State v. Smith, 249 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1971)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
State v. Smith, 249 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1971)
Full caption
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Cecil Edward SMITH, Respondent.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Florida (FL)
Court
Florida Supreme Court
Decided
May 12, 1971
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Cecil Edward SMITH, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 12, 1971.
Rehearing Denied June 28, 1971.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Walter R. Talley, Public Defender and D. Turner Matthews, Asst. Public Defender, for respondent.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 239 So. 2d 284. The decision sought to be reviewed conflicts with Doyle v. State,[1] giving this Court jurisdiction under § 4, Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
Cecil Edward Smith, respondent herein, was tried and convicted of rape, with recommendation of mercy, and of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: rape. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape and to ten years for breaking and entering, the sentenced to run concurrently.
The District Court reversed and remanded for either a new trial on both charges or, in the discretion of the trial judge, for discharge on the rape charge and reduction of the other offense to breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor.
In a novel opinion the District Court held that, although the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence, the interests of justice required a new trial. The basis of its decision is the following "doctrinal postulate" originated by the District Court:[2]
"If the testimony of persons not involved in the alleged rape, together with the data objectively verifiable, converge upon the hypothesis that the act was not forcible, a new trial should be granted either by the trial court on motion or the appellate court on appeal, although the prosecutrix' testimony alone supplies every element of the offense."
The above-quoted statement conflicts with the established rule in Florida that the testimony of the prosecutrix need not be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction.
The District Court acknowledges that the evidence supports the conviction and that corroboration is unnecessary under Florida law but concludes that there are "many little indicators of doubt"[3] on the question of consent such as the fact that the clothing of the prosecutrix was not torn. Clearly these questions were for the jury who heard and observed the conflicting testimony of respondent and the prosecutrix.
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