United States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007)

UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit

No. 06–562. Argued April 23, 2007—Decided June 11, 2007

Sections 107(a) and 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 allow private parties to recover expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated sites. Section 107(a) defines four categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) and makes them liable for, among other things, “(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan” and “(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with [such] plan,” §§ 107(a)(4)(A)–(B). Originally, some courts interpreted § 107(a)(4)(B) as providing a cause of action for a private party to recover voluntarily incurred response costs and to seek contribution after having been sued. However, after the enact ment of § 113(f), which authorizes one PRP to sue another for contribu tion, many courts held it to be the exclusive remedy for PRPs. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161, this Court held that a private party could seek contribution under § 113(f) only after being sued under § 106 or § 107(a).

After respondent Atlantic Research cleaned up a Government site it leased and contaminated while doing Government work, it sued the Government to recover some of its costs under, as relevant here, § 107(a). The District Court dismissed the case, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that § 113(f) does not provide the exclusive remedy for recovering cleanup costs and that § 107(a)(4)(B) provided a cause of action to any person other than those permitted to sue under § 107(a)(4)(A).

Held: Because § 107(a)(4)(B)’s plain terms allow a PRP to recover costs from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlantic Research with a cause of action. Pp. 134–141.

(a) Applying the maxim that statutes must “be read as a whole,” King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221, subparagraph (B)’s language can be understood only with reference to subparagraph (A). The provi sions are adjacent and have similar structures, and the text denotes a relationship between them. Subparagraph (B)’s phrase “other neces sary costs” refers to and differentiates the relevant costs from those listed in subparagraph (A). Thus, it is natural to read the phrase “any other person” by referring to the immediately preceding subpara

Syllabus

graph (A). Accepting the Government’s interpretation—that “any

other person” refers only to a person not identified as a PRP in

§§ 107(a)(1)–(4)—would destroy the symmetry of subparagraphs (A) and

(B) and render subparagraph (B) internally confusing. Moreover, be

cause the statute defines PRPs so broadly as to sweep in virtually all

persons likely to incur cleanup costs, accepting that interpretation

would reduce the number of potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering

subparagraph (B) a dead letter. Pp. 134–137.

(b) Contrary to the Government’s argument, this interpretation will not create friction between §§ 107(a) and 113(f). Their two clearly dis tinct remedies complement each other: Section 113(f)(1) authorizes a contribution action to PRPs with common liability stemming from an action instituted under § 106 or § 107(a), while § 107(a) permits cost re covery (as distinct from contribution) by a private party that has itself incurred cleanup costs. Thus, at least in the case of reimbursement, a PRP cannot choose § 107(a)’s longer statute of limitations for recovery actions over § 113(f)’s shorter one for contribution claims. Similarly, a PRP could not avoid § 113(f)’s equitable distribution of reimbursement costs among PRPs by instead choosing to impose joint and several liabil ity under § 107(a). That choice of remedies simply does not exist, and in any event, a defendant PRP in a § 107(a) suit could blunt any such distribution by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim. Finally, permitting PRPs to seek recovery under § 107(a) will not eviscerate § 113(f)(2), which pro hibits § 113(f) contribution claims against “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judi cially approved settlement . . . .” Although that settlement bar does not by its terms protect against § 107(a) cost-recovery liability, a district court applying traditional equity rules would undoubtedly consider any prior settlement in the liability calculus; the settlement bar continues to provide significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs that have inequitably reimbursed costs incurred by another party; and settle ment carries the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as to the United States or a State. Pp. 137–141.

459 F. 3d 827, affirmed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mc-Keown, Kannon K. Shanmugam, Ronald M. Spritzer, and Ellen J. Durkee.

Counsel

Owen Thomas Armstrong, Jr., argued the cause for re spondent. With him on the brief was Frank L. Steeves.

Jay D. Geck, Deputy Solicitor General of Washington, ar gued the cause for the State of Washington et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Rob ert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Maureen Hart, Solicitor General, and Michael L. Dunning, Assistant Attorney Gen eral, Linda Singer, Acting Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Salvador J. Antonetti Stutts, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, and the Attorneys General for their respec tive States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Col berg of Alaska, Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, John W. Suth ers of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Bill McCollum of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, Charles C. Foti, Jr., of Louisiana, Steven Rowe of Maine, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Martha Coakley of Massachusetts, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Kelly A. Ay otte of New Hampshire, Stuart Rabner of New Jersey, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Andrew M. Cuomo of New York, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Marc Dann of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and J. B. Van Hollen of Wisconsin.

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

Two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensati on, and Liabi l ity Ac t of 1980 (CERCLA)—§§ 107(a) and 113(f)—allow private parties to recover expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated sites. 42 U. S. C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f). In this case, we must decide a question left open in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Avi all Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161 (2004): whether § 107(a) provides so-called potentially responsible parties (PRPs), 42 U. S. C. §§ 9607(a)(1)–(4), with a cause of action to recover costs from other PRPs. We hold that it does.

I

A

“(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an In dian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; [and]

“(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contin gency plan.” §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B).

Enacted as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reau thorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 100 Stat. 1613, § 113(f) au thorizes one PRP to sue another for contribution in certain circumstances. 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f).1

In Cooper Industries, we held that a private party could seek contribution from other liable parties only after having been sued under § 106 or § 107(a). 543 U. S., at 161. This narrower interpretation of § 113(f) caused several Courts of Appeals to reconsider whether PRPs have rights under § 107(a)(4)(B), an issue we declined to address in Cooper Industries. Id., at 168. After revisiting the issue, some courts have permitted § 107(a) actions by PRPs. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F. 3d 90 (CA2 2005); Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing & Coat ings, Inc., 473 F. 3d 824 (CA7 2007). However, at least one court continues to hold that § 113(f) provides the exclusive cause of action available to PRPs. E. I. DuPont de Ne mours & Co. v. United States, 460 F. 3d 515 (CA3 2006). Today, we resolve this issue.

B

In this case, respondent Atlantic Research leased property at the Shumaker Naval Ammunition Depot, a facility oper ated by the Department of Defense. At the site, Atlantic Research retrofitted rocket motors for petitioner United States. Using a high-pressure water spray, Atlantic Re search removed pieces of propellant from the motors. It then burned the propellant pieces. Some of the resultant wastewater and burned fuel contaminated soil and ground water at the site.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Recognizing that Cooper Industries undermined the reason ing of its prior precedent, 459 F. 3d, at 830, n. 4, the Court of Appeals joined the Second and Seventh Circuits in holding that § 113(f) does not provide “the exclusive route by which [PRPs] may recover cleanup costs.” Id., at 834 (citing Con solidated Edison Co., supra). The court reasoned that § 107(a)(4)(B) authorized suit by any person other than the persons permitted to sue under § 107(a)(4)(A). 459 F. 3d, at

835. Accordingly, it held that § 107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action to Atlantic Research. To prevent perceived con flict between §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1), the Court of Ap peals reasoned that PRPs that “have been subject to §§ 106 or 107 enforcement actions are still required to use § 113, thereby ensuring its continued vitality.” Id., at 836–837. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1177 (2007), and now affirm.

II A

Statutes must “be read as a whole.” King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). Applying that maxim, the language of subparagraph (B) can be understood only with reference to subparagraph (A). The provisions are ad jacent and have remarkably similar structures. Each con cerns certain costs that have been incurred by certain enti ties and that bear a specified relationship to the national contingency plan.3 Bolstering the structural link, the text also denotes a relationship between the two provisions. By using the phrase “other necessary costs,” subparagraph (B) refers to and differentiates the relevant costs from those listed in subparagraph (A).

The Government’s interpretation makes little textual sense. In subparagraph (B), the phrase “any other neces sary costs” and the phrase “any other person” both refer to antecedents—“costs” and “person[s]”—located in some pre vious statutory provision. Although “any other necessary costs” clearly references the costs in subparagraph (A), the Government would inexplicably interpret “any other person” to refer not to the persons listed in subparagraph (A) but to the persons listed as PRPs in paragraphs (1)–(4). Nothing in the text of § 107(a)(4)(B) suggests an intent to refer to antecedents located in two different statutory provisions. Reading the statute in the manner suggested by the Govern ment would destroy the symmetry of §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B) and render subparagraph (B) internally confusing.

According to the Government, our interpretation suffers from the same infirmity because it causes the phrase “any other person” to duplicate work done by other text. In the Government’s view, the phrase “any other necessary costs” “already precludes governmental entities from recovering under” § 107(a)(4)(B). Brief for United States 20. Even as suming the Government is correct, it does not alter our conclusion. The phrase “any other person” performs a sig nificant function simply by clarifying that subparagraph (B) excludes the persons enumerated in subparagraph (A). In any event, our hesitancy to construe statutes to render language superfluous does not require us to avoid surplusage at all costs. It is appropriate to tolerate a degree of surplus age rather than adopt a textually dubious construction that threatens to render the entire provision a nullity.

B

We have previously recognized that §§ 107(a) and 113(f) provide two “clearly distinct” remedies. Cooper Industries, 543 U. S., at 163, n. 3. “CERCLA provide[s] for a right to cost recovery in certain circumstances, § 107(a), and separate rights to contribution in other circumstances, §§ 113(f)(1), 113(f)(3)(B).” Id., at 163 (emphasis added). The Govern ment, however, uses the word “contribution” as if it were synonymous with any apportionment of expenses among PRPs. Brief for United States 33, n. 14 (“Contribution is merely a form of cost recovery, not a wholly independent type of relief ”); see also, e. g., Pinal Creek Group v. New mont Mining Corp., 118 F. 3d 1298, 1301 (CA9 1997) (“Be cause all PRPs are liable under the statute, a claim by one PRP against another PRP necessarily is for contribution”). This imprecise usage confuses the complementary yet dis tinct nature of the rights established in §§ 107(a) and 113(f).

By contrast, § 107(a) permits recovery of cleanup costs but does not create a right to contribution. A private party may recover under § 107(a) without any establishment of lia bility to a third party. Moreover, § 107(a) permits a PRP to recover only the costs it has “incurred” in cleaning up a site. 42 U. S. C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). When a party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement or a court judgment, it does not incur its own costs of response. Rather, it reimburses other par ties for costs that those parties incurred.

Accordingly, the remedies available in §§ 107(a) and 113(f) complement each other by providing causes of action “to persons in different procedural circumstances.” Consoli dated Edison, 423 F. 3d, at 99; see also E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 460 F. 3d, at 548 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Section 113(f)(1) authorizes a contribution action to PRPs with com mon liability stemming from an action instituted under § 106 or § 107(a). And § 107(a) permits cost recovery (as distinct from contribution) by a private party that has itself incurred cleanup costs. Hence, a PRP that pays money to satisfy a settlement agreement or a court judgment may pursue § 113(f) contribution. But by reimbursing response costs paid by other parties, the PRP has not incurred its own costs of response and therefore cannot recover under § 107(a). As a result, though eligible to seek contribution under § 113(f)(1), the PRP cannot simultaneously seek to recover the same expenses under § 107(a). Thus, at least in the case of reimbursement, the PRP cannot choose the 6-year statute of limitations for cost-recovery actions over the shorter limi tations period for § 113(f) contribution claims.6

For similar reasons, a PRP could not avoid § 113(f)’s equi table distribution of reimbursement costs among PRPs by instead choosing to impose joint and several liability on an other PRP in an action under § 107(a).7 The choice of reme dies simply does not exist. In any event, a defendant PRP in such a § 107(a) suit could blunt any inequitable distri bution of costs by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim. 459 F. 3d, at 835; see also Consolidated Edison, supra, at 100, n. 9 (col lecting cases). Resolution of a § 113(f) counterclaim would necessitate the equitable apportionment of costs among the liable parties, including the PRP that filed the § 107(a) action. 42 U. S. C. § 9613(f)(1) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate”).

III

Because the plain terms of § 107(a)(4)(B) allow a PRP to recover costs from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlantic Research with a cause of action. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.