, the requirements of the Eighth Amendment must be applied with an awareness of the limited rôle to be played by the courts. This does not mean that judges hâve no rôle to play, for the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of legislative power.

“Judicial review, by définition, often involves a

conflict between judicial and legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires. In this respect, Eighth Amendment cases corne to us in no different posture. It seems conceded by ail that the Amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the Amendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 313-314 (White , J., concurring). See also id., at 433 (Powell , J., dissenting) ,19

But, while we hâve an obligation to insure that con-

“Courts are not représentative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a démocratie society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, économie and social pressures.” Dennis N. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of judgment).20

Therefore, in assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected législature against the constitutional measure, we présumé its validity. We may not require the législature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the représentatives of the people.

This is true in part because the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. “ [I] n a démocratie society législatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.”

20 See also Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 411 (Bla ck mun , J.,

C

In the discussion to this point we hâve sought to iden-

tify the principles and considérations that guide a court in addressing an Eighth Amendment claim. We now consider specifically whether the sentence of death for the crime of murder is a per se violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. We note first that history and precedent strongly support a négative answer to this question.

The imposition of the death penalty for the crime of

It is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers. At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a common sanction in every State. Indeed, the First Congress of the United States enacted législation providing death as the penalty for specified crimes. C. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). The Fifth Amendment, adopted at the same time as the Eighth, contemplated the continued existence of the capital sanction by imposing certain limits on the prosecution of capital cases:

“No person shall be held to answer for a eapital,

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... P And the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted over threequarters of a century later, similarly contemplâtes the existence of the capital sanction in providing that no State shall deprive any person of “life, liberty, or property” without due process of law.

For nearly two centuries, this Court, repeatedly and

Opinion of Ste war t , Pow ell , and Ste ve ns , JJ. 428 U. S.

often expréssly, has recognized that capital punishment is not invalid per se. In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S., at 134—135, where the Court found no constitutional violation in inflicting death by public shooting, it said:

“Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by

the Constitution, but the authorities referred to are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included in that category, within the meaning of the eighth amendment.” Rejecting the contention that death by electrocution was “cruel and unusual,” the Court in In re Kemmler, supra, at 447, reiterated:

“[T]he punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.” Again, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S., at 464, the Court remarked: “The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inhérent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.” And in Trop N. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 99, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, for himself and three other Justices, wrote:

Four years ago, the petitioners in Furman and its companion cases predicated their argument primarily upon the asserted proposition that standards of decency had evolved to the point where capital punishment no longer could be tolerated. The petitioners in those cases said, in effect, that the evolutionary process had corne to an end, and that standards of decency required that the Eighth Amendment be construed finally as prohibiting capital punishment for any crime regardless of its depravity and impact on society. This view was accepted by two Justices.21 Three other Justices were unwilling to go so far; focusing on the procedures by which convicted défendants were selected for the death penalty rather than on the actual punishment inflicted, they joined in the conclusion that the statutes before the Court were constitutionally invalid.22

The petitioners in the capital cases before the Court today renew the “standards of decency” argument, but developments during the four years since Furman hâve undercut substantially the assumptions upon which their argument rested. Despite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, over the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now évident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.

The most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The législatures of at least 35 States23 hâve enacted new statutes that provide for the

21 See concurring opinions of Mr . Jus ti ce Bren na n and Mr . Just ic e Mar sha ll , 408 U. S., at 257 and 314.

22 See concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr . Just ic e Stew art , and Mr . Just ic e Whi te , id., at 240, 306, and 310.

Laws 1974, c. 52, §4; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 53a-25, 53a-35 (b), 53a-46a, 53a-54b (1975); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4209 (Supp. 1975); Fia. Stat. Ann. §§782.04, 921.141 (Supp. 1975-1976); Ga. Code Ann. §§26-3102, 27-2528, 27-2534.1, 27-2537 (Supp. 1975); Idaho Code §18-4004 (Supp. 1975); 111. Ann. Stat. c. 38, §§9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-1A (Supp. 1976-1977); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-4-1 (1975) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020 (1975) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:30 (Supp. 1976); Md. Ann. Code, art. 27, §413 (Supp. 1975); Miss. Code Ann. §§97-3-19, 97-3-21, 97-25-55, 99-17-20 (Supp. 1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. §559.009, 559.005 (Supp. 1976) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-105 (Spec. Crim. Code Supp. 1976) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-401, 29-2521 to 29-2523 (1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. §200.030 (1973); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:1 (1974); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-2 (Supp. 1975); N. Y. Penal Law §60.06 (1975); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2929.02-2929.04 (1975); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.1-701.3 (Supp. 1975-1976) ; Pa. Laws 1974, Act. No. 46; R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1975); S. C. Code Ann. § 16-52 (Supp. 1975) ; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406 (1975); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (a) (1974); Utah Code Ann. §§76-3-206, 76-3-207, 76-5-202 (Supp. 1975); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-31 (1976); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.- 32.045, 9A.32.046 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6-54 (Supp. 1975).

In the only statewide referendum occurring since Furman and brought to our attention, the people of California adopted a constitutional amendment that authorized capital punishment, in effect negating a prior ruling by the Suprême Court of California in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P. 2d 880, cert. denied, 406 U. S. 958 (1972), that the death penalty violated the California Constitution.25

The jury also is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 439-440 (Powell , J., dissenting). See generally Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1 (1966). The Court has said that “one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making ... a sélection [between life imprisonment and death for a défendant convicted in a capital case] is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal System.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 519 n. 15 (1968). It may be true that evolving standards hâve influenced juries in

25 In 1968, the people of Massachusetts were asked “Shall the

As we hâve seen, however, the Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society. The Court also must ask whether it comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 100 (plurality opinion). Although we cannot “invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe penalties adéquate to serve the ends of

26 The number of prisoners who received death sentences in the years from 1961 to 1972 varied from a high of 140 in 1961 to a low of 75 in 1972, with wide fluctuations in the intervening years: 103 in 1962; 93 in 1963; 106 in 1964; 86 in 1965; 118 in 1966; 85 in 1967; 102 in 1968; 97 in 1969; 127 in 1970; and 104 in 1971. Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin, Capital Punishment 1971-1972, p. 20 (Dec. 1974). It has been estimated that before Furman less than 20% of those convicted of murder were sentenced to death in those States that authorized capital punishment. See Woodson v. North Carolina, post, at 295-296, n. 31.

The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: rétribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.28

In part, capital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.29 This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.

“The instinct for rétribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.” Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 308 (Stewart , J., concurring). “Rétribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,” Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248 (1949), but neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men.

Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential offenders hâve occasioned a great deal of debate.31 The results

30 Lord Justice Denning, Master of the Rolls of the Court of Appeal in England, spoke to this effect before the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment: “Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is. essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the révulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or préventive and nothing else.... The truth is that some crimes are so outrageons that society insists on adéquate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Dec. 1, 1949, p. 207 (1950).

A contemporary writer has noted more recently that opposition to capital punishment “has much more appeal when the discussion is merely academie than when the community is confronted with a crime, or a sériés of crimes, so gross, so heinous, so cold-blooded that anything short of death seems an inadéquate response.” Raspberry, Death Sentence, The Washington Post, Mar. 12, 1976, p. A27, cols. 5-6.

“[A]fter ail possible inquiry, including the probing of ail possible methods of inquiry, we do not know, and for systematic and easily visible reasons cannot know, what the truth about this ‘deterrent’ effect may be ....

“The inescapable flaw is . . . that social conditions

in any state are not constant through time, and that social conditions are not the same in any two States. If an effect were observed (and the observed effeçts, one way or another, are not large) then one could not at ail tell whether any of this effect is attributable to the presence or absence of capital punishment. A ‘scientific’—that is to say, a soundly based—conclusion is simply impossible, and no methodological path out of this tangle suggests itself.” C. Black, Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake 25-26 (1974).

Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater dé- terrent than lesser penalties,32 there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view. We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a signifi-

Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 397 (June 1975) ; Hook, The Death Sentence, in The Death Penalty in America 146 (H. Bedau ed. 1967) ; T. Sellin, The Death Penalty, A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute (1959).

The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the législatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts. Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 403-405 (Burge r , C. J., dissenting). Indeed, many of the posVFurman statutes reflect just such a responsible effort to define those crimes and those criminals for which capital punishment is most probably an effective deterrent.

In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Législature that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong. Considérations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a législature

33 Other types of calculated murders, apparently occurring with increasing frequency, include the use of bombs or other means of indiscriminate killings, the extortion murder of hostages or kidnap victims, and the execution-style killing of witnesses to a crime.

Finally, we must consider whether the punishment of death is disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed. There is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 286-291 (Brennan , J., concurring); id., at 306 (Stew art , J., concurring). When a defendant’s life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 71 (1932) ; Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in resuit). But we are concerned here only with the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of murder, and when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender,35 we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes.

We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it.

IV

We now consider whether Georgia may impose the

death penalty on the petitioner in this case.

35 We do not address here the question whether the taking of the

criminal’s life is a proportionate sanction where no victim has been deprived of life—for example, when capital punishment is imposed for râpe, kidnaping, or armed robbery that does not resuit in the death of any human being.

A

While Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death penalty per se violâtes the Constitution^ ban on cruel and unusual punishments, it did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our System of criminal justice. Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Mr . Just ice White concluded that “the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” 408 U. S., at 313 (concurring). Indeed, the death sentences examined by the Court in Furman were “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of ail the people convicted of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal Systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.” Id., at 309-310 (Stewart , J., concurring).36

Furman mandates that where discrétion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the détermination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discrétion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.

It is certainly not a novel proposition that discrétion in the area of sentencing be exercised in an informed manner. We hâve long recognized that “[f]or the détermination of sentences, justice generally requires . . . that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.” Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). See also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U. S. 576, 585 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S., at 247.37 Otherwise, “the System cannot function in a consistent and a rational manner.” American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 4.1 (a), Commentary, p. 201 (App. Draft 1968). See also President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 144 (1967); ALI, Model Penal Code § 7.07, Comment 1, pp. 52-53 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).38

37 The Fédéral Rules of Criminal Procedure require as a matter of course that a presentence report containing information about a defendant’s background be prepared for use by the sentencing judge. Rule 32 (c). The importance of obtaining accurate sentencing information is underscored by the Rule’s direction to the sentencing court to “afford the défendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment [on the report] and, at the discrétion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the presentence report.” Rule 32 (c)(3)(A).

38 Indeed, we hold elsewhere today that in capital cases it is con-

stitutionally required that the sentencing authority hâve information

The cited studies assumed that the trial judge would be the sentencing authority. If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information about a défendant and the crime he committed in order to be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned détermination of whether a défendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before hâve made a sentencing decision.

Jury sentencing has been considered désirable in capital cases in order “to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal System—a link without which the détermination of punishment could hardly reflect ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ ”39 But it créâtes spécial problems. Much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may hâve no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely préjudiciai to a fair détermination of that question.40 This problem, however, is scarcely insurmountable. Those who hâve studied the question suggest that a bifurcated procedure—one in which the

sufficient to enable it to consider the character and individual circumstances of a défendant prior to imposition of a death sentence. See Woodson v. North Carolina, post, at 303-305.

39 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S., at 519 n. 15, quoting Trop v. Dudes, 356 U. S., at 101 (plurality opinion). See also Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Cmd. 8932, |571.

question of sentence is not considered until the détermination of guilt has been made—is the best answer. The drafters of the Model Penal Code concluded :

“[If a unitary proceeding is used] the détermination of the punishment must be based on less than ail the evidence that has a bearing on that issue, such for example as a previous criminal record of the accused, or evidence must be admitted on the ground that it is relevant to sentence, though it would be excluded as irrelevant or préjudiciai with respect to guilt or innocence alone. Trial lawyers understandably hâve little confidence in a solution that admits the evidence and trusts to an instruction to the jury that it should be considered only in determining the penalty and disregarded in assessing guilt.

. . The obvious solution . . . is to bifurcate the

But the provision of relevant information under fair procédural rules is not alone sufficient to guarantee that the information will be properly used in the imposition of punishment, especially if sentencing is performed by a jury. Since the members of a jury will hâve had little, if any, previous expérience in sentencing, they are unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the information they are given. See American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 1.1 (b), Commentary, pp. 46-47 (Approved Draft 1968) ; Présidents Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Task Force Report: The Courts 26 (1967). To the extent that this problem is inhérent in jury sentencing, it may not be totally correctible. It seems clear, however, that the problem will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the défendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision.

The idea that a jury should be given guidance in its

decisionmaking is also hardly a novel proposition. Juries are invariably given careful instructions on the law and how to apply it before they are authorized to décidé the merits of a lawsuit. It would be virtually unthinkable to follow any other course in a legal System that has traditionally operated by following prior precedents and fixed rules of law.42 See Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494, 498 (1931) ; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 51. When erroneous instructions are given, retrial is often required. It is quite simply a hallmark of our legal System that juries be carefully and adequately guided in their deliberations.

While some hâve suggested that standards to guide a capital jury’s sentencing deliberations are impossible to formulate,43 the fact is that such standards hâve been developed. When the drafters of the Model Penal Code faced this problem, they concluded “that it is within the realm of possibility to point to the main circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented in a concrète case.” ALI, Model Penal Code § 201.6, Comment 3, p. 71 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (emphasis in original).44 While such standards are by

42 But see Md. Const., Art. XV, §5: “In the trial of ail criminal cases, the jury shall be the Judges of the Law, as well as of fact....” See also Md. Code Ann., art. 27, § 593 (1971). Maryland judges, however, typically give advisory instructions on the law to the jury. See Md. Rule 756; Wilson v. State, 239 Md. 245, 210 A. 2d 824 (1965).

43 See McGautha v. California, 402 U. S., at 204-207; Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Cmd. 8932, T 595.

44 The Model Penal Code proposes the following standards : “(3) Aggravating Circumstances.

“(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.

“(b) The défendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.

“(c) At the tirne the murder was committed the défendant also committed another murder.

“(d) The défendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.

“(e) The murder was committed while the défendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, râpe or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.

“(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.

“ (g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. “(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. “(4) Mitigating Circumstances.

“(a) The défendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.

“(b) The murder was committed while the défendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

“(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.

“(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the défendant believed to provide a moral justification or exténuation for his conduct.

“(e) The défendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.

“(f) The défendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.

“(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the défendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a resuit of mental disease or defect or intoxication.

In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adéquate information and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a System that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information.

We do not intend to suggest that only the abovedescribed procedures would be permissible under Furman or that any sentencing System constructed along these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman,*46 for each distinct System must be examined on an individual basis. Rather, we hâve embarked upon this general exposition to make clear that it is possible to construct capital-sentencing Systems capable of meeting Furmari s* constitutional concerns.47

45 As Mr . Just ic e Bren na n noted in McGautha v. California, supra, at 285-286 (dissenting opinion) : “[E]ven if a State’s notion of wise capital sentencing policy is such that the policy cannot be implemented through a formula capable of mechanical application . . . there is no reason that it should not give some guidance to those called upon to render decision.”

46 A System could hâve standards so vague that they would fail ade-

quately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the resuit that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.

47 In McGautha v. California, supra, this Court held that the

B

We now turn to considération of the constitutionality of Georgia’s capital-sentencing procedures. In the wake of Furman, Georgia amended its capital punishment statute, but chose not to narrow the scope of its murder provisions. See Part II, supra. Thus, now as before Furman, in Georgia “[a] person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.” Ga. Code Ann., § 26-1101 (a) (1972). Ail persons convicted of murder “shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life.” § 26-1101 (c) (1972).

Georgia did act, however, to narrow the class of murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10

These procedures require the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence. No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman’s jury did: reach a finding of the defendant’s guilt and then, without guidance or direction, décidé whether he should live or die. Instead, the jury’s attention is directed to the spécifie circumstances of the crime: Was it committed in the course of another capital felony? Was it committed for money? Was it committed upon a peace officer or judicial officer? Was it committed in a particularly heinous way or in a manner that endangered the lives of many persons? In addition, the jury’s attention is focused on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime: Does he hâve a record of prior convictions for capital offenses? Are there any spécial facts about this défendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth, the extent of his coopération with the police, his emotional state at the time of the crime).49 As a resuit, while

48 The text of the statute enumerating the varions aggravating

circumstances is set ont at n. 9, supra.

49 See Moore n . State, 233 Ga. 861, 865, 213 S. E. 2d 829, 832

(1975).

Opinion of Ste war t , Pow ell , and Stev en s , JJ. 428 U. S.

some jury discrétion still exists, “the discrétion to be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application.” Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S. E. 2d 612, 615 (1974).

As an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for automatic appeal of ail death sentences to the State’s Suprême Court. That court is required by statute to review each sentence of death and détermine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or préjudice, whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases. § 27-2537 (c) (Supp. 1975).

In short, Georgia’s new sentencing procedures require as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, spécifie jury findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the défendant. Moreover, to guard further against a situation comparable to that presented in Furman, the Suprême Court of Georgia compares each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated défendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate. On their face these procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman. No longer should there be “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” 408 U. S., at 313 (White , J., concurring).

The petitioner contends, however, that the changes in the Georgia sentencing procedures are only cosmetic, that the arbitrariness and capriciousness condemned by Furman continue to exist in Georgia—both in traditional practices that still remain and in the new sentencing procedures adopted in response to Furman.

First, the petitioner focuses on the opportunities for discretionary action that are inhérent in the Processing of any murder case under Georgia law. He notes that the state prosecutor has unfettered authority to select those persons whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital offense and to plea bargain with them. Further, at the trial the jury may choose to convict a défendant of a lesser included offense rather than find him guilty of a crime punishable by death, even if the evidence would support a capital verdict. And finally, a défendant who is convicted and sentenced to die may hâve his sentence commuted by the Governor of the State and the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles.

The existence of these discretionary stages is not déterminative of the issues before us. At each of these stages an actor in the criminal justice System makes a decision which may remove a défendant from considération as a candidate for the death penalty. Furman, in contrast, dealt with the decision to impose the death sentence on a spécifie individual who had been convicted of a capital offense. Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual défendant mercy violâtes the Constitution. Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the défendant.50

50 The petitioner’s argument is nothing more than a veiled contention that Furman indirectly outlawed capital punishment by placing totally unrealistic conditions on its use. In order to repair the alleged defects pointed to by the petitioner, it would be necessary to require that prosecuting authorities charge a capital offense whenever arguably there had been a capital murder and that they

The petitioner further contends that the capitalsentencing procedures adopted by Georgia in response to Furman do not eliminate the dangers of arbitrariness and caprice in jury sentencing that were held in Furman to be violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He daims that the statute is so broad and vague as to leave juries free to act as arbitrarily and capriciously as they wish in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. While there is no claim that the jury in this case relied upon a vague or overbroad provision to establish the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the petitioner looks to the sentencing System as a whole (as the Court did in Furman and we do today) and argues that it fails to reduce sufficiently the risk of arbitrary infliction of death sentences. Specifically, Gregg urges that the statutory aggravating circumstances are too broad and too vague, that the sentencing procedure allows for arbitrary grants of mercy, and that the scope of the evidence and argument that can be considered at the presentence hearing is too wide.

refuse to plea bargain with the défendant. If a jury refused to convict even though the evidence supported the charge, its verdict would hâve to be reversed and a verdict of guilty entered or a new trial ordered, since the discretionary act of jury nullification would not be permitted. Finally, acts of executive clemency would hâve to be prohibited. Such a System, of course, would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.

The petitioner attacks the seventh statutory aggravating circumstance, which authorizes imposition of the death penalty if the murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim,” contending that it is so broad that capital punishment could be imposed in any murder case.51 It is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Suprême Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction.52 In only one case has it upheld a jury’s decision to sentence a défendant to death when the only statutory aggravating circumstance found was that of the seventh, see McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S. E. 2d 577 (1974), and that homicide was a horrifying torture-murder.53

51 In light of the limited grant of certiorari, see supra, at 162, we review the “vagueness” and “overbreadth” of the statutory aggravating circumstances only to consider whether their imprécision renders this capital-sentencing System invalid under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it is incapable of imposing capital punishment other than by arbitrariness or caprice.

52 In the course of interpreting Florida’s new capital-sentencing statute, the Suprême Court of Florida has ruled that the phrase “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” means a “conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturons to the victim.” State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (1973). See Proffitt n . Florida, post, at 255-256.

53 Two other reported cases indicate that juries hâve found aggravating circumstances based on §27-2534.1 (b) (7). In both cases a separate statutory aggravating circumstance was also found, and the Suprême Court of Georgia did not explicitly rely on the finding of the seventh circumstance when it upheld the death sentence. See Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S. E. 2d 258 (1975) (State Suprême Court upheld finding that défendant committed two other capital félonies—kidnaping and armed robbery—in the course of

The petitioner also argues that two of the statutory aggravating circumstances are vague and therefore susceptible of widely differing interprétations, thus creating a substantial risk that the death penalty will be arbitrarily inflicted by Georgia juries.54 In light of the decisions of the Suprême Court of Georgia we must disagree. First, the petitioner attacks that part of § 27-2534.1 (b) (1) that authorizes a jury to consider whether a défendant has a “substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.” The Suprême Court of Georgia, however, has demonstrated a concern that the new sentencing procedures provide guidance to juries. It held this provision to be impermissibly vague in Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 540, 224 S. E. 2d 386, 391 (1976), because it did not provide the jury with “sufficiently ‘clear and objective standards.’ ” Second, the petitioner points to § 27-2534.1 (b) (3) which speaks of creating a “great risk of death to more than one person.” While such a phrase might be susceptible of an overly broad interprétation, the Suprême Court of Georgia has not so construed it. The only case in which the court upheld a conviction in reliance on this aggravating circumstance involved a man who stood up in a church and fired a gun indiscriminately into the audience. See

the murder, § 27-2534.1 (b) (2) ; jury also found that the murder was committed for money, §27-2534.1 (b) (4), and that a great risk of death to bystanders was created, § 27-2534.1 (b) (3)) ; Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280, 210 S. E. 2d 810 (1974) (found to hâve committed a capital felony—armed robbery—in the course of the murder, §27-2534.1 (b) (2)).

54 The petitioner also attacks § 25-2534.1 (b) (7) as vague. As

The petitioner next argues that the requirements of Furman are not met here because the jury has the power to décliné to impose the death penalty even if it finds that one or more statutory aggravating circumstances are présent in the case. This contention misinterprets Furman. See supra, at 198-199. Moreover, it ignores the rôle of the Suprême Court of Georgia which reviews each death sentence to détermine whether it is proportional to other sentences imposed for similar crimes. Since the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the penalty, the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on défendants who were sentenced under a System that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice.

The petitioner objects, finally, to the wide scope of evidence and argument allowed at presentence hearings. We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open and far-ranging argument. See, e. g., Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644, 220 S. E. 2d 922 (1975). So long as the

Finally, the Georgia statute has an additional provision designed to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously selected group of convicted défendants. The new sentencing procedures require that the State Suprême Court review every death sentence to détermine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion, préjudice, or any other arbitrary factor, whether the evidence supports the findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the défendant.” § 27-2537 (c) (3) (Supp. 1975).56 In per-

56 The court is required to specify in its opinion the similar cases which it took into considération. § 27-2537 (e) (Supp. 1975). Spécial provision is made for staff to enable the court to compile data relevant to its considération of the sentence’s validity. §§ 27-2537 (f)-(h) (Supp. 1975). See generally supra, at 166-168.

It is apparent that the Suprême Court of Georgia has taken its review.responsibilities seriously. In Coley, it held that “[t]he prior cases indicate that the past practice among juries faced with similar factual situations and like aggravating circumstances has been to impose only the sentence of life imprisonment for the offense of râpe, rather than death.” 231 Ga., at 835, 204 S. E. 2d, at 617. It thereupon reduced Coley’s sentence from death to life imprisonment. Similarly, although armed robbery is a capital offense under Georgia law, § 26-1902 (1972), the Georgia court concluded that the death sentences imposed in this case for that crime were “unusual in that they are rarely imposed for [armed robbery]. Thus, under the test provided by statute, . . . they must be considered to be excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases.” 233

The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing System serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. In particular, the proportionality review substantially éliminâtes the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time cornes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no défendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death.

V

For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we hold that the statutory System under which Gregg was sentenced to death does not violate the Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the Georgia Suprême Court is aflirmed.

Mr . Justi ce White , with whom The Chief Justic e and Mr . Justic e Rehnquis t join, concurring in the judgment.

In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), this Court held the death penalty as then administered in Georgia to be unconstitutional. That same year the Georgia Législature enacted a new statutory scheme under which the death penalty may be imposed for several offenses, including murder. The issue in this case is whether the death penalty imposed for murder on petitioner Gregg under the new Georgia statutory scheme may constitutionally be carried out. I agréé that it may.

I

“(1) The offense of murder, râpe, armed robbery,

of another human being. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow créature, which is manifested by extemal circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considérable provocation appears, and where ail the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

“(b) A person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice.

or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person

7^"ed WithOUt “ iUry °r When the iUdge accepts a pIea

Georgia Laws, 1973, Act No. 74, p. 162, provides-

,of “JfeIony cases heard b-v a »d

+ f and prOper Charge from the court> the jury

“(2) The offense of murder, râpe, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.

“(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

“(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.

“(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official duty.

“(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employée of another person.

“(7) The offense of murder, râpe, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.

“(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employée or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.

“(9) The offense of murder was committed by a

person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.

“(10) The murder was committed for the purpose

of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.” § 27-2534.1 (b) (Supp. 1975). Having found an aggravating circumstance, however, the jury is not required to impose the death penalty. Instead, it is merely authorized to impose it after considering evidence of “any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the [enumerated] statutory aggravating circumstances . . . .” § 27-2534.1 (b) (Supp. 1975). Unless the jury unanimously détermines that the death penalty should be imposed, the défendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment. In the event that the jury does impose the death penalty, it must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance which it found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.

“(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed

under the influence of passion, préjudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and

“(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or air-

craft hijacking, the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in section 27-2534.1 (b), and

“(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive

or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the défendant. . . In order that information regarding “similar cases” may be before the court, the post of Assistant to the Suprême Court was created. The Assistant must “accumulate the records of ail capital felony cases in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1970, or such earlier date as the court may deem appropriate.” § 27-2537 (f).3 The court is required to include in its decision a reference to “those similar cases which it took into considération.” § 27-2537 (e).

II

Petitioner Troy Gregg and a 16-year-old companion, Floyd Allen, were hitchhiking from Florida to Asheville, N. C., on November 21, 1973. They were picked up in an automobile driven by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore, both of whom were drunk. The car broke down and Simmons purchased a new one—a 1960 Pontiac—using

On November 24, 1973, at 3 p. m., on the basis of information supplied by the hitchhiker, petitioner and Allen were arrested in Asheville, N. C. They were then in possession of the car which Simmons had purchased; petitioner was in possession of the gun which had killed Simmons and Moore and $107 which had been taken from them; and in the motel room in which petitioner was staying was a new stéréo and a car stéréo player.

At about 11 p. m., after the Gwinnett County police had arrived, petitioner made a statement to them admitting that he had killed Moore and Simmons, but asserting that he had killed them in self-defense and in defense of Allen. He also admitted robbing them of $400 and taking their car. A few moments later petitioner was asked why he had shot Moore and Simmons and responded: “By God, I wanted them dead.”

When Allen had finished telling this story, one of the officers asked petitioner if this was the way it had happened. Petitioner hung his head and said that it was. The officer then said: “You mean you shot these men down in cold blooded murder just to rob them,” and petitioner said yes. The officer then asked him why and petitioner said he did not know. Petitioner was indicted in two counts for murder and in two counts for robbery.

At trial, petitioner’s defense was that he had killed in self-defense. He testified in his own behalf and told a version of the events similar to that which he had originally told to the Gwinnett County police. On crossexamination, he was confronted with a letter to Allen recounting a version of the events similar to that to which he had just testified and instructing Allen to memorize and burn the letter. Petitioner conceded writing the version of the events, but denied writing the portion of the letter which instructed Allen to memorize and burn it. In rebuttal, the State called a handwriting expert who testified that the entire letter was written by the same person.

The jury was instructed on the éléments of murder 4 and robbery. The trial judge gave an instruction on self-defense, but refused to submit the lesser included

4 The court said: “And, I charge you that our law provides, in connection with the offense of murder the following. A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied causes the death of another human being.

“Express malice is that deliberate intention, unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow créature which is manifested by external circumstances, capable of proof.

“Malice shall be implied where no considérable provocation appears and where ail of the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

“Section B of this Code Section, our law provides that a person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.

“Now, then, I charge you that if you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the défendant did commit the homicide in the two counts alleged in this indictment, at the time he was engaged in the commission of some other felony, you would be authorized to find him guilty of murder.

“In this connection, I charge you that in order for a homicide to hâve been done in the perpétration of a felony, there must be some connection between the felony and the homicide. The homicide must hâve been done in pursuance of the unlawful act not collateral to it. It is not enough that the homicide occurred soon or presently after the felony was attempted or committed, there must be such a legal relationship between the homicide and the felony that you find that the homicide occurred by reason of and a part of the felony or that it occurred before the felony was at an end, so that the felony had a legal relationship to the homicide and was concurrent with it in part at least, and a part of it in an actual and material sense. A homicide is committed in the perpétration of a felony when it is committed by the accused while he is engaged in the performance of any act required for the full execution of such felony.

“I charge you that if you find and believe beyond a reasonable

No new evidence was presented at the sentencing proceeding. However, the prosecutor and the attorney for petitioner each made arguments to the jury on the issue of punishment. The prosecutor emphasized the strength of the case against petitioner and the fact that he had murdered in order to eliminate the witnesses to the robbery. The defense attorney emphasized the possibility that a mistake had been made and that petitioner was not guilty. The trial judge instructed the jury on

the défendant while he, the said accused was in the commission of a felony as I hâve just given you in this charge, you would be authorized to convict the défendant of murder.

“And this you would be authorized to do whether the défendant intended to kill the deceased or not. A homicide, although unintended, if committed by the accused at the time he is engaged in the commission of some other felony constitutes murder.

“In order for a killing to hâve been done in perpétration or attempted perpétration of a felony, or of a particular felony, there must be some connection as I previously charged you between the felony and the homicide.

“Before you would be authorized to find the défendant guilty of the offense of murder, you must find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt, that the défendant did, with malice aforethought either express or implied cause the deaths of [Simmons or Moore] or you must find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the défendant, while in the commission of a felony caused the death of these two victims just named.

“Now, as to counts one and three, wherein the défendant is charged with the murders of—has been found guilty of the murders of [Simmons and Moore], the following aggravating circumstances are some that you can consider, as I say, you must find that these existed beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty can be imposed. “One—That the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of two other capital félonies, to-wit the armed robbery of [Simmons and Moore]. “Two—That the offender committed the offense of murder for the purpose of receiving money and the automobile described in the indictment. “Three—The offense of murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman, in that they involved the depravity of mind of the défendant. “Now, so far as the counts two and four, that is the counts of armed robbery, of which you hâve found the défendant guilty, then you may find— inquire into these aggravating circumstances. “That the offense of armed robbery was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of two capital félonies, to-wit the murders of [Simmons and Moore] or that the offender committed the offense of armed robbery for the purpose of receiving money and the automobile set forth in the indictment, or three, that the offense of armed robbery was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman in that they involved the depravity of the mind of the défendant.

“Now, if you find that there was one or more of these aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, then and I refer to each individual count, then you would be authorized to consider imposing the sentence of death. “If you do not find that one of these aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, in either of these counts, then you would not be authorized to consider the penalty of death. In that event, the sentence as to counts one and three, those are the counts wherein the défendant was found guilty of murder, the sentence could be imprisonment for life.” Tr. 476-477. The jury returned the death penalty on ail four counts finding ail the aggravating circumstances submitted to it, except that it did not find the crimes to hâve been “outrageously or wantonly vile,” etc.

On appeal the Georgia Suprême Court affirmed the death sentences on the murder counts and vacated the death sentences on the robbery counts. 233 Ga. 117, 210 S. E. 2d 659 (1974). It concluded that the murder sentences were not imposed under the influence of passion, préjudice, or any other arbitrary factor; that the evidence supported the finding of a statutory aggravating factor with respect to the murders; and, citing several cases in which the death penalty had been imposed previously for murders of persons who had witnessed a robbery, held:

“After considering both the crimes and the défendant and after comparing the evidence and the sentences in this case with those of previous murder cases, we are also of the opinion that these two sentences of death are not excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases

which are hereto attached.” 5 Id., at 127, 210 S. E. 2d, at 667.

However, it held with respect to the robbery sentences:

“Although there is no indication that these two

5 In a subsequently decided robbery-murder case, the Georgia Suprême Court had the following to say about the same “similar cases” referred to in this case:

“We hâve compared the evidence and sentence in this case with other similar cases and conclude the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in those cases. Those similar cases we considered in reviewing the case are: Lingo v. State, 226 Ga. 496 (175 SE2d 657), Johnson v. State, 226 Ga. 511 (175 SE2d 840), Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730 (182 SE2d 779), Watson v. State, 229 Ga. 787 (194 SE2d 407), Scott v. State, 230 Ga. 413 (197 SE2d 338), Kramer v. State, 230 Ga. 855 (199 SE2d 805), and Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117 (210 SE2d 659).

“In each of the comparison cases cited, the records show that the accused was found guilty of murder of the victim of the robbery or burglary committed in the course of such robbery or burglary. In each of those cases, the jury imposed the sentence of death. In Pass v. State, supra, the murder took place in the victim’s home, as occurred in the case under considération.

“We find that the sentence of death in this case is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the défendant. Code Ann. § 27-2537 (c) (3). Notwithstanding the fact that there hâve been cases in which robbery victims were murdered and the juries imposed life sentences (see Appendix), the cited cases show that juries faced with similar factual situations hâve imposed death sentences. Compare Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 835, supra. Thus the sentence here was not ‘wantonly and freakishly imposed’ (see above).” Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 865-866, 213 S. E. 2d 829, 833 (1975). In another case decided after the instant case the Georgia Suprême Court stated:

“The cases reviewed included ail murder cases coming to this court since January 1, 1970. AU kidnapping cases were likewise reviewed. The comparison involved a search for similarities in addition to the similarity of offense charged and sentence imposed.

“AU of the murder cases selected for comparison involved mur-

sentences were imposed under the influence of passion, préjudice or any other arbitrary factor, the sentences imposed here are unusual in that they are rarely imposed for this offense. Thus, under the test provided by statute for comparison (Code Ann. §27-2537 (c), (3)), they must be considered to be excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases.” Ibid. Accordingly, the sentences on the robbery counts were vacated.

III

The threshold question in this case is whether the death penalty may be carried out for murder under the Georgia legislative scheme consistent with the decision in Furman N. Georgia, supra. In Furman, this Court held that as a resuit of giving the sentencer unguided discrétion to impose or not to impose the death penalty for murder, the penalty was being imposed discrimina-

ders wherein ail of the witnesses were killed or an attempt was made to kill ail of the witnesses, and kidnapping cases where the victim was killed or seriously injured.

“The cases indicate that, except in some spécial circumstance such as a juvénile or an accomplice driver of a get-away vehicle, where the murder was committed and trial held at a time when the death penalty statute was effective, juries generally throughout the state hâve imposed the death penalty. The death penalty has also been imposed when the kidnap victim has been mistreated or seriously injured. In this case the victim was murdered.

The argument is considerably overstated. The Georgia Législature has made an effort to identify those aggravating factors which it considers necessary and relevant to the question whether a défendant convicted of capital murder should be sentenced to death.10 The

6 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).

7 See id., at 306 (Ste wa rt , J., concurring). 8See id., at 310 (Whi te , J., concurring). 9 Petitioner also argues that the différences between murder—for which the death penalty may be imposed—and manslaughter—for which it may not be imposed—are so difficult to define and the jury’s ability to disobey the trial judge’s instructions so unfettered that juries will use the guilt-determination phase of a trial arbitrarily to convict some of a capital offense while convicting similarly situated individuals only of noncapital offenses. I believe this argument is enormously overstated. However, since the jury has discrétion not to impose the death penalty at the sentencing phase of a case in Georgia, the problem of offense définition and jury nullification loses virtually ail its significance in this case.

10 The factor relevant to this case is that the “murder . . . was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony.” The State in its brief refers to this type of murder as “witness-elimination” murder. Apparently the State of Georgia wishes to supply a substantial incentive to those engaged

Whi te , J., concurring in judgmént 428 U. S.

jury which imposes sentence is instructed on ail statutory aggravating factors which are supported by the evidence, and is told that it may not impose the death penalty unless it unanimously finds at least one of those factors to hâve been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Georgia Législature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury in the exercise of its discrétion, while at the same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too intangible to Write into a statute, and I cannot accept the naked assertion that the effort is bound to fail. As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed become more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are particularly serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate as they are in Georgia by reason of the aggravating-circumstance requirement, it becomes reasonable to expect that juries—even given discrétion not to impose the death penalty—will impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined. If they do, it can no longer be said that the penalty is being imposed wantonly and freakishly or so infrequently that it loses its usefulness as a sentencing de vice. There is, therefore, reason to expect that Georgia’s current System would escape the infirmities which invalidated its previous System under Furman. However, the Georgia Législature was not satisfied with a System which might, but also might not, turn out in practice to resuit in death sentences being imposed with reasonable consistency for certain serious murders. Instead, it gave the Georgia Suprême Court the power and the obligation to perform precisely the task which three Justices of this Court, whose opinions were necessary to the resuit, performed

In considering any given death sentence on appeal, the Georgia Suprême Court is to détermine whether the sentence imposed was consistent with the relevant statutes—i. e., whether there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance. Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2537 (c)(2) (Supp. 1975). However, it must do much more than détermine whether the penalty was lawfully imposed. It must go on to décidé—after reviewing the penalties imposed in “similar cases”— whether the penalty is “excessive or disproportionate” considering both the crime and the défendant. § 27-2537 (c)(3) (Supp. 1975). The new Assistant to the Suprême Court is to assist the court in collecting the records of “ail capital felony cases” 11 in the State of Georgia in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1970. § 27-2537 (f) (Supp. 1975). The court also has the obligation of determining whether the penalty was “imposed under the influence of passion, préjudice, or any other arbitrary factor.” § 27-2537 (c)(l) (Supp. 1975). The Georgia Suprême Court has interpreted the appellate review statute to require it to set aside the death sentence whenever juries across the State impose it only rarely for the type of crime in question; but to require it to aflirm death sentences whenever juries across the State generally impose it for the crime in question.

11 Petitioner states several times without citation that the only cases considered by the Georgia Suprême Court are those in which an appeal was taken either from a sentence of death or life imprisonment. This view finds no support in the language of the relevant statutes. Moore v. State, 233 Ga., at 863-864, 213 S. E. 2d, at 832..

Whit e , J., concurring in judgment 428 U. S.

Thus, in this case the Georgia Suprême Court concluded that the death penalty was so rarely imposed for the crime of robbery that it set aside the sentences on the robbery counts, and effectively foreclosed that penalty from being imposed for that crime in the future under the legislative scheme now in existence. Similarly, the Georgia Suprême Court has determined that juries impose the death sentence too rarely with respect to certain classes of râpe. Compare Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S. E. 2d 612 (1974), with Coker v. State, 234 Ga. 555, 216 S. E. 2d 782 (1975). However, it concluded that juries “generally throughout the state” hâve imposed the death penalty for those who murder witnesses to armed robberies. JarreU v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 425, 216 S. E. 2d 258, 270 ( 1975). Consequently, it aflirmed the sentences in this case on the murder counts. If the Georgia Suprême Court is correct with respect to this factual judgment, imposition of the death penalty in this and similar cases is consistent with Furman. Indeed, if the Georgia Suprême Court properly performs the task assigned to it under the Georgia statutes, death sentences imposed for discriminatory reasons or wantonly or freakishly for any given category of crime will be set aside. Petitioner has wholly failed to establish, and has not even attempted to establish, that the Georgia Suprême Court failed properly to perform its task in this case or that it is incapable of performing its task adequately in ail cases; and this Court should not assume that it did not do so.

Petitioner’s argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless fashion in deciding which cases to try as capital félonies is unsupported by any facts. Petitioner simply asserts that since prosecutors hâve the power not to charge capital félonies they will exercise that power in a standardless fashion. This is untenable. Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decision by factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts. Unless prosecutors are incompetent in their judgments, the standards by which they décidé whether to charge a capital felony will be the same as those by which the jury will décidé the questions of guilt and sentence. Thus défendants will escape the death penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the offense is not sufîiciently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently strong. This does not cause the System to be standardless any more than the jury’s decision to impose life imprisonment on a défendant whose crime is deemed insufficiently serious or its decision to acquit someone who is probably guilty but whose guilt is not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus the prosecutor’s charging decisions are unlikely to hâve removed from the sample of cases considered by the Georgia Suprême Court any which are truly “similar.” If the cases really were “similar” in relevant respects, it is unlikely that prosecutors would fail to prosecute them as capital cases; and I am unwilling to assume the contrary.

IV

For the reasons stated in dissent in Roberts v. Louisiana, post, at 350-356, neither can I agréé with the petitioner’s other basic argument that the death penalty, however imposed and for whatever crime, is cruel and unusual punishment.

I therefore concur in the judgment of affirmance.

Statement of The Chief Justice and Mr . Just ice Rehnqui st :

Mr . Justice Blackmun , concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 405-414 (1972) (Black mun , J., dissenting), and id., at 375 (Burger , C. J., dissenting) ; id., at 414 Powell , J., dissenting) ; id., at 465 (Rehnquist , J., dissenting).

Mr . Justice Brennan , dissenting.* The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 1 The opinions of Mr . Just ice Stewart , Mr . Justic e Powell , and Mr . Justice Stevens today hold that “evolving standards of decency” require focus not on the essence of the death penalty itself but primarily upon the procedures employed by the State to single out persons to suffer the penalty of death. Those opinions hold further that, so viewed, the Clause invalidâtes the mandatory infliction of the death penalty but not its infliction under sentencing procedures that Mr . Justice Stewart , Mr . Justice Powell , and Mr . Justice Stevens conclude adequately safeguard against the risk that the death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

“From the beginning of our Nation, the punishment of death has stirred acute public controversy. Although pragmatic arguments for and against the punishment hâve been frequently advanced, this longstanding and heated controversy cannot be explained solely as the resuit of différences over the practical wisdom of a particular government policy. At bottom, the battle has been waged on moral grounds. The country has debated whether a society for which the dignity of the individual is the suprême value can, without a fundamental inconsistency, follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members to death. In the United States, as in other nations of the western world, The struggle about this punishment has been one between ancient and deeply rooted beliefs in rétribution, atonement or vengeance on the one hand, and, on the other, beliefs in the personal value and dignity of the common man that were born of the démocratie movement of the eighteenth century, as well as beliefs in the scientific approach to an understanding of the motive forces of human conduct, which are the resuit of the growth of the sciences of behavior during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’ It is this essentially moral conflict that forms the backdrop for the past changes in and the présent operation of our System of imposing death as a punishment for crime.” Id., at 296.2

That continues to be my view. For the Clause forbidding cruel and unusual punishments under our con-

2 Quoting T. Sellin, The Death Penalty, A Report for the Model

This Court inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our Constitution, to say whether, when individuals condemned to death stand before our Bar, “moral concepts” require us to hold that the law has progressed to the point where we should déclaré that the punishment of death, like punishments on the rack, the screw, and the wheel, is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society.4 My opinion in Furman v. Georgia concluded that our civilization and the law had progressed to this point and that therefore the punishment of death, for whatever crime and under ail circumstances, is “cruel and unusual” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. I shall not again canvass the reasons that led to that conclusion. I emphasize only that foremost among the “moral concepts” recognized in our cases and inhérent in the Clause is the primary moral principle that the State, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings—a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity. A judicial determina-

3 Novak v. Beto, 453 F. 2d 661, 672 (CA5 1971) (Tuttle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I do not understand that the Court disagrees that “[i]n comparison to ail other punishments today . . . the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity.” Id., at 291. For three of my Brethren hold today that mandatory infliction of the death penalty constitutes the penalty cruel and unusual punishment. I perceive no principled basis for this limitation. Death for whatever crime and under ail circumstances “is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a déniai of the executed person’s humanity. . . . An executed person has indeed ‘lost the right to hâve rights.’ ” Id., at 290. Death is not only an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity, but it serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment; therefore the principle inhérent in the Clause that prohibits pointless infliction of excessive punishment when less severe punishment can adequately achieve the same purposes invalidâtes the punishment. Id., at 279.

The fatal constitutional infirmity in the punishment of death is that it treats “members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. [It is] thus inconsistent with the fondamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.” Id., at 273. As such it is a penalty that “subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the [Clause].”5 I therefore would hold,

I dissent from the judgments in No. 74—6257, Gregg N. Georgia, No. 75-5706, Proffitt v. Florida, and No. 75-5394, Jurek v. Texas, insofar as each upholds the death sentences challenged in those cases. I would set aside the death sentences imposed in those cases as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Mr . Justice Marsh all , dissenting.* In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) (concurring opinion), I set forth at some length my views on the basic issue presented to the Court in these cases. The death penalty, I concluded, is a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. That continues to be my view.

I hâve no intention of retracing the “long and tedious journey,” id., at 370, that led to my conclusion in Furman. My sole purposes here are to consider the suggestion that my conclusion in Furman has been undercut by developments since then, and briefly to evaluate the basis for my Brethren’s holding that the extinction of life is a permissible form of punishment under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

In Furman I concluded that the death penalty is constitutionally invalid for two reasons. First, the death penalty is excessive. Id., at 331-332; 342-359. And

6 A. Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine 5-6 (Fridtjof-Karia Pub. 1960).

Since the decision in Furman, the législatures of 35 States hâve enacted new statutes authorizing the imposition of the death sentence for certain crimes, and Congress has enacted a law providing the death penalty for air piracy resulting in death. 49 U. S. C. §§ 1472 (i), (n) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). I would be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that these developments hâve a significant bearing on a realistic assessment of the moral acceptability of the death penalty to the American people. But if the constitutionality of the death penalty turns, as I hâve urged, on the opinion of an informed citizenry, then even the enactment of new death statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive. In Furman, I observed that the American people are largely unaware of the information critical to a judgment on the morality of the death penalty, and concluded that if they were better informed they would consider it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable. 408 U. S., at 360-369. A recent study, conducted after the enactment of the po^-Furman statutes, has confirmed that the American people know little about the death penalty, and that the opinions of an informed public would differ significantly from those of a public unaware of the conséquences and effects of the death penalty.1

The two purposes that sustain the death penalty as nonexcessive in the Court’s view are general deterrence and rétribution. In Furman, I canvassed the relevant data on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 408 U. S., at 347-354.2 The state of knowledge at that point, after literally centuries of debate, was summarized as follows by a United Nations Cbmmittee:

“It is generally agreed between the retentionists and abolitionists, whatever their opinions about the validity of comparative studies of deterrence, that the data which now exist show no corrélation between the existence of capital punishment and lower rates of capital crime.”3 The available evidence, I concluded in Furman, was convincing that “capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society.” Id., at 353.

The Solicitor General in his amicus brief in these cases

2 See e. g., T. Sellin, The Death Penalty, A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute (1959).

The Ehrlich study focused on the relationship in the Nation as a whole between the homicide rate and “execution risk”—the fraction of persons convicted of murder who were actually executed. Comparing the différences in homicide rate and execution risk for the years 1933 to 1969, Ehrlich found that increases in execution risk were associated with increases in the homicide rate.5 But when he employed the statistical technique of multiple régression analysis to control for the influence of other variables posited to hâve an impact on the homicide rate,6 Ehrlich found a négative corrélation between changes in the homicide rate and changes in execution risk. His tentative conclusion was that for the period from 1933 to 1967 each additional execution in the United States might hâve saved eight lives.7

The methods and conclusions of the Ehrlich study

41. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment : A Question of Life and Death (Working Paper No. 18, National Bureau of Economie Research, Nov. 1973) ; Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 397 (June 1975).

5 Id., at 409. 6 The variables other than execution risk included probability of arrest, probability of conviction given arrest, national aggregate measures of the percentage of the population between âge 14 and 24, the unemployment rate, the labor force participation rate, and estimated per capita income.

The most compelling criticism of the Ehrlich study is

8 See Passell & Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View (unpublished Columbia University Discussion Paper 74-7509, Mar. 1975), reproduced in Brief for Petitioner App. E in Jurek v. Texas, O. T. 1975, No. 75-5844; Passell, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 61 (1975); Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin & Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 Yale L. J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s Research on Capital Punishment, 85 Yale L. J. 187 (1975); Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 Yale L. J. 359 (1976). See also Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 Yale L. J. 209 (1975); Ehrlich, Rejoinder, 85 Yale L. J. 368 (1976). In addition to the items discussed in text, criticism has been directed at the quality of Ehrlich’s data, his choice of explanatory variables, his failure to account for the mterdependence of those variables, and his assumptions as to the mathematical form of the relationship between the homicide rate and the explanatory variables.

The Ehrlich study, in short, is of little, if any, assistance in assessing the deterrent impact of the death penalty. Accord, Commonwealth v. O’Neal,---- Mass. —, ---- , 339 N. E. 2d 676, 684 (1975). The evidence I reviewed in *Furman*13 remains convincing, in my view, that “capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society.” 408 U. S., at 353. The justification for the death penalty must be found elsewhere.

The other principal purpose said to be served by the death penalty is rétribution.14 The notion that retribu-

10Bowers & Pierce, supra, n. 8, at 197-198. See also Passell & Taylor, supra, n. 8, at 2-66—2-68.

11 See Bowers & Pierce, supra, n. 8, at 197-198; Baldus & Cole, supra, n. 8, at 181, 183-185; Peck, supra, n. 8, at 366-367.

12 Passell, supra, n. 8. 13 See also Bailey, Murder and Capital Punishment : Some Further Evidence, 45 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 669 (1975); W. Bowers, Executions in America 121-163 (1974).

The concept of rétribution is a multifaceted one, and any discussion of its rôle in the criminal law must be undertaken with caution. On one level, it can be said that the notion of rétribution or réprobation is the basis of our insistence that only those who hâve broken the law be punished, and in this sense the notion is quite obviously central to a just System of criminal sanctions. But our récognition that rétribution plays a crucial rôle in determining who may be punished by no means requires approval of rétribution as a general justification for punishment.15 It is the question whether rétribution can provide a moral justification for punishment—in particular, capital punishment—that we must consider.

My Brothers Stewart , Powell , and Stevens offer the foliowing explanation of the rétributive justification for capital punishment:

“ ‘The instinct for rétribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed

mitting another crime. Surely life imprisonment and, if necessary, solitary confinement would fully accomplish this purpose. Accord, Commonwealth v. O’Neal, — Mass. —, —, 339 N. E. 2d 676, 685 (1975); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 651, 493 P. 2d 880, 896, cert. denied, 406 U. S. 958 (1972).

15 See, e. g., H. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 8-10, 71-83 (1968); H. Packer, Limits of the Criminal Sanction 38-39, 66 (1968).

by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve/ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.’ ” Ante, at 183, quoting from Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 308 (Stewar t , J., concurring). This statement is wholly inadéquate to justify the death penalty. As my Brother Brennan stated in Furman, “[t]here is no evidence whatever that utilization of imprisonment rather than death encourages private blood feuds and other disorders.” 408 U. S., at 303 (concurring opinion).16 It simply défiés belief to suggest that the death penalty is necessary to prevent the American people from taking the law into their own hands.

In a related vein, it may be suggested that the expression of moral outrage through the imposition of the death penalty serves to reinforce basic moral values— that it marks some crimes as particularly offensive and therefore to be avoided. The argument is akin to a deterrence argument, but differs in that it contemplâtes the individual’s shrinking from antisocial conduct, not because he fears punishment, but because he has been told in the strongest possible way that the conduct is wrong. This contention, like the previous one, provides no support for the death penalty. It is inconceivable that any individual concerned about conforming his conduct to what society says is “right” would fail to realize that murder is “wrong” if the penalty were simply life imprisonment.

The foregoing contentions—that society’s expression of moral outrage through the imposition of the death penalty pre-empts the citizenry from taking the law into its

16 See Commonwealth v. O’Neal, supra, at —, 339 N. E. 2d, at

There remains for considération, however, what might be terméd the purely rétributive justification for the death penalty—that the death penalty is appropriate, not because of its bénéficiai effect on society, but because the taking of the murderer’s life is itself morally good.17 Some of the language of the opinion of my Brothers Stewart , Powell , and Steve ns in No . 74-6257 appears positively to embrace this notion of rétribution for its own sake as a justification for capital punishment.18 They state:

“[T]he decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adéquate response may be the penalty of death.” Ante, at 184 (footnote omitted).

17 See Hart, supra, n. 15, at 72, 74-75, 234-235; Packer, supra, n. 15, at 37-39. 18 Mr . Just ice Whi te ’s view of rétribution as a justification for the death penalty is not altogether clear. “The widespread reenactment of the death penalty,” he States at one point, “answers any claims that life imprisonment is adéquate punishment to satisfy the need for réprobation or rétribution.” Roberts n . Louisiana, post, at 354. (Whit e , J„ dissenting). But Mr . Just ic e Whi te later states: “It will not do to denigrate these legislative judgments as some form of vestigial savagery or as purely rétributive in motivation; for they are solemn judgments, reasonably based, that imposition of the death penalty will save the lives of innocent persons.” Post, at 355.

Mars hal l , J., dissenting 428 U. S.

They then quote with approval from Lord Justice Denning’s remarks before the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment:

“ ‘The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adéquate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.’ ” Ante, at 184 n. 30.

The death penalty, unnecessary to promote the goal of deterrence or to further any legitimate notion of rétribution, is an excessive penalty forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment upholding the sentences of death imposed upon the petitioners in these cases.

19 See Commonwealth v. CNeal, supra, at ——, 339 N. E. 2d, at 687 ; People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d, at 651, 493 P. 2d, at 896.