Interstate Com. Comm'n v. Hoboken Mfrs.' R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 368 (1943)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Interstate Com. Comm'n v. Hoboken Mfrs.' R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 368 (1943)
Full caption
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. v. HOBOKEN MANUFACTURERS’ RAILROAD CO.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Dec. 6, 1943
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. v.
HOBOKEN MANUFACTURERS’ RAILROAD CO.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY.
No. 43. Argued November 9, 1943.—Decided December 6, 1943.
Appellee, a terminal switching railroad, maintained with trunk lines joint rates on traffic which it interchanged with (inter alia) Seatrain. Much of the traffic so interchanged moved on lighterage-free rates, under which appellee was obligated to load and unload cars at shipside. Seatrain operated vessels on which it transported loaded railroad cars. By Seatrain’s method, cars were loaded on and unloaded from its vessels by means of a cradle; and the necessity and expense of loading and unloading freight to and from the cars, usual on interchange with other water carriers, were eliminated. Under a contract between them, appellee made payments to Seatrain in respect of interchanged traffic moving on lighterage-free rates, the payments approximating the cost of unloading or loading freight cars. In 1936 appellee filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a complaint seeking an increase of its divisions of the joint lighterage-free rates and an adjustment with respect to traffic moving on Commission-prescribed rates subsequent to the filing of the complaint, so as to compensate it for its contract payments to Seatrain. The Commission found that appellee’s divisions with the payments to Seatrain excluded were “not unjust, unreasonably low, inequitable, or unduly prejudicial”; that the corresponding divisions received by the trunk lines were “not unjust, unreasonably high, inequitable, or unduly preferential of them”; and dismissed the complaint. Held:
1. Although Seatrain’s service has since February, 1942, been discontinued, the complaint sought adjustment of divisions received on Commission-prescribed rates subsequent to its filing, and to that extent at least the case is not moot. P. 376.
2. The Commission’s findings that appellee’s transportation service with respect to carload freight interchanged with Seatrain begins and ends at Seatrain’s cradle; that the rail lines perform the interchange transportation service covered by their tariffs “when they place the cars in or take them from the Seatrain cradle”; and that consequently the payments made by appellee to Seatrain “cover no part of its transportation service under the lighterage-
368 Syllabus.
free rates and are in addition to the full costs of that service,” are supported by evidence. P. 377.
3. The Commission’s determination of the point in time and space at which a carrier’s transportation service begins or ends is an administrative finding which, if supported by evidence, is conclusive on the courts. P. 378.
4. Appellee is entitled to receive by way of divisions only its just and equitable share of the proceeds of the joint rail transportation service rendered, and can not claim as a part of its share the costs of a service which is not a part of the rail service called for by the joint rates. P. 379.
5. From the Commission’s finding that the loading and unloading of its vessels is incident to Seatrain’s transportation service, it follows that Seatrain is entitled to compensation therefor in its tariffs, which if inadequate may be increased, rather than through participation, by way of allowances paid to it by appellee, in the proceeds of a joint rail service of which it performs no part. P. 379.
6. Whether the payments to Seatrain induced the performance of an interchange service resulting in savings to the rail carriers is irrelevant to a determination of divisions of the joint rates for the rail service of which the ship loading and unloading service performed by Seatrain is not a part. P. 380.
7. Section 15 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which authorizes the division of joint rates applicable to a transportation service, contemplates only the apportionment of the proceeds of that service among the parties to it and not the compensation of others for a service not covered by the joint rates to be divided. P. 380.
8. Prescription by the Interstate Commerce Commission of divisions of joint rates is not a mere partition of property, but is an aspect of the general rate policy which Congress has directed the Commission to establish and administer in the public interest. At least where the Commission prescribes for the complaining party a fair return for the transportation service which it renders, the question as to what is a proper division is one for the Commission’s discretion, reviewable only for unreasonableness, departure from statutory standards, or lack of evidentiary support. P. 381.
9. The Commission’s determinations of rate policy in this case can not be set aside as arbitrary or as resulting in unjust divisions. P. 382.
10. The Commission’s refusal to include in appellee’s divisions payments which were voluntarily made to Seatrain does not constitute confiscation of appellee’s property. P. 382.
47 F. Supp. 779, reversed.
Appeal from a judgment of a District Court of three judges setting aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. E. M. Reidy, with whom Mr. Daniel W. Knowlton was on the brief, for the Interstate Commerce Commission; and Mr. Willis T. Pierson, with whom Messrs. Thomas P. Healy, Francis R. Cross, Joseph F. Eshelman, and R. Aubrey Bogley were on the brief, for the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al.,—appellants.
Mr. Parker McCollester, with whom Mr. Wilbur LaRoe, Jr. was on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal under 28 U. S. C. §§ 47a, 345, from a judgment by which the District Court for New Jersey, three judges sitting, set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 47 F. Supp. 779.
The question is whether appellee, a terminal switching rail carrier, is entitled to an increase in the divisions which it now receives out of joint class and commodity freight rates maintained by it and numerous trunk line carriers, appellants here, on traffic interchanged by appellee at Hoboken, New Jersey, with Seatrain Lines, Inc., a common carrier by water. The answer depends upon whether the Commission is required to treat as part of appellee’s costs of performing its carrier service as prescribed by the joint rates, allowances paid by appellee for services performed by Seatrain in effecting the interchange. The Commission’s order dismissed a complaint by which appellee sought to have the Commission prescribe for it increased divisions. 234 I. C. C. 114. The order, reviewable by the District Court, is reviewable by this court on appeal. Alton R. Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 229, 237-40;
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 358; Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125,142.
Appellee, Hoboken Manufacturers’ Railroad Company, operates a terminal switching line extending along the waterfront of Hoboken, New Jersey, for a distance of 1.632 miles. It connects with the Erie Railroad and over it with other trunk lines reaching New York Harbor. Numerous piers on New York Harbor are served by Hoboken, at which the vessels of various steamship lines regularly dock, including those of Seatrain.
Seatrain is a common carrier by water, subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under § 1 (la) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (la), by reason of its control of Hoboken. Investigation of Seatrain Lines, Inc., 195 I. C. C. 215, 206 I. C. C. 328. Since 1932 it has operated vessels in which it transports freight in loaded railroad cars between Hoboken, New Jersey, Havana, Cuba, and Belle Chasse, Louisiana, a point on the Mississippi River near New Orleans. The loaded cars which it transports are placed upon standard gauge railroad tracks located upon four decks of the Seatrain vessels. In loading the vessel, each car is switched onto a track located on a cradle placed alongside the vessel. An overhead crane lifts the cradle containing the car, swings it over the vessel and lowers it through a hatch to the appropriate deck where the car is moved onto one of the railroad tracks on the deck.
In unloading the procedure is reversed. Each car is moved from the deck track onto the cradle. The cradle containing the car is then lifted by the crane and placed on the dock alongside the vessel where the car is switched by Hoboken over its own tracks to a connecting trunk line over which it proceeds to its rail destination. By this operation the expense is avoided of loading and unloading freight into and from the cars at shipside, ordinarily p. 372incident to exchange of traffic between rail and water carriers.
In 1932 Seatrain secured control of Hoboken by the acquisition of all of its shares of capital stock except the qualifying shares of five directors, and the two corporations were brought under the management of common officers. In 1936 Hoboken filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission under §§ 1 (4) and 15
(6) alleging that the divisions it was receiving out of joint class and commodity rates maintained by it and the trunk lines, appellants here, on carload rail traffic interchanged with Seatrain were too low, and asking an increase. It also sought adjustment of all divisions with respect to such traffic moving under rates prescribed by the Commission subsequent to the date of filing the complaint.
Part of the traffic interchanged with Seatrain moves on so-called lighterage-free rates, and part on non-lighterage-free rates. Under the lighterage-free rates the rail carriers obligate themselves to place freight within reach of ship’s tackle, and to receive freight at the foot of ship’s tackle—an obligation which normally requires unloading and loading of cars and may also require lighterage and various other services. Hoboken has generally provided for this loading and unloading service by contract with the steamship companies with which it interchanges traffic. The work is done with steamship stevedore labor for which Hoboken has paid the steamship companies at the rate of approximately 75 cents a ton. Under non-lighterage-free rates the shipper performs or provides for necessary loading or unloading of cars, in which case Hoboken has only a switching service to perform.
On carload traffic interchanged with water carriers other than Seatrain’s and moving on lighterage-free rates, which is loaded or unloaded by Hoboken or at its expense, Hoboken’s division of the joint through rate has been $1.35 per ton. On carload traffic moving to and from Hoboken on non-lighterage-free rates, which is loaded or unloaded p. 373by the shipper or consignee or at his expense, Hoboken’s division has been 60 cents per ton.1
Since November, 1932, which was shortly after Seatrain acquired stock ownership control of Hoboken, it has paid to Seatrain a tonnage allowance on interchanged freight other than coal. At first 40 cents a ton, the allowance on lighterage-free freight was, in 1937, increased to 73 cents a ton, which is the approximate cost of loading or unloading carload freight. At the same time the 40 cents allowance on non-lighterage-free freight was abolished. Upon Seatrain freight moving on lighterage-free rates, the trunk lines accord to Hoboken a 60 cents per ton switching division, the same as for freight moving on non-lighterage-free rates, since with the one as with the other there is no necessity for the car loading service.
In the proceedings before the Commission Hoboken asked for the existing division of 60 cents per ton out of non-lighterage-free rates and for an increase to $1.35 per ton in its division out of lighterage-free rates on traffic interchanged with Seatrain, on the ground that its tonnage allowances to Seatrain are a part of its costs of performing its rail transportation service with respect to the Seatrain traffic, and that in any case the trunk lines, parties to the joint rates, are benefited by Seatrain’s shiploading devices to the extent that the rail carriers are relieved of the 75 cents per ton loading and unloading charge which they would otherwise incur.
The Commission rendered its report after a full hearing at which evidence was taken.12 It found from the evidence
1
These divisions have been increased by 5 or 10%, depending on the commodity shipped, as a result of a general rate increase authorized in Fifteen Percent Case, 1937-1938, 226 I. C. C. 41.
2
For prior reports of the Commission dealing with various aspects of Seatrain’s method of operation see Investigation of Seatrain Lines, Inc., 1951. C. C. 215,2061. C. C. 328; Seatrain Lines v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry. Co., 226 I. C. C. 7, 243 I. C. C. 199; Hoboken Mfrs. R. Co. v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 237 I. C. C. 97, 248 I. C. C. 109.
Opinion of the Court. 320 U.S.
that Seatrain had established its shiploading devices at large expense and had by their adoption made unnecessary, in the interchange of traffic with Seatrain, the loading and unloading of the cars at shipside, which would otherwise be required by the lighterage-free tariffs; that in effecting the interchange “the rail lines do all that is required when they place the cars in or take them from the Seatrain cradle”; and that “the payments which complainant makes to Seatrain cover no part of its transportation service under the lighterage-free rates and are in addition to the full costs of that service.”
The Commission recognized that if the payments by Hoboken to Seatrain are not borne in part by the rail lines through a decrease in their divisions and a corresponding increase in Hoboken’s divisions “they will receive an unearned benefit” since, by reason of Seatrain’s shiploading method, they are relieved of the necessity of compensating Hoboken for performance of the loading and unloading service ordinarily called for by their lighterage-free tariffs. It pointed out, however, that lighterage-free rates “are based on average conditions,” and said that if a steamship line now docking on the New York waterfront and served by lighter at the New Jersey rail carriers’ expense should shift to a dock with direct rail connections on the New Jersey shore a similar unearned benefit would result; yet “it would hardly be suggested” that the rail carriers should compensate the steamship company for the shift. Moreover it found no evidence that the payments were necessary to induce Seatrain to furnish its shiploading service. It stated that Hoboken’s contract with Seatrain was not such evidence in view of Seatrain’s control of Hoboken; that it did not appear that Seatrain received such payments from any independent rail connection; and that Seatrain’s method of transfer by which it receives and delivers loaded cars has sufficient advantages to impel its use p. 375by Seatrain regardless of contributing payments by its rail connections.
It concluded that Seatrain’s improved method of transfer is only an incident to its plan of transportation, that the transfer is consequently not a necessary part of the rail transportation service and that Hoboken is adequately compensated for its part in that service without including the payments to Seatrain in its divisions. The Commission accordingly found that Hoboken’s divisions with the payments to Seatrain excluded “are not unjust, unreasonably low, inequitable, or unduly prejudicial” and that the corresponding divisions received by the trunk lines “are not unjust, unreasonably high, inequitable, or unduly preferential of them,” and ordered Hoboken’s complaint dismissed.
The District Court sustained the Commission’s findings that Hoboken’s rail transportation service begins and ends at Seatrain’s cradle, and that the payments by Hoboken to Seatrain “do not constitute a legitimate transportation cost,” and held that upon these findings “supported by evidence” the Commission’s “judgment is final.” But it thought that even though the contract payments should be disregarded Hoboken might be obligated to pay to Seatrain the reasonable value to it of the use of the Seatrain method of interchange, and that if that use were found to have no value, at least any “windfall” resulting to the rail carriers as a whole should be divided equitably among them.
The District Court accordingly set the Commission’s order aside and remanded the cause to the Commission, directing it to consider whether the Seatrain devices “are an efficient aid to railroad transportation”; if it found that they were, to evaluate their worth to Hoboken and to include in Hoboken’s costs the amount of a legitimate payment for their use; and if it found that they were not, p. 376to determine whether any windfall to the rail carriers resulted from their use and to establish an equitable basis for its division among the rail carriers. The Commission has brought the case here on assignments of error challenging the District Court’s determination that compensation for any part of Hoboken’s payments to Seatrain should have been included in Hoboken’s divisions.
Section 15 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act directs that whenever the Commission, upon complaint or on its own motion, determines that the divisions of joint rates applicable to the transportation of passengers or property, “are or will be unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, or unduly preferential or prejudicial” as between carriers parties to such rates, “the Commission shall by order prescribe the just, reasonable, and equitable divisions thereof to be received by the several carriers.” In cases where the joint rate has been established pursuant to a finding or order of the Commission, it may also determine and order just and reasonable divisions for the period subsequent to the filing of the complaint “and require adjustment to be made” in accordance with its determination.
At the outset it is necessary to consider the suggestion that the case may have become moot by reason of the fact that since February, 1942, Seatrain’s vessels have been in Government service and Seatrain’s service has been discontinued. We may assume that the resumption of the service is so uncertain as to render it conjectural whether the Commission’s present determination will be given any future operation. But that determination under § 15 (6) is decisive of appellee’s request for adjustment of the divisions of joint rates prescribed by the Commission which have been collected since the beginning of the present proceeding. Brimstone Railroad & Canal Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 104, 121-3. While the present record does not disclose the full extent to which joint rates, p. 377divisions of which are here sought, were prescribed by the Commission, it does appear that the Commission has in prior proceedings prescribed joint rail-water-rail rates between eastern trunk line and New England territories and southwestern territory applicable over Seatrain lines, to which Hoboken, Seatrain, and most if not all of the trunk lines which are appellants here are parties. Seatrain Lines v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry. Co., 2261. C. C. 7, 2431. C. C. 199. As to them decision of this case controls the division of rates for the period since appellee’s complaint was filed with the Commission. To that extent at least the case is not moot.
Apart from the Commission’s exclusion of Hoboken’s tonnage allowances to Seatrain, we have no occasion to consider the sufficiency of the present divisions to Hoboken. The Commission found, upon abundant evidence, that they “are sufficient to cover the cost of the service performed by complainant and also a reasonable return on the property owned or used by it in performing such service.” And appellee conceded before the Commission that if the payments to Seatrain are not to be considered a part of appellee’s costs the divisions are adequate and “we are not entitled to anything more.”
As essential steps in determining whether Hoboken’s payments to Seatrain are a part of the rail transportation costs, we think the court below correctly sustained the Commission’s findings that Hoboken’s transportation service with respect to carload freight interchanged with Seatrain begins and ends at Seatrain’s cradles; that the rail lines perform the interchange transportation service covered by their tariffs “when they place the cars in or take them from the Seatrain cradle”; and that consequently the allowances paid by Hoboken “cover no part of its transportation service under the lighterage-free rates »nd are in addition to the full costs of that service.” These findings were based upon an extensive examination p. 378of the method of interchange of freight between rail and water carriers generally and between Hoboken and Seatrain. It is not and could not be seriously contended that they are unsupported by evidence.
We are of opinion that these findings are decisive of this appeal. The Commission’s determination of the point in time and space at which a carrier’s transportation service begins or ends is an administrative finding which, if supported by evidence, is conclusive on the courts. Los Angeles Switching Case, 234 U. S. 294, 311-14; United States v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 301 U. S. 402, 408; United States v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 304 U. S. 156, 158; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. n. United States, 305 U. S. 507, 525-6; Swijt de Co. n. United States, 316 U. S. 216, 222-5 and cases cited. In the Tin Plate and Pan American cases this Court sustained the Commission’s order prohibiting, as in violation of § 6 (7) of the Act, payment of allowances to an industry by rail carriers for spotting cars on its industrial tracks. The Court accepted as controlling the Commission’s findings that under prevailing conditions and practice the interchange tracks of the industry were convenient and usual points for the receipt and delivery of the interchanged cars, that the rail line-haul service accordingly ended there and that for that reason the industry performed no service in spotting cars on its own tracks for which the rail carrier was compensated under its line-haul tariffs and for which the industry was entitled to be compensated by allowances out of the line-haul charges.
The same principles apply in prescribing divisions of joint rail carrier charges where, independently of considerations not present here, the measure of the carrier s participation in the joint transportation service is the measure of its divisions of the joint transportation charges, New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 195; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274,284;
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, supra, 360-62; Sharfman, Interstate Commerce Commission, vol. III-B, pp. 287-8, and the carrier is entitled to “just compensation only for what it actually does,” Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S. 1,29; cf. Louisiana & Pine Bluff Ry. Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 114,118.
Here the Commission was concerned with the divisions of joint rail rates which covered the rail carrier service between inland points of rail shipment or destination and the point of interchange at Hoboken. The Commission has found that this point is the Seatrain cradle at shipside, and that the service rendered by Seatrain in loading and unloading the loaded freight cars upon and from its vessels is no part of the rail carrier service with respect to which divisions are here sought. Consequently neither Hoboken nor Seatrain is entitled to compensation out of the joint rail haul charges for the ship loading and unloading service. Since Hoboken is entitled to receive by way of divisions only its just and equitable share of the proceeds of the joint rail transportation service rendered, it cannot claim as a part of its share the costs of a service which is not a part of the rail service called for by the joint rates. Neither the joint rates of the rail carriers nor the rates of Seatrain are here under attack and presumptively they yield adequate but not excessive compensation for the transportation services rendered under them. Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74, 90; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, supra, 356.
From these findings of the Commission, and its further finding that the interchange service rendered by Seatrain is incident to Seatrain’s transportation service, it would seem to follow that Seatrain is entitled to compensation for it as such, and presumably is so compensated by its tariffs. If the compensation is inadequate the remedy lies in an increase in Seatrain’s rates or in its divisions of joint rail and
Opinion of the Court. 320U.S
water transportation rates—for which it has an application pending before the Commission, Seatrain Lines v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Ry. Co., No. 28668, filed May 22, 1941—rather than in its participation, by way of allowances paid to it by Hoboken, in the proceeds of a joint rail service of which it performs no part.
Hence the District Court’s direction to the Commission to determine what part of the value of the interchange service rendered by Seatrain should “be allowed in establishing Hoboken’s legitimate costs,” as an “aid to railroad transportation,” is inconsistent with its conclusion that the Commission correctly found that the payments by Hoboken to Seatrain “do not constitute a legitimate transportation cost,” and that Seatrain’s interchange service is no part of the rail transportation. If these findings be sustained, as they must, inquiry whether the payments to Seatrain have induced the performance of an interchange service resulting in savings to the rail carriers is irrelevant to a determination of divisions of the joint rates for the rail service of which the ship loading and unloading service performed by Seatrain is not a part. Cf. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 444,446-7.
Section 15 (6), which authorizes the division of joint rates applicable to a transportation service, contemplates only the apportionment of the proceeds of that service among the parties to it and not the compensation of others for a service not covered by the joint rates to be divided. Seatrain is not a party to this proceeding and it is not a necessary party to a proceeding to fix divisions of a joint rail rate—or of a portion of a joint rail-water rate—in which it does not participate. United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., supra, 283; Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry-Co. v. United States, supra. We are accordingly not concerned with the adequacy of Seatrain’s tariffs to compensate for its ship loading and unloading service or with the p. 381lawfulness of the payments to it by Hoboken. A determination by the Commission of the extent of the saving to the rail carriers attributable to Hoboken’s payments to Seatrain was therefore not prerequisite to its order prescribing divisions. And its order is adequately supported by its findings that the rail transportation service begins and ends with the placing of the cars in Seatrain’s cradles, and that the ship loading and unloading service forms no part of the rail transportation.
These findings, as we have seen, are based upon substantial evidence and since they are dispositive of the case we need not examine the evidence further to ascertain whether it supports the Commission’s additional finding that payment of the allowances to Seatrain was not necessary to induce Seatrain to perform its ship loading service in a manner which resulted in savings to the rail carriers.
There is an additional reason why the case should not be sent back to the Commission to reconsider its decision that Hoboken should receive no part of whatever windfall may result to the rail carriers from the use of Seatrain’s method of loading and unloading. The prescription of divisions where carriers are unable to agree is not a mere partition of property. It is one aspect of the general rate policy which Congress has directed the Commission to establish and administer in the public interest. New England Divisions Case, supra, 195; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., supra, 284-5; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, supra, 358-60. On such an issue, at least where the Commission prescribes for the complaining party a fair return for the transportation service which it renders, the question as to what is a proper division is one for the Commission’s discretion, reviewable only for unreasonableness, departure from statutory standards, or lack of evidentiary support. New England Divisions Case, supra, 204; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra, 359; p. 382Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 282,286-7; Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 546; Barringer & Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 1,6-7.
The Commission has determined that it is more consistent with the nature of lighterage-free rates, which are “based on average conditions,” that the switching carrier receive only fair compensation for the performance of whatever service may be required of it by the tariffs and the method of rail-water interchange, than that it share in any windfall resulting from the use of an economical method of interchange. And it stated in its report that in general the divisions of a short switching line should be determined on the basis of full remuneration for its services, without regard to the level of the joint rates, unless they are as a whole unremunerative.8 We can hardly say that such determinations of rate policy are arbitrary, or result in such unjust divisions that the court must set them aside. Cf. O’Keefe v. United States, 240 U. S. 294, 303-4.
We need not consider whether the contention that the Commission’s order is confiscatory adds anything to the contention that the divisions which the Commission approved are unjust, unreasonably low, or inequitable. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, supra, 364-9 with id. 383-5. As we have seen, the claim of confiscation is restricted to the Commission’s refusal to allow as a part of appellee’s divisions the payments made by it to Seatrain. These payments, voluntarily made by appellee, were not exacted by the Commission. The Commission’s refusal to include them in divisions of which they were not lawfully a part, not being an infringement of any right of
368 Counsel for Parties.
appellee, is obviously not confiscation of its property. Cf. General American Tank Car Corp. v. Terminal Co., 308 U. S. 422, 428; Louisiana & Pine Bluff Ry. Co. v. United States, supra. The Commission’s order is sustained and the judgment of the District Court setting it aside is reversed.
Reversed.
COLORADO v. KANSAS et al.
BILL IN EQUITY.
No. 5, original. Argued October 11, 12, 1943.—Decided December 6, 1943.
In a suit involving use of the waters of the Arkansas River, brought by Colorado against Kansas and a Kansas user, held:
1. Colorado is entitled to an injunction against further prosecution of suits by the Kansas user against Colorado users. P. 391.
2. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, made no allocation between the States of the waters of the river. P. 391.
3. Kansas is not entitled on the record to an apportionment in second-feet or acre-feet. P. 391.
4. In controversies involving the relative rights of States, the burden on the complaining State is much heavier than that generally required to be borne by private parties, and this Court will intervene only where a case is fully and clearly proved. P. 393.
5. Kansas’ allegations that Colorado’s use has materially increased since the decision in Kansas v. Colorado, and that the increase has worked a serious detriment to the substantial interests of Kansas, are not sustained by the evidence. P. 400.
6. Relief other than the restraint of further prosecution of suits by the Kansas user against Colorado users is denied to both States. P. 400.
Original suit in equity by Colorado against Kansas and the Finney County (Kansas) Water Users’ Association.
Messrs. Gail L. Ireland, Attorney General of Colorado, Jean S. Breitenstein, and Henry C. Vidal, with whom Messrs. Arthur C. Gordon and A. W. McHendrie were on the brief, for complainant.
552826—44----- 29
Messrs. W. E. Stanley and Eldon Wallingford, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, with whom Mr. A. B. Mitchell, Attorney General, was on the brief, for defendants.
Solicitor General Fahy, on behalf of the United States, and Messrs. Walter R. Johnson, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Paul F. Good, on behalf of that State, filed briefs as amici curiae, suggesting the elimination, from the form of final decree proposed by the Special Master, of language relating to state ownership of waters of the Arkansas River.
Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit is the latest of a series of litigations between Kansas, or her citizens, and Colorado, or her citizens, concerning their respective rights to the beneficial use of the waters of the Arkansas River.
The river has its origin in central Colorado, and is a mountain torrent for 130 miles to a point near Canon City where it enters a foothill region ending near Pueblo. Thence it traverses the high plains of eastern Colorado and western Kansas. In the areas mentioned the stream is non-navigable.
In 1901 Kansas brought suit against Colorado in this court for an injunction restraining the latter from diverting, or permitting anyone under her authority to divert, waters of the river within Colorado, and for general relief. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46.1 Kansas in her bill alleged that the waters of the river had been used for irrigation in her western counties and that, after establishment of these uses, Colorado began systematically to appropri- p. 385383 Opinion of the Coin!.
1
The court overruled a demurrer to the bill and required Colorado to answer. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125.
ate and divert them between Canon City and the Kansas state line for irrigating non-riparian arid lands; that, by 1891, all the natural flow, and much of the flood waters, had been appropriated in Colorado so that the average flow had been greatly reduced and the natural flow completely cut off.
Colorado replied that the stream was not continuous except at times of flood; that, in a state of nature, its bed east of Pueblo was frequently dry; that Colorado and her citizens had diverted and used only the perennial flow above Canon City and what had been done in effect conserved water for delivery into Kansas. She denied she had substantially diminished the flow of the river at the state line. She asserted she was entitled to consume the entire flow; but alleged that, in any view, her total appropriations did not amount to an infringement of Kansas’ rights calling for judicial interference.
The court denied Kansas’ contention that she was entitled to have the stream flow as it flowed in a state of nature. It denied Colorado’s claim that she could dispose of all the waters within her borders, and owed no obligation to pass any of them on to Kansas. It declared that as each State had an equality of right each stood before the court on the same level as the other; that inquiry was not confined to the question whether any portion of the river waters were withheld by Colorado but must include the effect of what had been done upon the conditions in the respective States; and that the court must adjust the dispute on the basis of equality of rights to secure, so far as possible, to Colorado, the benefits of irrigation, without depriving Kansas of the benefits of a flowing stream. The measure of the reciprocal rights and obligations of the States was declared to be an equitable apportionment of the benefits of the river. The court added that, before the developments in Colorado consequent upon irrigation p. 386were to be destroyed or materially affected, Kansas must show not merely some technical right but one which carried corresponding benefits.
On examination of the proofs, the court concluded that diversions authorized by Colorado embraced more water than the total flow at Canon City. It found, however, that no clear showing was made as to what surplus water, if any, was contributed by the tributaries below that point or as to the proportion of the diverted water returned to the river by seepage. The opinion described the diversions in each State, analyzed the use made of the water and the benefits derived from it in each, considered population tables and agricultural statistics bearing upon the growth of the communities adjacent to the river in each, and stated conclusions, now material, as follows: That the result of Colorado’s appropriations had been beneficial reclamation of many acres; that, while the influence of Colorado’s diversions had been of perceptible injury to portions of the Arkansas valley in Kansas, yet to the great body of the valley the diminution of flow had worked little, if any, detriment; that regarding the interests of both States, and the right of each to receive benefit through irrigation and otherwise from the waters of the stream, the court was not satisfied that Kansas had made out a case entitling it to a decree. The court added that if depletion by Colorado continued to increase there would come a time when Kansas might justly say that there was no longer an equitable distribution of benefits and might rightly call for relief against Colorado and her citizens. Accordingly the bill was dismissed without prejudice to future action by Kansas. The taking of evidence ended June 16,1905, and the decision of the court was announced May 13,1907.
October 30, 1909, the Finney County Water Users’ Association, which maintained the so-called Farmers’ Ditch in Kansas, applied to a Kansas court for adjudication p. 387of priorities as between various Kansas users of the river water. One of the defendants, the United States Irrigating Company, removed the cause to the United States District Court. A consent decree was entered May 16, 1911, which provided for the allocation and rotation of use amongst certain, but not all, of the Kansas ditches, including the Farmers’ Ditch. It was, however, provided that the settlement should remain binding upon the parties only until the adjudication of other litigation next to be noticed.
August 27,1910, United States Irrigating Company sued Graham Ditch Co. and others holding Colorado priorities, in the United States District Court for Colorado, to obtain an adjudication of priorities as between Kansas users and Colorado users. The Finney County Association was denied leave to intervene. Evidence was taken, but the suit was settled by a contract of February 19, 1916. By this settlement, the Colorado defendants agreed to recognize priorities as of August 27, 1910, for all the Kansas ditches in Finney County except the Farmers’ Ditch; not to apply for, or claim, priorities for storage purposes on the Purgatoire River, a tributary of the Arkansas, or below the mouth of the Purgatoire, of a date earlier than August 27, 1910; and to pay the costs of suit and an additional sum to the Kansas interests. The Kansas ditches agreed to accept the priority date of August 27, 1910, and the quantities of water specified in the contract, as a definition and determination of their rights. The defendants complied with the terms of the contract.
The Finney County Association declined to become a party to the contract and, on November 27,1916, brought suit in the United States District Court for Colorado against the same defendants for relief like that sought in the United States Irrigating Company’s suit. January 29,1923, the Finney County Association brought a second suit in the same court against other Colorado defendants p. 388for similar relief. January 24, 1928, Colorado filed the present bill against Kansas and the Finney County Association.
After formal recitals, the bill refers to our earlier decision, states that, in reliance upon it, money has been spent in the improvement of the irrigation systems in Colorado, recites the prior and the pending private litigation against Colorado appropriators, alleges that the establishment of an interstate priority schedule sought in the pending suits would disrupt and destroy Colorado’s administration of the waters of the Arkansas basin and result in conflict of state authority, asserts that no proper settlement of the relative rights of the States can be obtained in suits by Kansas appropriators against Colorado appropriators, outlines other injury to Colorado threatened by prosecution of the pending cases to judgment, and prays that the Finney County Association be enjoined from further pressing those suits, that Kansas and her citizens be enjoined from litigating, or attempting to litigate, the relative rights of the two States and their citizens to the waters of the river on claims similar to those made by the Association in its pending suits, and that the rights of Colorado and her citizens as determined by the judgment in Kansas V. Colorado be protected.
Kansas’ answer admits some allegations of the bill and denies others, sets forth her alleged rights in the waters of the river, recites appropriations by Kansas residents and citizens, diversions by Colorado citizens under appropriations junior in time and inferior in right to those made in Kansas, and asserts that, since the filing of the complaint in Kansas v. Colorado, Colorado users have largely increased their appropriations and diversions, and threaten further to increase them, to the injury of Kansas users. She prays that the court protect and quiet her rights and those of her citizens and residents, including the Finney
County Association, to their appropriations, that the rights of her citizens and residents to divert water from the river for irrigation be decreed in second feet and that Colorado, her officers, agents, and citizens be perpetually enjoined from diverting any waters from the river or its tributaries in Colorado until the rights of Kansas, her citizens and residents, are satisfied.
The Finney County Association filed an answer admitting and denying averments of the bill and affirmatively praying that Colorado and her citizens be enjoined from diverting water from the river until the Association’s right to 250 second feet is satisfied. The issues were made up by Colorado’s reply.
Pursuant to our order, evidence was taken by a Commissioner. Thereupon the cause was referred to a Master with leave to take additional evidence, and direction, in the light of all the evidence, to state findings of fact, conclusions of law, and to recommend a form of decree. The evidence consists of some seven thousand typewritten pages of testimony and 368 exhibits covering thousands of pages.
The Master states that the “evidence is voluminous and conflicting on many of the material issues of fact,” but his report contains no discussion or analysis of the proofs. Apart from formal recitals, the report consists of fourteen findings of fact,—more properly conclusions of fact,—nine conclusions of law, and a recommended form of decree. Each party has filed exceptions.
Three questions emerge from the pleadings. (1) Is Colorado entitled to an injunction against the further prosecution of litigation by Kansas users against Colorado users? (2) Does the situation call for allocation of the waters of the basin as between Colorado and Kansas in second feet or acre feet? (3) Has Kansas proved that Colorado has substantially and injuriously aggravated p. 390conditions which existed at the time of her earlier suit?
The Master concluded that the first question should be answered in the affirmative. Kansas has not excepted to the conclusion or to the corresponding provisions of the proposed decree.
Bearing upon the second question, the Master found that “the average annual natural flow of the river and its tributaries” is 1,240,000 acre feet, and the “average annual dependable and fairly continuous water supply and flow” 1,110,000 acre feet. He recommends that the dependable flow be allocated 925,000 acre feet to Colorado and 185,000 acre feet to Kansas, 150,000 thereof between April 1 and October 1, and 35,000 between October 1 and April 1 of each year—that is, five-sixths to Colorado and one-sixth to Kansas. He submits a form of decree embodying this allocation and adjusting required deliveries in the same proportions upward or downward in accordance with annual flows in excess of, or less than, the stated average annual dependable flow. He has not attempted to define flood waters or the extent to which they are unusable by either State, and suggests no provision whereby their occurrence may be taken into account in defining Colorado’s obligation to deliver water to Kansas. The form of decree requires measurement of flow by gauges, one at Canon City and the other at the mouth of the Purgatoire, and deliveries to Kansas prorated to the total of the flows at those points.
Both States except to these features of the decree as ambiguous and impossible of administration. Kansas, while asserting that the award to her is inadequate, professes her willingness to accept the recommended allocation, but insists that the decree require Colorado to deliver the quantity of water awarded to Kansas when and as demanded by her. Colorado asserts that the recommended decree—much more Kansas’ proposed amendment-— p. 391would entail serious and unjustified damage to her interests, if indeed compliance with its terms were possible.
In respect of the third question, the Master finds:
“There has been since the taking of testimony in the case of Kansas against Colorado cited in 206 U. S. 46, in 1907, a material increase in the river depletion by Colorado of the water supply of the Arkansas River, which has been consumed and used by Colorado users for irrigation purposes and which has diminished the flow of the water into the State of Kansas and that by reason thereof there have been injuries to the substantial interests in Kansas.”
No exception is taken to the Master’s recommendation that an injunction issue against further prosecution of the Finney County Association suits against Colorado users. In our view such an injunction is appropriate, and should be granted.
Colorado urges that our decision in Kansas v. Colorado, supra, amounted to an allocation of the flow of the Arkansas River between the two States. We cannot accept this view. In that case Kansas labored under a burden of proof applicable in litigation between quasi-sovereign states, of which more hereafter. The dismissal of her bill resulted from the conclusion that she had failed to sustain the burden. But from the decision then rendered it follows that unless Kansas can show a present situation materially different from that disclosed in the earlier case she cannot now obtain relief.
The prayer of Kansas for an apportionment in second feet or acre feet cannot be granted. In our former decision we ruled that Kansas was not entitled to a specific share of the waters as they flowed in a state of nature, that it did not then appear that Colorado had appropriated more than her equitable share of the flow, and that if Kansas were later to be accorded relief, she must show additional takings working serious injuries to her p. 392substantial interests. This was in accord with other decisions in similar controversies.2*
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States in such cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes,8 they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the federal Constitution. We say of this case, as the court has said of interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power.4*
It follows that the Master erred in attempting to divide what he designated as the “average annual dependable” water supply of the Arkansas River in Colorado into p. 393fractions and awarding those fractions to the States respectively. Such a controversy as is here presented is not to be determined as if it were one between two private riparian proprietors or appropriators.5
2
See the cases in notes 3,4 and 6 infra. In New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 347, the prayer of Pennsylvania for such an allocation was denied. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, is not an exception. As it happened, the doctrine of appropriation had always prevailed in each of the States there concerned and furnished the most appropriate and accurate measure of their respective rights of appropriation of the flow of the Laramie River. It was, therefore, possible in enforcing equitable apportionment, to limit the amount of water which Colorado might, without injury to Wyoming’s interests, divert to another water shed, to an amount not exceeding the unappropriated flow. 8 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208; Kansas n. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 95, 96. 4 See Washington v. Oregon, 214 U. S. 205, 218; Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 273,283; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296,313. Compare the Colorado River Compact of Nov. 24, 1922, authorized by Act of August 19, 1921, 42 Stat. 171, and dismissed in Arizona v. California, 292 U. S. 341, 345; and compare Hinderlider v. La Ptoio River Co., 304 U. S. 92.
The lower State is not entitled to have the stream flow as it would in nature regardless of need or use.6 If, then, the upper State is devoting the water to a beneficial use, the question to be decided, in the light of existing conditions in both States, is whether, and to what extent, her action injures the lower State and her citizens by depriving them of a like, or an equally valuable, beneficial use.7
We come now to the vital question whether Kansas has made good her claim to relief founded on the charge that Colorado has, since our prior decision, increased depletion of the water supply to the material damage of Kansas’ substantial interests. The question must be answered in the light of rules of decision appropriate to the quality of the parties and the nature of the suit.
In such disputes as this, the court is conscious of the great and serious caution with which it is necessary to approach the inquiry whether a case is proved. Not every matter which would warrant resort to equity by one citizen against another would justify our interference with the action of a State, for the burden on the complaining State is much greater than that generally required to be borne by private parties. Before the court will intervene the case must be of serious magnitude and fully and clearly proved.8 And in determining whether one State
* Kansas v. Colorado, supra, 85, 101-102; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 669-670; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S. 517, 523, 526.
* Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520-521; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 309; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 374; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 669; Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286, 292; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U. S. 517, 522. p. 394is using, or threatening to use, more than its equitable share of the benefits of a stream, all the factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other must be weighed as of the date when the controversy is mooted.
On this record there can be no doubt that a decree such as the Master recommends, or an amendment or enlargement of that decree in the form Kansas asks, would inflict serious damage on existing agricultural interests in Colorado. How great the injury would be it is difficult to determine, but certainly the proposed decree would operate to deprive some citizens of Colorado, to some extent, of their means of support. It might indeed result in the abandonment of valuable improvements and actual migration from farms. Through practice of irrigation, Colorado’s agriculture in the basin has grown steadily for fifty years. With this development has gone a large investment in canals, reservoirs, and farms. The progress has been open. The facts were of common knowledge.
The controversy was litigated in 1901. Kansas was denied relief in 1907. The dispute between appropriators in the two States was brought into court in 1910 and settled in 1916. The Finney County Association sued Colorado appropriators in 1916 and 1923. Even if Kansas’ claims of increased depletion and ensuing damage are taken at face value, it is nevertheless evident that while improvements based upon irrigation went forward in Colorado for twenty-one years, Kansas took no action until Colorado filed the instant complaint in 1928.
These facts might well preclude the award of the relief Kansas asks. But, in any event, they gravely add to the burden she would otherwise bear, and must be weighed in estimating the equities of the case.9
The Master concludes that there has been a material increase in depletion by Colorado, a consequent diminution
of flow across the state line, and injury to the substantial interests of Kansas. His report does not state what he considers material; or the extent of the diminution of flow; or the interests of Kansas which have been injured and the extent of the injury. We must, therefore, turn to the evidence to resolve the issues.
Kansas asserts that since the decision of Kansas v. Colorado, supra, Colorado has increased her consumptive use of the water of the Arkansas River by an annual average of between 300,000 and 400,000 acre feet. Witnesses so testified and, to support their conclusions, submitted elaborate calculations and analyses exhibiting the alleged total water supply of the river basin in Colorado and the alleged amount of water passing in the bed of the stream across the state line. A witness submitted tables covering the period 1895-1930 from which he deduced an average yearly water supply of 1,240,000 acre feet and an average annual dependable supply of 1,110,000 acre feet. He presented figures to show that Colorado’s consumptive use had increased to the extent of an annual average of 300,000 acre feet. He reached this result by using estimated flow across the state line between 1895 and 1908 and measured flow between 1908 and 1930, during which period a gauging station was maintained at Holly near the line. Measurements indicate that, during the latter period, the average annual state line flow was 260,700 acre feet.10 If, as claimed, this flow remained after an additional average annual depletion of 300,000 acre feet by Colorado, the average annual flow in the earlier period, 1895 to 1908, would necessarily have been greater by 300,000, or would have averaged 560,700 acre feet. The witness’ own exhibit shows that he assumed an average annual state line flow for the period
Opinion of the Court. 320 U. 8.
1895-1899 of 300,000 acre feet, for 1900-1904, of 470,000 acre feet, and, for 1905-1909, of 454,000 acre feet, or an annual average over the total period, 1895-1909, of 408,000 acre feet. On his own estimates the claimed average annual depletion of 300,000 acre feet could not have taken place. Moreover, the force of this evidence is weakened by Kansas’ allegations in Kansas v. Colorado, supra. In her bill in that case she alleged Colorado had totally destroyed the normal flow of the river exclusive of floods whereas she now asserts that the flow at the time of the earlier suit was such that Colorado has been able to deplete it on an annual average of 300,000 acre feet.
The records of Colorado’s consumption and ditch diversions, and the Colorado and Kansas exhibits showing the divertible and usable state line flow, rebut such an increase as Kansas asserts. Kansas’ expert witness himself testified that the diversion records show no material change in Colorado diversions since 1905 and that if acreage in Colorado has expanded under the ditches on the main stem of the river it has done so because of an improved duty of water; that, during the period, the river gains due to return flow have increased, the consumptive use of water has declined, and relatively the stream flows have improved.
The Kansas ditches are capable of diverting water only up to 2,000 c. f. s. When the flow is greater the excess cannot be diverted and used. It is admitted that the character of the flow of the river in Colorado is variable from year to year, from season to season, and from day to day, and the main river below Canon City may be almost without water one day, run a flood the next day, and, on the following day, be in practically its original condition. Thus it appears that both in Colorado and in Kansas there may at one time be flood water unavailable for direct diversion and, at another, not enough water to supply the capacity of diversion ditches. The critical matter is p. 397the amount of divertible flow at times when water is most needed for irrigation. Calculations of average annual flow, which include flood flows, are, therefore, not helpful in ascertaining the dependable supply of water usable for irrigation. That supply has, in Colorado, been supplemented by the extensive use of reservoirs for storage of flood waters and winter flows not usable or needed for irrigation. Though western Kansas affords sites for similar storage reservoirs, but one small basin has been constructed in that State. On the other hand, the storage in Colorado, and the release of stored water to supplement the natural flow of the stream in times of need, operates by seepage and return to the channel to stabilize and improve the flow at the state line and, to that extent, benefits irrigation in Kansas.
Kansas relies heavily upon the increase of irrigated acreage in Colorado since our decision in 1907. The testimony in the earlier case was closed in 1905. The then latest available census—for 1902—reported 300,115 acres under irrigation in the Arkansas basin in Colorado. In its opinion the court referred to this figure. The next census—for 1909—gives the Colorado acreage as 464,236. The later reports disclose an addition of less than 5,000 acres between 1909 and 1939. Thus a total of about 170,000 additional acres has been put under irrigation since 1902. On its face this record would seem to indicate a large increase of consumptive use by Colorado, but the acreage under irrigation does not afford a reliable measure of actual consumption. When first turned in, the water is rapidly absorbed by the sub-soil with consequent high consumption. By continued irrigation the sub-soil becomes saturated, the water table rises, and water, in increasing quantities, flows back to the stream. Ultimately consumption falls well below diversion. The returned water again may be diverted and again supply return flows. Since the decision in the earlier case, studies p. 398of return flows have been made which indicate a steady reduction in the quantity of water consumed per acre of irrigated land.
Practically all of the affected Kansas ditches are in three western counties. Tables taken from the United States census show that, in 1899, acreage irrigated in these counties was 6% of that irrigated in the Colorado basin. In 1909 it was 7%, in 1929, 9.7%, and, in 1939, 10.7%. It seems that Colorado cannot have depleted the usable supply passing into Kansas if acreage under irrigation is any measure of depletion.
Whatever may be said of the practices of Colorado since 1905, Kansas is not entitled to relief unless she shows they clearly have entailed serious damage to her substantial interests and those of her citizens. It is not necessary to quote the findings of this court made in the earlier case. We need only say they disclose that some ditches in western Kansas had been abandoned for lack of available water and all ditches were suffering from shortages of flow. The court pointed out that Colorado had authorized diversions in excess of the flow at Canon City. And the record in the present case indicates that, except for seepage and return flow, the appropriations Colorado has authorized from the basin, as a whole, exceed the available dependable flow of the stream and its tributaries, and this appears to have been true also in 1901. It appears, nevertheless, that, since 1904, an increased quantity of usable water has passed the state line, for it is testified by Kansas’ expert witness that, between 1895 and 1902, no divertible water passed the line and none between 1903 and 1907, except in 1903 and 1905, whereas in each year since 1908 divertible water has crossed the state line in varying quantities and, in most years, in substantial amounts.
Kansas, however, insists that 414,000 acres in western Kansas are susceptible of successful irrigation, and much of this land would have been irrigated had Colorado not p. 399deprived Kansas of her equitable share of the flow. The evidence is that the acreage now irrigated in Kansas lies close to the river and along the river bottom. The land claimed to be susceptible of irrigation extends many miles from the bed of the river. We are asked to speculate as to how much of this land would have been put under irrigation under more favorable circumstances.
As has been pointed out, despite Colorado’s alleged increased depletion, the acreage under irrigation in western Kansas through existing ditches has steadily increased, over the period 1895-1939, from approximately 15,000 acres to approximately 56,000 acres. Moreover, the arid lands in western Kansas are underlaid at shallow depths with great quantities of ground water available for irrigation by pumping at low initial and maintenance cost. There is persuasive testimony that farmers who could be served from existing ditches have elected not to take water therefrom but to install pumping systems because of lower cost.
Again, there is serious question whether lands which are not riparian may divert the water from the stream for irrigation. In the earlier suit Kansas asserted,11 and the court held,1112 that the common law prevailed in Kansas and governed the rights of riparian owners. It is true that the rule as to riparian rights has been expanded by the common law of Kansas to permit a riparian proprietor reasonable use of the waters of a stream for irrigation.13 But such use is subject to the rights of other riparian owners to a like reasonable use. What is reasonable must, in each instance, be determined in the light of total supply and total need of all riparian owners.14 It is also true that, beginning in 1886, Kansas, by statute, recognized appro-
11206 U. S. 51, 52, 58,59, 60,61. 12 Ibid., 95, 99,102,104. 13 Campbell v. Grimes, 62 Kan. 503,64 P. 62. 14 Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206,80 P. 571.
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priation for irrigation. But there is doubt whether the privilege is not restricted to riparian owners in some portions of the State. The Supreme Court of Kansas has held that, where a title originates in a grant antedating the Act of 1886, the right of appropriation is limited by the common law as to riparian rights, which are rights of property derived from the original patent or deed in the line of title.15 It seems that title to much of the land along the Arkansas Valley in western Kansas was originally granted or patented prior to 1886. The brief and argument of Kansas, while referring to the statutes of the State authorizing appropriation, make no reference to the Kansas decisions and no showing with respect to the right of non-riparian owners to appropriate waters against objection by other such owners.
The official census figures submitted bearing upon population of the western counties of Kansas, and the agricultural production in them, give no support to a claim that the inhabitants have suffered for lack of arable and productive land. Generally speaking, the population has steadily increased and the agricultural production has also risen throughout the period in question.
All these considerations persuade us that Kansas has not sustained her allegations that Colorado’s use has materially increased, and that the increase has worked a serious detriment to the substantial interests of Kansas.
A decree should be entered enjoining the further prosecution of the Finney County Association’s suits, and dismissing the prayers of both States for other relief. The parties may submit such a decree.