United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 220 U.S. 257 (1911)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 220 U.S. 257 (1911)
Full caption
UNITED STATES v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Apr. 3, 1911
UNITED STATES v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
No. 536. Argued January 5, 1911.—Decided April 3, 1911.
The rule that the allowance of amendments to pleadings is discretionary with the trial court and not to be reviewed on appeal except in case of gross abuse does not apply where such discretion is controlled by this court and the refusal to allow an amendment defeats the evident purpose of this court in remanding the case.
Where the refusal of the Circuit Court to allow an amendment is in conflict with the opinion and mandate of this court there is an abuse of discretion which this court can and will correct on appeal, even if such abuse be the result of misconception of the opinion and of the scope of the mandate.
While the decision of this court in this and other commodities clause cases, 213 U. S. 366, expressly held that under the commodities clause stock ownership by a railroad company in a bona fide corporation, irrespective of the extent of such ownership, does not preclude the railroad company from transporting the commodities manufactured, produced or owned by such corporation, it is still open to the Government to question the right of the railroad company to transport commodities of a corporation in which the company owns stock and uses its power as a stockholder to obliterate all distinctions between the two corporations; and an amendment to the original bill in one of the commodities cases alleging such facts as show the absolute control by the defendant railroad company, through stock ownership, over the corporation whose commodities are being transported, is germane to the original bill and should have been allowed' by the trial court.
By the operation and effect of the commodities clause a duty has been cast upon an interstate carrier not to abuse its power as a stockholder of a corporation whose commodities it transports in interstate commerce by so commingling the affairs of that corporation with its own as to cause the two corporations to become one and inseparable.
vol. ccxx—17
Argument for Appellant. 220 U. S.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Wade H. Ellis, Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom The Attorney General and Mr. Edwin P. Grosvenor, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, were on the brief, for appellant:
The Government’s right to proceed in this case is not foreclosed by the previous decision of this court in 213 U. S. 366. The facts now sought to be shown by the amendment of the Government in the court below are not the same as those which were before this court on the former appeal.
The stipulation of counsel in the original case was that the submission of the case on bill and answer should in no wise prejudice the parties in any suit or proceeding thereafter instituted.
In the recent case of United States v. Reading Co., 183 Fed. Rep. 427, 461, 462, it has been found that the Lehigh Valley Coal Company is a mere department of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, and not an independent corporation.
The construction by this court of the commodities clause shows that it applies when the commodity has been manufactured, mined or produced by a carrier or under its authority and at the time of transportation the carrier has not in good faith dissociated itself from such commodity; when a carrier owns the commodity transported in whole or in part; and when a carrier at the time of transportation has an interest in the commodity, direct or indirect, but not including an interest represented only by the ownership of stock in a “separate,” “distinct” and “bona fide” corporation.
It follows that in the present case the railroad company, as shown by the proposed amendment of the bill, is violating the commodities clause in two of the three ways indicated above.
220 U. S. Argument for Appellant.
Without regard to stock ownership, the coal transported by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company was mined and produced “under its authority,” and the railroad company has not dissociated itself from such commodity. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197; Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 197 U. S. 244; N. Y.j N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 390. In other words, if the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company did not own a single share of the stock of the coal company in the present case it could not lawfully transport the coal, and certainly it cannot get that authority simply because it owns all the stock of the coal company.
The coal company is not a separate, distinct and bona fide corporation. In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. Rep. 252; In re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. Rep. 546; Interstate Telegraph Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 49.
It can make no difference in this case that the coal company was organized before the passage of the commodities clause and before the former decision of this court construing that act, for it is the effect of a relation between a railroad and a coal company, and not the motive, which constitutes a violation of the statute.
The fiction of a separate corporate entity will be disregarded whenever it is insisted upon as a protection to an illegal transaction. In re Rieger, Capnor and Aultmark, 157 Fed. Rep. 609; Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U. S. 293; Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelley, 160 U. S. 327; Gas Co. v. West, 50 Iowa, 16; Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139; Bennett v. Minott, 28 Oregon, 389; Morawetz on Corp., §§ 1, 227.
The court below erred in not allowing the Government to amend its bill of complaint; first, because it had no discretion in the matter; 3 Ency. Law & Prac. 579; Na-, tional Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 567, 568; and second,
Argument for Appellant. 220 U. S.
because if it had such discretion this was abused. House v. Mullen, 22 Wall. 42; Rio Grande Dam &c. Co. v. United States, 215 U. S. 266; Texas & Pacific Railway v. Interstate Transp. Co., 155 U. S. 585; Swan Land & Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S. 603; Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423; Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107.
There are important considerations of public policy which weigh against any construction of the commodities clause which would offer inducements to the railroads to organize subsidiary companies to deal in commodities in competition with other shippers. There is no reason for denying to railroads the right to invest their funds in the stock of other corporations, where such other corporations are separate and distinct from the carrier’s business. But where a railroad company organizes a subsidiary corporation not for the purpose of investing its funds but to make its profits out of the transportation of the commodity produced, the temptation of the carrier is to increase the rates of transportation to all so that no one can afford to deal in the article except the railroad which transports it. The consequences of confirming in the railroads such unlimited power are well stated in the English case of Attorney General v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 29 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 794, cited in the New Haven Case, 200 U. S. 393.
The interpretation of the commodities clause contended for by the Government in this case would make unnecessary an amendment by Congress forbidding railroads to transport, in interstate commerce, the product or property of corporations in which their only interest is the ownership of stock, for it would make vital and effective the act as it stands by so construing it as to forbid railroads to transport commodities of other corporations where such other corporations are not in fact separate, independent enterprises but are mere departments of the railroads. And this last was the real evil which the commodities clause was intended to remedy.
220 U. S. Argument for Appellee.
Mr. John G. Johnson, with whom Mr. J. F. Schaperkotter and Mr. Frank H. Platt were on the brief, for appellee:
The only question left in the case on its return to the Circuit Court was whether the defendant was violating the commodities clause by carrying the coal produced and owned by the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, whose capital stock was entirely owned by the defendant, and that of other coal companies in which the defendant had stock interests, entire or part, either majority or minority, respectively.
The complainant’s motion for leave to file an amended bill of complaint was rightly denied.
The general replication had been filed and not withdrawn. Irrespective of Equity Rule 29, with which the Government wholly failed to comply, no cause was shown for leave to file an amended bill other than that which appeared on the face of the proposed amendment itself. Nothing had occurred since the original bill was filed except that this court had held that the Government’s theory of the law was erroneous. There was no averment of after-discovered matter. The refusal of leave to amend the bill was discretionary, and is not reviewable. Michigan Central Ry. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 201; Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, 681; Bullitt Co. v. Washer, 130 U. S. 142, 145.
The complainant’s motion for a decree dismissing the bill of complaint without prejudice was rightly denied. Pullman’s Car Co. v. Transportation Co., 171 U. S. 138, 146; Stevens v. The Railroads, 4 Fed. Rep. 97, 105; Chicago &, Alton R. R. Co. v. Union Rolling Mill Co., 109 U. S. 702, 713; Connor v. Drake, 1 Ohio, 170.
A dismissal without prejudice would have seriously prejudiced the rights of the defendant. It was clearly within the discretion of the court to deny the motion for a dismissal without prejudice, which would have opened the
Argument for Appellee. 220 U. S.
door for the bringing of a new suit in which the complainant would have all of the advantage growing out of the admissions set forth in the answer. American Bell Telephone Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 666, 670.
It was clearly within the discretion of the court to refuse to deprive the defendant of this right by means of a dismissal without prejudice. Hershberger v. Blewett, 55 Fed. Rep. 170, 171; Flaherty v. McCormick, 14 N. E. Rep. 846, 850; Georgia Pine Turpentine Co. v. Bilfinger, 129 Fed. Rep. 131; Ebner v. Zimmerly, 118 Fed. Rep. 818.
The decision of the Circuit Court was in conformity with the opinion of this court.
The character of a coal company,—whether it be bona fide, or not, within the meaning of this court—cannot depend on the extent or proportion of the capital stock held by the railroad company. A railroad company owning three-quarters, or more than half, of the stock of a coal company controls its management through election as completely as it would by owning the entire capital stock. The fact of entire or majority ownership, is, therefore, not logically more relevant to the issue of bona fides than minority ownership, unless this court intended to hold that every majority holding constitutes mala fides. Obviously the decision of this court is that the question of bona fides shall not depend on stock holding.
The relationship between the defendant and the coal company has from its inception existed under the direct authority of law, both of the State of Pennsylvania and the Federal Government. As to the State of Pennsylvania, under whose laws the coal company was organized, it is alleged and conceded that such organization and such relationship were allowed and encouraged by the legislative policy of the State of Pennsylvania. As to the Federal laws, there is the direct interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act in the Chesapeake and Ohio
Case, 200 U. S. 361, 401, to the effect that the relationship was legal. And see Haddock and Coxe Cases, 4 I. C. C. Rep. 296, 535.
The relationship which the Government now seeks to have declared so lacking in good faith as to render the existence of the coal company a mere fiction, forms the basis of the very rights from which arose the grave and doubtful constitutional questions which this court found it unnecessary to decide. Upon the strength of the relationship existing between the defendant and the coal company millions of dollars have changed hands, pursuant to transactions whose good faith cannot be questioned.
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is one of what were known as the commodities cases previously decided and reported in United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366. The controversy now is but a sequel to that disposed of in the previous cases. To understand the question now for consideration it is essential to have in mind the contentions which arose for decision upon the previous appeal and the disposition which was made of them. We therefore refer to those subjects.
The United States proceeded, both by suits in equity and mandamus, against certain railroad companies, including the Lehigh Valley, to prohibit them from transporting coal in interstate commerce in violation of what were deemed to be the prohibitions of the fifth paragraph of the first section of the act to regulate commerce as amended on June 29, 1906, usually referred to as the commodities clause of the Hepburn Act. The clause is as follows:
“From and after May first, nineteen hundred and eight, it shall be unlawful for any railroad company to transport p. 264from any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, to any other State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or to any foreign country, any article or commodity, other than timber and the manufactured products thereof, manufactured, mined or produced by it, or under its authority, or which it may own in whole, or in part, or in which it may have any interest, direct or indirect, except such articles or commodities as may be necessary and intended for its use in the conduct of its business as a common carrier.” 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591.
In effect, the contention of the Government was that the clause in question prohibited railroad companies from moving in the channels of interstate commerce articles or commodities other than the articles excepted by the provision which had been manufactured, mined or produced by the companies or under their authority or which were at the time of the transportation owned by them or which had been previously owned by them in whole or in part or in which the companies then or previously had any interest, direct or indirect. The Government, moreover, insisted that these general propositions embraced the movement by the companies in interstate commerce of a commodity which had been manufactured, mined or produced by a corporation in which the transporting railroad company was a stockholder, irrespective of the extent of such stock ownership. The railroad companies in effect defended the suits upon the ground that the statute as construed by the Government was repugnant to the Constitution. Each of the cases was submitted upon bill and answer and petition and return to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held by three circuit judges under the Expediting Act of February 11, 1903. 32 Stat. 823, c. 544. The submission in each case was made as a result of a stipulation between counsel “that the submission on bill and answer and any averment or admission in the pleadings of either party p. 265shall in no wise prejudice the said parties in any other suit or proceeding heretofore or hereafter instituted, and shall be operative and take effect only with respect to the present suit and for the purpose thereof.”
Treating the commodities clause in question as having the significance attributed to it by the United States the court held it to be repugnant to the Constitution. Judgments and decrees were accordingly entered, denying the applications for mandamus and dismissing the bills of complaint. The reasons which led to this action were expounded in one opinion, made applicable to all the cases, the court briefly but comprehensively stating the facts in each case which were relied upon by the Government as bringing the defendant corporation within the clause as the Government construed it. The cases were then brought here.
As was done in the lower court, the cases here were all disposed of by one opinion, the facts in each case as summarized by the court below being stated. In deciding the cases it became necessary first to ascertain the meaning of the commodities clause. In performing this duty the conclusion was reached that the clause did not have the far-reaching significance attributed to it by the Government and which had been substantially adopted by the court below, but on the contrary had a much narrower meaning. Attention was directed to the fact that the statute disjunctively applied four generic prohibitions, that is, it forbade a railway company from transporting in interstate commerce articles or commodities, 1, which it had manufactured, mined or produced; 2, which have been so mined, manufactured or produced under its authority; 3, which it owns in whole or in part; and, 4, in which it has an interest, direct or indirect. All these prohibitions, however, were held to have but a common purpose, “that is, the dissociation of railroad companies prior to transportation from articles or commodities, whether the p. 266association resulted from manufacture, mining, production or ownership, or interest, direct or indirect.”
In coming to determine whether the Government was correct in its contention that these prohibitions operated to prevent a railroad company from transporting a product because it was owned by or had been mined, manufactured or produced by a corporation in which the railroad company was the owner of stock, irrespective of the amount of such stock ownership, it was expressly decided that the prohibitions of the statute were addressed only to a legal or equitable interest in the commodities to which the prohibitions referred, that they therefore did not prohibit a railroad company from transporting commodities mined, manufactured, produced or owned by a distinct corporation, merely because the railroad company was the owner of some or all of the stock in such corporation.
Summing up its review as to the true construction of the commodities clause, the court held (p. 415) that it prohibited “a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce from transporting in such commerce articles or commodities under the following circumstances and conditions: (a) When the article or commodity has been manufactured, mined or produced by a carrier or under its authority, and at the time of transportation the carrier has not in good faith before the act of transportation dissociated itself from such article or commodity; (6) When the carrier owns the article or commodity to be transported in whole or in part; (c) When the carrier at the time of transportation has an interest, direct or indirect, in a legal or equitable sense, in the article or commodity, not including, therefore, articles or commodities manufactured, mined or produced or owned, etc., by a bona fide corporation in which the railroad company is a stockholder.”
Thus construed, the clause was held to be within the
power of Congress to enact. As this conclusion rendered it necessary to reverse the action of the court below which had been exclusively predicated upon the unconstitutionality of the statute, the question arose as to what disposition should be made of the cases. That is to say, the constitutionality of the statute being settled and its true meaning being expounded, the question was whether the cases should be finally disposed of or should be left in such a position as to give the Government the right to proceed to apply and enforce the prohibitions of the statute against the various corporations which were defendants if it deemed a good case existed for so doing. Disposing of this subject in the light of the consent upon which the cases had been tried in the court below, and of the error which had obtained as to the true meaning of the statute and of the consequent concentration of the attention of the court and of the parties to the question of the constitutionality of the statute, instead of its application to the facts, when correctly construed, it was determined that the decree should not conclude the right of the United States in the respective causes to further proceed to enforce the statute as construed, and hence that that subject should be left open for future action. Referring to this matter, it was said (p. 418):
‘As the court below held the statute wholly void for repugnancy to the Constitution, it follows from the views which we have expressed that the judgments and decrees entered below must be reversed. As, however, it was conceded in the discussion at bar that in view of the public and private interests which were concerned, the United States did not seek to enforce the penalties of the statute, but commenced these proceedings with the object and purpose of settling the differences between it and the defendants concerning the meaning of the commodities clause and the power of Congress to enact it as correctly interpreted, and upon this view the proceedings were p. 268heard below by submission upon the pleadings, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be subserved, not by reversing and remanding with particular directions as to each of the defendants, but by reversing and remanding with directions for such further proceedings as may be necessary to apply and enforce the statute as we have interpreted it.”
Accordingly, the mandate of this court provided that the cause “be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Circuit Court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this court.”
Upon the filing of the mandate the court below vacated its decree dismissing the bill in this (the equity) cause, and reinstated the case upon the docket. The United States then presented an amended bill and asked leave to file it. The amendment contained copious averments in regard to the actual relations existing between the railroad company and one of the coal companies mentioned in the original bill, viz., the Lehigh Valley Coal Company. In substance it was averred that as to this particular coal company the railroad company was not only the owner of all the stock issued by the coal company, but that the railroad company so used the power thus resulting from its stock ownership as to deprive the coal company of all real, independent existence and to make it virtually but an agency or dependency or department of the railroad company. In other words, in great detail facts were averred which tended to establish that there was no distinction in practice between the coal company and the railroad company, the latter using the coal company as a mere device to enable the railroad company to violate the provisions of the commodities clause. It was expressly charged that in consequence of these facts:
“The coal company is not a bona fide mining company, but is merely an adjunct or instrumentality of the defendant. The defendant is in legal effect the owner of p. 269and has a pecuniary interest in the coal mined by the coal company, and which is transported by the defendant.”
Not only was it thus charged that the railroad company used its stock ownership to so commingle the operating of the affairs of the mining company with its own as to render it impossible to distinguish as a matter of fact between them, but it was moreover expressly in substance charged that exerting its influence as the owner of all the stock of the coal company the railroad company caused the coal company to buy up all the coal produced by other mining companies in the area tributary to the railroad and fix the price at which such coal was bought so as to control the same and the transportation thereof and establish the price at which the coal thus ostensibly acquired by the coal company by purchase should be sold when it reached the seaboard.
It was charged that by these abuses the production, shipment and sale of all the coal within the territory served by the railroad company was brought within the dominion of that company practically to the same extent as if it was the absolute owner of the same. Finally it was alleged as follows:
“That by virtue of the facts hereinbefore set out and otherwise, and more particularly by virtue of the control, direction, domination, and supervision exercised by the persons who are the officers of the defendant railroad and by the defendant over all the operations of the said coal company, embracing the mining and production of said coal, the shipment and transportation of the same over the defendant railroad, and the sale thereof at the seaboard, it follows:
First. That the coal company, not being in substance and in good faith a bona fide corporation, separate from the defendant, but a mere adjunct or instrumentality of the defendant, the defendant, at the time of p. 270transportation, has an interest, direct or indirect, in a legal or equitable sense, in said coal.
“ Second. That said coal of said coal company is mined and produced under the authority of defendant, and the defendant at the time of transportation and before the act of transportation has not in good faith dissociated itself from all exercise of authority over said coal but continues to exercise authority over said coal at the time of transportation and over the subsequent sale thereof.”
On the objection of the railway company the court denied the request of the United States for leave to file the amended bill. The United States then moved for a decree dismissing its original bill without prejudice, and after argument that motion also was denied. Thereupon counsel for the railroad company moved to dismiss the bill absolutely, and upon the statement of counsel for the United States that it “would not proceed any further in view of the fact that the proposed amendment had been disallowed,” the court reached the conclusion “that the bill should be dismissed absolutely upon the allegations of the bill and answer.” A decree to that effect was entered, and the Government prosecutes this appeal, relying for reversal upon the error which it is insisted was committed in refusing to allow the proposed amended bill to be filed and in dismissing the suit.
At the threshold it is insisted by the railroad company that the action of the court below in refusing to permit the proposed amendment, however germane that amendment may have been to the cause of action stated in the original bill and even although the subject-matter of the amendment was not foreclosed by our previous decision, is not susceptible of being reviewed, because the allowance of amendments to pleadings is discretionary with a trial court, and the action of the court below in refusing to permit the amendment, even though erroneous, may not be reversed for error unless a gross abuse of discretion was p. 271220 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.
committed. The principle is elementary, but is inapplicable to this case for a twofold reason: First, because the analysis which we have hitherto made of the opinion of this 0010*1 on the prior hearing makes it certain that the undoubted object was not to foreclose the right of the Government to enforce in the pending causes the commodities clause as correctly construed, and therefore in this regard the discretion of the court below was controlled by the action of this court. Second, because, in view of the express reservations in the opinion and the explicit language of the mandate of this court, the conclusion cannot be escaped that an absolute abuse of discretion resulted from refusing to permit the amendment, even although such abuse was obviously occasioned by a misconception of the character of the action of this court and the scope of the mandate.
It remains only to consider, first, whether the proposed amendment was germane to the original cause of action, and if it was, whether it was foreclosed by our previous decision.
As to the first question. When it is borne in mind that the suit was brought by the Government to enforce as against the defendant the commands of the commodities clause, the fact that the proposed amendment was germane to such cause of action is too apparent to need anything but statement. Indeed, in the argument at bar on behalf of the railroad company this is in effect conceded, since it is insisted that the amendment should not have been allowed, because in substance its averments virtually constituted part of the original cause of action. And we think it is equally clear that the grounds of the amendment were not foreclosed by our former decision. While that decision expressly held that stock ownership by a railroad company in a bona fide corporation, irrespective of the extent of such ownership, did not preclude a railroad company from transporting the commodities manu-
Opinion of the Court. 220 U. 8.
factured, mined, produced or owned by such corporation, nothing in that conclusion foreclosed the right of the Government to question the power of a railroad company to transport in interstate commerce a commodity manufactured, mined, owned or produced by a corporation in which the railroad held stock and where the power of the railroad company as a stockholder was used to obliterate all distinctions between the two corporations. That is to say, where the power was exerted in such a manner as to so commingle the affairs of both as by necessary effect to make such affairs practically indistinguishable and therefore to cause both corporations to be one for all purposes. To what extent the amendment charged this to be the case will become manifest by again particularly considering its averments concerning the use by the railroad company of the coal company as a purchaser of coal, as also the direct charge made in the proposed amendment that by such acts the railroad company was enabled to control all or a greater portion of the coal produced in the region tributary to its road, and thus to dominate the situation and fix the price, not only at which all the coal could be bought, but at which it could be sold at the seaboard for consumption.
That the facts thus averred and the other allegations contained in the proposed amended bill tended to show an actual control by the railroad company over the property of the coal company and an actual interest in such property beyond the mere interest which the railroad company would have had as a holder of stock in the coal company is, we think, clear. The alleged facts, therefore, brought the railroad company, so far as its right to carry the product of the coal company is concerned, within the general prohibitions of the commodities clause, unless for some reason the right of the railroad company to carry such product was not within the operation of that clause. The argument is that the railroad company was so excepted, because any control which it exerted or interest p. 273which it had in the product of the coal company resulted from its ownership of stock in that company, and would not have existed without such ownership. The error, however, lies in disregarding the fact that the allegations of the amended bill asserted the existence of a control by the railroad company over the coal corporation and its product, rendered possible, it is true, by the ownership of stock, but which was not the necessary result of a bona fide exercise of such ownership and which could only have arisen through the use by the railroad of its stock ownership for the purpose of giving it, the railroad company, as a corporation for its own corporate purposes, complete power over the affairs of the coal company, just as if the coal company were a mere department of the railroad. Indeed, such a situation could not have existed had the fact that the two corporations were separate and distinct legal entities been regarded in the administration of the affairs of the coal company. Granting this to be the case, however, it is in effect urged, as the railroad company held all the stock in the coal company, and therefore any gain made or loss suffered by that company would be sustained by the railroad company, no harm resulted from commingling the affairs of the two corporations and disregarding the fact that they were separate juridical beings, because ultimately considered they were but one and the same. This, however, in substance but amounts to asserting that the direct prohibitions of the commodities clause ought to have been applied to a case of stock ownership, particularly to a case where the ownership embraced all the stock of a producing company, and therefore that a mistake was committed by Congress in not including such stock ownership within the prohibitions of the commodities clause. We fail, however, to appreciate the relevancy of the contention. Our duty is to enforce the statute, and not to exclude from its prohibitions things which are properly embraced within them. Coming to vol. ccxx—18 p. 274discharge this duty it follows, in view of the express prohibitions of the commodities clause, it must be held that while the right of a railroad company as a stockholder to use its stock ownership for the purpose of a bona fide separate administration of the affairs of a corporation in which it has a stock interest may not be denied, the use of such stock ownership in substance for the purpose of destroying the entity of a producing, etc., corporation and of commingling its affairs in administration with the affairs of the railroad company, so as to make the two corporations virtually one, brings the railroad company so voluntarily acting as to such producing, etc., corporation within the prohibitions of the commodities clause. In other words, that by operation and effect of the commodities clause there is a duty cast upon a railroad company proposing to carry in interstate commerce the product of a producing, etc., corporation in which it has a stock interest not to abuse such power so as virtually to do by indirection that which the commodities clause prohibits, a duty which plainly would be violated by the unnecessary commingling of the affairs of the producing company with its own, so as to cause them to be one and inseparable.
Deciding, as we do, that error was committed in denying leave to file the proposed amended bill, the decree below is reversed and the cause remanded with directions for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
UNITED STATES v. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY.
SAME v. CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY.
SAME v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY.
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Nos. 537, 538, 539. Argued January 5, 1911.—Decided April 3, 1911.
Under the decision of this court in these and other commodities clause cases, 213 U. S. 364, there was no error in the Circuit Court dismissing the bill absolutely, the Government not having asked leave to amend, the stipulation to submit on bill and answer not having been withdrawn, and no violation of the law having been shown on the admitted facts. Under such circumstances the decree must be affirmed whatever may x be its scope and effect as res judicata in view of stipulations made in the court below.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Wade H. Ellis, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom The Attorney General and Mr. Edwin P. Grosvenor, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, were on the brief, for the United States.
Mr. John G. Johnson for appellees. Mr. Adelbert Moot and Mr. Geo. F. Brownell submitted a separate brief for the appellee in No. 537.
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
These three cases were embraced in the commodities cases previously before this court, and, like the Lehigh p. 276Valley Railroad Company Case, No. 536, ante, p. 257, they are but sequels of the controversy pointed out in the opinion in that case as having been formerly passed upon in the opinion reported in Sand Filtration Corporation v. Cowardin, 213 U. S. 366. These cases, however, differ from the Lehigh Valley Case in this respect. Upon the filing in the Circuit Court of the mandate of this court the United States in each case, upon the same record on which the reversed decree was based, without offering to show any further facts, or withdrawing the stipulation to submit the cause on bill and answer referred to in the opinion in the Lehigh Valley Case, moved that the decree to be entered be “that the bill be dismissed without prejudice.” This motion was denied, whereupon the court was informed that the Government did not intend to proceed further with the cause, and in each case a decree was entered dismissing the cause absolutely.
The error alleged is in substance that the Circuit Court erred in each case in dismissing the bill of complaint absolutely. But leave to amend was not asked, and as, upon the facts appearing and admitted on each record, no violation of the commodities clause was shown, the decree entered may properly be held to have been in strict “conformity with the opinion of this court.” Whatever, therefore, in view of the stipulation made below, may be the scope and effect of the decree as res judicata, we see no reason for concluding that error was committed by the Circuit Court in refusing to qualify its decree. The decree in each case is, therefore,
Affirmed. p. 277220 U. S. Argument for Complainant.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY.
BILL IN EQUITY.
No. 13, Original. Argued February 23, 1911.—Decided April 3, 1911.
While the territorial condition lasts the governmental power of Congress over a Territory and its inhabitants is exclusive and paramount, except as restricted by the Constitution.
An act of Congress, regulating railway charges of a railway in a Territory until a state government is formed and providing that thereafter such State shall have authority to regulate the charges, ceases to be of force on the admission of such State into the Union; and thereafter the State can fix such charges, subject only to the constitutional rights of the railway; and so held as to §§ 1-4 of the act of July 4,1884, c. 179, 23 Stat. 73.
A State in its corporate capacity has no such interest in the rights of shippers as to entitle it to maintain an original action in this court against the carrier to restrain it from charging unreasonable rates within its jurisdiction. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1.
The original jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution on this court does not include every cause in which the State elects to make itself a party to vindicate the rights of its people or to enforce its own laws or public policy against wrong done generally.
The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States conferring original jurisdiction on this court in controversies in which a State is a party, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Charles West, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, for complainant:
The Attorney General of Oklahoma has authority to file the bill. Leedy v. Brown, unreported (Okla.); State v. Welbes, 73 N. W. Rep. 820; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hadley, 161 Fed. Rep. 419; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123;
Argument for Complainant. 220 U. S.
act of June 18, 1910; rules made for Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 479; Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199; Florida v. Anderson, 91 U. S. 667
The State has justiciable rights here. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling B. Co., 13 How. 519; South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 379; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 141; Georgia v. Tennessee Co., 206 U. S. 238; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 355.
If equity should take jurisdiction for a part it will retain jurisdiction for complete relief and not force separation of efforts in suits at law. United States v. Union Pacific Co., 160 U. S. 1. Equity jurisdiction enjoins illegal acts by corporations affecting public at large. Attorney General v. Great Northern Co., 62 Eng. Rep. Reprint, 337; Attorney General v. Delaware Ry. Co., Tl N. J. Eq. 631; Muncie Nat. Gas Co. v. Muncie (Ind.), 60 L. R. A. 822; Gas Light Co. v. Zanesville, 47 Oh. St. 35; Attorney General v. Chicago &c. Co., 35 Wisconsin, 425; Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Co., 123 Massachusetts, 361; Thompson, Corporations, 2d ed., §§5680, 5721. As to injunctions to restrain excessive rates, see Tift v. Southern Ry. Co., 123 Fed. Rep. 794, and cases there cited; State v. Pacific Express Co. (Neb.), 115 N. W. Rep. 619; Madison v. Gas Co. (Wis.), 108 N. W. Rep. 65.
The State can ask for a cancellation of the grant. When a Territory becomes a State it may refuse recognition of anything that the State might have repudiated if the grant had come from itself in the first instance. Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U. S. 431.
If the United States might have forfeited the right before statehood, that power belongs to the State now. Van Wick v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 396. The grants in the territory purchased from France made for a public purpose create a trust for the public. New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662; see also 6 Missouri, 524; Mayor &c. v. p. 279220 U. S. Argument for Complainant.
The grant made to the Southern Kansas Railroad was for a public purpose. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 641. The United States before statehood might have declared a forfeiture either by legislative action or judicial proceedings. United States v. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 211, 267; Utah N. & C. Ry. Co. v. Utah & C. Ry. Co., 110 Fed. Rep. 879.
Before statehood the United States was a trustee for the Territory. Hinman v. Warren, 6 Oregon, 409; Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 220.
Until the primary disposal the authority of the United States to control them is complete, but ends entirely at the primary disposal thereof. David v. Rickabaugh, 32 Iowa, 543; Farrington v. Wilson, 29 Wisconsin, 383; Gibson v. Chouteau, 3 Wall. 13; Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558; State v. Bachelder, 5 Minnesota, 223; Shiveley v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1.
Since statehood, the United States has had no authority to cancel the grant or control the trust. United States v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 154 U. S. 225, 239. The United States has no control over the internal commerce of a State. Louisville v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519; Sands v. Manistee Co., 123 U. S. 288; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 145 U. S. 204.
The primary duty of the company is to the local business. Lake Shore R. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 301; Cleveland Company v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 521.
The grant is now an act of the State. § 2 Schedule of Const, of Oklahoma.
The act of July 4, 1884, § 2, provides for a reversion to the tribe itself, but all the Indian tribes have ceased to be nations. A grant to a railroad and its successors and assigns does not give the right to it to sell or assign its property to another corporation. Oregon R. R. Co. v. Ore-
Argument for Respondent. 220 U. S.
gonian R. R. Co., 130 U. S. 1; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 1. The Southern Kansas Railway had no authority to sell to the respondents. Briscoe v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 273.
The jurisdiction of this court if it exists should be applied. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 404; California v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 157 U. S. 229, 269.
The limitation does not end with the Government’s jurisdiction.
Laws may as well be enacted by reference as by reenacting specific words. Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Co., 3 Wall. 51; Schwenke v. Union D. & R. Co., 1 Colorado, 512; >8. C. 4 Pac. Rep. 905; In re Larkin, 1 Oklahoma, 53; Pridgeon v. United States, 153 U. S. 53.
Though Congress may regulate interstate business and incorporate companies therefor, yet the police power of the State remains intact. Louisville Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 702; Cleveland Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 516.
Mr. Robert Dunlap, with whom Mr. Gardiner Lathrop was on the brief, for respondent:
The General Government alone and not the State of Oklahoma has the right to enforce obedience to the terms of the grant found in one of its laws.
The act of Congress in question granting the right to construct, operate, and use the railway constructed thereunder was passed under the constitutional power of that body to regulate commerce among the several States and with the Indian tribes. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 641; California v. Pacific R. R-Co., 127 U. S. 39, 40; United States v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 146 U. S. 570, 606, 607. Congressional authority to institute proceedings to revoke or forfeit the grant is necessary. United States v. Northern Pacific Ry-Co., 177 U. S. 440; California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U. S. 229; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60, 68, 69.
220 U. S. Argument for Respondent.
The provision of the act of Congress referred to in the bill in respect to freight rates ceased to be operative on the creation of the Territory of Oklahoma with reference to the lines embraced therein and certainly on the creation of the State.
In any event a bill in equity does not lie since mandamus is the appropriate remedy at law to enforce the performance of a public duty. Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 4th ed., §§ 826, 906; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 189 U. S. 274; Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co., 2 Johnson Ch. 371.
The main purpose of the bill, however, seems to be to secure a forfeiture of the rights and privileges granted by Congress, which could only be accomplished or effected in quo warranto proceedings on the part of the United States.
The bill does not set up a controversy between the State and the railway company justiciable in this court under the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1.
The State is not the successor of the General Government. The authority of Congress in the premises is still effective. The power of Congress was exercised not merely over a Territory or only as of a local nature, but under the power to regulate interstate commerce, a matter of national concern. Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264, 268; Gulf & Ship Island R. R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 77; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 529, 533; Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 183 U. S. 526, 527; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 34, 35, 36.
The State is not entitled to the equitable relief sought. The provision of the act of Congress relied upon ceased to be applicable with statehood. In respect to any claim of forfeiture of rights granted by Congress no case is presented, and, in any event, the Federal Government, being p. 282the sovereign power which granted the rights, could alone insist upon a forfeiture.
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an original suit in this court by the State of Oklahoma against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, a corporation of Kansas.
The case as made by the allegations of the bill, in connection with acts of Congress and with the constitution and laws of Oklahoma, is substantially as will be now stated.
The treaty of April 30, 1803, between the United States and France, by which the Territory of Louisiana was ceded to the United States, provided that the inhabitants of that Territory should be incorporated into the Union and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States; in the meantime to be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and the religion they profess. Art. III. The State of Oklahoma was formed out of a part of this ceded Territory.
By an act of Congress of July 4, 1884, the Southern Kansas Railway Company of Kansas was empowered to locate, construct, own, equip, operate, use and maintain a railway, telegraph and telephone line through the Indian Territory, over a specified route. The act forbade the company to charge “the inhabitants of said Territory a greater rate of freight than the rate authorized by the laws of the State of Kansas for services or transportation of the same kind” and provided that “passenger rates on said railway shall not exceed three cents per mile.” And Congress expressly reserved the right to regulate the charges for freight and passengers on the railway as well as messages on telegraph and telephone lines, “until a State government or governments shall exist in said p. 283Terntory, within the limits of which said railway or a part thereof shall be located; and then such State government or governments shall be authorized to fix and regulate the cost of transportation of persons and freights within their respective limits by said railway.” Congress also reserved “the right to fix and regulate at all times the cost of such transportation by said railway or said company whenever such transportation shall extend from one State into another, or shall extend into more than one State: Provided, however, That the rate of such transportation of passengers, local or interstate, shall not exceed the rate above expressed.” §§1,4, c. 179, 23 Stat. 73, 74.
The above grant was accepted by the Southern Kansas Railway Company, and the road now controlled by the appellee, the Atchison, Tokepa and Santa Fe Railway Company, in Oklahoma, is operated under that grant. The bill alleged “that ever since the defendant company took over the operation of said line of railway under said grant it had continuously violated the above condition, in that it has charged the inhabitants of said Territory a greater rate of freight than that authorized by the laws of Kansas for services or transportation of the same kind;” and that the company’s tariffs of freight charges show in detail said excessive charges. After setting forth the rates charged in Oklahoma and Kansas, respectively, for carrying, for the same distances, lime, cement, plaster, brick, crude oil and refined oil, the bill proceeds: “That the State of Oklahoma at this time has about two million inhabitants, is developing and building towns, villages and individual farmhouses, and that lime, cement, plaster, brick and stone are very essential to its growth; that at this time in the State of Oklahoma there are very large and extensive petroleum oil wells, and the manufacture or refining of the same is an industry continually growing in said State; that the transportation rates on crude and refined oil, lime, cement, plaster, brick and stone are very p. 284important and essential to the development of said State; and, that the violation by said respondent of the said conditions of said grant is a menace to the future of said State.” The State further alleged that if the defendant was permitted further to operate the railroad in violation of the condition of the grant it would be a hindrance to the growth of the State, as well as an injury to the property rights of its inhabitants.
The relief asked was that the grant contained in the above act of Congress be canceled and the property granted by it confirmed and decreed to be in the State of Oklahoma as cestui que trust; that the defendant be perpetually enjoined and restrained, and, pending the determination of this action, be enjoined and restrained from charging the inhabitants of the State of Oklahoma a greater rate of freight than that authorized by the laws of Kansas for services or transportation of the same kind, and from charging “for lime, cement, plaster, brick, stone, crude and refined oil, the rates specified” in its tariff in so far as the same are greater than those authorized for like transportation by the laws of Kansas until the determination of this cause; and that for the continual violation of the terms of the grant it be perpetually enjoined and restrained from operating a railroad in the state of Oklahoma. The bill also contains a prayer for such further or different relief as may be required by the nature of the case and be agreeable to equity and good conscience.
The railroad company filed a demurrer upon the ground that the bill did not show that the State was entitled to the relief asked nor set forth any controversy between the State and the defendant within the original jurisdiction of this court.
The difficulty in the way of granting the relief asked by the State is, in our judgment, insurmountable. The act of 1884 appears to have had in view, primarily, the protection of the inhabitants of the Indian Territory from being p. 285charged unreasonable rates by the railway company when using its right of way through that Territory. Congress undoubtedly supposed that it would be safe, at least for a time, to adopt as a test of the reasonableness of rates in Oklahoma, on domestic shipments, those which Kansas had prescribed as between its people and the corporation it had created; in other words, the inhabitants of the Territory were to have the same rights, in respect to railroad rates, as Kansas had prescribed for its corporations and people. But that the railway company might not act unjustly towards the inhabitants of the Territory, Congress reserved the right to regulate charges to be made by the railway company for freight and passengers transported on the railway in question. This, of course, Congress could have done without regard to any rates allowed by or in Kansas at any particular time; for, while the territorial conditions lasted, the governmental power of Congress over the Territory and its inhabitants was exclusive and paramount, there being no restrictions upon the exercise of that power, except such as were imposed by the Supreme Law of the Land. It is to be observed, however, that the regulations prescribed by the act of Congress were to exist and be in force “until a State government or governments shall exist in said Territory within the limits of which said railway or a part thereof shall be located; and then such State government or governments shall be authorized to fix and regulate the cost of transportation of persons and freight within their respective limits by said railway.” So, when Oklahoma was organized as a State and admitted into the Union “on an equal footing with the original States” (34 Stat. 267, 271, §4, pt. 1) the clause in the act of 1884, prescribing the Kansas rates as the test for rates that might be charged against the inhabitants of the Territory, necessarily ceased to be of any force in the State, and the whole subject of rates in domestic or local business passed under the full control of
Opinion of the Court. 220 U. 8.
the State in its corporate capacity, subject, of course, to the fundamental condition that it should authorize only such rates as were legal and not inconsistent with the constitutional rights of the railway company. If after Oklahoma became a State the company still charged the Kansas rates on local business in Oklahoma, and if those rates would have been illegal under any state regulations, or were, in themselves, unreasonable and purely arbitrary, a controversy, in the constitutional sense, would have arisen between each shipper and the company, which could have been determined by suit brought by the shipper in the proper state court, or even in the proper Federal court, where the controversy, by reason of the grounds alleged by the shipper, was one of which the latter court, under the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, could take judicial cognizance. But, plainly, the State, in its corporate capacity, would have no such interest in a controversy of that kind as would entitle it to vindicate and enforce the rights of a particular shipper or shippers, and, incidentally, of all shippers, by an original suit brought in its own name, in this court, to restrain the company from applying the Kansas rates, as such, to shippers generally in the local business of Oklahoma. The opposite view must necessarily rest upon the ground that the Constitution when conferring original jurisdiction on this court “in all cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls and those in which a State is a party” (Art. Ill, § 1), intended to include any and every judicial proceeding of whatever nature which the State may choose to institute, in this court, for the purpose of enforcing its laws, although the State may have no direct interest in the particular property or rights immediately affected or to be affected by the alleged violation of such laws. In the present case, the State seeks to enjoin the defendant company from charging more than the Kansas rates on the transportation of lime, cement, p. 287plaster, brick, stone, crude and refined oil. But the State, as such, in its governmental capacity, is not engaged in their sale or transportation, and has no property interest in such commodities. It seeks only, as between the railway company and shippers, by a general, comprehensive decree to enforce certain rates and to compel the railway company to respect the rights of all of the people of Oklahoma who may have occasion to ship such commodities over the railway.
Upon this general subject the case of Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, is instructive. The State of Louisiana, by an original suit in this court against the State of Texas, her Governor and Health Officer, sought to restrain the latter State from enforcing by its officers certain quarantine regulations it, had established, which Louisiana alleged were illegal and discriminative against it and injurious to the trade and business of its people, particularly interstate commerce as conducted between New Orleans and Texas. There was a demurrer to the bill upon these grounds: 1. That, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, the controversy was not one -between Louisiana and Texas. 2. That the controversy was between Texas or her officers and certain persons in Louisiana engaged in interstate commerce, and did not concern Louisiana as an aggregate, corporate body or State. 3. That by the suit brought in this court, Louisiana was only lending its name to certain individuals in New Orleans, who were the real parties in interest.
4. That it appeared from the face of the bill that “the State of Louisiana, in her right of sovereignty, is seeking to maintain this suit for the redress of the supposed wrongs of her citizens in regard to interstate commerce, while under the Constitution and laws the said State possesses uo such sovereignty as empowers her to bring an original suit in this court for such purpose.” 5. That “no property right of the State of Louisiana is in any manner p. 288affected by the quarantine complained of, nor is any such property right involved in this suit as would give this court original jurisdiction of this cause.”
This court, speaking by Chief Justice Fuller, after referring to the provisions of the Constitution enumerating the cases and controversies to which the judicial power of the United States extended and of which the Circuit Courts of the United States could take original cognizance, and to numerous adjudged cases, said: “In order then to maintain jurisdiction of this bill of complaint as against the State of Texas, it must appear that the controversy to be determined is a controversy arising directly between the State of Louisiana and the State of Texas, and not a controversy in the vindication of grievances of particular individuals. . . . Inasmuch as the vindication of the freedom of interstate commerce is not committed to the State of Louisiana, and that State is not engaged in such commerce, the cause of action must be regarded not as involving any infringement of the powers of the State of Louisiana, or any special injury to her property, but as asserting that the State is entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters complained of affect her citizens at large. Nevertheless if the case stated is not one presenting a controversy between these States the exercise of original jurisdiction by this court as against the State of Texas cannot be maintained. . . . But in order that a controversy between States, justiciable in this court, can be held to exist, something more must be put forward than that the citizens of one State are injured by the maladministration of the laws of another. The States cannot make war, or enter into treaties, though they may, with the consent of Congress, make compacts and agreements. When there is no agreement, whose breach might create it, a controversy between States does not arise unless the action complained of is state action, and acts of state officers in abuse or excess of their powers cannot be laid p. 289hold of as in themselves committing one State to a distinct collision with a sister State.”
These doctrines, we think, control this case and require its dismissal as not being within the original jurisdiction of this court as defined by the Constitution. Under a contrary view that jurisdiction could be invoked by a State, bringing an original suit in this court against foreign corporations and citizens of other States, whenever the State thought such corporations and citizens of other States were acting in violation of its laws to the injury of its people generally or in the aggregate; although, an injury, in violation of law, to the property or rights of particular persons through the action of foreign corporations or citizens of States could be reached, without the intervention of the State, by suits instituted by the persons directly or immediately injured.
We are of opinion that the words, in the Constitution, conferring original jurisdiction on this court, in a suit “in which a State shall be a party,” are not to be interpreted as conferring such jurisdiction in every cause in which the State elects to make itself strictly a party plaintiff of record and seeks not to protect its own property, but only to vindicate the wrongs of some of its people or to enforce its own laws or public policy against wrongdoers, generally.
Other questions of interest and importance have been elaborately discussed by counsel, but we deem it unnecessary to extend this opinion by an examination of them. What has been said is quite sufficient to show that the demurrer is well taken and that the bill must, in any event, be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this court to entertain it by original suit on behalf or in the name of the State.
Dismissed.
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