Knott v. Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900)

KNOTT v. BOTANY MILLS.

Bales of wool were stowed on a steamship, with proper dunnage, between decks and forward of a temporary wooden bulkhead. At a subsequent port, wet sugar (from which there is always drainage) was stowed aft of that bulkhead, with proper dunnage, but without any provision for carrying off the drainage in case it ran forward. The ship was then down by the stern, and all drainage from the sugar was carried off by the scuppers. At a third port, other cargo was discharged, so as to trim the vessel two feet by the head; and the drainage from the sugar found its way through the bulkhead, and damaged the wool, through negligence of those in charge of the ship and cargo. Held: That the damage to the wool was through fault in the proper loading or stowage of the cargo, within section 1 of the act of February 13, 1893, c. 105, known as the Harter Act, and not from fault in the navigation or management of the vessel, within section 3 of that act.

The words, in section 1 of the Harter Act, “ any vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports,” include a foreign vessel transporting merchandise from a foreign port to a port of the United States; and such a vessel and its owner are therefore liable for negligence iu proper loading or stowage of the cargo, notwithstanding any stipulations in the bill of lading that t ey shall be exempt from liability for such negligence, and that the contract shall be governed by the law of the ship’s flag.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

J. Parker Kirlin for the petitioner.

-Jfr. Wilhelmus Lfynderse for the respondents. Jfr. Lawrence Kneeland filed a brief for same.

Mr . Just ice Gra y delivered the opinion of the court.

Winf6 WorSted Mills, a corporation of New Jersey, and

respectively owners of two separate lots of bales of wool, shipped at Buenos Ayres for New York on board the steamship Portuguese Prince, severally filed libels in admiralty in personam in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, against James Knott, the owner of the vessel, to recover for damage caused to the wool by contact with drainage from wet sugar which also formed part of her cargo.

The Portuguese Prince was a British vessel, belonging to a line trading between New York and ports in the River Plata, Brazil, and the West Indies, loading and discharging cargo and having a resident agent at each port. The bills of lading of the wool, signed at Buenos Ayres, December 21, 1894, gave her liberty to call at any port or ports to receive and discharge cargo, and for any other purpose whatever; and purported to exempt the carrier from liability for “ negligence of masters or mariners; ” “ sweating, rust, natural decay, leakage or breakage, and all damage arising from the goods by stowage, or contact with, or by sweating, leakage, smell or evaporation from them; ” “ or any other peril of the seas, rivers, navigation, or of land transit, of whatsoever nature or kind; and whether any of the perils, causes or things above mentioned, or the loss or injury arising therefrom, be occasioned by the wrongful act, default, negligence, or error in judgment of the owners, masters, officers, mariners, crew, stevedores, engineers and other persons whomsoever in the service of the ship, whether employed on the said steamer or otherwise, and whether before, or after, or during the voyage, or for whose acts the shipowner would otherwise be liable; or by unseaworthiness of the ship at the beginning, or at any period of the voyage, provided all reasonable means have been taken to provide against such unseaworthiness.” Each bill of lading also contained the following clause: “ This contract shall be governed by the law of the flag of the ship carrying the goods, except that general average shall be adjusted according to York-Antwerp Rules, 1890.”

The District Court entered a decree for the libellants. 76 Fed. Rep. 582. That decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court o Appeals. 51 U. S. App. 467. The appellant then obtained a writ of certiorari from this court. 168 U. S. 711.

Before the act of Congress of February 13,1893, c. 105, (27 btat. 445,) known as the Harter Act, it was the settled law of , 1S] C°1Un^r^’ as declared by this court, that common carriers, y an or sea, could not by any form of contract exempt themse ves rom responsibility for loss or damage arising from negigence of their servants, and that any stipulation for such ex• V°*d as a&a^nsl public policy; although the courts England and in some of the States held otherwise. Railroad L 17 WalL 35T ’ L^rpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix U S S' 397’ ComPania La Flecha v. Brauer, 168

it has been held, independently of the Harter Act, that a stipulation that a contract should be governed by the law of England in this respect was void, and could not be enforced in a court of the United States; but the point has not been decided by this court. Nor is it necessary for us now to decide that point, because these bills of lading were issued since the Harter Act, and we are of opinion that the case is governed by the express provisions of that act.

Upon the facts of this case, there can be no doubt that the ship was seaworthy, and that the damage to the wool was caused by drainage from the wet sugar through negligence of those in charge of the ship and cargo. The questions upon which the decision of the case turns are two:

First. Whether this damage to the wool was “ loss or damage arising from negligence, fault or failure in proper loading, stowage, custody, care or proper delivery ” of cargo, within the first section of the Harter Act; or was “ damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel,” within the third section of that act ?

Second. Do the words, in the first section, ° any vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports,” include a foreign vessel transporting merchandise from a foreign port to a port of the United States ?

Section 1 of that act is as follows: “ It shall not be lawful or the manager, agent, master or owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between ports of the Unite States and foreign ports to insert in any bill of lading or s ip ping document any clause, covenant or agreement whereby i, he or they shall be relieved from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence, fault or failure in proper loading, stow age, custody, care or proper delivery of any and all lawful mer chandise or property committed to its or their charge. and all words or clauses of such import, inserted in bills o a mg or shipping receipts, shall be null and void and of no e ec This section, in all cases coming within its provisions, and nullifies any such stipulations in a bill of lading. « v. Atlas Steamship Co., 170 U. S. 272.

By section 3, on the other hand, “ if the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States” shall exercise due diligence to make her in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel nor her owner, agent or charterer “ shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel,” etc. This section does but relax the warranty of seaworthiness in the particulars specified in the section. The Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655; The Irrawaddy, 171 U. S. 187.

We fully concur with the courts below that the damage in question arose from negligence in loading or stowage of the cargo, and not from fault or error in the navigation or management of the ship—for the reasons stated by the District Judge, and approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals, as follows:

“ The primary cause of the damage was negligence and inattention in the loading or stowage of the cargo, either regarded as a whole, or as respects the juxtaposition of wet sugar and wool bales placed far forward. The wool should not have been stowed forward of the wet sugar, unless care was taken in the ot er loading, and in all subsequent changes in the loading, to see that the ship should not get down by the head. There was no fault or defect in the vessel herself. She was constructed in the usual way, and was sufficient. But on sailing from Para s e was a little down by the head, through inattention, during

e c anges in the loading, to the effect these changes made in e rim of the ship and in the flow of the sugar drainage. She as not own by the head more than frequently happens. It h^°KVay affected her sea-going qualities; nor did the vessel hv ?USe any damage to the wool. The damage was caused of th 6 raina®e the wet sugar alone. So that no question as ^seaworthiness of the ship arises. The ship herself was namhn ° sbe ^ara> as when she sailed from Perforward0’ -lhe negli"ence consisted in stowing the wool far loading k i Uklng care subsequently that no changes of fore r:?dU th™8Shipdown by the bead- 1 raust> theretbe strnvuL 1 Question as solely a question of negligence in

In The Glenochil (1896) Prob. 10, on which the appellant much relied, the negligence which was held to be within the third section of the Harter Act was, as said by Sir Francis Jeune, “a mismanagement of part of the appliances of the ship, and mismanagement which arose because it was intended to do something for the benefit of the ship, namely, to stiffen her, the necessity for stiffening arising because part of her cargo had been taken out of her.” He pointed out that the first and third sections of the act might be reconciled by the construction, “ first, that the act prevents exemptions in the case of direct want of care in respect of the cargo, and secondly, the exemption permitted is in respect of a fault primarily connected with the navigation or management of the vessel and not with the cargo.” And he added that the court had had the same sort of question before it in the case of The Ferro, (1893) Prob. 38, and he adhered to what he there said, “that mere stowage is an altogether different matter from the management of the vessel.” And Sir Gorell Barnes delivered a concurring opinion to the same effect.

The like distinction was recognized by this court in the recen case of The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462, 466.

The remaining question is whether the first section o Harter Act applies to a foreign vessel on a voyage from a foreign port to a port in the United States.

It is true that the words of that section are not exactly the same in this respect, being “ any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States,” whereas the corresponding words in the first section are “ any vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports.”

But the two phrases, as applied to the subject-matter, are precisely equivalent, and are both equally applicable to a foreign voyage that ends, and to one that begins, in this country. In their usual and natural meaning, the words “ from any port in the United States ” include all voyages, whether domestic or foreign, which begin in this country; the words “ to any port in the United States ” include all voyages, whether domestic or foieign, which end in this country; and the words “ between ports of the United States and foreign ports ” include all foreign voyages which either begin or end here. The words of the third section, “to or from any port in the United States” express in the simplest and most direct form the intention to inc u e voyages hither as well as voyages hence. And we find insuperable difficulty in the way of giving a different meaning o ie words of the first section, “ from or between ports of ne l nited States and foreign ports.” The words “ from ports all 6 ni^ States would of themselves be sufficient to cover or i' begin here, whether they end in a domestic Unitt^Qi0^61^11 Port’ and the words “between ports of the nato fn ,a 68 an^ f°reign ports ” no more appropriately designing ahr61^ V°yages beginning here, than such voyages begincab hnt°+ ' PPrase of the first section is slightly elliptiif the ell '1 US t0 Pave exactly the same meaning as of the United ee^ supplied by repeating the words “ ports merchanrT a eS’ 80 as read “ any vessel transporting betXen tSVr?TPertyfr°m P°rtsof the United States, or

Attention was called at the bar to the fact that in the act, as originally passed by the House of Representatives, the words of the third section were “ any vessel transporting merchandise or property between ports in the United States of America and foreign ports,” and that for those words the Senate substituted the words as they now stand in the act; and it was argued that the change in this section, leaving unchanged the corresponding clauses in the first and other sections of the act, showed that those sections were not supposed or intended to include vessels bound from foreign ports to ports of the United States. But the argument fails to notice that the third section, as it originally stood, did not contain the words “from or,” but covered only voyages “ between ports in the United States and foreign ports; ” and the more reasonable inference is that the change was made for the purpose of bringing domestic voyages within this section. See 24 Congr. Rec. 147-149, 173, 1181, 1291, 1292.

This express provision of the act of Congress overrides and nullifies the stipulations of the bill of lading that the carrier shall be exempt from liability for such negligence, and that the contract shall be governed by the law of the ship’s flag.

HUBBELL v. UNITED STATES.

app eal fro m the cou rt OF CLAIMS.

An examination of the history of the appellant’s claim shows that in order

® ls Patent he was compelled to accept one with a narrower claim an at contained m his original application; and it is well settled that

_ • . as a^owe(t must be read and interpreted with reference to the atnwj C,aim and to the prior state of the art, and cannot be so conclosPd h* ° C°V!r eith6r what was relected by the Patent Office, or disclosed by prior devices. made andCOncai® with the court below in holding that the cartridges contained the United States were not within the description contained m the appellant’s claim.

28’1878’ William Wheeler Hubbell filed, in for an tates Patent Office, an application for a patent arv 18 ln metallie cartridges, and on Februsued to him * etteFS Patent °- 212,313 were granted and is-

On April 19, 1883, Hubbell, the patentee, filed a petition in the Court of Claims against the United States, alleging that the latter were using his patented methods in circumstances that warranted a claim for compensation. This case was numbered in the Court of Claims as No. 13,793, and was so proceeded in that on June 1, 1885, judgment was entered in the Court of Claims dismissing the petition. 20 C. Cl. 354. In August, 1885, an application for allowance of an appeal from that judgment to this court was filed. Pending this application Hubbell brought another suit against the United States in the Court of Claims by filing a petition, No. 16,261, on June 11, 1888, presenting substantially similar issues to those asserted in the first suit.

On December 23, 1895, judgment was entered by the Court of Claims dismissing the petition in the second case. 31 C. CL 464. On March 20, 1896, an application for allowance of an appeal from this judgment to this court was filed, and on July 6, 1896, this appeal was allowed. On May 31,1898, the judgment of the Court of Claims, dismissing the petition in the second case, was approved by this court. 171 U. S. 203.

On June 7, 1898, the application for allowance of appeal in the first case was allowed, and on May 31,1898, a petition was allowed to be filed in this court for a rehearing in the second case. The appeal in the first case and the petition for a rehearing in the second case were argued together in this court on January 9, 10, 1900.

JZr. 'Frederic D. McKenney and Jfr. George 8. Boutwell for appellant. JZr. F. P. Devoees and J/r. J. Nota No Gill were on their briefs.

Mr. Charles C. Binney for appellee. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Pradt was on his brief.

Mr . Jus tice Shir as , after stating the case, delivered the opin

ion of the court.

Whether if the additional findings of the trial court had presented a new and meritorious case, this would afford a sufficient reason for this court to set aside its previous judgment, and to enter upon a consideration of the controversy de novo, we do not decide, as, even upon such an assumption, we agree with the court below in thinking that the new findings did not make a new or different case, or impair the legal foundation of the ju gment rendered in the case in which they were made

Those findings, as we find them printed in the record of the case No 198 of the October term, 1897, of this court, consist par y o matters connected with the claim on account of the

anu acture and use of the cup-anvil cartridge, and as the claim-

e a waiver of that claim such parts of the findings have

relevancy now. Other portions of the additional findings

oartridSes made by the United States,

anf , ° a basis for estimatmg the damages, if the claim-OthprOlf +iree°Ve.r’and n°tad?e°t the legal questions involved, bv thp0 i ,e allowed reference to certain drawings filed Pafpnt nmman\ Pre5dous applications made by him in the historv ’ wbl°k may have some relevancy as disclosing the construrti bufc do not appear to materially affect the and the °lalm flnaUy allo"'ed the Patent Office, to the may be some verbal amendments allowed

e ™mgs previously made.

An examination of the history of the appellant’s claim, as disclosed in the file wrapper and contents, shows that in order to get his patent he was compelled to accept one with a narrower claim than that contained in his original application; and it is well settled that the claim as allowed must be read and interpreted with reference to the rejected claim and to the prior state of the art, and cannot be so construed as to cover either what was rejected by the Patent Office or disclosed by prior devices. Leggett v. Avery, 101 U. S. 256; Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U. 8. 593; Knapp v. Morss, 150 U. S. 221, 227.

It is quite true that, where the differences between the claim as made and as allowed consist of mere changes of expression, having substantially the same meaning, such changes, made to meet the views of the examiners, ought not to be permitted to defeat a meritorious claimant. While not allowed to revive a rejected claim, by a broad construction of the claim allowed, yet the patentee is entitled to a fair construction of the terms of his claim as actually granted. The specification, as amended, contained the following description:

The claims made in the application were as follows:

“ 1st. The circular plate E, constructed with central solid resisting piece i, and two or more side perforations ~k substantially as described, applied within a metal case, with cylinder and rear end solid and tight, thereby requiring the insertion of the plate and charge and priming from the front, igniting the charge and remaining firetight in firing as described.

“ 2d. The circular plate E, constructed as described, in combination with the circular disc D, and metal solid firetight case A, substantially as shown and described.

3d. A circular metallic tight-fitting plate, perforated into a central fulminate chamber, leaving a central solid or unperforated bar over the fulminate chamber, within a solid firetight metal case, substantially as set forth.”

The examiners rejected these claims on reference to prior patents. Thereupon the claimant, having amended his specification as above, substituted for the three claims above copied the following;

What I claim as new and desire to secure by letters patent is— J r

The construction and arrangement of the chamber of fulminate, anvil, plate, perforations and case, with the central con-

ruc e filled chamber of fulminate powder in contact and becenf611^ 6 ^aSe °aSe an^ circular anvil plate, with

^ar and or more side perforations, extending base f thex^reme s^es of the chamber of fulminate into the an co ° 6 Pow^er charge, whereby the smallest area of resistfused $ P*?se^e(i to the fulminate explosion, and the fire is difsistqnp11 • 6 aSe ^le C^ar8'e °t powder, and the greatest re-

The examiners held that the construction described in the amended specification involved patentable novelty, and that a specific and well defined claim might be allowed, but not the amended claim, it being “ vague, indefinite and ambiguous.” The claimant thereupon withdrew the above amended claim, and substituted another, which was finally allowed, in the following terms:

“What I claim as new and desire to secure by letters patent is —

“ In the bottom of a solid metallic flange cartridge case or shell the combination of a circular base inclosing a central chamber of fulminate provided with two or more openings, whose inner edges nearly coincide with the edges of the central chamber of fulminate in the base of the cartridge, substantially as described.”

It is obvious that this is a claim for a combination, none of the elements or constituent parts of which are claimed to be new, but whose merit consists in such an adjustment and relation of the parts as to produce the desired effect.

“ In such a claim, if the patentee specifies any element as entering into the combination, either directly by the language o the claim, or by such reference to the descriptive part of the specification as carries such element into the claim, he makes such element material to the combination, and the court can not declare it to be immaterial. It is his to make his own claim and his privilege to restrict it. If it be a claim to a combination, and be restricted to specified elements, all must e re garded as material, leaving open only the question whether an omitted part is supplied by an equivalent device or instrumen tality.” Fay n . Cordesraan, 109 U. S. 408.

“ In patents for combinations of mechanism, limitations an provisoes, imposed by the inventor, especially such as were i troduced into an application after it had been persis ii rejected, must be strictly construed against the inven or in favor of the public, and looked upon in the na^re„°fig ciaimers.” Sargeant v. Halt Safe (& Lock Co., 114

“ If an applicant, in order to get his patent, accepts one with a narrower claim than that contained in his original application, he is bound by it. If dissatisfied with the decision rejecting his application, he should pursue his remedy by appeal.” Shepard n . Carrigan, 116 U. 8. 593.

When the rejected claims and the one finally allowed are compared, it will be perceived that they all describe the combination as consisting of a circular base, containing a central chamber of fulminate, the anvil over it, with two or more perforations to permit the fire or explosive force of the fulminate to be communicated to the powder charge. What, then, was the difference or modification which resulted in the allowance of a claim? We agree with the court below in finding that difference in the position of the apertures or vents. The examiners refused to allow the claim until the claimant distinctly located the vents as “ openings whose inner edges nearly coincide with the edges of the central chamber of fulminate in the base of the cartridge,” thereby making the relative position of the vents and the walls of the fulminate chamber a material part of the claimant’s patent. Breach-loading metallic cartridges were not new, and it was the opinion of the examiners f t, in merely claiming “ a circular metallic tight-fitting plate perforated with a central fulminate chamber, leaving a central so id or unperforated bar over the fulminate chamber, within a so i fire tight metal case,” the claimant was anticipated by an«AP^ntS °f 53,168, March 13, 1866; of Tibbals,

,607, May 25, 1869, and by an English patent, 2906, 1865. was not until the claimant specifically claimed, as part of his 0111 ination, “ an anvil over the fulminate provided with two edo-1110*! °Penings wbose inner edges nearly coincide with the

1° cen^ra^ chamber of fulminate in the base of the

. 1 ^hat the patent was allowed. Whether the exas therS?vere or wrong in so holding we are not to inquire, cented ° aiman*' n°t appeal, but amended his claim and acrano-P thereoi ’ thereby putting himself within the binatin° k ° au^h°rities which hold that if the claim to a comas mate ’ t to specified elements, all must be regarded

“ It may be observed that the courts of this country cannot always indulge the same latitude which is exercised by English judges in determining what parts of a machine are or are not material. Our law requires the patentee to specify particularly what he claims to be new, and if he claims a combination of certain elements or parts, he cannot declare that any one of these elements is immaterial. The patentee makes them all material by the restricted form of his claim.” Per Mr. Justice Bradley in Water JWeter Company v. Desper, 101 U. S. 332, 337; Jfw1-gan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425, 429.

With these principles of construction in view, we are constrained to concur with the court below in holding that the cartridges made and used by the Government were not within the description contained in the appellant’s claim.

The Government cartridges alleged to be within the appellant s patent are of two kinds, one called the “ cup-anvil cartridge, the other the “reloading cartridge.” As the appellant has withdrawn his claim for infringment of the former, we have only to do with the latter or reloading cartridge. It is thus described in the sixth finding of the court below:

“ This cartridge is a hollow metallic shell, rimmed around t e base, with a pocket in the exterior of the center of the base; through the center of the top of this pocket, supposing the car tridge to be stood upon its base or closed end, is pierced a sing e aperture or hole to carry the fulminate flame to the black pon der chamber. This cartridge contains only the black pow er and the bullet. Any one of the several kinds of primers may be used in it. The one used by the United States and a eg#* . to infringe claimant’s rights is a circular metallic cup, into w ic

This finding is claimed by the appellant to be incorrect in several respects, and particularly in its statement that “ the portion of the disk between the holes is the anvil.”

But even if we were permitted as an appellate court‘to depart from the findings of fact made by the trial court, we do not perceive that the particulars in which this finding is objected to really affect the case as presented to us. Even if we were to adopt the description of the Government’s cartridge given by the appellant, it still appears that there is an essential difference between the two types of cartridge. Without accepting or rejecting the Government’s contention that the Government’s cartridge is outside primed and the appellant’s inside primed, and wherein it is claimed that for reloading purposes an outside primed cartridge is superior, it is sufficient to say that the difference in the shape and position of the vents, whereby the exp oshe force of the fulminate is communicated to the powder charge, is obvious.

^he distinguishing feature of the appellant’s cartridge is that e anvil plate has two or more openings whose inner edges near y coincide with the edges of the central chamber of fulmina e, ut in the reloading cartridge of the Government the ven s are wholly over the fulminate chamber, do not lead dice y to the powder chamber, but lead to a channel cut across e upper face of the anvil, and by this to a hole in the base of the powder chamber. entf^ ^a^ter construction the explosive force of the fulminate lant^ efP0Wt^er Camber in a central stream. But the appel“chamhC1 eS’- aS «a distinguishing feature, that the fulminate rectlv 6i ^es or outer extreme edges communicates dinlO5nv a* exclusively with the powder charge, so that the ex-

It may be, as the appellant contends, that his method of communicating the explosive force of the fulminate to the powder charge is an improvement on previous methods, and is superior in efficacy to that used in the Government’s cartridges; but our inquiry is not as to the merits of the patent in suit, but is confined to the question whether it covers, in legal contemplation, the defendant’s cartridge.

Some contention is made, in argument, that because it is stated that some grains of powder may and do fall down through the base of the defendant’s powder chamber, and lie loosely in the groove across the upper face of the anvil, therefore it must be concluded that such loose grains of powder come directly in contact with the flame of the fulminate before the latter enters the powder chamber. But such a fact, if it be a fact, appears to be immaterial. It is not pretended that these few loose grains of powder are relied on, or in fact operate, as a means of igniting the charge in the powder chamber.

Nor can we accept the contention that these two combinations are identical because they are intended to obtain the same result. What we have to consider is not whether the end sought to e effected is the same, but whether the devices or mechanica means by which the desired result is secured are the same.

We do not consider it necessary to consider a further sugges tion, contained in the opinion of the court below, that, even the relative position of the vents and the wall of the fulmina chamber be not a material part of the claimant’s patent, the claimant cannot recover because the other characters ie of his invention, found in the cartridge now used by t e ®* fendants, were introduced by them prior to the application or issue of the patent. . . .,

The decree of the Court of Claims, dismissing tec anna Petition’is

No. 198— October Term, 1897. Hubbe ll ». Usnro States . Appeal from the Court of Claims. The petition in t e titled case, for a rehearing, is denied.