Speller ex rel. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 100 N.Y.2d 38 (2003)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Speller ex rel. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 100 N.Y.2d 38 (2003)
Full caption
Elijah Speller, by His Guardian, Stacy Miller, et al., Appel- lants, v Sears, Roebuck and Co. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New York (NY)
Court
New York Court of Appeals
Decided
May 6, 2003
Disposition
Reversed
New York Official Reports
Elijah Speller, by His Guardian, Stacy Miller, et al., Appel- lants, v Sears, Roebuck and Co. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants., 100 NY2d 38 [2003]
Elijah Speller, by His Guardian, Stacy Miller, et al., Appel-
lants, v Sears, Roebuck and Co. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
Argued March 25, 2003; decided May 6, 2003
SUMMARY
Appeal, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, entered May 6, 2002, which (1) reversed, on the law, an order of the Supreme Court (Orin R. Kitzes, J.), entered in Queens County, denying a motion by defendants Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Whirlpool Corporation for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, (2) granted the motion, (3) dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against defendants Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Whirlpool Corporation, and (4) severed the action against the remaining defendants.
HEADNOTE
Products Liability — Burden of Proof — Establishing Defect
Circumstantially
In a products liability action where plaintis allege that a defective refrigerator started the Žre that caused their injuries but are unable to determine the precise nature of the defect, the Appellate Division erred in granting the motion for summary judgment brought by the refrigerator's manufacturer and retailer. In order to proceed in the absence of evidence identifying a speciŽc aw, a plainti must prove that the product did not perform as intended and exclude all other causes for its failure that are not attributable to defendants. Although defendants oered evidence that a stovetop grease Žre caused the house Žre, plaintis came forward with competent evidence, in the form of three expert opinions, excluding the stove as the origin of the Žre. Because a reasonable jury could credit this proof and Žnd that plaintis excluded all other causes of the Žre not attributable to defendants, material issues of fact exist requiring a trial.
TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARYL REFERENCES
By the Publisher’s Editorial Sta
Am Jur 2d, Products Liability §§ 609–611, 1084. NY Jur 2d, Products Liability §§ 24–26, 196.
ANNOTATION REFERENCE
See ALR Index under Products Liability; Refrigerators
and Refrigeration.
Points of Counsel
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Renfroe & Quinn, Forest Hills (John E. Quinn of counsel), for appellants. I. The Appellate Division improperly weighed the evidence and made determinations of credibility in reversing the denial of summary judgment by the Supreme Court. (Sideris v Simon A. Rented Servs., 254 AD2d 408; Dubecky v S2 Yachts, 234 AD2d 501; Winckel v Atlantic Rentals & Sales, 159 AD2d 124; Jastrzebski v North Shore School Dist., 223 AD2d 677, 88 NY2d 946; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851; Byrnes v Scott, 175 AD2d 786; Gibson v American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 125 AD2d 65; Marano v Mercy Hosp., 241 AD2d 48; Menzel v Plotnick, 202 AD2d 558; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623.) II. In a product liability action direct evidence of defect can be established by expert testimony when the defective part was destroyed and is unavailable for testing. (Halloran v Virginia Chems., 41 NY2d 386; Dubecky v S2 Yachts, 234 AD2d 501; State Farm Ins. Co. v Amana Refrig., 266 AD2d 372.) III. The Appellate Division erred in placing a higher burden of proof upon plainti-appellant as the opponent to a summary judgment motion than upon the movant itself. IV. The Appellate Division erred in reversing the denial of summary judgment as a matter of law because the evidence presents questions of fact. (Jastrzebski v North Shore School Dist., 223 AD2d 677, 88 NY2d 946; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851; Byrnes v Scott, 175 AD2d 786; Gibson v American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 125 AD2d 65; Marano v Mercy Hosp., 241 AD2d 48; Ugarriza v Schmieder, 46 NY2d 471; Johnson v Michelin Tire Corp., 110 AD2d 824; Noseworthy v City of New York, 298 NY 76; Ferraro v Cinelli, 193 AD2d 409; Costalas v City of New York, 143 AD2d 573.)
Leader & Berkon LLP, New York City (James K. Leader of counsel), and Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for respondents. Plaintis-appellants’ claims were properly dismissed because they failed to present direct evidence of a speciŽc defect in the refrigerator. (Halloran v Virginia Chems., 41 NY2d 386; Rosa v General Motors Corp., 226 AD2d 213; Shelden v Hample Equip. Co., 89 AD2d 766, 59 NY2d 618; Henry v General Motors Corp., 201 AD2d 949; Sideris v Simon A. Rented Servs., 254 AD2d 408; Brown v Borruso, 238 AD2d 884; Fox v Corning Glass Works, 81 AD2d 826; Mayorga v Reed-Prentice Packaging Mach. Co., 238 AD2d 483; Herman v St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 242 AD2d 316; Codling v Paglia, 32 NY2d 330.)
Opinion per Graffeo, J.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Graffeo, J. In this products liability case, defendants—a product manufacturer and retailer—were granted summary judgment dismissing plaintis’ complaint. Because we conclude that plaintis raised a triable issue of fact concerning whether a defective refrigerator caused the Žre that resulted in plaintis’ injuries, we reverse and reinstate the complaint against these defendants.
Plaintis’ decedent Sandra Speller died in a house Žre that also injured her seven-year-old son. It is undisputed that the Žre originated in the kitchen. Plaintis commenced this action against Sears, Roebuck and Co., Whirlpool Corporation and the property owner alleging negligence, strict products liability and breach of warranty.* Relevant to this appeal, plaintis asserted that the Žre was caused by defective wiring in the refrigerator, a product manufactured by Whirlpool and sold by Sears.
After discovery, defendants Sears and Whirlpool moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint. Relying principally on a report issued by the New York City Fire Marshal, defendants rejected the refrigerator as the source of the Žre, instead contending that a stovetop grease Žre was the cause of the conagration. Thus, they argued that their product was outside the chain of causation that resulted in plaintis’ damages.
In opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintis submitted excerpts from the depositions of two experts and an adavit from a third, as well as other materials. Plaintis’ experts refuted the conclusions reached in the Fire Marshal's report, opining that the Žre started in the upper right quadrant of the refrigerator, an area with a concentration of electrical wiring. All three rejected the stove as the source of the Žre. Plaintis also submitted portions of the deposition of a Whirlpool engineer retained as an expert by defendants. Although the engineer disputed that the Žre originated in the refrigerator, he acknowledged that a Žre would not occur in a refrigerator unless the product was defective.
* This action has been joined with a subrogation action commenced by Prudential Insurance Co., the homeowner's insurer, against Sears and Whirlpool for purposes of trial only. The Prudential action is not before us on this appeal.
Opinion per Graffeo, J.
Supreme Court denied defendants’ request for summary judgment, holding that plaintis’ submissions raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the Žre was caused by a defect in the refrigerator. The Appellate Division reversed and granted the motion, dismissing the complaint as against Sears and Whirlpool. The Court reasoned that defendants’ evidence suggesting an alternative cause of the Žre shifted the burden to plaintis to come forward with speciŽc evidence of a defect. Characterizing the submissions of plaintis’ experts as ‘‘equivocal,’’ the Court concluded that plaintis failed to satisfy their burden of proof to withstand summary judgment. (294 AD2d 349, 350 [2002].) This Court granted plaintis leave to appeal.
A party injured as a result of a defective product may seek relief against the product manufacturer or others in the distribution chain if the defect was a substantial factor in causing the injury. ‘‘A product may be defective when it contains a manufacturing aw, is defectively designed or is not accompanied by adequate warnings for the use of the product’’ (Liriano v Hobart Corp., 92 NY2d 232, 237 [1998]; Robinson v Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 NY2d 471, 478 [1980]).
In this case, plaintis’ theory was that the wiring in the upper right quadrant of the refrigerator was faulty, causing an electrical Žre which then spread to other areas of the kitchen and residence. Because that part of the refrigerator had been consumed in the Žre, plaintis noted that it was impossible to examine or test the wiring to determine the precise nature of the defect. Thus, plaintis sought to prove their claim circumstantially by establishing that the refrigerator caused the house Žre and therefore did not perform as intended.
New York has long recognized the viability of this circumstantial approach in products liability cases. Indeed its origins can be traced back to Codling v Paglia (32 NY2d 330, 337 [1973]), where this Court stated that a plainti ‘‘is not required to prove the speciŽc defect’’ and that ‘‘[p]roof of necessary facts may be circumstantial.’’ In order to proceed in the absence of evidence identifying a speciŽc aw, a plainti must prove that the product did not perform as intended and exclude all other causes for the product's failure that are not attributable to defendants (Halloran v Virginia Chems., 41 NY2d 386, 388 [1977]; see generally Kreindler, Rodriguez, Beekman and Cook, New York Law of Torts § 16.64, at 519-522 [15 West's NY Prac Series 1997]). In this regard, New York law is consistent with the Restatement, which reads:
Opinion per Graffeo, J.
‘‘It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plainti was caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a speciŽc defect, when the incident that harmed the plainti: ‘‘(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and ‘‘(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution’’ (Restatement [Third] of Torts: Products Liability § 3 [1998]). Of course, if a plainti's proof is insucient with respect to either prong of this circumstantial inquiry, a jury may not infer that the harm was caused by a defective product unless plainti oers competent evidence identifying a speciŽc aw (see Shelden v Hample Equip. Co., 59 NY2d 618 [1983], ag 89 AD2d 766 [3d Dept 1982]).
Here, in their motion for summary judgment, defendants focused on the second prong of the circumstantial inquiry, offering evidence that the injuries were not caused by their product but by an entirely dierent instrumentality—a grease Žre that began on top of the stove. This was the conclusion of the Fire Marshal who stated during deposition testimony that his opinion was based on his interpretation of the burn patterns in the kitchen, his observation that one of the burner knobs on the stove was in the ‘‘on’’ position, and his conversation with a resident of the home who apparently advised him that the oven was on when the resident placed some food on the stovetop a few hours before the Žre.
In order to withstand summary judgment, plaintis were required to come forward with competent evidence excluding the stove as the origin of the Žre. To meet that burden, plaintis oered three expert opinions: the depositions of an electrical engineer and a Žre investigator, and the adavit of a former Deputy Chief of the New York City Fire Department. Each concluded that the Žre originated in the refrigerator and not on the stove.
In his extensive deposition testimony, the electrical engineer opined that the Žre started in the top-right-rear corner of the refrigerator, an area that housed the air balancing unit, thermostat, moisture control and light control. He stated that the wiring in this part of the appliance had been destroyed in the Žre, making it impossible to identify the precise mechanical failure and, thus, he could only speculate as to the speciŽc
Opinion per Graffeo, J.
nature of the defect. He testiŽed that the ‘‘most logical probability’’ was that a bad connection or bad splice to one of the components in that portion of the unit caused the wire to become ‘‘red hot’’ and to ignite the adjacent plastic. He tested the combustibility of the plastic and conŽrmed that the ‘‘plastic lights up very easily, with a single match’’ and continues to burn like candle wax. The engineer observed that the doors of the refrigerator were ‘‘slightly bellied out,’’ indicating they were blown out from the expanding hot gases inside the refrigerator. The wall behind the refrigerator was signiŽcantly damaged and the upper right quadrant was burned to such a degree that it was not likely to have been caused by an external Žre. Interpreting the burn patterns dierently from the Fire Marshal, the electrical engineer found that the cabinets above the stove, although damaged, were not destroyed to the extent he expected to Žnd if there had been a stovetop grease Žre.
Plaintis’ Žre investigator similarly opined that the Žre originated in the refrigerator's upper right corner, in part basing his conclusion on his observations of the scene three days after the Žre and his examination of the appliances. He also interviewed a witness to the Žre. He testiŽed that he eliminated the stove as the source of the Žre after his examination of that appliance and the cabinets above it. Contrary to the testimony of the Fire Marshal, he observed that all of the burner knobs on the stove were in the same position, either all ‘‘o’’ or all ‘‘on.’’ He further examined the burn patterns, noting that if the blaze had been caused by a grease Žre on the stove, the cabinets directly above would have been consumed in the Žre. Instead, they were merely damaged. He acknowledged that he did not know exactly how the Žre started inside the refrigerator but indicated he suspected there had been a poor connection in the wiring that caused the wire to smolder until it ignited the highly combustible foam insulation inside the unit.
The former Deputy Chief of the New York City Fire Department asserted in his adavit that the ‘‘Žre damage to the area around the refrigerator when compared to that of the stove clearly shows the longer and heavier burn at the refrigerator,’’ indicating the Žre originated there. He also stated that he had ruled out all other possible origins of the Žre.
Upon review of these expert depositions and adavit, we conclude that plaintis raised a triable question of fact by offering competent evidence which, if credited by the jury, was sucient to rebut defendants’ alternative cause evidence. In other words, based on plaintis’ proof, a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintis excluded all other causes of the Žre.
Opinion per Graffeo, J.
We therefore disagree with the Appellate Division's characterization of plaintis’ submissions as equivocal. Plaintis’ experts consistently asserted that the Žre originated in the upper right quadrant of the refrigerator and each contended the stove was not the source of the blaze. Both parties supported their positions with detailed, nonconclusory expert depositions and other submissions which explained the bases for the opinions.
Defendants contend that after they came forward with evidence suggesting an alternative cause of the Žre, plaintis were foreclosed from establishing a product defect circumstantially but were then required to produce evidence of a speciŽc defect to survive summary judgment. We reject this approach for two reasons. First, such an analysis would allow a defendant who oered minimally sucient alternative cause evidence in a products liability case to foreclose a plainti from proceeding circumstantially without a jury having determined whether defendant's evidence should be credited. Second, it misinterprets the court's role in adjudicating a motion for summary judgment, which is issue identiŽcation, not issue resolution. Where causation is disputed, summary judgment is not appropriate unless ‘‘only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts’’ (Kriz v Schum, 75 NY2d 25, 34 [1989]). That is not the case here where plaintis directly rebutted defendants’ submissions with competent proof speciŽ- cally ruling out the stove as the source of the blaze. Because a reasonable jury could credit this proof and Žnd that plaintis excluded all other causes of the Žre not attributable to defendants, this case presents material issues of fact requiring a trial.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the motion of defendants Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Whirlpool Corporation for summary judgment denied.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Smith, Ciparick, Wesley, Rosenblatt and Read concur.
Order reversed, etc.
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