Price v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 553 (1998)
92 N.Y.2d 553
US-DOC-25753014
locator
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Price v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 553 (1998)
Full caption
Fundisha Price, an Infant, by Her Mother and Natural Guard- ian, Shii Price, Appellant, et al., Plaintiç, v New York City Housing Authority, Respondent.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New York (NY)
Court
New York Court of Appeals
Decided
Nov. 24, 1998
Disposition
Affirmed
New York Official Reports
Fundisha Price, an Infant, by Her Mother and Natural Guard- ian, Shii Price, Appellant, et al., Plaintiç, v New York City Housing Authority, Respondent., 92 NY2d 553 [1998]
Fundisha Price, an Infant, by Her Mother and Natural Guard-
ian, Shii Price, Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v New York City Housing Authority, Respondent.
Argued September 15, 1998; decided November 24, 1998
SUMMARY
Appeal, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered November 13, 1997, which affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court (Edward J. Greenfield, J.), entered in New York County upon a verdict in favor of defendant, dismissing the complaint.
HEADNOTES
Trial — Instructions — Adequacy
1. In an action against defendant landlord by plaintiff tenant who was allegedly injured by the criminal act of an intruder due to negligently secured premises, the trial court's charge to the jury, viewed as a whole to determine whether it adequately apprised the jury of the applicable legal standards, correctly stated the law as to plaintiffs’ burden of proof on causation and how the jury should view the testimony of interested witnesses, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ claim that isolated statements in the charge were improper.
Negligence — Maintenance of Premises — Public Landlord — Po-
lice Protection
2. A public entity acting in a proprietary capacity as a landlord is held to the same duty as private landlords in providing security devices in the building, but remains immune from negligence claims arising out of governmental functions such as police protection unless a special relationship with a person creates a specific duty to protect, and that person relies on performance of that duty. Accordingly, in an action against defendant, a municipal landlord, by plaintiff tenant who was allegedly injured by the criminal act of an intruder due to negligently secured premises, defendant's obligation to implement reasonable security measures did not include the duty to warn of ongoing criminal activity in the area. The duty to warn of ongoing criminal activity in an area involves the governmental function of allocation of police protection, and plaintiffs do not allege the requisite special relationship here.
Witnesses — Expert Witness — Scope of Testimony — Qualifica-
tions
3. In an action against defendant landlord by plaintiff tenant who was allegedly injured by the criminal act of an intruder due to negligently secured premises, there was no error of law, on this record, in admitting the testimony of defendant's expert, who was qualified as an expert in criminal behavior analysis and testified that the minimal security afforded by a lock and intercom would not have deterred plaintiff's attacker. The testimony plaintiffs
Points of Counsel
offered about the intruder's impulsiveness and insecurity, and his propensity to commit crimes of opportunity when presented with an unlocked door, opened the door for defendant to offer the expert's contrary opinion. Further, although he had no academic degree in the behavioral sciences, the expert's skill, training, knowledge and experience were adequate to support an assumption that the opinion he rendered was reliable. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion on this particular record in admitting defendant's expert's testimony.
Evidence — Relevance
4. In an action against defendant landlord by plaintiff tenant who was allegedly injured by the criminal act of an intruder due to negligently secured premises, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the testimony of another of the intruder's victims that at the time of the attack on her, the front door of her building had a working lock, but that the intruder was already in the lobby when she arrived there. Given the testimony adduced by plaintiffs regarding the effectiveness of locks and ‘‘crimes of opportunity,’’ it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law in determining that the other victim's testimony was relevant. Any differences in the circumstances between the separate attacks were appropriate subjects for cross-examination and argument to the jury.
TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARYL REFERENCES
By the Publisher’s Editorial Staff
Am Jur 2d, Evidence, §§ 307–312; Expert and Opinion Ev-
idence, §§ 32, 33, 55–62, 350; Premises Liability, §§ 45, 46, 48, 49, 121–123; Trial, §§ 1077, 1078, 1120, 1123, 1124.
Carmody-Wait 2d, Presentation of the Case § 56:41. NY Jur 2d, Evidence and Witnesses, §§ 179, 180, 636, 639,
678; Premises Liability, §§ 33–39, 43, 60, 193; Trial, §§ 400, 411, 413–417.
ANNOTATION REFERENCE
See ALR Index under Evidence Rules; Expert and
Opinion Evidence; Instructions to Jury; Premises Liability.
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Steve S. Efron, New York City, and Madeline Lee Bryer for appellant. I. Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability should have been granted. (Chainani v Board of Educ., 87 NY2d 370; Felker v Corning Inc., 90 NY2d 219; Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650; Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506; Skaria v State of New York, 110 Misc 2d 711; Rosario v New York City Hous. Auth., 230 AD2d 900; Rojas v Lynn, 218 AD2d 611; Weidman v Ketcham, 278 NY 129; Grillias v D'Arrigo Bros. Co., 144 AD2d 638.) II. The
Points of Counsel
court's charge was fundamentally flawed and deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. (Russo v Port Auth., 98 AD2d 618; Leonard v Davenport & Sons, 44 AD2d 781; Caldwell v Village of Is. Park, 304 NY 268; Schneider v Kings Highway Hosp. Ctr., 67 NY2d 743; Swensson v New York, Albany Desp. Co., 309 NY 497; Dempsey v Methodist Hosp., 159 AD2d 541; Wragge v Lizza Asphalt Constr. Co., 17 NY2d 313; Jacqueline S. v City of New York, 81 NY2d 288; Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506; People v Agosto, 73 NY2d 963.) III. The court erroneously precluded plaintiff from proceeding on the theory that, in the circumstances of this case, the Housing Authority's duty to implement reasonable security measures included the duty to warn. (Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506; Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175; Rubino v City of New York, 114 AD2d 243; Gurevitch v State of New York, 284 App Div 717.) IV. Multiple evidentiary errors deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. (Dawson v New York City Hous. Auth., 203 AD2d 55; Ferrer v Harris, 55 NY2d 285; Witherel v Balling Constr., 99 AD2d 646; Rigie v Goldman, 148 AD2d 23; Halloran v Virginia Chems., 41 NY2d 386; People v Wernick, 89 NY2d 111; Gomez v New York City Hous. Auth., 217 AD2d 110; Borden v Brady, 92 AD2d 983; People v Jones, 73 NY2d 427; Hambsch v New York City Tr. Auth., 63 NY2d 723.)
Herzfeld & Rubin, P. C., New York City (Herbert Rubin, David B. Hamm and Miriam Skolnik of counsel), for respondent. I. The jury's finding that the Housing Authority's negligence was not a cause of plaintiff's injuries was supported by the evidence. Conflicting evidence on whether the presence of a lock would have averted plaintiff's injuries presented a jury question and precluded judgment as a matter of law in plaintiff's favor. (Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513; Mack v Altmans Stage Light. Co., 98 AD2d 468; Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507; Bridges v Riverbay Corp., 102 AD2d 800, 64 NY2d 1075; Santiago v New York City Hous. Auth., 63 NY2d 761; Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506; Jacqueline S. v City of New York, 81 NY2d 288; Waters v New York City Hous. Auth., 69 NY2d 225; Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308; Rivera v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 72 NY2d 1021.) II. The court's instructions properly charged the jury with regard to the elements of proximate causation. In any event, plaintiff's acknowledgment on the record that the charge as to proximate cause and circumstantial evidence was correct precludes review of that aspect of the charge. Certainly, a new trial is not warranted. (People v Ad-
Points of Counsel
ams, 69 NY2d 805; Fleischer v Melmarkets, Inc., 174 AD2d 647; Timmons v Hecker, 110 AD2d 762; Grow Tunneling Corp. v City of New York, 70 NY2d 665; People v Hoke, 62 NY2d 1022; Bernstein v City of New York, 69 NY2d 1020; McCummings v New York City Tr. Auth., 177 AD2d 24, 81 NY2d 923, 510 US 991; Chazon v Parkway Med. Group, 168 AD2d 660; Pestarino v Town of Islip, 114 AD2d 890.) III. The circumstances of this case do not give rise to a duty to warn of a ‘‘heightened risk’’ of criminal activity. Such a duty, if any, is part of a governmental function to provide police protection. In the absence of a special duty, the ‘‘failure to perform’’ such governmental functions is not actionable. (Miller of State of New York, 62 NY2d 506; Rubino v City of New York, 114 AD2d 243; Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175; De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296.) IV. The evidence propounded by the Housing Authority in support of its defense that the absence of a lock was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was clearly admissible. Accordingly, the order of the court below sustaining the trial court's admission of that evidence should be affirmed. (Radosh v Shipstad, 20 NY2d 504; Rhoades v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 202 AD2d 762; Uss v Town of Oyster Bay, 37 NY2d 639; People v Pitsley, 185 AD2d 645, 81 NY2d 792; People v Mastropietro, 232 AD2d 725, 89 NY2d 1038; People v Steinberg, 170 AD2d 50, 79 NY2d 673; Meiselman v Crown Hgts. Hosp., 285 NY 389; Caprara v Chrysler Corp., 52 NY2d 114; Van Scooter v 450 Trabold Rd., 206 AD2d 865; Sitaras v Ricciardi & Sons, 154 AD2d 451, 75 NY2d 708.) V. The arguments raised by amici, which focus primarily on the provisions and impact of Multiple Dwelling Law § 50-a, are not relevant to the issues presented on this appeal and should not be considered by this Court.
Susan Xenarios, New York City, Ken Schaeffer and Galen Sherwin for Downstate Coalition for Crime Victims, New York State, and others, amici curiae. I. Public policy precludes a jury from hearing evidence that contradicts express legislative findings. II. Residential tenants should not be subjected to a higher burden of proof than commercial tenants. (Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507; Freno v Sutton, 160 AD2d 597.) III. This Court should review whether the testimony of criminal profiler Peter Smerick was admissible expert opinion. (People v Neer, 129 AD2d 829; People v Berrios, 150 Misc 2d 229; Matter of Arrigo, 132 Misc 2d 113.)
Opinion per Chief Judge Kaye
OPINION OF THE COURT
Chief Judge Kaye. Today, in Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp. (92 NY2d 544), the Court delineates the standard for establishing proximate cause in suits against landlords for negligently secured premises by tenants injured as a result of a third party's criminal attack. This appeal, involving an attack on a tenant by someone known to be an intruder, differs from Burgos in several material respects, leading us to affirm the Appellate Division order, which itself affirmed the jury verdict in defendant's favor.
On the afternoon of December 12, 1987, while waiting in the lobby of the apartment building where she resided, plaintiff was pushed into an elevator, robbed and sexually assaulted at knifepoint by a person acknowledged by defendant building owner to have been an intruder. The front door of the building was not equipped with a lock. Plaintiff's mother, individually and on behalf of her daughter, sought damages for defendant's negligent failure to provide the building with adequate security. In a special verdict, the jury found that defendant was negligent, but additionally found that defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the verdict on proximate cause was supported by the evidence.
[1] Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's instruction overstated their burden of proof on causation and improperly instructed the jury on how it should view the testimony of interested witnesses. While plaintiffs (and the dissent) point to isolated statements they claim were improper, as we have innumerable times held the charge must be viewed as a whole to determine whether it adequately apprised the jury of the applicable legal standards. Viewing the charge in that light, we conclude that it correctly stated the law (see, Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544, supra).
[2] Plaintiffs further contend that defendant's obligation to implement reasonable security measures included the duty to warn of ongoing criminal activity in the area, and that it was error for the trial court to preclude them from proceeding on a duty to warn theory. When a public entity acts in a proprietary capacity as a landlord, it is held to the same duty as private landlords in providing security devices in the building (see, Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 508). However, it remains immune from negligence claims arising out of governmental functions such as police protection unless a special re-
Opinion per Chief Judge Kaye
lationship with a person creates a specific duty to protect, and that person relies on performance of that duty (id., at 510). Plaintiffs do not allege such a special relationship here. Since the duty to warn of ongoing criminal activity in an area involves the governmental function of allocation of police protection (see, Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175, 182), plaintiffs were properly precluded from maintaining a duty to warn claim.
[3, 4] Addressing the dissent, on this record no error of law was committed in admitting the testimony of Peter Smerick or Lakeshia Johnson.
Peter Smerick, who was qualified as an expert in criminal behavior analysis, testified that the minimal security afforded by a lock and intercom would not have deterred plaintiff's attacker, Ronnie Matthews. Smerick based his conclusion on Matthews’ conduct, verbal behavior, and use of a knife during his attacks on plaintiff and several other victims. Smerick also considered the serial nature of Matthews’ crimes. Whether expert testimony is admissible on a particular point is generally a mixed question of law and fact (see, Selkowitz v County of Nassau, 45 NY2d 97, 101-102). Thus, the ‘‘admissibility and bounds of expert testimony are addressed primarily to the sound discretion of the trial court, and review beyond the intermediate appellate level is generally unwarranted’’ (People v Cronin, 60 NY2d 430, 433; see also, People v Miller, 91 NY2d 372, 379). While this Court can, of course, review a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony that constituted an abuse of discretion, there was no such abuse on the particular record before us.
First, contrary to the dissent, Smerick's testimony did not shift the jury's focus away from the issue of proximate cause. In order to demonstrate the proximate cause burden in a security premises case, a tenant victimized in a criminal attack must prove that the assailant was an intruder who gained access to the premises through a negligently maintained entrance (see, Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544, supra). Plaintiffs in this case, however, chose to introduce additional evidence regarding proximate cause, which in turn led to Smerick's testimony rebutting this additional evidence.
While the dissent characterizes the testimony of plaintiffs’ security expert Professor Hair as pertaining to ‘‘the properties of a lock and the manner in which a lock serves to secure a given area,’’ Professor Hair in fact also testified that ‘‘criminals
Opinion per Chief Judge Kaye
are known * * * to take crimes of opportunity. A crime of opportunity, for example, would be a criminal walking by and checking a door and finding no lock on it. Well, let's go investigate, what are the opportunities to commit criminal acts, for example.’’ Detective Robert Fleming, who investigated the attack and was one of the officers who arrested Matthews, also testified on plaintiffs’ behalf that an unlocked door provides a person who is ‘‘immature and acts on impulse’’ with an opportunity to commit a crime. This testimony immediately followed plaintiffs’ reading into the record of a psychiatric report of Matthews stating that ‘‘[h]is personality characteristics reflect a rather insecure and immature person who acts on impulse.’’ Finally, Dr. Robert Goldstein, a psychiatrist called by plaintiffs, testified that unlike a stalker, an impulsive person is one ‘‘who just at the spur of the moment gets an impulse or a thought, and acts it out without thinking about the consequences.’’
[3] The testimony plaintiffs offered about Matthews’ impulsiveness and insecurity, and his propensity to commit crimes of opportunity when presented with an unlocked door, furnished the occasion for defendant to offer Smerick's contrary opinion that the presence of a lock would not have deterred Matthews from attacking plaintiff. The dissent disagrees that Smerick's testimony rebutted that of Dr. Goldstein and Detective Fleming because only part of their testimony concerned whether a lock would have deterred Matthews, and because those witnesses were called by plaintiffs for other purposes. As the testimony quoted from the record demonstrates, however, in actual fact plaintiffs’ witnesses opened the door to Smerick's contrary opinion, regardless of why those witnesses were called or what other topics their testimony covered.
Furthermore, while the dissent correctly notes that Smerick did not have formal training in psychology or the behavioral sciences, an expert may be qualified without specialized academic training through ‘‘[l]ong observation and actual experience’’ (Meiselman v Crown Hgts. Hosp., 285 NY 389, 398; see also, Caprara v Chrysler Corp., 52 NY2d 114, 121, rearg denied 52 NY2d 1073 [an expert's competency can be derived just as well ‘‘from the real world of everyday use’’ as from a laboratory]). As this record demonstrates, although he had no academic degree in the behavioral sciences, Smerick's skill, training, knowledge and experience were adequate to support an assumption that the opinion he rendered was reliable (see, Matott v Ward, 48 NY2d 455, 459).
Dissenting opinion per Smith, J.
[4] Finally, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the testimony of Lakeshia Johnson, another of Matthews’ victims. Johnson testified that at the time of the attack, the front door of her building had a working lock, but that Matthews was already in the lobby when she arrived there. The dissent argues, in effect, that Johnson's testimony was irrelevant since Johnson and plaintiff lived in different buildings, and there was no evidence demonstrating how Matthews entered Johnson's building. Determinations of relevancy rest largely in the discretion of the trial court (see, Radosh v Shipstad, 20 NY2d 504, 508, rearg denied 20 NY2d 969). Given the testimony adduced by plaintiffs regarding the effectiveness of locks and ‘‘crimes of opportunity,’’ we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law in determining that Johnson's testimony was relevant. Furthermore, any differences in the circumstances between Matthews’ attacks on plaintiff and Johnson were appropriate subjects for crossexamination and argument to the jury. Indeed, in summation plaintiffs’ counsel argued the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various witnesses.
Plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Smith, J. (dissenting). Because the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the testimony of a purported criminal profiler and the testimony of a young woman allegedly assaulted by the same attacker, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remand the action for a new trial.
Seventeen-year-old Fundisha Price was returning home from choir practice when she was accosted near the lobby elevator bank of her building and taken up to the roof landing at knifepoint. Ms. Price was sexually assaulted and sodomized. The perpetrator, later identified as Ronnie Matthews, had entered the building through the front door that did not contain any locking device.* Ms. Price and her mother commenced this action against the New York City Housing Authority alleging
* Between December 20 and December 22, 1987, several victims viewed a photo array of various paroled offenders. Ronnie Matthews was identified by some of the victims as a possible suspect. On December 23, 1987 two officers from the Manhattan Sex Crimes Squad apprehended Matthews in the hallway of 210 West 153rd Street. He was brought to the Housing Authority Police Department for the purpose of conducting lineup identifications and
(n. cont’d)
Dissenting opinion per Smith, J.
that its negligent failure to provide minimum security was the proximate cause of her injuries.
During the litigation, the Housing Authority conceded that it was negligent in failing to equip the building's front door with a lock, conceded that the perpetrator was not a resident of the building, and conceded that the perpetrator entered the building through the unlocked front door. Thus, the only contested issue was whether the Housing Authority's negligence was the proximate cause of Price's injuries.
At trial, plaintiff elicited the testimony of Professor Hair, a professor of security management at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Professor Hair, who spent 25 years in the New York City Police Department and is a retired deputy inspector of the police force, also serves as a consultant to several corporations, institutions, and housing management organizations on matters of security. Professor Hair testified that a lock is a delaying security device; its primary function is to create a delay in the time in which an intruder could effect an unauthorized entry. In creating this delay, a lock also serves as a deterrent. Professor Hair stated that because a lock lessens the chances of successfully breaking into a building, there is a greater risk of capture to the criminal. If a door or entrance has no lock, the risk of capture decreases and thus the opportunity to commit a criminal act increases.
The Housing Authority, in response, called to the stand, as the last witness before the jury, Peter Smerick, a partner and vice-president of a self-described forensic or behavioral science consulting firm in Virginia. The firm, which consisted of four retired FBI agents and one retired Secret Service agent, uses the collective knowledge of these men to address issues of criminal behavior and violent crime. According to Smerick, the firm is called upon to perform criminal profiling and violent crime analysis whereby its members analyze the behavior of a criminal offender in a particular case. Smerick was previously an FBI expert in document examinations, including fingerprints and handwriting analysis, and in forensic photography. The court qualified him as an expert in ‘‘criminal behavior analysis.’’
In this case, Smerick was given numerous documents, including parole record hearings, police department investigative reports, indictments and other records pertaining to other
he was positively identified by four of the victims. Matthews was then arrested.
Dissenting opinion per Smith, J.
sexual assaults allegedly committed by Ronnie Matthews, and deposition transcripts of the victim and security experts. It is claimed that these documents provided information about Ronnie Matthews’ background and behavior. Based upon his training and review of the data, Smerick testified that, in his expert opinion, Ronnie Matthews, the person who assaulted Fundisha Price, was a predatory serial rapist and a calculating career criminal who would not have been deterred by a lock on the door.
This evidence shifted the jury's focus away from the issue of proximate cause in this case. The trial court permitted Smerick to testify that there were six categories of rapists and that because Matthews was a so-called power assertive rapist, he would not have been deterred by a locked door. This evidence was totally irrelevant on the issue of whether it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Matthews walked through an unlocked door prior to sexually assaulting the plaintiff. Again, the issue was not whether Matthews was the type of individual who would not have been deterred by a locked door but rather whether a jury could reasonably conclude that a door which was admittedly unlocked was a substantial factor in the assault upon the plaintiff.
I cannot agree with the majority that Smerick's testimony was in rebuttal to testimony given by Professor Hair, Dr. Goldstein and Detective Fleming.
Dr. Goldstein, a psychiatrist, was called to give a psychological assessment of the plaintiff. His conclusion was that as the result of being sexually assaulted, plaintiff was suffering ‘‘major depression with post-traumatic stress features.’’ He attributed a change in her work, study and outside activities to the assault. Detective Fleming was called because he was the arresting officer and a person who conducted an extensive investigation of the crime. Smerick was not qualified to nor did he rebut the testimony of Dr. Goldstein. Moreover, there was no challenge by Smerick to the investigation by Detective Fleming.
‘‘The guiding principle is that expert opinion is proper when it would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror’’ (De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 307). The expert ‘‘should be possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience from which it can be assumed that the information imparted or the opinion
Dissenting opinion per Smith, J.
rendered is reliable’’ (Matott v Ward, 48 NY2d 455, 459). The expert's opinion cannot be founded upon speculation or supposition (id., at 463).
Though Smerick's experiences with the Federal Bureau of Investigation were varied, his testimony did not clarify an issue or provide general or technical information from which a jury could draw factual inferences. While Smerick testified that he was trained to analyze information and draw conclusions about the identity of criminal suspects based on data provided and clues left behind, his testimony in this case went far beyond even his own training or experiences. In this case, Smerick rendered an opinion regarding Matthews’ inner thoughts and future actions; he purported to be capable of ‘‘getting inside [the] mind’’ of Ronnie Matthews. But no foundation was established demonstrating Smerick's qualification to engage in such an activity. It does not appear that Smerick had any formal training in psychology or the behavioral sciences which would qualify him to forecast Matthews’ future behavior. His testimony regarding what Matthews would have done had a lock been in place was sheer speculation.
Moreover, it cannot be argued that Smerick's testimony was brought in rebuttal to the testimony of Professor Hair. The primary focus of Professor Hair's testimony was upon the properties of a lock and the manner in which a lock serves to secure a given area. Smerick's testimony went beyond the properties of a lock. In fact, Smerick's testimony had nothing at all to do with a lock, but was focused on the ‘‘properties’’ of the perpetrator. It cannot reasonably be said that Professor Hair opened the door to such testimony.
Finally, the testimony of another young woman sexually assaulted by Ronnie Matthews in another apartment complex should not have been presented to the jury. That individual testified that though the front door of her building had been locked, Matthews was already inside of her building when she passed through the front door. This testimony was adduced, it appears, to buttress the contention that Matthews would have found a way to enter the building notwithstanding the presence of a lock. However, there was no evidence demonstrating that Matthews was not a guest of a tenant in that particular building or that he entered that building along with another resident, or even that he entered the building in another manner. No foundation existed from which a fact finder could infer that because Matthews entered one building with a locked front door, Matthews could enter all buildings with locked doors.
Dissenting opinion per Smith, J.
Indeed, this victim's testimony was simply irrelevant. ‘‘Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove the existence of any material fact, i.e., it makes determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence’’ (People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777). That Matthews gained entry into this particular building is not probative of whether he would have been able to gain entry into plaintiff's building had defendant placed a lock on the front door. The young woman's testimony could not and did not address or clarify the critical issue before the jury: whether defendant's failure to place a lock on the front door of Fundisha Price's apartment building was the proximate cause of the sexual assault.
Finally the court's charge was flawed. The court's charge was that ‘‘it must be demonstrated if plaintiff is to establish that an unlocked or defective door was a proximate cause, that other means of access have been ruled out. I use the term ruled out as doctors sometimes do.’’ Contrary to this charge, plaintiff was required to prove only that it was ‘‘more likely’’ than not that an assailant entered the premises through an unlocked door (Schneider v Kings Highway Hosp. Ctr., 67 NY2d 743, 745; Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544).
In sum, the admission of Smerick's testimony and that of another victim of sexual assault were irrelevant to the proximate cause issue in this case and constituted prejudicial error. The charge to the jury was also flawed.
Judges Bellacosa, Levine, Ciparick and Wesley concur with Chief Judge Kaye; Judge Smith dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion.
Order affirmed, with costs.