President, Dirs. & Co. op the Bank OP the U.S. v. Weisiger, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 331 (1829)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
President, Dirs. & Co. op the Bank OP the U.S. v. Weisiger, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 331 (1829)
Full caption
THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS AND COMPANY op the BANK OP THE UNITED STATES, Appellants. v. DANIEL WEISIGER, Appellee
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1829
Disposition
Reversed
Concurrence
Johnson (Justice)
Concurrence
Makshall (Chief Justice)
Concurrence
Marshall (Chief Justice)
Concurrence
Story (Justice)
*THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS
AND COMPANY op the BANK OP THE UNITED STATES, Appellants.
v.
DANIEL WEISIGER, Appellee.
Promissory note — suit against remote indorser — equity — diligence — insolvency — imprisonment for debt — discharge under United States in¬ solvency law.
This court has decided that a suit could he main¬ tained in equity, by the holder of an indorsed note, against a remote indorser; and upon grounds per¬ fectly familiar to courts exercising- equity juris¬ diction.
In has been decided in Kentucky, that a suit at iaw could not be maintained in that State by the in¬ dorsee, against a remote indorser. The conclusion, then, results from our own decisions, that he must be let into equity ; for an indorsement is certainly no release to the previous indorsers ; and the ulti¬ mate assignee alone is entitled to the benefit of their liability. And this we understand to be con¬ sistent with the received opinions and practice in Kentucky. [348]
The law in Kentucky is settled, as it is in Virginia and in this court, that upon Virginia contracts by indorsement of promissory notes, every reasonable effort must be made to recover of the drawer by suit, before the assignee can have recourse againsi^ the assignor or Indorser.
It is upon the question, what constitutes such dil¬ igence, that all the difficulties arise in suits upon these contracts. And certainly this court cannot be called upon to carry the obligations imposed up¬ on assignees on this point, further than the State courts have already extended them. [348]
What will be considered a sufficient compliance with the requisitions of the laws of Kentucky im¬ posing diligence in the prosecution of a suit against the drawer of a note, by the indorsee, in order to ehang-e a prior indorser.
The discharge of an insolvent under the statutes, is the most satisfactory evidence of Insolvency. After such discharge, it is not required that pro¬ cess of execution shall be Issued against the party, in order to conform to the injunction of diligence. [349]
The 3d, 3d and 4th sections of the Act of January 6, 1800, entitled “An Actfor the relief of persons im¬ prisoned for debts,” make provision for the dis¬ charge of persons confined under execution ; and the 5th section extends “the privileges and relief” of that Act to persons in continement against whom judgment is obtained, but no execution is¬ sued. Under the provisions in favor of persons charged in execution, on the day of arrest, a notice may be served upon the person at whose suit they are confined, and at the end of thirty days, they ma.y be discharged. By the 5th section it is enact¬ ed, “that any person Imprisoned upon process issuing from any court of the United States, except at the suit of the United States, in any civil action, against whom judgment has been or shall be re¬ covered, shall be entitled to the privileges and re¬ lief provided by this Act, after the expiration of thirty days from the time such judgment has been or shall be recovered ; though the creditor should not within that time sue out his execution, and charge the debtor therewith.”
It has been argued that under this section the defendant must remain in prison thirty days at ter judgment, before he can sue out his notice to the plaintiff; thus requiring him to remain sixty days in confinement in the cases which come under this section, whereas he remains but thirty days when confined under execution.
There can be no reason for this distinction ; and in favor of liberty, and with a *vlew to con- [*3.33 sistency, the construction should be othei’wise. If such were the true construction, the relief would not be the same as is extended to the debtor-s of the other class. The day of entering judgment under the 5th section, is the day that corresponds to the day of arrest, under the previous provisions of the law; and therefore, in thirty days after the judg¬ ment, the defendant may be discharged : comply¬ ing with the other requisitions of the law. [350] Where the agent of the plaintiff agreed in writ¬ ing to dispense with the imprisonment required by
Ml
332
Supreme Court of the United States.
1829
linv, to entitle the defendant to be discharged under the insolvent law of the United States; and the defendant who was in confinement was discharg'ed ^vlthout having' been impris¬ oned thirty days, this was not such a proceeding as would bar the assignee of the note to recover against a subsequent assignor. The object of the imprisonment is to give theplaintifC an opportunity to ascertain the situation of the defendant, and if he does notrequire this, it may be waived without prejudice to his claims on others. [351]
A discharge under the insolvent laws of the Unit¬ ed States, is confined in its effects altogether to the particular cause ; and even as to that, does not ex¬ empt the debtor’s present effects, or future acciiii- sitions from the process of the law. Nor is his per¬ son exempt from confinement for the same debt, should he be detected in a fraud upon the creditor. [353]
PPEAL from the Circuit Court of Ken¬ tucky.
The complainants’ bill, filed in the Circuit Court of Kentucky, on the 22d of November, 1822, stated that, on the 25th of July, 1821, Peter G. Voorhdes made Ids promissory note for $2,560, payable sixtj^ days after date, to Daniel Weisiger; that Weisiger assigned to John H. Hanna, and Hanna to the complain¬ ants, ■who discounted the note. That they duly instituted a suit against Voorhees, on the com¬ mon law side of the court, recovered judgment, find prosecuted him to insolvency. It prayed that the defendant may be decreed to pay the amount, with interest and costs.
Annexed to the bill is a copy of the record of the jiroceedings against Voorhees, from which it appears that the declaration was filed on the 2d of October, 1821 ; and on the same day a writ of capias ad respondendum was is¬ sued, with this memorandum: “This is an action of debt; bail required.” The marshal made return to the writ as follows; “Executed 6th of October, 1821, and committed defend¬ ant to jail at Franklin county ; receipt hereon.” The jailer’s receipt bears date 5th of Novem¬ ber. 1821.
At November term, 1821, judgment ■was en¬ tered for the plaintiffs by default for $2,560, with interest from the 26th of February (Sep¬ tember) 1821, and costs. Afterwards, on the 333*J *14th of December, 1821, the jailer of Franklin county surrendered the body of Voorhees into court.
On the 29th of December, 1821, du fieri facias issued, which was placed in the hands of the marshal on the 19th of January; and the mar-, shal returned — “No estate found.”
On the 11th of April, 1822, a writ of capias de satisfaciendum issued, to which the marshal returned — “ Not found.”
To this bill the defendant Weisiger moved the court for leave to file a demurrer, alleging the cause that the bill did not aver the prosecution of any suit against Hanna, the immediate assignee of the complainant, and that Hanna was not made a party defendant; that the bill con¬ tained no case of equitable jurisdiction nor for a decree against Weisiger, and was altogether void of equity.
Afterwards in the same term the defendant Hanna appeared and waived all objection to a decree on acconnt of the want of service of process upon him, and Weisiger waived the demurrer so far as respected the want of proper parties.
And at the following term the court over¬ ruled the demurrer.
443
At May term, 1826, the defendants failing to answer according to rule, the bill was taken for confessed, and the cause came on for hear¬ ing on the bill and exhibits; whereupon the court decreed that the complainants should re¬ cover from the defendant Weisiger the sum of $3,278.17, and costs, unless, &c. ; which decree was afterwards set aside on Weisiger’s motion, and leave given him to file an answer.
The answer of Weisiger, protesting against the jurisdiction of the court, relies and in,sists bj^ way of plea in bar to the relief claimed, that the matters contained in the bill, if true, do not constitute a case for the interposition of a court of equity, but are cognizable at law, and relies upon the 16th section of the Judi¬ ciary Act of 1789. It admits that he may have put his name on the note, but denies that he ever received any consideration for the same, or that it was ever pa.ssed or negotiated by him or for his use or benefit. He answers further that he did not of his own knowledge know *of the discount of the note, although
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he was informed that such discount had been made, and for a long time believed that it had been fully satisfied by Voorhees; that he is ad¬ vised that the proper measures were not adopted in due season to enforce the payment ; and that the proceedings had were not such as to authorize a recovery against him, inasmuch as the return of the marshal shows that Voorhees was committed to jail, and it does not appear that he had ever been discharged or escaped, and there does not appear to have been any order to charge him in execution ; nor is there any return that he had no property or estate on which the fieri facias might have been levied. He does not admit that Voorhees was insolvent at the time the judgment was ob¬ tained against him, but believes he then had estate within the district sufficient to satisfy the same, in whole or in part.
The complainants’ amended bill states that before the rendition of the judgment against Voorhees, he was brought before the district judge, took the oath required by the Act of Congress, and was discharged as an insolvent from the custody of the jailer. Shortly after, and before the return of the. fieri facias, he left the State, and has ever since remained out of it, leaving no estate upon which the amount could be levied, or any part of it; all of which is averred to be personally known to Weisiger, as is also the fact that he indorsed the note for the accommodation of Voorhees, and to give Jiim credit, and with the view and expectation that it would be discounted by the bank.
The exhibit referred to in the amended bill states the proceedings to discharge Voorhees from imprisonment in three suits of the Bank of the United States, entitled as follows:
The President, Directors and Company of the Bank of the United S’totes, plaintiffs, v. Peter G. Voorhees, defendant.
The Same v. the Same.
The Same v. George M. Bibb, Charles S. Todd, and Peter G. Voorhees.
The judge’s order to discharge dated 14th December, 1821, states that Voorhees was im- pi’isoned in the jail of Franklin county by pro¬ cess in these suits; that judgment *had
been rendered in' the suit, and he had petitioned to have the oath administered to him; that a
Peters 2.
1829
The Bank op the United States v. Weisigeh.
335
citation had been served upon Henry Clay, Esq., agent, &c. ; that they appeared, and no good cause being shown, the oath was adminis¬ tered and he was discharged.
The citation bears date the 14th of Decem¬ ber, 1821, and requires appearance on the 7th of Januaiy following. And then is a paper, of which the following is a copy:
‘ ‘ I agree, on behalf of the Bank of the United States, to waive the previous imprison¬ ment by law to entitle the defendant to take the oath of an insolvent debtor, and that the said oath may be now administered with the same effect as if that imprisonment had taken place 14 December, 1821.
(Signed) H. Clay,
Counsel of the B. U. S.
Upon the bills, answer and exhibits above set forth, the court, at May term, 1827, decreed the complainants’ bill to be dismissed with costs.
Mr. Sergeant, for the appellants, complain¬ ants below, made the following points:

1. The defendant not being the immediate

indorser to the complainant, but a remote in¬ dorser, the case was cognizable and the com¬ plainant relievable only in equity.

2. That having proceeded at law with due

diligence against the drawer, and the drawer being insolvent, the complainant was entitled to relief against the indorser.

3. That the discharge by the district judge,

or the consent of the counsel of the plaintiff to waive the thirty days’ notice or the thirty days’ imprisonment, or any part thereof, did not im¬ pair or affect the right to recover against the indorser.

4. The fact of Voorhees’s insolvency is es¬

tablished by the oath taken by him before the district judge, which is at least pnma facie evi¬ dence, and sufficient until the contrary appear as well by the return to the fieri facias; and that fact being established is sufficient to entitle the complainant to recover. For,

5. The discharge could not prejudice the in-

336] dorser. His cause of action against the drawer will accrue by the payment of the money, and be unaffected by the discharge.

6. That the decree below ought to be re¬

versed and a decree rendered for the appellant.

1. As to the objection that the bill contained

no case for equitable jurisdiction and was al¬ together without equity, he said the whole of the questions in the cause, the present included, depended upon a law peculiar (as far as he knew) to Virginia and Kentucky, and derived by the latter from the former. It was not cre¬ ated by statute, but was the common law of the State in the case of indorsers or assignors as ex¬ pounded by judicial decisions.
The first case in the books was Mackic’s Ex¬ ecutors V. Davis and Young, in Vii’ginia, 1796, (2 Wash. Hep. ,219). It makes no distinction be¬ tween bonds and notes; sealed and unsealed in¬ struments. It established in general, “ that the assignor is liable to the assignee, provided due diligence be used by him again, st the obligor or drawer, and the latter prove insolvent.” (Tuck. Bl. , 442, in note.) In Lee v. Love (1 Call, 497, 1799), it was decided that the assignee of a note must sue the maker before he can resort to the assignor. The liability of the indorser, there¬ fore] is dependent upon a condition which eLse- Peters 2.
where does not belong to it, of due diligence being first nsed against the drawer and failing from his established want of ability to pay.
Against the immediate indorser the remedy is at law ; against a remote indorser in equity. {Mandevillc v. Biddle, 1 Cranch, 293; Riddle v. Mandeville, 5 Cranch, 322; Dralce v. Johnson, Hardin, 218; S. C., 3 Marsh., 163.)
This being decided by the Supreme Court of the United States as well as by the tribunals of Kentucky, there can be no doubt that the pres¬ ent is a case for equitable jurisdiction ; being the case of a remote, and not of an immediate in¬ dorser, there is no jurisdiction at law.
That the bill was without equity is supposed to be made out because Hanna, a subsequent indorser to Weisiger,was not first prosecuted to insolvency, and because (as alleged) there was no consideration from the bank to Weisiger.
*To the first of these suggestions,
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after stating that Hanna wms a party defendant, he replied that it was no part of the condition of the holder’s resort against one indorser, that he should first proceed against another. Their common liability was dependent upon one and the same condition, that is, the failure by due diligence to obtain the money from the drawer ; upon which condition they all became liable, and the holder might proceed against either. Such was the law as decided. Independently of this, it must be obvious that no reason can be assigned for requiring the holder first to proceed against a subsequent indorser, inas¬ much as a recovery from him would give an immediate action against the prior indorser. This is contrary to the principle of Riddle v. Mandeville. There is no ground, however, for the sugge.stion.
To tlie other he replied, that if it appeared (which he did not admit) that there was no beneficial consideration from the bank to W eis- iger, still there was a consideration sufficient at law and in equity to support the contract — the comsideration of injury to the bank. The mon¬ ey was loaned (whoever may have received it) upon the credit of the indorser. His contract was the inducement to lend, without which the loan would not have been made.

2. The complainants, he said, had fully per¬

formed the condition to entitle them to recover from the indorser. They had proceeded at law with due diligence against the drawer until he became insolvent, and further pursuit be¬ came hopeless. To proceed further could not be required, and would be liable to censure if attempted at the expense of the indorser. He is answerable for costs I'easonably incurred, but not for expenses entirely thrown away.
The note fell due the 26th of September, 1821. Suit was brought against the drawer the 2d of October, 1821, to the next term. At the next term judgment was obtained. A fi. fa. issued December 29, 1821, and a ca. sa. the 11th of April, 1822. In the meantime, to wit, Decem¬ ber 14, 1821, Voorhees was discharged under the in.solvent law of the United Blates. So that here there were due diligence, and established legal insolvency. There was even more than *due diligence; forafter the insol vencj^
the process of execution was unnecessary, and could only have been taken out from abundant caution.
He then examined all the decided cases in
443
338
Supreme Court of the United States.
1839
Kentucky, so far as they were accessible, and 339**'] proceeded to state that he perceived in them nothing which appeared to him to in¬ terfere witli the complainants’ right to recover. 340] The point to be established by a reasonably diligent pursuit, is the insolvency of the drawer, or the impossibility of getting the money from him. Upon that being estab¬ lished, the right arises against the indorser. It may be established in various ways.
1 . By showing that he was out of the State and not within the reach of process, and with¬ out property in the State. This he inferred from SprattY. M’ Kinney (1 Bibb., 595) Stapp V. Anderson (1 Marsh., 535).

3. By the use of cUie diligence, and inability

to recover, or prosecution to insolvency. He 341 ] must sue in a reasonable time. {M’ Kin¬ ney V. M.' Connell, 1 Bibb., 339; M’Ginnis v. Burton, 3 Bibb., 6.) But there is no fixed time. {CollyerY. IF/wtefer, 3 Marsh., 197.) Perhaps it must generally be the next term. {Glair v. Barr, 3 Marsh., 855.) He must use the ordi¬ nary remedies. {Smallwood v. Wood, 1 Bibb. , 548.) B\it he is not bound to use extraordinary ones. {Oldham v. Benyan, 3 Littell, 133.) He must in general issue ji. fa. and ca. sa. and is¬ sue them in succession. He cannot issue them together. Ho decided case gives any counte¬ nance to the suggestion that he can do so. The records in this court show that he cannot. The return to thej?. fa. directed to the county where party resides, is conclusive to show that there is no property in the county, and prima facie that there is none in the State.
The re.sult is to be insolvency, evidenced by legal pursuit. The end and object is to make this appear.
But there is another case:

3. Insolvency, legally ascertained by other

means. When this occurred after the note fell due, he contended that it dispensed with legal pursuit. When it occurred after proceedings begun, he contended it dispensed with further prosecution. The contrary doctrine would be
absurd, the object being to ascertain insolvency. Why proceed after it had been ascertained?
Upon this point, there was a seeming con¬ tradiction in the decided ca.ses, but it was not a real one. It was explained by the puinciple of the decisions, which w^as this: tliat parol evidence should not be received to prove insolv¬ ency, it must be a legal insolvency, legally or judicially ascertained.
This would appear from a brief attention to the cases. In Collyer v. Whitaker (8 Marsh. , 197), it is said, “insolvency, in general, only legitimately proved by suit.” “The prosecu¬ tion of suit, however, is essential, barely as the means of ascertaining, &c.” In Yoking v. Gos- 5?/ (3 Bibb., 337), “if the assignee prosecute diligently as far as a prudent man would do in a case where he was solely intere.sted, that is all that is required.” In Stapjpv. Anderson (1 Marsh., 545), insolvency and removal of the drawer from the State were held suffi¬ cient, per se, to subject assignor, wfithout suit against *drawer. “ The law,” says the
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court, “does not require anyone to do a vain or idle act.” If sued to insolvency on one note, therefore, not necessary to sue upon another. These cases are supposed to be contradicted by Clair V. Barr (3 Marsh., 255). In that case the drawer was living w'hen the note fell due. He died on the third day of the first term, being about two months after the note fell due. The court decide that proof of insolvency did not absolve the holder from the necessity of suing : ‘ ‘ he (the drawer) may have had credit , though he had no property.” The decision. ■ therefore, amounts to nothing more than that, at a sub¬ sequent time, parol evidence shall not be re¬ ceived to prove that the party was actually in¬ solvent at a prior time. In other words, actual insolvency no excuse. The debtor was going on in business, “had credit,” and possibly might have paid. How could this be if he were legally devested of all his property, and stripped of all his credit, by judicial insolvency? It is a reasonable distinction, the same that is made

1. — The following abstract of the cases which

have been decided in the courts of Kentucky, for which the reporter is indebted to the counsel of the appellant, will be found highly useful and in¬ teresting- to the profession :

1808. — Assignor holding up obligation for four¬

teen months without suit, was guilt.v of gross neg¬ ligence. Not accounting for this delay, he was not entitled to recourse against assignor. If the debtor was in doubtful circumstances, the necessity for due diligence was therefore the greater.

1809. — Assignee to use every compulsory process

of the law against the debtor ; and all the incident¬ al remedies to compel )iayments; excei)t where obligor is out of the Commonwealth, and such absence was not contemplated by assignor and a.ssignee. To omit to demand hail, where bail was of right dernandable, in case the ca. sa. should be returned it<in est iiwenUts, would be negligence. Where bail given, the assignee must proceed against bail, upon ti. e. 1. returned against principal.
tlefers to Muckie’s Ex. v. Davis Wash., 219); Boal’s Ex. ^ ^ M'Connell (I’r. Dec., 1.52).
1809.— Asr-ignment on assignment of a covenant.
Absence of debtor from the circuit is not suffi¬ cient TO entitle the assignee to recourse against the •assignor. Diligence by suit cannot be dispensed with by averring that debtor was insolvent.
(Drake V. Johnson, Hardin, 218.)
1808.— The a.ssignee of a bond or note cannot sue a remote indorser, for there Is no privity between them.
444
Refers to 1 Cra., 209; Mandeville v. Riddle (S. P.) 3 Marsh., 163; 2 Tuck. Bl., 442), a case in District Court, Virginia; and a case in Maryland, see p. 222.
(Hogan V. Vance, 2 Bibb, 34.)

1810. — The sheriff’s return of no nroperty to a ti:

fa. directed to the country where debtor resides, is conclusive evidence that he had no property in the county, and prima facie that he hath none elsewhere. But such return on an execution, di¬ rected to a county where ho does not reside, is no evidence of insolvency. The assignee must use due diligence to recover the money from the obli¬ gor, if he do not, and debtor become insolvent, he makes the debt his own.

1811. — Suit against two obligors (first one and then

the other added), fl. fa. against one, and •J.fterwards ca. sa. against both. Sheriff returned that he had taken defendant and released by County Court. Held, not sufficient against as.signor. Ought to have been a fi. /ft. Doubt, to which defendant the return applied. Doubt, as to power of court.
(M’Ginnis v. Burton, 3 Bibb., 6.)
1813.— Assignee of note (bond), holding ut) for ten months without bringing suit, and not accounting tor delay, guilty of negligence. Staying execution by plaintiff, after property seized by sheriff, dis¬ charges assignor. Replevying debt is conclusive evidence of solvency at the time, and it bond after¬ wards quashed for irregularity, remedy is against officer, and not assignor. (Seems otherwise, 2'Litt., 132, post, in this note.)
(Young V. Cosby, 3 Bibb, 227.)
J813.— If the assignee prosecute diligently as far
Peters 3.
18r’9
The Bank of the Uniteh States v. Weisiger.
342
by the priority laws of the United Stales. They disregard actual insolvency.
This case, therefore, leaves in full force the reasonable doctrine of Young v. Coabg, and Stapp v. Anderson; otlierwise understood, it w'ould be contrary to the very princijjle of the law, and would go far towards extinguishing all liability of the indorser, already sufficiently reduced.

3. The discharge by the judge, and the

waiver of the thirty days’ imprisonment, or thirty days’ notice, did not take away the right of the complainants. Why keep him in prison?
The insolvency w’ould no more have been ascertained at the end of thirty days than at the beginning. It would have been mere wan¬ ton cruelty to keepi the debtor in prison. The law does not require it. The decisions in Ken¬ tucky, which are in the spirit of humanity to the debtor, do not require it. Else why not require the creditor to pay the prrison fees, and thus continue the debtor’s imprisonment? It is not necessary to use undue severity or indulge in unproductive cruelty. ( Young v. Cosby, 3 Bibb., 227.) It has been supposed (and perhaps the belief led to this decision) that Glair v. Barr established the doctrine that a creditor was 3-I:3]bound to keep in prison a destitute and in.solvent debtor, in the hope that, though he had nothing himself, something might be ex¬ torted by his sufferings from the charity of his friends. This is not a just motive, nor one that a court can countenance. Imprisonment of a debtor is not to be u.scd at this time of day for inflicting a punishment upon him or his friends. Why, then, it is said, is a ca. sa. given? The answer is very easy. It is to compel the sur¬ render of property which, from its nature or locality, cannot be made amenable to other process. But Clair v. Bai'r does not proceed upon the principle imputed to it. Rightly un¬ derstood, it is in harmony with the other cases, and with the obvious dictates of humanity and justice.
As to the supposed neglect to charge Voor-
hees in execution, he said he doubted whether it was in any case required, or even admissible; for the decisions in Kentucky made it neces¬ sary first to issue But, without enter¬
ing into that question, he said that in this case the discharge under the insolvent law di,spensed with that step, and indeed, made it impossibie.
He submitted, therefore, that the decree be¬ low was not warranted by the principles upon which the liability of indorsers rests, nor by the decisions in Kentucky ; which had certainly gone far enough in limiting and crippling the rights of the holder.
J/y. Wickliffe, for the appellee, stated that it was denied tliat any consideration had been received for his indorsement by Daniel Weis¬ iger; and he also denied that the bank had u.sed due diligence to obtain payment of the note from the drawer. The facts of the case are un¬ contradicted upon the pleadings and exhibits, as there was no evidence introduced to oppose the statement and allegations in the answer of the appellee in the Circuit Court.
The court should be aware of the nature and legal character of paper of the description of that upon which the appellants claim to receive. Such instruments are not negotiabie by the laws of Kentucky; the statute of Anne never having been in force in that State. The party who sues may *do so upon a statute of Ken-
tucky, which authorizes the suit in the name of the assignee, but goes no further.
The true principle upon which the respon.si- bilitj' of the assignor depends, and upon which it can alone be supported, is the general liability to refund that wfliich he may have received, on a consideration which has failed. (1 Bibb., 545.) In 1 Marshall, 544, it was decided that this liabiiity was thus restricted, and did not extend to the amount stated in the note. Under the authority of cases in Kentucky, the assignor is not liable without a consideration received by him; nor unle,ss the consideration be alleged and proved. (1 Bibb, 596; 2 Bibb, 425.)
The only case which impugns the uniform
as a prudent man would do, In a case where he was solely interested, that is all that is required to g-ive him recourse upon the a,S8ignor. If he sue &fi. fa. which is returned nulla hona, and then a ca. sa. upon which the debtor is arrested, and discharged for want of security for prison fees, tliis is not laches, unless the debtor had property not -within the reach of a fi. fa., which the assignor tnust prove.

1818. — On a transfer of a bond, a covenant to be

liable if obligor not solvent, does not vary legal liability of assignor. Must be diligence. “Failing to commence his action for four months, inexcusa¬ ble delay. Fatal negligence not so to prosecute it as to ascertain insolvency or fix the bail.”

1819. — The insolvency and removal from the State

of the drawer, jser se, subjects the assignor without suit against the drawer. “The law does not re¬ quire anyone to do a vain or idle act.”
A note negotiated in bank is a mercantile paper.

1820. — Assignee preferring a petition and sum¬

mons, and thereby waiving his right to bail, must show payee’s insolvency by ca. sa. not aUimdc.
Note, in this case, no neglect imputed for not re¬ quiring bail, which is contrary to 1 Bibb., 542. (Per¬ haps they may be reconciled : the one speaking of a return of non est, and the other supposing an fl.rr©st»)
As to time of bringing suit, the case says, “short- Peters 2.
ly and within a reasonable time after note became due;” not immediately.
As to fl. fa. “which issued in reasonable time not immediately.
Supposes that in general “insolvency only legiti¬ mately proved by suit,” &c. The prosecution of suit, however, is essential barely as the means of ascertaining,” &c.
1820.- If drawer dead at time note falls due, with¬ out heirs or letters testamentary, parol evidence may be received of insolvency. But it he be alive when note falls due, insolvency does not absoWe holder from necessity of suing; he may have had credit, though without propertj-.
Note 1. In this case, the drawer died on the third day of the first term after the note fell due, being about two months. The court say that a suit was essential, that proof of insolvency could make no difference, and .yet reverse the judgment below, because parol proof of insolvency was not re¬ ceived.
Note 2. “ He might not have been without cred¬ it,” &c., i. 6., there was no open, public, or legal Insolvency; therefore he might possibly have paid, &c. In this sense (which is the obvious one) it is correct. It cannot be proved that he would not have paid, as ho was going on. Many men are insolvent. This reconciles it.
1820.— Omitting to issue a ca. sa. for five months after the return of the fl. fa. is an unreasonable delay, and discharges assignor. Note. There appears to have been some interval between judg¬ ment and fi. fa. Certificate of discharge as an
445
344
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
current of decisions in Kentucky upon these principles, is that of Allen v. Prior (3 Marshall, 305).
The appellee received nothing for his in¬ dorsement of the note; and he is, therefore, protected from all liability upon it, by the de¬ cisions of the courts of Kentucky.
There cannot be a liability by the appellee, considering him as having guaranteed the debt. Such a liability should have been in writing; as, unless it is so, the statute of frauds destroys it.
It is not denied that the injury a promisee may receive, as well as a benefit given to the promisor, is a good consideration ; but if the principle is otherwise, it can be claimed only in favor of an original indorsee. In this case the bank stands independent of such a principle, for to the bank no promise was ever made by the appellee, his engagement having been made to Hanna, the preceding indorsee. But if a responsibility by the assignor does exist, in a case where he received no benefit, and a chan¬ cellor will interpose and enforce the contract, this will only be where the condition imposed by the law governing the contract has been performed.
The next inquiry is, therefore, has the law creating this liability of the assignor been com¬ plied with?
The law in Kentucky stands thus ;
The assignee ought to take every compulsory process of law against the original debtor, un¬ til his insolvency is established, or the suit and 34:f>]all incidental remedies are found insuf- ficient to coerce payment. {Smallwood v. Woods, 1 Bibb, 546.)
To omit holding to bail, when bail is of right demandable, if on a ca. sa. the return is non est inventus, is negligence. (2 Marshall, 197.)
The assignee is bound to issue a fi. fa. and a ca. sa., and if the debtor is not found, to pro¬ ceed against the bail. Nothing short of this will do. (1 Bibb, 147.) In M’ Kinney y. M’ Con¬ nell (1 Bibb, 239), it was decided that a delay of fourteen months is, per se, negligence, no matter what other steps may have been taken.
Averment of insolvency, and consequently proof of that fact, by any other means than a legal proceeding on the note assigned, will not be sufficient to charge the indorser. (3 Bibb, 6.)
Mr. Wickliffe also cited the case of Hogan v. Vanel (2 Bib^b, 34); Thompson v. Caldwell (2 Bibb, 290) ; also 3 Bibb, 6 ; and Young v. Cosby
(3 Bibb, 227), upon these points. Also 2 Mar¬ shall, 524; 2 Littell, 134; nnA Parker y. Owing - son, in 3 Marshall.
Tliese authorities, he contended, maintain the absolute obligation of industry and vigi¬ lance on the part of the assignee ; and they also establish the principle, that the rules in relation to a guaranty are to be construed under the law, with great strictness.
He also argued that the proceedings under which the drawer was discharged from the pro¬ cess against him by the district judge, were ir¬ regular, and subjected the appellants to all the consequences of their illegality.
By the pleadings and evidence it appeared that the note fell due on the 23d of September. A writ was issued on the 2d of October, in which bail was required; this was returned “ executed” on the 6th of November, the de¬ fendant having been committed to prison on the preceding day. On the 20th of November, judgment was entered by default, and after¬ wards in December, during the same term, the jailer surrendered the body in court. It was the duty of the plaintiff to charge the defend¬ ant in execution ; and if not so cliarged within ^thirty days, then, and not before, he [*34G might be discharged under the insolvent law.
The discharge by the district judge was be¬ fore the thirty days, of a prisoner not in execu¬ tion ; and this was done by a waiver of the time required by law. The assignee is not per¬ mitted to run ahead of the law, and discharge a debtor before, under its provisions, he is en¬ titled to it. Bj^ not proceeding according to law, and failing to pursue the course of the law marks out, he releases the assignor from all responsibility to him.
The district judge had no jurisdiction. His authority was to administer the oath ; but the Act of Congress directs him not to do so until after thirty days. The period of thirty days is given for the benefit of the creditor, and of those who are interested that the debt should be paid. All such are, therefore, parties inter¬ ested in the proceeding; and if the consent of the creditors can give the right to discharge, all should consent. The assignor should have consented, as his responsibility became con¬ summate by the discharge.
The consent of the counsel for the appellants alone gave jurisdiction to the District Court, or was so considered. If it did not, where is the prisoner? The discharge being illegal, he
insolvent debtor in another suit, is not evidence, as he is liable to be imprisoned in other suits.
1820.— Assignor not liable, though drawer has taken the oath and surrendered a schedule ; unless schedule produced and amount of property ascer¬ tained, the assignee is bound to pursue the prop- eriy.
(Uldliam V. Bengan, 2 Littell, 132.)
1822.— 1. Not obliged to sue at first term, if he cannot by so doing get judgment.

2. Not obliged to apply the extraordinary pro¬

cess of the law.

3. 'Wliether in any case, laches of sheriff will re¬

lieve assignor? If in any case, it can only be where of such a nature as to subject him to the whole debt.

4. Not obliged to take out execution on affidavit

during sitting of court, nor can the assignor avoid responsibility by showing that other plaintiffs did so and got their mone.y.
(Trimble v. Webb, 1 Monroe, 100.)
446
1824.— Tudgment obtained 4th of Aprii, 1820 Court adjourned the 14th. Execution issued 26th of July. Court below deemed it sufficient dili¬ gence. Court of Appeals: “The only chasm in the diligence exercised by the appellees in prose¬ cuting their suit against the original debtor, ap¬ pears between the judgment and execution. For this delay no apology was offered, nor excuse proved. This court has never held assignees to more than reasonable diligence in prosecuting the demand against the original debtors, and has never required them to run a race against time ; still it has not permitted any unreasonable delay to be passed over. The time here lost is more than any prudent man would have Indulged in, when he believed his debt to be in danger, and savors too strongly of indulgence graciously giv'en, by some understanding between the parties. Considering this case, as wo have stated it, uncoupled with any other circumstances in the cause, we must, ac¬ cording to previous decisions of the court, hold the delay as conclusive against the appellee’s right to recover.”
Peters 2,
1829
The Bank of the Unitsed States v. Weistger.
346
has escaped, and may he pursued and retaken, or the jailer was liable.
It is manifest that the appellants considered that they had not used the diligence required of them. They proceeded afterwards by a fa., which was issued on the 29th of December, hut which did not reach the hands of the mar¬ shal until the 9th of January following; and which was in March returned no effects.” After the return in March, a ca. sa. issued in April, one month having expired.
It has been decided, that it is the duty of tlie party to place his writ in the hands of the offi¬ cer in a reasonable time. {Tremble v. Webb, 1 Monroe, 100.)
He further argued, that if the discharge of the drawer by the district judge was not in a suit brought upon the note for which the ap¬ pellee was now claimed to be liable, and this might be inferred from the record, the dis¬ charge in another suit was not evidence of in¬ solvency.
347] In reference to one of the cases cited by the counsel for the appellants, he argued, that where it had been considered that not holding to bail was not laches, the case rvas one in which a speedier remedy was obtained by petition and summons, in which no bail was allowed, and good faith was presumed.
Mr. Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the court :
This case turns altogether upon doctrines peculiar to the States of Virginia and Ken¬ tucky. It is the case of a suit in equity, insti¬ tuted by the indorsee, or, in the language of the country, the assignee, of a promissory note, to charge an intermediate indorser. All the doctrine on the subject will be found fully stated in the two cases of Riddle & Co. v. Mandemlle efc Jamesson., reported among the de¬ cisions of this court; and in the cases of /SmaM- wood V. Woods, and Spratly. M’ Kinney, to be found among the decisions of the Court of Ap¬ peals of Kentucky.
The defendant here has demurred to the bill, for want of equity, and this raises the first question in the cause.
In the last case decided in this court, be¬ tween Riddle & Co. v. Manderille cfc Jamesson, which was a case in most respects similar to the present, this court decided, that a suit could be maintained in equity by the holder of an in¬ dorsed note against a remote indorser ; and upon grounds perfectly familiar to courts exercising equity jurisdiction. It was a Virginia contract, governed by the same law which is in force in Kentucky. This court had before decided, that by the law's of the country, governing the contract, a suit at law could not be maintained between the holder of the note and a remote indorser. But then a suit at law could have been maintained by him against the immediate indorser, and by him against the preceding in¬ dorser, and soon through any number o^ in¬ dorsers. This presented the ordinary case of an assignment of a chose in action, which transfers an interest without the right of action.
To maintain this demurrer, then, it was in¬ cumbent on the defendant to have showm that there w’as some principle in the juris¬ prudence of Kentucky that could sustain a 348] distinction between his case and that Peters 2.
previously decided here; but everything con¬ curs to repel the idea of such a distinction. In the case of Drake v. Johnson, the Court of Ap¬ peals of Kentucky also decided, that a suit at law could not be maintained in that State by the indorsee against a remote indorser.
The conclusion, then, results from our own decisions, that he must be let into equity; for an indor.s<!ment i.s certainly no release to the previous indorsers, and the ultimate assignee alone is entitled to the benefit of their liabil¬ ity. And this we understand to be consistent with the received opinions and practice of Kentucky.
The second point made for the defendant is, that as he received no consideration for assign¬ ing the note, he is not liable at all.
But on this it is only necessary to observe, that he indorsed it to give credit to Voorhees, the promisor; and the law therefore imputes to him the consideration paid to Voorhees,
The most material point in the cause, and that on which the decision below was render¬ ed in favor of the defendant, was the want of due diligence against the drawer of the note. The law is settled there, as it is in Virginia, and in this court, upon Virginia contracts of this description; that every reasonable effort must be made to recover of the drawer by suit, before the assignee can have recourse against the assignor or indorser. It is on the question what constitutes such diligence, that all the difficulties arise on suits upon these contracts. And certainly this court cannot be called upon to carry the obligations imposed upon assignees on this point, further than the State courts have already extended them.
There are three grounds on which the de¬ fendant would impute to the complainant a want of diligence fatal to his right to recover.
The first is, that i\Qfi.fa. did not come to the marshal’s hands until the expiration of about thirty-six days after the judgment was obtain¬ ed, and nineteen after it issued.
The second, that the ca. sa. did not i.ssue until about three months and a half after the
fi-fa.
Let it be observed, that the note fell due on the 25th of *September, the writ was
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issued on the 2d of October; the judgment was entered the November term following; and the drawer, Voorhees, being held in custody for want of bail, was discharged, as insolvent, on the 14th of December of the same year.
Ju.stice can hardly be charged with a halting gait thus far. As to her subsequent progres^, it does not appear on what day the court for November term adjourned; but as the fi. fa. bears date on the 29th of December, it is pr-o sumable that it sat on that day. The.;?, fa. did not reach the office of the marshal until three weeks after; and the ca. sa. was not sued out at the time when the./i. fa. issued. But it was sued out at the term to which the J?. fa. was returnable, to wit, on the 11th of April,

1822. 8o that from the time the note fell due,

to the last step in the progress of judicial means for enforcing payment, we count but six months and a half. We do not recognize the supposed obligation or power of the party, in the Circuit Court, to sue out the ca. sa. contemporaneous¬ ly with the. /a. / and with the exception of that interval, we are rather inclined to attribute
447
349
Supreme Court of the United States.
1829
to the complainant extraordinary diligence than culpable delay.
But, why were the executions issued at all in this case, except from abundant caution, and to avoid the imputation of laches? Was it necessary? The courts of Kentucky have cer¬ tainly decided otherwise. In the case of Stajjp etal. V. Anderson et al. (1 Marsh., 240), they express themselves thus;
‘ ‘ The discharge of an insolvent under our statute is a judicial act, of a record character, and is in its nature, as it must be in contempla¬ tion of law, the most satisfactory evidence of the insolvency of the person discharged.”
This, it is true, was declared respecting a discharge in another suit, on a different cause of action, under the insolvent law of the State, and upon a ea. sa. But it would be difficult to assign a reason why it should not apply to a discharge in a suit on the same cause of action, under the law of the United States, and where the defendant was in custody under an order for bail. In both instances, a state of insolv¬ ency is judicially established; and as the court 350] expresses itself in the same case, “ it would have been worse than idle,” nay, in this case it would have been false imprisonment, to have retaken the debtor; if, as the defendant contends, and no doubt was the fact, he was discharged under the suit upon this note.
The third and last ground of laches, and that which it appears, by a report handed to us, in¬ fluenced the court below, was the consent of the agent of the complainant to dispense with the imprisonment to which the drawer of the note might have been subjected, before he would have taken the oath, and received a dis¬ charge under the Act of Congress.
The correctness of the decision below upon this point must be tested by considerations drawn from the object of the imprisonment ; the influence of the discharge upon the loss of the debt, and from adjudged cases. W e are inclined to think that it has been rather too hastily con¬ ceded .that no case similar to the present has been adjudicated. That it adds another to the long list of instances of laches which have been held to be fatal to the recovery of the as¬ signee against his assignor in that country, cannot be doubted.
This case, it must be recollected, comes with¬ in the fifth section of the Act of January 6th, 1800, entitled ‘ ‘An Act for the relief of persons imprisoned for debt. ” The second, third, and fourth sections of that Act make provision for the discharge of persons confined under execu¬ tion, and the fifth section extends “the privi¬ leges and relief ” of that Act, to persons in confinement, against whom judgment is ob¬ tained but no execution issued. Under the provisions in favor of persons charged in exe¬ cution, on the day of arrest, a notice may be served upon the person at whose suit they are confined and at the end of thirty days they may be discharged. By the fifth section it is enact¬ ed, “that any person imprisoned upon process issuing from any court of the United States, except at the suit of the United States, in any civil action, against whom judgment has been or shall be recovered, shall be entitled to the privileges and relief provided by this Act after the expiration of thirty days from the time such judgment has been or shall be recovered, though 448
the ^creditor should not, within that
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time, sue out his execution and charge the debtor therewith.”
It has been argued, that under this section the defendant must remain in prison thirty days after judgment before he can sue out his notice to the plaintiff, thus requiring him to remain sixty days in confinement, in the cases which come. under this section; whereas he re¬ mains but thirty days when confined under ex¬ ecution.
There can be no reason for the distinction, and we think that in favor of liberty, and with a view to consistency, the construction should be otherwise. If such were the true construc¬ tion, the relief would not be the same as is ex¬ tended to the debtors of the other class. We think, therefore, that the day of entering judg¬ ment under the fifth section, is the day that corresponds to the day of arrest under the pre¬ vious provi.sions of the law; and, therefore, that in thirty days after judgment he may be discharged by complying with the other requi¬ sitions of the law. The day of entering the judgment appears nowhere in this record, but as the notice was served on the plaintiffs’ agent on the 14th of December, we must presume that the judgment had then been entered; and on the same day the agent signed that con¬ sent to dispense with “the previous imprison¬ ment by law to entitle the defendant to take the oath of an insolvent debtor,” by which, it is now insisted, that the complainants are barred of their right to recover of the assignor.
The error of the court below obviously con¬ sists in this, that it considers the imprisonment to which the defendant is subjected, as among the means of coercing payment. The arrest certainly is so ; but the thirty days’ confinement that ensues is only incidental to the notice re¬ quired to be given to the plaintiff of the defend¬ ant’s intention to claim his discharge as an insolvent. Now, he must be insolvent when this notice is given, and what is to be forced from an insolvent man by the thirty days’ imprison¬ ment? It is obvious that the confinement is not regarded as the means of coercion, but only as a time necessary to the investigation of the defendant’s circumstances, or the collection of evidence *to repel his insolvency. The
coercive means of the law are to be found in the searching oath to be administered, and in the fear of prosecution for perjury, and recom¬ mitment in the same actions.
If, then, this imprisonment has no other ob¬ ject than to make the debtor await the investi¬ gations of his creditor, it is difficult to assign a reason why the creditor may not dispense with it, when satisfied that the application is an hon¬ est one, and that delay would discover nothing that he was not already acquainted with. In the language of the Kentucky court, it would be “ worse than idle,” to detain him. Nothing but unavailing hardship upon him, and ulti¬ mate expense to his indorser, could result from it.
Nor do we think ourselves unsupported by the Kentucky decision in this view of the sub¬ ject.
In the case of Young v. Coshy, the drawer of the note being in custody under a ca. sa. issued by the assignee, was discharged for want of se¬ curity for the payment of prison fees. This
Peters 2.
352
1829 Campbell’8 Executors v. Pratt et al.
discharge, it was contended, was imputable to the assignee and barred his recovery against the assignor; unless he could prove that the drawer had nothing which might have been wrung from him by a protracted imprisonment. But the Court of Appeals decided otherwise ; and established, that if the assignor had sus¬ tained any injury in that respect, it was incum¬ bent upon him to prove it. The language of Chief Justice Boyle, on that occasion, was this:
It has repeatedly been decided in this court, that to entitle the assignee of a bond or note to recover of the assignor, it was nece.ssary to show that he had used due diligence by suit, to recover the amount from the payer or oblig¬ or; but it has never been required of him to prosecute the suit against the payer or obligor, farther than a man of ordinary prudence and diligence would do, in a case where he was solely and exclusively interested. To make it necessary to do so, would be unreasonable and unjust; inasmuch as it would tend to accumu¬ late costs, without the prospect of any proba¬ ble advantage to either of the parties.”
We entirely approve of the opinions here ex- 353] pressed; they are conceived in the reason and benignity of the law, and we are unwilling to extend the diligence required of the assignee beyond the limits there laid down.
In the case of Oldham v. Bengan, the doc¬ trine laid down in Young y. Cosby isconsidered and affirmed, and Chief Justice Bibb observes “ that although due diligence has always been required in such cases, yet in no case has all possible diligence been exacted. ”
And both these cases concur to establish this principle, that it is not on the ground of a mere possible injury that the assignor can claim his discharge; much less where it is improbable, as Judge Rowan remarks in the case of Stapp V. Anderson, before cited. The present case presents the drawer in a situation in which it is not only improbable, but scarcely possible, that the assignor could have sustained an injury. For a discharge under the insolvent law of the United States, is confined in its effects altogether to the particular case, and even as to that, does not exempt the debtors present effects, or fut¬ ure acquisitions from the process of the law ; nor is his person exempt from confinement for the same debt, should he be detected in a fraud upon the creditor. The bare speculative idea, then, of a possible acquisition of property with¬ in the thirty days, during which Voorhees might have been compelled to await the will or inquiries of his creditor, and of property not tangible by the process of the law, is too feeble a consideration to affect the rights of the com¬ plainant.
The decree below will be reversed, and a decree entered here that the complainant recover his de¬ mand.
354] WILLIAM CAMPBELL’S EXEC¬ UTORS, Appellants,
V.
PRATT, FRANCIS et al.. Appellees, Practice.
The court refused to reverse the decree of the Circuit Court of the county of Washington, al-
Peters 2. U. S., Book 7.
though an error had been committed in proceed¬ ing under the mandate from this court, as no benefit would result to the appellant from a reversal.
A PPEAL from the Circuit Court of Wash- -tJL ington county.
The matters in controversy in this ca.se aro.se out of proceedings in the Circuit Court, under the mandate of this court issued at February term, 1815, in the case of Pratt et al. v. Camp¬ bell et al., reported 9 Cranch, 456.
In the Circuit Court, the appellants in this case filed their bill alleging that they had been • injured by the proceedings under the mandate (9 Cranch, 58), and that the court gave a de¬ cree against their claims, as set forth in the bill. From this decree they appealed.
The couiLsel for the appellants contended, that by the decree passed by the Circuit Court in_ the original cause, the appellants had sus¬ tained injury in the following particulars:

1. Of the thirty-six squares mortgaged to

Law, thirty-two were attached and purchased by the appellant; and four squares therefore remained affected only by Law’s mortgage.
Campbell was permitted to redeem his thirty- two, by paying their proportion of the whole of Law’s debt, thereby making the four re¬ maining squares bear also their proportion of Law’s debt.
Admitting this to be right, it should have been decreed, upon the same principle, that if the parties did not redeem, the sale should be made so as to produce the same result ; that is, the four squares not purchased by the appel¬ lant should have been sold first, and his thirty- two squares should only have been sold to make up the deficiency of Law’s debt.
The court below put on these four squares only the sum of $2,806.29 (much less than their proportion), and decreed *them to be
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sold last; thereby saving them to Pratt et al., if the other squares produced enough to pay Law, and thus giving them a preference over the appellant, denied by this court in the original cause.

2. Of the eighteen squares mortgaged to

Duncanson, thirteen only were attached and purchased by the appellant, consequently five remained; and these five the appellant con¬ tends, on the same principle, should have been sold first, and the appellant’s thirteen only re¬ sorted to, to make good the deficiency under that mortgage.
It was contended that these errors can be corrected, by this court’s ordering that such of the said .squares as have not been sold, .shall be sold for the benefit of the appellant, and that the money received for such as have been sold shall be decreed to him, or the sales rescinded.

3. The court below also erred in requiring

the appellant to redeem from both mortgages, and decreeing that in case he did not redeem from both, the squares should be sold to satisfy both.
The case was submitted to the coui:t on the written arguments of counsel. Mr. Swann and Mr. /le?/ for the appellants ; Mr. Jones for the appellees.
Mr. Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the court :
This cause has its origin in the great case of 29 " 449
355
Supreme Court of the United States.
183»
Pratt, Francis et al., which appeared in this court some jmars ago Muth the formidable bulk of nine hundred fohos! The rights of the par¬ ties had become exceedingly perplexed in the progress of large and multifarious tran.sactions, originating in the speculations of Morris, Nich¬ olson & Greenleaf, in the land of this city. Thomas Law held a mortgage of thirty-six squares from Morris, Nicholson & Greenleaf, and fourteen of the same squares were mort¬ gaged b}' them to one Duncanson. Campbell acquired the equity of redemption of Morris, Nicholson & Greenleaf, in thirty-two of the thirty-six squares, the four others not being included in Duncanson’s mortgage. The equity of redemption in these' four squares has passed by assignment to present appellees, in right of Morris, Nicholson & Greenleaf. Thir- 356] teen of the squares included in Dun¬ canson’s mortgage were among the thirty-two in which Campbell had po.ssesscd himself of Morris, Nicholson & Greenleaf’s equity of re¬ demption; and his constant efforts have been to reduce the sum due on Law’s mortgage, to put aside that of Duncanson, as a satisfied in¬ cumbrance, and to obtain a precedence to Mor¬ ris, Nicholson & Greenleaf’s equity, in the four remaining squares.
This court established the principles on which the sum to be raised to satisfy Law’s mortgage should be ascertained ; decided against any precedence in Campbell, as a joint holder of the equity of redemption, and sustained Duncanson’s mortgage, in favor of a prior equity which Greenleaf held in it. So that in effect, the cause went down to the Circuit Court for the sole purpose of having a sale of the squares effected; the proceeds applied, first to pay off Law’s mortgage, then Greenleaf’s interest in Duncanson’s mortgage, and the bal¬ ance only, if any, to go to the equity of re¬ demption. Substantially, this has not been done; for we now find the two squares, which form the subject of the present controversy, in the hands of Pratt a?., the appellees, which could only be in the right of Morris, Nicholson & Greenleaf’s equity of redemption; whereas Duncanson’s mortgage, to a large amount, re¬ mains unsatisfied; and Campbell, with eight- ninths of the equity of redemption in him, has received nothing.
If, then, the appellees should be confirmed in the possession of those squares, it is obvious that Campbell would have much to complain of, since his equity of redemption in the other thirty-two squares had been, in effect, applied to the extinction of a common incumbrance. This would serve him at equity in eight-ninths of these two stiuares.
But this is a mere delusion, since the holders of the equity of redemption could rightfully receive nothing until the mortgages were both paid off. This was certainly the case with Morris, Nicholson & Greenleaf ; and this court has been constantly inculcating that Campbell stood precisely in their shoes, and was entitled to no higher equity.
All the obscurity in which the case is in¬ volved, and wdiich has seemed so long to keep 357 i both parties from approaching it, arises from an error committed below, proba¬ bly by the commissioner, in selling the doubly incumbered squares before those singly incum-
450
bered were disposed of; the consequence of which is, that these squares, which "were not in Duncanson’s mortgage, remain unsold, because the sale of the thirty-four satisfied Law’s mort¬ gage; whereas, by beginning with the sale of those singly incumbered, two squares (suppos¬ ing the value to be the same) would have re¬ mained, to be applied to the payment of Green¬ leaf’s interest in Duncanson’s mortgage.
But there is nothing in this for Campbell to complain of; since, after applying the proceeds of the.se squares to the payment of the second mortgage, it still remains unsati.sfled to a great amount, and leaves Campbell nothing to re¬ ceive in right of his equity of redemption.
The decree of the court below, as against this appellant, will be affirmed.
This cause came on to be heard on the tran¬ script of the record, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is considered, ordered, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Cir¬ cuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.
*SUNDIIY GOODS, WAKES and [*353
MERCHANDISES, The American Fur
Company, Claimants, Plaintiffs in Error.
V.
THE UNITED STATES, Defendants in Error.
Agency — evidence — construction of an Act of Congress as to Indian territory.
Whatever an agent does or says in reference to the business in which he is at the time employed, and within the scope of his authoiity, is done or said by the principal : and may be proved, as well in a criminal as a civil case, in like manner as if the evidence applied personally to the principal. L364]
Where two or more persons are associated to¬ gether for the same illegal purpose, any act or declaration of one of the parties in reference to- the common object, and forming a part ('f the res (lesfa, may be given in evidence against the other. [365]
The Act of 30th of March, 1803, having described what should be considered as the Indian country at that time, as well as at any future time when purchases of territory should be made of the Indi¬ ans; the earr.\ing of spirituous liquors into a ter¬ ritory so imrchased after March, 1803, although the same should be at the lime frequented and inhab¬ ited exclusivelj' by Indian.®, would not be an of¬ fense within the meaning of the before-mentioned Acts of Congress, so ns to subject the goods of the ti-ader, found in company with those liquors, to seizure and forfeiture. [368]
KIT of error from the District Court of the United States for the District of Ohio.
In the District Court of Ohio, the district attorney filed, on behalf of the United States, a libel or information, stating that on the twenty-third day of September, in the year of our Lord one thou.sand eight hundred and twenty-four, at and within the district of ludi-
Note. — A(ient, what he says or does, while acting as agent, adrnlssihle against his principal.
See notes to Clark v. Russell. 3 Dali., 413 ; Leeds V. Marine Insurance Co., 3 Wheat., 380; Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat., 336.
Peters 2.
1829
Sundry Goods, etc., v. The United States.
358
aua aforesaid, one William H. Wallace, a citi¬ zen of the United States, and having a license and legal authority to Uade with Indian tribes within the territory of the United States, did take and cany into the Indian country, to wit, the country lying on the north or west side of the river Tippecanoe, for the purpose of trad¬ ing with the tribes of Indians, sundry goods, wares, and merchandises, enumerating the same; that the said Wallace did, among the goods, wares and merchandises, carry into the said Indian country a large quantity of ardent spirits, to wit, seven kegs of whisky, and one keg of shrub, for the purpo.se of vending or distributing the same among the Indian tiibes, contrary to the statute in such cases made and 359*J ^provided, and against the peace and dignity of the said United States.
The libel further alleged that John Tipton, Indian agent at FortVVayne, within said dis¬ trict, duly appointed to, and qualified for that office; and being duly authorized and instruct¬ ed to search the stores aud packages of traders among Indian tribes, upon suspicion that ardent spirits had been by the said Wallace carried into the said Indian country for the purpose of being vended or distributed among the Indian tribes therein, caused the said goods, wares and merchaudises, to be searched, and upon such search, the seven kegs of whisky and the keg of shrub were found so carried by the said Wallace into the said Indian country, for the purpose of being sold or distributed among the Indian tribes therein, contrary to the statutes aforesaid in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the said United States; the said goods, wares and merchandises, were, on the day and year aforesaid, seized by the said John Tipton, and now by him held to be disposed of as the court directs.
The libel then proceeds to pray that the goods, &c., so seized may be deemed to be for¬ feited, and be disposed of according to law.
A claim and answer were filed by William H. Wallace, attorney in fact and agent for the plaintitfs in error, in which the allegations of the libel were denied, aud tendered an issue upon which the cause was tried by a jury; who found a verdict for the United States. On the trial three bills of exception were taken by the claimants’ counsel to the opinion of the court.
The first exception stated, as ground of error, that on the trial of this cause, the district attor¬ ney offered to give in evidence to the jury, the transactions and declarations of one John Davis, with a view to prove the purpose of the defendant, to which the defendant by his counsel objected, and the court permitted the district attorney to give in evidence to riie jury the conduct and declarations of Davis, so far as he acted as the agent of the said defendant, 360] or in conjunction with him, in rela¬ tion to the charge made against the defendant in the information.
The second exception stated that, on the trial of this cause, the district attorney moved the court to instruct the jury that if they should believe from the evidence that had been ad¬ duced that the defendant, as an Indian trader, did carry ardent spirits into the Indian coun¬ try, and that the same were found therein
Peters 2.
among any part of his goods, that it is imma facie eviilence of his having violated the Acts of Congress on which this prosecution is founded, so as to throw the burden of proof upon the defendant; which instruction the court did give the jury, also instructing them that an Indian trader might lawfully carry ar¬ dent spirits into an Indian country for some purposes, as, for instance, for medical use.
The third exception was, that at the trial of this cause the defendant, by his counsel, prayed the opinion aud direction of the court to the jury, that unless they are of opinion from the evidence of the cause that the ardent spirits mentioned in the libel of information were mingled with the bales of merchandise at the time of seizure, and carried into the Indian territory in violation of the Act of 1820, enti¬ tled “ an Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to pre.serve peace on the frontiers,” and whilst said spirits and goods were remaining in the Indian territory, were seized upon by the officers of government, their verdict must be for the defendant ; which opinion and instruction the court refused to give to the jury; but did instruct the jury that if they should be of opinion from the evidence that the defendant, as an Indian trader, did carry ardent spirits into the Indian country, which were found with a part of his goods therein, with the purpose of being vended or distributed amongst the Indian tribes, that all the goods of said trader designed for sale un¬ der his license to trade with Indian tribes and seized in the Indian country, whether all or only a part of them were found with the spir¬ its, are forfeited ; and that the seizure thereof in a territory purchased by the United States of the Indians, but frequented and inhabited exclusively by Indian tribes, is *legal;
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to which refusal of the court to instruct as re¬ quested, and to the instruction given, the de¬ fendant, by his counsel, excepted, &c.
The case was argued for the plaintiffs in error by Mr. Ogden, and by Mr. Wirt, Attorney- General, for the United States.
Mr. Ogden, for the plaintiffs, stated, that as to the first exception, no other remaik would be made upon it but that if the declarations of Davis were made at the time of the seizure, the evidence was legal; but if at any other time, the testimony w'as irregular.
On the second exception he argued, that the statute of the United States being highly penal in its provisions, should be construed with great strictness. It was incumbent on the govern¬ ment to show, not only that the spirits were carried into the Indian country, but that the same was done with an intent to sell them. The jury were to judge of the intention; but this was taken from them by the instructions given by the court.
The power to search must only be exerci.sed within the Indian territory. Tim goods which may be seized must be in the territoiy ; but the instruction given to the jury is in its terms so general as to authorize a seizure of goods be¬ longing to Indian traders in any part of the United States. He argued that this was not the sound interpretation of the law. In sup¬ port of the third exception, he said that the Act of Congress applied only to those territories in which the Indian title had not been extin.
451
361
SuPBEME Court op the United States.
1829
guislied. Those were exclusively the Indian country. “ Indian country,” ex m termini, means the country belonging to the Indians; and it was not shown that the place of seizure was of this description.
The provisions of the law relative to licenses to trade with the Indians, sustain and illustrate this construction.
Mr. Wirt, Attorney-General, considered the instructions given by the court right in every particular. A reference to the Act of Congress would show that it w'as the Indian country, and not the Indian territories, from which it was in¬ tended to exclude the sale of spirituous liq- 362 ] uors. Their sale among the ignorant natives of the forest, led to war and bloodshed, and the evils were the same, on whichever side of the Indian line they were sold.
Such, too, is plainly the purpose, from the language of the Act of 1802. The descriptive words are Indian “country,” and not “terri¬ tory.” The Act looks to all places where goods may be carried with the intent to vend them to the Indians, and the penalty is restricted to such offenses. It also takes away the license to the trader.
In reference to the third instruction, he said that the case stated that the ardent spirits were mingled with the merchandise, which' is not the language of the law ; the residue of the in¬ struction is in accordance with the law. That language is “ all the goods designed for sale under his license to trade with the Indians,” and “which are seized in the Indian country.” It cannot be a question, whether a country, although ceded to the United States, while in¬ habited by Indians continues an Indian coun¬ try, within the view of the law. The license granted to trade is, “with the Indians,” and not in the Indian country.
Mr. Justice Washington delivered the opin¬ ion of the court:
This was an information filed in the District Court of Indiana, by the United States, against sundry goods and merchandise, seized as for¬ feited under the provisions of two Acts of Congress, bearing date the 30th of March, 1802, ch. 273, and the 6th of May, 1822, ch. 68, for regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes.
The information sets forth, in substance, that on the 24th of September, 1824, William H. Wallace, a citizen of the United States, and having a license to trade with Indian tribes within the territory of the United States, did take and carry into the Indian country lying on the north or west side of the Tippecanoe River, for the purpose of trading with the tribes of Indians, certain goods, which are particularly described, amongst which were seven kegs of whiskey and one keg of shrub, for the purpose of vending or distributing the same among the Indian tribes ; contrary to the 363 ] statute, &c. That upon suspicion that ardent spirits had been carried by the said Wallace into the said Indian country, for the purpose aforesaid, the said goods, &c., were searched by order of an Indian agent, duly ap¬ pointed to, and qualified for that office; upon which search the said kegs of whisky and shrub were found so carried, for the purpose aforesaid; and were, together with the said 452
goods, &c., seized by the said Indian agent. The information concludes with a prayer, that the goods so seized may be declared to be for¬ feited, and to be disposed of according to law.
To this information, Wallace, as attorney in fact for the American Fur Company, interposed a claim and answer, which, after protesting against the sufficiency of the information, de¬ nies, by way of plea, that he did, among the goods, &c., in the information mentioned, carry into the Indian country, Ijdng on the north or west of the Tippecanoe River, seven kegs of whisky and one of shrub, for the purpose of trading, or distributing the same among the Indian tribes, as in the information mentioned.
The issue was tried by a jury, who found a verdict in favor of the United States.
Upon the trial of the cause, three bills of ex¬ ceptions, to the following effect, were taken ;
The first is to the opinion of the court, which permitted the district attorney to give in evi¬ dence the conduct and declarations of John Davis, so far as he acted as the agent of Wal¬ lace, or in conjunction with him, in relation to the charge laid in the information, with a view to prove the purpose of the said Wallace.
The second bill states that, upon the motion of the district attorney, the court instructed the jury, that if they should believe, from the evi¬ dence, that Wallace, as an Indian trader, did carry ardent spirits into the Indian country, and that the same were found therein, among any part of his goods, it is prima facie eviAance of his having violated the Acts of Congress, on which this prosecution is founded, so as to throw the burden of proof upon the defendant.
The defendant then moved the court to in¬ struct the jury, that, unless they should be of opinion, uponMie evidence, *that the
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ardent spirits mentioned in the information were mingled with the bales of merchandise at the time of seizure, and carried into the Indian territory, in violation of the Act of 1802, and, whilst the said spirits and goods were remain¬ ing in the Indian territory, were seized by the officers of government, their verdict should be for the defendant. This instruction the court refused to give, and directed the jury that if they should be of opinion, from the evidence, that the defendant, as an Indian trader, did carry ardent spirits into the Indian country, which were found with a part of his goods therein, with the purpose of being vended or distributed amongst Indian tribes, all the goods of the said trader, designed for sale under his license, and seized in the Indian country, whether all or only a part of them were found with the spirits, are forfeited ; and that the seizure thereof in a territory purchased by the United States of the Indians, but frequented and inhabited ex¬ clusively by Indian tribes, is legal. This re¬ fusal and instruction form the subjects of the third bill of exceptions.
The objection to the evidence of Davis is so fully answered and repelled by this court in the case of the United States y . Gooding {12 468), that it seems necessary only to refer to that decision. That was a criminal prosecu¬ tion against the owner of a vessel, under the Slave Trade Act of Congress; and an objection was taken by his counsel to evidence of the acts and declarations of the master of the vessel, who was proved to have been appointed to that of
Peters 2
1829
Sundry Goods, etc., v. The United States.
364
flee by the defendant, with an authority to make the fitments for the vessel.
The principle asserted in the decision of that point, and applied to the case was, that what¬ ever an agent does, or says, in reference to the business in which he is at the time employed, and within the scope of his authority, is done or said by the principal ; and may be proved, as well in a criminal as a civil case; in like manner as if the evidence applied personally to the principal.
The opinion of the court in the present case is not less correct, whether Davis was consid¬ ered by the jury as having acted in conjunc¬ tion with Wallace, or strictly as his agent. 365] For we hold the law to be, that where two or more persons are associated together for the same illegal purpose, any act or declaration of one of the parties, in reference to the com¬ mon object, and forming a part of X\e.vesgesta, may be given in evidence against the others; and this we understand, upon a fair interpreta¬ tion of the opinion before us, to be the principle which was communicated to the jury.
The instruction to -which the second excep¬ tion was taken, having been passed over with¬ out objection by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, it becomes unnecessary for the court to notice it otherwise than to say that it meets our entii’e approbation.
In order clearly to comprehend the subjects embraced by the third bill of exceptions, it will be proper to examine with attention a few of the sections of the Acts on which this prosecu¬ tion is founded.
The first commences in the 1st section, by declaring that a certain boundary line, therein described in general terms, as established by treaty between the United States and various Indian tribes, shall be clearly ascertained, and distinctly marked in such places as the Presi¬ dent of the United States should deem neces¬ sary, and in the manner he should direct ; with a proviso, that if the boundary line between the said Indian tribes and the United States should at any time thereafter be varied, by any treaty which should be made between the said Indian tribes and the United States, then all the provisions contained in that Act should be con¬ strued to apply to the said line, so to be varied in the same manner as the said provisions ap¬ ply, by force of that Act, to the boundary line therein before recited.
The Act then proceeds to prohibit citizens of, or residents within the United States, from crossing over the said boundary line to hunt, &c., and inflicts punishments of various de¬ grees upon persons who should be convicted of certain other acts of aggression within the In¬ dian country. By the 16th section, it is made lawful for the military force of the United States to apprehend every person who ma}' be found in the Indian country, over and beyond the said boundary line, between the United States 366] and the Indian tribes, in violation of any of the provisions of this Act ; and to convey them to the civil authority of the United States, in some one of the three adjoining States or districts, to be proceeded against in due course of law. We then come to the 21st section of this Act, to which the Act of the 6th of May , 1822, is an amendment; which authorizes the Presi¬ dent of the United States to take such meas- Peters 2.
ures, from time to time, as to him might appear expedient, to prevent or restrain the vending or distributing of spirituous liquors among all or any of the Indian tribes.
The 2d section of the latter Act, in execution of the power vested in tlie President of the United States by the preceding 21st .section, au¬ thorizes him to direct Indian agents, governors of territories, acting as superintendents of In¬ dian affairs, and military officers, to cau.se the stores and packages of goods of all traders to be searched, upon suspicion or information that ardent spirits are carried into the Indian coun¬ tries by the said traders, in violation of tlie afore.said 21st section; and declares, that if any ardent spirits should be so found, all the goods of the particular trader should be forfeited, one- half to the use of the informer, the other to the use of the government; and that his license shoidd be cancelled, and his bond put in suit.
The difference between the instruction asked for by the defendant’s coun.sel, which the court refused to give, and that which was given in the flr.st part of this exception, consists in this, that the former would seem to iusist (for this branch of the exception is very ambiguously expressed, and is on that ground objectionable), that to produce a forfeiture of the trader’s goods, the ardent spirits must be found mingled with the bales of goods at the time of seizure in the Indian country; and that no part of the goods but that with which the spirits were found so mingled were liable to seizure. It is very apparent from the manner in which the instruction which was given is expressed, that that asked for by the defendant’s counsel was understood by the court below as we have in¬ terpreted it.
But the instruction which was given asserts the law to be that if the ardent spirits were found with a part only of the *goods
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carried into the Indian country, for the illegal purpose stated in the information, all the goods of such trader designed for sale under his li¬ cense, and seized in the Indian country, were liable to forfeiture.
This construction of the Acts of Congress which have been referred to, is, in the judg¬ ment of this court, well warranted by the words of those Acts, as well as by the obvious policy which dictated them. The expressions “all the goods of the .said traders” in the 2d section of the last Act, although general enough if they stood alone, unexplained by the con¬ text, to embrace all the goods belonging to the trader whoever they might be found, are clearly restrained by the provision which im¬ mediately precedes them, so as to mean those goods only which might be found in company, though not in contact with the interdicted ar¬ ticle.
The notion that those goods alone are liable to seizure and forfeiture, amongst which the ardent spirits are found mingled, can receive no countenance from any fair construction of this .section. That which is contended for would enable the trader, by the mo.st simple contrivance, to protect the whole of his other goods from forfeiture. To effect this, he would only have to keep the spirits separate from his other goods during their tran.sporta- tion to, and after their arrival in the Indian country, so as not to contaminate those goods
453
367
Supreme Court of the United States.
1829
by placing tliem in immediate contact with the offending article. A construction which would sanction so glaring an evasion of the whole pol¬ icy of the law, ought in no case to be adopted, unless the natural meaning of the words of the Act require it. Even penal laws, which, it is said, should be strictly construed, ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the ob¬ vious intention of the Legi.slature. This was laid down as a rule by this court, in the case oi The United States y. Wiltberger (5 Wheat., 56).
We are, therefore, of opinion that the in¬ struction asked for by the defendant’s counsel was properly refused, and that that which was given, so far as it has been examined, is unex¬ ceptionable.
The latter part of this instruction remains now to be considered. After stating to the 368 *] j'liT' that if they should be of ^opinion that the defendant, as an Indian trader, did carry ardent spirits into the Indian country, which were found wdth a part of his goods therein, with the purpose of being vended or distributed amongst Indian tribes, all thegood.s of the said trader designed for sale under his license, and seized in the Indian country, were forfeited; the instruction proceeds as follows: “And that the seizure thereof, in a territory purchased by the United States of the Indians, but frequented and inhabited exclusively by In¬ dian tribes, is legal.”
We have found no little difficulty in under¬ standing the real meaning of the court, from the language in which this latter proposition is expressed; whether it was intended to state that after the goods with the ardent spirits had been carried into the Indian country with the unlawful purpo.se, they might be seized in a country purchased of the Indians by the United States, under the circumstances referred to; or that being caried into this latter district of country, and there seized, such seizure would be legal.
We rather incline to the opinion that the lat¬ ter interpretation was the one intended by the court, and that that part of the sentence was merely added as explanatory of the terms In¬ dian country, which had previously been used. For if it was merely meant to affirm that, after the forfeiture had attached in the Indian country, the goods might be seized anywhere out of that country; no rea.son is perceived why the place of seizure should be confined to a ter- riiory purchased by the United States of the Indians and inhabited exclusively by them, rather than to a tendtory not so purchased and inhabited. Besides, the proposition asserted in the preceding part of the instruction being, that ardent spirits carried into the Indian country, with the unlawful purpose, and found wilh a paid of the trader’s goods; and .seized in the In¬ dian country, subjected all his goods found with spirits to forfeiture ; it would seem something like a contradiction to lay it down as a distinct pro])osition that the seizure spoken of might be made out of the Indian territory. As explanatory of the expres.sions before no¬ ticed, it was entirely appropriate.
369] lf we have rightly interpreted this part of the instruction, we feel no hesitation in saying that we cannot accede to the corrctne.ss of the instruction thus qualified, .since it would 4o4
subject to seizure and forfeiture all the goods of the trader carried into a country, not only belonging to the United States, but lying with¬ out the boundaries of the Indian country, as they are described by the 1st section of the Act of 1802; to which all the provisions contained in that Act, and consequently those contained in the amendatory Act of 1822, are bj" that sec¬ tion expressly confined. If the country re¬ ferred to in this instruction was purchased of the Indians subsequent to the 30th of March, 1802, so as that the boundary line thereby be¬ came varied, then the above section declares that all the provisions of that Act shall be con.strucd to appl}' to the boundarj^ line so to be varied, in the same manner as they apply by force of that Act to the boundary line therein recited.
If we misunderstand the meaning of this in¬ struction, it is so probable that it might have been misunderstood by the jury, that justice demands a retrial of the cause.
The judgment of the court below is to be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court, with instruction to award a 'cenire de novo.
This cause came on to be heard on a tran¬ script of the record from the District Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is considered, ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled, and that the cau.se be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said District Court, with directions to aw'ard a venire faeias de novo.
*JOHN DANDRIDGE, Appellant,
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V.
MARTHA WASHINGTON’S EXECUTORS, Appellees.
Construction of a loill — parties.
The testatrix directed that the interest of certain funds should he applied “ to the proper educaiion” of certain persons her nephews, “ so that they may be severally fitted and accomplished in some use¬ ful trade and gave to each of them “ who should live to finish his education or reach the age of twent.y-one years of age, one hundred pounds to set him up in his trade.” She also gave the whole of her estates of every description, to be eipially divided among certain persons, who should be liv¬ ing when the interest applicable to the education of her nephews should cease to be required, they being- sonie of the persons among whom tlie same was to be divided : and she directed tliat so long as any one of the three nephews who shouid liv e, had not finished his education, or ari-ived at the age of twenty-one years, the division of the property so devised and given,- should be deferred, and no longei-.
A bill was filed by the appellant, one of the nephews of the testatrix, charging that the execu¬ tors had not paid the several sums of money be¬ queathed to him, and praying that they may be decreed to pay the same. No other persons were made parties to the proceeding but the executors ; and after a report of the master, the cause came on to a hearing, and the Circuit Court dismissed the bill for want of proper parties. The defendants at the argument insisted that not only the two neph¬ ews, whose education was provided for by the tea-
Petens 2.
1829
Dahdutdge V. Washington’s Exkcutobs.
tatrix, should have been made parties, but also all the residuary legatees.
So far as the bill sought to obtain such a portion of the fund as was by a fair construction of the will applicable to the education of the nephews of the testatrix, the.y alone were required to bo par¬ ties, and the court reversed the decree of the Cir¬ cuit Court which dismissed the bill, forthe purpose of enabling the complainant to make the other two nephews of the testatrix parties. .
Tlie court did not consider it necessary to make the residuary legatees parties in a proceeiing, the sole object of which was to ascertain anti distribute among the nephews of the testatrix, the amount to which they were entitled for the expenses of education. The residuary legatees have undoubt¬ edly an interest in reducing every demand on the estate. Whatever remains, sinks into the residuum; and that residuum is diminished as well by the elaimsof creditors and specific legatees, as by this. In all such cases, the e.xecutors represent the resid¬ uary legatees, and guard their interests. It is a partofthat duty which requires them to protect the interests of the estate. In such suits, the resid¬ uary legatees are never made parties. To require It, would be an intolerable burden on those who have claims on an estate in the hands of executors. £377]
The court do not think that in ascertaining the amount applicable to the education of the appel¬ lant, one of the learned professions may bo taken as the stiindard, with as much propriety as the trade or art of a mechanic. The distinction be¬ tween a profession and a trade is well understood ; and they are seldom, it ever, confounded with each other in ordinary language. If the testatrix had contemplated what in the common intercourse of society is denominated a profession, she would scarcely have used a term which is g'enerally re¬ ceived as denoting a mechanical art.
But the bequest is not confined to the expense of 371] acquiring- the trade, so as to be enabled to exercise it in the common way. The testatrix in¬ tended such an education as would fit her relations to hold a distinguished place in that line of life in which she designed them to move. The sum al¬ lowed for the object ought to be liberal, such as would accomplish it, if tiie fund from which it was to t)e drawn would permit it. [377]
APPEA.L from the Circuit Court of the County of Alexandria, in the District of -Columbia.
In the Circuit Court, the appellant filed his bill against George W. Curtis and Thomas Peter, as executors of Mrs. Martha Washing ton, late of Mt. Vernon; claiming the payment of a sum of money due to him, under the be¬ quests in the will of the testatrix, for the ex¬ penses of his education; and also for a distrib¬ utive share of the residuary estate of the de¬ ceased, in the hands of the executors, acting as trustees under the will. The facts of the case are stated at large in the opinion of the court.
The Circuit Court dismissed the bill for want of parties, and the case was argued in this court for the appellant by Mr. Swann and Mr. Lear, and by Mr. Taylor for the appel¬ lees.
For the appellant, it was contended, that the Circuit Court erred in dismi.ssing the bill, and that this court should correct the decree, and direct the payment of so much of the fund in the hands of the executors and trustees as by the terms of the will was to be appropriated to the education of the appellant.
The counsel for the appellant admitted that the general rule in chanceiy is, that all who are interested in the decree shall be made parties to the proceedings; but the rule is not without ex¬ ceptions; and it does not prevail where parties cannot be found, and where great inconven¬ ience would result from its application. (Cited, 2 Mason’s Rep., 189.)
Neither creditors or legatees are required to Peters 2.
370
be parties, unless where one or more residuary legatees sue.
But if all the parties interested under the will .should have been absolutely, or constructively before the court, still it was error in the Circuit Court to dismiss the bill. The proper course was for the defendants below to enter a demur¬ rer. (Praclical Register, 261; 16 Ves., 321,325; 4 *Munford, 485.) If the court could
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have dismissed the bill, because all the resid¬ uary legatees were not parties, yet in this case the complainant below sought to obtain a specific legacy, that sum to wliich he was en¬ titled for his education; and as to this part of the bill the dismissal was error. (2 Chancery Cases, 124; 3 Johns., Chau. Rep., 555; Finch., 243.)
A sound construction of the will does not confine the education of those who were the ob¬ jects of the bequest to preparation for a “trade.” The appellant had obtained an education for the law, which he afterwards studied, and by no interpretation could it be claimed to restrict the expenses of his instruction to the acquisi¬ tion of such knowledge as was nece.ssary for a mechanic art. The words of the will are to re¬ ceive a liberal construction, and to be so applied as will fully execute the generous purposes of the testatri.x. “Trade” is. “business,” and not a “manual,” or “mechanic” employment. To die profitable use of every business, knowledge is nece.ssary; and in the United States men are called to the highest stations from every occu¬ pation. To limit the education of the appel¬ lant only to a preparation for a mechanical em¬ ployment, was contrary to those principles which should have been applied, taking into consideration the situation and relations of the testatrix, and of the appellant.
Upon general principles, the appellant is en¬ titled to the proportion of the fund claimed by him. Although it was not expended in his eilucation, it is nevertheless his. (Cited, 5 Ves.. 461; 1 Swanston, 35.)
This court has all the facts before them, up¬ on which a decree may be made, and it inay determine what sum out of the fund appro¬ priated for the education of the nephew of the testatrix. As it would not have been necessary to bring all the parties before the court, if a claim had been preferred while the education of the appellant was going on, it is not essen¬ tial that this should now be done. What is a reasonable and proper sum to be paid to the appel¬ lant, depends on no other circumstances but those with which he is exclusively connected.
*Mr. Taylor, for the appellees, stated
that the executors of the testatrix had instruct¬ ed him to offer to restore the bill to the Circuit Court, if the appellant would there make all the legatees, tlie residuary legatees included, parties. The executors are trustees bound to protect the fund for all who are interested in it. If this court shall decide that they can make a final decree, and shall do so, it will be entirely satisfactory to the appellees. Tlie residuary legatees tire iutere.sted in the whole of the funds in the hands of the executors. If the expenses of the education of the appellant, and of Bar¬ tholomew and Samuel Henley are limited, ac¬ cording to the construction of the will assum¬ ed by the executors, that fund, for all, is in¬ creased.
455
373
SUPBEME COUET OF THE UNITED 8TATES.
1829
The rule is settled, that when an interest can be shown to be in a party not before the court, he must be brought in ; unless special circum¬ stances authorize an exception to this rule. (1 Ves., Jun., 311; 8 Wheaton, 4S1; 2 Atk., 510.)
Were not the Henleys interested in this pro¬ ceeding? This is not a specific legacy. The fund is to be raised out of the residuary estate, and thus all interested in the residuum ought to be parties. No legacy is specific, unless it is clearly so, and the amount of it not depend¬ ent on an account. (4 Ves., 573; 2 Mad., 8, 9.)
By a fair construction of the will, the resid¬ uary legatees were interested in the sum to be appropriated to the education of the appellant, and B. and S. Henley; who were to be educat¬ ed for a trade, not & jyrofesmn; as, if those ex¬ penses were less than the dividends on the stock, the residuary fund would be increased. It was therefore proper that all those thus interested should be before the Circuit Court.
Want of parties may be objected to at the hearing. This point came before the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and was so decided in the case of Clark v. (4 Randall’s Rep. , 451).
The court may dismiss the proceedings for want of parties, or order parties to be made. (1 P. Williams, 428.)
Mr. Chief Justice Makshall delivered the opinion of the court :
374] This suit was brought by the plaint¬ iff, against the defendants, the acting executors of Mrs. Martha Washington, late of Mount Vernon, to obtain payment of legacies bequeath¬ ed to him in her last will.
The testatrix, after several devises and be¬ quests, devised as follows; “Item — It is my will and desire, that all the rest and residue of my estate, of whatever kind and description, not herein specifically devised or bequeathed, shall be sold by the executors of this my last will, for ready money, as soon after my decease as the same can be done, and that the proceeds thereof, together with all the money in the house, and the debts due to me, (the debts due from me and the legacies bequeathed being first satisfied) shall be invested by my executors in eight per cent, stock of the funds of the United States, and shall stand on the books in the name of my executors, in their character of executors of my will ; and it is my desire that the interest thereof shall be applied to the proper education of Bartholomew Henley, and Samuel Henley, the two youngest sons of my sister Henley, and also to the education of John Dandridge, son of my deceased nephew John Dandridge, so that they may be severally fitted and accom¬ plished in some useful trade ; and to each of them who shall have lived to finish his educa¬ tion, or to reach the age of twenty-one years, I give and bequeath one hundred pounds to set him up in his trade.
“Item — My debts and legacies being paid, and the education of Bartholomew Henley, Samuel Henley, and John Dandridge aforesaid, being completed, or they being all dead before the completion thereof, it is my will and desire, that all my estates and interests, in whatever form existing, whether in money, funded stock, or any other species of property, shall be equally 456
divided among all the persons hereinafter men¬ tioned, who shall be living at the time that the interest of the funded stock shall cease to be applicable, in pursuance of my will hereinbe¬ fore expressed, to the education of my nephews, Bartholomew Henley, Samuel Henley, and John Dandridge; namely, among Anna Maria Wasliington, daughter of my niece, and John Dandridge, son of my nephew, and all my great grandchildren living at the time that the ^interest of the said funded stock shall
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cease to be applicable to the education of the said B. Henley, S. Henley, and John Dand¬ ridge; and the same shall cease to be so applied when all of them shall die before they arrive tO' the age of twenty-one years, or those living shall have finished their education, or arrived at the age of twenty-one years ;,and so long as any one of the three lives, who has not finished his edu¬ cation or arrived to the age of twenty-one years, the division of the said residuum is to be defer¬ red, and no longer.”
The bill charges that the executors have not paid the several sums of money bequeathed to him by their testatrix ; and prays that they may be decreed to pay the same with interest.
The process was executed on one of the ex¬ ecutors only. He failed to answer, and the bill as to him was taken for confessed, and the court ordered the master commissioner to as¬ certain the period when the complainant attained his age of twenty-one years, and what would have been a competent sum for his ed¬ ucation, according to the true intent and mean¬ ing of the last will of Martha Washington, and make report to the court. At a subsequent term the defendants were ordered to settle their accounts before the commissioner. The defendant, Thomas Peter, afterwards appeared, and filed his answer, in which he admits the last will of Martha Washington, deceased, and that his co-defendant and himself alone have qualified as executors thereof. He says that they have paid the legacy of one hundred- pounds, and advanced a considerable sum of money to the guardian of B. Henly, S. Henly, and the complainant, to fit them for some use¬ ful trade. He also alleges that the executors, have been prevented from dividing the resid¬ uum, by the unreasonableness of the demand- made by the complainant.
The master’s report shows that the complain¬ ant attained his age of twenty- one years on the 21st day of November, 1817; that the defend¬ ants were on that day indebted to the estate for principal, the sum of $7,282.30, and for inter¬ est accruing thereon and remaining in their hands, the sum of $7,345.11. That they had paid the legacy of £100, and *had [*37(> advanced to the guardian of the complainant for his education the sum of $166.67.
The cause came on to be heard in April, 1827, when the bill was dismissed for want of proper parties.
At the argument, the counsel for the defend¬ ants have insisted that not only Bartholomew and Samuel Henley, but all the residuary lega¬ tees should have been made parties.
This court is clearly of opinion that the twa Henleys who participated with the complain¬ ant in the fund applicable to their education, ought to have been parties to a suit which asks the distribution of that fund. This would be
Peters 2.
1829
Dandridgb V. Washington’s Exbcutobs.
376
admitted if the whole was distributable among them. But the court thinks it also proper, though a different construction should be put on the will. The fund is not so large tliat the claims of each, while all were under age, might be sati.sfied without taking into view the claims of the other two. In determining how much ought to have been applied to the education of the complainant, the court would find it neces¬ sary to take into consideration the amount of the fund and the relative situation of all the persons entitled to it. They ought to have been parties to a suit in which their interests were in¬ volved.
The question whether the whole interest ac¬ cruing on the residuum ought to be divided among the legatees to whose education it was applicable, or only so much thereof as was necessary for the purpose for which it was giv¬ en, has been earnestly discussed at the bar. In considering this question, as in all others de¬ pending on wills, the intention of the testatrix is to be collected from the will, and from the circumstances under which it was made. In this case the testatrix does not appear to have intended a pecuniary donation to the parties in the particular bequest under consideration. Her intention in that respect was effected by the gifts of £100 to each, to set him up in his trade. This bequest seems to have been made not with a view of adding to their private fortunes, but with a view to their education and preparation for that particular business which they were afterwards to pursue. They 377] are not, therefore, entitled to the whole fund, whatever may be its amount, but to so much of it as is required for the object it is to acco.mplish.
In ascertaining the amount which is so ap¬ plicable, the plaintiffs contend that one of the learned professions may be taken as the stand¬ ard, with as much propriety as the trade or art of a mechanic. The court does not think so. The distinction between a profession and a trade is well understood ; and they are seldom, if ever, confounded with each other in ordinary language. If the testatrix had contemplated what in the common intercourse of society is denominated a profession, she would scarcely have used a term which is generally received as denoting one of the mechanical arts.
But we do not think the bequest is confined to the expense of acquiring the trade, so as to be enabled to exercise it in the common way. Such does not appear to have been the intent of the testatrix. Her bounty is extended to the proper education of three relatives, so that they may be severally fitted and accomplished in some useful trade. Their education is a primary object, as well as their acquisition of the trade; and when we consider the situation and character of the parties, and the language of the will, we cannot doubt that the testatrix intended such an education as would fit her rel¬ atives to hold a distinguished place in that line of life in which she designed them to move. The sum allowed for the object ought to be lib¬ eral, such as would accomplish it. if the fund from which it was to be drawn would admit of it.
In a suit for the distribution of this fund, we do not think the residuary legatees necessary Peters 2.
parties. They have undoubtedly an interest in reducing the sum to be allowed out of it to the complainant, but they have the same interest in reducing every demand on the estate. What¬ ever remains sinks into tlie residuum, and that residuum is dimini, shed as well by the claims of creditors and specific legatees as by this. In all such cases the exeeutors represent the residuary legatees, and guard their interests. It is a part of that duty which requires them to protect the interests of the estate. *In such
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suits the residuary legatees are never made parties. To require it would be an intolerable burden on those who have claims on an estate in the hands of executors. '
We do not think that the bill ought to have been dismissed for want of proper parties, un¬ less the complainant refused to make such as were really necessary; and then it might have been dismissed without prejudice.
The Circuit Court can make no decree for the distribution of the residuum, unless all those entitled to distribution are brought before the court ; but it may 'grant all other relief to which the complainant may be entitled, on making Bartholomew and Samuel Henley parties.
This court is of opinion, that the decree of the Circuit Court, dismissing the complainant’s bill, ought to be reversed, and the cause re¬ manded to the said Circuit Court, with leave to the plaintiff to make new parties; after which the cause ought to be referred to the master, with instructions to compute the several sums which ought to be allowed out of the fund ap¬ plicable to the education of Bartholomew Hen¬ ley, ISamuel Henley, and John Dandridge, in conformity with the will of Mrs. Martha Wa,shington, deceased; on which sums interest ought to be allowed ; and also to compute the sum to which the plaintiff may be entitled, as one of the re.siduary legatees of the said Martha Washington, deceased; provided the other residuary legatees be brought before the court as parties ; on failure to do which, the plaint¬ iff’s bill is to be dismissed, so far as it claims a part of the residuary estate, without prejudice.
This cause came on to be heard on the tran¬ script of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Alexandria, and was argued by eounsel; on consideration whereof, this court is of opinion, that the Cir¬ cuit Court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s bill for want of proper parties, and that the said decree ought to be reversed. Whereupon it is ordered and decreed by this court, that the de¬ cree of the *said Circuit Court in this [*370 cau.se be, and the same is hereby reversed ; and this court doth further order that the said cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to give leave to the plaintiff to make new parties, that the proper accounts may be taken in order to a final decree; in which decree, the plaintiff ought to be allowed interest on the sum due to him for his education out of the money applicable to that object.
Cited— 7 'Wall., 110 ; 1 Woods, 147 ; Bald., 217.
457
880
8tJPKEMB Court of the United States.
1829
380] J0HN F. SATTERLEE, Plaintiff in Error,
V.
ELIZABETH MATTHEWSON, Defendant in Error.
Ejectment — Connecticut title to land in Pennsyl¬ vania— landlord and tenant — constitutionality of Pennsylvania Act of Sth April, 18S6— ju¬ risdiction — Constitution of the United States — case of E'letcher v. Peck.
S. and M. held land in Luzerne county, Pennsyl¬ vania, in common, under a Connecticut title. A division ot the land was made hetwcen them, and S. became the tenant of M. of his part of the land thus set off in severalty, under a lease to be ter¬ minated on a notice of one year. S. afterwards ob¬ tained a Pennsylvania title to the land leased to him by M., and on atrial in an ejectment for the land, broug'lit by M. ag'ainst S., the Court ot Com¬ mon Pleas ot Bradford county, Penns.ylvania, held thatS., having held the land as tenant otsM., could not set up a title against his landlord. Upon a writ ot error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 182.1, it was held that “ the relation between land¬ lord and tenant could not exist between persons holding under a Connecticut title.” The Legisla¬ ture ot Pennsylvania, on the 8th of April, 1826, passed an Act declaring that “the relation of land¬ lord and tenant should exist and be held as full.v and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylvania claimants as between citizens of the Commonwealth." The case came again before the Supreme Courtof Pennsylvania, and the judgment ot the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford count,y. in favor of M., the landlord, was affirmed ; that court having decided that the A<d of Assembly of the 8th of April, 1826, was a constitutional Act, and did not impair the validity of any contract S. brought a tvrit of error to this court, claiming that the Act of the Assembly of Pennsylvania, of the 8th ot Apiil, 1826, was unconstitutional. Held, that the Act was constitutional.
Objections to the jurisdiction of this court have been frequently made, on the ground that there was nothing apparent on the record to raise the question whether the court from which the case had been brought had decided upon the constitu¬ tionality of a law, so that the case was within the provisions of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This has given occasion fora critical e.x- amiiiation of the section, which has resulted in the adoption of certain principles of construction ap¬ plicable to it. One of those principles is, that if the repugnancy of a statute of a State to the Con¬ stitution of the United States was drawn into question, or if that question was applicable to the case, this court has jurisdiction of the cause, although the record should not in terras state a misconstruclion ot the Constitution of the United States; or that the repugnancy of the statute of the State to any part of that Constitution was drawn into que.stion. [409]
There is nothing in the Con.stitution of the Unit¬ ed States which forbids the Legislature of a State to exercise judicial functions. [418]
There is no part of the Constitutioii of the United States which applies to a State, law which devested rights vested by law in an individual, provided its effect bo not to impair the obligation of a contract. 1413]
In the case of Fletcher v. Peck (6 Cranch, 87). it was stated by the Chief Justice, that it might well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government do not prescribe some limits to the legislative power, and he asks: “If any be pre- sciibed, where are they to be found, if the property 381'J of an imilvidual, *rairly and honestl.y ac¬ quired, may he seized without compensation?” It is nowdiere intimated in that opinion that a State statute which devests a vested right is repugnant to the Constitution ot the United States. [413]
Note. — Appellate. jvrisdtctU in of Supreme Court of V. S. to review .aval judgments of State courts.
458
This case came before the court on a wi-it of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.
In 1784, or 1785, Elisha Satterlee, the father of the plaintiff in error, and Elisha Matthew- son, the husband of the defendant in error — the defendant in error being the sister of Elisha Satterlee — went to a large body of land in Lu¬ zerne county, Pennsylvania, part of wdiich was the land in controversy, and both took posses¬ sion of the same, under, as is believed, a sup¬ posed title from the Susquehanna Company. They worked on the lands in partnership — the same lying on both sides of the Su.squehanna River — until 1790, when it was agreed that Matthewson, who had a house on the west side of the river, should occupy the land before held in common, on that side, and become the tenant of Satterlee for his portion of the land on the said west side of the river; and Elisha Satterlee moved on the lands on the east side, on precisely the same terras — that is, that he should become the tenant of Matthewson for his portion of the land on the said east side of the river. By this arrangement each became possessed, in severalty, of the particular por¬ tion of the lands thus allotted to him, and the tenant to the other of portions of the land before held in common; and it was expressly agreed that either of the parties might put an end to the tenancy at the end of any one year; and in that case, each was to be put into possession of his own lands.
In 1805, Elisha Matthewson died, having be¬ queathed by his will to his widow during life, and to his children after her death, the interest he had in the said land. Elisha Satterlee re¬ peatedly, after Matthewson’s death, acknowl¬ edged the original bargain, and that he was a tenant of Matthewson’s part; but he wished to buy it; he wished tc give other lands for it, &c., &c. ; but his sister could only sell for life, and her children were minors. In 1810 she built a house on part of the tract, and put a tenant in it; but her brother would not give her possession of the part he had in cultivation. In 1811 she made application to the land-office of ^Pennsylvania, and on the 7th of
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January, 1812, took out a warrant in her name in trust for her children, and had the land sur¬ veyed, and obtained a patent for it from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. She stated in her application, an improvement made by her husband in 1785 ; and paid interest to the State on the purchase monej^s from the date of the improvement. After his sister’s warrant, survey, and return, Elisha Satterlee purchased a Pennslvauia title, commencing in 1769, and consummated by a patent from the Common¬ wealth in 1781, which he alleged covered the land in question; but he directed the deed to be made to his son, J. P. Satterlee, the plaintiff in error; and in 1818 an ejectment was instituted in the name of the son against the father, in pursuance of a plan of the father’s to release him from the situation of tenant to his sister. By a law of Penn.sylvania then in existence, but since repealed, a rule of refer¬ ence might be entered the same day the writ was taken out, and by diligence a plaintiff might obtain a report of arbitrators, which had the effect of a judgment, before the return day of the writ.
Peters 2.
1839
Satteklee V. Matthewson.
382
This proceeding was, by means of the fath¬ er’s waiving all objections as to time and notice, so carried on, as tliat the son not only had judg¬ ment, but a writ of possession before the return of the writ.
J. F. Satlerlee tlicn gave to his father a lease for life of the land for the consideration of one dollar. Elizabeth Matthewson instituted an ejectment. J. F. Sattcrlee, in 1817, procured himself to be entered co-defendant in the suit, and, his father being dead, is now sole defend¬ ant.
On the trial of the catise, the defendant made title under an application of John Stoner of 3d of April, 1769. Stoner conveyed to Mr. Slough, who in 1780 conveyed to Joseph Wharton. A patent issued to Wharton in 1781, and he, in April, 1812, conveyed to the defendant. The judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Brad¬ ford county instructed the jury, that if they found the ejectment brought by the son of J. F. Satterlee, in whose name the conveyance was taken, was actually instituted by the father, though in his son’s name, as agent for himself, and that the suit was all a trick, and so con- 383] ducted on purpose to prevent his sis¬ ter from interfering or being heard, that he was still her tenant, as much as if no such pro¬ ceeding had taken place. But if the son was the real purchaser, and the suit was instituted and conducted bona fide, and the lease to the father during life for a dollar a year was bona fide, that then E. Satterlee, having been evicted by due course of law, might take a lease from him who recovered; and in that case, the rela¬ tion of landlord and tenant between him and his sister was at an end. and the cause must be decided upon the respective titles of the par¬ ties. But if they found him still a tenant, he could not set up against his landlord an adverse title purchased during his life. But he must restore his possession to his landlord, and might then institute a suit on the title he had purchased; and, if it was the best, recover from his former landlord. The verdict and judg¬ ment were for Mrs. Matthewson.
The case was removed by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On the ar¬ gument of this cause before the Supreme Court, it was decided, “That the relation be¬ tween landlord and tenant could not exist be¬ tween persons holding under a Connecticut ti¬ tle.” And that court in 1825 rever.sed the judg¬ ment of the Common Pleas, and awarded a venire facias de novo.
Immediately after this decision, on the 8th of April, 1826, the Legislature of Pennsylva nia passed an Act, by which it was enacted, “That the relation of landlord and tenant should exist, and be held as fully and effectu¬ ally between Connecticut settlers and Pennsyl¬ vania claimants as between other citizens of the Commonwealth.”
The ejectment depending in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford county, between the plaintiff in error and the defendant, again came on for trial after the law' of April 8, 1836, on the 10th of May, 1826; and the judge gave in charge to the jury as follows, tifter stating the above-recited A~ct of Assembly, to wit: “It is a general principle of law’, founded on wise policy, that the tenant shall not contro¬ vert the title of his landlord, and prevent the Peters 2.
\
recovery of his po.ssession, by showing that the title of the landlord is defective. Among the ■^exceptions to this general rule, the
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have decided, that when the landlord claimed (as the plaintiff claimed on the former trial of this cause) under a Connecticut title, the case should form one of the excepted cases. The Legislature have thought proper to enact the above-recited law, and by it we are bound. And if the plaintiff in all other respects should be found entitled to a recovery, the mere claiming through a Con¬ necticut title would not now deprive her of her right to a recovery.”
A verdict and judgment were obtained in fa¬ vor of the defendant in error,- Elizabeth Mat- thew’son.
To the charge of the judge — which is insert¬ ed at large, and sent up with the record — the defendant excepted, and the judge signed and sealed a bill of exceptions.
A writ of error was taken by the defendant to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and the following were among the errors as-signed, to wit:
The court erred in charging.

1. That by the laws of Pennsylvania, the

plaintiff’s te.stator could lease the land, and that the rights of landlord do extend to him; he having claimed under a Connecticut title.

2. That the Act of the 8th of April, 1826,

gives a right of recovery, and does away the force of the law, as declared by the Supreme Court in this case.
On the first of July, 1827, the Supreme Court, after argument, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. And on the 6th of July, 1837, a petition and prayer for re- vensal was filed by John F. Satterlee, the plaintiff in error, who survived Elisha Sattcr- lee; on the ground that the said court had de¬ cided the said Act of Assembly to be constitu¬ tional and valid, though he had insisted that he ought not to be affected and barred of re¬ covery by the said Act, for that the said Act w’as not valid, and w’as repugnant to the Con¬ stitution of the United States.
The cause was argued by Mr. Eli K. Price and Jfr. Sergeant for the plainliff. and by Mr. Sutherland and Mr. Peters for the defendant.
*Mr. Price, for the plaintiff, con-
tended:
There was enough apparent on the record to sustain the appellate jurisdiction of this court.
If in fact tile Act drawn in question is un¬ constitutional, tliere is sufficient on the record to give juiisdiction, because it appears that the judge w’ho tried the cause instructed the jury that the Act w’as binding on them as the law. In accordance with the judge’s instruc¬ tion was the verdict of the jury, on which judgment was rendered, and that judgment was atlirmed in the Supreme Court of Penn¬ sylvania, to which this writ of error was taken.
This is therefore a case to which the clause of the Constitution of the United States is ap¬ plicable, and which rvas disregarded; which is all that need appear to sustain the appellate jurisdiction of this court. {Martin v. Hunter, i Wheaton, 304; Inglee v. Coolidge, 3 Wheat¬ on, 363; Lanusse v. Barker, 3 Wheaton, 147; Miller V. N'ieholls, 4 Wheaton, 311; Willmms
455)
385
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
Is the Act unconstitutional so far as it affects rights existing at tlie time of its enactment?
Of the prospective operation of the Act we have nothing to say, our complaint being of the devestiture of vested rights. These were the rights of Satterlee to the possession of his estate, derived from the Commonwealth, and to take the rents and profits, without liability to pay the latter or surrender the former to any landlord who, as such, held a Connecticut title. This was tlie settled law of the land by the decision in this very case, when first before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. (13 Serg. & R., 133.) This decision was evidence of what the law of Pennsylvania had always been. At no time, therefore, did the relation of landlord and tenant exist between these par¬ ties. The claimant under the Connecticut title had no rights, and therefore was not enti¬ tled to the aid of the liberal principle, that a tenant shall not dispute the possession with his landlord, though he may hold the better title. The decree of Trenton in 1782 had settled the right to the disputed soil in the northern bor¬ der of Pennsyivania, in favor of that State. 386] The policy thereafter pursued by that State was utterly to exterminate the Connecti¬ cut claims within her borders, at the same time that she made great sacrifices to furnish the Connecticut settlers with Pennsylvania titles, by expending her treasures to purchase releases from the holders of them. Among the penal acts to destroy the Connecticut claims, were the Acts of 1795 and 1802; making it highly penal and criminal to intrude under, or convey a Connecticut title. (3 Smith, 209, 525.) A more extended history of this imhappy and often bloody controversy may be found in 2 Dali., 304; 6 Binn., 467; 6 Binn., 57; 4 Serg. & R., 281, and 1 Binn., 110.
In the last case, it was decided that a vendor of a Connecticut title could not recover from the vendee the purchase money, because, the contract being in violation of the law, the plaintiff had no rights in a court of justice. On the same salutary principle was this case first decided. But with the justice and sound legal principle of this decision, which are most ap¬ parent, we have nothing to do. It is enough, that by it the law was settled and a rule of propertj^ established. That it did establish a rule of property is most evident; but it has also been expressly decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. (1 Serg. & R., 521.) Under this rule of property was Satterlee pro¬ tected in the possession and enjoyment of his estate. By this Act, if this judgment is af¬ firmed, will he be dispossessed of his property, made liable to pay the rents and profits to an¬ other, and by the conversion of his possession into the possession of the landlord, forever pre¬ cluded from regaining his estate.
Does not this Act, then, impair the obliga¬ tion of a contract? The contract is the grant of a title from the State to Satterlee. Such a grant is a contract within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. {Fletcher V. Peck, G Cranch, 87 ; Bartmoidh College case, 4 Wheaton, 518, 656, 682; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheaton, 1.) The obligation of a contract is ‘ ‘ the law which binds the parties to perform 400
their undertaking.” (4 Wheaton, 197.) The undertaking of the State of Pennsylvania by her grant, to which the law bound her, was that Satterlee should have and hold the prem¬ ises *granted, to. take and enjoy the
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rents and profits thereof, without liability to surrender the possession or pay the profits to any Connecticut claimant, through the relation of landlord and tenant.
By the loss of the possession, Satterlee has been unconstitutionally devested of rights, though the right of possession might remain in him. The possession gives the enjoyment of the rents and profits, which are equivalent to the land itself ; and by those terms a title to the land will pass. Possession is itself a title against everybody who does not exhibit a bet¬ ter title. It gives a home, which may be in¬ valuable to the owner from the attachments created by long residence, or from its being the place of nativity, or the patrimony derived from a line of revered ancestors He who is in possession, may forcibly defend that possession ; nay, slay the invader of his habitation, with¬ out a breach of the peace or the commission of a crime ; while he who is out of possession can¬ not forcibly take possession, and if he does, though he may have the right, will be dispos¬ sessed by the statutes against forcible entry and detainer.
With the title of the Commonwealth in his pocket, Satterlee has “ by this Act ” been de¬ nied the right of defending his possession by it. He has been obliged to confess his possession to be the possession of an alien claimant, whose it never was, and never could have been by any judicial decision that was not suicidal to the State sovereignty. He has been bound in fealty to a landlord to whom, if according to the ancient custom he had taken the oath of homage, it would have been an abjuration of his allegiance to the State; for that landlord claims, in breach of his allegiance, the title of a foreign state. Yet by this Act the strong arm of the State is to be exerted to dispossess her grantee, and to deliver it over to the fa¬ vored alien claimant who had asserted a title in criminal violation of her laws. And to con¬ summate the injustice as far as the most abso¬ lute power could do it, her courts of justice are forever to be closed against a claim on her vio¬ lated and useless patent. If an individual had thus attempted to re-assume the rights he had granted, he would be met by the doctrine of estoppel. For States who have *the
power to execute their arbitrary will, there is no estoppel but that which is to be found in the paramount law of the Constitution, firmly enforced by an independent judiciary. If this Act had given Satterlee’s estate to a claimant on a title perfectly void, it could not have com¬ mitted a more flagrant violatioh of justice and of the Constitution ; for this title was not only void, but could not have been otherwise than criminally asserted.
It was an attempt by the Legislature to en¬ croach upon the judicial power; was passed at the next session, in terms precisely the reverse of the decision of the court, and applied to pending suits, when probably no suit but this was pending to which it was applicable.
If the Legislature can thus, by a retrospective act, devest a citizen of his estate, there is no
Peters 2.
1829
Sattbrlbb V. Matthbwson.
388
safety for our boasted rights and liberties. It is as impossible to make laws to operate upon the past without the usurpation of despotic power, as it is to recall the past. Law is a rule of action; but a law which did not exist when an action was performed, could not have been a rule for that action. To make a rule for it after the action is performed, is to sub¬ stitute the will of the Legislature few a rule, which is despotism itself ; for what that will may be no man can foresee, and it is the same whether it proceeds from an American legisla¬ tor or an eastern despot. The court cannot be unmindful that legislative bodies sometimes act under the impulse of strong and sudden excite¬ ment; sometimes inadvertently; that sometimes the good intentions of the many may be misled by the management and intriguing talent of the few ; and a case has been referred to which shows that they are not always inaccessible to corrunt influences.
This court would not suffer counsel to argue a question so plain as that a Legislature could not declare what a law was. (Odgen v. Black- ledge, 2 Cranch, 276.) This Act changes the acknowledged law for the past. It has decided that State bankrupt laws are unconstitutional in respect to contracts made previous to their passage (Sturgess v. Croioninshield, 4 Wheat., 122); though constitutional in respect to con- 389] tracts made after their enactment. {Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 261.)
Retrospective laws are invalid at common law. (7 Johns., 477; 2 Johns., 268; 13 Serg. & Rawle, 353.) Nor can property be taken away, not even for public use, without com¬ pensation. (2 Dali., 304; 2 Johns., 263; 2 Johns. Cha. Rep., 162; 8 Johns., 388.) The principle being tlie same at common law and under the Constitution, they are applicable to this case.
The recovery in ejectment is conclusive evi¬ dence of the plaintiff’s right to recover in an action for the mesne profits. (2 Johns. Rep., 371; 2 Dali., 156; 2 Burr., 665.)
If this judgment is affirmed, Satterlee will lose the rents and profits, which he would have held as his own but for the effect of the Act in question.
In Oreen v. Biddle, this court decided laws of Kentucky to be unconstitutional which de¬ prived the owner of a right to recover any part of the profits on a recovery of his land.
The Act having brought Satterlee within the operation of the statute of limitations, if he be dispossessed by the attirmance of this judg¬ ment, it has totally deprived him of all remedy. By the loss of all remedy all right is gone. For every right it is a maxim that there is a legal remedy for its violation. The converse of this must therefore be true, and if there be no remedy there is no right.
If this court has not decided that the destruc¬ tion of all remedy by a State law is an uncon¬ stitutional act, the several judges have at least expressed such an opinion. {Chief Justice Marshall, 4 Wheaton, 207; Justice Washington, 12 Wheaton, 271, 267; Justice John, son, 286; Justice- Thompson, 295, 301 ; Justice Trimble, 327; Justice Story, 8 Wheaton, 12; and State decisions, 5 American Law Journal, 520; 8 Mass., 423, 430; 12 Serg. & Rawle, 358.)
Mr. Suthe/rland, for the defendant.
Peters 2.
The question submitted in the present case was one of great interest ; not only to the de¬ fendant, but also to the free exercise of the legislative powers of the State of Pennsylvania. The question arose out of the Act of the As¬ sembly of *the State, entitled, ‘ ‘ An Act
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relating to Connecticut settlers,” passed the 8th day of April, 1826.
On the ca.se as presented by the plaintiffs, the Act is alleged to have been passed on the 28th, whereas it was in fact enacted into a law on the 8th of April, 1826. It is therefore re- .spectfully submitted to the court as a prelimi¬ nary point, whether they will not dismiss the writ of error for want of certainty in the date of the Act; as we contend, that under the de¬ cisions already made in this court, it should dis¬ tinctly, and not by reference, appear that a statute of a State was drawn in question, upon the ground of its being repugnant to the Con¬ stitution of the United States, and that its de¬ cision was in favor of its validity.
But if the court should decide that the record presents a case so as clearly to bring the ques¬ tion before the court, then it is respectfully contended, 1. That the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (13 Sergeant & Rawle, 133) was contrary to law. 2. That the Act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, passed March 8th, 1826, was an explanatory Act, and therefore constitutional. 3. That the jiidgment of the Supreme Court of Penn.sylvania, which the plaintiff in error seeks to reverse, did not im¬ pair, but affirmed the obligation of a valid con¬ tract,^ and was not against the Constitution of the United States. 4. The judgment of the Su¬ preme Court of ^Pennsylvania in the case now submitted to this court for revision, was not made upon the authority of the Act of Assem¬ bly of the 8th of April, 1826, but upon the known and established law of the State.
It is contended that the first decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was erroneous. It appears, from looking back into the early histoiy of Pennsylvania, that a mimber of per¬ sons emigrated from the State of Connecticut, and settled in some of the northern counties of Penasylvania. They alleged that the charter of Connecticut, being of an older date, and covering the soil in question, they were legally entitled to settle on the lands in que.stion. Out of this dispute originated the celebrated Wyoming controversy, which produced the decree of Trenton, which went in favor of the jurisdiction of the State of Pennsylvania. A number *of laws were pa.ssed by the
Legislature of Pennsylvania relative to the Connecticut settlers. The most important were,
, what was denominated the “Intrusion Act,” and' the Act suspending the operations of the statute of limitation in that region of country. The Act to prevent intrnsions was highly penal. The first section provided, that if any person .shall take possession of, enter, intrude, or set¬ tle on any lands within the counties of North¬ ampton, Northumberland or Luzerne, by vir¬ tue or under color of any conveyance of half share right, or any other pretended title not de¬ rived under Pennsylvania, he shall, on convic¬ tion, &c., forfeit and' pay two hundred dollars, &c., and be subject to imprisonment not ex¬ ceeding twelve months.
The 2d section declared, that every person
461
391
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
who shall combine, or conspire, for the purpo.se of conveying, possessing or settling any lands within the limits aforesaid, under any half share right, or any pretended title as afore.said, or for the laying out townships by persons not appointed or acknowledged by' the laws of Pennsylvania, and accessaries thereto, shall forfeit and pay not less than four hundred dol¬ lars and not more than one thousand dollars, &c., &c., and be subject to imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding eighteen months.
The 8th section enacts, that on trials of in¬ dictments for such intrusion, proof that the person indicted entered into, intruded, settled on, or was in posse.ssion of the land before the time of finding the indictment, shall be suffi¬ cient to eonvict thereof ; unless defendant shall prove that he or she entered upon, took pos¬ session of, and settled on such land before the passing of the original Act — 11th of April,

1795.

When the case of Mattlieioson v. Satterlee (13 Serg. & Rawle, 133) came up before the Su¬ preme Court of Pennsylvania, the impression, as is evident from the report of the case, upon the minds of the judges of the court, was, that the Intrusion Act was in full operation. For it nowhere appears, either in the argument of counsel or the opinion of the judges, that any¬ thing had been said about its repeal. The Act, however, had been repealed. This opinion was no doubt based upon the case of Mitchel v. Smith {1 Binn., 110). The plaintiff there sold the defendant a tract of land, lying in the 392] county of Luzerne, and held by' him nnder a deed from a committee of the Susque¬ hanna Company, under the Connecticut title, and not derived from the authority of this Com¬ monwealth or the late proprietaries of Pennsyl- vauia; and gave his note for $483.33, payable in three years. The suit was on the note. The principal question, says the court in that case, is whether this be a legal or illegal considera¬ tion for the bill, and whether the contract for the sale and pui’chase of this land is a violation of the laws of this Commonwealth, so tainting the whole transaetion as that this court can¬ not legally afford their aid to carry the contract into execution. The court say, the mischief intended to be remedied by the Act of the 11th of April, 1795 (the Intrusion Act), was of a grievous nature. A warfare had been carried on between the claimants of land under Con¬ necticut and the claimants under Pennsylvania for many years, and many lives were lost in the contest ; the court then go on to state that the decree of Trenton being in favor of Penusyl-. vania, the Intrusion Act was pa.ssed to en¬ force the rights of that State, and finally de¬ cide that the action for the note could not be sustained.
But the Intrusion Act having been repealed, the case of Mitclisl v. Smith is now no author¬ ity; and independent of the repeal of the Intru¬ sion Act, the decision of the court in 13 Serg. & Rawle was erroneous, because the penalties of that law were never extended to apply to a case like Matthewson’s. The 8th section, by special provision, excludes Matthewson from the operation of it. “No person is to be liable to the severities of the law who could prove that he entered upon and took possession of, or settled on such lands before the passing of the
4«‘i
Act of the 11th of April, 1795. Matthewson took posse.s,sion as far back a.s 1784 or 1785, ten or eleven years before the existence of the In¬ trusion Act.
In the course of a short time after the repeal of the Intrusion Act, the law suspending the operation of the statute of limitation in this section of the Commonwealth was also repealed. This was the last and only Act remaining upon the statute book, to the prejudice of the Con¬ necticut settlers. So that if Matthewson had not ever settled upon these lands, and leased *them to Satterlee, long prior to these
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enactments, framed for the purpose of prevent¬ ing any more intrusion from the settlers of New England; yet, their total and unqualified re¬ peal, afterwards, would have been sufficient to entitle him to the benefits of all the laws to which other persons settling in Pennsylvania were entitled. Under this view of the facts connected with this ea.se, we have but one mode left for accounting for the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and that is the one heretofore adverted to; by supposing that the repeal of the Intrusion Act, as well as “ the Act suspending the operation of the Lim¬ itation Act,” had not reached them. Cer¬ tainly their repeal is not to be collected either from the argument or opinion of the court, in the case of Satterlee v. Mattheicson (13 Sergeant & Rawle). It being therefore, evidently, an oversight on the part of the court, we contend that the Act of the 8th of April, 1826, became necessary to effectuate justice between the parties, and to declare what was really the law at the time the erroneous decision of the court was pronounced. We therefore maintain the position that the Act of the 8th of April is con¬ stitutional.
Indeed, it is nothing more than a declaratory or explanatory Act. It was but a re-enactment of what was understood in that part of the State to have been the law from the year 1785 down to 1813, and certainly ever since the re¬ peal of the acts of restriction. Surely, an un¬ disturbed practice for twenty-eight or thirty years, during which period no tenant in the situation of Satterlee had brought a case of the kind into a court of law, ought alone to settle this question in favor of Matthewson; and to have satisfied the Supreme Court of Pennsyl¬ vania that the title of the landlord, obtained prior to the Intrusion Act, could not be con¬ tested by his tenant.
But Satterlee became the tenant of Matthew¬ son prior to the Act of Intrusion; and when the law was passed, exempting Mattewson from the effects of the Intrusion Act, Satterlee was his tenant.
By referring to the Act of the 8th of April, it will be found that its provisions are to apply to the “ trial of any cause *then pend-
ing, or hereafter to be brought;” and it is alleged that its application to a cause in court proves it to be unconstitutional; and that it wears none of the features of an explanatory act. It is not neeessary to call an act in its title an explanatory act, to make it so. If in its de¬ sign and effects it is explanatory, that is suffi¬ cient. If the law of the 8th of April had not applied to the cause in court, it would not have remedied the evil. This was the only cause of the kind that had ever been decided, and the
Peters 2.
1829
Satteki.ee V. Matthbwson.
394
Legislature being satisfied that the court had niisaiiprehended the meaning of the law, passed this v^ct by way of explanation.
Again, it has been suggested that this Act violates the obligation of a contract, and affects vested rights; because it “ does away the force of the law, as decided by the Supreme Court in this case.”
In 15 Sergeant & Rawle, our present case, the court say that the case of Occrtun v. Tracy, reported in 14 Sergeant & Rawle, virtually overrules the decision in 13 Sergeant & Rawle of Satterlee v. Matthewwn, which decides that a tenant may resist the title of his Connecticut landlord. So far, therefore, as the judgment of the Supreme Court has decided the law, it is in our favor. For it appears, that in the very next volume of reports a case is decided virtu¬ ally revoking the former decision. They had no vested rights under the first judgment of the court, as it was an erroneous one. This question would have never reached this court, nor would we have heard of the infringment of vested rights, if the Supreme Court had not given an incorrect opinion in the first instance.
But let us look at the law as it stood between Satterlee and Malthewson. Matthewson leased the property in question to Satterlee. It was also agreed that either of the parties might put an end to the tenancy at the end of one 3'ear. All this took place when there was no act in existence against Connecticut settlers in Penn¬ sylvania; on the contrary, many of the New England men had gallantly defended the north¬ ern borders of the Slate, where this land is located, from Indian barbarities, and many of them lost their lives there.
395] Under such circumstances, no one could imagine that the men, who thus exposed their all in defense of their settlemeuts,could be driven from them afterwards by honest or up¬ right legislation. Hence we find the Assembly of Pennsylvania, in 1784, pa.ssed an Act for re¬ storing possessions from which the Connecticut settlers had been removed. (7 Smith, 531.) And when they enacted the law to prevent intrusion from new emigrants, they cautiously, and with a just regard for good faith, declare that their enactments shall not apply to those who resided there before the passage of the law. Both Matthewson and Satterlee had been there from ten to twelve years before the Act adverted to had been passed. By excluding the prior settlers and defenders of the State from the operation of the Intrusion Act, they virtually passed a law preventing them from disturbance in their possession. And as such they were entitled to all the benefit of the laws of the State. During this time of peace and quiet, the lease was made; and all the inhabitants of Pennsylvania were subject to the same laws. At that time the tenant could not resist the title of his land¬ lord. He was bound to deliver up possession, if he claimed through or by an outstanding title. We hesitate, therefore, not to say that the Act of the Legislature of the 8th of April, 1826, violated no contract, but on the contrary, it prevented injustice by sustaining a contract, made upon the purest principles of good faith.
Mr. Peters, for the defendant, contended, that thei-e is nothing in the record to show upon what principles the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided the case, or what in fact
Peters 2.
was the decision of the court. The facts of the case may be found on the papers which come up with the record, but there i§ no certificate by the clerk that the same are part of the pro¬ ceedings of the cause. The certificate signed by the clerk alllrms nothing more than the docket entries; and to all the papers in the case, the clerk’s certificate has no application.
If, by the law of Pennsylvania, a judge, who tries a cau.se *ia bound to file his opin- [*39G ion, and the same when filed becomes a part of the record, the law enjoins tliis duty only wlien the judge is so required; and there does notap- pear to have been any request in this case. (5 Smith, 197.) Neither does the recoid show that the paper, which purports to be the opinion of the court, was filed by tlie judge. Its language would authorize the assertion that it had been drawn up by another. Nor do the exceptions to the charge of the Court of Com¬ mon Pleas, which were presented before the Supreme Court, exhibit the particular matters which are presented to this court as ground of eri'or in the court of Pennsylvania; and if this court are to consider these exceptions as bring¬ ing up the whole charge of the judge of the Court of Common Pleas, they will have to de¬ cide upon the relevancy of all the matter in the charge, and to review the same; some of which this court are not judicially comnetent to ex¬ amine.
Thus, therefore, as the charge of the court is not legall}^ upon the record, and there is no exception which is sustained by the actual or certified record, nothing is before the court in the form of assigned errors, upon which they can form an opinion. Again, unless in the form of instructions to the jury, the opinion or charge of the court can in no case constitute a part of the record.
In Williams v. Norris (12 Wheaton, 117), this point was explicitly decided as has been stated. The law of Tennessee, like that of Pennsyl¬ vania, requires the judges to file their opinions, in writing, among the papers of tjie cause.
We do not deny the right of this court to decide upon the constitutionality of a law of a State, where the question is fairly and regular¬ ly presented for determination, according* to the provisions of the Act of Congress, and the settled rules of this court; nor that an Act of a State is unconstitutional if it impairs the obli¬ gation of a contract; nor that the grant of titles to lands by a State is a contract within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
All the principles claimed by the eounsel for the plaintilT in error upon these points are therefore entirely conceded.
But admitting all these principles, it is sub¬ mitted that *this is not such a case as
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comes within them, or as this court can judi¬ cially notice.
To constitute such a case it mu.st appear from the record that the constitutionality of the law of the State has been drawn in question, and that the decision of the court was in favor of its validity. {Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, ] Wheaton, 304, 323, 352.)
The judgment of the State Court, to be re¬ viewed in this court, must not only appear to have been on the validity of the legislative act, but it must also appear that the judgment of this court was upon no other point. If, on the
4 (5a
397
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
record, it appears that the court of this State may have decided upon the rights of the par¬ ties before them without deciding upon the constitutional question — and it is not expressly shown that the judgment was upon the consti¬ tutionality of the law alone — this court will not take jurisdiction.
This is in precise harmony with all the principles which have governed this court, and the course of its proceedings. It always re¬ spects the decisions of State courts upon the laws of the State, and reluctantly interferes with them.
This record presents a case in which the judgment of the court may have been upon a question in which the constitutionality of the law of Pennsylvania, of the 8th of April, 1826, was not involved.
Two exceptions were made to the charge of the court of Bradford county, before the Su¬ preme Court.

1. That by the law of Pennsylvania the

plaintiff’s testator could lease the land, and that the rights of landlord extended to him.

2. That the Act of the 8th of April, 1826,

gives a right of recovery, and does away the force of the law, as declared by the Supreme Court.
Under the first proposition the inquiry was, what was the law of Pennsylvania in relation to these parties? They were landlord and tenant; and unless there was a special law ex¬ empting them from the obligations of this re¬ lation, all the rights of landlord did apply to the defendant in ejectment. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had said in 1825 that this law did not apply. This was the question 398] for the determination of the Supreme Court in the present case, and they decided that the former decision of the same court was er¬ roneous.
Had they not a right to overrule the former decision of the court? This will not be denied. That this was the fact and that the court so overruled the former decision, is manifest from the opinion of the court.
Thus it is manifest that the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case before this court was, that by the laws of Pennsylvania the plaintiff’s testator could lease the land, and that the rights of landlord did extend to him.'
Upon this principle the judgment of the court could have been, and was in favor of the defendant in error; without touching the ques¬ tion of the validity of the law of the 8th of April, 1826. And this decision was in con¬ formity with all the principles which had gov¬ erned the Legislature of Pennsylvania, in rela¬ tion to the Connecticut claimants.
At no period did the Legislature deny to those claimants the benefits of all the principles of law, except when the preservation of her own rights, and the performance of her own contracts, made it absolutely necessary; and the moment that necessity ceased, she released her restrictions, and at length entirely removed them.
The Connecticut settlers had always been in¬ dulgently considered by the Legislature, until after the decision of the case of Vanhorn’s Les¬ see V. Durance, in 1795 (2 Dali. , 304).
The decree of Trenton, in 1783, had settled the jurisdiction over the land to be in Pennsyl- 464
vania; but until 1795, it was not judicially set¬ tled that the right of soil was in Pennsylvania, and that the Connecticut grants were void. Af¬ ter the decree of Trenton, violent measures were resorted to by the Pennsylvania claimants to oust the Connecticut settlers.
In 1784 the Legislature of the State passed an Act to stay and prevent these proceedings. It Was at this period that Matthewson settled on the land, under a Connecticut title, but never asserting it under a Pennsylvania title. In 1784, an Act offering general amnesty to all those who, as Connecticut claimants, had violat¬ ed the peace of the State. In 1787 *an
(no text on this page in the source reporter)
Act was passed confirming certain Connecticut claims, which Act was suspended in 1788, and repealed in 1790.
The title of Pennsylvania to the soil being fully established by the decision of the court in 1795 ( Vanhorn v. Dorance), the State of Penn¬ sylvania then passed the Instrusion Act, refer¬ red to by the plaintiff’s counsel.
This law was not retrospective. It applied only to settlers after its date. It continued in force untilJanuary,1814, when it was repealed. (6 Smith, 122.)
In 1813 the Legislature repealed the law which had suspended the operation of the Act of Limitations (6 Smith, 61); and thus, those who came in under Connecticut claims were re¬ stored to all the rights of citizens of the State, and to the enjoyment of all the laws of the State. Well, therefore, might the court in this case reprobate the decision before given, which was against all the spirit of legislation so em¬ phatically declared by the State, and say that it was not law.
That court in the following term, June, 1826, had, therefore, overruled their former decision. {Tracy v. Overton, 14 Serg. & Rawle, 311.) In that case it was held, that an improvement made under a Connecticut title was an object of purchase, and they affirmed the obligation of the mortgageor who had made the purchase.
These views show conclusively that the court thought the Supreme Court in 1825 was mis¬ taken, and that the law was not as they declar¬ ed it.
Until the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is overruled, it will be respected by this court. This is conclusive to the case.
2d point. The counsel for the plaintiff in error say, that the Supreme Court of Pennsyl¬ vania have violated the Constitution of the United States, because they have decided that the Act of the 8th of April, 1826, gives a right of recovery, and does away the force of the law as declared by the Supreme Court.
It is nowhere found on , the record that the court have said so.
All that the record contains is, that five er¬ rors in the charge of the court of Bradford county were assigned, and *that the
court gave judgment for the defendant in that court, he being the plaintiff below.
The language of the exception is such as de¬ serves notice. The court are said to have de¬ clared that the Act of Assembly does away the force of the law, as declared by the Supreme Court; not that the Act of Assembly does away the law of the land. This is saying that the Act of 1826 was, as in truth it was, a de¬ claratory Act, There can be no doubt of the
Peters 2.
1829
Satteulke V. Mattiiewbon.
400
right of a Legislature to pass a declaratory Act.
A reference to the opinion of the court will show that this wa,s their decision. •
The Act of 1826 is said to he unconstitutional because it impaired a contract; but what is the contract which the counsel assert to be im¬ paired?
The right which settlers had to the possession of the land, under the title obtained in 1812 by purchase from Wharton, it is said to be affect¬ ed, and the contract under the patent for the State is said to be impaired. Look at the situa¬ tion of the parties. They both settled in 1784, or 1785, under a Connecticut title. If neither could acquire any legal possession under that title, they stood in the same situation up to the 10th of January, 1812, when Elizabeth Mat- thewson took out a warrant for the land, and obtained a patent on the 19th of February,

1813.

If the warrant and survey under the State of Pennsylvania carries with it a contract for possession, E. ilatthewson was to have the ■benefit of that contract ; and the possession of Satterlee being an illegal one, she must be deemed to be in possession.
After this, or after the warrant to Matthew- son, Satterlee bought of Wharton a title de¬ rived from the Commonwealth by patent, in 1781, and which had lain dormant from that time thirty-one years.
He now says that the law of Pennsylvania, of the 8th of April, 1826, has devested him of his possession. This possession was not a pos¬ session which was lawful.
The possession upon which the Act of As¬ sembly operated, was one which the partj^ could not avail him.self of in a court of Pennsylvania. The Act of Assembly, therefore, in giving to 401] the heirs of Matthewson the rights of landlord, impaired no part of the contract of the State, under Wharton’s patent. It only took away a disability, if any existed, as be¬ tween the two persons who held under the Con¬ necticut posses.sion.
That Act left all the rights derived under Wharton’s patent unimpaired.
Ejectment might have been brouglit, and may now be brought. And unless the Act of 1813 is retrospective, which it cannot be, there is no possession to bar a recovery.
This view puts the case out of all the perils it would stand in, if the law interfered with the rights of Satterlee under the State. It is earnestly presented to the consideration of the court, that the Act of Assembly which is said to be unconstitutional by impairing a contract, has no such operation. It leaves the contract of the State under the patent to Wharton un¬ touched, and the plaintiff in error to the asser¬ tion of all his rights derived under it. It does no more than declare that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant, as landlord and tenant, shall operate upon them, and thus it affirms, instead of impairing the obligation of a contract.
From these views it is claimed:

1. That the record does not exhibit a case

for the consideration of this court.

2. The decision of the court of Pennsylvania

was upon the general law of the land, and not on the Act of Assembly.
Peters 2. U. S., Book 7.

3. The Act of the 8th of April, 1826, was a

constitutional law, and did not impair, but af¬ firmed a contract which was lawful; and has heen since declared to have been so, by the highest judicial authority of the State.
Mr. Sergeant, in reply.

1. As to the jurisdiction of the court to en¬

tertain a writ of error in this case undei' the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. It appears that, in the Court of Common Pleas, the Act of the 8th of April, 1806, was relied upon by the plaintiff below. The court charged the jury that it was a binding Act. To this charge the defendant excepted, and the judge signed and sealed the bill of exceptions. Was this error? *If it was, the court above, by affirm-
i ing the judgment, adopted the error, and af¬ firmed the constitutionality of the law. That it was material to the decision, cannot be doubl ¬ ed, but the proof of its materiality does not lie upon the plaintiff. The rule upon this subject is laid down with great precision in Etting v. Bank of the United States (11 Wheat., 59). “But if he (the judge) proceed to state the law ” (though not bound to do it), “ and state it erroneously, his opinion ought to be revised, and if it can have had any influence on the jury, this verdict ought to be set aside.” It is necessary, therefore, for those who allege that an errone- o\is opinion of a judge in his charge to a jury is not examinable in error, to show that it could not have had any influence on the jury.
But it is manifest that the opinion expressed in the Court of Common Pleas, that the Act of As¬ sembly was a binding Act, had a decisive influ¬ ence on the issue of the cause. It cut off all de¬ fense, by making the defendant tenant of the plaintiff. It was so considered by court and counsel ; and it was the very ground of reversal of the previous judgment. (13 Serg. & Rawle, 133.)
The exceptionable opinion thus expressed, sufficiently appears. It was filed of record, which in Pennsylvania is sufficient to subject it to revision in the Superior Court. {Downing v. Baldwin, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 298.) It is set out, too, in a bill of exceptions signed and sealed by the judge. The Supreme Court, therefore, could not avoid passing upon it. They did pass upon it ; and thus it became a final decision of the “ highest court ” in the State, to which a writ of error lies from this court.
Does it sufficiently appear that the Constitu¬ tion of the United States came in question? This is the only remaining inquiry under this head, and it is settled by decisions heretofore made. It is not necessary, to found the juris¬ diction, that it should appear that the Consti¬ tution, or an Act of Congress, or a treaty, was insisted upon. It is sufficient if it be seen that either of them was applicable to the case. ( J/i7- lerY. Nicholls, 4 Wheat., 311 ; Williams v. Nor¬ ris, 12 Wheat., 124; Ilielceyv. Starkie, 1 Peters, 98.) But it is *very apparent that the
(no text on this page in the source reporter)
uncon stitutiouality of the Act was insisted upon in both courts. The charge was excepted to in the common pleas, on the ground that it stated the xCct to be binding. In the Supreme Court, it was evidently presented in the first and sec¬ ond errors assigned. It appears, also, that the suit was brought in 1817, so that the Act pass¬ ed after the commencement of the action ; and it further appesirs from the charge, what the 30 465
403
Supreme Court of the United States.
1829
former decision had been upon the same alleg¬ ed lease, before the Act was passed. The judge decided (and the Supreme Court of Pennsylva¬ nia affirmed the decision) that the court and jury ivere bound by the Act. If it was uncon¬ stitutional, it was no law, and they were not bound by it. He therefore decided that it was not unconstitutional. The question is thus di- rcctlj" brought before this court, and it is the only question in the record which is examina¬ ble here.

2. Is this Act, then, a constitutional Act, con¬

sistent with the Constitution of the United States? Before the Act passed, there was no subsisting lease between the parties. The Act created one. {Satterlee v. 3TatthewisO)i, 13 Serg. & Rawle, 133.) It was impossible that any val¬ id lease could be derived from, or founded up¬ on a Connecticut title. I'hat title was from the beginning adverse to the sovereignty of Penn- syUauia, was maintained by force, was treated by the laws of Pennsylvania as hostile, and its assertion as criminal. For proof of this posi¬ tion, he referred to the histoiy of the contro¬ versy, the decree of Trenton which settled the right, and the various laws of Pennsylvania whicli prohibited, under severe penalties, every form of Connecticut title, of derivation from it, or possession under it. He referred also to ju¬ dicial decisions, to show that every contract growing out of it was void, and especially to Mitchell V. Smith (1 Binn., 110), and the pream¬ ble of the Act of 1802 (3 Smith, 525). The pe¬ riod of settlement or claim under that title made no difference. The Act of 1795, it was true, gave peculiar powers, in certain cases, to pun¬ ish and remove certain intruders. But all were intruders, not upon private right merely, but upon the State sovereignty, who came in or 404:] continued, under pretense of Connec- ticul right; and as such they were public dis¬ turbers, obnoxious to public chastisement. So, they were always considered, both in the legis¬ lation and in the judicial decisions of Pennsyl¬ vania. Overton v. Traey (14 Serg. & Rawle, 311) was not to the contrary. It only decided that it was not unhewful and criminal for the owner of a Pennsylvania title voluntarily to pay a Connecticut settler for his improvements. That case admits that it would be unlawftd to buy the title.
Independently, then, of the Act in question, there could be no relation of landlord and ten¬ ant, because there could be no valid lease. The Act creates the relation in a pending suit. It was a law to alter the rights of property be¬ tween individuals without their consent, so as to give to one a right to recover from the other which he had not l)efore. It works this result, b}^ making a new rule to govern between the parties, so that A shall be enabled bj' means of it to recover the property of B. In otlier words, it enables A to turn B out of the possession of his freehold. This is precisely equivalent to a law declaring that A shall have B’s property without his consent. Such a law, penned in plain terms, would excite universal abhorrence in every one who has the least feeling of re¬ spect for individual lights. It is not the less dangerous and objectionable for being more in- direclly accomplished.
This Act does not profess to be declaratory. If it did. it would still be objcctionabb-. To ex- 466
pound laws is a judicial, and not a legislative function. {Ogden v. Blackhdge, 2 Cranch, 277.) But, admitting the law^ to be as it had been laid down by the Supreme Court, it changes the law, as to existing cases, so as to devest vested rights. To do this, it makes that rightful and valid which before was rvrongful and void. It cre¬ ates a lease where none before existed. It makes one a landlord and the other a tenant, creating for each the capacities and disabilities belonging to that character. It carries this back for thirty-five years. It thus makes A’s pos¬ session the possession of B. and introduces the statute of limitations as a bar. Thus, it creat^ lease. *teuancy, possession, bar, and
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completely changes the whole case. The ef¬ fect is precisely this, that Satterlee shall have no defense in the pending suit.
This cannot be called judicial legislation. It is neither judgment nor legislation, but more. Neither does irmerely exercise appellate ])ower. li makes a case for a party to insure a recover}' in an existing case. It is an exercise of pow'er, neither legislative, executive, or judicial, but ar¬ bitrary. The intention of the Legislature Is not material. The time when this Act was passed, a few days before the end of the session, warrants a belief that it wuis not much consid¬ ered. But, though the Legislature did not so intend, it was cleiu'ly devised for this very case. The haste with which it was carried to the common pleas of Bradford county, immediate¬ ly after it W'as passed, and before tiie laws of the se.ssiou could have been pulilished, is proof of its design. It was meant for this case.
Is such an xlct constitutional?

1. It is a violation of contract. In 1781, the

State sold the land to IMr. Wharton, who paid foi' it; and granted him by patent an estate in fee-simple. In 1812 he sold to John P. Satter¬ lee, who .succeeded to all his rights. Thus. Satterlee held by contract of the State who sold the land. .Could the State resume the grant? No. {Fletcher v. Peek, 6 Cranch, 87, 131.) If the State could not resume the grant, could she grant it to another? That would, in fact, be a resumption ; for she could not grant without as- summing the dominion over the land. Such a proceeding is entirely indefensible, and is used as the strongest illustration of what rightful legislation cannot accomplish, by Juetiee Pat¬ terson in Vanhorn v. Dorance (2 D.all., 304), and Juxtice Chase in Calder v. Ball (3 Dali., 386).
Can the State, then, rightfully resume any part of the dominion over the land? The an¬ swer is implied in the universality of the for¬ mer proposition. She has parted with the whole. To resume a part violates the contract of sale as much as to resume the whole. _ Can the Stale .grant any part of it? Certainly hot. Can she, by her mere authority, impose upon it any in¬ cumbrance, subject it to mortgage, judgment *or lease? Can tlie State alter the reia-[*400 tion of the owner to his property, or make him less than an owner, or less than a tenant in fee- simple? Can she, directly or indirectly, de¬ prive him of his title, his possession, or' right of possession? Either is inconsistent with the grant, and a violation of the contract. These deductions are all legitimately and unavoidably made from the first principle'. Now, this Act of Assembly does take from the owmer his pos-
Peters 2.
1829
Satterlee V. Matthewson.
406
session and his right of possession, and trans¬ fers them to another. It therefore violates tlic contract and transcends the just powers of legislation. If this can be done, what limit shall be assigned to the power? The truth is, that the Act gives IMatthewson a title. That is its effect. It takes away the right of Satterlee. It is the same exercise of power, as to declare that a valid lease should be void, or a younger grant better than an older one.

2. It is retrospective and ex poistfndo. There

are three provisions in the Constitution which, in defining the limits of legislative i)ower, ought to be taken together; The guaranty of a Republican government, in the 4tli section of the 4th article, which secures the distribution of legislative, executive, and judicial authority; the prohibition to the States of the power to pass bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, in the 10th section of the ol;h article; and the fifth amemlment, restricting the exercise of the power of the eminent domain. Thej" were in¬ tended, together, effectually to secure the po¬ litical and civil rights of the citizen, and to protect from legislative encroachment. They ought alwaj's to be liberally' construed in favor of the rights of the citizen. (Opinion of Judge Johnson, 12 Wheaton, 286.) These provisions were intended to be equal and invariable in their operation, and to embrace all cases of un¬ just legislation affecting the properly or liberty of individuals. Retrospective taws are always unjust, and are contrary to the fundamental principles of our social compact. In these clauses of the Constitution, regard must be had to the spirit. Suppose a law were to declare a valid lease void. This would impair the obliga¬ tion of the contract between the parties. Sup- 407'^] pose a law to declare a void *lease valid. Precisely the same inju.stice is done. Will the Constitution be satisfied with a distinction be¬ tween them, when there is no difference? The spirit of the Constitution abhors it. Private property cannot be taken, even for public use, without full compensation and process of law. To affect the riglits of property in any other way, was deemed to be beyond the power of legislation, and therefore the guard is applied to the taking for public use. The other parts of the Constitution had done the rest.
Retrosiiective laws, violating the rights of property, are contrary to the contract of any society established upon a Republican basis. Tlww not only impair, they break it. The great object of our Constitution is to preserve indi¬ vidual rights, not to destroy them. There is no Ijower in the government but what is given for this end. The freedom of the citizen, the en¬ joyment of his own without disturbance or in¬ terference, are what constitute his happiness; and in a government where that is consulted, constitute his rights. They are sacred, and ought not to be interfered with.
Mr. Justice Washington delivered the opin¬ ion of the court :
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. An ejectment was com¬ menced by the defendant in error in the Court of Common Pleas against ElishUj Satterlee, to recover the land in controversy, and upon the motion of the plaintiff in (u-ror. he was admit-
Peters 2.
ted as her landlord, a defendant to the suit. The plaintiff, at the trial, set up a title under a warrant dated the 10th of January, 1812, founded upon an improvement in the year 1785, which it was admitted was under a Connecti¬ cut title, and a patent bearing date the 19th of February, 1818.
The defendant claimed title under a patent issued to Wharton in the year 1781, and a con¬ veyance by him to John P. Satterlee in April,

1812. It was contended on llie part of the

plaintiff, that admitting the deffmdaut’s title to be the old(;st and best, yet he was stoi)ped from setting it up in that suit, as it apjiearedin evidence that he had come into possession as tenant to the,, plaintiff some tiim* in the year *1790. J'he Court of Common Pleas
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decided in favor of the plaintiff upon the ground just stated, and judgment was accord¬ ingly rendered for her. Upon a writ of error to the Supreme Court of that S^tate. that court decided, in June, 1825 (13 Serg. A Rawle, 133), that by the settled law of Pennsylvania, the relation of landlord and tenant could not subsi.st under a Connecticut title; upon which ground the judgment was reversed and a, venire facias de novo was awarded.
On the 8th of xlpril. 1826, and before the second trial of this cause took place, the Legis¬ lature of that State passed a law in substance as follows, viz. ; “That the relation of landlord and tenant shall exi.st, and be held as fully and elfectually between Connecticut .settlers and Pennsylvania claimants as between other citizens of this Commonwealth, on the trial of any cause now pending, or hereafter to be brought within this Commonwealth, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.”
Upon the retrial of this cause in the inferior court in May, 1826, evidence was given con¬ ducing to prove that the land in dispute was purchased of Wharton bj' Elisha Satterlee, the father of John F. Satterlee, and that by his di¬ rection, the conveyance was made to the son. It further appeared in evidence, that the son brought an ejectment against his father in the year 1813, and by some contilvance between those parties, alleged by the plaintiff below to be merely' colorable and fraudulent, for the pui’iioise of depriving her of her po.sse,s,sion, ob¬ tained a judgment and execution thereon, un¬ der wiiich the posses.sion was delivered to the plaintiff in that suit, who immediately after¬ wards leased the premises to the father for two lives, at a rent of one dollar per annum. The fairness of the transactions was made a ques¬ tion on the trial, and it was asserU.al by the plaintiff that, notwithstanding the eviction of Elisha Satterlee under the above proceedings, he still continued to be her tenant.
The judge, after noticing in his charge the decision of the Suiircme (.tourt in 1825, and the Act of Assembly before recited, stated to the jury the general principle of law, which pre¬ vents a tenant from controverting the title of his *landlord by showing it to be defect-
ive, the exception to that principle where the landlord claims under a Connecticut title, as laid down by the above decision, and the effect of the Act of As.sembl}^ upon that decision, which Act he pronounced to be binding on the court. He therefore concluded, and so charged the jury, that if they should be satisfied from
467
409
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
the evidence that the transactions between the two Satterlees before mentioned were bona fide, and that John P. Satterlee was the actual purchaser of the land, then the defendants might set up the eviction as a bar to the plaint¬ iff's recovery as landlord. But that if the jury should be satisfied that those transactions were collusive, and that Elisha Satterlee was in fact the real purchaser, and the name of his son in¬ serted in the deed for the fraudulent purpose of destroying the right of the plaintiff as land¬ lord, then the merely claiming under a Con¬ necticut title would not deprive her of her right to recover in that suit.
To this charge, of which the substance only has been stated, an exception was taken, and the whole of it is spread upon the record. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff; and judg¬ ment being rendered for her, the cause was again taken to the Supreme Court by a writ of error.
The only question which occurs in this cause which it is competent to this court to decide is, whether the statute of Pennsylvania, which has been mentioned, of the 8th of April, 1826, is or is not objectionable, on the ground of its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States? But before this inquiry is gone into, it will be proper to dispose of a preliminary ob¬ jection made to the jurisdiction of this court, upon the ground that there is nothing apparent on this record to raise that question, or other¬ wise to bring this case within any of the pro¬ visions of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Questions of this nature have freciuently oc¬ curred in this court, and have given occasion for a critical examination of the above section, which has resulted in the adoption of certain principles of construction applicable to It, by which the objection now to be considered may, without much difficulty, be decided. (2 Whea- 410] ton, 363; 4 Wheaton, 311; 12 Whea- ton, 117.) One of those principles is, that if it sufficiently appear from the record itself, that the repugnancy of a statute of a State to the Con,stitution* of the United States was di’awn into question, or that that question was appli¬ cable to the case, this court has jurisdiction of the cause under the section of the Act referred to; although the record should not, in terms, state a misconstruction of the Constitution of the United States, or that the lepugnancy of the statute of the State to any part of that Con¬ stitution was drawn into queistion.
Now, it is manifest from this record, not only that the constitutionality of the statute of the 8th of April, 1826, was drawn into ques¬ tion, and was applicable to the case, but that it was so applied by the judge, and formed the basis of his opinion to the jury, that they should find in favor of the plaintiff, if in other respects she was entitled to a verdict. It is equally manifest that the right of the plaintiff to recover in that action depended on that stat¬ ute; the effect of which was to change the law, as the Supreme Court had decided it to be in this very case in the year 1825. (13 S. & R., 133.)
That the charge of the judge forms a part of this record is unquestionable. It was made so by the bill of exceptions, and would have been so without it, under the statute of the 24th of
468
February, 1806, of that State; which directs, that in all cases in which the opinion of the court shall be delivered, if either party require it, it is made the duty of the judges to reduce the opinion, with their reasons therefor, to writing, and to file the same of record in the cause. In the case of Downing v. Baldwin (1 Serg. & Rawle, 298), it was decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that the opin¬ ion so filed becomes part of the record, and that any error in it may be taken advantage of on a writ of error without a bill of exceptions.
It will be sufficient to add that this opinion of the Court of Common Pleas was, upon a writ of error, adopted and affirmed by the Su¬ preme Court; and it is the judgment of that court upon the point so decided by the inferior court, and not the reasoning of the judges upon it, which this court is now called upon to revise.
We come now to the main question in this cause. Is the *Act which is objected
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to repugnant to any provision of the Constitu¬ tion of the United States? It is alleged to be so by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, for a variety of reasons ; and particularly, because it impairs the obligation of the contract be¬ tween the State of Pennsylvania and the plaint¬ iff, who claims title under her grant to Whar¬ ton, as well as of the contract between Satterlee and Matthewson ; because it creates a contract between parties where none previously existed, by rendering that a binding contract which the law of the land had declared to be invalid ; and because it operates to devest and destroy the vested rights of the plaintiff. Another objec¬ tion relied upon is, that in passing t4e Act in question, the Legislature exercised those func¬ tions which belong exclusivel}^ to the judicial branch of the government.
Let these objections be considered. The grant to Wharton bestowed upon him a fee- simple estate in the land granted, togethei’ with all the rights, privileges and advantages which, by the laws of Pennsylvania, that instrument might legally pass. Were any of those rights, which it is admitted vested in his vendee or alienee, disturbed, or impaired by the Act un¬ der consideration? It does not appear from the record, or even from the reasoning of the judges of either court, that they were in any instance denied, or even drawn into question. Before Satterlee became entitled to any part of the land in dispute under Wharton, he had voluntarily entered into a contract with Mat¬ thewson, by which he became his tenant, un¬ der a stipulation that either of the parties might put an end to the tenancy at the termination of any one year. Under this new contract, which, if it was ever valid, was still subsisting and in full force at the time when Satterlee acquired the title of Wharton, he exposed himself to the operation of a certain principle of the common law, which estopped him from controverting the title of his landlord, by setting up a better title to the land in himself, or one outstanding- in some third person.
It is true that the Supreme Court of the State decided, in the year 1825, that this contract, be¬ ing entered into with a person claiming under a Connecticut title, was void ; so that *the
principle of law which has been mentioned did not apply to it. But the Legislature afterwards
Peters 2.
1839
Satteri.ee V. Mattiiewson.
412
declared b}" the Act rinder examination, that contracts of that nature were valid, and that the relation of landlord and tenant should ex¬ ist, and he held effectual, as well in contracts of that description as in those between other citizens of the State.
Now, this law may be censured, as it has been, as an unwise and unjust exercise of leg¬ islative power; as retrospective in its opera¬ tion; as the exercise, by the Lc.gislature, of a judicial function; and as creating a contract between parties where none previously existed. All_ this may be admitted ; but the question which we are now considering is, does it im¬ pair the obligation of the contract between the State and Wharton, or his alienee? Both the decision of the Supreme Court in 1835, and this Act, operate, not upon that eontract, but upon the subsequent contract between Satter- lee and Matthewson. No question arose, or was decided, to disparage the title of Wharton, or of Satterlee as his vendee. So far from it, that the judge stated in his charge to the jury, that if the transactions between John F. Sat¬ terlee and Elisha Satterlee were fair, then the elder title of the defendant must prevail, and he would be entitled to a verdict.
We are then to inquire, whether the obliga¬ tion of the contract between Satterlee and Mat¬ thewson was impaired by this statute? The objections urged at the bar, and the arguments in support of them, apply to that contract, if to either. It is that contract which the Act de¬ clared to be valid, in opposition to the decision of the Supreme Court ; and admitting the cor¬ rectness of that decision, it is not easy to per¬ ceive how a law which gives validity to a void contract can be said to impair the obligation of that contract. Should a statute declare, con¬ trary to the general principles of law, that con¬ tracts founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration, whether in existence at the time of passing the statute, or which might here¬ after be entered into, should nevertheless be valid and binding upon the parties; all would admit the retrospective character of such an enactment, and that the effect of it was to cre- 413 ] ate a contract between parties where none had previouslj^ existed. But it surely cannot be contended, that to create a contract, and to destroy or impair one, mean the same thing.
If the effect of the statute in que,stion be not to impair the obligation of either of those con¬ tracts, and none other appear upon this record, is there any other part of the Constitution of the United States to which it is repugnant? It is said to be retrospective. Be it so; but re¬ trospective laws which do not impair the obli¬ gation of contracts, or partake of the character of e.r post facto laws, are not condemned or forbidden by any part of that instrument.
All the other objections which have been made to this statute, admit of the same answer. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United Stales which forbids the Legislature of a State to exercise judicial functions. The case of Ogden v. BlacMedge came into this court from the Circuit Court of the United States, and not from the Supreme Court of North Carolina; and the question, whether the Act of 1799, which partook of a judicial character, was repugnant to the Constitution of the Peters 3.
United Slates, did nut arise, and con.sequenlly was not decided. It may safely be affirmed, that no case has ever been decided in this court, upon a w'rit of error to a State courts which affords the slightest countenance to thi, objection.
The objection, however, w'hich was most pressed upon the court, and relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, was, that the effect of this Act was to devest rights wdiich were vested by law m Saterlee. There is cer¬ tainly no part of the Constitution of the United States which applies to a State law of this de¬ scription ; nor are we aware of any decision of this, or of any circ(ut court, which has con¬ demned such a law upon this ground ; provided its effect be not to impair the oliligalion of a contract; audit has l)een showm that the Act in que.stion has no such effect upon either of the contracts which have been before men¬ tioned.
In the case of Fletcher v. Peck, it was stated by the Chief Justice that it might well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government do not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and he asks, “if any be pre¬ scribed, *where are the}^ to be found, if
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the property of an individual, fairly and hon¬ estly acquired, may be seized without compen¬ sation ?” It is nowdiere intimated in that opin¬ ion that a State statute which devests a vested right is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and the case in which that opin¬ ion was pronounced was removed into this court by wuit of error, not from the supreme court of a State, but from a circuit court.
The strong expressions of the court upon this point in the cases of Vanliorne’s Lessee v. Borance and The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, were founded ex¬ pressly on the Constitution of the respective States in which those cases w'ere tried.
We do not mean in any respect to impugn the correctness of the sentiments expressed in those cases, or to question the correctness of a Circuit Court, sitting to administer the law's of a State, in giving to the Constitution of that State a paramount authority over a legislative Act passed in violation of it. We intend to decide no more than that the statute objected to in this case is not repugnant to the Constitu¬ tion of the United States, and that unless it be so, this court has no authority, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, to re-examine and to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Penirsylvania in the present case.
That judgment, therefore, must be affirmed with costs.
Justice Johnson. 1 assent to the de¬ cision entered in this cause, but feel it my duty to record my disapprobation of the ground on wduch it is placed. Could I have brought myself to entertain the same view of the de¬ cision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with that which my hrethren have expres.sed, I should have felt it a solemn duty to reverse the decision of that court, as violating the Constitution of the United States in a most vi¬ tal part.
What boots it that I am protected by that Constitution from having the obligation of my contracts violated, if the legislative power can
469
414
Supreme Court ok the United States.
1829
create a contract for me, or render liinding up¬ on me a contract which was null and void in its creation ? To give efficacy to a void con- 4 1 5] tract, is not, it is true," violating a con¬ tract, but it is doing infinitely worse; it is ad¬ vancing to the veiy extreme of that class of arbitrary and despotic acts which bear upon individual rights and liabilities, and against the whole of which the Constitution most clearly intended to interpose a protection commensurate with the evil.
And it is very clear to my mind, that the cause here did not call for the decision now rendered. There is another, and a safe and obvious ground upon which the decision of the Pennsylvania court may be sustained.
The fallacy of the iirguraent of the plaintiff in error consists in this, that he would give to the decision of a court, on a point arising in the progress of his cause, the binding effect of a statute or a judgment; that he would in fact restrict the same court from revising and over¬ ruling a decision which it has once rendered, and from entering a different judgment from that which would have been rendered in the same court, had the first decision been adhered to. It is impossii)le, in examining the cause, not to perceive that the statute complained of was no more than declarative of the law on a point on which the decisions of the State courts had fluctuated, and ivhich never was finally settled until the decision took place on which this writ of error is sued out.
The decision on which he relies to maintain the invalidity of the Connecticut lease was rendered on a motion for a new trial ; all the right it conferred was to have that new trial; and it even appears that before that new trial took place, the same court had decided a cause which, in effect, overruled the decision on which he now rests; so that when this Act was passed, he could not even lay claim to that imperfect state of right which uniform decis¬ ions are supposed to confer. The latest de¬ cision in fact, which ought to be the precedent, if any, was against his" right.
It is iierfectly clear, when we examine the reasoning of the judges on rendering the judg¬ ment now under review, that they consider the law as unsettled, or rather, as settled against the plaintiff here at the time the Act was passed ; and if so, what right of his has been violated? The Act does no more than what the courts of justice had done, and would 416] do without the aid of the law — pro¬ nounced the decision on which he relies as erroneous in principle, and not binding in pre¬ cedent.
The deci.sion of the State Court is supported under this view of the subject, without resort' ing to the portentous doctrine (for I mu.st call it portentous) that a State may declare a void deed to be a valid deed, as affecting individual litigants on a point of right, without violating the Constitution of the United States. If so, why not create a deed, or destroy the operation of a Limitation Act after it has vested a title ?
The whole of this difficulty arise, s out of that unhappy idea that the phrase “ ex post facto," in the Constitution of the United States, was confined to criminal cases exclusively; a decis¬ ion which leaves a large class of arbitrary leg¬ islative Acts without the prohibitions of the 470
Constitution. It was in anticipation of tin* consequences, that I took occasion, in the in¬ vestigations on the bankrupt question, to make a remark on the meaning of that phrase in the Constitution. My subsequent investigations have confirmed me in the opinion then deliv¬ ered, and the present case ilhrstrates its correct¬ ness. I will subjoin a note' to this opinion, devoted to the examination of that question.
This cause came on to be heard on the tran¬ script of the record from the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is con¬ sidered, ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Supreme Court for ihe State of Pennsylvania in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.
Aff’g, 16 Serg. & K., 191; 13 Serg. & R., 133.
Cited— 3 Pet., :i02 ; 8 Pet., 110, 111 ; 10 Pet., 398; 11 Pet., 5:59, 580 ; 1 How., 330 : 1 How., 784 ; 10 How., -103, 539: 18 IIow., 379 ; 1 Wall., 304 : 4 Wall., .390 ; 7 Wall., 434; 8 Wall., 603 ; 6 Otto, 436: 1 Wood. & M., 374 ; Bald. 77, 320, 285, 302, 547 ; 1 McLean, 532 ; 3 McLean, 217 ; 5 McLean, 165 ; 6 McLean, 441 ; 7 Bank. Reg., 263 ; s Bank. Reg., 407 ; 2 Paine, 80 ; 1 Dill., 2,54 : 3 Dill., 448.
*JOHN REYNOLDS, Tenant the
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United States, Plaintiff,
V.
DUNCAN M’ ARTHUR, Defendant.
Lands reserved by Yiryinia in her deed of cession — military land warra.nts.
The lands north-west of the river Ohio, between the rivers Scioto and Little Miami, lying west of Ludlow’s line, east of Roberts’ line and south of the Indian boundary, reserved by Virginia, in her deed of cession to the United States of March, 1784, forthe satisfaction of the military bounties Vir¬ ginia had promised, were not, prior to 1,810, by any legislative Acts of the government of the United States, withdrawn from appropriation under and by virtue of Virginia military land warrants. A patent issued on the 12th of October, 1812, founded upon a military land warrant, for land within the reserved lands, is valid against a claimant of the same land, holding under a sale made by the L^nit- ed States^
RROR to the Supreme Court of Ohio. This was an action of ejectment, brought originally in the Court of Common Pleas for Champaign county, in the State of Ohio, by M’ Arthur, the defendant in error, again, st Rey¬ nolds, the tenant in possession. In that court a verdict and judgment were rendered in fa¬ vor of the plaintiff below. The plaintiff in er¬ ror appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio for that county.
On the trial in the latter court (being b_y the laws of Ohio, a trial de novo), M’ArthuV again obtained a verdict and judgment in his favor. M’ Arthur claimed the land in contro¬ versy under a patent from the United States, bearing date October the 12th, 1812, founded on entry and survey ma'de in the year 1810, on a warrant granted for services in the Virginia line on continental establishment during the war of the Revolution. Reynolds, the defend¬ ant below, claimed as the assignee of one
L— For this note, see the end of the volume.
Peters 2.
18211
IIky^oi.ds V
Henry Van Meter, who in the year 1805 en¬ tered I he land in controversy at the Cincinnati land-odice. It reverted to the United States in the year 1813, for non-payment of the pur¬ chase monej", and during the same year it was entered again by Van dieter, and the certifi¬ cate of entry assigned by liim to Reynolds.
The deed of cession of the country north¬ west of the Ohio River from Virginia to the United States, dated in March, 1784, reserved the country between the rivers Scioto and 4: 1 8] Little Miami for the satisfaction of the military bounties Virginia had iiromised to her officers and soldiers on continental establish¬ ment. The sources of the two rivers are be¬ tween fifty and sixty miles apart, and the country between them makes a part of the western boundary of the reservation. In 1802 Israel Ludlow was directed by the then Sur¬ veyor-General of the United States, to run the boundary line between these rivers, who in that year accordingly ran a direct line from the source of the Little Miami towards what he supposed to be the source of the Scioto; to which river he did not extend his line, in con¬ sequence of being arrested in his survey by the Indians at the Greenville treaty line, that line being then the Indian boundary. The line run by Ludlow is called Ludlow’s line.
In the year 1812, Congress passed an Act au¬ thorizing the appointment of three commission¬ ers, who, in conjunction with commissioners to be appointed by Virginia, were directed to run the boundaiy line between the sources of these rivers, with authority to agree upon and estab¬ lish the same. Thej' ■ proceeded to ascertain the sources of these rivers and emplo3'ed a sur- vejmr of the name of Roberts to run a direct line between them. M^hile he was running the line, a misunderstanding arose among the. com¬ missioners as to the principle on which the boundaiy should be settled. The Virginia commissioners contended for a line fi'om the source of the Scioto to the mouth of the Little IMiami as the boundar3^ The United States commissioners claimed the line then running between the sources of the two rivers as the boundaiy.
The commissioners separated without agree¬ ing upon a boundaiy. This line is called Roberts’s line. It runs from nearly the same point on the Little Miami, at which Ludlow’s line commences, to a point on the Scioto several miles west of the termination of Ludlow’s line when extended to the latter river. The two lines include a triangular gore of country ex¬ tending from one river to the other. Shortly after Ludlow’s line was run, the surveyors in the emplojunent of the United States proceeded to survey the cOuntrj" west of and bounding upon that line as far as the Indian boundary, 4:11)] and the officers at the Cincinnati land- otlice sold the whole or part of the country ly¬ ing betwmen Ludlow’s and Roberts’s lines as the land of the United States; among which was the laud in controversy. 'The Act of 1812 declared that Ludlow’s line should be the boundary until otherwise established by the consent of Virginia and the United States. By another Act of Congress, passed in 1818, Ludlow’s line to the Greenville treaty line was made the boundaiy until otherwise directed by law'. And above the Greenville treaty line to
Pet ere 2.
M'AnTntm. 4i7
the Scioto, Roberts’s line w^as made by that ,VcL the boundary.
The land in controversy was admitted b}' the parties to lie on Buck Creek, a water of the Great Miami River, adjoining Ludlow’s line, and south of the Indian boundary line. The plaintiff below', M’Arthiir, further agreed that if the land in controvers}' did not lie between the rivers Scioto and Iffitle Miami, a verdict and judgment should be rendered against him.
On the trial in the Supreme Court of Ohio the counsel for the plaintiff in error prayed the court to give the Jury eight several instructions; all of which that court refused to give.
To this refusal a bill of exception was ten¬ dered, upon Avhich the wuit of error is founded.
The instructions pra.yed for by the counsel for the plaintiff in tlie court below w'ere as fol¬ low's ;

1. That the lands west of Ludlow’s line,

east of Roberts’s line, and south of the Indian boundary line, had been withdrawn from ap¬ propriation under and by virtue of said military land warrants prior to the .year 1810; and tliat as the same had, pursuant to the xlcts of Con¬ gress in such ease made and provided, been directed to be surve.yed and sold; and that as the same had accordingl}’ been surveyed and sold to the defendant prior to the year 1810; consequently that the plaintiff’s patent is void, and their verdict ought to be for the defend¬ ant.

2. That as the third section of the Act of

Congre.ss of the United States of the 11th April, 1818, declares, “that from the source of the Little Miami River to the Indian boundaiy line established by the treaty of Greenville in 1795, the line de.signated as the westerty boundaiy line of the Virginia tract, *by an Act of
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Congress pas,sedon the 23d day of March, 1804, entitled ‘ An Act to ascertain the boimdar.v of the lands reserved b}' the State of Virginia, north-west of the river Ohio, for the sati.sfac- tion of her officers and soldiers on continental establishment, and to limit the period for loca¬ ting [the said lands,’ shall be considered and held as such until otherwise directed ly law ;” and as said boundaiy line w'as run by Ludlow', under the directions of the Surveyor-General, pursuant to an Act of Congress, entitled, “An Act to extend and continue in force the pro¬ visions of an act entitled ‘ An Act giving a right of pre-emption to certain persons who have contracted with John Cleves Symmes, or his a.ssociates, for lands lying between the Miami rivers in the territory north-west of the Ohio, and for other purposes,’” approved May 1st, 1802, and off’ered for sale at public auc¬ tion at the Cincinnati land-office pursuant to the Act entitled “ An Act making provision for the disposal of iniblic lands in the Indian terri¬ tory, and for other purposes,” approved JMarch 26th, 1804, must be construed as having rela¬ tion back to the time the above-recited Act, en¬ titled “An Act to ascertain the boundary of the lands reserved by the State of Virginia, north-west of the river Ohio, tor the satisfac¬ tion of the officers and soldiers on continehtal establishment, and to limit the period for loeal- ing .said lands,” approved 23d of March, 1804, was passed and took effect; and as the plaint¬ iff’s patent covers lands w.est of that line, and
471
420
SUPKEME COUKT OP THE UNITED STATES.
1829
soutli of the Greenville treaty line, and is based on an entry made in 1810, on a Virginia con¬ tinental land warrant, which land had been surveyed and sold to the defendant pursuant to the Acts of Congress prior to the year 1810, the plaintiff’s patent is void, and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.

3. That according to the true intent and

meaning of the Act and deed of cession from Virginia to the United States, and the several Acts of Congress relative to the sale of the pub¬ lic lands to the United States, the lands lying between the rivers Scioto and Little Miami are bounded by a line extending from the source or point of land farthest removed from the mouths of these respective rivers from which the rain descending on the earth runs down iii- 421*] to their respective ^channels, along the top of the ridges dividing the waters of the Scioto from the waters of the Great Miami, which empty into the Oliio below the mouth of the Little Miami, as delineated on the dia¬ gram returned by tlie county surveyor for the defendant in this cause ; and as the plaintiff’s patent covers land west or without the bound¬ ary of the district so bounded as aforesaid, and is based on an entry on a Virginia conti¬ nental land warrant, which entry was made in the year 1810, and which said entry and patent cover lands which had, pursuant to the Act of Congress, been survejmd and sold to the de- fenciant prior to the date of the plaintiff’s said entry, the plaintiff’s patent is void, and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.

4. That if the line connecting the rivers

Scioto and Little Miami cannot, according to the true intent and meaning of tlie said Act and deed of cession, and the several Acts of Congress for the sale of their public lands, be extended as stated in instructions last above asked, then that the line connecting the rivers Scioto and Little Miami, so as to include all the lands between the said two rivers must be extended from the sources of the Little Miami, parallel to the general course of the Ohio lliver until it inter¬ sect the river Scioto; and as the plaintiff’s pat¬ ent is based on a Virginia continental land warrant, which warrant had been located in 1810 on lands which had prior to the3mar 1810 been surveyed and sold to the defendant pur¬ suant to the Act of Congress the patent of the plaintiff is void, and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.

5. That if the line connecting the rivers

Scioto and Little Miami cannot, according to the true intent and meaning of the said Act and deed of cession, be extended as stated in either of the instructions asked for above, then that the sources of the said two rivers must be at that point in their respective chanuels,at which, from the union of several rivulets, brooks or creeks,, sufficient water flows at an ordinary' stage, on which to navigate small vessels laden: and that the line connecting said rivers mu.st be a direct line from said sources so ascer¬ tained as aforesaid ; and if, from the evidence, the jury shall find that the lands covered by 422] the plaintiff’s patent are based on an enliy covering lands without the limits of said Virginia military district so called, which had prior to the imar 1810, pursuant to the Acts of Congress in such case made and provided, been surveyed and sold to the defendant, the plaint- 472
iff’s patent is void, and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.

6. That if the line connecting the rivers

Scioto and Little Miami, according to the true intent and meaning of the said Act and deed of cession, cannot be extended, as stated in either of the instructions asked for as above, then that the sources of the said two rivers must be considered as commencing at that point in their respective channels, from which the water flows at all seasons of the .year; and that said rivers must be connected by a direct line, run from said sources; and if, from the evidence, the jury shall find that the plaintiff’s patent is based on an entry, covering lands without the limits of said Virginia military district, so called, which had prior to the year 1810, pursuant to the Acts of Congress in such case made and provided, been surveyed and sold to the defendant, the plaintiff’s patent is void, and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.

7. That if the line connecting the rivers

Scioto and Little Miami, according to the true intent and meaning of the said Act and deed of cession, cannot be extended, as .stated in either of the instructions asked for above, then that the sources of the said two rivers must be fixed at that point in their respective channels, far¬ thest removed from their respective mouths, at which water is found at all seasons of the year, and that a direct line, connecting said rivers, must be extended from said point ; and if, from the evidence, the jury shall be of opinion that the plaintift’’s patent covers land without said boundary, so fixed as aforesaid, and which is based on an entry covering said land, made in the year 1810, which had pursuant to the Acts of (Jongress of the United States been surveyed and sold to the defendant by the United States prior to the jmar 1810, the plaintiff’s patent is void, and their verdict ought to be for the de¬ fendant.

8. That if the line connecting the said rivers

Scioto and Little Miami, according to the true intent and meaning of *the said Act and [*423 deed of cession, and the several Acts of Congress relative to the sale of the public lands of the United States, cannot be extended, as stated in either of the instructions asked for above, then that the sources of these streams are at that point, farthest removed from their respective mouths, from which the rain descending on the earth, runs down into their re.spective clian- nels; and that the lands lying between the.se rivers are limited bj^ a direct line run from those points; and if. from the evidence, the jury shall be of opinion that the plaintiff’s pat¬ ent covers land without the limits of .said bound¬ ary. so stated a.s aforesaid, and which is based on an entry made in the year 1810, which had, pursuant to the Acts of Congre.ss of the United States, prior to the said year 1810, been survey¬ ed ami sold to the defendant b}^ the United States pursuant to the Acts of Congress, the plaintiff’s patent is void, and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.
But the court declined giving the in.structions asked for, to which refusal of the court the de¬ fendant, by his counsel, excepted, and prays the court here to sign and seal this bill of ex¬ ceptions, which is done accordingly, July 19th,

1827. _

This case was argued by Mr. Scott for the
Peters 2.
1829
Reynolds v. M’Artiicjk.
42H
plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Mamn and Mr. Vinton for the defendant. Mr. Wirt, Attorney- General, appeared for the plaintiff by order of the government of the United States, but was prevented taking part in the argument by in¬ disposition.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court :
This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Oliio for the county of Champaign, in an ejectment in which the lessee of Duncan IM’Arthur was plaintiff, and .John Reynolds was defendant. The plaintiff claimed the land in controversy, under a patent issued on the 12th day of October, 1812, found¬ ed on an entry made in the year 1810, on a military land warrant granted by the State of Virginia for services during the war or the rev¬ olution in the Virginia line, on continental establishment.
424] The title of the defendant is thus stated : The land was sold by the United States at their land-office in Cincinnati, in the year 1805, to Henry Van IMeter. It reverted to the United States in the year 1813 on account of the non-payment of the purchase money; and was again sold, during the same year, at the same office, to Henry Van Meter, to whom a certiffcate of sale was issued, which he after¬ wards transferred to the defendant, John Rey¬ nolds.
The verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff in the State Court. At the trial, the counsel for the defendant moved the court to instruct the jury on several points made in the cause* and excepted to the refusal of the court to give these instructions. The judg¬ ment of the State Court, having been against a title set up under several Acts "of Congress, is brought before this court by writ of error, that the construction put on tho.se Acts by that court may be re-examined. The inquiry will be, whether the court ought to have given any one of the instructions which were required. The several prayers for this purpose will be con¬ sidered in the order in which they were made.

1. The first instruction asked is, that the

lands west of Ludlow’s line, east of Roberts’s line, and south of the Indian boundary line, had been withdrawn from appropriation under and by virtue of military land warrants prior to the year 1810; and that as the same had, pur¬ suant to the Acts of Congress in such case made and provided, been directed to be surveyed and sold, anrl had accordingly been surveyed and sold to the defendant, prior to the year 1810, the plaintiff’s patent is void, and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.
'This motion does not question the bounds of the lands reserved by Virginia for military bounties, but supjmsing the tract of country west of Ludlow's line, east of Roberts’s line, and south of the Indian boundary line to be within that reserve, asks the court to say, that Congress had, prior to the year 1810, when ISr Arthur’s entry was made, withdrawn it from appropriation under and by virtue of military land warrants,
425] Before deciding on the propriety of refusing or granting this prayer, it will be nec¬ essary to review the legislation of Congress on this subject.
Peters 2.
The Act of the 9th of June, 1794 (2 United States Laws, 440), taken in connection with the reservation in favor of their officers and soldiers contained in the deed of cession made by Vir¬ ginia, unque.stionably subjected the whole of the military reserve to the satisfaction of those warrants, for which the reserve was made. Had Congress, previous to the year 1810, withdrawn that portion of this reserve which lies between the line run by Ludlow, and that run by Rob¬ erts, from its liability to be so appropriated?
So early as the year 1785, Congre.ss passed “an ordinance” (1 United States Laws, 563, 569) “ for ascertaining the mode of disposing of lands in the western territory,” in which, for the purpose of securing to the officers and sol¬ diers of the Virginia line on continental estab lishment the bounties granted them by that State, it is ordained ‘ ‘ that no part of the land between the rivers called Little Miami and Sci¬ oto, on the north-west side of the River Ohio, be sold or in any manner alienated, until there shall first have been laid off and appropriated for the said officers and soldiers and persons claiming under them, the lands they are enti¬ tled, to agreeably to the said deed of cession and Act of Congress accepting the same.
The scrupulous regard which this clause in the ordinance of May, 1785, manifests to this condition made by Virginia in her deed of ces¬ sion, is the more worthy of remark, because at that time no suspicion was entertained that the military warrants of Virginia would cover the whole territory; and it was even doubted, as the legislation of Congress shows, whether any part of that territory would be required for them. Even under these circumstances. Con¬ gress declared the determination not to sell or alienate any land between the Scioto and the Little Miami.
In May, 1796, Congress passed “an Act pro¬ viding for the sale of the lands of the United States in the territory north-west *of [*426 the river Ohio, and above the mouth of Ken¬ tucky River.” (2 United States Laws, 533.)
The second section enacts that, “the part of the said land which has not been already con¬ veyed,” &c., “or which has not been heretofore, and during the present session of Congress may not be appropriated for satisfying military land bounties, and for other purposes, shall be di¬ vided,” Ac.
This law, then, from which the whole power of the Surveyor-General is derived, excludes from his general authority all lands previously appropriated for military land bounties and for other purposes; and con.sequently excludes from it the lands between the Scioto and the Little Miami.
In May, 1800 (3 United States Laws, 385), Congress passed an Act to amend the Act of 1 796, which enacts ‘ ‘ that for the disposal of the lands of the United States directed to be sold by the original Act, there shall be four land-of¬ fices established in the said territory.” The places at which these land-offices shall be fixed are designated in the Act, and the district of country attached to each is described. One of these is Cincinnati, the place at which the lands in controversy were sold, and the district at¬ tached to it is that below the Little Miami.
It is pei’fectly clear from the language of this Act, that it extends to those lands only which
473
426
SuPRBMJs Court of the United States.
1829
were comprehended in the Act of May, 1796, and that no one of the districts established by it, compreliends the land in controvei'sy. Any general phrases which may be found in the law must, according to every rule of construction, be limited in their application to those lands which the original Act authorized the Surveyor- General to laj' off for the purpose of being sold. If he surveyed any lands to which that Act does not extend, he exceeded his authority, and the survey is not sanctioned b}" the law. If land thus surveyed by mistake has been sold, the sale was not authorized b}^ the law under color of which it was made.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error has pressed earnestly on the court the grants made 427’"] to John Cleves Symmes, and *to the purchasers under him. Me are not sure that the argument on this point has been clearly un¬ derstood, and have therefore examined that transaction, in order to discover its influence, if it can have any, on the (.[uestion now under con¬ sideration.
In 1787 John Cleves Symmes applied to Con¬ gress for a grant to himself and his associates of the lands lying within the following limits, viz. : “ Beginning at the mouth of the Great Miami River, thence running up the Ohio to the mouth of the Little Miami River; up the main stream of the Little IVIiami River to the place wiiere a due west line; to be continued from the western termination of the northern boundary line of the grant to Messrs. iSargent, Cutler & Co. shall intersect the said Little Miami River; thence due west, continuing the said western line to the place where the said line shall inter¬ sect the main branch or stream of the Great Miami; thence down the Great Miami to the place of beginning.”
In consequence of this petition, a contract was entered into for the sale of one million of acres of land, to begin on the bank of the Ohio, twent}" miles along its meanders above the mouth of the Great Miami; thence to the mouth of the Great Miami; thence up that river to a place whence a line drawn due east will inter¬ sect a line drawn from the place of beginning, parallel with the general course of the Great Miami, so as to include one million of acres within these lines and the said rivers, and from that place upon the said Great Miami River, ex¬ tending along such lines to the place of begin¬ ning, containing, as aforesaid, one million of acres.
The languag'6 of this contract does not indi¬ cate any intention on the part of Congress to encroach on the military reserve, which the ordinance of May, 1785, then in full force, had excepted fi'om sale or alienation.
In 1792 (2 United States Laws, 270) Con¬ gress, at the request of John C. Symmes, pass¬ ed an Act to alter this contract in such manner that the land sold should extend from the mouth of the Great Miami to the mouth of the Little Miami, and be bounded by the river 428*] *01uo on the south, by the Great Miami on the w'est, by the Little Miami on the east, and by a parallel of latitude on the north, ex¬ tending from the Great Miami to the Little Miami, so as to comprehend the proposed quan¬ tity of one million of acres.”
The lands, then, which might be granted to John C. Symmes, in pursuance of this Act of 474
Congress, lay between the Great and Little Miami, and were to lie below the Little Miami. The Scioto is above that river; so that Con¬ gress could not have intended that this grant to Symmes should interfere with the military re¬ serve.
On the 36th of September, in the year 1794, a deed was executed in pursuance of the Act of 1792, conveying to John C. Symmes that tract of land beginning at the mouth of the Great Miami River, and extending from thence along the river Ohio to the mouth of the Little Jliaraa River, bounded on the south by the river Ohio, on the west by the Great IVIiami, on the east by the Little Miami, and on the north b}" a pai'allel of latitude to be run from the Great Miami to the Little Miami, so as to comprehend the quantity of 311,682 acres of land.
It is obvions that this patent does not inter¬ fere with the military reserve. But John C. Symmes had sold to several persons who pur¬ chased in the confidence that he would comply with his contract for one million of acres, and be enabled to convejGlie lands sold to them.
In March, 1799, Congress pas.sed an Act de¬ claring that any person or persons, wdio, before the first day of April, in the year 1797, had made any contract in writing with John C. Symmes fpr the purchase of lands betw^cen the Great and Little Miami rivers, which are not comprehended in his patent elated the 30th of September, 1794, shall be entitled to a prefer¬ ence in purcha.sing of the Lmited States all the lands so contracted for at the price of twm dol¬ lars per acre.
In IMarch, 1801, Congress passed ah Act ex¬ tending this right of pre-emption to all persons who had, previous to the first day of Januar}", 1800, made any contract in writing wdth the said John C. Symmes.or with any of his associ¬ ates, for the purchase of lauds betw'een the Mi¬ ami rivers within the ^limits of a [*420 survey made by Israel Ludlow% in conformit}' to an Act of Congress of the 12th of April, 1792.
The provisions of this Act are supposed to contemplate the survey and sale of the lands which had been sold to John C. Symmes be- tw’een the Miami rivers; in like manner as had been prescribed for other lands lying above the mouth of Kentucky bj^ the Acts of 1796 and

1800. The right of pre-emption was limited to

lands within Israel Ludlow’s survej’; but that survey contained less than 600,000 acres, and the contract of Symmes was for one million of acres; Congress therefore resumed the consid¬ eration of this subject, and in May, 1802, ex¬ tended this right of pre-emption to all those who had purchased from John C. Symmes lauds lying between the Miami rivers, and without the limits of Ludlow’s survey. It can¬ not be doubted that this right of pre-emption, allowed to the purchasers under John C. Symmes, was limited to lands lying between the Miami rivers, and lying within his contract. Congress could never have intended that this contract should interfere with the military re¬ serve. That reserve was of lands lying above the Little Miami. The sale to Symmes was of lands lying below that river. It was made while an ordinance was in full force, declaring the resolution of Congress not to alienate any part of that reserve. Their contract w'as made
Petera 2.
1819
Reynolds t. M'Arthuk.
429
in subordination to that ordinance, and cannot have intended to violate it. The terms of the contract do not purport to violate it. The land sold to Symmes, and the pre-emption rights al¬ lowed to the purchasers under him, are so de¬ scribed as to furnish no ground for the opinion that Congress could have suspected them to in¬ terfere with the military re.serve. If the Scioto and the Great Miami, contrary to all probability, should take such a direction as to produce a po.ssible interference between the lands sold to Symmes and the reserve which Congress had declared its resolution not to alienate, some dif¬ ficulty might possibly arise in a case where one of the parties claimed under a military wari'ant, and the other under a pre-emption certificate. But that is not this ca.se. The title of the plaintiff in error is under a purchase made at a sale of the lauds of the United States at Cincinnati, by Henry Van IMeter, who is not 430*] ^stated to have held a pre-emption cer¬ tificate, or to have been a purchaser under Symmes.
The instruction which the court was asked to give is, that the land between the lines of Ludlow and Roberts had beeii withdrawn from appropriation, under and by virtue of military land Avarrants, previous to the year 1810. This withdrawal is not in express terms, but is sup¬ posed to be implied from a direction to survey the lands between the Great and Little Miami which had been exempted from the operation of the Acts of 1796 and 1800, under the idea that the}' Avere comprehended in the contract with Symmes. Congress could not suspect that the lands to be surveyed under this law could interfere with the lauds lying betAveen the Little Miami and the Scioto; and conse¬ quently cannot have intended by this Act to vary tiie boundary of the military reserve.
It has been A'cry truly observed, that all the laws on this subject .should be taken together. The condition inserted in the deed of cession of Virginia, Avhich reserves the land lying be¬ tween the Little IMiami and the Scioto foV the purpose of satsfying the warrants granted to the officers and soldiers of that State; the ordi¬ nance of l\Iay, 1785, declaring that no part of that reserve should be alienated; the contract with Symmes for the sale of lands lying between the two Miamis; the Acts relative to pre-emptions, and Avhich direct the survey and sale of the lands lying between Ihe Miamis, without any allusion to the military district, must be taken into Auew at the .same time.
It is, Ave think, impossible to believe th.at Congre.ss supposed itself, AA'hen directing the survey and sale of lands between the Great and Little Miami, to be abridging or altei'ing the bounds of a district which Virginia had re- , served in the deed of cession by which the country north-west of the Ohio had been con¬ veyed to the United States.
When Congress designed to act on this 'sAib- ject the purpose Avas expressed, and overtures were made to the other part}' to the compact to obtain her co-operation.
In executing the Act of IVIay, 1800, the Sur¬ veyor-General had caused a line to be run, from 431] Avhat he supposed to be the source of the Little Miami, towards what he supposed to be the source of the Scioto, which is the line denominated LudloAv’s, and surveyed the lands Peters 2.
Ave.st of that liiu; in the manner pi'escribed by the Act of Congress.
In March,, 1804 (3 United States Laws, 592), Congress pas.sed an Act establishing that line as the western boundary of the re.serve, provid¬ ed the State of Virginia should, Avithin tAvo years after the passage of the Act, accede to it. Virginia did not accede to it.
In 1812 (4 United States Laws, 455) Con¬ gress made another effort to establish this line. The Presid(mt Avas authorized to appoint com¬ missioners to meet others Avhich should be ap¬ pointed by Virginia, who Avere to agree on the Ave.stern line of the militaiy reserve, and cause the same to be surveyed and marked out. The.se commissioners met, and after ascertain¬ ing the sources of the two rivers, employed IMr. Charles Roberts to survey and mark a line from the source of the one to the .source of the other. This line is called Roberts’s line. The Virginia commissioners, however, refused to accede to this line.
This Act provided that, until an agreement should take place between the commissioners, the line designated in the Act of 1804, which is Ludlow’s, should be considered and held as the proper boundary line. This enactment is provisional and pi’ospective.
In 1816 (6 United States Laws, 282) Congre.ss pas.sed an Act declaring that from the source of the Little IMiami to the Indian boundary line established by the treaty of Greenville, Lud- loAv’.s line should be considered as the western boundary of the military reserve, until other¬ wise directed by law; and that from the said Indian boundary line to the source of the Scioto River, the line run by Charles Roberts shall be so considered.
When Ave review the whole legislation of Congi'e.ss on this subject, we think the conclu- ,sion inevitable, that in the Acts of 1801 and 1802, which iiave been cited, the Legislature did not consider itself as altering the bounds of the military district, or as AvithdraAving be¬ fore the year 1820 any part of the territory lying between the Little Miami and the Scioto *from being appropriated by the mili-
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tary land-Avarrants' granted by the State of Virginia. If those Acts have this effect, it is one which Avas not intended.
Before a court can be required to declare the law which would arise betAveen conflicting statutes of this character, the fact that they do conflict ought to be clearly established. The counsel for the plaintiff in di’ror has argued this part of the case as if the fact Avas estab¬ lished; as if a line drawn from the source of the Little IVIiami to the source of the Great Miami Avovdd include the land between Lud¬ low’s line and that of Roberts, and this court has thus far treated the question as it has been argued. But this fact is not e.stablished in this case. It is not among the facts agreed by the parties, nor Avas the State Court required to in¬ struct the juiy, that if they should And the land Avest of Ludlow’s and east of Roberts’s line to lie betAveen the Little and Great' IMiami, or within Symme.s’ purchase, “that it had been withdrawn from appropriation, under and by virtue of said military land-warrants, prior to the yeaiTSlO,” and that M’Arthur’s patent Avas con¬ sequently void. The court was not required to state the laAv hypothetically, as being depend-
475
432
1829
Supreme Court op the United States.
ent on the fact ; but to assume the fact, and to 1 state the law positively upon that assumption. The record, we think, did not authorize the court to consider this fact as established, and to withdraw it from the jury.
There is no error in refusing this instruction.

2. The counsel for the defendant then asked

the court to instruct the jury that, as the third section of the Act of the Congress of the United States, of the 11th of April, 1818, de¬ clares: “That from the source of the Little INIiami River to the Indian boundary line es¬ tablished by the treaty of Greenville in 1795, the line designated as the westerly boundary line of the Virginia tract by an Act of Con¬ gress passed on the 23d day of March, 1804, entitled ‘ An Act to ascertain the boundary of the lands reserved by the State of Virginia north-west of the river Ohio for the satisfaction of her officers and soldiers on continental es¬ tablishment, and to limit the period for loca¬ ting the said lands,’ shall be considered and held as such until otherwise directed by law 433*] and as said ^boundary line was run by Ludlow, under the directions of the Surveyor- General, pursuant to an Act of Congress, enti¬ tled ‘ ‘ An Act to extend and continue in force the provisions of an Act entitled ‘An Act giving a right of pre-emption to certain persons who have contracted with John Cleves Symmes, or his associates, for lands lying between the Mi¬ ami rivers, in the territory north-west of the Ohio, and for other purposes,’ ” approved May 1st, 1802, and offered for sale at public auction at the Cincinnati land-office, pursuant to the Act entitled “An Act making provision for the disposal of public lands in the Indiana terri¬ tory, and for other purposes,” approved March 26th, 1804, must be construed as having rela¬ tion back to the time the above-recited Act, en¬ titled “An Act to ascertain the boundary of the lands reserved by the State of Virginia north¬ west of the river Ohio for the satisfaction of the officers and soldiers on continental estab¬ lishment, and to limit the period for locating said lands,” approved 23d of March, 1804, was passed and took effect; and as the plaintiff’s patent covers lands west of that line and south of the Greenville treaty line, and is based on an entry made in 1810 on a Virginia conti¬ nental land-warrant, which land had been sur¬ veyed and sold to the defendant pursuant to the Acts of Congress prior to the year 1810. the plaintiff’s patent is void and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.
The prayer for this instruction is founded on the assertion that Ludlow’s line was run under the direction of the Surveyor-General, pursuant to the Act of Congress of the 1st of May, 1802, granting pre-emption rights to purchasers from John Cleves Symmes; and that the land in con¬ troversy was sold pursuant to the Act of the 26th of March, 1804, making provision for the disposal of public lands in the Indian territory, and for other purposes.
If by the words “pursuant to an Act of Congress,” as used in this prayer, it is intended to say that the boundary line run by Ludlow was correctly run as required bj'' the Act of May 1st, 1802, and that the sale of the land in controversy was authorized by the Act of the 26th of March. 1804, then the court is lequired to decide facts not admitted by the parties,
476
*which are proper for the consideration [*43_4 of the jury, and then to declare the law aris¬ ing upon those facts. If those words mean no more than that the line was actually run under the authority of the Surveyor-General, and that the land in controversy w’as actually sold at the land-office in Cincinnati by the officers of government, the question fairly arises, what influence have these facts on the rights of the parties? Do they, taken in connection with the Acts of the 23d of March, 1804, and of the 11th ofApril, 1818, justify the inference which the court is asked to draw, that the Act of 1818 relates back to the Act of 1804, and takes effect from its date, so as to avoid a pat¬ ent issued in October, 1812, on an entry and survey made in 1810?
It has already been stated that the Act of the 23d of March, 1804, establishes Ludlow’s line, not absolutely, but on condition that Virginia should assent to it; and that Virginia never did assent to it.
It has also been stated that in 1812 Congress authorized the President to appoint comnais- sioners who shoidd proceed in concert with such as might be appointed by Virginia, to run a line which should constitute the western boundary of the Virginia niilitary reserve. These commissioners did meet, and did cause a line to run from the source of the Little Mi¬ ami to the source of the Scioto. This is called Roberts’s line. The commissioners of Virginia did not assent to this line. Consequently it is of no operation.
The Act of April the lltli, 1818, declares that Ludlow’s line shall be considered and held as the true western boundary of the Virginia military reserve until otherwise directed by law. But from what time shall it be so consid¬ ered and held? The language of the law is entirely prospective. It is a principle which has always been held sacred in the United States, that laws by which human action is to be regulated, look forward, not backward; and are never to be construed retrospectively unless the language of the Act shall render- such construction indispensable. No words are found in the Act of 1818 which render this odious construction indispensable. The lan¬ guage is, that Ludlow’s line shall be consid¬ ered and held; that is, shall in future be considered and held as the *true west-
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ern boundary of that reserve. That this -was the understanding of the Legislature, is ren¬ dered the more probable from the clause which relates to patents. It does not annul patents already issued, but declares that no patent shall be granted on any location and survey that has been or may be made west of this line. Patents which have been granted are not affected di¬ rectly by the words of this law, and must de¬ pend on the pre-existing Act of Congress.
The argument is, that this Act declaring that Ludlow’s line shall be considered and held as the westerly boundary line of the reserve until otherwise directed by law, proves that, according to the true construction of the deed of cession, this line is in reality the true bound¬ ary, and therefore that all titles previously acquired to lands lying west of this line are invalid.
We cannot admit the correctness of this ar¬ gument.
Peters 2.
1819
Reynolds v. M’Aiu'iiuk.
435
That in the state of things which existed in 1812 and 1818, Congress might establish the western boundary of the military reserve, so as to affect titles thereafter to be acquired, is not questioned. Congress might fix a reasonable time within which titles should be asserted, and might annex conditions to the extension of this time. But to look back to titles already acquired, to declare by a law what was the meaning of the compact under which those ti¬ tles were acquired, is to construe that compact and to adjudicate in the form of legislation. It would be the exercise of a judicial, not of a leg¬ islative power. This con.struction can never be admitted by the court unless it be rendered indispensable by the language of the Act. We do not think that the language of this Act does require it.
If the language of the statute does not re¬ quire this construction, neither do the facts that Ludlow’s line was run by order of the Surveyor-General, and that the land in contro¬ versy was sold by the regular agents of govern¬ ment. These facts cannot, we think, carry back the Act of 1818 to 1804, and give it a re¬ trospective operation.
We do not inquire into the power of Con- gi'ess to pass such an Act. There is undoubt¬ edly much force in the argument suggested at the bar, that the general jjower of legislation, 430 ] which Congress could exercise over the territory north-west of the Ohio, passed to the new government when the territory was erected into a State; and that Congress re¬ tained only the power of a proprietor with a capacity ‘ ‘ to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the property.” But it is unnecessary to pursue this inquiry, because we are of opinion that this construc¬ tion is inadmissible.
The court therefore did right in rejecting this prayer.
The third instruction asked by the defendant is in these words: that, according to the true intent and meaning of the Act and deed of cession from Virginia to the United States, the land lying between the rivers Scioto and Little Miami is bounded by a line extending from the source or point of land farthest removed from the mouths of these rivers, from which the rain descending on the earth runs down into their respective channels, along the tops of the ridges, dividing the waters of the Scioto from the waters of the Great Miami, which empties into the Ohio below the mouth of the Little Miami, as delineated on the diagram re¬ turned by the county surveyor for the defend¬ ant in this case; and as the plaintiff’s patent covers land west or without the boundary of the district so bounded as aforesaid, and is based on an entry on a Virginia continental land warrant, which entry was made in the year 1810, and which said entry and patent cover land which had, pursuant to the Acts of Congress, been surveyed and sold to the de¬ fendant prior to the date of the plaintiff’s said entry, the plaintiff’s patent is void; and their verdict ought to be for the defendant.
In the case of Doddridge v. Tlwm'pmn (9 Wheaton, 469), this court said that the territory lying between two rivers is the whole country from their sources to their mouths; and a straight line drawn from the source of one riv- Peters 2.
er to the source of the other was considered, in that case, as furnishing the western boundary of the lands lying between them. One or both of the rivers may pursue such a course that a straight line from the source of one to the source of the other may cross one or both of them. Such a case may form an exception to the universal application of the straight line, *and may go far in showing that no
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general rule can be laid down which will fit every possible case. But this obvious and rea¬ sonable rule has been adopted by Congress as well as by this court. The Act of 1804 adopts the straight line. The Act of 1812 obvi¬ ously contemplates a straight line, and the Act of 1818 adopts Ludlow’s line, from the source of the Little Miami to the Indian boundary line established at the treaty of Greenville, and the line run by Roberts from the Indian bound¬ ary to the source of the Scioto.
The counsel for the defendant in the State Court abandoned the rule adopted by Congress and by this court, by taking for his commence¬ ment “that point of laud which is farthest re¬ moved from the mouths of the respective riv¬ ers, and from which the rain descending on the earth runs down into their respective chan¬ nels ;” and to draw a line from that point along the top of the ridges dividing the waters of the Scioto from the waters of the Great Miami.
We feel some difficulty in comprehending the principle which has suggested and can sus¬ tain this rule. Why should a line drawn along the top of the ridges which divide the waters of the Scioto from those of the Great Miami, constitute the true boundary of the country lying between the Great and Little Miami? Would such a line certainly lead to the source of the Scioto or to that of the Little Miami? We can give no satisfactory answer to these inquiries. It is some objection, too, to this in¬ struction, that the jury would be much and unnecessarily perplexed in finding the point of land farthest removed from the mouth of each river, and from which the rain descending on the earth runs down into their respective chan¬ nels. If any point exists which would fit all parts of the description, and could be found by the jury, it is by no means certain that such point would be in a line which would mark the boundary of the country between the two rivers.
The rule which the court was asked to lay down appears to us to be entirely arbitrary; and this prayer was properly rejected.

4. The fourth instruction has been aban¬

doned by the plaintiff in error.
*5. The proposition on which the
fifth prayer depends, is that the sources of the two rivers must be at that point in their re¬ spective channels at which, from the union of several streams, sufficient water flows at an or¬ dinary stage on which to navigate small ves¬ sels laden.
This rule for ascertaining the source of a river is entirely new in this country. A stream may acqiure the name of a river which is not navigable in any part. A river which is navi¬ gable may retain that name above the highest navigable point. The meaning of words as commonly used must be changed before the source of a river can be confounded with its highest navigable point
477
438
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
The court did not err in rejecting this prayer.

6. The proposition on which the sixth prayer

depends is, “ that the sources of the two rivers must be considered as commencing at tliat point in their respective channels from which the water flows at all seasons of the year.”
Is this proposition so invailablj^ true as to become a principle of law? We think it is not. A stream may acquire the name of a river, in the channel of which, at some seasons of ex¬ treme drought, no water flows. For a great portion of the year parts of a stream rnaj' flow in great abundance, in which, during a very dry season, we may find only standing pools. It would be against all usage to .say that the general source of the river was at that point in its channel from which the water always flows.
This prayer, we think, ought not to have been granted.

7. The seventh pray(‘r depends on the

proposition, that the sources of the two rivers must be fixed at that [)oint in their respective channels, farthest removed from their re.spect- ive mouths, at which watci- is found at all sea¬ sons of the year.
If the terms of this proposition be taken ac¬ cording to their most obvious import, it would seem to vary from the sixth only in this: that the sixth fixes the source of a river at the point in the channel from which water flows at all seasons in the j^ear; while the seventh fixes it at that point which is farthest removed from its mouth, at which water is found at all seasons. Umlerstanding it in this sense, the proposition *would not raise the question, which of several was the main branch ; but at what point the source of that main branch was to be found. The remarks made on the sixth praj^er would apply with equal propriety to this; and the court wmuld come to the same conclusion on both. But we understand from the argu¬ ment, that the counsel for the plaintifl in error, intended, by this prayer, to furnish a rule by which the main branch might be designated. That rule is, that the branch in whose channel water might be found furthest removed from the mouth of the river, is its main branch.
Is this proitosition universally true? That branch of a river, which is entitled to the ap¬ pellation given to the main river, is a conclu¬ sion of fact to be drawn from the evidence in the cause. Consequently no general rule can be laid dowm, which will, in aircases, guide us to a correct conclusion. One of the'forks may have retained the name of the main river,- in exclusion of the others. The Scioto and Miami are both Indian names, and if any one branch of either had received from the natives, and re¬ tained exclusively, the name given to tlie main river, that would have been the stream referred to in the reserve, contained in the deed of ces¬ sion ; although water might have been found in a dry .sea.son of the year, in the channel of some other, at a greater distance from the mouth of the river ; or the white men, who ex¬ plored the country before the deed of cession was executed, may have fixed the name on some one of the branches of the respective rivers.
When France ceded to Great Britain all her pretensions to the country lying ea.st of the Mi.ssi.ssippi, “from its source to the river Iberville,” no man could have been so extrava¬ gant as to assert that the source of the Missis- 478
sippi was to be looked for through all its branches, and fixed at that point in the chan¬ nel of either in which water might be found farthest removed from the mouth of the river.
The size of the rivers, and the notoriety of the names by which they w'ere designated, place the unreasonableness of such a pretension in so strong a point of Auewq that we can scarcely bring ourselves to suppose that there is any resemblance ^between the case put by [*4:40 way of illustration, and that under considera¬ tion. And yet, what is the real difference in principle? If one branch of a small river has by consent retained the name of the main river, in exclusion of the others, that branch must be considered, in the absence of other circum¬ stances, as the true boundary intended by the parties, in a deed whicli calls for the stream by its name. The fact may be less certain and less notorious; but, if it exists, it must be followed by the same consequences.
If neither branch had notoriously retained the name of the river, the main branch is en¬ titled to it. But the main branch is not nec¬ essarily that in whose channel wuiter might be found at all seasons of the year, at the point farthest removed from its mouth. The largest volume of wmter is certainly one indication of the main stream, w’hich does not necessarily accompany that wdiich the counsel for the plaintiff in error has selected as the .sole crite¬ rion by which it is to be determined. The length of the stream is another. It is obvious, that two branches may pursue such a course tliat the source of the longest may be nearer the mouth of the river than that of the shortest.
We think the rule propo.'ed in this prayer does not furnish a certain guide to conduct us to the source of the river; and therefore the in¬ struction ought not to have been given.

8. The eighth prayer requires the court to

instruct the jury that the source of each river is at that point farthest removed from its mouth, from which the rain runs dowm into its channel.
We cannot perceive in the rule wiiich this instruction proposes, any principle which wdll conduct us to the source of the main stream. Every objection to granting the seventh prayer, applies with equal force to this. They need not be repeated.
The court did not err in rejecting it.
The instructions to the jury, for which the plaintiff applied to the State Court, are some of them mixed questions, involving fact with lawq and requiring the court to decide the fact, and then to declare the law’ upon that fact. Others propose a rule, as of universal applica¬ tion, to a.scertain the main *i)ranch of
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a river, and the source of that main branch, which would unquestionably, in mam' cases, mislead us. They propose one single circum¬ stance, in exclu,sion of all others, as being the infallible evidence of a complex fact depending on a number of varying circumstances.
The court very properly refused to give any of these instructions.
This amrt is of opinion that there is no error in thejudgvierit of the State Court, and that it ought to be ajfirtncd with costs.
Petei’s 2
1S29 SoUTHWTCK ET AT;. Y. TfIE PoPTMASTER-GeNETTAL OF THE UnTTEO StATES. 4^1-2
442] S?0L0M01Sr SOUTHWICK, SPEN¬ CER STAFFORD, and JOHN VAN NESS
GATES, Plaintiffs in Error,
V.
THE POSTMASTER-GENERxlL OF THE UNITED STATES.
District Court of United States.
A District Court of the United States, perform¬ ing- the approjiriate duty of a District Court, is not sitting- as a Circuit Court, because it possesses the poTrers of a Circuit Court also.
AirRIT of error to the Circuit Court of the tV Southern District of New York.
This suit was commenced, originally, by the Po.stmaster-General, in the District Court of the Northern District of New York, in May, 1822, tigainst Solomon Southwick and his co- dcfendants, who were his sureties, to recover six thousand dollars, the penalty of a bond giveiT by them for the faithful discharge of his duties as postmaster of the city of Albany. In 1824, judgment was rendered in favor of the Postmaster-General, and a writ of error was thereupon brought, and the record certified to the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York. The jtidges of the Circuit Court divided in opinion upon several points which arose in the case, and the same were certified to this court; where they were considered and de- fdded at January term, 1827. The decision of this court having been certified to the Circuit Court, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed by the circuit, in May term, 1828.
Upon this judgment this writ of error was prosecuted, and now Mr. Wirt, the Attorney- General of the United States, moved to dismiss the same.
He contended that the phrase in the Act of Congress, passed April 29, 1812 (1 Sess., 12 Congress, ch. 71), “sitting as a circuit court,” is confined to such causes as are exclusively of circuit court jurisdiction; and does not em¬ brace causes of wliich district courts as such, and circuit courts as such, have a concurrent jurisdiction.
He argued, that this is the correct construc¬ tion of the Act of Congress, and is consistent 443 ] with the judicial system; because, in no case has a writ of error been given to re¬ verse the judgment of a circuit court, in a cause brought up from a district court; pro¬ vided such cause was within the ordinary juris¬ diction of a district court. In such cases, the judgment of the circuit court has been uni¬ formly final and conclusive. If the Act in question has introduced a different rule, in reference to causes decided in the Northern district court of New York, it is an anomaly in our judicial legislation.
The district courts have jurisdiction of post- office bonds. (12 Wheaton, 136; Box et al. v. The Postmaster-Oemral, 1 Peters, 318.)
He submitted that the Act of 1826 does not reach cases within the ordinary jurisdiction of the district courts. If it be otherwise, it must be shown that, in fact, the District Court sat as a circuit court; and this cannot be estab¬ lished in the case before the court.
He inquired if the judgment of the District Court, in this cause, could have been i-emoved Peters 2.
directly to the Supreme Court under the Act of
1826. Certainly nol..
The Act creatin,g the Northern Drstri(-t Court, was designed to extend to that district the benefit of a <-ircuit court jurisdiction ; not to confer cii-cuit court power.s, concurrent with those which it ]Tossessed in its appropriate character. It would have been idle a.nd useless to have intended otherwise, and therefore can¬ not be presumed.
Mr. Taylor, for the ]fiainliffs in ei-ror, in op¬ position to the motion, urgcal that the appro¬ priate original jurisdiction of the District Court, in its general features, i-elates to admiralty ami m-aritime causes, to seizures under the revenue laws, to petty offenses, and to civil suits when the United States is plaintiff, and the sum in controversy does not exceed five hundred dol¬ lars. It is the inferior court of the United States.
The appropriate original civil jurisdiction of the Circuit Court extends to all civil suits where the United States is plaintiff, and the matter in controversy exceeds five hundred dol¬ lars ; or when an alien is a party ; or the siut is between a *citizen of the State where
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the action is brought, and a citizen of another State.
The District Court may, indeed, exercise ju- ri.sdiction of civil cau.ses in behalf of the United States, where the matter in controver,sy ex¬ ceeds five hundred dollars, but in all such cases the jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts is concurrent. It is to be presumed that the court sit.s in its superior character, whenever the matter in controversy will author¬ ize this to be done.
This presumption is strengthened by the consideration that the parties have a right in the one case to have the proceedings reversed, and the errors which may happen coi-rected by this court, which is of common right; and which is denied to them upon the principles claimed for the Postmaster-General.
The propriety of a liberal construction of the Act of Congress, for the purposes of allowing a review of the District Court for the Northern district, will be apparent, when the history of that court for several years subsequent to 1811, shall be considered.
In 1812 the judge of the New York District Court became incapable of discharging the du¬ ties of his office. Hence the Act of ilpril, 29, 1812, which authorized the appointment of an additional judge of the District Court, for the District of New York. The Act of April 9, 1814 (2d Session of the 13th Congress, ch. 108), divided the original New York district into two districts, and assigned a district judge to each.
It provides “that the District Court in the said Northern District of New York, shall, be¬ sides the ordinary jurisdiction of a district court, have jurisdiction of all causes except of appeals and writs of error, cognizable by law in a circuit court;” and writs of error shall lie from decisions thereon, to the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York, in the same manner as from other district courts, to their respective circuit courts.
Writs of error would lie equally in all cases, whether the court was exej-cising its ordinary or extraordinarv jurisdiction.
4VJ
444
SuPKEME Court of
In the northern district, until the Act of the 445*] 3d of March, *1815, there was but one Attorney-General , and tlie marshal was appoint¬ ed and commissioned for both courts, until the Act of March 3d, 1825.
Mr. Taylor considered that the Act of the 3d of March, 1817, revived and continued the suits and proceedings which had been discon¬ tinued in the Northern District of New York, and that it authorized the judges of the south¬ ern district to hold the courts therein, either singly or jointly, with the judge of the north¬ ern district.
Under this Act the same difficulties arose in conducting the business of the northern dis¬ trict, which had been formerly experienced in the southern district. To remedy these evils, at the first session of the 15th Congress, the Act of April 3d, 1818, was passed. That Act re¬ quired the judge of the northern district to hold his courts, unless he gave timely notice of his inability to the judge of the southern dis¬ trict ; in which case the latter was required to act as his substitute. Suits and proceedings were again revived ; actions commenced in the former district of New York were transferred, and actions thereafter to be commenced were limited to the district where they might or did arise; and the original jurisdiction of the Cir¬ cuit Court of the southern district was confined to actions arising there.
No further legislation took place relative to these courts until the 22d of May, 1826, when the Act was passed allowing appeals and writs of error to this court, from decisions of the northern District Court, “when exercising the power of a circuit court and from decisions thereafter to be made by the Circuit Court for the southern district, in causes removed to the Circuit Court from the District Court of the northern district, “ sitting as a circuit court.”
At the time the former writ of error was brought to remove this cause from the northern District Court to the Circuit Court of the south¬ ern district, it was not legal to prosecute it to this court. Similar causes may now be removed, and here reviewed. This, he argued, furnished a reason for the second clause of the Act of

1826.

These Acts afford an answer to the inquiry, whether the northern District Court, in decid- 446 ] ing this cause, “ was sitting as a cir¬ cuit court.” The expression in the Act of 1814 is, “causes cognizable by law in a circuit court,” and in that of May, 1826, it is, “when exercising the powers of a circuit court.”
Was not this cause cognizable by law in a circuit court? Would not such a court, in en¬ tertaining jurisdiction over it, be in the exercise of its appropriate powers? If so, the District Court was “sitting as a circuit court.”
The parties were proper for the Circuit Court ; the nature of the action was one involv¬ ing a large sum, and questions were presented of deep interest, both as to their responsibility as sureties, and the character of the principal in the bond. The allegations made by the de¬ fendants were supported by the finding of the jury, and they went to show that the sureties were exonerated, and in judgment of law were discharged from the bond. The doubts and difficidties of the case were manifested by the division of opinion of the judges of the south- 480
TjiE Urited States. 1829
ern Circuit Court. These matters are sufficient to give the District Court of the northern district, jurisdiction as a circuit court. The Act of 1826 allows writs of error from the Dis¬ trict Court only “when exercising the powers of a circuit court,” and this is done on the presumption that these powers were exercised on subjects proper for them.
He further contended that the Act of 1826 was a remedial statute, and was entitled to be viewed most favorably to parties to whom it was intended to give relief. If its provisions do not embrace this case, it will stand almost wholly inoperative on the statute book.
Had the Circuit Court, when the case was first before it, decided that the facts found bj" the jury discharged the parties to the bond, the United States would, by their law officer, have considered it altogether reasonable that the opinion should have been reviewed by this court. The plaintiffs in error claim no more than the application of the same just principle to their case.
Mr. Chief Judies M.4.rshall delivered the opinion of the court:
*This is a motion to dismiss a writ of
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error to a judgment rendered in the Court of the United States for the Seventh Circuit and Southern District of New York, in favor of the Postmaster-General. The foundation of the motion is, that this court has no jurisdic¬ tion of the cause.
The original judgment was rendered in the court for the Northern District of New York, on which Congress had conferred jurisdiction as a circuit court also. That judgment was removed into the Circuit Court sitting in the southern district by writ of error, and was affirmed in that court.
In May, 1826, Congress enacted “that ap¬ peals and writs of error shall lie from decisions in the District Court for the Northern District of New York, when exercising the powers of a circuit court ; and which may be made by the Circuit Court for the Southern District of said State, in causes heretofore removed to said Circuit Court from the said District Court, sitting as a circuit court, to the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner as from circuit courts.”
The doubt respecting the jurisdiction of the court is produced by this Act.
By the Judicial Act the district courts have cognizance concurrent with the Circuit Court of all cases where the United States sue. By the Act of the 3d of March, 1815, Vol. IV., p. 855, it is enacted that the district courts of the United States shall have cognizance, concur¬ rent, &c., of all suits at common law where the United States or any officer thereof, under the authority of any Act of Congress, shall sue, &c. This Act gave the District Court jurisdiction of all suits brought by the Postmaster-General. It has been construed by this court to give the circuit courts cognizance of the same causes.
The district courts which exercise circuit court jurisdiction, do not distinguish in their proceedings whether they sit as a circuit or a district court. That is determined by the sub¬ ject-matter of their judgments. Their records are all kept as the records of a district court. If the court for the Northern District of New
Peters 2.
1829
447
Weston et al. v. The City Council op Charleston.
York sat as a circuit court wlien the original judgment was rendered against the plaintiff 448 ] in error, this court can take juris¬ diction of the judgment affirming it, which was rendered in the Circuit Court; if the original judgment was rendered by a district court, no writ of error lies to the judgment of affirmance pronounced in the Circuit Court.
Had^the Court for the Northern District of New York possessed no circuit court powers, it could still have taken cognizance of this cause. conferring on it the powers of a circuit court, Congress has added notliing to its jurisdiction in this case. In taking cogni¬ zance of it, a district court has exercised the ordinary jurisdiction assigned to that class of courts. No extraordinary powers were brought into operation. We cannot say tiiat a district court, performin'^ the appropriate duty of a district court, is sitting as a circuit court, be¬ cause it possesses the powers of a circuit court also.
The writ of error must he dismissed, this court having no jurisdiction in the case.
This cause came on to he heard on a tran¬ script of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, and on the motion of the Attorney- General made in this cause at a prior day of this term, to wit, February 7th, 1829, to dismiss this cause for want of jurisdiction, and was argued b}^ counsel ; on consideration Avhereof, it is considered, ordered and adjudged by this court, that the writ of hrror in this cause be, and the same is hereby dismissed for want of juris¬ diction.
Cited— 1 Wood. & M., 448.
449*]'^PL0WDEN WESTON btal.. Plaint¬ iffs in Error,
V.
THE CITY COUNCIL of CHAHLESTON, Defendants.
State tax. of federal securities— jurisdiction — mnt of error — ‘ ‘ suit ” — “final judgment ” — Consti¬ tution of the United States.
A tax imposed by a law of any State of the United States, or under the authority of such a law, on stock issued for loans made to the United States, is unconstit u tional.
The power of this court to revise the judg ments of State tribunals, depends on the 2.')th section of the Judiciary Act. That .section enacts “ that a final judg-ment or decree in any suit in the highest court of law or equity of a State, in which a decis¬ ion in the suit could be had,” where is di-awn in question the validity of a statute, or of an author¬ ity exercised under any State, on the ffround of their being- repugnant to the Constitution, trea¬ ties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity, “may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States.” [463]
The city council of Charleston, exercising an au¬ thority under the State of South Carolina, enacted an ordinance, by which a tax was imposed on the
Note.— AppeUaf 6 jurisdiction of Supreme Court of U. S. to review final judgments of State courts.
Peters 2. U. S., Book 7.
six and seven per cent, stock of the United States ; andin theCourtof Common Pleas of the Charleston District, iinairplication was made tor a prohibition to restain them from levying- the tax, on the ground that the ordinance violated the Constitution of the United States. The prohibition was granted, and the proceedings in the case were removed to the Constitutional Court, the highest court of law of the State ; andin that court it was held that the ordinance did not violate the Constitution of the United States, and a writ of error was prosecuted on this decision to this court. Held, that the ques¬ tion decided l)y the Constitutional Court was the very question on which the revising power of this court is to be exercised. [464]
A writ of error to this court may be prosecuted, where by the judgment of the highest court of the State of South Carolina a prohibition, issued in a State court, to prevent the levying of a tax which was iniposcii by a law repugnant to the Constitu¬ tion of the United States, was refused on the ground that the law was not so repugnant to the Constitu¬ tion. [464]
The term “suit” is certainly a very comprehen¬ sive one, and is understood to apply to any pro¬ ceeding in a court of justice in which an individual pursues that remedj- in a court of justice which the law affords him. [464]
The words “final judgment,” in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, must bo understood in the sec¬ tion under consideration as applying to all judg¬ ments and decrees which determine the particular cause: and it is not recjuii-ed that such judgments shall finally decide upon the rights which are liti¬ gated, that the same shall be within purview of the section. [464]
It is not the want of original power in an inde¬ pendent sovereign State to prohibit loans to a for¬ eign government, which restrains the State Legis- latui-e from direct opposition to those made by the United States. The restraint is Imposed by our Constitution. The American people have conferred the power of borrowing- money on the government, and by making that government supreme, have shielded its action in the exercise of that power, from the action of the local governments. The grant of the power, and the declaration of suprem¬ acy, is a declaration that no such restraining or controlling power shall be exercised. [468]
This was a writ of error to the Con-
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stitutional Court of South Carolina.
On the 20th of February, 1823, the city coun¬ cil of Charleston passed “ an ordinance to raise supplies for the use of the city of Charleston, for the j'ear 1823. ” The ordinance provides“that the following species of property, owned and pos¬ sessed w'ithin the limits of the city of Charleston, shall be subject to taxation in the manner, and at the rate, and conformahlj" to the provisions hei-einafter specified ; that is to say, all personal estate, consisting of bonds, notes, insurance stock, six and seven per cent, stock of the United States, or other obligations upon which interest has been or will he received during the year, over and above the interest which has been ]iaid (funded stock of this State, and stock of the incorporated hanks of this State and the United States Bank excepted), twenty-five cents upon every hundred dollars.”
In the Court of Common Pleas for the Charles¬ ton District, the plaintiffs in error, in May, 1823, filed a suggestion for a prohibition, as owners of United States stock, against the city council of Charleston, to restrain them from levying under the ordinances, on six and seven per cent, stock of the United States and tiie tax impo.sed under the ordinance; on the ground that the ordinance, so far as it imposes a tax. on the stock of the United States is contrary to the Constitution of the United States.
The prohibition having been granted, the city council applied to the Constitutional Court, the highest court of law in the State, to reverse the order, on the ground that the ordinance was 31 481
450
Supreme Court of the United States.
1829
not repugnant to tlie Constitution of the United States; and the proceedings in the case_ having been removed to the said court, the said court in May term, 1823, by a majority of their judges the ordinance, and three again.st it), decided that (for being in favor of the constitutionality of the said ordinance did not violate the Constitu¬ tion of the United States, in imposing a tax upon the holders of United States stock. From this decision the relators appealed by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The error assigned in this court was. that 451] the judgment of.the Constitutional Court was erroneous, in that it decided the or¬ dinance of the city council of Charleston not to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
The case was argued by Mr. Hayne for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Cruger and Mr. Legem for the defendants.
The counsel for the plaintiffs in error sub¬ mitted, that if the course of proceeding adopted by the plaintiffs in error was not approved of, by requiring a prohibition in the Court of Com¬ mon Pleas, and on the decision of the Consti¬ tutional Court being against them by taking the writ of error, some other mode would be em¬ ployed. It was the wish of all the parties to have the decision of this court on the question involved in the case ; and a ready and entire acquiescence would be yielded to the judgment of the court by all who were interested. It was submitted to the court, that for the purposes of justice, the court would give an opinion upon the matter assigned for error; and if the form in which the case had been brought up was not proper, the judgment of the court would be equally operative, and would be yielded to by the parties, plaintiffs and defendants in error.
The subject in controversy is one of proper cognizance for this court. It involves a most important constitutional question; the right of the States, or of State authorities, to tax the funded debt of the United States.
The subject-matter of the case belongs to this court. The soundest rule that can be adopted is, that when the matter in question belongs to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a liberal construction in favor of the powers of the court over it should be given.
The question in this case concerns the vital means of the nation ; and the power claimed to be exercised under the ordinance, would inter¬ fere with those means on emergencies of the deepest interest. It is n constitutional ques¬ tion, and as such is peculiarly undei' the guar¬ dianship of this court.
The writ of error is to the highest tribunal of the State of South Carolina; and the de¬ cision of that court has been in favor of the constitutionality of the ordinance; thus bring- 45 2] ing the case fully within the 25th sec¬ tion of the Judiciary Act.' Let this court certify its opinion, and the controversy will be at an end.

1. — Huger, J., di-Hsentiente. This was an applica¬

tion for a prohibition to restrain the treasm-er of the cit.y of Charleston from levying a tax, imposed by a city ordinance, on six and seven per cent, stock of the United States. The words of the ordi¬ nance are : All personal estate, consisting' of bonds, notes, &c., six and seven per cent, .stock of the United State.?, or other obligations, upon wliicli
482
On more occasions than one, when the court has felt some embarrassment as to its jurisdic¬ tion, it has expressed an opinion upon impor¬ tant questions; and when the general good required a decision. ( United States v. Kirk¬ patrick, 9 Wheaton, 720.)

2. The Act of Congress organizing the courts

of the United States, authorizes this court to form and mould its process, so as to enforce and carry into effect the objects and purposes for which the federal courts were e.stablished. It is conceived that the writ of prohibition is a mode of exercising jurisdiction which is essen¬ tial to those purposes. There is a strong anal¬ ogy between the prohibition asked in this case, and those issued to district courts under the law. But if the writ of prohibition may not be adopted, and the court should decide this case in favor of the plaintiffs in error, the case may be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for the Charleston District; and should that court refuse to proceed as required, the Supreme Court may itself enforce its judg¬ ment.
Upon the general ciuestion, the counsel for the plaintiffs in error argued, that the ordi¬ nance does not impose a tax on all public funds, but specifically on the six and seven per cent, stock of the United States. Thus there are selected, as the particular object of taxa¬ tion, those debts of the government of the United States; and the .sum the government has stipulated to pay for the loan is diminished to the extent of the tax. The contract of the general government is invaded, and its credit impaired. Its competenc}^ to negotiate loans may be destroyed by the admission of this power of taxation. There are two sources of revenue which are essentially the right of the general government — that of imposing duties, and that of borrowing money on the credit of the nation. The safety of the whole depends upon the free and undisturbed exercise of these powers. In peace, the fir.st is necessary to reve¬ nue; in war, the second *is vital to de-
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fense and success. If these powers and rights are not guarded and preserved, the functions and purposes of the Union will be suspended and destroyed.
There is no warrant for this tax, to be de¬ rived from the opinion of this court in the case of M'Gullocli V. Tke State of Marylancl (4 Wheaton, 316). The court, at the'close of the opinion delivered in that case, sanction a tax on property held by citizens of Maryland in the Bank of the United States, in common with other property throughout the State; but they say expressly, that “ a particular tax upon the operation of an instrument emplojmd bj^ the government to carry its powers into execution, is void.”
Mr. Hayne presented, as a part of his argu¬ ment, the opinion of Mr. Justice Huger in the Constitutional Court ; who, with Nott and Bay, Justices, dissented from the opinion of the ma¬ jority of the court.’
interest has been or will be received during- the year, over and above; the interest which has been paid (except, «&c., &o.), twent.y-flve cents on every $100. The prohibition was ordered. A motion is now submitted for the reversal of that order. I am unwilling, on so important a question, merely to express my dissent from the judgment of the court. It ts now for the fir.st time agitated, and
Peters 2.
1820
Wkston et ai,. V. The City Council of Ciiakleston.
454
454] Mr. Cruger and Mr. Legare, for tlie defendants in error, contended that a writ of error could not be sustained on proceedings in prohibition.
455] Sbould the Supreme Court reverse the iudgment below in Ibis case, a mandate will 45 G] be directed to the inferior State court. (8 Dali., 342.) In the event of the State court declining or refusing to carry that mandate 457 ] into effect, a question will then arise as to the mode of proceeding to be adopted as a remedy. That a futile exercise of jurisdic¬ tion may not on this occasion take piace, the difficulty ought to be anticipated; for if it be insurmountable, this tribunal will not, from self-respect, hold cognizance of the principal inquiry involved in the present suit.
Unless the Supreme Court acts in this mat¬ ter through the intervention of the State tri¬ bunal, it must issue a prohibition of itself, ad¬
dressed to the tax collector individually. Should he disobe3Lit will then have to proceed against him fora contempt, and inflict a tine; and thus be thrown into a course of practice unprecedented and extremely inconvenient. That it will not award compulsory jn'oeess directed to a recu.sant State court may safely be a.ssumed upon the strength of the rea.soning in Martin, v. ilnnt&r'n Lenaee, (1 Wheaton, 802). If not from a regard to the sovereignty of a State in its last refuge of the judiciary, this resort will not be had at least becau.se it seems to be negatively precluded by the 25th section of the Act of the 24th of Sei)tember,1789. That section provides for the Supreme Court’s “pro¬ ceeding to a final decision of the cause, and awarding execution therein if it has been once remaiuled before.” Whether under the.se words on the refusal of a Slate coui't to fulfll its man¬ date this court has jurisdiction in prohibition so
ought to be fully discussed that it might be better understood. It affects the use of a power, as essen¬ tial to the general government in periods of diffi¬ culty and danger, as any other which the people have delegated to it. If the city council of Charles¬ ton can tax the stock of the United States, w no¬ mine, the States can ; and if the States can, it is im¬ possible not to perceive that the fiscal operations of the general government may be completely frustrated by the States. It will be in vain for Congress to pass acts authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow money; if the holders of their stock can be taxed for having done so by the States. Congress may offer ten per cent, for loans, but who will lend, if the States can appropriate the whole to their own use?. Whether the States will do so or not may be problematical, but if they can do so, the risk of their doing so must be covered by the terms on which the loans will be made. There is but one substantial security for the proper ad¬ ministration of our governments — the nn mediate responsibility of the administrators thereof to the people. If, however, the people have or feel no intei’est in the measures of a government, its ad¬ ministrators are only nominallj' responsible; the.y will only be checked where they act in derogation of what is understood or felt to be the interest of their constituents. Remote interests are not seen by the better informed, and they always must pre¬ sent grounds for much difference of opinion, even among the best Informed. It is not a suliicient g’uard to the i lowers of the general government, that the con.stitueuts of the administrators of the State governments have a remote interest in the preservation of those r>owers, or in an unembar¬ rassed e.xercise of t hem b.y the g'oneral g-overnment. They must not be seen, or may not be understood, and the very casit before us presents a full illustra¬ tion of the truth. No government, not revolu¬ tionary, has ever attempted to tax its own stock, and among others, for two very satisfactory rea¬ sons. 1. Because such a tax must necessarily op¬ erate injuriously upon all future loans; and 3. Because there is in fact a violation of contract in 80 doing, and therefore immoral and Impolitic. Under the influence of tliese reasons, the Legisla¬ ture of this State has refused to ta.x the stock of the United States: but it appears that the city council of Charleston have thought differently, and have taxed it. Thereare, however, some very obvious reasons why the council of Charleston should be less disposed to impose such a tax than the I.egislaturo. In the first place, the city of Charleston being commercial, is more within the influence of the policy of the general government than the Legislature; if, therefore, the council of the city can believe it politic and just to tax the stock of the United States, can it be thought im¬ probable that the Legislature may do so? If they can do so at all, they may do so to any extent ; it is equally within their power to tax twenty per cent, or one hundred per cent, as one-half per cent. What shall govern their discretion, it is impossible to foresee. A State or a foW States may concur in a policy at variance with that of the government, nay, in hostility to it. This, unfortunately, has been already witnessed. They may, indeed, be in¬ disposed to dissolve the Union, and declare war;
Peter.s 2,
when the.y might have no objection to counteract Congre.ss, and control its measures by the exercise of a power strictly constitutional. Seven-tenths of the stock of the'United States are owned in the cities of Bo.ston, New York, Philadelphia, Balti¬ more, and Charleston.
The same causes which have concenti-ated the stock in these cities, will, in all probability, con¬ tinue to operate, and the greater part of future loans will be effected there. .Should, therefore, even so small a pt)rtion of the United States as these cities, unite in taxing stock to any considera¬ ble amount, the government may be defeated, and will certainly be inqicded in its fiscal oiierations, to the extent of any tax imposed. It may be sup¬ posed, that these cities would be checked in such procee<lings by their State Legislatures. Whether this could be done, must depend upon the con.sti- tutions of the States, and the charters of the cities. It may not suit the prevailing i)olicy of a State to interfere in such a case, even it it possess the power. We know, from the charter of the city of Charleston, that the LegUlature of this State can interfere and repeal the ordinance in question; this, however, has not been done, although they have refused to impose such a tax themselves; anti South Carolina is, has alv/aysbeeu, and I hope will ever continue to be, as national as any other State in the Union. It may be said, that admit all this to be true, it cannot aifect the question before the court; who arc called upon to decide what the constitution is, and not -what it ought to be. The judicial liianoh of the government most certainly does not possess the nower of legislating; much less, then, can they claim the power of making a constitution. But, in construing the constitution, they must look to tlio object.s it professes to attain, and the.y cannot so as to defeat the very end and aim of its creation, nor can they make it inconsist¬ ent with itself, if it be possible to avoid it. The general power.s of Cong-ress may be sufficiently desi.gnatod in the Constitution, but the extent and ramifications of each power, it was not in the wis¬ dom of man to foresee and prcciscl.y describe. How they are to operate and exhibit themselves, must depend upon the future contingent circum¬ stances of the nation ; and, as the.se must be for¬ ever vai'ying, constitutional questions or doubts must arise, as long as tlie Constitution shall exist. These ai'c the certain and legitimate consequences of a wiitten constitution. The numerous ([ues- tions which the statute of frauds has given ilse to, simple as was its object, may afford some intima¬ tion of the numbth', which an instrument so com¬ plicated and general in its objects as the Constitu¬ tion may be ex])octcd to iiroduce. The great diffi¬ culty is, not only in ascertaining and defining the powers wliich rcssult from those which are expre.sslj' given to the government, but (as in this cast*, and in that of the Bank of the United States) in deter¬ mining the inlluencc of these on the jiowers of the different States. In the deci.“ion of such cases, there must, at least, bo the semblance of legisla¬ tion. I am not conscious of even a desire to e.vtend unnecessarily the powers of the judiciary ; the pur¬ suits and habits of near twenty years, b.y tar the better part of my life, have given at least to my fccling.sa direction decidedh favorable to the leg-
483
457
SuPiiEMifl Court of
as to enable it to execute its own judgment, bjr inhibiting the officers personally from collecting the tax under consideration, if adjudged uncon¬ stitutional, must first be decided. If the power be wanting, nothing but an Act of Congress can supply the deficiency. The mode and forms of proceeding under the appellate authority of 458] this court are dependent upon the Acts of Congress for their regulation. (6 Cr., 307.) Although the. 14th section of the Judiciary Act gives to the courts of the United States ‘‘ pow- ei’ to issue all writs necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law,” this general grant is limited by the 25th section in the par¬ ticular instance of writs of error fi-om final judgments of State courts to “awarding execu¬ tions.” No construction of these words con¬ sistent with technical accuracy will bring a pi’ohibition within their meaning; and original
TUB United States. 1829
jurisdiction will scarcely be assumed to admit the proceedure.
The power of Congress to incorporate a bank, or even to invade the territory of a State to establish its branches, cannot be controverted after the decisions in M’OuUoch v. Maryland (4 Wheat., 316), and Osborne v. United States Bank {9 Wheat., 738); much less could their right to raise loans for carrying' on the opera¬ tions of government be drawn into question. On the other hand, it would be taken as con¬ ceded that the right of the States to impose taxes is sovereign and concurrent; and that there are no express limitations upon this at¬ tribute, except those contained in the 18th sec¬ tion, article 1st, of the Federal Constitution, as to duties or imposts on imports, exports and tonnage.
Through these mutual admissions, the ques¬ tion now to be disposed of is simply, can a
islative branch of the g;overnineiit ; when attached m fact, as I was In feeling-, to that branch, I could not but discern the importance of the .indicia] brancli of the government, and tlie necessitj' of leaving to its decisions all questions like the one before the court, though they savored of legisla¬ tion. I shall certainly not omit to do now what I formerly regarded as incumbent upon the judi¬ ciary to perform. I shall now proceed to inquire— 1st. Whethertbe tax in question be an income tax ? That it is not, appears v-ery clearly from ttie facts of the case, as well as from the terms of the ordi¬ nance. The stock of the State; the stock of the city : bank stock universally, as well as the jirofits of agriculture, enjoyed b,y those -who reside in the city, are not taxed; nor does the ordinance affect to regard it as an income tax. It is a tax upon the United States stock, eo nomine. As this is not a tax upon income, it is unnecessary to inquire if the cit.v council, or a State, have the power to tax in¬ come, and include therein the interest received on United States stock. I shall, therefore, proceed to inquire if the city council, or a State, have the power to tax the United States stock, eo nomine. The first question presented by the Inquiry is, the meaning of the term United States stock. It is, I apprehend, a credit on the got^ernment for so much money, on which they have agreed to pay a certain interest. He who has the credit is the holder, and the certificate is the evidence of the credit, and the terms on which the credit has been given. The power to create this credit is expressly given b.v the 8th section, 1st article, of the Consti¬ tution of the United States: “Congress shall have power to borrow money on thecredit of the United States.” The credit of the United States is the es¬ sence of the stock; without it the stock is of no value. The credit of the United States is a crea¬ tion of tire general government, which did not ex¬ ist until they brought it into being ; and, in the production of which, the State governments did not participate. The State could rrot ta.v it before the Constitution was formed, for it did not exist ; if, therefore, the.y can tax it now, it must be by some new power vested in them by that instru¬ ment; but there is no such power given ; thecredit of the United States cannot be taxed liy the States. It is contended that to deny the States a power to tax tnoney loaned to the general government, is to deprive them of a great resource without any ade- (iuate object. In the first place, I must observe that if the States cannot tax the stock of the United State.s, the general government will be able to borrow on better terms, and in this wav the people of the United States will be compensated for any inconvenience that might result from the e.xemption of the stock from the taxation of the Slate governments. In the second place, I must repeat, they have no cause to complain, because it is a creation of the general government which the States did not possess before its establishment. But on this subject I cannot but think that a very erroneous opinion prevails. It appears to be thought that for ever.v thousand dollars loaned to the general government, so much taxable prop¬ erty has been withdrawn from the States. But this is eprtainl,v not so. Of the one hundred mill¬ ions of dollars loaned to the general government,
484
during the late war, how much of it remains with the government? Not one cent. Where, then, is it? Certainly in the States. If a certain number of individuals paid it into the Treasury of the United States, the government has returned it to individuals living in the different State.s; and if liable to taxation at all, can now be ta.xed by the States. If the general government had been for¬ eign to the State governmeiits, or had they hoarded it up, this objection might have had some force ; but as fast as they got it. they returned it, and no means of the State governments were affected, but an Increased difficulty in borrowing money, owing to the competition of the general government. One of the great objects of the Con.stitution was to render the genei'al governmentindependent of the State governments for those pecuniary means which are necessary to effect the great purpose for which it was established, viz., to form a more per¬ fect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tran¬ quility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, &c., &o. If, however, means so essential in periods of distress and danger, as loans, can be controlled b3' the States, Congress is yet essentiall.v dependent uiion the States. There is another objection to this tax. I regard it as a violation of the contract made with the holders of the United States stock. The people of the United States, of whom the citizens of Charleston are a part, have contracted to pay so much ])«• centum on the stock by their agents, the general govern¬ ment. To authorize the citizens of Charleston to deduct a part from the interest agreed upon, thej' must possess the power of altering the contract, without the consent of the holders of the stock, which would be a violation of the oblig'ation of the contract. Btit the Constitution expressly declares that they shall not violate the obligation of con¬ tract.
To recapitulate my objections to the tax, thej- are :

1. Because a tax upon stock of the United States,

CO nomine, is a tax upon the credit of the United States.

2. Because the credit of the United States was

not a subject for taxation by the States, anterior to the adoption of the Constitution; the credit of the United States being a result of the establish¬ ment of the government of the United States ; and the Constitution has given no new powers to the State g'overnments.

3. Because the objects of taxation by the State

governments are not diminished bj' withholding from them the power of taxing stock of the United States; as the monej' borrowed by the United States is immediately, by disbursements, returned to the people of the different States.

4. Because it renders the genei'al government

dependent upon the discretion of the State gov¬ ernments, for one of its essential means in accom¬ plishing the purposes for which it ivas established, a result at variance with one of the principal ob¬ jects of the Constitution, which was to render the general government independent of the pecuniary aid of the State governments.
And lastl^q because it is a violation of the oblig'a¬ tion of contract.
Peters 2.
1829
Weston et al. v. Tub City Councii- of Charleston.
458
State constitutionally tax the income accruing to its citizens from six and seven per cent. stock of the United States owned by them individu¬ ally?
The purpose of plaintiffs in error is to make out by implication a restriction upon a sover¬ eign and vital, though a concurrent State right. This is attempted upon substantially three grounds: 1st. That the tax in dispute is a vio¬ lation of the faith and obligation of a con¬ tract. 2d. That the credit of the United Stales upon which it bears did not exist until after the Constitution was framed. And 3d, because it interferes with the means of the federal government necessary to carry their powers in¬ to effect. •
As to the first objection, certainly if the United States were to impose a tax going to diminish the interest it had stipulated to pay the imrchasers of this stock, such a measure 4f59] would be a violation of faith. But the reason does not hold as to a third person, not a party to the contract; and in this light the State of South Carolina stands; for her faith is pledged as an integral part of the Union in this respect only, quoad federal taxation. She has come under no obligation individually, not to draw her resources from these funds, though emanating from the common authority whenever they pass into the hands of her pe¬ culiar citizens; and it may be presumed that the liability of this stock so situated to State taxation, was perfectly understood by those who became holders and entered into their contract wuth the general government. x\.s well might a tax imposed by a State on the pub¬ lic lands within its limits when sold out to pri¬ vate persons be treated as a departure from good faith and a violation of the contract of sale, for here, as much as where public stock is created and sold, a State is a party to the engage¬ ment that no more than a certain price is to be paid for the property, and that its profits are not to be diminished. It is said, however, that where lands are sold, the United States parts with the freehold with no prospect of resump¬ tion, and that it is otherwi.se with stock. Yet in point of fact the only difference is between the real and personal property of the govern¬ ment, for in the case of a sale of the former on credit, liable to a foreclosure of mortgage, there will be a chance of its reverting to the public domain; and surely it will not be ex¬ empted from State taxation until the first cent of the price is paid off.
It is next said that this stock con.stitutes the credit of the Union which, not having exi.sted anterior to the adoption of the Constitution, cannot be subjected to State taxes unless by vir¬ tue of some provision in that in.strument. This reason, if of any avail, wull go to exonerate all the territories and other property of the United States acquired subsequently to that epoch; and failing of that result, must be discarded al¬ together.
The objection most strongly urged, how¬ ever, against this ordinance, is that it interferes with a law of the general government, whiclj, being supreme, must predominate, and it is roundly laid down that “should any State 400*] directly or indirectly ^modify, alter or abridge any of the acts of sovereignty of the United States, or render any of its measures
Peters 2.
nugatory or inoperative, or in an}^ manner im¬ peach the credit or impair the re.souices of the Union by taxation or otherwise, the act would be an interference repugnant to the Constitution,” and that “a State cannot tax any of the con¬ stitutional means employed by the government of the United States to execute its constitutional powers;” “ nor can it, by taxation or otherwise, retard, impede, burden, or in any manner con¬ trol the operation of the constitutional laws en¬ acted by Congress to carry into effect the [low¬ ers vested in the national government.”
Throughout this dlscus.sion the State has been treated of as in an antagonist position to¬ wards the federal government, and as seeking [uirposely to incommode and destroy its fiscal operations; while the direct effect of these up¬ on the resources of the State has been allowed no consideration. The ordinance in question is assumed to be a measure passed expressly to countervail and defeat a law of Congress. But it is nowhere demonstrated that a tax on this stock owned by individuals will be attended by any such consequence. Tlip utmost that ma.}' ensue will be a prejudice to the preference of this stock in market, and perhaps the citizens ofthe State imposing the tax may find it more profitable to invest their capital otherw'ise. This creates a question of policy, at the dis¬ cretion of the State alone, wdiether it will drive abroad a particular means of speculation ; but the reflection is beside the constitutional in¬ quiry now agitated.
The position broadly taken here is that if the exercise of a concurrent power by a State in¬ terferes wuth a power of the general govern¬ ment, the former must give way. What is the extent of interference which is to be thus re¬ sisted? and how is this interference to be graduated? Here it is always put as mounting to the point of destruction, and as brought into action ipso intuitu. To presuppose hostility on the part of the State is wdiolly gratutious, and greatly to be deprecated. As much may be trusted to the liberality and forbearance of a State, as of the federal government; and *comity and cordial confidence should [*401 characterize all their relations. All the reason ing in this case is against the abuse of a con¬ ceded State right, and it is founded upon a quia timet, and its materials are extremes. Not even a surmise is thrown out that this tax has, in point of fact, impeded, much less frustrated a fiscal operation of government; but it is said that if the power it involves were pushed further it might have that effect; and that as it is without any limit or control save the discre¬ tion of a State, no guarantee against its abuse short of aliolition should be accepted. This is in a .strain of ho.stility that well W'arrants the interrogatory, why should an unprescrlptible sovereign and indispensable right of a State be postponed and put in derogation in favor of an implied, auxiliary and optional means (>t the general government? Is not the power to msethis means also a power to destroy, and alike unlimited?
The general government, by carrying their power to extremes in the creation of exten.sive loans, might furnish facilities of exempt invest¬ ment, that w'ould entirely ab.sorb from the reach of Slate taxation all the funds of its citi¬ zens, and thus destroy one of its highest pre-
486
461
Supreme Courp op phe United htates.
1829
rogatives and very existenee. If the possible abuse of tlie power to tax by a State, is to in¬ fringe upon the right, the like objection will assuredly attach to the power of borrowing on the part of the United States. In answer to this a suggestion has been made, that the gen¬ eral government does not hoard up its revenue, but immediately re-instates bj^ expenditure, all that has been substracted from the resources of a State. This is only partially true, and yields but indifferent consolation, and affords occasion for another most forcible impeachment of the prevailing system of internal improvements, and other government expenditure of the pub¬ lic money. By the supposed operation the Southern States not only have their capital drawn off from local taxation, but in the exist¬ ing state of things supply another means of conferring benefits, or rather gratuities, in which they have no participation.
The doctrine that interfei'ence with federal power will suffice, by implication, to neutralize, or even annihilate State rights, is .startling in 402] itself, and most pernicious when car- ried out to its legitimate results. The degree of interference being entirely unsettled, and incapable of adjustment, however slight *or shadowy it may be, the objection can never be started but to a fatal is.sue. Indeed, it will go to abolish all power in the States, under some circumstances, to levy and collect taxes. In the event of a resort to direct taxation, on the part of Congress, whatever is .subjected to federal assessment, mu.st, ijiso .facto, be discharged from all other impo.silion; inasmuch as a tax by a State, on any given article, must necessa¬ rily diminish its capacity of bearing other exac¬ tions, and, if carried to excess, must frustrate any attempt on the part of the general govern¬ ment to raise a revenue from the same sources. In fact, there are but few powers reserved to the States that, upon the possibility of abuse, may not be brought under the ban of interfer¬ ence with federal mea.sures.
In the case of Bulow et al v. The City Coun¬ cil of Charleston (1 Nott & M’Cord, 527), it has been decided that United States bank stock, in the hands of individuals, may constitutionally be taxed by a State. And in M'dallmigh v, Mctryland, it is admitted, that the principle there ascertained “ does not extend to a tax paid bj^ the real property of the Bank of the United States, in common with the other real property in a particular State, nor to a tax imiiosed upon the proprietary interest which the citizens of that State maj^ hold in this institution, in com¬ mon with other property of the same descrip¬ tion throughout the State,” and that, “as to the bank stock belonging to its own citizens, it still continues liable to State taxation, as a por¬ tion of their individual property in common with all other private property in the State.” The stock brought under contribution by the city ordinance now attacked, comes within this exception. When taxed it had been sold out by government, and wa.s in the hands of indi¬ viduals, who.se proprietary interest in the fund was subjected in common with property of a similar (lescription. The tax here assessed was not in the nature of a penalty on lending to the United States, being neither excessive nor dis¬ criminating, If charged on the stock, eo no-
486
mine, the name was inserted in *the
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ordinance merely as a description of one among several sources, from whence the income of the citizens might arise on which it w^as to bear. The words of the ordinance evince clearly that this species of property was not singled out for prescription, or a sinister purpose, as various others are enumerated ; and if an exception is made in favor of stock of the United States Bank, and of local institutions, motives of ex¬ pediency, or the fact that a bonus had been paid in commutation of taxes, pi’obably influ¬ enced the departure from, while they recog¬ nized the existence of the general rule.
This ta:^, then, is not obnoxious to the objec¬ tions urged against it, and b(flng upon the in¬ terest held by individuals in the funded debt of the .United States, in common with other property of the same description in South Car¬ olina, it comes within the exception made in the leading case decided by this court upon the subject, and the ordinance imposing it is con¬ stitutional and valid.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court:
This case wms argued on its merits at a pre¬ ceding term ; but a doubt having arisen with the court respecting its jurisdiction in cases of prohibition, that doubt was suggested to the bar, and a re-argument was requested. It has been re-argued at this term.
The power of this court to revise the judg¬ ments of a (State tribunal, depends on the 25th section of the Judicial Act. That section enacts “that a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had,”, “where is drawn in question the validi- tj^ of a statute or of an authority exercised un¬ der any State, on the ground of their .being- repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or law^s of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity, ” may be re-exam¬ ined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States.”
In this case the city ordinance of Charleston is the exercise of an “authority under the State of South Carolina,” *“ the validity of
which has been drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,” and “ the decision is in favor of its validity.” The question , therefore, vdiich was decided by the Constitutional Court, is the verj^ question on which the revising power of this tribunal is to be e.xercised, and the only inquiry is, whether it has been decided in a case described in the section wdiich authorizes the writ of error that has been aw-arded. Is a writ of prohibition a suit?
The term is certainly a very comprehensive one, and is understood to apply to any proceed¬ ing in a court of justice, by which an individ¬ ual pursues that remedy in a court of justice which the law affords him. The modes of pro¬ ceeding may be various, but if a right is litigat¬ ed between parties in a court of justice, the proceeding by which the decision of the court is sought, is a suit. The question betw'een the parties is precisely the same as it would have been in a writ of replevin, or in an action of trespass. The constitutionality of the ordi-
Peters 2,
464
■Weston et ai,. v. The City Councie op Charleston.
1829
uauce is contested; the party aggrieved hy it applies to a court; and at his suggestion, a writ of prohibition, tlie appropriate remedy, is is¬ sued. The opposite party appeals; and, in the highest court, the judgment is revensed and judgment given for ihe defendant. This judg¬ ment was, we think, rendered in a suit.
We think also that it was a final judgment in the sense in which that term is used in the 2oth section of the Judicial Act. If it were ap¬ plicable to those judgments and decrees only in which the right was finally decided, and could never again be litigated between the parties, the provisions of the section would be confined within much narrower limits than the words import, or than Congress could have intended. Judgments in actions of ejectment, and decrees in chancery dismissing a bill without prejudice, however deeply they might affect rights pro¬ tected by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, would not be subject to the revision of this court. A prohibition might issue, restraining a collector from collecting duties, and this court would not revise and correct the judgment. The word “final’’ must be understood, in the section under considera- 465 ] tion, as applying to all judgments and decrees which determine the particular cause.
We think, then, that the writ of error has brought the cause properly before this court.
This brings us to the main question. Is the stock issued for loans made to the government of the United States liable to be taxed by States and corporations?
Congre.ss has power “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” The stock it issues is the evidence of a debt created by the exercise of this power. The tax in question is a tax upon the contract subsisting between the government and the individual. It bears di¬ rectly upon that contract, while subsisting and in full force. The power operates upon the contract the instant it is framed, and must im¬ ply a right to iiffect that contract.
If the States and corporations throughout the Union, possess the power to tax a contract for the loan of money, what shall arrest this principle in its application to every other con¬ tract? What measure can government adopt which will not be exposed to its influence?
Hut it is unnecessary to pursue this principle through its diversified application to all the contracts, and to the various operations of gov¬ ernment. No one can be selected which is of more vital interest to the community than this of borrowing money on the credit of the United States. No power has been conferred by the American people on theii’ government, the free and unburdened exercise of which more deep¬ ly affects every member of our Republic. In war, when the honor, the safety, the independ¬ ence of the nation are to be defended, when all its resources are to be strained to the utmost, credit must be brought in aid of taxation, and the abundant revenue of peace and prosperity must be anticipated to supply the exigencies, the urgent demands of the moment. The peo¬ ple, for objects the most important which can occur in the progress of nations, have empow¬ ered their government to make these anticipa¬ tions, “ to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” Can anything be more danger¬ ous, or more injurious, than the admission of a Peters .2.
principle which authorizes every State and every corporation in *the Union which
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possesses the right of taxation, to burden the exercise of this power at their discretion ?
If the right to impose the tax exists, it is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corporation which imposes it, which the will of each State and corporation may prescribe. A power which is given by the whole American people for their common good, which is to be exer- citjed at the most critical periods for the most important purposes, on the free exercise of which the interests ccrlainljq perhaps the liberty of the whole may depend; may be burdened, impeded, if not arrested, by any of the organ¬ ized parts of the confederacy.
In a society formed like ours, with one supreme government for national purposes, and numer¬ ous State governments for other purposes; in many respects independent, and in the uncon¬ trolled exercise of many important powers, oc¬ casional interferences ought not to surprise us. The power of taxation is one of the most essen¬ tial to a State, and one of the most extensive in its operation. The attempt to maintain a rule which shall limit its exercise, is undoubtedly among the most delicate and difficult duties which can devolve on those whose province it is to expound the supreme law of the land in its application to the cases of individuals. This duty has more than once devolved on this court. In the performance of it we have con¬ sidered it as a necessary consequence from the supremacy of the government of the whole, that its action in the exercise of its legitimate pow'ers should be free and unembai’rased by any conflicting powers in the possession of its parts ; that the powers of a State cannot right¬ fully be so exercised as to impede and obstruct the free course of those measures which the government of the States united may rightfully adopt.
This subject was brought before the court in the case of M’Galloch v. The State of Mary¬ land (4 Wheaton, 316), when it was thoroughly argued and deliberately considered. The ques¬ tion decided in that case bears a near resem¬ blance to that *which is involved in
this. It was discussed at the bar in all its rela¬ tions, and examined by the court with its utmost attention. We will not repeat the rea- .soning which conducted us to the conclusion thus formed; but that conclusion was that “all subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it docs not extend, are upon the soundest principles exempt from taxation.” ‘ ‘ The sovereignty of a State extends to every¬ thing which exist.s by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission;” but not “to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferretl on that body b}^ the people of the United States.” “The attempt to use” the power of taxation “ on the means employed by the governinent of the Union in pursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot give.”
The court said in that case, that “ the States have no power by taxation, or otherwise, to re-
48 7
467
Supreme Court op the United States.
tard, impede, burden, or in any manner con¬ trol the operation of the constituti.onal laws enacted by Congress, to carry into execution the powers ve.sted in the general government."
We retain the opinions which were then ex¬ pressed. A contract made by the government in the exercise of its power, to borrow money on the credit of the United States, is undoubtedly independent of the will of any State in which the individual who lends may re.side,and is undoubt¬ edly an operation essential to the important ob¬ jects for which the government was created. It ought, therefore, on the principles .settled in the case of M' Gullocli v. The State of Maryland, to be exempt from State taxation, and conse¬ quently from being taxed by. corporations de¬ riving their power from States.
It is admitted that the power of the govern¬ ment to borrow money cannot be ilirectly op¬ posed, and that any law directly obstructing its operation would be void; but a distinction is taken betw'een direct opposition and those meas¬ ures which may consequentially affect it : that is, that a law prohibiting loans to the United States would be void, but a tax on them to any amount is allowable.
It is, we think, impossible not to perceive the 468*] intimate ^connection which exists be¬ tween these two modes of acting on the subject.
It is not the want of original power in an in¬ dependent sovereign State, to prohibit loans to a foreign government, which restrains the Leg¬ islature from direct opposition to those made by the United States. The restraint is imposed by our Constitution. The American people have conferred the power of borrowing money on their government, and by making that govern¬ ment supreme, have shielded its action, in the exercise of this power, from the action of the local governments. The grant of the power is incompatible with a restraining or controlling power, and the declaration of supremacy is a declaration that no such restraining or controll¬ ing power shall be exercised.
The right to tax the contract to any extent, when made, must operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised, and have a sensi¬ ble influence on the contract. The extent of this influence depends on the will of a distinct government. To any extent, however incon¬ siderable, it is a burden on the opei'ations of government. It may be carried to an extent wliich shall arrest them entirely.
It is admitted by the counsel for the defend¬ ants, that the power to tax stock must affect the terms on which loans will be made; but this objection, it is said, has no more weight when urged against the application of an ac¬ knowledged power to government stock, than if urged against its application to lands sold by the United States.
The distinction is, we think, apparent. AVheu lands are sold, no connection remains between the purchaser and the government. The lands purchased become a part of the mass of prop¬ erty in the country with no implied exemption from common burdens. All lands are derived from the general or 2iarticular government, and all lands are subject to taxation. Lands sold are in the condition of money borrowed and rejiaid. Its liability to taxation in any form it may then assume is not questioned. The connection between the borrower and the 488
1829
lender is di.ssolved. It is no burden on loans, it is no impediment to the power of borrowing, that the money, when repaid, loses its exemp¬ tion from taxation. *But a tax upon
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debts due from the government, stands, we think, on very different principles from a tax on lauds which the government has sold.
“The Federalist” has been quoted in the argument, and an eloquent and well-merited eulogy has been bestowed on the great states¬ man who is suiiposed to be the author of the number from which the quotation was made. This high authority was also relied upon in the case of M’CuUoch v. The State of Maryland, and was considered by the court. Without re¬ peating vrhat was then said,-w’e refer to it as exhibiting our view of the sentiments expressed on this subject by the authors of that work.
It has been supposed that a tax on stock comes within the exceptions stated in the case of M' Gullough v. The State of Maryland. We do not think so. The Bank of the United States is an instrument essential to the fiscal operations of the government, and the power which might be exercised to its destruction was denied. But property acquired by that corporation in a State was supposed to be placed in the same condition with property acquired by an individual.
The tax on government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and consequently to be re¬ pugnant to the Constitution.
We are therefore of opinion that the judg¬ ment of the Constitutional Court of the State of South Carolina, revei’sing the order made by the Court of Common Pleas, awarding a prohibi¬ tion to the city council of Charleston, to re¬ strain them from levying a tax inqiosed on six and seven per cent, stock of the United States, under an ordinance to raise supplies for the use of the city of Charleston for the year 1823, is erroneous in this, that the said Constitutional Court adjudged that the said ordinance wnisnot repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; whereas, this court is of opinion that such repugnancy does exist. We are there¬ fore of opinion that the said judgment ought to be reversed and annulled, and tlie cause re¬ manded to the Constitutional Court for the State of South Carolina, that farther proceed¬ ings may be had therein according to law'.
*Mr. Justice Johnson, dissentiente.
Entertaining dift’erent views on the questions in this cause from the majority of the court, and wishing generally that my reasons for my opinions on constitutional questions should ap¬ pear, where they cannot be misunderstood or misrepresented, I will briefly state the ground upon which I di.ssent from the decision now rendered.
On the first point I am of opinion that the cause is not one within either the letter or the policy of the 2oth section of the Judiciary Act.
That the suggestion and motion to obtain a prohibition is a suit in its general sense, cannot be questioned ; but that is not enough to give this court jurisdiction ; it must be a suit within the meaning and policy of the law which gives this writ of error. The words of the 25th sec-
Peters 2.
1829
Weston et al. v. Tue City Council oe Charleston.
470
tioii iU'c, “ a final judgment or decree on any suit;” from which I think it unquestionable that it must be a suit capable of terminating in a final judgment or decree. Now, a prohibition, especially where it is refused, as in this case, is not final, and concludes nobody. If the party against which it was prayed goes on to carry into effect an unconstitutional law, he to whom it was refused is at liberty to bring his action of trespass, and tlie refusal of the prohibition would be no bar to his recovery.
Indeed, in cases of prohibition, there is no consideratum e.sT, no judgment entered, except, as well as I can recollect, in two cases: in that where it is first granted and then dissolved, and a writ of consultation awarded authorizing the defendant to proceed; and in the case where the promovcnt is ruled to declare, and the cause goes on to judgment in the usual form. When it is refused there is never a judgment entered, nor where it is granted in ordinary cases; and hence it is laid down generally that no writ of error lies in prohibition. There is no ground that I can perceive, to suppose that Congress intended any^ innovation in the ordinary rules of law as to suing out writs of error. Ou the contrary, in authorizing a writ of error to a final judgment iu so many words, the legal conclusion is that they^ need not to adhere to the rule that a wi it of error can only issue to re¬ cover a judgment as technically understood. 471] Again, the suit to w'hich this section
has relation must be a suit iu which this court possesses or can exercise the power to enter judgment and award execution; because the latter part of the 25th section enacts, “ that the Supreme Court may at their discretion, if the cau.se shall have been once remanded before, proceeil to a final decision of the same, and award execution. Now, if the term “execution” here be taken in its ordinary technical mean¬ ing. this is not a case in which it can issue; the sole object of this prohibition being to stay the proceedings of the city council and city' sheriff' under the law complained of; and if the i.ssu- ing of a prohibition be considered as coming within the meaning of execution as here used, then this court has no power to issue a prohi¬ bition to a State, court, or State officer. Con¬ gress has not pretended to vest in it such authority. And I am well .satisfied that this power has been withheld from the courts of the LTnited States ex indtiatrid. For every provis¬ ion in the Constitution and the uniform policy of the government, have been to prevent the immediate action of the one government upon the constituted authorities of the other, a col¬ lision which it was a leading object in the Con¬ stitution to avoid, because its effects were un¬ avoidably and fully anticipated.
If it be asked, or has been argued, wliy may not this court xnoceed as far as it can proceed, and reverse the judgment of the State court, or enter a judgment for a prohibition, though it cannot Issue it? I answer, simply because the case w'ants tho.se distinctive features which are necessary to make out a case for the interfer¬ ence of this court under the 25th .section. And I cannot imagine that the Legislature would place this court in the unenviable dilemma of thus as.suming ungranted powers, or of exer¬ cising jurisdiction iu a ca.se over which it could assume no coercive power.
Peters 2.
Hence I conclude, that neither the letter nor the policy of the law .sanctions us in exercising this jurisdiction. Nor is there the least neces¬ sity for it, since every beneficial end may be answered, when individuals are brought into controversy, by^ the ordinary proceedings under an unconstitutional *law; and until
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this conflict of interest arise from the actual execution of process, the law remains a mere “ hrutum fulmen.”
My' views of the question of jurisdiction would exempt me from the necessity of giving an opinion on the constitutionality of the case under consideration. But I have no objection to oxpre.ssing my opinion upon this que.stion.
If I could bring my.self to consider this ques¬ tion in the form in which it is considered by the majority of the court. I should certainly concur in the opinion that the tax was uncon¬ stitutional. For, the exercise of a power which, under the mask of imposing a tax, may defeat or impede the operation of the government of the United States in borrowing money, could not be tolerated. But I am strongly impressed with the opinion that the record does not authorize this state of the ques¬ tion. It is true the act of the city council of Charleston, which imposes this tax, is most clumsily worded. But I think it clear that, taken together, the object is to impose an in¬ come tax. This, I think, is necessarily inferred from the fact that the tax is not imposed upon money at interest generally, but only on so much as the individual has at interest above what he owes or pays an interest upon. The operation of this is to charge no more than his clear income from money at interest. It is ob¬ jected that they make discriminations, and ex¬ empt from taxation State stock, city stock, and stock of their own chartered banks. But then they exempt, also, stock of the United States Bank; and there can be no better proof de¬ manded to show that the law is conceived in the spirit of fairness, with a view to revenue, and no masked attack upon the powers of the general government. Had they, in fact, taxed any one of these excepted objects, we should have had the law brought up here as a violation of the obligation of contracts; since the statute books of the State will show that all their banks, with the exception of the State bank, have paid a bonus to the State. And it wouhl have been impossible to tax the State bank, be¬ cause the stock is altogether owned by the State, and the laws of the council are subject to be repealed by the State.
*As to the specification of six and [*47 15 seven per cent, stock of the United States as objects of taxation, this also admits of an ex¬ planation, showing that the council acted in the spirit of fairness and candor, although certain¬ ly not happy in expressing the legislative mind. This specification became neces.sary from their imposing the tax by means of a percentage of twenty-five cents upon the capital at interest instead of a percentage on the interest received. Hence, to have brought the four and three per cent, stock of the United States under the tax, would have been unequal and unjust; and there can be little doubt that to avoid this inequality was their object.
I consider the case, therefore, as one of a tax upon income arising from the interest of mon-
489
473
1829
SupEEMB Court or the United States.
cy, a very unwise and suicidal ta.x; unquestion¬ ably, and not very judiciously arranged and ex¬ pressed; but still characterized by no unfair¬ ness, and no masked attack upon the powers of the general government. And if so, with what correctness can it be characterized as unconsti¬ tutional?
Why should not the stock of the United States, when it becomes mixed up with the cap¬ ital of its citizens, become subject to taxation in common with other capital ? Or why should one who enjoys all the advantages of a society purchased at a heavy expense, and lives in af¬ fluence upon an income derived exclusively from interest on government stock, be exempt¬ ed from ta.xation?
No one imagines that it is to be singled out and marked as an object of persecution, and that a law professing to tax, will be permitted to destroy; this subject was sufficiently explain¬ ed in M’OullocKs case. But why should the States be held to confer a bonus or bounty on the loans made by the general government? The question is not whether their stock is to be exposed to peculiar burdens; but whether it shall enjoy privileges and exemptions, directly interfering with the power of the States to tax or to borrow.
I can see no reason for the exemption, and certainly cannot acquiesce in it.
Mr. Juitiice Thompson, dissentiente. This case comes before us under the 25th section of 47 4] the Judiciary Act of 1789, on a writ of error to the Constitutional Court of the State of South Carolina, the highest Court of Appeals in that State. The question in the State court arose upon proceedings commenced in an infe¬ rior court, and the issuing of a prohibition to restrain the city council of Charleston, and all other persons acting under their authority, from levying and collecting a tax on stock of the United States, held by the appellants; on the ground that such tax was a violation of the Constitution of the United States. The prohi¬ bition having been granted by the inferior court, the order and judgment of that court were revei’sed in the Constitutional Court, there¬ by upholding the constitutionality of the tax.
A preliminary question has been raised, whether this court has jurisdiction of the case, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. I think we have not. It is not a suit within the meaning of that section ; and if it was, the writ of error is brought to reverse a judgment, refusing to grant the prohibition. And if that judgment or order should be reversed here, this court has no power to enforce its judgment, or give the party any relief or protection against the imposition of the tax. But I shall not enter into an examination of this question ; it is one of minor importance; as 1 understand this court does not claim the power of enforcing its judgment in any manner whatever, and the or¬ dinance will remain in full force, and the pay¬ ment of the tax be enforced unless the city council shall voluntarily repeal it, and revoke the order to collect the tax. The judgment of this court is, therefore, no more than an opin¬ ion expressed upon an abstract question, and in its nature and effect oidy monitoiy.
In considering this case on the merits, it is to be borne in mind that this ordinance of the city
180
council is subject to be repealed by the Legisla¬ ture of South Carolina, and not having been done, we must consider it as having tacitly received the sanction of the Legislature, and comes be¬ fore us, therefore, with all the force and au¬ thority of a State law, and involves one of those delicate and difficult inquiries of conflicting powers between the general and State govern¬ ments.
It is necessary, in the first place, that wm should understand the true character of this tax. Much importance seemed to *be
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attached to this, both in the court below and on the argument here. In the opinion of the minority of the State Court, which has been submitted to us by the appellants’ counsel as a part of his argument, it is said, ‘ ‘ this ordinance does not affect to regard the tax as an income tax. It is a tax upon the United States stock eo nomine. As it is not a tax on income, it is unnecessary to inquire if the city council or a State have the power to tax income, and include therein the interest received on United States stock. The inquiry is, whether there is any such power to tax United States stock eo no¬ mine.” This distinction being so emphatically relied upon by the minority of the court, it is a fair inference, that if it had been considered a tax on income, it would not be objectionable on constitutional grounds.
What are we to understand by its being a tax on United States stock eo -nOTrafne Certainly, nothing more than that it is enumerated as one description, in a long list of specified property subject to taxation.
We have not the ordinance at large before us, but the clause upon which the question arises, is stated as follows; All personal estate, con¬ sisting of bonds, notes, insurance stock, &c., &c., six and seven per cent, stock of the United States, or other obligations, upon which inter¬ est has been, or will be received during the year, over and above the interest which has been paid, twenty-five cents on every hundred dol¬ lars. There is excepted out of this enumeration, stock of the State, stock of the city, and bank stock. But this exception cannot certainly af¬ fect the present question. No part of the Con¬ stitution of the United States prohibits the States from exempting from taxation certain species of property, according to their own views of policy or expediency.
What, then, is the ordinance in substance? It is a tax ujDon the net income of interest, upon money secured by bonds, notes, insurance stock, six and seven per cent, stock of the Unit¬ ed States, or other obligations, upon which in¬ terest has been received, &c. It is the net in¬ terest received upon which the tax is laid. For the ordinance declares the tax shall be on the inter¬ est received over and above that *which [*47 O has been paid. For example : he who receives $1,000 interest, and pays out $500 interest, is taxed only upon the balance. It is therefore a general tax upon an income from money at interest, and this, too, only included as one item in the enumeration of taxalfie property. It is not an objection that can be made here, if any¬ where, that the tax is not upon the whole in¬ come. It is a tax, general in its application to income, from interest derived from investments of every description (with the exception men¬ tioned) and money on loan. It cannot be con-
Peters 2,
1829
47f5
Weston et al. v. The
siclercd as an exorbitant tax, or in any maimer partaking of the character of a penalty. It be¬ ing only a tax of a quarter of one per cent.
If the objection to this tax is to be sustained, it must be on the broad ground tliat stock of the United States is not taxable in any sliape or manner whatever; that it is not to be included in tire estimate of property subject to taxation; and tliat I understand is the extent to wliicli a majority of tliis court mean to carry tlie ex¬ emption. As I am unable to come to this con¬ clusion, and it being a constitutional question of vital importance; I am constrained to dissent from the opinion of the court, and, contrary to my usual practice iii ordinary cases, briefl}^ to assign my reasons.
I shall, for the reason already mentioned, consider this ordinance as standing upon the same grounds precisely as if it had been a law of the State of South Carolina.
It is not pretended that there is any express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States, which has been violated by this law.
The only express limitation to the power of the individual States, to lay and collect taxes, is to be found in the 10th section of the first article of the Constitution. “No State shall, without the consent of Clongress, lay any im¬ posts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely uecessarj’ for executing its inspection law's, &c. No State shall, w’ltli- out the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage.” The ta.x in question can certainly not fall within either of these prohibitions.
The objection to the tax is rested chiefly, if not entirely, upon that part of the 8th section 477] of the first article w'hich gives to Con¬ gress the power ‘ ‘ to borrow money on the cred¬ it of the United States.” And it is said that to permit the States to tax the stock, might, by possibility, sometimes embarrass the United States in procuring loans. In the examination of the powers of the general government under the Constitution, “The Federalist ” is often re¬ ferred to as a work of high authority on ques¬ tions of this kind ; and the author has seldom been charged with surrendering any powers that can be brought fairly w'ithi)i the letter or spirit of the Constitution. In No. 32 of that work, the writer, in discus.sing the subject of taxation, and the conflicts that might arise be¬ tween the general and State governments, says; “Although I am of ojiinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences to. the State governments, which seem to be apprehended from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of monej', yet I am -willing to allo-w, in its full e.xtent, the justness of the reasoning W'hich requires that the individual States should possess an independent and uncontrollable au¬ thority to raise their owm revenues for the sup¬ ply of their owm wants. And making this con¬ cession, I affirm that (w'ith the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they w'ould, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority, in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the na¬ tional government to abridge them in the exer- [ cise of it, w'ould be a violent assumijtion of powei’, unwan’anted by any article or clause of its Constitution. That a negation of the au¬ thority of the States to impose taxes on imports and exports, is an aflirmanc^ of their authority
Peters 2.
City Councii, of Charleston.
to impose them on all other articles. That it is not a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of pow'ers, but an immediate constitu¬ tional repugnancy, that can by implication alienate and extinguish ii pre-existing right of .sovereignty.”
The power of the general government to borrow money on the credit of the United States, is not only an express pow'er granted to Congress, but one that it must have been foreseen would be brought into practical oper¬ ation, and that stock would of course be cre¬ ated; and yet it never entered into the discrim¬ inating mind of the writer referred *to
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that merely investing property, subject to tax¬ ation, in stock of the United States, would w'ilhdraw' the property from taxation. It is said, the credit of the United States is a crea¬ tion of the general government, which did not exist until they brought it into being, and in the production of w'hich the State govern¬ ments did not participate ; that the States could not tax it before the Constitution was formed, for it did not exist. This view of the subject is calculated to make an erroneous impression. It is true it did not exist in the shape of stock, but the property existed in some other form. No one procures stock without exchanging for it an equivalent in money or some other prop¬ erty; all which was, doubtless, subject to the payment of taxes. Exemption from taxation may hold out an inducement to invest proper- t}' in stock of the United States, and might, possibly, enable the government to procure loans with more facility, and perhaps on bet¬ ter terms. But this possible, or even certain benefit to the United States, cannot extinguish pre-existing State rights. To consider this a tax upon the means employed by the general government for carrying on its operations, is, certainly, very great refinement. It is not a tax thal operates directly upon any power or credit of the United States. The utmost ex¬ tent to W'hich the most watchful jealousy can j lead is, that it may, by possibility, prevent the ' government from borrow'ing money on quite so good terms. And even this inconvenience is extremely questionable; for the stock only pays the same tax that the money with w'hich it was purchased did. And whether the prop¬ erty exists in one form or the other, would seem to be matter of very little importance to the owner. But great injustice is done to oth¬ ers, by exempting men w'ho are living upon the interest of their money, invested in stock of the United States, from the payment of ta.xes; thereby establishing a privileged class of public creditors, w'ho, though living under the protection of the government, are exempted from bearing any of its burdens. A con¬ struction of the Constitution, drawing after it such consequences, ought to be verj' palpable before it is adopted.
But. it seems to me, that the right of the States to tax property *of this descrip-
tion is admitted by the court, in the case of McCullough V. The State of Maryland (4 Wheat., 436.) The court there con.sidered the tax im¬ posed directly upon the opei'ations of the bank, wdiich was employed by the govern¬ ment as one of the means of cariying into ex¬ ecution its constitutional powers ; and in sum¬ ming up the result, it is said, the States have
491
1829
479 SUPKEMB COTJTIT OB
no power by taxation, or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws of Con¬ gress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government; and yet the court say this opinion does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in the bank, in common with other property of the same de¬ scription throughout the State.
In the case now before us, the tax is not di¬ rect upon any means used by the government to carry on its operation. It is only a tax up¬ on property acquired through one of the means employed by the government to carry on its operations, viz., the power of borrowing mon¬ ey upon tire credit of the United States; and it is not perceived how any Just distinction can be made in this respect, between bank stock and stock of the United States; both are ac¬ quired through the medium of means em¬ ployed by the government in carrying on its operations ; and both are held as private prop¬ erty; and it is immaterial to the present ques¬ tion in what manner it was acquired.
The broad proposition (laid down in the case of MoGuUoch v. The Stats of Maryland) that the States cannot tax any instrument or means used by the general government in the execution of its powers, must be understood as referring to a direct tax upon such means or instrument ; and that such was the understand¬ ing of the court, is to be inferred from the ex¬ emption of bank stock from the operation of the rule ; and the parallel cases put to illustrate the application of the doctrine lead to the same conclusion. Thus it is said the States cannot tax the mint; but this does not imply that they may not tax the money coined at the . mint, when held and owned by individuals. Again,
480 *] it is said the States cannot Max a patent- right; but if the patentee, from the sale or use of his patent has acqvured property, or is receiving an income, it could not be intended to say that such property or income cannot be taken into the estimate of his taxable prop¬ erty.
The unqualified proposition that a State can¬ not directly or indirectly tax any instrument or means employed by the general government in the execution of its powers, cannot be literally sustained. Congre.ss has power to raise ar¬ mies, such armies are made tip of officers and soldiers, and are instruments employed by the government in executing its powers; and al¬ though the army, as such cannot be taxed, yet it will not be claimed, that all such officers and soldiers are exempt from State taxation. Upon the whoie, considering that the tax in question is a general tax upon the interest of money on loan, I cannot think it any violation of the Constitution of the United States to include therein interest accruing from stock of the United States.
I am accordingly of opinion that there is no error in the opinion of the State court.
This cause came on to be heard on the tran¬ script of the record from the Constitutional Court of the State of South Carolina, and was
492
THE United States.
argued by counsel ; on consideration whereof, this court is of opinion that there is error in the Judgment of the said court in this, that the said court decided that an ordinance passed by the city council of Charleston for the year 1823, entitled, an ordinance to raise supplies for the use of the city of Charleston for the year 1823, is, so far as the same imposes a tax on the six and seven per cent, stock of the United States, consistent with the. Constitution of the United States. Whereas, it is the opin¬ ion of this court, that so much of the said or¬ dinance as imposes the said tax, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and void. Whereupon it is considered, ordered and adjudged by this court, that the said Judgment be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled, and that the said cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Con¬ stitutional Court for the State of South Caroli¬ na, that such further proceedings may be had therein as may consist with law and Justice.
Clted-13 Pet., 645 ; 14 Pet., 563, 566, 611, 613, 624 ; 16 Pet., 449 ; 6 How., .548 ; 7 How., 534, 538 ; 16 How., 409 ; 1 Black, 273 ; 2 Black, 629, 633 ; 3 Wall., 591, 596 ; 4 Wall., 112 ; 6 Wall., 47, 605 ; 7 Wall., 24 ; 9 Wall., 589 ; 11 Wall., 123; 13 Wall., 224; 18 Wall., 34, 38, 585; 1 Otto, 34, 375 ; 3 Otto, 131; 6 Otto, 436, 437 ; 9 Otto, 279; 10 Ot¬ to, 543 ; 12 Otto, 144. 418 ; 1 Wood. & M., 373 ; 5 Bank. Keg., 348 ; 3 Wall. Jr., 74 ; 3 Cliff., 353. 378, 384, 388.
*THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS
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AND COMPANY OE THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, Apellants,
V.
DAVID WEISIGER, A2)ells6.
Desease of appellee during a term.
Where the appellee had died after the com¬ mencement of the term, and the court not know¬ ing his decease had decided upon the case, after arg-ument, the court ordered the decree to be en¬ tered as of the first day of the term.
IN this case which had been argued on a previous day of the term, and the opinion of the court delivered in favor of the appel¬ lants,- (See ante, page 331) Mr. Bibb having in¬ formed the court tliat the defendant, W eisiger, had died since the commencement of the term ; stated that he had been of counsel with the re¬ spondent, but he considered that his authority had expired by his death. He objected to the entiy of a decree.
Mr. Sergeant, for the complainants, moved the court to cause the decree to be entered of a day in the term before the respondent’s death ; and he cited Davis v. Davis (9 Yes. 461), Camp- hell y. Kme?’ (4 Johns.Ch. R. 342), Asburnham V. Thompson, and 2 Mad. C. P. 529, as fully establishing the practice according to his mo¬ tion.
Mr. Bibb, contra.
The court ordered the decree to be entered as of the first day of the term.
Peters 2.
1839
482
Mandeville et al. V. Riggs.
482] JOSEPH MANDEVILLE et al., Appellants,
V.
ROMULUS RIGGS, Appellee.
Service upon stockholders of a voluntary associa¬ tion-death of a party — equity— joint liahility — service on non-resident stockholders-^’ac- tiee 011 apjieal.
Where a IhII was filed against the stockholders of a voluntary association for the purposes of bank¬ ing, and the process was returned “^served” upon some of the parties named in the bill, and as to oth¬ ers, who were uot within the reach of the process, not found;” the court stated, that it was not meant to say, that in cases of this nature it is neces¬ sary to bring all the stockholders before the court, before any decree can be made. It is well known that there are cases in which a court of equitj' dis¬ penses with such a proceeding, when the parties are very numerous and unknown ; and the adop¬ tion of the rule would evidently impede, if not de¬ feat the purposes of justice. [487]
Upon the death of some of the parties to the tiiil who had been served with process, the bill ought to have been revived against tlieir personal rei)re- sentatives, if they could be brought before the court; unless some good reason, such as absolute insolvency, could be assigned to justify the decis¬ ion. [487]
One of the great principles upon which courts of equity generally require all parties who are known and within the reach of its jurisdiction to be made parties, is to prevent future litigation, and to take away multiplicity of suits. There are exceptions, it is true, to the rule, but they are founded upon special considerations. [487]
We know of no instances where a joint liability has been asserted before a court of chancery, on which the decree has not been made against all the parties before it who did not establish some person¬ al discharge. [488]
In a bill filed in the Circuit Court of Alexandria county, in the District of Columbia, against the stockholders of an association for banking pur¬ poses, the bill was dismissed as to those stockholders who were named in the bill, but were not served with process ; and it was held to be error. As non¬ residents, the Act of Congress of the .3d of May, 1803, allows proceedings to be had against them by publication in the newspapers in the district. [489] Where an appeal from the Circuit Court to this court was prayed by a number of the defendants, and one only executed the proper ai)peal bond, the objection to the proceeding ought to have been taken by way of preliminary motion to dismiss the appeal for irregularity, on account of the failure to give the proper appeal bond. [490]
This wa,s an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for tlie county of Alexandria, in the District of Co¬ lumbia.
In that court in July, 1818, a bill was filed by the appellee against certain individuals named in the subpoena, charging them with having en¬ tered into a certain association or copaTtner- ship, called “ the Merchants’ Bank of Alexan¬ dria.” That the partnership, for a considei'able 483] time, issued notes and bills, and in other respects prosecuted their trading or busi¬ ness as a bank, until about the mouth of May, 1816, at which time they became so embarrass¬ ed as entirely to put a stop to their proceedings. The bill then alleges, that sundry notes or bills of various denominations aud amounts, issued and sent into cii'culation by the bank during its operations, amounting in the whole to $20, 000, regularly came into the possession of the complainant, and that no part of them has been paid. The bill proceeds to present other facts and proceedings upon which the com¬ plainant claimed relief, and concludes with a demand for general relief.
Peters 3.
The process was served on twenty-two of the stockholders and defendants; the whole number being sixty-one. An alias subpoena having is.sued. the marshal returned, as to the others, “not found; iiou-residents in the coun¬ ty of Alexandria.” On the 13th of August, 1818, a pluries subpania was issued, on which the marshal returned, “executed on John Mc¬ Pherson; the other defendants not found.”
In November, 1818, the bill was taken for confes.sed, as to those defendants on whom pro¬ cess had been served, and who had not answer¬ ed; and continued as to the others.
At Maj^ rules, 1820, and at November term, 1830, the suit was abated as to such of the de¬ ceased defendants upon whom the process was executed; and no proceedings were instituted to bring in their legal representatives. The an¬ swers of some of the defendants who were served with process having been tiled, depositions taken, i-eports of the auditor made, and the ar¬ guments of counsel heard, the court went on to decree the payment of certain sums to the com¬ plainant bj' the parties thus before the court; apportioning the same according to the time they became stockholders in the bank, and the periods of issuing the notes held by the com¬ plainant. The bill was di.smissed as to the other defendants who did uot answer; and also as to all those who were either not served with pro¬ cess to appear in the cause, or who were served with process, and not. charged by any evidence on the part of the complainant.
The defendants against whom the decree was rendered, prayed an appeal to this court, which was allowed on their *giviugbond and
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security, &c. Joseph Mandeville alone, of all the defendants, gave bond to prosecute the ap¬ peal.
It is uot considered necessary to state in this report any of the points presented by counsel, upon which no opinion was expressed by the court; and therefore those proceedings in the case, and matters set forth in the bill, answers, and evidence, which are not connected with, or required to exhibit the only question decided by the court, and the arguments of the counsel upon them are omitted.
The Case was argued upon all the questions presented by the record, by Mr. Jones and Mr. E. J. Lee for the appellant, and by Mr. Wirt and Mr. Ooxe for the appellee. The only points upon which the court gave an opinion were, 1. The dismission of the bill as to the absent de¬ fendants who were uot served with process. 2. The omission to make the legal representatives of those defendants who had died after they were served with process, parties to the pro¬ ceedings. And 3. The regularity of the appeal to this court, Mandeville only having given bond.
Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the court :
This is an appeal from a decree rendered in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, sitting in Alexandria, in a suit in chancery, in which the appellants were original defendants. The appellants are stockholders in an unincor- porated association, which was formed in 1815, for the purpose of carrying on the business of banking, under the name of the Merchants’ Bank of Alexandria; the nature and extent of
493
484
Supreme Court of
which association is evidenced by certain arti¬ cles of agreement; which were at the time pub¬ lished in the newspapers in the district, and are set forth in the case. The first article provides, that the capital stock may consist of one million of dollars, divided into shares of one hundred dollars each, which were to be payable by calls, provided for therein. In the other articles pro¬ vision is made for the management of the bnsi-- ness of the bank by directors, and fo)- the issu¬ ing of bank notes, &c., to be signed by the president, and countersigned by the cashier of 485] the bank. The" 15th article declares' the object of the stockholders to be, that the joint stock of the company ‘ ‘ shall alone be re¬ sponsible for the debts and engagements of this company; and that no person who may deal with the company, &c., shall, on any pretense whatsoever, have recourse against the separate property of any present or future member of this company, or against their persons, further than may be necessary to secure the faithful ap¬ plication of the funds thereof to the purposes to which, by these presents, they are lialile. But all persons accepting any bond, bill or note, &c., of the corapanj^ &c., thereby give cred¬ it to the said joint stock or property of said company, and thereby respectively disavow having recourse, on any pretence whatever, to the persons, or separate property of any present or future member of this company, ex¬ cept as above mentioned.”
The whole stock of one million of dollars was subscribed, and calls to an amount of about one hundred and eighty three thousand dollars were paid in, with money or by stock notes dis¬ counted fof that purpose. The bank went into operation, and circulated its notes to a large amount; and finally, after about a year, the bank failed, leaving its notes to an amount, as it is said, of about ninety thousand dollars in circulation and unpaid ; and having assigned all its property to certain assignees (who were not parties to the bill), for the payment of certain preferred debts, and then for the benefit of the creditors generally. These assignees have now no property in their hands for distribution. The original plaintiff is the holder of the bank notes of the bank to the amount of $20,000 and up¬ wards, which remain unpaid. The form of the notes issued by the bank was as follows: “Cap¬ ital, one million of dollars. The Merchants’ Bank of Alexandria promises to pay to C.
M’Knight or order, on demand, - dollars.”
These notes were signed by the president and countersigned by James S. Scott, who was cash¬ ier, and indorsed by C. M’Knight, in blank, without consideration ; and solely to enable the notes to circulate as currency, as notes payable to the bearer.
The hill seeks payment out of the separate property of the stockholders, to the amount of 486] $20,000, the notes so held by the plaint¬ iff. It states the articles of copartnership, and charges that the notes were issued by the bank, and that it prosecuted business Until May, 1816, at which time its affairs, either by mismanage¬ ment or by a fraudulent issue of jraper beyond its known means, became embarrassed and stopped payment. But it contains no direct charge of fraud or fraudulent misapplication of the funds, by the directors or stockholders in distinct terms. It states the assignment of the
494
THE United States. 1829
property of the bank after the failure; and charges the preferences therein provided for to be fraudulent ; but if not fraudulent, then that the trust fund is insufficient to pay the creditors of the bank, without resort to the separate prop¬ erty of the stockholders. It further charges that the plaintiff does not know whether there are other stockholders or not, than those sued, and that he has no means of ascertaining them, and calls upon the defendants for a discovery. And the prayer of the bill is, that the assign¬ ment may be decreed null and void, that the plaintiff’s demand may be paid out of the joint funds as far as they will go, and then, out of the separate funds of the stockholders ; and also for general relief.
In the progress of the cause some of the original defendants died, and the bill was not revived against their representatives. Some of the defendants put in thei ' several answers, to which the general replication was filed, and against others the bill was taken pro confesso; and after several intermediate proceedings, ref¬ erences to, and reports by a master in order to ascertain certain facts, &c., &c., the cause was finally set down for a hearing again.st the defend¬ ants who had answered, and those against whom it_was taken pro confe&so, and a decree rendered for the plaintiff; from which the parties against whom it was made have appealed to this court. The decree, in sub.stance, declares that there are no funds in the hands of the assignee to pay the debt ; that certain defendants (naming them) who had answered, do pay the debt to the plaintiff with interest from the first of Jan¬ uary, 1818, with costs; that this decree be dis¬ charged as to two of the persons so charged, by their paying a less sum, equal to the amount of the notes is, sued *by the bank, while they
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were stockholders; and as to the other defend¬ ants, the decree is that the bill be dismissed,
‘ ‘ it appearing to the court that they are either not served with process to ajipear in the said cause, or were served with process, not charged by any evidence on the part of the plaintiff.”
Such is a very summary statement of the case. Several questions have been elaborately argued at the bar, respecting the form and suf¬ ficiency of the bill, as well as the merits of the case. Upon some of these questions much di¬ versity of opinion at present exists among the judges. But as we are all of opinion that there must be a reversal upon two points, we deem it unnecessary to examine any others. Those points are the defect of parties, and the erroneous dismissal of the bill as to any of the defendants properly before the court, against whom a decree might have been made.
In the finst place, as to the defect of parties, we do not mean to say that in cases of this nat¬ ure it i^i necessary to bring all the stockholders before the court, before any decree can be made. It is well known: that there are cases in which a court of equity dispenses with such a proceeding when the parties are very numer¬ ous, or unknown, and the adoption of the rule would essentially impede, if not defeat the pur¬ poses of justice. But in the present case we are of opinion that upon the death of the par¬ ties who were before the court, the bill ought to have been revived against their personal rep¬ resentatives, if they could be brought before
Peters 2.
1820
MaNDEV1I,LE ET AL. V. TtKiOB,
487
the court, unless some good reason, such as absolute insolvency, could be assigned to justify the omission. The reason is obvious. Suppos¬ ing the decree against the parties jointly to be good, those who shall pay, are entitled to con¬ tribution from the other stockholders and their personal representatives. If they are not be¬ fore the court they are not bound by the de¬ cree ; and consequently in a subse(juent suit for contribution, they may controvert ever}'^ ma¬ terial fact upon which' the decree was founded, and put the party seeking contribution to the full proofs of them, as well as of the responsi¬ bility over, of the party sued. One of the gi-eat principles upon which courts of equity gcneral- 488] ly require all per.sous who are known, and within the reach of its jurisdiction, to be made parties, is to prevent future litigation, and to take away multiplicity of suits. It is a matter of justice, as well as of convenience, that all the parties who are ultimately liable to contribution, should, when practicable, be brought before the court, so that the equities between them may be adjusted as well as the right of the plaintiff. There are exceptions, it is true, to the rule, but they are founded upon special considerations; such, as where a decree of contribution would be useless, or where the proceeding would defeat the jurisdiction of the court, and the parties are not indispensable to a decree, or where the convenient administration of justice forbids it in the particular case.
This reasoning applies with far more force to the dismissal of the bill as to the defendants, who were before the court,and who were liable to a decree as stockholders. It is a positive in¬ jury to the defendants; who are charged by the decree, not only as to their immediate re¬ sponsibility, but as to the means and proofs of contribution. The decree of dismissal, so far from aiding the other defendants, puts them to the absolute neces.sity of instituting a new suit for contribution, and to establish every step in its progress by plenary evidence. We know of no instance, where a joint liability has been as¬ serted before a court of chancery, in which the decree has not been made against all the parties before it who did not establish some personal discharge.
' If the bill had been dismissed against those persons only who appeared and answered, and whose liability was not proved by the evidence there would have been no difliculty. But it is dismis.sed as to all the defendants who did not answer the bill, and against whom the bill was taken as confessed, and set for a decree. Now, if these persons were duly brought be¬ fore the court, and if due proceedings were afterwards had against them they certainly were jointly chargeable with the other defendants, upon their own default as in cases of confes¬ sion.
It is no answer to this objection, that no ex¬ ception was taken at the hearing for the want of proper parties. The objection we are now 489]considering is not merely,that theprop- er parties were not before the court, but that the bill, being set down for a hearing, as to those who had answered, and also as to those against whom it had been taken as confessed, the court has decreed against a part only; when it ought to have decreed against the whole, who were chargeable as stockholders. Peters 2.
The proper parties for such a decree were be¬ fore the court, and the error was in dismissing the bill as to any of them. It has been also said that the decree of dismi.s.sal, if an error, is only to the prejudice of the plainliff. But this is not admitted. It was prejudicial to the rights of all the defendants, who were charged bj'^ the decree.
We are also of oj)inion, that assuming that the cause might be properly brought to a hear¬ ing as to the parties before the court, the decree WEIS erroneous in dismissing the bill eis to any of the defendants named in the bill as stock¬ holders, upon whom process Wiis not served ; if by any proceedings they could have been bi'ought before the court before ii final decree. They were known to the phuntiff when he brought his bill, and were named therein ; and the other defendants, in proceeding to a hear¬ ing, cannot be understood to waive any fur¬ ther proceedings against them. If they were non-residents, .still the Act of Congress of the 3d of May, 1802, allows proceedings to be had against non-residents by publication in the newspapers in the district ; and no reason is as¬ signed why such a proceeding might not have been effectual to bring them before the court in the present case. W e give no opinion what would have been the case, if they had not been named in the bill, or had not fippeared by the bill to have been known to the plaintiff at the time of filing it. But as they were known and named, the same reasons apply to them as to the other defendants before the court and their personal representatives.
It was asserted at tlie argument that the bill had also been dismissed as to some of the de¬ fendants, who had answered find admitted themselves liable as stockholders. Upon exam¬ ining their answers, it is manifest that they were nominal stockholders only, their names having been used without their consent, or un¬ der circumstances which demonstrate that they *never meant to become stockholders.
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And no attempt was made at the hearing to charge them with any other proofs. As to them, therefore, the dismissal was properly de¬ creed.
An objection was taken at the argument, as to the regularity of the appeal, it having been claimed by all the defendants against whom the decree was made, and the appeal bond having been ,given by Mandevilleonly. The objection, if it had been material in this case, ought to have been taken by way of preliminary motion to dismiss the appeal for irregularity, on ac¬ count of the failure to give the proper appeal bond. But it is not material in this case, since if Mandeville be considered the only appellant, the error of the decree is equally fatal, and consequentially re-iustates the cause, discharged of that decree, as to all his co-defendants.
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the decree must be reversed, and the cause re¬ manded to the Circuit Court with directions to have the cause re-iu.stated, as to all the defend¬ ants as to whom the bill was ttikcn as confe.ssed, and dismiisaed at the hearin.g; and with direc¬ tions also that the personal representatives of the parties to the bill, who died during the pendency of the suit, if they are known, can !)'■ brought before the court to be also made parties; find iilso with directions, tluit all the
. 495
490
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
other defendants named in the hill, who were not served with process, hut against whom farther proceedings may be had to bring them i)efore the court (as to whom the bill was dis¬ missed at the hearing), be brought before the court, if practicable, as parties; and that there¬ upon such farther proceedings be had as to justice and equity may appertain.
This cause came on to be heard on the tran¬ script of the record from tlie Circuit CouiT of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Alexandria, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that there is error in the decree of the said Circuit Court in dismissing the bill against the de¬ fendants upon whom process was not served,
and also *againstthe defendants against whom the bill was taken pro corifesso, and set down for a hearing; and also error in the said court in not requiring the said suit to have been revived before said decree against the personal representatives of the parties thereto, who were served with process, and died during the pendency of the said suit, who wdiere knowm, and might have been brought before the court. It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled, and that the cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to cause the same to be re-instated as to the defendants aforesaid against whom the bill was taken pro confesso and set down for a hearing, and by the decree dismissed. And also w'ith directions that the personal representatives of the defendants, who died pending the suit, who are known and maj' be brought before the said Circuit Court, be made parties thereto, and the bill be levived as to them.
492] THE BANK OF HAMILTON, Plaintiff in Error,
V.
THE LESSEE OF AMBROSE DUDLEY, JUN., Defendant.
Repeal of Ohio Act regarding sale of real estate of intestate — acts of a court of record rrune pro tunc — administrator s-^udiciary — righttojury trial — practice.
Proceedings for the sale of the real estate of an Intestate, for the payment of debts, were com¬ menced before the repeal of the Act of che Legisla¬ ture of Ohio, entitled “ A law for the settlement of intestates’ estates.” The administators, notwith¬ standing the repeal, went on to sell the laud, and appropriate the proceeds to the discharge of the debts of the intestate. Held, that the sale was void.
The power of the inferior court of a State to make an order at one term as of another, is of a character so peculiarly local, a proceeding so necessai ily de¬ pendent on the .iudgment of the revising tribunal, that the judgment of the same is considered au¬ thority, and this court is disposed to conform to it. [5221
That a court of record, whose proceedings aie to be proved by the record alone, should, at a subse¬ quent term, determine that an order was made at a ptevious term, of wtiich no ti-ace could be I'omid on its records, and that, too, after the repeal of the
496
law which gave authority to make such an order, is a proceeding of so much delicacy and danger, which is liable to so much abuse, th.at some of the court question the existence of the power. [.522]
Where administrators, acting under the provis¬ ions of an Act of Assembly of the State of Ohio, were ordered by the court, vested by the law with the power to grant such order, to sell real estate, and before the sale was made the law was repealed, the iiowors of the administrators to sell terminated with the repeal of the law. [523]
The lands of an intestate descend not to the ad- miuistator, but to the heir ; they vest in him, liabie to the debts of his ancestor, and subject to lie sold for those debts. The administrator has no estate in the land, but a power to sell under the authority of the Court of Common Pleas. This is not an in¬ dependent power, to be exercised at discretion, when the exigency in his opinlim may require it ; but it is conferred by the court, in a state of things prescribed by the law. The order of the court is a pre¬ requisite, indispensable to the very existence of the power ; and if the law which authorizes the court to make the order, be rcfiealed, the power to sell can never come into existence. The repeal of such a law devests no vested estate, but it is the e.xercise of a legislative power, which every Legislature pos¬ sesses. The mode of subjecting the property of a debtor to the demands of a creditor, must always depend on the wisdom of the Legislature [.523]
The judicial department of every government is the rightful expositor of its laws, and emphatically of its supreme law. If in a case depending before any court a legislative Act shall conllict with the Constitution, it is admitted that the court must ex¬ ercise its judgment on both, and that the Constitu¬ tion must control the Act. The court must de¬ termine whether a repugnancy docs, or docs not exist, and in making this determination must con¬ strue both instruments. That its construction of the one is authority, while its consti'uction of the other is to be disregarded, is a proriositioii tor which this court can perceive no reason. [524]
*This court can perceive no sufficient [*493 grounds for declaring that the Legislature of Ohio mig'ht not repeal the law of that State by which the Court of Common Pleas was authorized to direct, in a summary way, the sale of the lands of an in¬ testate. “Jurisdiction of all probate and testament¬ ary matters ” may be completely exercised \vlth- out possessing the power to order the sale of the lands of an intestate. Such jurisdiction does not appear to be identical with that power, or to com¬ prehend it. [524]
The occupant claimant law of Ohio, which de¬ clares that an occupying claimant shall not be turned out of possession until he shall bo paid for lasting and valuable improvements made by him, and directs' the court in a suit at law, to appoint 5 commissioners to value the same, is repugnant to the seventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that “ in suits at com¬ mon law, where the value in controversy shall ex¬ ceed twentj’- dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The compensation for improve¬ ments is a suit at common law, and must be sub¬ mitted to a jury. [525]
Admitting that the. Legislature of Ohio can give an occupant claimant a right to the value of his improvements, and authorize him to retain posses¬ sion of the land he has improved, until he shall have received that value ; and assuming that they may annex conditions to the change of !)08session, which, so far as they are constitutional, jnust be respected in all courts ; still, the Legislature cannot change radically the mode of proceeding prescribed for the courts of the United States, or direct those courts, in a trial at common law, to appoint com¬ missioners for the decision of questions which a court of common law must submit to a jury. [.520]
The inability of the courts of the United States to proceed in suits at common law, in the mode prescribed by the f)ccupant law of Ohio, does not depri\ e the occ\jpant of the benelit intended him. The modes of proceeding- which belong- to courts of chancery, are ada.pted to the execution of the law ; a7id to the equity side of the court he may apply for relief. Sitting in chancery it can appoint com¬ missioners to estimate improvements, as well as rents and profits, a-ad can enjoin the execution of the judgment at law, until its decree shall be com¬ plied with. It any part of the Act be unconstitu¬ tional, the provisions of tliat part may be disregard¬ ed; while full efl'oct rvill be given to such as are not I epugnant to the constitution of the state, or the. ordinance of 1787. The question whether any of its
Peters 2.
1829
The Bank of Hamilton v. The Lessee op Dudley.
493
provisions be of this description, will properly arise in the suit brought to carry them into effect! [536]
This is a writ of error to a juclgnaent rendered in the Court of the United States for the Seventh Circuit and District of Ohio, in an ejectment brought in that court by the defend¬ ants in error, against the present plaintiffs for part of lot No. 103, in the city of Cincinnati.
The plaintiff is heir-at-law of Israel Ludlow, who died seized of the premises in the declara¬ tion mentioned. The defendant claimed under a sale and deed made by the administrator of the said Israel Ludlow, in pursuance of certain orders of the Court of Common Pleas for the county of Hamilton.
494] The case depends on the validity of this deed.
In August, 1788, the territorial government of Ohio enacted “ a law establishing a court of probate. ” The first section enacts that ‘ ‘ there shall be appointed one judge of probate in each county, whose duty it shall be to take the pro¬ bate of last wills and testaments, and to grant letters testamentary and letter of administration, and to do and perform every matter and thing that doth or by law may appertain to the pro¬ bate office, excepting the rendering definitive sentence and final decrees.
In 1795, an Orphans’ Court was established, and it was enacted that where persons die in¬ testate and leave lawful issue, “but not a suffi¬ cient personal e.state to pay their just debts and maintain their children, it shall be lawful for the administrator or administrators of such de¬ ceased person to sell and convey such part or parts of the said lands or tenements for defray¬ ing their just debts, maintenance of their child¬ ren, &c., as the Orphans’ Court of the county where such estate lies, shall think fit to allow, order and direct, from time to time.”
In the year 1802, Ohio became an independ¬ ent State. The Constitution, in the article which respects the judicial department, de¬ clares that “ the Court of Common Pleas in each county shall have jurisdiction of all pro¬ bate and testamentary matters, granting ad¬ ministration, the appointment of guardians, and such other cases ak shall be prescribed by law.” In April, 1803, the judicial courts were organized; and the Court of Common Pleas, after a general grant of original jurisdiction, was empowered to examine and take the proof of wills, to grant administration on intestate estates, and to hear and determine all causes, suits and controversies, of a probate and testa¬ mentary nature.
In June, 1805, the territorial ordinance of 1795 was repealed.
At the trial of the ejectment in the Circuit Court, after the plaintiff had closed his evi¬ dence, the defendants offered in evidence a deed from the administrators of Israel Ludlow, deceased, to Andrew Duuseth, for the premises in the declaration mentioned. ‘ ‘ They also of- 495*] fered in evidence duly ^certified entries and copies of orders from the records of the Court of Common Pleas within and for the county of Hamilton, State of Ohio, of which the following are true copies, viz. , ‘ 2d of February, 1804: Letters of administration granted unto Charlotte C. Ludlow, John Lud¬ low, James Findlay, and James Pierson, on the Peters 2. U. S., Book 7.
estate of Israel Ludlow, deceased; and their bond with William Ludlow and .lames Smith as securities for their faithful administration.’ ” At May term, in the year 1804, date 8th of May, 1804, the following order was made, viz. : “The administrators of the estate of Israel Ludlow, deceased, exhibit an account current and pray the court to issue an order for the sale of real property to defray the debts due from the estate, &c. .lohn Ludlow and James Find¬ lay sworn in court. The court order so much of the real property to be sold as will meet the said demand, except the farm and improved land near Cincinnati, together with the house and lots in Cincinnati.” At the August term of the said court in the year 1805, a supple¬ mental order vnis made, of which the following was a copy, viz.: “The administrators of I. Ludlow, decea.sed, on application to the court to extend the order for the sale of property to discharge the debts arising from the estate; whereupon the court allow the administrators to sell the house and lots in the town of Cin¬ cinnati and any other property, except the mansion house and farm in the country, so that the sale do not amount to more than ten thou¬ sand dollars. This entry considered as of May term, 1805.”
It was in evidence that the sale was made agreeably to the provisions of the law adopted from the Penn.sylvania code by the Governor and judges of the north-western territory on the 16th of June, 1795, entitled,” a law for the set¬ tlement of intestate estates;” that the deed was dill}’- executed, acknowledged and proved.
The plaintiff, by his counsel, moved to over¬ rule the testimony offered by the defendants’ counsel, because the law aforesaid, entitled, “a law for the settlement of intestate estates,” was repealed before the order was made authorizing said sale, and that at the time of making of the said order there was no law of the State of Ohio authorizing the Court of Common Pleas to *order the sale of real estate for the [*496 payment of debts, &c., of intestates. ’ The court sustained the motion and overruled the defendants’ evidence. The defendants except¬ ed to this opinion.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff ; after which the counsel for the defendants moved the court for the appointment of commissioners, under the occupying claimant law of Ohio, to value improvements. This motion was over¬ ruled, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs.
The case was argued for the plaintiff in error by 3fr. Benham and Mr. Baldwin, and by Mr. Garrard for the defendant.
For the plaintiff it was said, that the defend¬ ant in error claims by descent, as heir-at-law of Israel Ludlow, deceased, who died seized of the premises in que.stion; and the plaintiff claims by purchase from his administrator.
The case is one of deep interest to the present litigants, as well as to all those who hold real estate in Ohio under deeds from administra¬ tors; and this class is numerous. Its decision depends upon old statutes which it is proposed to collate, in such a manner as to aid the judg¬ ment of the court in expounding them in refer¬ ence to this case.
These statutes will be found between the periods of 1788 and 1805, and to relate, 1. To
82 4 9 7
496
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
the establishment of probate and testamentary courts under the territorial government. 2. Their powers and jurisdiction. 3. The aboli¬ tion of these courts upon passing from a terri¬ torial into a State government. And 4. _ The organization of new courts of similar jurisdic¬ tion, and the modification and repeal of laws relating to testamentary matters.
Tlie facts of the case in reference to which the court must expound these laws are as fol¬ lows: Ludlow died the 21st of January, 1804. On the 2d of February of that year, adminis¬ tration was granted upon his estate to John Ludlow and others, who gave bond with sure¬ ties, as the law required, for the faithful ex¬ ecution of their trust. On the 10th of May,

1804. the following proceedings were had in

the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton coun¬ ty, viz. : “The administrators of J. Ludlow, deceased, exhibit an account current, and pray 497] the court to issue an order for the sale of real property to defray the debts due from the estate, &c. John Ludlow and James Find¬ lay, sworn in court. The court order so much of the real property sold as will meet the said demands, except the farm and improved lands near Cincinnati, together with the house and lots in Cincinnati.” On the 15th of August,
1805, the court made another order as follows : “ The administrators of J. Ludlow, deceased, on application to the court to extend the order for sale of property to discharge the debts owing from the estate ; whereupon the court allow the administrators to sell the house and lots in the town of Cincinnati and any other property except the mansion house and farm in the country, so that the sales do not amount to more than ten thousand dollars — this entry considered as of May term, 1806.” The ad¬ ministrators, under the above orders or decrees, sold the lot in dispute and made a deed there¬ for to Andrew Dunseth, under whom the plaintiff in errorclaims, which orders and deeds were offered in evidence in the Circuit Court and overruled.
Whether this evidence were admissible or not, will depend upon the solution of the fol¬ lowing propositions:

1. Had the Court of Common Pleas jurisdic¬

tion of the subject-matter? 2. Was it compe¬ tent for that court, upon the application of administrators, to condemn the real estate of intestates to be sold for the payment of their debts, &c. ? 3. Did the sale and deed of the administrators of the lot in question, pass the legal title to their vendee?
By the law of the territory, adopted by the Governor and judges in 1788, and confirmed in 1799 (Ohio Laws, 378-9), a qualified jurisdiction over probate and testamentary matters was confided to a judge of probate in each county. This judge had power to grant letters testa¬ mentary and of administration, receive guard¬ ians chosen by, and appoint guardians for minors, idiots, and insane persons; but he had no power to compel executors, administrators, or guardians to execute faithfully their duties. And for this purpo.se, in 1795, an Orphans’ Court was instituted, with supervisory juris¬ diction, to call trustees to account, and to re¬ view the judicial proceedings of the judges of 498] probate. (Maxwell’s Code, 81.) At the time the Orphans’ Court was established,
498
in June, 1795, a law was adopted from the Pennsylvania code “ for the settlement of in¬ testates’ estates ” (Maxwell’s Code, 90). This statute prescribes the form of administrators’ bonds, directs the distribution of the per.sonal estate under the superintendence of the Or¬ phans’ Court; and provides (section 7), upon a deficit of personalty, to pay the debts of in¬ testates and maintain and educate the chil¬ dren, &c., for the sale of the lands and tene¬ ments for these purposes by the administrator, in such manner as the Orphan’s Court “shall allow, order and direct, from time to time.”
In May, 1798, another Act was adopted, which contained a general provision for the sale and distribution of insolvents’ estates, which was repealed by an Act passed January, 1802, on the same subject. (Ohio Land Law.s, 383.) Coeval with the last-mentioned Act, a law was pa.ssed for the appointment of guard¬ ians to lunatics, &c. , which provides for the sale of their real estates, in the same manner that administrators are authorized to sell the real estates of their intestates. (Terr. Law, 120.) Thus stood the laws relative to courts probate and testamentary, and the apportion¬ ment of jurisdiction among them, and relative to the sale and distribution of the estates of intestates, minors, idiots, &c., up to the adop¬ tion of the State constitution in 1802. In this political transit from a territorial to a State government, the courts above mentioned were abolished, and new courts instituted with ple¬ nary probate and testamentary jurisdiction.
But the abolition of the testamentary courts of the territory did not abrogate the laws above cited, relative to the sale of intestates’ estates for the payment of debts, &c. ; the Act adopt¬ ed from the Pennsylvania code in 1795 re¬ mained in full force. What court under the State government was charged with its execu¬ tion, will now be considered.
By the constitution of Ohio, the judicial power of the State is vested in a supreme court, courts of common pleas, and justices of the peace. The Common Pleas is invested with jurisdiction of all probate and testament¬ ary matters, granting of administration, Ac. (art. 3, sec. 2), and such other cases as shall be prescribed by law. It also provides that all actions, *suits, prosecutions, rights, [*499 claims and contracts, shall continue as though no change had been made in the organic law. (Sched., section 1st.)
It is maintained to he clear, that by the words “all probate and testamentary matters,” was meant all the duties of executors and ad¬ ministrators, and all matters arising out of the settlement of the estates of decedents. The Com¬ mon Pleas was the only court, under the new form of government, that possessed original ju¬ risdiction over the estates of intestates; and it could not have been the intention to leave the law of 1795 in force without a court to execute it. A.gain, it will be seen that the constitution pro¬ vides (art. 3, sec. 5) that the Common Pleas .shall have jurisdiction “ in such other cases as shall be prescribed by law.” Now, by the statute of April 15, 1803, unlimited jurisdiction is given to the Common Pleas in all civil cases in law and equity, and all causes, suits and controver¬ sies of a probate or testamentary nature. (Ohio Laws, 40.) And the 26th section of this
Peters 2.
1829
The Bank op Hamilton v. The Lessee of Dudley.
499
Act requires the Supreme Court and Common Pleas to take cognizance of all judgments, mat¬ ters and causes whatsoever, pending in the ter¬ ritorial courts. For the sense in which the words ‘ ‘ courts of prohate ” were used, see the law abolishing territorial courts. (3 Ohio Laws, 188). The Legislature has throughout used the words “probate and testamentary” in a popular, and not in a restrained and technical sense.

2. If the Common Pleas had jurisdiction of

the subject, either as a court of general chan¬ cery powers or a court of probate, did the orders granted confer the right upon the ad¬ ministrators to sell this lot ? The order of May term, 1804, extends to all the real estate “ex¬ cept the farm and improved lands and house and lots in Cincinnati.” It is asked if this ex¬ ception includes the unimproved lots; the lot in dispute was unimproved and unpro¬ ductive. But if this order did not extend to the lots, the order of 1805 did ; whether it be considered as the order of May or August term. If it be a valid order of May term, it ends the controversy; and whether it can be so regard¬ ed or not, must depend upon the power of the court to grant it. W e affirm the order was 500] made at May term, and, by the mere misprision of the clerk, not recorded; to cor¬ rect which, it was entered, nunc fro tunc, at August term. The exercise of this power rests in the sound discretion of the court, and is in¬ dispensable to prevent a failure of justice. Amendments are always allowed where the omission happens by the oversight or neglect of any of the ministers of justice, as an attor¬ ney or clerk. (3 Johns. Rep., 443, 144, 519;
The power to correct clerical misprisions is incidental to every court of record. (1 Tidd’s Prac., 438; 1 Durnf. & East, 638; 2 Tidd, 846.)
Judgments are entered under powers after the death of the donor (1 Salk., 87; 3 Salk., 116; 3 P. Williams, 399; 6 Durnf. & E., 368;
2 Strange, 882, 1081), and also on verdicts of a prior term. (Salk., 401.) The same rule obtains in chancery. (4 Johns. Ch. Rep., 342; 9 Ves., 461, 92.) If an execution be lost or destroyed, a second will be ordered, nunc fro tunc. (3 .Johns. Rep., 443). In the case of Lawrence v. Richards (1 Jac. & Walker, 241), the chancel¬ lor, after the lapse of more than twenty years, ordered a decree filed nunc fro tunc. It may be said that this is a delicate power, and should be exercised with great circumspection. This is true; but when a court of competent juris¬ diction has exercised it, and the validity of the act is drawn collaterally in question in some other court, that court will presume favorably — omnia esse rite acta. (2 Bin. Rep., 255.)
Now, if this order can be considered as of May term, could the administrators sell under it, after the law of 1795 was repealed? For the argument, the law may be considered re¬ pealed before the sale. The order was granted upon the application of the administrators, ex- farte, it is true, the law not requiring the heir to be notified; for the administrator is often the heir himself, or next of kin, or the particu¬ lar friend of the heir, who is presumed to be careful of his rights. The order is a proceed¬ ing in rem; it condemned the real estate to be Peters 2
sold, and a .sale made under it directs the title of the heir, and judgment liens.
This order confers more power upon the ad¬ ministrators than a judgment or decree can give to the sheriff; and in *devesting [*501 liens, it is more efficacious than either. Why, then, shall it be regarded as less sacred? Acts done under an existing law are not impugned by its repeal. (6 Bac. Ab., 392; 12 Co., 7; 3 Dali., 379.)
It is not in the power of either the judiciary or Legislature to render nugatory an existing judgment. (7 John.s. Rep., 485.)"
If this order can be regarded in the light of a mere power, it would not affect the conclu¬ sion to be drawn. A power in a will to execu¬ tors to sell real estate, to pay debts, is a power coupled with an interest, and survives. (2 Johns. Ch. Rep., 1, 19; 12 Johns. Rep., 537; 14 Johns. Rep., 527.)
This court, in 7 Wheat, 114, recognizes as a lien the power of the administrator to sell real estate of intestates to pay debts, and limits its exercise within a reasonable time, which is to be fixed by analogy to the statute of limita¬ tions.
Again, if this order cannot be regarded upon either legal or equitable principles as of May term, it is urged, that as a decree of August term it authorized the sale, whether it did or not depend upon the power of the court to grant it at that time ; and this proposition in¬ volves several nice and difficult considerations, upon which the counsel for the defendant in error will place much emphasis. He will con¬ tend that the court had no power to make the order, independent of the Act of 1795, and that this Act was repealed before it was made. He will rely, to maintain this postulate, upon the following statutes, viz., an Act passed the 18th of February, 1804, “defining the duties of executors and administrators on wills and intestates’ estates,” which took effect in May, 1804 (2 Ohio Laws, 279); an “Act directing the manner of executing, proving, and record¬ ing wills and codicils;” an “Act directing the distribution of insolvents’ estates,” and an ‘ ‘ Act defining the duties of executors and ad¬ ministrators, on wills and intestates’ estates, and providing for the appointment of guard¬ ians.” (3 Ohio Laws, 173, 182, 188.)
These several Acts, did they all conflict with the provisions of the Act of 1795, are in terms prospective; they refer to future administra- tion.s, and define the duties of e.xecutors and administi-ators, in relation to the personal es¬ tate of those who may die after they take effect. Neither of them contains *any [*502 provision incompatible with the Act of 1795, but they stand in perfect harmony with it, at least so much of it as provides for the disposi¬ tion of the lands and tenements of intestates.
The Act of the 18th of February, 1804, re¬ peals “all laws contrary to its provisions,” but contains no provision relative to lands. So far from being repugnant, it rather contemplates the life of the Act of 1795, as necessary to give complete effect to its 6th section, which requires the administrator to account to the heir, after paying the debts. The Act “direct¬ ing the manner of executing, &c., wills and codicils,” repeals “all laws on that subject.” (Sec. 6.) The Act “defining the duties of ex-
495)
502
1829
SuPiiEME Court op the United States.
editors, &c., on wills and intestates’ estates,” repeals the law establishing the courts of pro¬ bate, of June, 1795; the Act “empowering the judges of probate to appoint guardians to minors,” and “ all other laws on the subject of this law.” Here the laws intended to be re¬ pealed are expressly designated, and the gen¬ eral clause was added, ex abundante can, tela, to guard against collusion. A subsequent act must be expressly repugnant to a former, or it does not operate as a repeal. tH Co., 64.) Again, the learned counsel will strenuously in¬ sist that the Act of 1795, authorizing adminis¬ trators to sell the lauds, &c., of decedents, was expressly repealed on the 1st of June, 1806, by an Act repealing certain laws, passed the 22d of February, 1805.
This law purports to repeal all the laws adopt¬ ed or passed by the Governor and judges, prior to the first of September, 1779, then in force. (3 Ohio L. , 294.) At the session this law was enacted, the Legislature undertook a revision of the old statutes; not with a view of foi'ming a new code of laws out of new materials, for the course of legislation shows no intention to change the general principles of the laws; but rather to preserve, arrange and classify them, with a view to perspicuity and certainty. It was believed, no doubt, that the committee of revision had fully and faithfully performed this onerous and responsible duty ; and that all the elementary principles of the laws repealed, had been incorporated into the new code. Under these circumstances, on the last day of the session, to prevent confusion and repug- 503] nancy, the general repealing law w'as enacted. This is a question of legislative in¬ tention. In exploring this intention, in all cases of ambiguity, the judgment is submitted to the guidance of certain familiar rules of construction. We look back upon the old law, and trace its effects upon community, with an eye to its mischievous influence ; and we con¬ sider well the remedy or policy of the law given in the enactment of the new law. Now, the liability of real estate in the hands of an administrator for the just debts of his intestate, is a sacred elementary principle to be found in all the codes of the different States of this Union, introduced originally by an Act of Par¬ liament. At an early period of their colonial history, it was a relaxation, in favor of the colonies, of that feudal sternness which char¬ acterizes the common law in relation to landed property ; and which, for reasons of State pol¬ icy, has been scrupulously maintained in Eng¬ land ; indeed, upon this principle and that of primogeniture, depends the stability of the peerage. In the United States, land has a less sacred character than in less free governments, and has ever been considered an article of trade ; and it is the policy of our laws to discourage everything calculated to fetter or embarrass ti¬ tles, or to lock up estates in families; such as entailments, &c.
Upon the hypothesis that this law was repeal¬ ed, what remedy was left for creditors against deceased debtors? They were remediless; chancery could afford none, and they had none at common law. (2 Saund. Rep., 7, note 4; Cruise Dig. title 1, sec. 63., title 32, sec. 12-16.)
Now, suppose the partial remedies of the common law existed after the organization of
aOO
the State government; which is denied, be¬ cause they are incompatible with the judg¬ ment and execution laws then in force, and in express violation of the Act of February 11, 1805, for the distribution of insolvents’ estates; still the simple contract creditors have no rem¬ edy, and tlie specialty creditors are left to scramble for priority; some one creditor, and often the least worthy — for such are apt to be most vigilant — monopolizes the whole.
Again, whether the Legislature did intend to repeal the Act of 1795 must be determined by considering as unique, *all the laws in [*504 pari materia, whether repealed or not. (3 Mass. Rep., 21; 1 Kent’s Com., 443; 6 Bac., 380, 383.)
Applying these rules of exposition, it is sub¬ mitted that not only ah inconvenienti, but from necessity, in order to give effect to the Act of the 11th of February, 1805, which provides for an equal distribution among all the credit¬ ors, the court will be constrained to say the Act of 1795 was not intended to be repealed. This idea is also fortified by the Act of the 15th of January, 1805 (3 Ohio Laws, 163), for the “appointment of guardians to lunatics” and others. It provides for the sale of their real estate “ in such manner as executors or admin¬ istrators are by law enabled to discharge the debts of deceased persons.”
The plaintiff also relies upon the general understanding of the profession, that this law was not repealed. (5 Crauch, 32; 1 Dali., 131, 11, 13.)
What was the effect of the saving clause in the repealing law ; and whether the repeal of the law could operate on an administration pending.

1. Upon general principles, if the law were

repealed, it was prospectively, and could not affect the duties of these administrators, nor their rights, nor the rights of creditors. The maxim is, nova constitutio fiiUirin formam dehet imponere, non prceteritis. Ludlow died on the 21st of June, 1804, and administration was granted on his estate on the 2d of February following. The administrators had disbursed all the personal effects in their hands, and had filed a petition to sell the real estate, upon which a limited order had been granted; which proceedings were pending in fieri before and at the time all the repealing statutes before named took effect.
By the laws in force when this administra¬ tion was commenced, the real estate of intes¬ tates were assets, sub modo, in the hands of the admini.strators; and by the Act directing the distribution of insolvents’ estates the creditors were prohibited from prosecuting their claims to judgment; by these laws, the rights of the administrators, creditors, distributors, and heirs in said estate were to be ascertained and finally settled; and by these laws the administrators had *made a partial settlement. The [*505 rights of the creditors to look to the real estate (rights paramount to the heirs), as assets, had attached; had been recognized by the court; and the administrators had instituted the only suit known to the law to enforce them; the suit was ea!-pffirte, it is true; so are admiralty, bankrupt and insolvent proceedings,from neces¬ sity; they all act under the supervision and direction of the court, at all times liable to be called to account, or subject to be removed for
Peters 2.
1829
The Bank of Hamilton v. The Lessee of Dudley.
503
omission or neglect of cliity. The administra¬ tor brings no adversary into court, but must meet all who choose to come; bis proceedings are in rem, and must be considered as entire and pending, until fluisbed upon the basis they were begun. He bad undertaken a trust and bad entered into a contract, and bad given se¬ curity for its faithful execution. By this con¬ tract, in reference to the laws in force at the time of its date, the duties of the administra¬ tor were fixed, and the riglits of the creditors and heirs were to be ascertained. (2 Serg. & Rawle, 8; 2 Binn., 299.)
If this be not true, it would be easy to point out the confusion and injustice of a contrary doctrine. Some creditors have been paid, others have received part, and others nothing. And the administrator may have paid debts out of his own pocket, as be had a right to do, looking to the real estate to he re-imbursed,&c.
To show that the repeal of the law, even without a saving clau.se, could not affect an administration commenced and pending, the following authorities were cited; Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. R., 485; 3 Dali., 397; 20 Johns. R., 212; 17 Johns. R., 208; 3 Johns. Ca., 75; 16 Johns. R., 252; 7 Johns. R., 309; 1 Kent’s Com., 419. Vide also ordinances of Congress of 1787, article 2, made perpetual by the Act of 1802, section 5.

2. The repealing law, however, contains this

saving clause ; “ This Act shall not he construed to affect in any manner any suit or prosecution pending and undetermined; hut the same shall he carried on to final judgment, and execution, agreeably to the provisions of any of said laws under which they are commenced, and the practice of the courts.”
It is asked, what was the object of this sav- 506] ing clause, or rather what rights and interests was it intended to protect from the operation of repealing power? The rights and interests which the saving clause were to pro¬ tect were all those various rights and interests upon w’hich the laws repealed had acted or be¬ gun to act in a course of judicial proceeding; it is to affect not in any manner any suit or prosecution pending and undetermined, com¬ menced under existing law^s, or sanctioned by the practice of the courts.
Prosecution is a word still more comprehen¬ sive than suit, and which cannot he subjected to technical restraints. It is not a technical term, though sometimes vulgarly used to sig¬ nify criminal proceedings. (3 Thomas’s Coke, 348.)
In addition, to show the .sense in which the words suits, actions and prosecutions have been used by the Legislature of Ohio, the court will look at Land Laws, 323. (1 Ohio Laws, 8, 11; 2 Ohio Laws, 67 ; 3 Ohio Laws, 257, 284, 285, 294.) From tliese it appears, that these words have been u.sed to embrace all manner of judi¬ cial proceeding when transferring jurisdiction, upon passing from a tenitory to a State; in the organization of new counties and new courts.
It has been said that this petition of the ad¬ ministrators for the sale of the land, &c., was pending, and that a qualified order had been granted in 1804, and that the order of 1805 was supplementary. Now, it is asked whether this proceeding did not involve rights and interests as sacred, falling as completely within the mis- Peters 2.
chiefs intended to be guarded against by the saving clause as any adversary proceeding which can be imagined. In 2 Serg. & Rawle, 8, the court decides, that all the orders of sale are parts of the same proceeding, they rest upon the. same foundation, and refer them¬ selves back to the filing of the petition. It is, therefore, considered that if the Act of 1795 were repealed, it did not affect the administra¬ tion.
It has been shown that the Common Pleas was a court of original and almost unlimited jurisdiction, and that the principle that lands siiould he assets in the hands of administrators for the payment of debts, a principle unknown to the common law, had been early introduced into the colonies, and perpetuated after the rev¬ olution by nearly all the States, *and [*507 particularly by Pennsylvania, the powerful neighbor of Ohio; from whom were borrowed not only most of the principles of her organic law, but nearly all her first statutes. Now, if the point of jurisdiction is established, it is claimed that the order of 1805, which author¬ ized the sale of the lot in question, is valid un¬ til reversed; it is res judicata, and cannot he impeached collaterally. It is not like the. order of a judge of probate or any other judicial, whose powers are specified and limited. The principle which this argument maintains per¬ vades all the cases. “What judges of the mat¬ ter have adjudged, is not traversable.” (1 Salk., 396.) A contrary principle applies only to courts of special limited jurisdiction.
It was hoped that as the defendant in error had elected the federal judiciary to decide upon his rights, he would have been content to abide by its unbiassed decision; and that if those whom he has driven to battle were to fall, they would, at least, have the consolation which in legal warfare always arises from an unshaken confidence in the learning and integrity of the arbiter. It is known that it is the law of this forum, that in cases depending upon the laws of a State, this court will adhere to the construc¬ tion given by the Superior Court of the State, upon the universally recognized principle, that the judicial department of everj^ government is not only competent to, but is the fit organ to expound its laws. But this rule, from the pe¬ culiar form of our governments, is subject to these limitations, namely, that if the exposition of the local laws by the local judiciary conflict with the Constitution, the laws, or treaties of the United States, it is not binding upon this court. To this rule, which is certainly correct, we yield unqualified approbation; but deny its application. What is the reason upon which it is founded? Why does this court, possessing so many superior advantages, yield an entire submission to State adjudication? It is not from courtesy ; but because natural justice re¬ quires it, since the local adjudication has be¬ come a rule of jiroperl.y which regulates and settles the rights of mcnm and tuum, a perma¬ nent landmark which it would be mischievous to remove. {Vide 5 Cranch, 184; 10 Wheaton. *199; 7 Wheaton, 114; 5 Johns. Rep., [*508 290; 9 Johns. Rep., 424; 6 Johns. Rep., 387.)
Even if the statute of 1795 were repealed, and had no saving clause, while the act requiring an equal distribution of insolvents’ estates contin¬ ued in force, the court had jurisdiction of the
501
508
1829
SuPREJCE Court op the Uptited States.
subject-matter and could grant the order. And the order once granted could not be in¬ validated by showing, some twenty years after¬ wards, that the court erred in point of fact, that the estate was solvent ; for whether Lud¬ low’s estate was solvent or insolvent does not appear.
This case having been continued under ad¬ visement since the last term, we are now met with a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, which, it is .said, decides the merits of this con¬ troversy and concludes this court. What in¬ fluence this ought to have upon the judgment of this court as to the law of the case, will now be considered.
The decision in Ohio acts retrospectively and annuls past transactions, and not prospectively to regulate the future acquisition of property. It is the decision of the Common Pleas which settled the law, if competent to decide upon the subject-matter, which is binding upon this court until it is reversed. The questions in¬ volved in this case, can only be decided by the principles of the common law ; even the ques¬ tion whether a statute is repealed or not, can only be determined by the rules of construction which it prescribes. If the Supreme Court had decided against the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas to grant the orders, perhaps it would have been conclusive upon this court; but it sustains thejjurisdiction. The order of 1805 is claimed to be an order of May term before the , law was repealed, entered, nuTicpro tunc, at August term: and if not valid as an order of May, it is good as a supplemental order of Au¬ gust, and relates back to the petition ; but the Supreme Court has decided, collaterally, that it was an act coram non judice. All these are questions which depend upon general princi¬ ples, and not upon the exposition of local laws, and we think we have a right to ask the unbi¬ ased decision of this court upon them.
This court will never follow the law as de¬ cided by the local tribunals, unless it be settled 509] by a series of decisions, and is ac¬ quiesced in by the profession. But it is in this case asked to yield implicit obedience to an iso¬ lated case, in the decision of which the court was divided ; a decision, too, as it is solemnly believed, fraught with the most pernicious and ruinous consequences; and which, unless the learning and justice of the profession are greatly mistaken, will never meet its approba¬ tion.
The counsel for the plaintiff then proceeded to discuss the question of the constitutionality of the occupying claimant law. The argu¬ ments upon this point for the plaintiff and the defendant, are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Oarrard, for the defendants, after stat¬ ing the case, the laws of the territory of Ohio, and the Acts of the Legislature of that State, which had been referred to by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, proceeded to say :
In construing the Act of 1803, it should be borne in mind that the Court of Common Pleas, created by it, is a limited and circumscribed tribunal in its jurisdiction; and that upon the law of 1803 it depends entirely for its exist¬ ence. If it is a court of limited and not gener¬ al jurisdiction, the distinction between them is at once destroyed, if the exercise of general 602
powers shall be deemed consistent with its lim¬ ited character.
The distinction between courts of limited and general jurisdiction should not be abolished. Obligatory effect should not alike be given to acts of a court of limited jurisdiction, when they are done within their real, or by assumed powers. If a court of limited and circumscribed jurisdiction can legitimately exercise gener¬ al powers, no good reason can be given why the Court of Common Pleas should not be sus¬ tained in assuming the peculiar powers and jurisdiction of this court. If an assumed pow¬ er is valid for one purpose and for one occasion, it is valid for all and every purpose. There is no rule of construction by which the limited and circumscribed jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas can be made so broad and reaching in its character as to embrace the orders of 1804 and 1 805. The rule of construc¬ tion applicable ^to this case is well set- [*510 tied, and has never been deviated from; it is, that the organic law of the court is the charter of its powers, and that it has no powers beyond that charter, except such as are necessarily in¬ cident to it, to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees. Such was the rule of construction under which the Court of Pro¬ bate and Orphans’ Court acted, who possessed the same power with the Court of Common Pleas, under their respective organic laws. The power to order the sale of an intestate’s real estate, by his administrators, was exercised by the Orphans’ Court only in virtue of the Act of 1795. That Act does not extend to the Court of Common Pleas, but is confined in its terms. The law of 1803 does not extend that power to them by any express grant ; nor can it be implied by any reasonable interpretation of that Act. The power therefore did not exist, and the orders are consequently "coram non judice.”
Should the jurisdiction of the Court of Com¬ mon Pleas be sustained, it will then be con¬ tended that the Act of 1795 was repealed prior to the granting of either of the orders in evi¬ dence.

1. The Act of 1795 was repealed by the Act

of the 18th of February, 1804. which took effect the 1st day of May, 1804, entitled, “ an Act de¬ fining the duties of executors and administra¬ tors on wills and intestates’ estates.” This Act strictly confines the duties and powers of ex¬ ecutors and administrators to the personal estate of the deceased; it directs how letters of administration shall be granted ; what pow¬ ers they shall confer ; how administrators shall proceed ; how they shall be called to account ; and it repeals “all laws and parts of laws contrary to the provisions of this Act.” The intention of this law was to point out and de¬ fine the whole duties and power to be exercised by executors and administrators in future, and it restricts them to the personalties of the de¬ ceased; a power to sell the real estate does not seem to be contemplated by this statute in any of its provisions, either by a direct grant or by reference to former and existing laws, giving such power ; but it repeals all laws *and [*5 1 1 parts of laws contrary to the provisions of this law. A power in the administrator to sell the land and pass the title of an intestate’s real estate is certainly inconsistent with, and
Peters 2,
18:J9
The Bank op Hamilton v. The Lessee op Dudley.
511
contrary to, the provisions of a laiv, that un¬ dertakes to prescribe the whole duties and powers of executors and administrators, and limits their management to the personal estate. And whilst this spirit continued to direct the minds of the tir.st legislatures of the State, it is a reasonable and legitimate presumption to say that whenever they undertook to legislate upon any particular subject, they made all regula¬ tions and provisions required by the exigences of the country. That they intended by this Act to define the whole duties and powers of executors and administrators, and limit them to those prescribed by this statute itself, which repeals all laws and parts of laws contrary to its provisions.

2. It was repealed by the Act of 1805, entitled

' ‘ An Act detining the duties of executors and administrators on wills and intestates’ es¬ tates, and providing for the appointment of guardians.” This Act was passed in connection with two other laws relative to the same mat¬ ter — one directing the manner of executing, proving and recording wills and codicils; and the other directing the distribution of insolvents’ estates. All of these laws restricts the duties of executors and administrators, and the pow¬ ers of the courts to the personalties of the de¬ ceased; and each of them contains a repealing clause, and the first all laws upon the same subject. If the law of 1795 was then in force, it was certainly repealed ; as it was upon the same subject with this Act. By a reference to the statute book of this year it will be seen that the Legislature of 1804-5 took upon themselves, in an especial manner, the character and duties of revisors of the laws then in force; and they adopted a system which underwent little or no change till i808. They passed a general repeal¬ ing law, which will be noticed hereafter. They passed a general law regulating judgments and executions, incorporating in it provisions en¬ tirely new, and repealed all other laws upon that subject. That the three laws above mentioned were treated and considered as the only laws in force from their passage till 1808, is evidenced 5 1 2] by the fact that the law of the 18th of February, 1808, which incorporates the provis¬ ions of these three laws into one, repeals these laws by a special reference to them as the only laws then in force upon the subject. (Land Laws, 459.)

3. The Act of 1795 was repealed by the Act

of the 22d of February, 1805, entitled, “An Act repealing certain laws.” (Land Laws, 473.) The first section repeals all the laws adopted by the Governor and judges prior to the 1st of September, 1799. The Act for the settlement of intestates’ estates, having been adopted prior to that period, was certainly repealed by this Act; and all proceedings by administrators subsequent to the 1st of June, 1805, which as¬ sumed the Act of 1795 as their basis, were null and void, unless they were such as came within the meaning of the saving clause of the second section.
The .second section provides, “that nothing in this act contained, shall be so construed as to affect in any manner, any suit or prosecution now depending and undetermined, but the same shall be carried on to final judgment and execution, agreeably to the provisions of any of said laws under which the suit or prosecu-
Peters 2.
tion may have been commenced, and the prac¬ tice of the courts.” It was contended by the defendant’s counsel, that the clau,se not only saved the unexecuted power derived under the order of 1804, but that it saved a power in the Court of Common Pleas to go on and make additional and supplemental orders ad infini¬ tum, by relation to the first. To support these propositions, it was maintained that such was the intention of the statute by a fair construc¬ tion of the terms used; and, secondly, that the Legislature had not the constitutional pow¬ er, under the circumstances of the case, either to annul the order of May, 1804, although no rights had been acquired by a sale under it, or to repeal the Act of 1795 so as to prevent the court from making new and additional orders.
In determining the correctness of the first position, as to the meaning of the saving clause, we must look to the language of the statute. The repeal is not to affect in any manner any “ suit or prosecution.” The definition is thus given of the term suit, ‘ ‘ the lawful demand of one’s right,” *or in the words of Jus- [*513 tinian, “jus prosequendi in judicio quo alicui debetur.” (3 Blackstone’s Commentaries, 116.) If a “ suit ” means the lawful demand of one’s right, there necessarily must be some one to make the demand, and some one of whom the demand is made, through the medium of a court, and these parties receive the names of plaintiff and defendant. The one complains of the violation of his rights, either growing out of contract or torts committed ; the other, de¬ fending himself against the injury complained of, either denies the contract or tort, or shows that the one has been satisfied, or the other jus¬ tified. (See, also ,6 Wheat., 407,406.)
The term prosecution, both technically and in common parlance, when applied to the pro¬ ceedings of a court, i-elates exclusively to crim¬ inals, or to suits upon penal statutes. If a murder is committed, the perpetrator is prose¬ cuted by the State. So with perjury, rape, arson, and the various degrees of felony — the State is plaintiff, complaining of wrongs and violations of her statutes. There are also vari¬ ous statutes attaching penalties in money for the performance or non-performance of certain acts — when the one is done or the other neglect¬ ed, prosecutions are commenced in the name of the State for the amount of the penalty.
But the terms ‘ ‘ suit and prosecution ” are fully explained (if they needed any explanation) by the subsequent part of the saving clause. It provides that the “ suitor prosecution ’' depend¬ ing and undetermined, shall be carried on to final “ judgment and execution.” It is wholly immaterial whether the term ‘ ‘ suit or prosecu¬ tion ” is attempted to be applied to the order of 1804, or the subsequent petition and order of August term, 1805. If it is said that the un¬ executed order of 1804 is saved by the term “ suit or prosecution,” it may be asked, who is the plaintiff in the order? To what tribunal was the appeal made? And against whom was the complaint made? What judgment was the order to be “carried on to?” Against whom and for whose benefit was the judgment to be entered? These queries unquestionably show that the terms ‘ ‘ suit or prosecution ” cannot be applied to the order of 1804, or to the subse¬ quent petition and order of 1805. But the
503
513
Supreme Court of the United States.
182»
“ suit or prosecution ” is to be carried on, not 514] only to “final judgment,” but also to “execution.” The term “ execution ” is cer¬ tainly used here in the technical sense of the word”, as applied to the final process of the court, in the hands of its executive officer, to carry into effect its orders, judgment, and de¬ crees. An execution is defined to be the “ put¬ ting the sentence of the law in force. This is performed in different manners, according to the nature of the action upon which it is found¬ ed, and of the judgment 'which is had or re¬ covered.” (3 Blackstone, 413, title Execution, chap. 20.)
Neither the order of 1804, nor the subsequent petition and order of August, 1805, can, by any reasonable interpretation of language, be con¬ strued into a “suit or prosecution;” neither was “ pending and undetermined ” at the time the repealing law took effect ; neither of them was a proceeding of a character upon which a judgment could be entered or an execution issued; they are, therefore, clearly without the saving clause of the general repealing law of 1805.'
But to this it is replied, that the Legislature had not the constitutional power to repeal the law of 1795, so as to affect either the order of 1804, or the subsequent order of 1805. It is said that by the laws in force at the “death of Ludlow, and when administration was granted, the real estate of an intestate was assets in the hands of his administrators; and that by the.se laws the rights of the administrators, creditors, distributees and heirs in the estate should be ascertained and settled. That the rights of the creditors to look to the real estate in the hands of the administrators as as.sets, had attached; that their rights had been recognized by the court, and the administrators had instituted the only suit known to the law to enforce them.”
If these orders and proceedings were with¬ drawn from the scope of constitutional legisla¬ tion, and the law of 1795 rendered perpetual, it was in virtue of the Constitution and the ordi¬ nance of Congress.
What are the facts relative to the order of 1804, and what rights had been acquired under it at the date of the repeal of the Act of 1796, that were shielded by the Constitution and or¬ dinance? It is in evidence, that at the May 515*] term, *1804, of the Court of Common Pleas, the administrators of Ludlow applied for and obtained an order to sell a portion of the estate of said Ludlow. No sale, however, was made of any portion of his real estate till August and September, 1805, in the county of Hamilton. None bad ever been offered under that order at public sale; no purchase had been made, no contract had been entered into, that was within tbe power conferred by the order. The order remained a naked authority or pow¬ er to sell ; it was unexecuted either in whole or in part; it was dependent upon tbe statute for its validity, and when that was repealed, tbe order fell with it. Tbe rights of the creditors were in no better or worse condition by the repeal of the law ; they remained as they did at the death of Ludlow, susceptible of having the lands charged with them in case of a deficiency of the personal estate If in fact the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction under the Act of 1795, and it was in force at the date of the
504
order of 1804, and in virtue of that order the administrators had proceeded to sell at public sale the real estate of Ludlow, prior to the re¬ peal, but had not finally executed the title papers, it would be a fair and legitimate con¬ struction of the repealing law, to say that the rights of the purchasers thus acquired would be saved by the reservation of the repealing law, and the administrators would, under those circum.stances, have been authorized to proceed and complete the title to the purchasers.
The order of 1804, and the rights of the creditors under it, were, at the time of the re¬ peal, as legitimate subjects of legislation, as the execution laws of the State are, which have undergone various changes and modifications without reference to the contracts of individu¬ als. (Cited M’Gorviac v. Alexander, 2 Ohio Rep., 76.)
What were, in fact, the rights of the credit¬ ors of Ludlow at his death? They consisted of debts due from him as evidenced by open ac¬ count, or by bonds or notes of hand. Now, these are the rights which, it is said, were so incorporated with, and mixed up with the laws existing at his death, that the repeal of those laws impaired the obligation of his contracts.
*These rights, in their amount and [*5 1 6 their character, were ascertained and fixed by the contracts of the parties. The right to de¬ mand, and the obligation to pay, are the conse¬ quences of contract. The repeal of the Act of 1795 neither takes away the right to demand, nor diminishes, nor discharges the obligation to pay. The amount and quality of the rights of his creditors were left by tbe repealing law exactly as they were fixed by the parties; and the obligation to pay, and the liability of his estate to answer the demand of his creditors, are as valid and perfect as they were prior to the repeal. The law does not assume that the debts due shall, from its passage, be considered paid, and the estate discharged; it does not purport to absolve the estate from the contracts of Ludlow, in any other manner than by the payment of the uttermost farthing. If it less¬ ened the rights of the creditor, and impaired the obligation of the debtor, it would not onlj”^ fill the spirit, but the letter of the inhibiting clause.
Whatever power the order may have con¬ ferred on the administrators, or whatever rights the creditors may have had, to have their debts collected through that particular mode of en¬ forcing their collection, they were all alike derived through, and dependent upon, the leg¬ islation of the country; and it is held to be consistent with sound principles, and the decis¬ ions of this court, to say, that so long as the order remained unexecuted, neither purchaser nor creditor had such vested rights under it as were drawn out of the scope of legitimate leg¬ islation. If the order itself, or the supposed vested rights of the creditors to have that order executed, were the result of the contracts of the parties, and not the effect of the operations of a law, which in no manner entered into or became a part of their contracts, they might with some propriety be said to be embraced within the Constitution.
All the arguments of the defendant’s counsel, whatever form they may have assumed, have been refuted by the very learned and unan¬ swerable opinion of the Chief f Justice of the
Peters 3.
1819
The Bank of Hamilton v. The Lessee of Dudley.
516
United States in the case of Ogdens. Saunders. (12 Wheaton’s Reports. 332 to 357). He seems 517 ] to have e.stablished, incontrovertib]y, the converse of the proposition contended for by the defendants in this case. He lias shown that tlie right to contract is not conferred by society, but is a natural original right, brought by each individal into society ; and that the ob¬ ligation of contracts is not the result of positive law, but is intrinsic, and is couferrecl by the act of the parties. The right to coerce the per¬ formance of a contract, although as much a natural right as the right to contract, yet it is surrendered by every individual when he comes into a government of laws, and this surrender imposes the duty on the government to furnish adequate remedies. The defendant’s counsel assume that the right to regulate the remedy, and to modify the obligation of a contract, are the same ; that the obligation and the remedy are identical; that they are synonymous — two words conveying the same meaning. The an¬ swer to this shape of the argument, is plain and simple. The obligation of a contract is coeval with the contract itself — it originates with the contract, and exists with it anterior to the time of performance. The remedy oper¬ ates upon a broken contract, and its otllce is to enforce a pre-existing obligation. Obligation and remedy, or right and remedy, are therefore not identical; they originate at different times, and are derived from different sources; the one flows from the act of the parties— the other is furnislied by the government.
The counsel themselves shrink from the con¬ clusions to which their doctrines must inevita¬ bly lead, and attempt to show that such would not be their consequences; but they cannot be disguised. If the rights of the creditors of Ludlow to have their debts collected under the remedial laws in force at the date of their con¬ tracts or at his death, were such as were with¬ drawn from subsequent legislation, by that clause of the Constitution inhibiting “ the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts,” and a sale could legally be made one day after the repealing law took effect, the same principle can be extended to all cases without regard to time or circumstances. The Act of 1795 would be made perpetual in the settlement of an estate. The order of 1804 would be a springing use, or power in the ad- 5 1 8] ministrators, which they could go on to execute at their pleasure, regardless of the subsequent alterations and modifications of the laws regulating the passage of lands from one to another. The power to modify the remedial law, necessarily includes the j)ower to repeal it ; and this doctrine equally excludes both.
Upon the subject of this repealing law of February 22d, 1805, another argument has been pressed into the service, of a very singular character. How'ever out of place it is consid¬ ered, still it has been urged so often, so seri- ously,and by so many different gentlemen, that it ought not to be passed in silence.
In the session of 1804 and 1805 (Vol. HI., 164), the same Legislature that enacted the re¬ pealing law, also enacted a statute providing for the appointment of guardians to lunatics and others. This latter statute passed January 15, 1805, and the 2d section contains a provis¬ ion similar to that of the law, on the same sub-
Peters 2.
ject, of 1792, with a variation of phraseology, using the word “are,” in.stead of “may or shall.” “ Out of the real estate, in such man¬ ner as executors and administrators are by law enabled to discharge the debts of deceased per¬ sons.” &c. It is urged that all the acts of the same session should be taken and con.sidered together as one statute. And that, upon this construction, the clause here quoted is to be considered as a declaration that no repeal of the law of 1795 was intended.
The answer already given to the attempt to create or set up a law, by indirect legislation of this nature, applies with equal force here. But in this place the argument is destroyed by other con.siderations. The last enactment of the same session controls the first, if they are in terms contradictory or inconsistent. If, in January, the law of 1795 was supposed to be in force, and if the reference to it may be regard¬ ed as a legislative declaration of an intention to continue it, the subsequent enactment of February expressly repealing it, must never¬ theless have operative effect. And, adopting the principle of construction insisted upon by the other side, this consequence follows: the reference in the Act of January to the existing law, adopts or revives it for *the spe- [*5 1 cial purpose declared; but cannot, contrary to the Repealing Act, continue it in force for any other purpose.
There remains one point more to be disposed of, in relation to the order of 1805. It is not denied that the order of May, 1804, excludes from its operations the lot now in dispute, and that the defendants are thrown entirely upon the order of August term, 1805, to make out their defense. As an order of August term,

1805. it is liable to all the objections made to

the order of 1804, with this additional and un¬ answerable one, that it wuis applied for and ob¬ tained after the Repealing Act took effect. It is attempted, however, to obviate this objection by showing that the order was really applied for and granted at May term, 1805, prior to the taking effect of the repealing law ; but that it was, through the negligence of the clerk, not entered till the subsequent term, ‘ ‘ nunc pro tunc.”
If this order can be sustained for any benefi¬ cial purpose, in this controversy, as an order of May term, 1805, it must be upon the princi¬ ple that a court of record is not bound to keep a record, but that its proceedings are matters which can be sustained and preserved in the minds of its officers. In this instance, it is an order of May term, only by the testimony of one of the judges, who then composed the court.
Admit, for the sake of argument, that the Court of Common Pleas had tlie power to make the order at the May terra, yet that power had ceased before the August term, by force of the repealing law, and it was as competent for them to grant a new order upon an original ap¬ plication as it was to enter this one “nunc pro tunc.”
But suppose the law of 1795 had not been repealed, and the jurisdiction of the court should be admitted, still it is contended that upon well-settled principles, heretofore recog¬ nized by this court, the order could only be re¬ garded as the judicial act of the court, from
605
519
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
tlie time it actually became a matter of record ; and the fact that the court attempted to give it an operative character, prior to its having been entered of record, by ordering it to be entered “nunc pro to-nc,” gives it no addition¬ al validity. If, indeed, tlie order had been regularly applied for, and the records of the 520*] court ^furnished evidence of that fact, and the order had been granted, but neglected to be entered by the clerk, and previous to the next term the administrators had gone on to sell, under the belief that the officers of the court had done their duty, and purchasers had paid their money upon the faith of the validity of the proceeding, it is not doubted, that at a subsequent term, it could be entered and held valid.
The records themselves would furnish evi¬ dence of the proceedings in part, and the re¬ mainder might be substituted; but its validity, as the order of a previous term, could only be supported upon the principle, that rights had been acquired in good faith, under a due execu¬ tion of the power intended to be conferred by the order. It would be to protect and make good that which had already been done in good faith, and under the supposition that the pro¬ ceedings of the court were spread upon its rec¬ ords; but it cannot be made the order of May term, merely to give color to the power of the court, and to support proceedings which took place subsequent to August, 1805.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court :
This cause was fully argued at the last term on the validity of the deed made by the admin¬ istrators; and several acts, which were sup¬ posed to illustrate that question, to which it is unnecessary now to refer, were cited and relied on. As it was a question of great interest, on which many titles depended, which was to be decided entirely by the statutes of Ohio; and as the court was informed that the very case was depending before the highest tribunal of the State, the case was held under advisement. The cause depending before the State Court, which was an ejectment for other land sold by the same administrators under the same orders of the Court of Common Pleas, has been since decided, and the Supreme Court of the State has determined :

1. That there was no law in the territory

prior to the Act of 1795, authorizing adminis¬ trators to sell the lands and tenements of an intestate.
521*] *2. That this law was repealed, and
ceased to have effect from and after the 1st day of June, 1805.

3. That the order of the Court of Common

Pleas of May term, 1804, directing the admin¬ istrators of Israel Ludlow to sell a part of the real estate of said Ludlow for the payment of his debts, did not embrace the premises in question.

4. That the pfirol testimony offered in evi¬

dence to prove an order of sale at the May term, 1805, was incompetent.

5. That the order of the said court at the

August term, 1805, was coram non judice and void ; and that the lessors of the plaintiffs could not be devested of their title, in conse¬ quence of any act done in pursuance of that order.
50t) ,
At this term the cause has been again argued, and the counsel for the plaintiffs in error have made several points which they suppose to be still open.
They contend that the repeated declaration of this court, that it will conform to the con¬ struction of the statutes of a State made by its own tribunals, does not apply to the decision respecting the order made in August, 1805. They insist that the power of the court to make this entry as of the May term preceding, de¬ pends upon the common law, not on the stat¬ utes of Ohio, and that the question is still open for discus.sion.
Supposing it to be open, they maintain that the omission to enter the order in May, when it was made, was a clerical misprision, which the court might correct in August, and enter the order as of May term. It has, they contend, the same effect as if it had been actually enter¬ ed in May; and allowing this, the subsequent repeal of the law before the sale was made, could not affect the power to sell which was given by the order, and therefore the sale is valid.
To sustain this argument, all the propositions on which it rests must be true. The decision of the State tribunal must be of a character which this court wilt consider, undoubtedly, with great respect, but not as conclusive au¬ thority. The Court of Common Pleas must have had the power in August, after the repeal of the law under which the order was made, to enter it as of May, and the administrators must have had the power to sell in virtue of the or¬ der, after the law, by authority of which it was made, had been repealed. If the plaintiffs in *error have failed in sustaining any one [*522 of these propositions, the conclusion which has been drawn from them is not supported.
The judges are not united in opinion on these several propositions, but concur in thinking that the conclusion drawn from the whole of them is not sustained. The power of the in¬ ferior courts of a State, to make an order’ at one term, as of another, is of a character so peculiarly local, a proceeding so necessarily de¬ pendent on the judgment of the revising tribu¬ nal of the State, that a majority conisiders that judgment as authority, and we are all disposed to conform to it.
But were this question entirely open, the considerations which appear to have influenced the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio are certainly entitled to great weight. That a court of record, whose proceedings can be proved by the record alone, should, at a subse¬ quent term, determine that an order was made at a previous term, of which no trace could be found on its records, and that, too, after the re¬ peal of the law which gave authority to make such an order, is a proceeding of so much deli¬ cacy and danger, which is liable to so much abuse, that some of us question the existence of the power.
In the case, as depending before this court, there is still a stronger objection to the validity of the order of August, 1805. Its language does not import that the administrators bad ap¬ plied to the court at the preceding May term, for an extension of the order of May, 1804, and that the court had granted their application, and made the order, which the clerk had
Peters 2.
1829
The Bank or Hamilton v. The Lessee op Dudley.
522
omitted to enter, and that therefore the order is now made, with a direction that it should he entered as of May. This is not its language. It makes no allusion to any proceeding in May. It purports to have been made on an original application by the administrators, in August, for an extension of the order of May, 1804. On this original application, the court allows the administrators to sell the house and lots in Cincinnati, and adds, ‘ ‘ this entry to be con¬ sidered as of May term, 1805.” The entry, on its face, does not import to be the correction of the record, by placing on it an order which had in fact been made in the preceding May, 523"'] *and which the clerk had omitted to enter; but to be an original proceeding in August, to which the court by its own au¬ thority gives a retrospective operation. If anj^ explanatory testimony could have been received in the Circuit Court, none was offered. That court was required to infer from the words,
‘ ‘ this entry to be considered as of May term, 1805,” that it was in fact made at that term, and that the clerk had totally omitted it. The certainty which is necessary injudicial records, and the principle that they prove themselves, forbade the court to draw this inference. The law being then repealed, the order was certain¬ ly coram non jiidice.
It is also the opinion of one of the judges, that had the order even been made in May term, the repeal of the law before the sale, ter¬ minated the power to sell.
The counsel for the plaintiffs in error have also contended, that the interest of the adminis¬ trators in the real estate, as trustees for the creditors, w'as a vested interest, which the re¬ peal of the law could not devest; and that they might proceed to sell under the sanction of an order made even after the law was repealed.
This is a point on which we cannot doubt. The lands of an intestate descend not to the administrators, but to the heir. They vest in him, liable, it is true, to the debts of his ances¬ tor, and suliject to be sold for those debts. The administrator has no estate in the land, but a power to sell under the authority of the Court of Common Pleas. This is not an independent power, to be exercised at discretion, when the exigency in his opinion may require it; but is conferred by the court in a slate of things pre¬ scribed by tiie law. The order of the court is a prerequisite, indispensable to the very exist¬ ence of the power; and if the law which au¬ thorized the court to make the order be re¬ pealed, the power to sell can never come into existence. The repeal of such a law devests no vested estate, but is the exercise of a legislative power which every Legislature po.ssesses. The mode of subjecting the property of a debtor to the demands of a creditor, must always depend on the wisdom of the Legislature.
It is also contended that the jurisdiction of 524*] the Court of ^Common Pleas, in testa¬ mentary matters, is established by the Consti¬ tution, and that the exclusive power of the State courts to construe legislative acts does not ex¬ tend to the paramount law, so as to enable them to give efficacy to an act which is con¬ trary to the Constitution.
We cannot admit this distinction. The judi¬ cial department of every government is the rightful expositor of its laws; and emphatically
Peters 2.
of its supreme law. If in a case depending be¬ fore any court, a legislative act shall not con¬ flict with the Constitution, it is admitted that the court mast exercise its judgment on both, and that the Constitution must control the Act. The court must determine whether a repug¬ nancy does or does not exist: and in making this determination, must construe both instru¬ ments. That its construction of the one is au¬ thority, while its coastruction of the other is to be disregarded, is a proposition for which this court can pei'ceive no reason.
But, had the question never been decided in Ohio, this court can perceive no sufficient ground for declaring that the Legislature of the State might not repeal the law by which the Court of Common Pleas was authorized to direct, in a summary way, the sale of the lands of an intestate. ‘ ‘ J urisdiction of all probate and testamentary matters,” may be completely ex¬ ercised, without possessing the power to order the sale of the lands of an intestate. Such jurisdic¬ tion does not appear to us to be identical with that power, or to comprehend it. The Consti¬ tution did not mean,and could not mean, to de¬ prive the Legislature of the power of exercising its wisdom on the subject so vitally interesting to the people ; nor do its words convey such an intent. Were it even true, which we cannot admit, that the Constitution established the ju¬ risdiction of the Court of Common Pleas in the case, still the Legislature might prescribe the rule by which that jurisdiction should be exer¬ cised.
We are satisfied that there was no error in the instruction given by the Circuit Court to the jury.
The plaintiffs in error contend that the court erred in overruling the motion to appoint com¬ missioners to value the improvements in pursu¬ ance of the occupant law of Ohio; *and [*525 in rendering judgment without conforming to that law. The first section of the Act provides that “ an occupying claimant,” circumstanced as was the plaintiff in error, ‘ ‘ shall not be evicted or turned out of possession, until he or she shall be fully paid the value of all lasting and valua¬ ble improvements made by such occupying claimant, ” ‘ ‘ previous to receiving actual notice by the commencement of suit,” &c., “unless such occupying claimant shall refuse to pay the person so setting up and proving an adverse and better title, the value of the land without the improvements made thereon,” &c.
The 2d section proceeds to direct the court to appoint commissioners to make the valuation, which had been prescribed by the preceding section.
The counsel for the defendant in error insists that this law is repugnant to the 10th section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States; and to the ordinance of 1787 for the government of the north-western territory.
This court does not think that these ques¬ tions properly arise in the present actual state of this controversy. The 7th amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares that ‘ ‘ in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” This is a suit at common law, and the value in con¬ troversy exceeds twenty dollars. The con- trover.sy is not confined to the question of title.
507
525
Stjpkbmb Court of thb United States.
1829
The compensation for improvements is an im¬ portant part of it, and if that is to he deter¬ mined at common law, it must he submitted to a jury.
It has been said that the occupant law of Ohio must, in conformity with the 34th section of the Judicial Act, be regarded as a rule of de¬ cision in the courts of the United States.
The laws of the States, and the occupant law^, like others, would be so regarded independent of that special enactment; hut the exception contained in that section must he regarded like¬ wise. The law, so far as it consists with the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Ohio, is a rule of property, and of 526] course a rule of decision in the courts of tlie United States; but that rule must be ap¬ plied consistently with their constitution.
Admitting that the Legislature of Ohio can give an occupant claimant a right to the value of his improvements, and can authorize him to retain possession of the land he has improved, until he shall have received that value; and as¬ suming that they may also annex conditions to the change of possession, which, so far as they are constitutional, must be respected in all courts; still that Legislature cannot change radically the mode of proceeding prescribed for the courts of the United States; or direct those courts, in a trial at common law, to appoint commissioners for the decision of questions which a court of common law must submit to a jury.
But this inability of the courts of the United States to proceed in the mode prescribed by the statute, does not deprive the occupant of the benefit it intended him. The modes of pro¬ ceeding which belong to courts of chancery are adapted to the execution of the law ; and to the equity side of the court he may apply for relief. Sitting in chancery, it can appoint commissioners to estimate improvements as well as rents and profits, and can enjoin the execu¬ tion of the judgment at law until its decree shall be complied with. If any part of the act be unconstitutional, the provisions of that part may be disregarded while full effect will be given to such as are not repugnant to the Con¬ stitution of the United States or of the State or to the ordinance of 1787. The question whether any of its provisions he of this description, will proper!}" arise in the suit brought to carry them into effect.
We think there is no error in the judgment, and it is aftirmed with costs.
Cited-2 How., 17; 8 How., 563; 9 How., 31; 1 Wall., 310 ; 6 Wall., 630, 641 ; Bald., 233, 227, 27.5, 284, 405 ; 3 Wood. & M., 483 ; 8 Ben., 480.
527] TnE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS AND COMPANY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,
V.
V7ILLIAM OWENS, HERBERT G. WAG¬ GONER, GEORGE WAGLEy,AND ALEX¬ ANDER MILLER.
Umry— fraud upon a datute — charter of Bank of United States.
The branch Bank of the United States, at Lex¬ ington, Kentucky, discounted a promissory note,
608
reserving interest thereon, at the rate of six per centum per annum ; it being agreed that the own¬ er of the note sliould receive the pioceeds of the discount In notes of the Bank of Kentucky, at their nominal value, although the same were at the time of no greater current value than fifty-four per cent, of the said nominal value. Held, that the contract was usurious, and void ; and that the bank could not recover of any of the parties to the dis¬ counted note.
A fratid upon a statute is a violation of the stat¬ ute. [5361
A profit made, or loss imposed on the necessities of the borrower, whatever form, shape, or disguise it may assume, where the treaty is for a loan, and the capital is to he returned at all events, has al¬ ways been ad.iudged to be so much profit taken up¬ on a loan, and to be a violation of those laws which limit the lender to a specific rate of interest. Ac¬ cording to this principle, the lender in this case has taken forty-six per cent, for three years, or at the rate of about fifteen per cent, per annum above his prescribed interest. This is contrary to the pro¬ visions of the charter of the Bank of the United States, and against law. [537]
Reserving interest as discount, is the same as tak¬ ing the same: since it cannot be permitted by law to stipulate for the receipt or reservation of that which it is not permitted to receive. In those in¬ stances in which courts are called upon to inflict penalties upon the lender, whether in a civil or criminal form of action, it is necessarily otherwise ; for tliere the actual receipt is generally necessary to consummate the offense. But where the re¬ strictive policy of a law alone is in contemplation, we hold It to be an universal rule, that it is unlaw¬ ful to contract to do that which it is unlawful to do. [538]
The charter of the Bank of the United States for¬ bids the taking of a greater rate of Interest than six per centum, but it does not declare a contract on which a greater interest has been taken or reserved, to be void. Such a contract is void upon gener¬ al principles. Courts of justice are instituted to carry into effect the laws of a country, and they cannot become auxiliary to the violation of those laws. There can be no civil right where there can be no legal remedy ; and there can be no legal rem¬ edy for that which is itself illegal. [538]
This case came up on a certificate of the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky, they being opposed in opinion.
The action was upon a promissorj" note sign¬ ed by the defendants, bearing date the 7th of February, 1822, by which they promised to pay to the president, directors and company *of the Bank of the United States or or [*528 der, on the 7th of February, 1825, five thousand dollars, with interest at tlie rate of six per centum per annum from the date.
The following indorsement is on the note: “Mem. Interest is to be charged on this note from the 21st day of May, 1822, only, and not from the 7th of February, 1822, within mentioned, the former being the day on which the amount was actually received b}" the mak¬ ers of this note. (Signed) H. Clay.
The declaration being in the usual form, the defendants, Waggoner, Wagley, and Miller, pleaded as follows:
“That the}" ought not be charged with the said debt by virtue of the said suppo.sed note or writing, because they say that they executed the said note at the instance and for the accom¬ modation of the said Owens, and with the view of making him to obtain a loan of ■ the money from the Bank of the United States, upon the discounting of said note ; and defendants alleged that afterwards, to wit, at, &c., the said Owens
'N<yTE,.~Usury— receiving interest ns discount.
Peters 2.
1829
The Bank of the United States v. Owens et al.
528
presented the said note for discount to the pres¬ ident and directors of tlie office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States at Lex¬ ington, Kentucky, and that the president and directors of the said office, then and there fail¬ ed to discount the said note or make any loan thereon ; and that after the r(;jection of the said note as aforesaid at Lexington in Kentucky, to wit, on the Olst day of May, 1822, it was un¬ lawfully, usuriously, and corruptly agreed by and between the said plaintiffs, by their agents, managers and servants employed in the man¬ agement and business of said office, and the said Owens, that they, the said plaintiffs, would re¬ ceive and discount said note, and that the said 1 Owens should receive from them therefor notes of the Bank of Kentuckj’ or its branches at the nominal value of said notes; and for the for¬ bearance and loan aforesaid, that said Owens would pay said note in current money of the United States when it fell due, with interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum from the 7th day of February, 1822, and they aver, that in pursuance of said corrupt and unlawful agree¬ ment, the said note was delivered to the said plaintiff's at their said Lexington office upon the 529 ] terms aforesaid, they advancing and loaning therefor, as the whole and sole consid¬ eration of said note (after deducting a large sum from the amount of said note for discount) to
wit, the sum of $ - in notes of said Bank
of Kentucky, counted and rated at their nom¬ inal value. And said defendants aver, that at the time said note was discounted as aforesaid, the notes of said Bank of Kentucky and its branches were generally depreciated, so much so that one hundred dollars thereof nominally were of the value of lifty-four dollars only, or less, and current only at that depreciation for greater or smaller sums, to wit, at, &c. And the said defendants avhr that said transaction and dealing was contrary' to law and the fun¬ damental articles of said corporation, and the said note founded upon a corrupt and usurious consideration, the said plaintiffs reserving a greater interest than at the rate of six per cent, per annum upon the value of the notes loaned h}' them as aforesaid, and this they are ready to verify'. Wherefore, &c.”
To this plea, the plaintiffs by their attorney demurred. ‘
*Upon the argument of the demurrer, [*530 the following questions arose, namely.

1. Whether the facts set forth, and the aver¬

ments in said plea, make out a case in which the corporation has taken more than at the rate of six per cent, per annum, upon a loan or dis¬ count, contrary to, and in violation of the 9th rule of the fundamental articles of the consti¬ tution of the corporation.

2. If the plea does make out such a case,

whether the notes sued ou, or the contract there¬ in expressed to pay to the plaintiffs five thou¬ sand dollars, is void in law, so that no recovery can be had thereon in this suit.

3. If not wholly void, whether the plea is

sufficient to bar the plaintiffs’ recover}" of any, and if of any, of what part of the said sum of five thousand dollars.
The judges being opposed in opinion itpon the questions, they were, upon the request of the plaintiffs by their counsel, certified to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Mr. Sergeant, for the plaintiffs.

1. Upon the first question, after referring to

the 9th rule,^ he proceeded to say, that the case presented by the plea was not witliiu the words of the rule. The prohibition is again.st taking more than six per cent. The utmost that can be made out of the allegations of the plea, sup¬ posing the construction attempted to be put up¬ on the transaction to be correct, is that there was an agreement to take more than at the rate prescribed. Nothing was taken but the note. There is no prohibition against an agreement to take more than six per cent. The offense is in taking more and nothing else. Penal provisions in a statute are to be construed strictly. This is highly penal, for it is made a *viola- [*531 tion of the charter, and exposes to the danger of forfeiture.
Where a penalty is given for taking usurious interest it is well settled that the penalty can¬ not be recovered without proving an actual taking of the usurious interest. {Fisher- v. Beasley, Doug., 236; Maddock v. Hammett, 7 T. R., 180.) Here no discount was deducted, as is most usual in banking operations. The interest was not payable till the maturity of the note. It is clear, therefore, that there has not been a taking of more than six per cent, in v o- lation of the 9th rule.
1.— The demurrer entered In this case, prevented that investig'ation of tlie facts attending the trans¬ action which was the subject of the suit, and b3' which the plaintiff.s would have been enabled to present the circumstances under which the loan was made to the drawer of the note, so as to fully vindicate the institution from any charge of inten¬ tional violation of the provisions of the charter of the Bank of the United States, or the general rules of law. The following- authentic and expianatory statement has been furnished to the reporter :
The note in this case is joint and several, and was not offered, as the plea suggests, for a loan in the ordinary course of discount, in United States bank notes, or specie (it being generally known that the Lexington office was at that time restrained from making such loans), but specially for notes of the Bank of Kentucky. These notes had been received L).y the Bank of the United States, at their office at Lexington, at their nominal specie value, a part of them being for government deposits ; they had al- waj’s preserved that value to the bank, bj' the bal¬ ance being liquidated, and interest being paid by the Bank of Kentucky, periodically, and by the act¬ ual pa.yment in specie, within a few (six) months after the loan to Owens, of the balance due. The bank therefore would have received in specie from
Peters 2.
the Bank of Kentucky the amount loaned to Owens with its interest, in addition to the sum actually paid, had the loan not been made to him. The pub¬ lic exhibits of the Bank of Kentuck.y, at the time of the loan, and before and since, have shown its entire ultimate ability to pay its notes and deposits in specie ; and individuals have, in a great number of instances, received from that bank by compro¬ mise on time, or by assignments of its discounted notes, or by recover.y on suit, the nominal amount of their notes and deposits in specie. The great issue of Commonwealth Bank notes at the period re¬ ferred to, and their free reception by the Bank of Kent ucky in payment of its debts had, however, the effect of giving to the notes of the Bank of Ken¬ tucky nearly the same nominal depreciated charac¬ ter as those of the Bank of the Commonwealth.
3.—“ The said corporation shall not, directly or in¬ directly, deal or trade in anything e.xcept bills of exchange, gold or silver bullion, or in the sale of goods really and truly pledged for money lent and not redeemed in due time, or goods which shall be the proceeds of its lands. It shall not be at liberty to purchase any public debt whatsoever, nor shall it take more than at the rate of six per centum per annum, for or upon its loans or discounts.”
609
531
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829

2. This question does not arise unless the

first be made out affirmatively. If there has been no taking of more than six per cent, in violation of the 9th rule (as there clearly has not) this question being by its statement made dependent upon the first is also decided in the negative.
There is nothing in the Act to make the con¬ tract void. The penalty is specified, and is of a different nature. An additional penalty cannot be imposed.
A mere prohibition to take more than six per cent does not of itself avoid a contract agreeing to take more. When the agreement is avoided, it is always in comsequence of an ex¬ press provision by law to that effect. Such is the law in England against usurious contracts, and .in many of the States. Such is the law of Kentucky, and this question could only have arisen from the application of that law to the present case.
Nor do courts incline to de.stroy the contract. Even under those laws which avoid the con¬ tract for usurious agreement, if chancery get possession of the matter by the application of the debtor, it will compel him to pay the debt and legal interest as a condition of relief.
But State legislation has no power over the Bank of the United States or its contracts. This has been decided, and is obvious from the nature of the case. The Bank of the United States is governed by the law of Congress, and is subject to no other jurisdiction. {M’Gulloch V. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316; Os- 532] horriY. The Bank of the United States,
9 Wheat., 859; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. ,1 ; Bank of the United States y. Halstead,
The rule in the charter, therefore, is the gov¬ erning rule. That even the taking of more than the legal interest does not under the char¬ ter avoid the contract has been already de¬ cided by this court. {TPleekner v. Bank of the United States, 8 Wheat., 355.) “The tak¬ ing of interest by the bank beyond the sum authorized by the charter would doubtless be a violation of the charter for which a remedy might be applied by the government; but as tlie Act of Congress does not declare that it shall avoid the contract, it is not perceived how the original defendant could avail himself of this gi'ound to defeat a recovery.”
Still less can the agreement to take.

3. Admitting for the argument’s sake that if

the bank had agreed to take more than by law it was authorized to take, the court would not lend its aid to recover the excess, the question arises whether this was an agreement to take more than six per cent, on a loan or discount.
It was not so in terms, for the interest pay¬ able was precisely six per cent., neither more nor less. It was not so in extent. The object of the transaction was not to cover illegal in¬ terest. The real design was to dispose of the notes of the Bank of Kentucky. It was in sub¬ stance a sale upon a credit of three years, and not a loan.
If the transaction be unimpeachable on this ground can it be questioned on any other? The plea seems to aim to extricate the de¬ fendants from knowledge of the negotiation. But there are two particulars to be observed in it. 1. It does not aver that the bank knew 510
that the note was given to enable Owens to get a discount in the ordinary way. 2. It does not aver that the defendants were ignorant of the negotiation for the Kentucky bank notes. What is not denied in pleading must be con¬ sidered as admitted. There is an admission, therefore, that the bank did not know that the note was given for any particular purpose (if such were the fact) and that the defendants did know of the negotiation for the bank notes. Upon this basis of knowledge and assent the case is to be considered.
*Was there not, then, an adequate [*533 consideration given? It was so agreed volun¬ tarily, without coercion, compulsion or duress ; the parties being able and willing to contract, and understanding the subject-matter of the contract. The bank had a perfect right to fix the terms upon which it would part with the notes, and the defendants an equal right to de¬ cide whether they would accede to them. Both were the exclusive masters of their own judgment in making the contract ; but that once made, and not in itself unlawful, becomes the law between them. No one has a right to alter it. The consideration has passed; the contract is executed; and the parties cannot now be restored to the condition they were in at the time of contracting. Sales are made ac¬ cording to the views of the parties, understood by themselves and influenced by many cir¬ cumstances. Here the sale was upon a long credit enhancing the risk to the seller and in¬ creasing the chances of the buyer. The notes might, and did appreciate during the interval.
It is impossible now to adjust the terms dif¬ ferently. There is no evidence to furnish a rule. What were these notes worth to the Bank of the United States? They were notes for the payment of money, which the Bank of Kentucky was bound tO pay, and the payment of which to the full amount was compellable by process of law. Who can say that the full amount might not have been recovered? Again, what was the value to the buyer? He, too, could enforce the payment and use the notes for some purposes, as equivalent to money. It does not appear that he did not so use them. He may have recovered the full amount or passed them off in advantageous negotiation.
The case is not new. Bank paper being a kind of currency, has been variously depreciated at different periods and in different parts of the United States; in some to the extent of more than twenty per cent. Contracts made when specie was the basis of circulation were satis¬ fied with depreciated bank paper. Was it ever heard that he who chose to take them in payment (and none could be compelled to do so) could afterwards recover the difference? Contracts *were made in the time of a [*534 depreciated currency, and executed since by payment with specie. Was it ever understood that the payee could claim a deduction or re¬ cover back any part of what he had paid?
Bank paper, too, which, besides being a cur¬ rency, was a commodity, was the subject of pur¬ chase and sale for cash and on credit under all the modifications that effect the dealings in any other article. Those who dealt in it were the judges, as they are with respect to other com¬ modities. It was never thought that courts of justice could be required to revise and reform
, Peters 2.
1829
The Bank op the United States v. Owens et al.
634
their bargains. This would he an exercise of equity power that would end in anything but equity. It would be wholly without limit or guide.
The pleadings, however.do not admit of such a defense in part. The plea is entire, and goes to the whole. If bad for a part, it is bad for the whole. Tliey should have taken defense only for as much as they controverted. (1 Chitty, 523; 6 Cranch, 136.)
That such a transaction could not be con¬ sidered a cover for usury was quite evident. An increased rate of interest or profit for the use of the money was no part of the object. There is no preten.se of any such thing. If not, it is unobjectionable even under the usury laws. A bond or note or other security may be pur¬ chased at any discount without incurring the charge of usury. {MusgrateY. 1 Dali.,
217; Wycoff V. Longhed, 2 Dali., 92.) Oases more analogous to the present, and involving the. very same sort of negotiation, had been judicially decided upon principles decisive of this. {Northampton Bank v. Allen, 10 Mass. Rep., 254; Stuart v. Farmers & Mechanics’ Bank, 19 Johns. Rep., 496.)
The question whether the bank had a right to make a sale of notes, was not presented here. If it had been, he w’ould have cited as deciding it, Fieckner v. The Bank of the United States (8 Wheat. ,349, 351.) The same point, he would remark, has been fully discussed and decided in the Court of Appeals in Kentucky in the case of The Bank of the United States v. Norton. 535] The opinion would be found at length in the record of the case of The Bank of the United States v. Venable, decided at the pres¬ ent term of this court.
No counsel appeared for the appellees.
Mr. Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the court:
This suit is instituted for the recovery of a promissory note.
The plea is filed by the three last-named defendants, who represent themselves as secu¬ rities to Owens, and sets out in substance that the note was created for the purpose of enabling Owens to obtain a loan of money from the plaintiff in the ordinary course of discount; that it was offered for di.scount and rejected, and after such rejection it goes on to aver that ‘ ‘ it was unlawfully, usuriously, and corruptly agreed by and between the .said plaintiffs, by their agents employed in the management and business of the said office, and the said Owens, that they, the said plaintiffs, would receive and discount the said note, and that the said Owens should receive from them therefor, notes of the Bank of Kentucky, or its branches, at the nominal value of said notes, and for the for¬ bearance and loan aforesaid, that Owens should pay said note in correct money of the United States, when it fell due, with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from, &c. ; the plea then avers “that in pursuance of said cor¬ rupt and unlawful agreement,” this note was passed to the plaintiffs, and Kentucky notes re¬ ceived in loan “ as the .sole consideration there¬ of” at their nominal value; and farther, “ that at the time the said note was discounted, as aforesaid, the notes of the said Bank of Ken¬ tucky and its branches were generally depre- Peters 2.
dated, so much so, that one hundred dollars thereof, nominally, were of the value of fifty- four dollars only or less, and current only at that depreciation for greater or smaller sums, ” &c. ; and the defendants further aver “ that the said transaction and dealing was contrary to law and the fundamental articles of the said corpo¬ ration; and the said note founded upon a cor¬ rupt and usurious consideration, the said plaint¬ iffs reserving a greater ^interest than [*536 at the rate of six per centum per annum upon the value of the notes loaned by them, as afore¬ said.”
To this plea the plaintiffs demurred, and three points are made on which the court below certify a difference of opinion to this court.
The first is. Whether the facts set forth and the averments in said plea make out a case on which the corporation has taken more than at the rate of six per centum per annum upon a loan or discount, contrary to, and in violation of the ninth rule of the fundamental articles of the constitution of the corporation.
The proposition here presented to the court has relation altogether to the violation of the ninth fundamental rule of the Act of Incorpo¬ ration, and it brings under consideration the sufficiency both of the facts and averment con¬ tained in the plea to make out a violation of that article.
I have myself entertainedvery serious doubts of the sufficiency of the averment in the plea, for it is not a case of a direct reservation of a higher interest than the law allows, since on the face of the note only six per cent, is re¬ served ; but the facts are calculated to present one of those cases in which a device is resorted to by which is reserved a higher profit than the legal interest, under a mask thrown over the transaction, to wit, by taking a note payable in gold or silver for a loan of depreciated paper — a return, in fact, in specie, for an article of scarcely half the value of specie — a loan of adulterated dollars, for which a note is taken, payable dollar for dollar, in coin of the United States.
That the law will not tolerate such transac¬ tions has long been settled, for a fraud upon a statute is a violation of the statute.
But the difficulty with me was this, that the plea neither avers an intention to evade the statute, nor a knowledge in the plaintiffs of the actual depreciation of Kentucky money. I am content, however, to unite with the three of my brethren who make up the majority on this point in holding the averments to be suffi¬ cient ; because, in a considerable dearth of au¬ thorities on this subject, I find it decided in the case of Bolton v. Durham, in Croke’s Reports (Cro. Eliz., 642), that *the confession of [*537 the quo animo implied in a demurrer will af¬ fect a case with usury, when a very similar case; in the same book in which the plaintiff had traver.sed the plea, was left to the jury with a favorable charge. {Benningfield v. Ashley, Cro. Eliz., 741.)
In the present iastance, the loan, the uncon¬ ditional return of the sum lent, the illegality, and even corruption of the bargain, are all dis¬ tinctly averred, and more than once reiterated. If the transaction was corrupt and in violation of the fundamental laws of the charter, as averred in the plea and admitted by the demur-
511
537
Supreme Court of the United States.
1829
rer, it couid only have been upon the ground of an intention to evade the statute, and with a knowledge of the reduced value of the Ken¬ tucky hills.
And it is not unnatural here to remark that the plea sets out a refusal to make a_ loan in the ordinary course, to wit, in gold or silver, or the plaintiffs’ own notes ; and a subsequent agree¬ ment to make the loan, provided payment would be received in this depreciated paper. This state of facts presents an obvious analogy to the leading case of Lowe v. Waller (Douglas, 736), in which the negotiation commenced for a loan of money, but terminated in a sale of goods, on the resale of which the borrower (as he was held to be) sustained a great loss.
The court charged the lender with that loss, as so much exacted from the necessities of the borrower.
That part of the 9th section of the funda¬ mental rules of the bank charter, which is here drawn in question, is expressed in these words > “The bank shall not be at liberty to purchase any public debt whatever, nor shall it take more than at the rate of six per centum per annum for or upon its loans or discounts.”
A profit made or loss imposed on the necessi¬ ties of the borrower, whatever form, shape, or disguise it may assume where the treaty is for a loan and the capital is to be returned at all events, has always been adjudged to be so much profit taken upon a loan, and to be a violation of those laws which limit the lender to a specified rate of interest.
According to this principle the lender has 538] here taken forty-six per cent, for three years, or at the rate of about fifteen per cent, per annum above his prescribed interest. So that in this point the certificate of this court must be in the affirmative.
Some doubts have been thrown out whether, as the charter speaks only of taking, it can ap¬ ply to a case in which the interest has been only reserved, not received. But on that point the majority are clearly of opinion that reserving must be implied in the word taking ; since it cannot be permitted by law to stipulate for the reservation of that w'hich it is not permitted to receive. (1 Hawk. P. C., 620.) In those in¬ stances in which courts are called upon to in¬ flict a penaltv upon the lender, whether in a civil or criminal form of action, it is neces¬ sarily otherwise ; for then the actual receipt is generally necessary to consummate the offense. But when the re.strictive policy of a law alone is in contemplation, we hold it to be a universal rule that it is unlawful to contract to do that which it is unlawlul to do.
The second question propounded to this court is, “ Whether, if the plea does make out a case of violation of a provision of the charter, the notes sued on, or the contract therein ex¬ pressed, is void in law, so that no recovery can be had therein in this suit.
The question here propounded has relation exclusively to the legal effect of a violation of the provision in the charter on the subject of interest; and does not bring in question the operation of the statute of usury of Kentucky upon the validity of this contract. To under¬ stand the gist of the question, it is necessary to observe that, although the Act of Incorpo¬ ration forbids the taking of a greater interest
612
than six per cent., it does not declare void any contract reserving a greater sum than is per¬ mitted. Most, if not all the Acts passed in England and in the States on the same subject, declare such contracts usurious and void.
The question then is, whether such contracts are void in law, upon general principles.
The answer would seem to be plain and obvious, that no court of justice can in its nat¬ ure be made the handmaid of iniquitj^ Courts are instituted to carry into effect the laws of a *country; how can they then become [*539 auxiliary to the con, summation of violations of law?
To enumerate here all the instances and bases in wdiich this reasoning has been practi- call}^ applied, would be to incur the imputation of vain parade.
There can be no civil right where there can be no legal remedy ; and there can be no legal remedy for that which is itself illegal.
That this is true of contracts violating the laws of morality is recognized in the familiar maxim, “ex turpi causa non oritur actio;” as has been exemplified in some modern cases of a house let for immoral pui’poses. (Cited and admitted in 1 B. & P., 340, and Esp. N. P., 13.)
In the case of Auhert\. Maze (2 B. & P., 374) it is expressly affirmed that there is no dis¬ tinction as to vitiating the contract between malum in se and malum prohibitum. And that case is a strong one to this point, since the con¬ tract there arose collaterally out of transactions prohibited by statute.
So the same doctrine was maintained in equity upon a similar contract in the case of Watts V. Brooks (3 Ves., Jun., 612), in which the court observes: “ There is nothing immoral in this transaction, but it is against a prohibit¬ ory statute. I doubt a little the policy of the act, but I cannot allow it to be argued that you can break a law covertly. The court will not execute these contracts.”
So in the case of Webb v. Pritchett (1 B. & P., 264), where the action was by a tavern- keeper against a candidate for provisions fur¬ nished to the voters at an election, contrary to the statute of William. Although the statute does not declare the contract void, the court declared it void, and in this explicit language: “This action is apparently founded on a con¬ tract to disobey the law. ” ‘ ‘ The defense set
up proves the principle of the contract.”
‘ ‘ Then how shall an action be maintained in that which is a direct violation of a public law? The contract is bottomed in malum prohibitum of a very serious nature in the opinion of the Legislature; how, then, can we enforce a con¬ tract to do that very thing which is so much reprobated by the act? ” “ This *court [*540 cannot give any assistance to the plaintiff con¬ sistently with the principles which have gov¬ erned the courts of justice at all times. Per¬ sons who engage in such transactions must not bring their cases before a court of law, &c.”
So in the case of assurance in illegal voy¬ ages, even wdiere the underwriters have con¬ tracted with their eyes open, they are, notwith¬ standing, permitted to avail themselves of the plea of illegality ad libitum; as in the case of Camden v. Anderson (6 T. R., 723), adjudged in the King’s Bench and affirmed in the Ex-
Peters 2.
540
1829 The Bank OF THE United
chequer, where it is declared that “the defense is founded upon a principle of law which is permanent to all obligation by which the par¬ ties to a contract can "bind themselves.” (1 B.
& P., 272.)
And so in another case of great hardship ■{Morck V. Abel, 3 B. & P., 35), where the in¬ surance was upon a trading in the East Indies prohibited by an obsolete statute, the plaintiff could not even recover back his premium, al¬ though admitted that the risk never commenced because the policy was void in its inception on the ground of illegality.
Nor is it to voyages illegal by statute alone that this principle applies. A respectable writer on insurance makes these remarks:
“ Whenever an insurance is made on a voyage expressly prohibited by the common, statute or maritime law of the country, the policy is ■of no etfect. The principle on which such a regulation is founded is not peculiar to this kind of contracts, for it is nothing more than tliat which destroys all contracts whatsoever (Park, 232), that men can never be presumed to make an agreement forbidden by the laws ;
-and if they should attempt it, it is invalid, and will not receive the assistance of a court of justice to carry it into execution.
Nor is the rule applicable only to contracts expressly forbidden; for it is extended to such as are calculated to affect the general interest and policy of the country.
Thus, a note given by a bankrupt upon a seci-et compromise with a creditor is declared void, as it produces inequality in the distribu¬ tion of the bankrupt’s effects and evades the provisions and policy of the law, which pro- •541] poses to put all the creditors upon an •equal footing. {Wells v. Girling, 1 Brod. & Bing.. 447.)
And on the same principle a note given for a wager on the future amount of a branch of the public revenue is declared void, because it interests an individual in diminishing the pro- ■duction of the revenue. (2 T. II., 610; 2 B. &
P., 130.)
After citing these more modern decisions upon this subject, it may not be amiss to refer to some reporters whose authority has been ■consecrated by the re.spect of ages. They will serve to show the antiquity and universality of this doctrine.
Thus, in 1 Bulls., 38, it is laid down “that wherever the consideration which is the ground cf the promise, or the promise which is the con- sequeAce or effect of the consideration be un¬ lawful, the whole contract is void.
So in Hobart, 72, and Dyer, 356, “if one promises to do a thing that is unlawful, such promise is void.”
And innumerable ancient cases might be cited from the best reporters of the application of the rule to maintenance, to simony, and to promises made to public officers, engaging them to act contrary to the duties of their of¬ fices, or to individuals imposing upon them re¬ straint inconsistent with the public interest.
For these reasons, and upon these decisions, the majority of the court are of opinion that an affirmative an.swer must also he certified upon the second question in the cause.
And this renders it unnecessary to consider the third question.
Peters 2. U. S., Book 7.
States v. Carnbal.
This cause came on to be heard on the tran¬ script of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky, and on the questions and points on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion, and was argued by coun¬ sel; on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, (1) that the facts set forih, and the averments in .said plea, make out a case in which the corporation *has taken more [*542 than at the rate of six per centum per annum upon a loan or discount, contrary to and in violation of the ninth rule of the fundamental articles of the constitution of the corpora¬ tion. (2) That the plea does make out such a case where tjje notes sued on, or the contract therein, expres.sed to pay the plaintiffs five thousand dollars, is void m law, so that no re¬ covery can be had thereon in this suit. And (3) this court being of opinion in the affirma¬ tive on the finst and second points, renders it unnecessary to con.sider the third question; all of which is ordered and adjudged to be certi¬ fied to the said Circuit Court.
Cited-9 Pet., 399, 400, 403 ; 18 Wall., 384 ; 6 Otto, 303 ; 7 Otto, 23 ; 1 Bank. Reg., 477 : 4 Bank. Keg., 609 ; 7 Bank. Reg., 260 ; 8 Bank. Reg., 82 ; 9 Bank. Reg., 248 ; 11 Bank. Reg., 17.1 ; 3 McLean, 61i ; 4 McLean, 248 ; Taney, 2:10, 237 : 1 Dill., 149, 233 ; .5 Dill., 339 ; 1 Biss., 443; 2 Abb. U. S., 431, 4,32 ; 2 Bond, 177 ; 3 Wood. &M., 492; 2 Sawy., 421; 6Sawy., 500.
*THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS [*543 AND COMPANY OP THE BANK OP THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiffs in Errw,
V.
THOMAS D. CARNEAL, Defendant in Error .
Promissory note — demand of payment — notice of non-payment — diligence.
The evidence in the ease was, that the day when the note became due, the bank being tlie holder thereof, and it being payable there, after the usual banking hours were over it was delivered to a no¬ tary by the officers of the bank, they informing him at the time that there were no funds there for the payment of the note. This was a sufficient proof of due demand of payment. [.549]
When a note is payable at a bank, it Is not neces¬ sary to make any personal demand upon the maker elsewhere. It is his duty to be at the bank within the usual hours of business to pay the same, and if he omits so to do, and a demand is there made of payment by the holder within those hours, and it is refused or neglected to be made, the holder is enti¬ tled to maintain his action for such dishonor. [,549] It is difficult to lay down any univerhal rule as to what is due diligence in respect to notice to indors¬ ers. Many cases must be decided upon their own particular circumstances, however desirable it may be, when practicable, to lay down a general rule. [551]
When notice Is sent by the mail, it is sufficient to direct it to the town where the party resides, if it is a post town ; if it is not, then to the post-office or post town nearest to his residence, if known. But the rule as to the nearest post-office is not of uni-
Note.— Ril/s and notw — staps to charge indorsers.
See notes to Brown v. Barry, 3 Dali., 365 ; Vt Ilson V. Lenox, 1 Cranoh, 194; Fenwick v. Sears, 1 Crunch, 259; Coolidge V. Payson, 2 Wheat., 66; Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat., 102; Young v. Bi’yan, 6 Wheat., 146; Bank of U. S. v. Smith, 11 Wheat., 171 ; Thorn¬ ton V. Wynn, 12 Wheat., ISl; Brent v. Bank of Metropolis, 1 Pet., 89; Schimmelpennick v. Bryant, 1 Pet., 264.
33 613
543
SxjPKEME Court of the United States.
1829>
t
versal application ; for if the party is in the habit of receiving his letters at a more distant post-office, or through a more circuitous route, and the fact is known to the person sending notice, notice sent by the latter mode will be good. And where the party is in the habit of receiving his letters at various post-offices to suit his own convenience or business, it may be sufficient to send it to either. [.Wl]
A suggestion was made at the bar that the letter to the indorser, stating the demand and dishonor of the note, is not sufficient unless the party send¬ ing it also informs the indorser that he is looked to for payment. But where such notice is sent by the holder, or by his order, it necessarilj' implies such a responsibility over. [653]
liROR to the Circuit Court of Ohio.
This suit was originally brought against William Steele, William Lytle, and Thomas D. Carneal. The plaintiffs counted in asmmp- sit for money lent and advanced, under a pro¬ vision of the statute of the State of Ohio authorizing a joint suit against all the parties to a promissory note.
The original process was served upon William Steele and William Lytle. As to Thomas D. 54:4] Carneal, the marshal of the District of Ohio returned ‘ ‘ not found and this return being suggested of record, the plaintiffs, at the September term of the Circuit Court for the year 1823, proceeded to judgment against Steele and Lytle.
In May, 1824, the plaintiffs, in pursuance of another statute of the State of Ohio, sued out of the clerk’s office of the Circuit Court a writ of scire facias against Thomas D. Carneal (as to whom the marshal of the district had previous¬ ly returned “ not found ”), the object of which writ was to call upon him to show cause why he should not be made a party to the judgment against Steele and Lytle, and why execution should not issue against him agreeably to the provisions of the statute.
This writ having been served upon the de¬ fendant, a rule was taken against him for a plea. At the September rules, 1824, the de¬ fendant’s default was entered, and judgment nisi. At the January term, 1825, this defaidt was set aside, and the defendant tiled the plea of non assumpsit; upon which issue was joined.
The cause was regularly continued upon the docket until the July term, 1827; at which term the defendant’s attorney filed a further plea.
“And the said Thomas D. Carneal, by the leave of the court, first had and obtained for further plea in this behalf, defends the wrong and injury, when, &c., and says that the said promise in the said declaration, in the original cause supposed, was made by the said Carneal as co-indorser with William Lytle upon a promissory note made and executed by the said William Steele, the said Carneal and" Lytle be¬ ing indorsers, as securities for the said William Steele; and, after the making of the said prom¬ ise, and after the commencement of this suit, to wit, oil the 17th day of December, 1824, in consideration that the said Lytle had transferred to the plaintiffs a large amount of real estate, in payment and satisfaction of the debts of the said William Lytle to the said plaintiffs, in¬ cluding the debt due the plaintiffs upon the in¬ dorsement aforesaid, and had given his notes for the payment of a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of forty thousand dollars, upon
514
account of and in satisfaction of his said lia¬ bilities *to the plaintiffs, including the [*545 indorsement aforesaid, the said plaintiffs agreed with the said William Lytle that they would accept and receive the real estate so conveyed and the notes so made and delivered in satis¬ faction of the said debt due from the said William Steele, upon which the said Carneal, with the said William Lytle, were indorsers and securities as aforesaid ; and did then and there accept and receive the same in' satisfac¬ tion of said debt; and this the said Carneal is ready to verify ; wherefore he prays judg¬ ment, if the said plaintiffs their action ought further to have or maintain against him.”
At the December term, 1827, the plaintiffs- filed their replication to the above plea in the following words : “ And the said plaintiffs, by Daniel J. Caswell, their attorney, as to the plea- of the defendant, by him last pleaded, to the further maintenance of the said action, say, that for anything in the said plea set forth they ought not to be barred from further having and maintaining their said action, because pro¬ testing that the said William Lytle did not transfer to the said plaintiffs the real estate in the said plea set forth, nor give his notes for the sum of money in the said plea set forth for replication to the said plea they say that the said plaintiffs did not accept the same in satis¬ faction of the sum of money due the said plaintiffs, as set forth in their said declaration; and this they pray may be inquired of by the country, and the defendant doth the like,” &c.
The cause was tried at the July term, 1828, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the defendant.
The counsel for the plaintiffs tendered their bill of exceptions and prosecuted this writ of error.
The bill of exceptions sent up with the rec¬ ord contains the whole of the testimony given on the trial. The facts of the case, as they were understood and considered by the court, are stated in the opinion of the court delivered hj Mr. Justice Story.
On the trial in the Circuit Court of Ohio, after the evidence wms closed, the defendant’s counsel moved the court to instruct the jury as in case of a nonsuit, “upon the ground that the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs wms not sufficient in Maw to charge the defend- [*546 ant as indorser of the note aforesaid ; and the court, upon the motion aforesaid, decided that the evidence in writing adduced by the plaintiffs was insufficient in law to charge the defendant and render him liable as indorser of the note aforesaid, and so charged the jury; to which opinion of the court and charge to the jury the plaintiffs,by their counsel, except, and pray the court that this, their bill of exceptions, may be signed, sealed, and made a part of the record; which is hereby ordered.”
The plaintiffs, by their counsel, moved the court to charge the jury that, under the present state of the pleadings in the cause, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that they gave notice to the defendant of the non-pay¬ ment of the said note at the time the same be¬ came due and payable, in order to charge the •said defendant; which instruction the court re¬ fused to give the said jury ; and, on the con¬ trary, charged the said jury that it was incum-
Peters 2.
1829
The Bank of the United States v. Cakneal.
546
bent upon the plaintiffs to prove such notice. To -which opinion and charge of the court the plaintiffs.Sby their counsel, excepted, and prayed that this, their bill of exceptions, may also be signed, sealed, and made a part of the record. All -which -was ordered by the court.
The case -was argued by Mr. Caswell and Mr. Sergeant for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Benham for the defendant.
The counsel for the plaintiffs contended :

1. That the court erred in deciding that it

was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove that due and legal notice was given to the defend¬ ant of the non-payment of the note set forth in the record. In order to sustain this position they relied upon the fact that, after the issue of non assumpsit was joined by the parties, the defendant, by leave of the court, tiled a plea of accord and satisfaction pending the writ, upon which issue was joined. This plea, it is contended, was a waiver of the former issue.

2. That the proof of notice was sufficient to

charge the defendant with the payment of the note, and, consequently, that the court erred in charging the jury as in case of nonsuit.
547] For the defendant in error it was ar¬ gued that there was no error in the decision of the Circuit Court of Ohio.

1. Because the evidence adduced on the tri¬

al by the plaintiffs to prove a presentment of said note and demand of payment, was not sufficient to charge the defendent as indorser.

2. That the evidence of notice to charge de¬

fendant as indorser was insufficient.

3. That the .special plea filed by the defend¬

ant at the term of July, 1827, in bar of the further maintenance of said writ, did not waive the issue previously joined.
Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the court :
This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the District of Ohio. The Bank of the United States brought a joint action against William Steele, William Lytle, and Thomas D. Carneal (the defendant in error), upon a promissory note dated at Cincinnati on the 22d of August 1820, whereby Steele promised to pay Cai'neal or order, at the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States, at Cincinnati, the sum of $11,563 in .sixty days after date ; which note was afterwards succes¬ sively indorsed by Carneal and Lytle, and was discounted by the bank and dishonored at its maturity.
The declaration is for money lent and ad¬ vanced, and the suit is authorized to be brought in this form jointly against all the parties to the note, by a statute of Ohio. The proce.ss was served upon Steele and Lytle, but returned “not served” upon Carneal. Judgment was afterwards duly obtained agaioiSt Steele and Lytle, and a scire faciccs issued according to another statute of Ohio against Carneal, to which he appeared and pleaded the general is¬ sue of non assumpsit at the January term of the court in 1825. The cause was then regu¬ larly continued until July term, 1827, when by leave of the court he pleaded, as a further plea, the receipt of certain real estate of Lytle by the bank, after the commencement of the suit, in satisfaction of the debt due upon the note, and prayed judgment if the plaintiffs
Peters 2.
their action ought further to have or maintain against him. To this plea there was a replica¬ tion and issue to the *country; and at [*548 June term, 1828, the cause was tried and a ver¬ dict was found, and judgment thereupon en¬ tered for the defendant. A bill of exceptions was taken at the trial, upon which the ques¬ tions arose which have been discussed at the bar, and upon which the opinion of the court is now to be delivered.
The first question is, whether the plea of satisfaction, so as above pleaded, is a substitu¬ tion for the former plea of non assumpserunt, so as to displace it entirely, or whether it is an auxiliary plea, so that both i.ssues were properly before the jury at the trial upon which they might pronounce their verdict. The latter is contended for by the defendant in error, and was supported by the judgment of the Circuit Court.
It is admitted that a plea puis darrien con¬ tinuance is always pleaded by way of sub.sti- tution for the former plea, on which no pro¬ ceeding is afterwards had. (Stephens on Pleading. 81, 83; Comyn’s Dig. Abatement, I. 24.) The present plea was in fact pleaded after the last continuance, although it is not so stated in the plea. It differs from a technical plea of puis darrien continuance only in this circumstance, that the satisfaction is alleged to have been after the commencement of the suit, instead of after the last continuance of the suit. In principle, however, they do not differ, since each of them requires the same com¬ mencement and conclusion ; that is, instead of actio non, generally, each must be pleaded with the prayer of actio non ulterius habere, &c., and the judgment must follow the prayer, and is repugnant to and incompatible with that of a general judgment upon matters be¬ fore the suit brought. As, therefore, the same judgment cannot be rendered upon the general issue, and upon such a plea of matters arising after the suit brought, it is difficult to perceive how they can be united. But it is the less necessary to rest any absolute decision upon this point, because we are all of opinion that the judgment below ought to be reversed upon the exceptions taken to the merits.
The court below ruled that the evidence ad¬ duced at the *trial was not sufficient in [*549 law to charge the defendant as indorser. That evidence was supposed to be deficient in fwo respects: 1st, that there was not a proper de¬ mand of payment of the note of the maker at the time when it became due; and, 2d, that due notice was not given of the non-payment to the defendant as indorser.
Upon the first point the evidence is, that on the day when the note became due, the note was in the bank at Cincinnati, the bank being the holder thereof, and it being payable there, and that after the usual banking hours were over, it was delivered to a notary by the offi¬ cers of the bank for protest, they informing him at the time that there were no funds there for the payment of the note. We are all of opinion that this was a sufficient proof of a due demand of payment. Where a note is payable at a bank, it is not necessary to make any personal demand upon the maker else¬ where. It is his duty to be at the bank within the usual hours of business to pay the same,
ol5
219
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
and if he omits so to do, and a demand is there made of payment by the holder within those hoars, and it is refused or neglected to he made, the holder is entitled to maintain his action for such dishonor. But where the bank is itself the holder of the note so payable, no formal demand is necessary to be made of pay¬ ment. The maker has the whole period of the usual banking hours to pay it, and if he does not pay it within those hours, it is equivalent to a demand and refusal of payment on his part, and the note ought not to be delivered out for protest until after those hours are passed. If the bank has funds of the maker in its hands, that might furnish a defense to a suit brought for non-payment. But this is proper¬ ly matter of defense to be shown by the party sued, like any other payment, and not matter to be disproved by the bank by negative evi¬ dence. This docti’ine was recognized by this court in Fullerton v. The Bank of the United States, at the last term. (1 Peters’ Rep., 604, 617.)
Then, as to the other point of notice, the facts are that the defendant. Carneal, resides in Campbell county, in the State of Kentucky. The note became due on the 24th of October, 1820, and on the next day the notary put a 550*] sealed ^notice of the protest and non- payment into the post-offlee in Cincinnati, di¬ rected “To Thomas D. Carneal, Campbell county, Kentucky,” the postage on which was not paid. At that time Carneal’s residence in Campbell county was without the limits of any post town, and about two miles from Cincinnati, across the river Ohio ; and his resi¬ dence was well known to the officers of the bank as well as the postmaster at Cincinnati. The county seat of Campbell County is New¬ port, where there is a post-office, about three miles distance from Carneal’s residence, the river Licking being between them ; and there is also another post-office at Covington, below the river Licking, about two miles distance from his residence. In October, 1820, the mails from Cincinnati' passed once a week only through Covington, and three times a week through Newport. Carneal was in the habit of receiving letters at the Newport office, as well as at the offices in Covington and Cincin- natti. He was in the habit ofreceiving all the letters .directed to him at Cincinnati at the of¬ fice in that place, and had given orders to the postmasters to detain all such letters there un¬ til he called for them. He visited Cincinnati very frequently, and almost daily, having busi¬ ness, and being a director of a bank located at that place. The postmaster was in the habit of .sending letters directed to him, in Campbell county, by the Covington mail, whenever he observed the address, unless, as was sometimes the case, he called for letters at the office before the Covington mail was sent. But other let¬ ters, directed generally to Campbell county, when the place of residence of the party was unknown, were sent by the postmaster to New¬ port. The notary him.self, when he put the present notice into the post-office at Cincinnati, supposed that Carneal received all his letters at that office. The first mail which left Cin¬ cinnati for Newport after the deposit of this notice, was on the 26th of October; and the first which left for Covington was on the 28th 516
of the same month. There is no evidence in the case that the letter in question went either by the mail of the 26th to Newport, or by that of the 28th to Covington. The defendant, Carneal, has not produced the letter, if it was ever *received by him; and the cir- [*551 cumstancGS afford a strong presumption that it might have been received at Cincinnati.
Such is a summary of the material facts up¬ on which this court is called to pronounce, whether there was due diligence in the trans¬ mission of the notice to the defendant. The latter having asked the court below to instruct the jury as in case of a nonsuit, and the coui't having acceded to his request, that instruction can be maintained only upon the supposition that there was no contrariety of evidence as to the facts which ought to have been left to the jury; and, consequently, every inference fairly deducible from the facts which afforded a pre¬ sumption of due notice ought to be made in favor of the plaintiffs.
It is difficult to lay down any universal rule as to what is due diligence in respect to notice to indorsers. Many cases must be decided up¬ on their own particular circumstances, how¬ ever desirable it may be, when practicable, to lay down a general rule. When notice is sent by the mail, it is sufficient to direct it to the town where the party resides, if it is a post town. If it is not, then to the postoffice or post town nearest to his residence, if known. But the rule as to the nearest post-office is not of universal application ; for if the party is in the habit of receiving his letters at a more dis¬ tant post-office, or through a more circuitous route, and that fact is known to the person sending notice, notice sent by the latter mode will be good. And where the party is in the habit of receiving his letters at various post- offices to suit his own convenience or business, it may be sufficient to send it to either. The object of the law in all these cases is to en¬ force the transmission of the notice by such a route as that it may reach the party in a rea¬ sonable time. This doctrine is fully recognized by this court in the case of The Bank of Co¬ lumbia V. Lawrence, decided at the last term. (1 Peters’ Rep., 578.)
It has been objected that the direction of this letter to Campbell county generally was not sufficient, but that it ought to have been di¬ rected to the nearest office, for otherwise it might happen that it would be sent to a post- office which, though the county seat, might be very distant from *the residence of the [*552 party. Whether a mere direction to the coun¬ ty without farther specification, where the party doe.s not reside in any town therein, would be sufficient in all ca.ses and under all circumstances, we do not think it necessary to decide. That question may well be left until it is necessary in judgment. But where the de.scription is general, if it is in fact sent to the proper post-office, or, if after due inquiry it is the only description within the reach of the person sending the notice, we think it may be safely declared to be sufficiently certain, and that a different doctrine would materially clog the circulation of negotiable paper. We think the description in the present case was in every view sufficient. There was no misdirection ; for Carneal did live in Campbell county.
Peters 8.
1829
Canter v. The American and Ocean Insurance Company.
553
His actual residence was well known to the postmaster at Cincinnati, and the description did not and could not mislead him. If the di¬ rection was observed it would be sent to Cov¬ ington, or would be delivered at Cincinnati. If not, it would be sent, at farthest, to Newport.
Then, was the notice in fact duly given, or duly sent through the proper post-office? We are all of opinion that it was. The post-office at Cincinnati was almost as near to the party’s residence as that at Covington. The difference is too trifling to afford any just ground of pref¬ erence; and Cincinnati was the place where he was most likely to receive the letter promptly, since it was the place of his business and of his habitual and almost daily resort. If it had never been transmitted from that office at all, we are not prepared to say that, under such circumstances, the notice left there was not of itself sufficient, since the party was known there and his description unequivocal. It does not appear in point of fact that it ever left that place for any other po.stoffice. If it did not, the strong presumption is that it was there deliv¬ ered to the parly. But if it was sent to New¬ port, how can the court say that it was missent? The party was in the habit of receiving letters there; it was the county seat; and the mail by that route was three times a week, and that by Covington only once a week. The proba¬ bilities, therefore, in favor of an early receipt 553] of the letter from this circumstance might fairly balance any in the opposing scale, from the increase of distance and the interven¬ tion of the river Licking. And, in fact, the letter would at that time have reached New¬ port two days earlier than it would have reached Covington. We think it would be in¬ convenient and dangerous to lay down any rule that the person sending a notice ought under such circumstances to direct the letter to the nearest post-office. We think that the notice would have been good by either route; indeed, good if left at the post-office at Cincinnati.
A suggestion has been make at the bar that a letter to the indorser stating the demand and dishonor of the note is not sufficient, unless the party sending it also informs the indorser that he is looked to for payment. But when such notice is sent by the holder, or by his order, it necessarily implies such a responsibility over. For what other purpose could it be sent? We know of no rule that requires any formal dec¬ laration to be made to this effect. It is suf¬ ficient, if it may be reasonably inferred from the nature of the notice.
For these reasons we are all of opinion that the judgment of the Circuit Court ought to be reversed and the cause remanded, with direc¬ tions to award a venire facias de novo.
Cited— 10 Pet., 582: 4 H6w., 348; 8 Wall., 649; Hemp., 460.
554] DAVID CANTER, AppelUnt,
V.
THE AMERICAN AND OCEAN INSUR¬ ANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Appellee.
Jurisdiction.
A motion to dismiss a suit for want of jurisdic¬ tion applies solely to cases where this court has not
Peters 2.
jurisdiction of the cause, and not where the Cir¬ cuit Court has e.vceeded its proper jurisdiction in the particular case.
This case was heard and decided upon the preliminary question which it involved in January term, 1828. (Sec 1 Peters, 511.) On the hearing, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the claimant, and decreed restitution of the cotton which was the subject of contro¬ versy. By the mandate directed to the Cir¬ cuit Court, it was ordered “that such execu¬ tion and proceedings be had as, according to right and justice, and according to the laws of the United States, ought to be had.” The man¬ date being filed in the Circuit Court, it was ordered that the same be recorded, ‘ ‘ that the case be put on the docket, and it be referred to the officer of this court to examine into the damages sustained by the claimant, David Can¬ ter, in consequence of the proceedings of the libelants, and report thereon at as early a day as possible to the court. ”
Upon this order of court being made, Mr. Canter filed a statement of his claim, and the case went before the register.
The counsel for the defendants filed with the register the following protest:
And now, on this sixteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, the said libelants, by Petegru and Cruger, their proctors, object to the order of reference made by the honorable the Circuit Court of of the United States for the Sixth Circuit, to ascertain the damages alleged to have been sustained by the respondent in this case, and they article and protest against all acts and pro¬ ceedings under the same for these reasons, to wit: 1st. That the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States gives no authority.or ' instructions to the Circuit Court to inquire in¬ to damages. 2d. That the decrees of the Dis¬ trict, *C^ircuit and Supreme courts do [*555 not award damages to the respondent. 3d. That the libelants are not in any manner liable for damages. 4th. That, at all events, the in¬ quiry as to damages cannot extend beyond the amount of libelants’ stipulations, by which alone they are before the court.
Petegru & Cruger,
Proctors for Libelant. These objections were disallowed, and the register proceeded to take evidence subject to the protest, and to examine into the claim of damages; and afterwards made a report upon the claim to the Circuit Court.
The Circuit Court having by their decree disallowed the claims of the appellant to dam¬ ages, with the exception of a small amount, an a{)peal was entered to this court.
Mr. Cruger, for the appellees, moved to dis¬ miss the appeal on the ground that the man¬ date of this court did not authorize any pro¬ ceedings in the Circuit Court for the assess¬ ment of damages.
The motion was supported by Mr. Cruger for the appellees, and opposed by Mr. Coxe and Mr. Webster for the appellant.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court:
The motion made is to dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction. But a motion to dismiss a suit for want of jurisdiction applies solely to
517
555
Supreme Court of the United States.
1829
cases where this court has not jurisdiction of the cause,’ and not to cases where the Circuit Court has exceeded its proper powers_ in the particular case. In the present case this court has certainly jurisdiction to revise the decree complained of in the Circuit Court. Whether that decree was proper or not, after the man¬ date of this court, is matter for discussion upon an argument upon the merits of that decree, hut not on a motion like the present.
The motion in therefore overruled.
S. C., 3Pet., 307.
556] JAMES CONOLLY et al.. Appel¬ lants,
V.
RICHARD TAYLOR et al.. Appellees.
Jurisdiction — parties .
When there is no change of the parties to a suit, during its progress, a jurisdiction depending on the condition of the parties is governed by that con¬ dition as it was at tlie commencement of the suit. [53'd
If an alien should sue a citizen, and should omit to state the character of the parties in the bill, though the court could not exercise jurisdiction while the defect in the bill remained, yet it might, as is every day’s practice, be corrected at any time before the hearing, and the court would not hesi¬ tate to decree in the cause. 1535]
The suit was originally Instituted by aliens and a citizen of the United States as complainants, against the defendants, citizens of the United States. In the progress of the cause, and before the final hearing, the name of the citizen of the United States, who was one of the plaintiffs, was struck out, and he was made a defendant by the court. It was held : The substantial parties, plaint¬ iffs, those for whose benefit the decree is sought, are aliens, and the court has original jurisdiction between them and all the defendants. But they prevented the exercise of this jurisdlctioh by uniting with themselves a person between whom and one of the defendants the court could not take jurisdiction : strike out his name as a complainant, and the impediment is removed to the exercise of that original jurisdiction which the court possessed between the alien parties and all the citizen defend¬ ants. There is no objection, founded on conven¬ ience or law, to this course. [365]
This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky, in which court the appellants were complainants and the appellees were defend¬ ants.
In the Circuit Court of Kentucky, on the 20th of February, 1818, Thomas Conolly, James Conolly, Margaret Conolly, David David, and Francis Badley, aliens and subjects of the King of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and Samuel Mifflin, a cit¬ izen of the State of Pennsylvania, tiled their bill against certain defendants, claiming to have an equitable title to a large tract of hinds in right of Colonel John Conolly, deceased, situated at the Palls of Ohio, in the State of Kentucky. The defendants in the bill were Richard Taylor, Fortunatus Cosby, and Henry Clay, citizens of Kentucky, and William Lytle, 557] described in the subpoena as a citizen of Kentucky, but who was in fact a citizen of the State of Ohio. The subpama was served on all the defendants, Mr. Lytle having been found by the process in Kentucky.
The answer of Mr. Lytle protests against the 618
jui'isdiction of the Circuit Court, he being a cit¬ izen of the State of Ohio.
In the further progress of the suit before the Circuit Court at May term, 1823, on motion on the part of the complainants the name of Sam¬ uel Mifflin was struck out of the bill as a plaint¬ iff, and he was made a defendant, after which he answered an amended bill filed against him.
When, therefore, the case came on to a hear¬ ing in the Circuit Court at May term, 1826, the parties complainants were all aliens and sub¬ jects of the King of Great Britain and Ireland ; two of the defendants were citizens of the State of Kentucky, one of them was a citizen of the State of Ohio, and Samuel Mifflin was a citizen of the State of Pennsylvania.
The cause was argued upon an objection to the jurisdiction of the case in the Circuit Court of Kentucky, and upon its merits. This court being divided upon the merits, and no opinion having been expressed upon any other question in the cause but that of jurisdiction, the report¬ er does not consider himself permitted to state any of the facts of the case or the arguments of counsel, other than those connected with that point.
The counsel for the plaintiffs in error were Mr. Wirt, Attorney-General, Mr. WicMiffe, and Mr. Peters. For the defendants, Mr. Sergeant and Mr. Nicholas.
In support of the jurisdiction of the court, it was argued that it was a subject of frequent regret that the whole jurisdiction proposed by the Constitution for the courts of the United States has not been conferred by Congress on these courts. The wise policy of the Constitu¬ tion has failed to take effect, and justice has often fallen short and been defeated by the mere defect of the judiciary system.
The court will not be disposed, therefore, to narrow the *defective legislation which [*558 has taken place, by putting on it a too rigorous construction.
In the present instance it requires only a fair construction of the Act of Congress to sustain the jurisdiction. All the ca.ses cited on the other side are admitted, but it is conceived that they do not touch the question of jurisdiction in this case.
The 11th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts “of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity where the matter in dispute exceeds, ex¬ clusive of costs, the sum or value of five hun¬ dred dollars, and the United States are plaint¬ iffs or petitioners, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between the citizen of a State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State.” Thus the Act presents three distinct classes of cases where the court takes jurisdiction from the character of the parties: 1st, where the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners; 2d, where an alien is a party; and, 3d, wheue the action is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State.
The counsel for the appellees suppose that this case falls within the third class, and they have cited several cases decided in the circuit courts to show that w’here the case does fall under the third class, one of the parties must be a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought.
Peters 2.
1829
CONOLLY ET AL. V. TaYLOR ET AL;
568
If it were conceived that the case did belong to the third class, it might well be contended that the objection came too late from Mr. Lytle; because it is a privilege on which the party may insist, or may waive at pleasure ; and that after appearing and answering to the mer¬ its, it is too late to make it. (Gfacie v. Falvier, 8 ^Vheaton, 699: the case of The Abbey, 1 Mason, 360; 3 Mason, 158.)
Lytle appeared and answered to the merits; and although in his answer he suggests an ob¬ jection to the jurisdiction of the court, he does not state the specific ground of his objec¬ tion.
Besides, according to the chancery practice, a pica in abatement to the jurisdiction and an answer to the merits cannot stand together, but the answer overrules the plea.
*But the conclusive answer to the ob¬ jection of the want of jurisdiction is, that this case does not belong to the third class of cases put by the Judiciary Act, but belongs to the second.
The third class, being of suits between citizen and citizen, has been judicially settled to relate to cases not where citizens were the nominal parties only, hut where the interests also are •citizen interests.
In Brown et al. v. Strode (5Cranch, 303), this ■court decided that the courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a case between citi¬ zens of the same State where the plaintiffs are •only nominal parties for the use of an alien. The plaintiffs in that were the justices of the peace for the county of Stafford in Virginia, and were all citizens of that State. The de¬ fendant Strode was also a citizen of that State. The action was on an executor’s bond; no one ■could have sued on that bond but the plaintiffs, to whom the bond had been given. They were, therefore, necessary and indispensable parties.
But the interests involved in the suit being the interest of an alien; the suit being for the use of the alien; the nominal plaintiffs being, ■quond hoe, merely trustees for the alien, suing solely for his benefit without any interest in the subject themselves, the jurisdiction was maintained on this ground, and on this alone.
So here, Mifflin, one of the nominal plaint¬ iffs, had and still has no manner of interest in the case. He is a mere trustee under the will of John Conollj' for the alien complainants, and the suit is brought solely for the use of aliens.
In principle the case is identical with that of Brown et al. v. Strode. Like that it is purely a .suit for the recovery of alien interests, and like that this suit is well founded, as being in sub¬ stance a suit by aliens.
Again, Mifflin was a party solely for con¬ formity; that is, a merely formal party. The test of’a defendant being merely a formal party is that no decree can be rendered against him; that is, against his interests or affecting his in¬ terest. E converso, the test of a complainant being merely a formal party is that no decree SOOj can be rendered for him; that is, no decree in favor of his interests, and the joinder nr non joinder of such a party cannot affect his interests.
In support of which were cited the following authorities: Russell v. Clark (7 Cranch, 69);
Peters 2.
Wormley v. Wormley {S Wheaton, 421); West V. Randall (2 Mason, 181).
The suit, then, being substantially and ac¬ cording to Brown et al. v. (8!;mZe,a suit by aliens, is it any objection to the juri.sdiction of the court that some of the defendants are citizens of Kentucky, where the suit is brought, and one of them is a citizen of Ohio? Is it nec¬ essary, when the plaintiffs are aliens, that the defendants should be citizens of the particular State where the suit is brought?
The Judiciary Act does not make this neces¬ sary. The 11th section gives the jurisdiction where an alien is a party without a word more; there is no qualification of this jurisdiction from the residence of the opposite parties ; it is enough if they be citizens of the United States.
Will this court create a limitation on their jurisdiction when the law has created none?
Is it not the object of the law and of the Con¬ stitution in all cases to give the alien, where he is a party to the suit, an impartial tribunal in the courts of the nation? And is not this object as strongly demanded where his antagonists are citizens of different States as where they are citizens of the same State?
The manifest object of the Constitution and law is to prevent the alien from being driven into the State courts, and there encountering the prejudices which were to be apprehended in the local courts; but this salutary purpose will be totally defeated if, by the residence of his adversaries in different States, you compel him to go into the courts of the State where some of them reside. Hence the law founds the jurisdiction in any case where an alien is a party.
If you limit his right to a case in which all his adversaries reside in the same State, you defeat, so far, the salutary purpose of the Con¬ stitution and the law.
Reverse the case: suppose that citizens of different States have a joint claim against an alien, can they not bring a suit ^against [*561 him in the federal court? The single criterion of jurisdiction put by the law has occurred.
“ An alien is a party, and it is nowhere said that the opposite parties must all belong to the same State.”
Will you not apply the same rule, where the alien is the plaintiif, the case being the same?
So far as the court appear to have touched this question in former cases, it may he in¬ ferred that their construction is that which has been indicated.
When the case is one between citizens, it is necessary to show the jurisdiction in the bill or declaration by averring that the plaintiff is a citizen of one State and the defendant of an¬ other. But when an alien is a parly, the juris¬ diction has been held to be sufficiently shown by stating that fact, without averring that the defendant is a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought. {Gracie et al. v. Palmer et al., 8 Wheaton, 699.)
The 11th section contains this further provis¬ ion, “that no civil suits shall be brought be¬ fore either of the said courts against an inhabit¬ ant of the United States by any original pro¬ cess in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall he found at the time of suing the writ.”
Does this apply to suits brought by aliens,
619
561
Supreme* Court of the United States.
lcS29'
or is it confined to suits brought by citizens? Considered as applying to suits brought by citi¬ zens, it has been judicially pronounced to be a very inconvenient restriction on the constitu¬ tional grant of jurisdiction. ( White v. Fenner, 1 Mason, 521.) That it should apply to suits by aliens may be ■well questioned.
The only substantial and real parties in in terest to this suit were the aliens. Mr. Mifflin was made a party complainant at the com¬ mencement of the proceedings, but it was afterwards found that in order to carry into effect the object of the bill, and to obtain from him what the real parties had a right to de¬ mand, it was necessary to make him a defend¬ ant. Thus, therefore, in the Circuit Court, when the case was heard, all the parties plaint¬ iffs, even nominally, were aliens; and the de¬ fendants were all citizens of the United States, and alleged to be so on the record.
562] Por the defendants in error it was contended that the Circuit Court of the Ken¬ tucky District had no jurisdiction. The bill of complaint, which is tiie foundation and com¬ mencement of the suit in equity, states Samuel P. Mifflin, one of the complainants, to be a citizen of Pennsylvania, and William Lytle, one of the defendants, to be a citizen of Ohio. William Lytle pleaded to the jurisdiction and thus sazed his right to object, even if he had had power to waive it, which he had not. Con¬ sent cannot give jurisdiction. The objection is not founded upon the provision that a citizen shall not be sued in the courts of the United States, except in the State where he resides or is found at the time of serving the process. That is a privilege which he may waive by ap¬ pearance. It rests upon that part of the Act of Congress (Act of 1789, sec. 11) which expressly limits the jurisdiction (and so far as it rests upon the character of tlie parties) to suits be¬ tween citizens of different States, one of them being ‘ ‘ a citizen of the State where the suit is brought.” There is no doubt that the jurisdic¬ tion, under the Constitution, might have been more extensive. The terms of the Constitution only require that the parties should be citizens of different States. But the uniform construction of this grant of power has been that it is to be exercised by the judiciary only to the extent which Congress may authorize.
It is perfectly clear, upon this statement, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction between Mifflin and Lytle. (Section 11 of the Act of the 24th of September, 1789.) The court is bound to notice the question of jurisdiction whenever it may occur and however proposed. (2 Dali., 868.) The plaintiff may a.ssign as eiTor the want of jurisdiction, though the tribunal of the United States were resorted to by himself. The court must see that it has jurisdiction.
The juri.sdiction must appear on the record affirmatively. Everything must be alleged that is necessary to give jurisdiction. (3 Dali., 382; 4 Dali., 8; 1 Cranch, 343; 2 Crunch, 186; 5 'Crunch, 185; 6 Wheat., 450.)
This would be clear if Mifflin and Lytle were the sole parties. Does their joinder with others make any difference? The answer has long 563] .since been given. The plaintiffs and de- fendants mu.st all be competent to sue and be sued. (^Sirmobridgev. Curtiss, 8 Cranch, 267; Hope Insurance Company v. Boardman, 5 520
If the plaintiffs be not all competent, it is- immaterial whether the joinder is from necessity or voluntary. {Corporation of Neio Orleans v.. Winter, 1 Wheat., 91, 94; Ward v. Arredondo,. 1 Paine, 410.) The rule is the same as to de¬ fendants.
Some exceptions have been made out of the- generality of the proposition, but none that in its terms or spirit can comprehend the present- case. In Cameron v. M’Boherts (3 Wheat., 591), it was decided that if a distinct interest vested in one of the parties defendant, he being- the one within the jurisdiction, so that sub¬ stantial ju,stice could be done so far as he was concerned without effecting the other defend¬ ants, the jurisdiction of the court might be ex¬ ercised as to him alone. That is, to apply it to- the present case; if Lytle were within the juris¬ diction, the case might proceed against him alone; for here Lytle was the sole party in in¬ terest. . It so appears by the bill of complaint, the title having come to be entirely vested in him. But he who was thus the only material party, was the very party who was out of the jurisdiction, and not amenable to the court.
So it is very true that the joinder of a mere formal party defendant does not take awaj^ the jurisdiction. {WormleyN. Wormley, 8 Wheat., 421, 451.) The criterion in such cases is whether a decree is sought against him. ( Ward v. Ar- redondo, 1 Paine, 410.) If he be a material party, he must be brought in, even though the- jurisdiction would thereby be ousted. {Har¬ rison V. Roican, Circuit Court New Jersey District.) But Lytle -was not a mere formal party, he was an indispensable party, without, whom no decree could be made.
So if improper persons be made parties by mistake who are not subject to the jurisdiction. {CarnealY. Banks, 10 Wheat., 187, 188.) But here there was no such mistake in joining im¬ proper persons.
There is no case, therefore, where the deci.sion has been'eontrary to what is now contended for. The opinion that *in a suit at common [*564- law in Pennsylvania, where non est inventus is returned as to one who is not subject to th& jurisdiction (2 Wash. C. C. Rep., 505; 1 Peters’’ Rep., 431, note), the proceedings may go on against the others, has no application.
It is true that in this case the court, in 1821 (three years after suit brought), permitted the complainants to amend their bill by striking- out Mr. Mifflin as complainant and making him a defendant. But this was itself an exer¬ cise of judicial authority which could not rightfully take place, but in a case over which, the court had previously a power. The court could not make the amendment, unless it first had jurisdiction. The time of suit brought is- the period to which the question of jurisdiction applies. (Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat., 537.)- It cannot afterward be either vested or devested.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court:
As an objection was made to the jurisdiction of the court in this case it may be proper, in. order to prevent a possible misunderstanding of the principle on which jurisdiction is sus¬ tained, briefly to state it.
Petei's 2.
1829
Beatty and Ritchie v. Kurtz et al.
564
The bill is filed in the court of the United States sitting in Kentucky by aliens, and by a citizen of Pennsylvania. The defendants are citizens of Kentucky except one, who is a citizen of Ohio, on whom process was served in Ohio. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be questioned so far as respects the alien plaint¬ iffs. As between the citizen of Pennsylvania and of Ohio, neither of them being a citizen of the State in which the suit was brought, the court could exercise no jurisdiction. Had the cause come on for a hearing in this state of parties, a decree could not have been made in it for the want of jurisdiction. The name of the citizen plaintiff, however, was struck out of the bill before the cause was brought before the court, and the question is whether the original defect was cured by this circumstance — whether the court, having jurisdiction over all the parties then in the cause, could make a decree.
The counsel for the defendants maintain the 565 ] negative of this question. They con¬ tend that jurisdiction depends on the state of the parties at the commencement of the suit, and that no subsequent change can give or take it away. They say that if an alien becomes a citizen pending the suit, the jurisdiction which was once vested is not devested by this circum¬ stance. So, if a citizen sue a citizen of the same State, he cannot give jurisdiction by re¬ moving himself and becoming a citizen of a different State.
This is true, but the court does not under¬ stand the principle to be applicable to the case at bar. Where there is no change of party, a jurisdiction depending on the condition of the party is governed by that condition as it was at the commencement of the suit. The court in the first case had complete original jurisdiction ; in the last it had no jurisdiction either in form or substance. But if an alien should sue a citizen and should omit to state the character of the parties in the bill, though the court could not exercise its jurisdiction while this defect in the bill remained, yet it might, as is every day’s practice, be corrected at any time before the hearing, and the court would not hesitate to decree in the cause.
So in this case. The substantial parties plaintiffs, those for whose benefit the. decree is sought, are aliens ; and the court has original jurisdiction between them and all the defend¬ ants. But they prevented the exercise of this jurisdiction by uniting with themselves a per¬ son between whom and one of the defendants the court cannot take jurisdiction. Strike out his name as a complainant, and the impedi¬ ment is removed to the exercise of that original jurisdiction which the court po.ssessed between the alien plaintiffs and all the citizen defend¬ ants. We can perceive no objection, founded in convenience or in law, to this course.
Upon examining the record, the judges are divided in opinion on the question whether the defendants, who are purchasers, have taken the lands charged with the equity which was at¬ tached to it while in pos.session of Campbell and his heirs, or are to be con.sidered as pur¬ chasers without notice. It would be useless to state the arguments and facts in support of each opinion. The decree is affirmed by a divided court.
Peters 2.
Cited— Y Pet., 261 ; 18 Wall., 5Y4: Bald., 193,284; Hemp., Y12; 2 Brock., 522; 12 Blatchf., 290; ISumii., 584; 12 Bank. Reg., 102.
*CHARLES A. BEATTY and JOHN [*5G6 T. RITCHIE, Appellants,
V.
DANIEL KURTZ bt al.. Trustees of the German Lutheran Church of Georgetown, Appellees.
Dedication of land to public use — Maryland bill of rights — members of voluntary society as parties.
A lot of ground had, in the original plan of an addition to Georgetown, been marked “ for the Lutheran Church,” and by the German Lutherans of the place had been used as a place of bui-ial from the dedication, and who had erected a school- house on it, but no church ; exercising acts of pro¬ tection and ownership over it at some periods by committees appointed by the German Lutherans; the original owner acquiescing In the same. This may be considered as a dedication of the lot to public and pious uses ; and, although the German Lutherans were not Incorporated, nor were there any persons who as trustees pould hold the prop¬ erty, the appropriation was also valid under the bill of rights of Maryland. The bill of rights, to this extent at least, recognizes the doctrines of the statute of Elizabeth for charitable uses; under which it is well known that such uses would be upheld, although there was no specific grantee or trustee. This might at all times have been en¬ forced as a charitable and pious use through the Intervention of the government as parens patriae, by its Attorney-General or other law officer. It was originally consecrated for a religious purpnse. It has become a depository of the dead, and it can¬ not now be resumed by the heirs of the donor. [584]
If the complainants in the Circuit Court wei’e proved to be the regularly appointed committee of a voluntary society of Lutherans in actual posses¬ sion of the premises, and acting’ by their direction to prevent a disturbance of that possession ; under the circumstances of this case, there does not ap¬ pear to be a serious objection to their right to maintain a suit for a perpetual injunction against the heirs of the donor, who sought to regain the pr(.,perty, and to disturb their possession. [584]
The only difficult.y which presents itself upon the question whether the complainants in the Circuit Court have shown in themselves sufficient author¬ ity to maintain their suit, is, that it is not evidenced by any formal vote or writing. If it were neces¬ sary to decide the ca.«e on this point, under all the circumstances, it might be fairly presumed. But this is not necessary ; because this is one of those cases in which certain persons belonging’ to a voluntary society, and having a common interest, may sue in behalf of themselves and others having the like interests, as part of the same society, tor purposes common to all and beneficial to all. [585]
A PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the JA- county of Washington.
The appellees filed their hill in the Circuit Court against Charles A. Beatty and John T. Ritchie, which states, in substance, that the late Colonel Charles Beatty and George Frazier Hawkins, in the year 1769, laid out on lands belonging *to them and adjoining the [*567 town of Georgetown, a certain town known by the name of “Beatty and Hawkins’s addition to Georgetown;” the lots whereof were laid down and distinguished on a plot and disposed of by lottery. That Beatty, in laying out the said addition, distinguished and set apart a certain lot or portion of ground in the said ad¬ dition for the sole use and benefit of the Ger¬ man Lutheran Church, declaring the same to
o21
567
SUPKBMB COTIBT OP THE UNITED STATES.
1829
be their absolute right and property, to be held by them for religious purposes and the use of said congregation, and caused the same to be so entered and designated in the plot of said addition, as now appears by the plot and papers on record in the clerk’s office for Washington, to which they beg leave to refer; which plot and papers were recorded under authority of the Act of Maryland, 1796, ch. 54; which lot is described in the said plot of said addition as the German Lutheran Church lot, and also in the general plot of the town of Georgetown and its additions, deposited in the office of the clerk of the corporation of Georgetown. That soon after the lots in the said addition were laid off and disposed of as aforesaid, the said lot was taken possession of by the said German Lutherans, and was inclosed, and a church erected thereon ; and hath been kept and held by them ever since, during a period, as they believe, of upwards of fifty years, and hath been used by them as a burying-ground for the members of the said church, with the avowed intention of building thereon another church or place of worship, the building first erected being decayed, whenever their funds would enable them to do so. That during all this period, neither their possession nor title hath ever been questioned, and the lot has been ex¬ empted from taxation at their request by the corporation of Georgetown as being church property. That Charles Beatty died about six¬ teen years ago, and without having made any conveyance of the said lot, and that Charles A. Beatty is his heir-at-law. They therefore pray that he may be made defendant, and be com¬ pelled to convey the title to the complainants, in trust for the German Lutheran Church.
They further state that the defendant, John T. Ritchie, without any pretense of title, dis- 568] putes the title of complainants a.nd their right of possession, and has undertaken to enter on part of the lot, and to remove tomb¬ stones, &c. , and they fear that he means to dis¬ possess them; wherefore they pray subpoena, <&c. , and that they may be quieted in their pos¬ session of said lot, and that the defendant, Ritchie, may be enjoined from disturbing their possession, and for general relief.
The answer of the defendants in the court below admits that Charles Beatty, deceased, did designate a lot in his addition to George¬ town by inscribing on the plot thereof these words, “for the Lutheran Church;” that they always understood and believed that he meant by that inscription to manifest an intention to appropriate that lot to the use of the Luther¬ ans, provided they would build on it within a reasonable time a house of public wonship, which would conduce to diffuse piety, to en¬ hance the value of his property, and to adorn his addition to Georgetown. But they deny that this inscription was ever meant, or could be interpreted to be, a contract with the Luther¬ an Church to convey to that body the property in question. That the writing itself could not operate as a conveyance, and there was no consideration to sustain it as a contract. They deny that Charles Beatty ever declared the lot in question to be the absolute right and prop¬ erty of the Lutherans, or did in any manner by means thereof hold out inducements to them or the public to purchase tickets in the pre- 622
tended lottery mentioned in the bill, or to pur¬ chase and improve lots in that part of the town. They aver that no church had ever been built on it, and that its occupation by graves and a school-house was a use of it by no means bene¬ ficial to defendants, or him under whom they claimed.
The answer denies the possession averred in the bill, and also that there ever was an organ¬ ized congregation of German Lutherans in Georgetown.
It avers, also, that the lot in question has re¬ mained uninclosed for at least three-fourths of the time since it became a part of George¬ town, and that the inclosures which occasionally surrrounded it were not erected by the com¬ plainants, nor those whom they pretend to rep¬ resent. The respondents *admit that [*569 the lot was u.sed as a burying-ground; but aver that it was thus used by Beatty’s permission, and not exclusively by the Lutherans, but the public generally. But they further say that if the Lutherans had enjoyed the possession al¬ leged in the complainants’ bill, they might and should have enforced the rights thereby acquired at law, ando ught not to have come into equity for a remedy. Finally, confessing that they had resumed possession of the propei'ly, they deny the authority of the complainants to act in belialf of the pretended German Luther¬ an Church, and pray the same benefit of these defenses as if they had been urged by plea to the bill.
The plaintiffs amended their bill by stating the German Lutheran Church, mentioned in their bill, was composed of the members of the German Lutheran Church in Georgetown, duly organized as such ; ‘ ‘ that the lot was set apart by C. Beatty,” from and out of that “part of the said land composing said addition,” of which he, the said Beatty, was seized. “The said Beatty, by the said designation, decla¬ ration, and setting apart, holding out to the public, and to the German Lutherans particularly, inducements as well to pur¬ chase tickets in a lottery by which the said lots were disposed of, as to purchase and im¬ prove that part of the town in other ways. And thereby meaning to transfer to the said German Lutherans, as soon as they should or¬ ganize themselves into a congregation or church, all his right to said lot in fee, to be used for the religious purpose of such congregation or church, and thereby declaring tliat intention. That they organized themselves into a congre¬ gation or church, and erected a church, or house of wonship, on the said lot.” That the complainants, and the congregation for whom they act, have called upon C. A. Beatty, and required a conveyance according to the prom¬ ise and declared intent of the said Charles Beatty, deceased; that upon organizing the church or congregation aforesaid, certain otfi- cers, called a committee, were appointed to take charge of the concerns of the church; which appointments were, from time to time, made and renewed, and that complainants were appointed in 1824, and have continued to hold such appointment ever since.
*To those amendments the defend- [*570 ants answered, and denied all the allegations in the amended bill.
It was in evidence that soon after this lot
Peters 2.
1829
Beatty and Ritchie v. Kurtz bt al.
670
was thus set apart for the Lutherans, it was, with Colonel Beatty’s permission, taken posses¬ sion of by certain persons of that sect in Oerogetown, who had a log house erected on it, which was called a church, and used as such frequently, and also as a school-house, by Ihe German Lutherans. That in the year 1796 a German minister came from Philadelphia and was employed by them, and preached in this house for three months, being employed and paid by the German Lutherans of Georgetown ; and about the year 1799 the congregation of German Lutherans, of which Travers, the wit¬ ness in this cause, was one, employed a Ger¬ man minister, who officiated in said house for about nine months. Though divine service was frequently administered in that building, there was, at no other periods than those just mentioned, a stationed preacher who minister¬ ed to a congregation in regular attendance there, except a ISIr. Brooke, who was an Epis¬ copal clergyman, and who. Dr. Balch testifies, had possession of that building as a church in

1779. In the same or the following year a

steeple was erected on the said house, in which a bell was hung, at the expense and by the di¬ rection of the German Lutherans of George¬ town. This building some years afterwards went to decay, and no church has been since rebuilt on the lot, though efforts have been since made for that purpose; and as late as 18.23 a considerable subscription was raised, but not sufficient for the object.
During the whole period from 1769 to the bringing of this suit, the lot in question was generally under inclosures put up at the ex¬ pense of the Lutherans of Georgetown, and under the care and custody of a committee ap¬ pointed by them. It has been continually so inclosed for more than twenty years before the entry and claim set up by the defendants in this suit. The said lot has been also used by the Germans as a burying-ground from the year 1769 till a short time before the bringing this suit, and has been called and known as the Dutch burying-ground, and one of the witness¬ es, Styles, acted as sexton, under the orders of 571] the committee of the congre,gation. It does not appear that the German Lutherans in Georgetown ever were incorporated by law as a religious society.
It also appeared from the evidence that from the year 1769 till within a month or two before the bringing this suit, no claim to the posses¬ sion or property in the lot now in dispute was ever set up by. Col. Charles Beatty or by either of the defendants; but, on the contrary. Col. Charles Beatty, up to the time of his death, always declared it to be the property of the German Lutherans of Georgetown ; his admin¬ istrator, Abner Ritchie, who, it is stated, sold all his lots in said addition left by him at his death, never claimed or offered to sell the lot in question as part of his property : that his son and heir, the defendant, Charles A. Beatty, has repeated the same declarations to a witness (Mountz) a few years before this suit — he ex¬ pressed “his surprise, that the Germans had been so indifferent about getting their title to this property, as he was always ready and will¬ ing to give them a deed for it. ”
A witness, Mr. Rhseffer, testified that in 1823
Peters 2.
the defendant Beatty, in his presence, declared ‘ ‘ that the lot aforesaid was the property of the Lutherans, and that he was very anxious to make them a deed. He also confirmed the evi¬ dence of the other witnesses.
It also appeared from the evidence that since the year 1769 the said lot has never been as¬ sessed for taxes to Col. Beatty or his heirs, nor have any taxes ever been paid by them. That it has always been recognized by the cor¬ poration of Georgetown, since their charter in 1789, as the church properly of the Lutherans; and as such has been exempted from taxation with other church property in the town.
It was in evidence that the Lutherans of Georgetown always had a church committee to act for them, and to take charge and custody of the lot in question; and the appellees consti¬ tuted that committee from 1816 till the bring¬ ing this suit, and to the present time. In virtue of that appointment, when Ritchie entered on the premises and threw down the fence and tombstones, they filed this bill for a convey¬ ance *in fee of the lot to complainants [*5 7 2 as trustees for said church ; to be quieted in the possession thereof, and for an injunction to re¬ strain the appellants from disturbing their pos¬ session or trespassing on said lot.
The Circuit Court decreed a perpetual in¬ junction against the defendants, the appellants ; who, by their appeal, brought the case before this court.
The cause was argued for the appellants by Mr. C. G. Lee, and for the appellees by Messrs. Key and Dunlop.
For the appellants it was claimed that the decree of the court below should be reversed and the bill dismissed.

1. Because neither C. Beatty nor his son ever

did any act which devested either of them of the right of property and possession in the lot in question.

2. Because neither of them ever entered into

any contract (and least of all such an one as a court of equity will enforce) with the appellees, or those whom they pretend to represent, to convey to them or their pretended cestuis que trust the lot in question.

3. Because the appellees, or those whom they

pretend to represent, have never had such an adverse possession of the lot as gave them a title to it.

4. Because if they had, it was such a title as

they might and should have enforced at law and not in equity.

5. Because the appellees have failed to show

any authority in themselves to prosecute this suit.
Mr. Lee contended that the only' act done by C. Beatty or his heirs which can be pretended to have devested them of the title to the lot in question, is the inscription by C. Beatty on the plot of the lot of the words “for the Lutheran Church.” No possible interpretation of these can make them act as a conveyance; and the bill itself .which attempts to interpret them into a contract, and which seeks to have that con¬ tract specifically performed, necessarily admits the title of the lot to be still remaining in the appellants.
Dismissing, then, this point, as scarcely made in the case, it will be most perspicuously treated
623
673
Supreme Court op the United States.
1829
by considering the bill in reference to its ditfer- 5 7 3] ent prayers, which are for specific per- formance, and to be quieted in possession. This leads directly to the point that the bill shows no contract of which equity will decree per¬ formance. The words relied on as creating a contract are the aforesaid inscription, “ for the Lutheran Church.” But of the three requisites of a contract two are wanting here, viz., par¬ ties and a price ; and interpret them as you will, no mutuality can be pretended. This of itself is sufficient to prevent the assistance of a court of equity. {Howel v. George, 1 Mad., 13.) More¬ over, the contract alleged concerns lands, and must, therefore, by the statute of frauds, be in writing. But there is no consideration men¬ tioned in the contract as set out, and this has been too often decided to be an essential part of a contract, and therefore to be embraced in the written instrument to need illustration from cited authorities. True, the plot of Beatty & Hawkins’ addition to Georgetown, with the said inscription thereon, was recorded, as al¬ leged in the bill, by the Act of 1796, ch. 54; but the court will perceive, by inspecting that Act, that it does not affect this discussion.
The appellees will doubtless insist on a part performance of the pretended contract to re¬ lieve themselves from operation of the statute of frauds. This is a matter of fact which the court must decide on from the evidence. They will at least remembel’ that if the appellees rely on their pretended erection of a pretended church as an execution on their part of the pre¬ tended contract, they admit that they were bound by that contract to erect a church; while it will be impossible to regard a log school - house, afterwards converted into a dwelling- house, and now destroyed, whoever may have called it a church and have preached in it, as such a building to be applied to such a purpose as is called for by a contract to build a church. And it may also be observed upon this part of the case, that this prayer of the bill was refused by tlie court below, and no appeal was taken from that decision.
As to the second prayer of the bill, he argued that it might be viewed under two aspects. 1. As regarding the complainants below, dispos¬ sessed by the defendants and seeking to be re¬ possessed and quieted; and, 2. As regarding 574 ] the corap]ainants in possession and seeking protection against the defendants as in¬ truders or trespassers. Either view of the case is equally fatal to the bill; and for the same reason, because the iiroper remedy is at law. For, regarded under the first aspect, the bill is what is reproachfully termed an ejectment bill, and clearly condemned. (Cooper’s Plead., 125; Locker v. Rolle, 3 Ves., Jun., 4, and Ryves v. Ryves, 3 Ves., Jun., 343.) And regarded under the second aspect, no precedent can be found to authorize it. The only species of bills which can be mistaken as affording such a precedent, are bills of peace and bills founded oi\i\Q solet. But the least reflection will show that this is not a case for a bill of peace, which is “ made use of where a person has a right which may be controverted by various persons at different times and by different actions,” and “where there have been repeated attempts to litigate the same question by ejectment and repeated and satisfactory trials.’’ (1 Mad. Ch., 166.) 524
In short, bills of peace lie to prevent multiplic¬ ity of actions, and this is not pretended to be brought for that purpose.
Bills founded on the solet are used “where a man is entitled to a rent out of lands, as chief rents or quit-rents, and from length of time the remedy at law is lost or become very difficult ;” relief has, in such case, been given in equity, on the sole ground of long and undisputed pay¬ ment of the rent. (1 Mad. Ch., 39.) But the appellees in this case, or those whom they pre¬ tend to represent, never had such an adverse possession of the lot in question as gave them a title to it; and if they had, the argument sup¬ poses them in possession, and they can main¬ tain all their rights at taw without the aid of the Court of Equity.
He also contended that whatever rights any society of German Lutherans might have to the lot, the appellees had shown no authority in them to prosecute their claim to those rights; and that the bill they had filed, regarded in its true lig’ht, is a bill to establish a legal title and to obtain a perpetual injunction. That such a bill is inadmissible is clearly estab- [*5 7 5 fished by Wilby v. The Duke of Rutland (2 Brown’s P. C., 41).
Mr. Lee, in reply to the argument of the counsel for the appellees, said the true sources of the success of the appellees in the court be¬ low were in the clamor about the pollution of the remains of the dead — in the declamation about violating the sanctuary of the tomb, which triumphed before the inferior tribunal, and which now places the appellants literally in the situation which was but figuratively ascribed to Sextius —
Jam te premet nox, fatmlasque manes,
Et domus exllis Plutonla.— Hor.
And, after all, the only thing done was by one of the appellants, who threw down a part of the inclosure of the lot in dispute; but it was that part which separated it from his own garden. Yet that is complained of as such a nuisance as that the chancellor will prevent it by injunction. But while this is complained of as a nuisance, why is not that considered to which the appellants are subjected? It may well be that one will consent to have a gi-ave- yard in his vicinity if it be hallowed by a church. The spire which points us to the skies may reconcile us to the mound which tells of what is mouldering in the earth. But we object to the bane without the antidote — the objects which awaken the mortal shudderings without that which inspires the immortal hopes.
He contended that the old Acts of Maryland referred to were entirely inapplicable to this cause. That the case cited from 7 John. Ch. Rep. does not refer to perpetual injunctions, and that in the one cited from the 4th vol. of the same book there was a dispute about boundaries, to ascertain and establish which has long formed a head of chancery jurisdic¬ tion ; and that the extraordinary powers of one of the parties entitled the other to the extraor¬ dinary aid of the chancellor.
As to the possession contended for, Mr. Lee insisted that no persons were pointed out who held that possession ; that the temporary com¬ mittees were never incorporated, and there could have been no holding by succession ; and that the appellees, so far from showing any au-
Peters 2.
1829
Beatty and Kitchib v. Kurtz bt al.
675
thority vested in them to institute these Pro¬ 'S 70] ceedings, had even failed to showany congregation or religious society which could confer such an authority.
For the appellees it was contended :
The decree below for a perpetual injunction was right, if the appellees had title,, either under the grant or hy possession, and we con¬ tend that they had title under both.

1. Under the grant, three objections are

made to it: that it is without consideration; that there is no certain grantee; that it is with¬ in the statute of frauds.
As to consideration, we admit the general rule to be that equity will not lend its aid to enforce a mere voluntary agreement. But here there is a consideration. The diffusion of piety and promotion of religion are sufficient to sup¬ port it. Besides there was a money considera¬ tion. The designation of this lot as a church lot caused the tickets to sell, and enabled the grantor to dispose of his property. It is in proof that the Germans were by this means in¬ duced to buy.
“That there is no certain grantee.” It is agreed that upon general principles this grant could not be executed in favor of a voluntary, unincorporated society, and that the statute of 43 Eliz., ch. 4, having been decided not to be in force in ]\Iaryland, n@ aid can be derived from that statute.
But this grant has had a legislative recogni¬ tion. (Act of Assembly of Maryland, 1796, ch. 54, sections 3 and 4.) That Act is as strong a recognition of the grant by the Maryland Leg¬ islature as if they had passed a special law with the assent of Beatty, declaring the lot in ques¬ tion to be the property of “ the German Luther¬ ans of Georgetown.”
If such a special law had passed, would not the courts be bound to give effect to the intent of the Legislature and donor? Would they not apply to it the principles of coRstruction adopted by England in relation to the 43 Eliz. , and the charities provided for by that statute? (See 4 Wheaton, appendix, p. 11.)
It is also contended that this grant is protect¬ ed and made valid by the 34th article of the bill of rights of Maryland. The grant is within the exception contained in tbe 34th article, and that exception ought to have a liberal construction. 577 ] Withinthe narrow limits prescribed by the exception, the principles of construction adopted in England as to the 43 Eliz. ought to be applied. Within these limits it was and had been the policy of the people and Legisla¬ ture of Maryland to favor the Church. (Acts of Assembly of Maryland, 1704, ch. 38; 1722, ch. 4.)
The last objection urged against the grant is that it concerns lands, is not in writing, and is avoided by the statute of frauds. We answer that the contract is in writing. The inscrip¬ tion on the plot is by Beatty himself, and de¬ scribes the lot with certainty. But if it w'as not in writing, the contract has been performed, the gift executed, and possession delivered and retained for more than fifty years.
If the grant was void for uncertainty of the donee, then it is contended that the appellees and those under whom they claim have a good title by possession. The lot has been in their adversary possession by actual inclosures for more than twenty years.
Peters 2.
Having title either under the grant or by possession, the only remaining question is, is there a right to the interference of a court of equity to restrain liitchie, the trespasser, by in¬ junction?
It is said the only remedy is at law, for dam¬ ages; that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin trespass. It is known that in ordinary cases of private trespass the proper remedy is at law, for damages; and this has been found sufficient for the protection of propert3n But in cases of trespass of a peculiar nature, where the mischief is irremediable, which dam¬ ages could not compensate; where the injury reaches to the very substance and value of the estate, and goes to the destruction of it in the character in which it is enjoyed, the English Court of Chancery and the courts of chaiicery of this country are in the habit of granting in¬ junctions.
To this point, and in support of the distinc¬ tion here taken, cited the case of Jerome v. Boss (7 Johns. Ch. Rep., 332). Also 6 Vesey, 147; 7 Vesey, 307; 1 Brown, 588; 10 Vesey, 290; 17 Vesey, 128; 18 Vesey, 184.
If any case could justify the strong and men¬ acing hand of *an injunction, this is [*578 it. What damages can redress the feelings of the injured, or punish, as they ought, the ag¬ gressor? What trespass could more effectually destroy the property in the character in which it is enjoyed?
If the appellees had no other title but poss- ses.sion, the case of Varick v. The Mayor, &a., of New York {4: Johnson’s Ch. Rep., 63) fully sustains the decree of the court below. In that case.Varick, who applied for and got the in¬ junction, set up no other title but possession for twenty-five years.
Chancellor Kent says : “After such a length of time, it is right and just that the plaintiff should be protected in his property, &c. The defendant must first acquire possession of the ground in dispute, not by forcible entry, but by regular process of law. The principle upon which the injunction is to be upheld is, that after a claim of right, accompanied with actual and constant possession for twenty-five years and upwards, the corporation of New York cannot be permitted, without due process of law,pto enter upon posse, s.sion, pull down build¬ ings,” &c.
In the case at bar, our adversary possession is long enough to take away the appellants’ right of entry.
Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the court :
This is an appeal in a suit in equity from a decree of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, sitting for the county of Washing¬ ton.
Georgetown was erected into a town by an Act of the Legislature of Maryland, passed in 1751, ch. 25. By subsequent acts additions were made to the territorial limits of the town ; and the town was created a corporation with the usual municipal officers by an Act of the Maryland Legislature passed in 1789. ch. 23. The charter of incorporation has been subse¬ quently amended by Congress by various acts passed upon the subject .since the ce,ssion.
In the year 1769, (jharles Beatty and George
525
578
SuPKEME Court op the United States.
1829
F. Hawkins laid out a town known by the name of Beatty and Hawkins’ addition to Georgetown, and which is now included with¬ in its corporate limits. The lots of this addi- 6 7 9] tion were disposed of by way of lot¬ tery, under the direction of commissioners ap¬ pointed to lay out the same and conduct the drawing of the lottery. The books of the lot¬ tery and the plan of the lots, and a connected survey thereof, were afterwards, by Act passed in 1796, ch. 54, ordered to be recorded in the clerk’s office for the Territory of Columbia, and copies thereof to be good evidence in all courts of law and equity in the State. Upon the orig¬ inal plan so recorded, one lot was marked out and inscribed with these words : ‘ ‘ for the Lu¬ theran Church;” and this lot was in fact part of the land of which Charles Beatty was seized.
The bill was brought up by the original plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be trustees and agents for the German Lutheran Church composed of the members of the German Lu¬ theran Church of Georgetown, duly organized as such, in behalf of themselves and the members of the said church. It charges the laying out of the lot in question for the sole use and ben¬ efit of the Lutheran Church, to be held by them for religious purposes and the use of the con¬ gregation, as above mentioned. That soon aft¬ erwards the lot was taken possession of by the said German Lutherans in Georgetown, who organized themselve^ into a church or con¬ gregation and erected a church or house of worship thereon; and the lot was inclosed by them and a church erected thereon, and hath been kept and held by them during a period of fifty years, and hath been used as a burying- ground for the members of the church, with the avowed intention of building thereon an¬ other church or place of worship, the first building erected thereon being decayed, when¬ ever their funds would enable them so to do. That during all this period their possession has never been questioned, and the lot has been ex¬ empted from taxation as property set apart for a religious purpose. It further charges that upon the organization of the church or congre¬ gation, certain officers, called a committee and trustees, were appointed to take care of the said church, which appointments have been from time to time renewed; that in 1824 the plaint¬ iffs were re-appointed as such, having been so appointed at former times. It further charges that Charles Beatty died about sixteen years 580*] ago ^without having made any convey¬ ance of the said lot, and th.at Charles A. Beatty, the defendant, is his heir, and has the title by descent; and prays that he may be compelled to convey it to them. It further charges that Ritchie, the other defendant, has unwarrant¬ ably disputed their title; and has entered upon the lot and removed some of the tombstones erected thereon, and means to dispossess the plaintiffs and to remove the tombstones and graves. The bill therefore prays that they may be quieted in their possession, and that a writ of injunction may issue, and for further relief.
The defendants put in a joint answer. They admitted that the lot was so marked in the plot as the bill states, and that it was Charles Beat¬ ty’s intention to appropriate the same to the use of the Lutheran congregation, provided they would build thereon, within a reasonable 526
time, a house of public worship. They deny that the German Lutherans were ever organ¬ ized, as stated in the bill, or that any such church has been built, or that there has been any such possession or inclosure as the bill asserts; or that Charles Beatty ever made any conveyance of the property to transfer his title. They admit that the lot has been used as a grave-yard, but not exclusively appropriated to the use of the Lutheran congregation. They admit that a building was erected thereon, but that it was used as a school-house. They ad¬ mit that the defendant, Beatty, is 'heir-at-law, and as such that he claims the lot in question, and has authorized the defendant, Ritchie, to take possession thereof. They deny all the equity in the bill, as well as the authority of the plaintiffs to sue ; declaring them to be mere volunteers, and demanding proof of their au¬ thority, &c.
The general replication was filed, and the cause came on for a hearing upon the bill, an¬ swer, exhibits and depositions; and the court decreed a perpetual injunction against the de¬ fendants with costs. The appeal is brought from that decree.
Upon examining the evidence, it appears to us that the material allegations of the bill are satisfactorily established. It is proved that, shortly after the appropriation, and more *than fifty years ago, the Lutherans [*581 of Georgetown proceeded to erect a log house on the lot, which was used as a church for public worship by that denomination of Chris¬ tians ; and was also occasionally, and at differ¬ ent times since, used as a school-honse under their direction. That at a much later period a steeple and bell were added to the building; that the land wms used as a church-yard ; that a sexton appointed by Lutherans had the direc¬ tion of it; that more than half of the tot is cov¬ ered with graves ; and others as well as Luther¬ ans have been buried there ; that the Lutherans have caused the lot to be inclosed from time to time, as the fences fell into decay, and pro¬ cured subscriptions for that purpose ; that the possession of the Lutherans, in the manner in which it was exercised over the lot by erecting a house, by public worship, by inclosing the ground, and by burials, was never questioned by Charles Beatty in his lifetime, or in any manner disturbed until a short period before the commencement of the present suit. That Charles Beatty in his lifetime constantly avow¬ ed that the lot was appropriated for the Lu¬ therans, and that they were entitled to it.
The Lutherans have constituted but a small number in the town of Georgetown ; they have not been able, therefore, to maintain public worship constantly in the house so erected dur¬ ing the whole period, and sometimes it has been intermitted for a considerable length of time. But efforts have been constantly made, as far as practicable, to keep together a con¬ gregation, to use the means of divine worship, and to support public preaching. The house, however, in consequence of inevitable decay, fell down some time ago ; the exact period of which, however, does not appear; but it seems to have been more than forty years after its first erection. Efforts have since been made to rebuild it, but hitherto they have not been successful.
Peters 2.
1829
Beatty and Ritchie v. Khiitz bt al.
581
The Lutherans in Georgetown who have pos¬ sessed the lot in question are not and never have been incorporated as a religious society. The congregation has consisted of a voluntary society, acting in its general arrangement by committees and trustees chosen from time to time by the Lutherans belonging to it. There 682] does not appear to have been any for¬ mal records kept of their proceedings, and there have been periods of considerable inter¬ mission in their appointment and action. There is no other proof that the plaintiffs are a com¬ mittee of the congregation than what arises from the statement of witnesses, that they were so chosen by a meeting of Lutherans, and that their appointment has always been acquiesced in by the Lutherans, and they have assumed to act for them without any question of their authority: that they are themselves Lutherans, living in Georgetown and forming a part of the voluntary society, is not disputed.
There is decisive evidence, also, that the de¬ fendant Beatty has, since the decease of his father, repeatedly admitted the claim of the Lutherans to the lot, and his willingness that it should remain for them as it had been orig¬ inally appropriated. No assertion of owner¬ ship was ever made by him until the acts were committed which form the gravatnen of the present bill.
Such are the material facts; and the princi¬ pal questions arising upon this posture of the case, are, first, whether the title to the lot in question ever passed from Charles Beatty, so far at least as to amount to a perpetual appro¬ priation of it to the use of the Lutheran Church, or to the pious uses to which it has been in fact appropriated. And, second, if so, whether it is competent for the plaintiffs to maintain the present bill.
As to the first question, it is not disputed that Charles Beatty did originally intend that this lot should be appropriated for the use of a Lutheran Church in the town laid off by him. But as there was not at that time any church, either corporate or unincorporated, of that de¬ nomination in that town, there was no grantee capable of taking the same immediately by grant. Nor can any presumption of a grant arise from the subsequent lap.se of time, since there never has been any such incorporated Lutheran Church there capable of taking the donation. If, therefore, it were neee.ssary that there should be a grantee legally capable of taking, in order to support the donation in this case, it would be utterly void at law, and the 583] land might be resumed at pleasure. To be sure, if an unincorporated society of Lu¬ therans had, upon the faith of such donation, built a church thereon, with the consent of Beatty, that might furnish a strong ground why a court of equity should compel him to convey the same to trustees in perpetuity for their use ; or at least to execute a declaration of trust that he and his heirs should hold the same for their use. For such conduct would amount to a contract with the persons so build¬ ing the church that he would perfect the dona¬ tion in their favor, and a refusal to do it would be a fraud upon them which a court of equity ought to redress. And if the town of George¬ town had been capable of holding such a lot for such uses, there would be no difficulty in
Peters 2.
con.sidering the town as the grantee under such circumstances; since the uses would be of a public and pious nature, beneficial to the in¬ habitants generally. But it does not appear that Georgetown, in 1769, or indeed until its incorporation in 1789, was a corporation, so as to be capable of holding lands as an incident to its corporate powers.
If the appropriation, therefore, is to be deemed valid at all, it must be upon other prin¬ ciples than those which ordinarily apply be¬ tween grantor and grantee. And we think it may be supported as a dedication of the lot to public and pious uses. The Bill of Rights of Maryland gives validity to. “any sale, gift, lease or devise Of any quantity of land not ex¬ ceeding two acres for a church, meeting or other house of worship, and for a burying- ground, which shall be improved, enjoyed, or used only for such purpose. ” To this extent, at least, it recognizes the doctrines of the stat¬ ute of Elizabeth for charitable uses, under which it is well known that such uses would be upheld, although there were no specific grantee or trustee. In the case of The Town of Paiclei V. Clarke (9 Cranch, 292, 331), this court considered cases of an appropriation or dedication of property to public or religious uses as an exception to the general rule requir¬ ing a particular grantee, and like the dedication of a highway to the public. (Bee also Brown V. Porter, 10 Mass. Rep:, 93; Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. Rep. , 500 ; Inhabitants of Shapleigh v. G-ilman, 13 Ma.ss. Rep., 190; Burrard's case, 12 Jac. C. B. ; 2 Mod. Ent., 413, b.) There *is no pretense to say that the present [*684: appropriation was ever attempted to be with¬ drawn by Charles Beatty during his lifetime, and he did not die until about sixteen years ago. On the contrary, the original plan and appropriation were constantly kept in view by all the legislative acts passed on the subject of this addition. The plan was required to be recorded as an evidence of title, and its incor¬ poration into the limits of Georgetown had ref¬ erence to it. We think, then, it might at all times have been enforced as a charitable and pious use through the intervention of the gov¬ ernment 'A& parens patriot, by its Attorney-Gen¬ eral or other law ofiicer. It was originally consecrated for a religious purpose ; it has be¬ come a depository of the dead; and it cannot now be resumed by the heirs of Charles Beatty.
The next question is as to the competency of the plaintiffs to maintain the present suit. If they were proved to be the regularly appointed committee of a voluntary society of Lutherans, in actual possession of the premises, and acting by their direction to prevent a disturbance of that possession under circum.stances like those stateci in the bill, we do not perceive any seri¬ ous ('bjection to their right to maintain the suit.
It is a case where no action at law, even if one could be brought by the voluntary society (which it would be difficult to maintain), would afford an adequate and complete remedy. This is not the case of a mere private trespass, but a public nuisance, going to the irreparable injury of the Georgetown congregation of Lutherans. The property consecrated to their use by a per¬ petual servitude or easement is to be taken from them ; the sepulchres of the dead are to be vio¬ lated ; the feelings of religion and the sentiment
527
584
Supreme Court of the United States.
1829
of natural affection of the kindred and friends of the deceased are to be wounded; and the memorials erected by piety or love to the mem¬ ory of the good are to be removed, so as to leave no trace of the last home of their ancestry to those who may visit the spot in future gener¬ ations. It cannot be that such acts are to be 585] redressed by the ordinary xirocess of law. The remedy must be sought, if at all, in the protecting power of a court of chancery ; opei'ating by its injunction to preserve the re¬ pose of the ashes of the dead and the religious sensibilities of the living.
The only difficulty is whether the plaintiffs have shown in themselves a sufficient authority, since it is not evidenced by any foi'mal vote or writing. If it w'ere necessary to decide the case on this point, we should incline to think that under all the circumstances it might be fairly pre¬ sumed. But it is not necessary to decide the case on this point; because we think it one of those cases in which certain persons belonging to a voluntary society, and having a common inter¬ est, may sue in behalf of themselves and others having' the like interest as part of the same so¬ ciety for puriioses common to all and beneficial to all. Thus, some of the parishioners may sue a parson to establish a general modus, without joining all ; and some of the members of a vol¬ untary society or company, when the parties are very numerous, may sxie for an account against others without joining all. (Cooper’s Eq. Plead., 40, 41; Mitf. Plead., 145.)
And upon the whole we are of the opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court ought to be affirmed with costs.*
This cause came on to he heard on the tran¬ script of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof it is considered, ordered and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.
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