S. Utils. Co. v. City of Palatka, 268 U.S. 232 (1925)

268 U.S. 232
45 S. Ct. 488
69 L. Ed. 930
1924 SCDB 199
1925 U.S. LEXIS 774
US-DOC-25121759
locator
Case details
Bluebook Citation
S. Utils. Co. v. City of Palatka, 268 U.S. 232 (1925)
Full caption
SOUTHERN UTILITIES CO. v. CITY OF PALATKA, FLA.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
May 11, 1925
SOUTHERN UTILITIES CO. v. CITY OF PALATKA, FLA.
No. 339.
Argued April 27, 1925.
Decided May 11, 1925.
Messrs. Wm. L. Ransom, of New York City, J. T. G. Crawford, of Jacksonville, Fla., and W. B. Crawford, of Orlando, Fla., for petitioner.
Mr. P. H. Odom, of Jacksonville, Fla., for respondent.
Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
The City of Palatka brought this bill to restrain the petitioner, the Southern Utilities Company, from charging more than ten cents per kilowatt, metre measurement, for commercial electric lighting in the city. It alleged a contract in the grant of the petitioner's franchise by which the petitioner was bound not to charge more than that sum. The defendant pleaded that in present circumstances the rate prescribed in the ordinance granting the franchise was unreasonably low and that to enforce it would deprive defendant of its property without due process of law contrary to the Constitution of the United States. The plea was overruled and defendant having declined to plead further a decree was entered for the plaintiff by the Circuit Court for Putnam County which subsequently was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 86 Fla. 583, 99 So. 236.
2
The Supreme Court held that the City had power to grant the franchise and to make the contract and that it had no power of its own motion to withdraw, but it concedes the unfettered power of the legislature to regulate the rates. On that ground the defendant contends that there is a lack of mutuality and therefore that it is free and cannot be held to rates that in the absence of contract it would be unconstitutional to impose. The argument cannot prevail. Without considering whether an agreement by the Company in consideration of the grant of the franchise might not bind the Company in some cases, even if it left the city free, it is perfectly plain that the fact that the contract might be overruled by a higher power does not destroy its binding effect between the parties when it is left undisturbed. Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432, 438, 43 S. Ct. 613, 67 L. Ed. 1065; Opelika v. Opelika Sewer Co., 265 U. S. 215, 218, 44 S. Ct. 517, 67 L. Ed. 983. Such a notion logically carried out would impart new and hitherto unsuspected results to the power to amend the Constitution or to exercise eminent domain. There is nothing in this decision inconsistent with Southern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton, 255 U. S. 539, 41 S. Ct. 400, 65 L. Ed. 764, San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 255 U. S. 547, 41 S. Ct. 428, 65 L. Ed. 777, and Ortega Co. v. Triay, 260 U. S. 103, 43 S. Ct. 44, 67 L. Ed. 153.
3
Decree affirmed.
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