Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)

NYQUIST, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION OF

NEW YORK, et al . v. MAUCLET et al .

No. 76-208. Argued March 22, 1977—Decided June 13, 1977

New York statutory provision that bars certain resident aliens from state

financial assistance for higher education held to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 7-12.

(a) State classifications based on alienage are “inherently suspect and

subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372. P. 7.

(b) The statute discriminates against a class and is subject to

strict scrutiny since it is directed at aliens and only aliens are harmed by it even though its bar against them is not absolute in that those who have applied for citizenship or those not qualified to apply who have filed statements of intent may participate in the assistance programs. Graham v. Richardson, supra; cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 504-505, n. 11. Pp. 7-9.

(c) Any incentive through the statute for an alien to become natural-

ized is not a proper state concern, since control over immigration and naturalization is exclusively a federal function. P. 10.

(d) The naturalization incentive (even if that could be accepted,

arguendo, as a justification) or the further justification asserted by appellants, viz., that the financial assistance program is confined to actual or potential voters, thus enhancing the educational level of the electorate, cannot be deemed adequate to support the statute’s ban. If the

encouragement of naturalization through such programs were adequate, every discrimination against aliens could be similarly justified. And the claimed interest in educating the electorate would not be frustrated by including resident aliens in the assistance program. Pp. 10-12. 406 F. Supp. 1233, affirmed.

Bla ck mu n , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Bre nn an , Whi te , Mar sha ll , and Stev en s , JJ., joined. Burg er , C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 12. Pow el l , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Bur ge r , C. J., and Ste wa rt , J., joined, post, p. 15. Reh nq ui st , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Bur ge r , C. J., joined, post, p. 17.

Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Samuel A. HirshowitZf First Assistant Attorney General.

Michael Davidson argued the cause for appellee Mauclet. With him on the brief was Kevin Kennedy. Gary J. Greenberg argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee Rabinovitch.

Mr . Just ice Blackmu n delivered the opinion of the Court. New York, by statute, bars certain resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education. N. Y. Educ. Law § 661 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1976). This litigation presents a constitutional challenge to that statute.

I

There are several general restrictions on eligibility for participation in any of these programs. § 661. For example, there is a modest durational residency requirement. § 661 (5).3 The instant dispute, however, concerns only § 661 (3). That subsection provides:

“Citizenship. An applicant (a) must be a citizen of the United States, or (b) must have made application

(McKinney Supp. 1976); Regents professional education in medicine or dentistry scholarships, §§605 (3) and 672; Regents physician shortage scholarships, §§ 605 (4) and 673; Regents war veteran scholarships, §§ 605 (5) and 674; and Regents Cornell University scholarships, § 605 (6).

to become a citizen, or (c) if not qualified for citizenship, must submit a statement affirming intent to apply for United States citizenship as soon as he has the qualifications, and must apply as soon as eligible for citizenship, or (d) must be an individual of a class of refugees paroled by the attorney general of the United States under his parole authority pertaining to the admission of aliens to the United States.”4

The statute obviously serves to bar from the assistance programs the participation of all aliens who do not satisfy its terms. Since many aliens, such as those here on student visas, may be precluded by federal law from establishing a permanent residence in this country, see, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a)(15)(F)(i); 22 CFR §41.45 (1976), the bar of §661 (3) is of practical significance only to resident aliens. The Court has observed of this affected group: “Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society.” In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722 (1973).

II

Appellee Alan Rabinovitch is a citizen of Canada. He was admitted to this country in 1964 at the age of nine as a permanent resident alien. He is unmarried and, since his admission, has lived in New York with his parents and a younger sister, all of whom are Canadian citizens. He registered with Selective Service on his 18th birthday. He graduated in 1973 from the New York public school system. Id., at 68, 71. As a result of a commendable performance on the competitive Regents Qualifying Examinations, Rabinovitch was informed that he was qualified for, and entitled to, a Regents college scholarship and tuition assistance. He later was advised, however, that the offer of the scholarship was withdrawn since he intended to retain his Canadian citizenship. Id., at 69, 25. Rabinovitch entered Brooklyn College without financial aid from the State. He states that he “does not intend to become a naturalized American, but . . . does intend to continue to reside in New York.” Id., at 65.

Appellants—the various individuals and corporate entities responsible for administering the State’s educational assistance programs—challenge this determination.7 We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 917 (1976).

III

The Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are “inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). See Examining Board n . Flores de Otero, 426 U. S? 572, 601-602 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 642 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, “the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.” Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S., at 605. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721-722. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8

The first purpose offered by the appellants, directed to what they describe as some “degree of national affinity,” Brief for Appellants 18, however, is not a permissible one for a State. Control over immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to interfere. U. S. Const., Art I, § 8, cl. 4. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 84-85 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 376-380; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948). But even if we accept, arguendo, the validity of the proffered justifications, we find them inadequate to support the ban.13

In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642, the Court recognized that the State’s interest “in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within ‘the basic conception of a political community’ ” might justify some consideration of alienage. But as Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State’s historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of voters,14 or of “elective or important nonelective” officials “who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.” Id., at 647. See id., at 648. In re Griffiths, decided the same day, reflects the narrowness of the exception. In that case, despite a recognition of the vital public and political role of attorneys, the Court found invalid a state-court rule limiting the practice of law to citizens. 413 U. S., at 729.

Certainly, the justifications for § 661 (3) offered by appellants sweep far beyond the confines of the exception defined in Sugarman. If the encouragement of naturalization through these programs were seen as adequate, then every discrimination against aliens could be similarly justified. The exception would swallow the rule. Sugarman clearly does not tolerate that result. Nor does the claimed interest in educating the electorate provide a justification; although such education is a laudable objective, it hardly would be frustrated by including resident aliens, as well as citizens, in the State’s assistance programs.15

Bur ge r , C. J., dissenting 432 U. S.

Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the assistance programs. There thus is no real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to participate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis. And although an alien may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may play a role—perhaps even a leadership role—in other areas of import to the community. The State surely is not harmed by providing resident aliens the same educational opportunity it offers to others.

Since we hold that the challenged statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, we need not reach appellees’ claim that it also intrudes upon Congress’ comprehensive authority over immigration and naturalization. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 378; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915).

The judgments of the District Court are affirmed.

Mr . Chief Justice Burger , dissenting. I join Mr . Justice Rehnquist ’s and Mr . Justice Powel l ’s dissenting opinions, but I add this comment to point out yet other significant differences between this case and our prior cases involving alienage-based classifications.

Rico statute permitted only United States citizens to practice as private civil engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973) (membership in state bar limited to citizens); Sugarman n . Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973) (participation in State’s competitive civil service limited to citizens); Takahashi v. Fish& GameComm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948) (state statute denied fishing license to persons “ineligible to citizenship”) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) (state constitution required employers to hire “not less than eighty (80) per cent qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) (city ordinance discriminatorily enforced against aliens so as to prevent Chinese subjects, but not United States citizens, from operating laundries within the city). The only other case striking down a classification on the basis of alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), involved the denial of welfare benefits essential to sustain life for aliens, while needy citizens were given such benefits. The Court has noted elsewhere the crucial role which such benefits play in providing the poor with “means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 264 (1970) (footnote omitted).

In this case the State is not seeking to deprive aliens of the essential means of economic survival. Rather, pursuant to its broad power to regulate its education system, the State has chosen to provide some types of individuals—those it considers most likely to provide a long-range return to the local and national community—certain added benefits to facilitate participation in its system of higher education. The State is certainly not preventing aliens from obtaining an education, and indeed it is clear that appellees may attend New York colleges and universities on an equal footing with citizens. However, beyond that, the State has provided certain economic incentives to its own citizens to induce them to pursue higher studies, which in the long run will be a benefit to the

Bur ge r , C. J., dissenting 432 U. S.

State. The State has not deemed such incentives as necessary or proper as to those aliens who are unwilling to declare their commitment to the community in which they reside by declaring their intent to acquire citizenship. Such simple declaration is all that the statute requires.

In my view, the Constitution of the United States allows States broad latitude in carrying out such programs. Where a fundamental personal interest is not at stake—and higher education is hardly that—the State must be free to exercise its largesse in any reasonable manner. New York, like most other States, does not have unlimited funds to provide its residents with higher education services; it is equally clear that the State has every interest in assuring that those to whom it gives special help in obtaining an education have or declare some attachment indicating their intent to remain within the State to practice their special skills. It has no interest in providing these benefits to transients from another country who are not willing to become citizens. The line drawn by the State is not a perfect one—and few lines can be—but it does provide a rational means to further the State’s legitimate objectives. Resident individuals who are citizens, or who declare themselves committed to the idea of becoming American citizens, are more likely to remain in the State of New York after their graduation than are aliens whose ties to their country of origin are so strong that they decline to sever them in order to secure these valuable benefits.

I therefore conclude that the State of New York has not acted impermissibly in refusing to dispense its limited tax revenues to give assistance to aliens who by clear implication reject the opportunity to become citizens of the United States. Beyond the specific case, I am concerned that we not obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.

Mr . Just ice Powell , with whom The Chief Justice and Mr . Justice Stewart join, dissenting.

I am persuaded, for the reasons set forth in Mr . Justice Rehnquist ’s dissent, that New York’s scheme of financial assistance to higher education does not discriminate against a suspect class. The line New York has drawn in this case is not between aliens and citizens, but between aliens who prefer to retain foreign citizenship and all others.

“The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio School Dist. n . Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1,28 (1973). Our prior cases dealing with discrimination against all aliens as a class, In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973), and against subclasses of aliens without regard to ability or willingness to acquire citizenship, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), do not justify the application of strict judicial scrutiny to the legislative scheme before us today.*

I also agree with Mr . Justi ce Rehnquist that the line New York has drawn in extending scholarship assistance in higher education is a rational one. I see no basis for the Court’s statement that offering incentives to resident alien scholars to become naturalized “is not a permissible [purpose] for a State.” Ante, at 10. In my view, the States have a substantial interest in encouraging allegiance to the United States on the part of all persons, including resident aliens, who have come to live within their borders. As the New York Legislature declared in enacting a predecessor to the present financial assistance scheme:

“The future progress of the state and nation and the general welfare of the people depend upon the individual development of the maximum number of citizens to provide the broad range of leadership, inventive genius, and source of economic and cultural growth for oncoming generations.” 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, § 1 (a). As long as its program neither discriminates “on the basis of alienage,” Graham v. Richardson, supra, at 372, nor conflicts with federal immigration and naturalization policy, it is my view that New York legitimately may reserve its scholarship assistance to citizens, and to those resident aliens who

Mr . Just ice Rehnquist , with whom The Chief Justic e joins, dissenting.

I am troubled by the somewhat mechanical application of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence to this case. I think one can accept the premise of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973); and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973), and therefore agree with the Court that classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect, but nonetheless feel that this case is wrongly decided. In those cases, the reason postulated for the elevation of alienage classifications to strict scrutiny was directly related to the express exclusion of aliens found in the State’s classification. Here, however, we have a significantly different case. The State’s classification trenches not at all upon the sole reason underlying the strict scrutiny afforded alienage classifications by this Court.

Graham v. Richardson is, of course, the starting point of analysis, as it was the first case to explicitly conclude that alienage classifications, like those based on race or nationality, would be subject to strict scrutiny when challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Graham reasoned, 403 U. S., at 372:

NYQUIST v. MAUCLET

not the other. Nothing except time can remove him from his identified status as an “alien” and from whatever associated disabilities the statute might place on one occupying that status. In this sense, it is possible to view aliens as a discrete and insular minority, since they are categorized by a factor beyond their control.

The prior alienage cases from this Court, utilizing strict scrutiny to strike down state statutes, all dealt with statutes where the line drawn necessarily suffered that infirmity; in all of those cases, the line drawn necessarily left incoming resident aliens afflicted with the disability for some period of time. Nothing except the passage of time could remove the alien from the classification and the disability. The statutes, therefore, involved the precise infirmity which led this Court to accord aliens “suspect classification” treatment: The line drawn by the legislature was drawn on the basis of a status, albeit temporary, that the included members were powerless to change.2

While the majority seems to view Graham v. Richardson as somehow different, ante, at 8—9, it is clear that the statute involved in that case suffered from the same weakness. By making aliens, but not citizens, await a durational residency requirement, aliens coming into the State were, because of their status, treated differently from citizens for a period of time, and during that period of time, the incoming aliens were

In all of these cases, then, the classification made by the State conformed to the reason underlying the strict scrutiny this Court applied. But it would seem to follow that if a state statute classifies in a way which necessarily avoids the underlying reason for the strict scrutiny, the statute should be viewed in a different light. This is such a case. Under this New York statute, a resident alien has, at all times, the power to remove himself from one classification and to place himself in the other, for, at all times, he may become entitled to benefits either by becoming a citizen or by declaring his intention to become a citizen as soon as possible.3 Here, unlike the other cases, the resident alien is not a member of a discrete and insular minority for purposes of the classification, even during the period that he must remain an alien, because he has at all times the means to remove himself immediately from the disfavored classification. There is no temporal disability since the resident alien may declare an intent, thereby at once removing himself from the disabled class, even if the intent cannot come to fruition for some period of time. Unlike the situation in Griffiths, Sugarman, and Graham, there exists no period of disability, defined by status, from which the alien cannot escape. The alien is not, there-

Since the New York statute under challenge in this case does not create a discrete and insular minority by placing an inevitable disability based on status, the Court’s heightened judicial scrutiny is unwarranted. The reason for the more rigorous constitutional test having ceased, the applicability of the test should likewise cease. Applying the rational-basis test, it is obvious that the statutory scheme in question should be sustained. The funds that New York wishes to spend on its higher education assistance programs are, of course, limited. New York’s choice to distribute these limited funds to resident citizens and to resident aliens who intend to become citizens, while denying them to aliens who have no intention of becoming citizens, is a natural legislative judgment. By limiting the available pool of recipients to resident citizens and aliens who will become citizens, New York is able to give such recipients a larger payment from the same quantum of funds than would be the case were other aliens recipients as well. A State is entitled to decide, in distributing benefits, that resident citizens, whether or not they will remain residents of New York, are more likely to contribute to the future well-being of the State, either directly (by settling there) or indirectly (by living in some other State, but maintaining economic or social ties with New York or by improving the general well-being of the United States) than are aliens who are unwilling to renounce citizenship in a foreign country, and who may be thought more likely to return there. New