Solomon v. Arthur, 102 U.S. 208
Case details
Citation
102 U.S. 208
Full caption
Solomon v. Arthur.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Solom on v . Arthur .
Imported goods composed of cotton and silk, the latter being the component part of chief value, were, by the act of June 30,1864 (13 Stat. 202), subject to a duty of fifty per cent ad valorem.
Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
This was an action brought by Solomon Solomon and others, constituting the firm of Solomon Brothers, against Arthur, the collector of the port of New York. The following facts were admitted upon the trial, it being agreed that neither party should offer any evidence.
Plaintiffs are partners in business, and as such imported at the port of New York, in December, 1873, and January, 1874, certain goods manufactured of silk and cotton. The defendant exacted upon them a duty of fifty per cent ad valorem, which rate the plaintiffs paid under protest, the substantial part of which is, that under existing laws the goods are only liable to a duty of thirty-five per cent, because they are provided for at that rate by sect. 22 of the act of March 2, 1861, and sect. 13 of the act of July 14,1862. This protest was followed by an appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, who affirmed the decision of the collector. This suit was brought in due time.
The goods were composed of silk and cotton, in varying proportions, the warp being all cotton and the filling partly silk. It is admitted by the plaintiffs, for the purpose of this case, that silk was the component material of chief value. The goods generally are known in trade and commerce as goods made of mixed materials, but each kind thereof is also known by its specific name. If’ the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, judgment shall be rendered in their favor for the difference between thirty-five and fifty per cent, which amount is $461.75 gold, with -$75.40 interest in currency.
The jury found a verdict for the defendant pursuant to the instructions of the court, and the plaintiffs sued out this writ.
Jfr. Edwards Pierrepont and Mr. William Stanley for the plaintiffs in error.
The duty was exacted under the last clause of sect. 8 of the act of June 30, 1864, which imposes fifty per cent ad valorem “ on all manufactures of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, not otherwise provided for.” 13 Stat. 202, 210.
It is plain that the commercial designation of the goods in question was, “goods made of mixed materials.” A commercial designation is that “ known in trade and commerce.”
The tariff acts recognize two species of dutiable goods, into one of which silk must enter and be “ the component part of chief value,” and a totally distinct kind of “ mixed goods,” into which silk may or may not enter in part, as the case may be.
We invite attention to the act of Aug. 5, 1861, and the act of March 2, 1861. Sect. 16 of the latter act prescribes: “On silk ribbons, galloons, braids, fringes, laces, tassels, buttons, button cloths, trimmings, and on silk twist, twist composed of mohair and silk, sewing-silk in the gum or purified, and all other manufactures of silk or of which silk shall be the component material of chief value, not otherwise provided for, thirty per cent ad valorem?' 12 Stat. 186. Sect. 22 describes the other kind, in these words: “ Manufactures, not otherwise provided for, composed of mixed materials in part of cotton, silk, wool or worsted, or flax.” Id. 192. Sect. 2 of the act of August 5, which raises the duty on silk goods to forty per cent, leaves that on “ mixed goods ” at thirty per cent. The enumeration of the silk goods on which the duty was raised to forty per cent is precisely the same, word for word, as in the preceding act. Id. 293.
By sect. 13 of the act of July 14, 1862, the duty on “manufactures composed of mixed materials in part of cotton, silk, wool, or worsted, hemp, jute, or flax,” was raised to thirty-five per cent. Id. 557.
No higher duty than thirty-five per cent had ever been imposed by any statute upon this class of goods. And it is here to be noted that the statute of 1862, which increased the duty on “ manufactures composed of mixed materials,” did not
VOL. XII. 14
change the duty upon goods of which silk was the component material of chief value.
The attempt is now made to strain the statute of 1864, relating to silk goods, to cover “ manufactures composed of mixed materials,” into which silk may so enter as to form the more costly part.
After enumerating some thirty silk manufactures, the section ends in the words we have first quoted.
The class of goods “ known in trade and commerce as goods made of mixed materials,” which are specifically named in the other statutes, and upon which the duty was in 1861, thirty per cent, and in 1862 thirty-five per cent, is nowhere alluded to in this statute of 1864. Sect. 22 expressly provides “that the duties upon all goods, wares, and merchandise imported from foreign countries not provided for in this act shall be and remain as they were, according to existing laws prior to the 29th of April 1864” (13 id. 216), and “ that all acts and parts of acts repugnant to the provisions of this act be, and the same are hereby, repealed.”
Thus we find running through the statutes these two classes of manufactures: those into which silk must enter; and the “mixed manufactures,” into which silk might or might not enter. It is an admitted fact that the goods in question are generally known in trade and commerce as goods made of mixed materials ; but inasmuch as “ silk was a component material of chief value,” it is argued by the learned Assistant Attorney-General that these “ mixed goods ” must pay a duty of fifty per cent, under the act of 1864, which relates to a totally different kind of goods.
Surely no such construction can fairly be given to the acts, and such ruling would be quite out of harmony with numerous decisions of this court. Arthur n . Zimmerman, 96 U. S. 124; Arthur v. Unkhart, id. 118; Arthur v. Lahey, id. 112; Arthur v. Davies, id. 135; Arthur v. Homer, id. 137; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162 ; Homer v. The Collector, 1 id. 486, and the long list of earlier cases on commercial designation.
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith, contra.
Mr . Justi ce Bradley delivered the opinion of the court.
It is obvious that the goods in question came under the designation of the last clause of sect. 8 of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 210), which lays a duty “on. all manufactures of silk or of which silk is the component part of chief value, not otherwise provided for, fifty per centum ad valorem.1' That duty was, therefore, properly assessed, unless the articles imported were “otherwise provided for.” And that is the question. The plaintiffs insisted then, and insist now that a duty on these goods was “ otherwise provided for ” by the acts of March 2, 1861, sect. 22, and July 14, 1862, sect. 13, as “ manufactures composed of mixed materials, in part of cotton, silk, wool or worsted, or flax,” on which a duty of only thirty per cent was laid by the act of 1861, and of five per cent additional by the act of 1862. 12 Stat. 192, 557.
Previous acts were not repealed in toto by the act of June 30,1864, but it was declared by sect. 22 that “ all acts and parts of acts repugnant to the provisions of this act be, and the same are hereby, repealed,” with a, proviso “ that the duties upon all goods, wares, and merchandise imported from foreign countries, not provided for in this act, shall be and remain as they were, according to existing laws prior to 29th April, 1864.”
The act of 1864 contained no separate provision for a duty on goods composed of “mixed materials,” like that in the acts of 1861 and 1862, on which the plaintiffs rely. They contend, therefore, that those clauses still continued in force, and that the goods imported by them were embraced therein, and were not intended to be embraced in the general clause in the act of 1864, under which the collector exacted the duty in question. The plaintiffs insist that the term “ mixed materials,” or “ goods made of mixed materials,” is a specific and well-known commercial designation or name, which by usage covers the goods imported by them, and is not a descriptive phrase used merely to designate any class of goods answering to the description; and, therefore, although they may be embraced in the general description of the act of 1864, of goods “ in which silk is the component part of chief value,” such a general p. 212description is not sufficient to take them out of their places in the previous acts where they are designated by name. It may be conceded that if the goods in question had a specific name, such as that applied to “ reps, ” “tapestry, ” “galloons,” &c., and had been designated in the acts of 1861 and 1862 by such specific name, the argument of the plaintiffs would be well founded. It would be in accordance with the decision of this court in Movius v. Arthur, 95 U. S. 144. But are the terms relied on a name for goods ? Are they not descriptive rather than denominative ? We think it is very clear that they are merely descriptive. It may be true, as stated in the agreed case, that “ such goods are generally known in trade and commerce as goods made of mixed materialsbut the case also adds that “ each kind thereof is also known by its specific name.” The fact that certain goods belong to the class of mixed goods, or of goods made of mixed materials, does not stamp them with the name of mixed goods ; for the same description is applicable to many other kinds of goods, all having different names. It is not their name: it is merely their description.
Since, therefore, the designation in the act of 1861, of “manufactures composed of mixed materials, in part of cotton, silk,” &c., is merely descriptive; and since the designation in the act of 1864, of “ manufactures of which silk is the component part of chief value,” is also descriptive ; and since the goods in question are confessedly embraced in both descriptions; and since the act of 1864 contains no provision relating to mixed goods, like that in the acts of 1861 and 1862, and lays a duty of fifty per cent ad valorem on goods in which silk is the component part of chief value,“ not otherwise provided for,” which we have construed generally to mean not otherwise provided for in this act ” (Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374), — it seems to be almost a matter of demonstration that this was the duty properly demandable on the goods.
It is observable that the description of “ manufactures made of mixed materials, in part of cotton, silk, ” &c., is more general than that of “ manufactures of which silk is the component part of chief value.” Logically, the two phrases standing together in the same act or system of laws would be related as p. 213follows: “ Goods made of mixed materials, cotton, silk, &c., shall pay a duty of thirty-five per cent; but if silk is the component part of chief value, they shall pay a duty of fifty per cent.”
It is suggested by the plaintiffs’ counsel that a counterpart of the clause in the act of 1864, relating to goods in which silk is the component part of chief value, was contained in the acts of March 2, 1861, and Aug. 5, 1861 ; and that if this clause in these acts did not apply to the plaintiffs’ goods, the like clause in the act of 1864 should not be construed to apply to them ; and, to show that the said clause in the acts of 1861 did not apply to the goods, they refer to the fact that, prior to the passing of the act of 1864, the goods now in question were always assessed under the “ mixed materials ” clause, and not under the “ component material of chief value ” clause. We do not think that this argument can prevail. In the first place, it does not appear by the record what the practice was prior to 1864; and if it did appear as suggested, it is observable that under the act of March 2, 1861, it was a matter of indifference under which clause the goods should be assessed, as the duties were the same under both; and, having commenced to assess the goods in one way under that act, the practice may have been inadvertently continued. We think the practice was at least questionable, if it obtained. At all events, the true construction of the law in its ultimate form is too obvious to admit of a reasonable doubt. The goods are aptly described by the general clause in the act of 1864, and are not otherwise provided for in that act, nor provided for by name in any previous act. It follows that they are subject to duty under the said general clause.
We have been unable to find anything in the clauses referred to, or in their collocation in the various acts, or in the method of grouping or classification observed therein, that would lead us to infer an intention to exclude the goods in question from the operation of said general clause. It is sometimes the case, no doubt, that certain articles are so obviously intended to be included in a particular grouping or classification, as to repel any suggestion that they are meant to be embraced in a different part of the law, though literally p. 214applicable to them. But this cannot be said in the case before us. The goods in question have no such inseparable relation to one form of description exclusive of the other; nor are they so clearly intended to be embraced in any particular grouping or classification, as to repel or prevent the application to them of the clause under which they were assessed.
Judgment affirmed.
The “ Benefa ctor .”
1. At about ten o’clock in the forenoon, when the weather was clear and fine, a steamship and a schooner were on the ocean. The schooner, having seen the steamship when six or seven miles away, kept steadily on her course. The steamer saw the schooner when three miles off, and from that time until a collision between them occurred both vessels were sailing on courses which crossed each other, so as to involve risk of collision. Held, that under the circumstances it was the duty of the steamship to keep out of the way of the schooner, and the latter having held her course, the former is liable for the damages occasioned by the collision. 2. The ruling in The Abbotsford (98 U. S. 440), that under the act of Feb. 16,
1875 (18 Stat. 315), the finding of facts by the Circuit Court in admiralty cases is conclusive, and that only rulings upon questions of law can be reviewed by bill of exceptions, reaffirmed.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.
This is a libel filed in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York by William H. Mount and others against the steamship “ Benefactor,” to recover damages arising from a collision between that vessel and the schooner “ Susan Wright.”
The District Court found in favor of the libellants, and from its decree the claimants of the “ Benefactor ” appealed to the Circuit Court. The latter court found, —
1. That the collision took place a little after ten o’clock in the forenoon of the twenty-sixth day of February, 1875, off Squan Beach, New Jersey, and about three miles distant therefrom.
2. That the weather at and prior to the time of the collision was fine and clear, the wind about west-northwest, and strong; p. 215the steamship was bound from New York to Wilmington, and the schooner bound from Matanzas to New York.
3. That the steamship was observed by those in charge of the schooner when six or seven miles distant therefrom, and from twenty to thirty minutes before the collision. At that time the steamship bore a point or two off the starboard bow of the schooner. The schooner was close-hauled, sailing on a course about north by west, at the rate of about eight miles an hour. The steamship was proceeding on a course about south-southwest at the rate of about ten miles an hour, with her sails set, and the wind free, and making much lee-way.
4. That at this time the courses of the two vessels were such as to cross each other, if continued, and such as to bring the two vessels either together or into close proximity to each other, and the two vessels were proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of collision.
5. That on the windward side of the two vessels, and about three miles distant therefrom, was the New Jersey shore, trending at that point about north by east and south by west, and on the leeward side was the open ocean, without any obstruction to safe navigation. There was nothing to prevent the steamship from seasonably changing her course so as to pass either to windward or to leeward of the schooner and give her a wide berth.
6. That from the time when the steamship was observed, as above stated, she was watched by those in charge of the schooner, and the schooner was kept close-hauled upon her course. The steamship was also kept upon her course, without slacking speed or stopping, until the vessels were only a few lengths apart and a collision was imminent, when the peak of her mainsail was lowered, her engines slowed and stopped, and an effort made to pass to leeward of the schooner, but without success.
7. That after the steamship was within a few lengths of the schooner, and a collision was imminent, the captain of the schooner attempted to avoid the impending collision or lessen its force by porting the helm of the schooner; but, after putting the schooner’s wheel only about two spokes to port, he was driven away therefrom by the nearer and dangerous approach p. 216of the steamship, which struck the schooner on her starboard quarter, in consequence of which the schooner sank almost immediately, with her valuable cargo.
8. That the schooner kept her course until the steamship was in close proximity and the collision was imminent, and if there was any change in the schooner’s course after that, and before the collision actually took place, it was very slight; had no effect in producing the collision, and was made in extremis.
9. That at the time of the collision the schooner was of the value of $17,850, the cargo was of the value of $35,046.58; and both the vessel and cargo, by reason of the collision, became a total loss. The amount of damage sustained by William H. Mount, by reason of loss of and injury to his personal effects by the collision was $1,283.85. The net freight lost by reason of the collision was $1,923.14. The amount of damages sustained by the other libellants, by reason of the loss of and injury to their personal effects by the collision, was $591.15.
The court concluded as matters of law, —
1. Upon the steamship and schooner discovering each other proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of collision, as stated in the foregoing findings of fact, it was the right and duty of the schooner to keep her course, and the duty of the steamship to keep out of the way of the schooner; and the steamship was in fault in failing to perform that duty.
2. It was also the duty of the steamship, under the circumstances stated, to pursue a course which should not needlessly put the schooner in imminent peril; and the steamship was in fault in failing to perform that duty.
3. It was the duty of the steamship, before the time when she did so, to slacken her speed or stop; and the steamship was in fault in failing to perform that duty.
4. If, when a collision had become imminent by reason of the fault of the steamship, any error was committed in extremis by those in charge of the schooner, the schooner is not responsible therefor.
5. The steamship had no right, under the circumstances stated, needlessly to place herself in such close proximity to p. 217the schooner that the error of a moment would bring destruction.
6. The collision was occasioned by the fault of the steamship, and the steamship should be condemned therefor.
7. The decree of the District Court was right, and should be affirmed with costs.
The claimants of the “ Benefactor ” thereupon appealed here. Mr. Cornelius Van Santvoord for the appellants. The court declined to hear counsel for the appellees.
Mr . Chief Justi ce Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon the facts as found the judgment below was clearly right. The vessels were on the ocean, and there was nothing to interfere with their navigation. The weather was clear and fine, and the time about ten o’clock in the forenoon. The schooner saw the steamer when six or seven miles away, and from that time steadily kept her course until the collision was imminent. While there is no special finding that the steamer saw the schooner, it would have been a gross fault on her part if she did not; and both in the answer and in the requests for finding presented to the court below it is stated that the schooner was seen when three miles off. From that time until the collision the vessels were sailing on courses which crossed each other, so as to involve a risk of collision. Under these circumstances it was the imperative duty of the steamer to keep out of the way, and of the schooner not to embarrass the steamer by any change of course. The schooner, mindful of her duty, did hold her course, but the steamer did not avoid a collision.
The theory of the steamer seems to have been that, as the schooner was bound for New York, she should have steered more to the eastward than she did, and that the steamer had the right to assume she would do so, and act accordingly. This is clearly wrong. The steamer was bound to govern herself by what the schooner actually did, not by what might have been done. When more than six miles from the steamer, and from twenty to thirty minutes before the collision, the schooner was close-hauled, and on a course which she held steadily all the p. 218time. At that distance from the steamer she had the right to choose her own way of getting to her port of destination, and •the steamer could not require her to change it. As the responsibility of avoiding the collision was on the steamer, it was a fault in her to get so close that a slight change in the course of the schooner, in the midst of what seemed to be imminent peril, would bring the vessels together. It is clear to us that those on board the steamer were deceived as to the movements of the schooner by the leeway they themselves were making, and that they expected to pass to the windward, when they should have shaped their course to go to the leeward.
The only remaining questions are those which arise on the bill of exceptions. In The Abbotsford (98 U. S. 440), we decided that on an appeal in this class of cases we could only pass on such rulings of the court below as might properly be put into a bill of exceptions on the trial of an action at law, and that the findings of fact sent up with the record were conclusive here. If there are errors in these findings, they can only be corrected at the proper time and in the proper way by the court below. We are no longer required to weigh evidence. On an appeal, the findings have all the effect of the verdict of a jury in actions at law. This must be accepted as our final conclusion as to the effect of the act of 1875 (18 Stat. 315) in this particular.
The bill of exceptions in this case contains all the evidence, and a request made of the court by the appellant to find the facts in a certain way. From this request it appears that the only material controversy about the facts was as to whether the schooner negligently changed her course so as to cross the bows of the steamer and bring on the collision. The court, after considering the evidence, which was to some extent conflicting, found that she did not. This disposed of the case, and is conclusive on us. All the exceptions taken have their foundation in this finding, and relate to questions of law which would have arisen if that had been the other way. As we cannot disturb the finding, we cannot consider the exceptions. It follows that the judgment must be affirmed, and it is consequently , , n J So ordered.